KLT-40S Reactor Plant for the floating CNPP FPU

2

OKBM has participated in realization of reactor plant (RP) designs for nuclear ships since 1954.

Currently, four generations of RPs have been developed for

the civil nuclear fleet.

1 2 3 4

OK-900

(OK-900A) OK-150 KLT-40

(KLT-40M, KLT-40S)

Four generations of marine RPs

RITM-200

INTRODUCTION

RP design, manufacture, complete supply

Upgrade

Author’s supervision during manufacture and operation

Lifetime and service time extension

JSC «Afrikantov OKBM»

Creation of marine RPs

Disposal

3

MARINE RPs

JSC “AFRIKANTOV OKBM” IS THE

CHIEF DESIGNER OF MARINE RPs FOR THE NUCLEAR ICE-BREAKER FLEET.

Since 1954

9 NUCLEAR ICE-BREAKERS AND THE OCEAN LIGHTER

CARRIER “SEVMORPUT” ARE EQUIPPED WITH JSC

“AFRIKANTOV OKBM” REACTORS.

20 REACTORS WERE FABRICATED AND OPERATED.

THE RUNNING TIME IS MORE THAN 340 REACTOR-YEARS.

6 NUCLEAR ICE-BREAKERS ARE OPERATED.

THE ACTUAL LIFE TIME OF THE NUCLER ICE-BREAKER

“ARKTIKA” RP IS 177,204 H, THE SERVICE LIFE IS 34 YEARS.

SERVICE LIFE EXTENSION UP TO 200,000 H FOR NUCLEAR

ICE-BREAKER RPs IS ENSURED.

THE WORLD-LARGEST NUCLEAR ICE-BREAKER

“50 LET POBEDY” WITH THE ОК-900А RP

DESIGNED BY JSC “AFRIKANTOV OKBM” WAS

PUT IN COMMISSION ON МARCH 23, 2007 AT

MURMANSK OCEAN COMPANY (FSUE

“ATOMFLOT”).

THE FINAL DESIGN OF THE RITM-200 RP FOR

THE UNIVERSAL NEW GENERATION DUAL-

DRAFT NUCLEAR ICE-BREAKER WAS

DEVELOPED.

4

FLOATING NPPs ARE A NEW CLASS OF POWER SOURCES

AN AUTONOMOUS POWER UNIT IS MOUNTED ON THE NON-SELF-PROPELLED BARGE.

IT IS COMPLETELY FABRICATED AT THE SHIPBUILDING YARD.

POWER UNIT CONSTRUCTION TIME IS NOT MORE THAN 4 YEARS.

THE POWER UNIT IS SUPPLIED TO THE CUSTOMER ON A TURNKEY BASIS AFTER ACCEPTANCE

TESTS.

IT IS TRANSPORTED TO THE OPERATION SITE BY WATER.

THE NUMBER OF OFFSHORE FACILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS FOR THEM ARE MINIMAL.

THE POWER UNIT TOTAL SERVICE LIFE IS 40 YEARS.

IT IS POSSIBLE TO CHANGE THE POWER UNIT LOCATION SITE.

AFTER DECOMMISSIONING ON TERMINATION OF THE SERVICE LIFE, THE FLOATING POWER UNIT

(FPU) IS TRANSPORTED TO ITS DISPOSAL SITE PROVIDING RETENTION OF THE “GREEN LAWN”

STATE IN THE FLOATING NPP OPERATION AREA.

6

MAIN ENGINEERING CHARACTERISTICS OF FPU

LENGTH, m

WIDTH, m

BOARD HEIGHT, m

DRAUGHT, m

140,0

30,0

10,0

5,6

DISPLACEMENT, t

FPU SERVICE LIFE, YEARS

21 000

40

TYPE - SMOOTH-DECK NON-SELF-PROPELLED SHIP

8

EXTERNAL ACTIONS ON THE RP

The RP is designed to withstand the external

actions, i.e.

It withstands rolls and tilts in accordance

with the requirements of the Russian

Maritime Registry of Shipping.

It has the impact resistance of not less

than 3 g.

The reactor is shut down, and

containment is preserved in case of flood,

including in case of turnover.

The PR withstands the crash of an

aircraft with the mass of 10 t from the

height of 50 m.

