Knight Schumpeter Weber

J Evol Econ (2002) 12: 83105

c Springer-Verlag 2002

Weber, Schumpeter and Knighton entrepreneurship and economic development

Maria T. Brouwer

University of Amsterdam, Department of Economics and Econometrics, Roetersstraat 11,1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands (e-mail: [email protected])

Abstract. This paper interprets the discussion on entrepreneurship and economicdevelopment that started off with Webers papers on the Protestant Ethic. Webersought the reason for the relatively rapid growth of the Occident in the rational,Calvinist attitude to life. Calvinism in his view exactly suited a society of freelabourers, whowere not tied tomaster and soil by extra-economic considerations asin tribal and feudal societies. Schumpeter gave an alternative explanation, empha-sizing the importance of innovation and entrepreneurship. Knight, who stressedneither rationality nor innovation but uncertainty and perceptiveness as the solesource of progress and profits, followed up German language writing on this sub-ject. Only the investor who can detect hitherto hidden qualities in people can gain.The paper demonstrates how these three authors influenced each other. The debatebetween these three authors has raisedmany issues of governance and organizationthat feature contemporary thinking.

Key words: Entrepreneurship History of economic thought Organizationalbehavior Bureaucracy Uncertainty

JEL Classification: B25, D23 , D73, D81, K11

1 Introduction

Theories of entrepreneurship span a long period, at least from Cantillons timeup to the present. Many scholars have contributed to the literature on the subject.All wanted to unravel the way in which entrepreneurial initiative contributed toeconomic development (Hebert and Link, 1982). This paper analyzes the contri-butions of three leading social scientists: Max Weber, Joseph Alois Schumpeterand Frank Hyneman.Knight. All three authors wrote their theories during the firsttwo decades of the 20th century and were well aware of each others writings.

84 M. T. Brouwer

This paper will indicate how they reacted to one another. Their work constitutes afascinating debate on themotives and effects of entrepreneurship, their theories ex-plaining why new ventures emerge and how they are financed.Weber held the viewthat Calvinist parsimony would finance investment, whereas both Schumpeter andKnight considered external finance the main source of entrepreneurial investment.

Entrepreneurship had only been a sideshow in economic theory after WorldWar II. Neo-classical economics had read the entrepreneur out of the economicmodel, leaving no room for enterprise and initiative but only for passive calculation(Baumol, 1968). Entrepreneurship escapes neo-classical modeling by definitiondue to its relationship to novelty and change. The lack of interest in entrepreneur-ship in the second half of the past century can be attributed to the widespread ideathat entrepreneurship would become more and more obsolete as capitalism devel-oped. Weber contributed to this idea by emphasizing that economic life would getever more rational. Large bureaucracies would take over as the predominant orga-nizational form of capitalism. Entrepreneurship would fade out as a consequence.Schumpeter also became convinced that large firms would become the main ve-hicles for innovation and economic progress. He predicted that market societieswould evolve from competitive to trustified capitalism, which with time wouldgive way to socialism. Schumpeter also contended that the demise of capitalismwould be hastened by an increase of rationality in all realms of life. People wouldno longer tolerate the irrational elements of capitalism such as the incidence ofbusiness cycles and income inequalities. Hence, he considered entrepreneurshipin the sense of new firm formation a relic of the past. Knight did not have sucha strong opinion on the matter, but he expected that large diversified companieswould become predominant due to their uncertainty reducing capacities.

The view that large firms would become increasingly important was supportedby the facts in the developed world during the larger part of the twentieth century.Firms did get larger on average, but this trend has been reversed since 1973. Theincreased importanceof small firmsand start-ups is indicated by empirical research,which indicates that the share of large firms in employment has decreased sincethe seventies in Europe, Japan and Northern America (OECD, 2000). This courseof events indicates a deviation from a long-term trend of increasing dominance oflarge firms1. Political and economic events of the turn of the 21st century thus seemto mark a break from the evolutionary path that these authors foresaw. We want tofind out what elements of the theories of Weber, Schumpeter and Knight are mostrelevant for contemporaneous entrepreneurship.

2 Life and work of Weber, Schumpeter and Knight

The German social scientist Max Weber (18641920) exerted a large influence onAmerican social science.Weber studied law in Berlin, but held chairs in economicsin Freiburg and Heidelberg before he became seriously ill and was kept fromwork-ing for about four years. After that time he lived as a private scholar in a state

1 The alleged superior innovative and job creating capacities of new and small firms have spawneda large theoretical and empirical literature (Acs and Audretsch, 1988).

Weber, Schumpeter and Knight on entrepreneurship and economic development 85

of semi-invalidism in Heidelberg. He only accepted a regular appointment at theuniversity of Munich one year before his sudden death in 19202.

Joseph Schumpeter (18831950) was born in Moravia, which now belongs tothe Czech Republic but at that time to the Austro-Hungarian empire. As a youngboy hemoved to Viennawith hismother after the sudden death of his father. Hewasa brilliant student of law and economics at the famous University of Vienna, whereprominent economists such as Boehm-Bawerk and vonWieser taught. Schumpeterwas an economic prodigy, who wrote a history of economic thought at the age of25 (Schumpeter, 1908). After taking stock of existing theory, he wrote his owntreatise,Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, which was first published in1911. Schumpeter contended that all economic theories up to that date only appliedto a stationary economy and could not explain change. His theory diverges fromthat of his teacher Boehm-Bawerk on several crucial points, and it may be due tothis divergence of opinions that Schumpeters career had a slow start. He got aprofessorship at the University of Cnernowitz, located at the borders of the empireand was later appointed in Graz, in which provincial intellectual climate he did notfeel well at ease. A brief career in politics followed in the aftermath ofWorldWar I,when he becameminister of finance in the Renner Coalition cabinet in 1919. But hewas forced to resign after one year due to heavy political struggles on the issue ofnationalization. Schumpeter became a banker, but this career was also unfortunate,when the Biedermeier bank, of which he was president failed in 1925. He becamea professor of economics in Bonn in the same year and moved to Harvard in 1932,where he stayeduntil his death in 1950.Hewrote twomajorworkswhile atHarvard:Business Cycles(1939) andCapitalism, Socialism and Democracy(1942).

Frank Hyneman Knight (18851972), a farmers son from Illinois, studiedchemistry, German drama, and philosophy at the universities of Iowa and Cor-nell. He also studied with Max Weber in Heidelberg. He completed his doctoraldissertation in economics in 1916 atCornell, published in 1921 asRisk, Uncertaintyand Profit,while he was a professor of economics at the University of Iowa. Knightmoved to the University of Chicago in 1928 and published several works on ethicsand economic reform, of whichThe Ethics of Competition(1935) andFreedom andEconomic Reform(1947) are most well known3.

This paper starts with Webers articles on Protestantism and the Rise of Cap-italism, which were first published in 1904 and 1905 in theArchiv fuer Sozial-wissenschaft und Sozialpolitik. SchumpetersTheory of Economic Development,which was first published in 1911, can be considered a refutation of Webers the-ory. He stated that not the Puritan ethic, but innovation could explain economic de-velopment. Webers books on social and economic organization and on economichistory, which were published posthumously, can be interpreted as a response toSchumpeters (implicit) criticism.Weber sketched a historical sequence of businessorganizations from antiquity till the early twentieth century inGeneral EconomicHistory (GEH). He pointed out that most organizational forms were designed tosupport the status quo and thus unable to cope with change.

2 These biographical details are from Talcott Parsons introduction to WebersThe Theory of Socialand Economic