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KLT-40S RP FLOW DIAGRAM

PASSIVE EMERGENCY

SHUTDOWN COOLING

SYSTEM

SYSTEM OF REACTOR CAISSON

FILLING WITH WATER

ACTIVE EMERGENCY CORE

COOLING SYSTEM

ACTIVE SYSTEM OF

LIQUID ABSORBER

INJECTION

PASSIVE EMERGENCY CORE

COOLING SYSTEM (HYDRAULIC

ACCUMULATORS)

PASSIVE SYSTEM OF

EMERGENCY PRESSURE

DECREASE IN THE

CONTAINMENT (CONDENSATION

SYSTEM)

ACTIVE SYSTEM OF EMERGENCY

SHUTDOWN COOLING THROUGH

PROCESS CONDENSER

PASSIVE SYSTEM OF

EMERGENCY PRESSURE

DECREASE IN THE

CONTAINMENT (BUBBLING

SYSTEM)

RECIRCULATION SYSTEM PUMPS

NEWLY INTRODUCED

SAFETY SYSTEMS

STEAM GENERATOR

REACTOR MCP

PRESSURIZER

PSCS

METAL-

WATER

PROTECTION

TANK

10

CORE REACTOR AND FA

FA Reactor

KLT-40S Cassette

Fuel rod 6.8 mm

CPS AR

BPR

Cover

Vessel

Block of CG

control rods

Cavity

11

CORE REFUELING DIAGRAM

Refueling

compartment

Apparatus

room

Storage tank Dry storage tanks

SFA (spent fuel assembly) transportation from the reactor to the storage tank FFA (fresh fuel assembly) cassette transportation to the reactor

SFA transportation from the storage tank to the dry storage tank casks

Refueling process safety is ensured for

all possible initial events, in

particular:

SFA hanging-up during refueling;

SFA container hanging-up during

transportation;

SFA and SFA cask falling;

refueling equipment deenergization;

SFA-storage cooling circuit

depressurization;

SFA-storage deenergization; etc.

12

MAIN CIRCULATION PUMP

Parameter Value

High/low speed supply, m3/h 870/290

Consumed power, kW

155/11

Rotor rotation speed,

synchronous, rpm

3000/1000

Head , m 38/4

Service life, year 12

PUMP TYPE – CANNED,

CENTRIFUGAL, SINGLE-STAGE,

VERTICAL WITH TWO-SPEED

(TWO-WINDING) MOTOR.

RELIABILITY PROVED BY

OPERATION EXPERIENCE OF

MORE THAN 1500 SHIP MCPs;

ELIMINATION OF PRIMARY

CIRCUIT LEAKAGES;

ELIMINATION OF EXTERNAL

SYSTEMS OF THE PUMP

AGGREGATE (EXCEPT

COOLING):

lubrication system of

radial-axial bearing and

motor;

water supply system for

seal unit;

system of leakage

discharge from seal.

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STEAM GENERATOR

PRIMARY

CIRCUIT

INLET/OUTLET

STEAM OUTLET FEEDWATER

INLET FEEDWATER

HEADER

STEAM HEADER

SG COVER

ADAPTER

FEEDWATER

TUBES

HEAT-EXCHANGING

TUBES

STEAM GENERATOR TYPE –

VERTICAL RECUPERATIVE

HEAT EXCHANGER WITH COIL

HEAT-EXCHANGING SURFACE

OF TITANIUM ALLOYS AND

FORCED CIRCULATION OF

WORKING FLUIDS;

MODULAR DESIGN WITH

POSSIBILITY OF FLOW-LINE

PRODUCTION;

AUTOMATED ON-LINE

DETECTION OF INER-CIRCUIT

LEAKAGES BY SECONDARY

CIRCUIT STEAM ACTIVITY

REPAIRABILITY WITHOUT

OPENING PRIMARY CIRYUT

CAVITIES

DEPRESSURIZATION CAPACITY

AT PRIMARY CIRCUIT LEAKAGE

NOT MORE THAN Deq.=40 mm

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SAFETY CONCEPT OF KLT-40S RP

The safety concept of the KLT-40S reactor plant is based on modern

defence-in-depth principles combined with developed properties of reactor

plant self-protection and wide use of passive systems and self-actuating

devices;

Properties of intrinsic self-protection are intended for power density self-

limitation and reactor self-shutdown, limitation of primary coolant pressure

and temperature, heating rate, primary circuit depressurization scope and

outflow rate, fuel damage scope, maintaining of reactor vessel integrity in

severe accidents and form the image of a «passive reactor», resistant for all

possible disturbances;

The KLT-40S RP design was developed in conformity with Russian laws,

norms and rules for ship nuclear power plants and safety principles

developed by the world community and reflected in IAEA recommendations.

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SAFETY LEVELS

1

2

3

4

5

1 – FUEL COMPOSITION

2 – FUEL ELEMENT CLADDING

3 – PRIMARY CIRCUIT

4 – RP CONTAINMENT

5 – PROTECTIVE ENCLOSURE

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SYSTEMS OF REACTOR EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN

1 Reactor

2 CPS drive mechanisms

3 System of liquid absorber injection

4 Electric power circuit-breaker by pressure

Electric power circuit-breakers by pressure provide de-energizing of CPS drive mechanisms (reactor shutdown):

by pressure increase in the primary circuit

by pressure increase in the containment

from CSS

System of liquid

absorber injection

Electromechanical

system of reactivity

control

4

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REACTOR EMERGENCY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS

Hydraulically

operated air

distributors

Opening of

pneumatically-

driven valves

of ECCS

passive

channels by

primary circuit

overpressure

(cooldown)

There are two autonomous passive channels for heat removal from the core. Duration of operation without water makeup is

for two channels, 24 h; for one channel, 12 h.

1 Reactor

2 Steam generator

3 Main circulation pump

4 Emergency heat removal

system

5 Purification and cooling

system

6 Process condenser

6

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

1 Reactor

2 Steam generator

3 Main circulation pump

4 ECCS hydroaccumulator

5 ECCS tank

6 Recirculation system

A combination of passive and active core cooling subsystems is utilized in case of PR

depressurization (LOCA).

ECCS tank capacity is 2×10 m3.

GA water volume is 2×4 m3.

The time margin in the passive mode before core drainage starts is approximately 3 h.

1

2

3

4

5

6

4

19

SYSTEM OF EMERGENCY PRESSURE DECREASE IN CONTAINMENT

The passive

emergency pressure

decrease system

(preservation of

safety barrier –

containment)

consists of two

channels.

Operation duration –

24 h.

At LOCA the steam-

water mixture is

localized within the

containment of the

damaged RP

Conditioning system

blower

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ANALYSIS OF POSTULATED SEVERE ACCIDENT

MELT CONFINEMENT IN KLT-40S RP REACTOR VESSEL

Melt volume, m3 - 0.885

Melt surface diameter, m - 1.918

Melt height, m - 0.471

Heat output, MW - 0.79

Reactor

caisson

Reactor

vessel

Core melt

Cooling water

supply

Results of severe accident preliminary analysis Reactor vessel submelting does not occur; Reliable heat removal is provided from the outer surface of reactor vessel bottom; Reactor mechanical properties are maintained at the level sufficient to ensure load bearing capacity despite appeared temperature difference; Radiation dose for population in case of beyond design accident with severe core damage does not exceed 5 mSv.

21

ANALYSIS OF HYDROGEN SAFETY IN SEVERE ACCIDENTS

Arrangement of hydrogen

recombiners (afterburners) in

equipment and reactor

compartments of KLT-40S RP

22

Conclusions Based on the Results of the FPU Stress Test

There are no radiation consequences for the population and environment when a postulated seismic impact on the FPU

takes place with the force of 10-12 points at the vertical acceleration to 1.8 m/s2. Additional measures to increase strength,

impact resistance of the FPU casing and its internal equipment are not required.

Taking of the FPU ashore or grounding of the FPU at the basing point under the impact of tsunami waves does not lead

to radiation consequences for the population and environment assuredly for 24 hours.

When a postulated event generates with complete deenergization of the FPU and loss of all coastal, backup and

emergency sources of electric power there is no depressurization of fuel rod cladding and, as a consequence, there are no

radiation consequences for the population and environment assuredly for 24 hours.

When a complex postulated event with the complete deenergization + RP accident with melting of FPU reactor cores

originate the following takes place:

The system assuredly stays deeply subcritical.

At an absence of the steam gas mixture flaring up with account of stopping of recombiners, localization of

the being-ejected primary coolant and non-condensing gases is provided within the containment, except for

leaks through its leakages (1% of containment volume a day) into the space of the FPU protective enclosure.

There are no radiation consequences for the population and environment assuredly for 14 hours after the

beginning of the RP severe accident with melting of reactor cores. Here, the reactor vessel does not burn

through under conditions of external heat removal using the system for filling the reactor caisson with water

provided for in the design.

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RADIATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY

1 km

PROTECTIVE ACTION

PLANNING AREA

BUFFER

AREA

POPULATION RADIATION DOSE RATE UNDER NORMAL OPERATION CONDITIONS AND DESIGN-BASIS

ACCIDENTS DOES NOT EXCEED 0.01% OF NATURAL RADIATION BACKGROUND;

NO COMPULSORY EVACUATION PLANNING AREA;

THE PERFORMED ANALYSIS OF REFUELING COMPLEX AND REFUELING PROCESS OF NUCLEAR

POWER PLANTS OF FLOATING POWER UNIT REACTORS CONSIDERING ENGINEERING MEANS OF

NUCLEAR SAFETY PROVISION SHOWS NO POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR OR RADIATION ACCIDENT

OCCURRENCE.

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FLOATING POWER UNIT AT BUILDING BERTH

BALTIYSKY ZAVOD, 2009

25

FLOATING POWER UNIT WAS LAUNCHED IN JUNE 2010

26

FLOATING POWER UNIT AT BUILDING BERTH

BALTIYSKY ZAVOD, 2010

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FLOATING POWER UNIT AT BUILDING BERTH

BALTIYSKY ZAVOD, JUNE 2010

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FLOATING POWER UNIT AT BUILDING BERTH

BALTIYSKY ZAVOD, JUNE 2010

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STEAM GENERATOR UNIT

30

STEAM POWER UNIT AT ENGINEERING PLANT

31

STEAM POWER UNIT

DELIVERY AT BALTIYSKY ZAVOD

Thank you for attention!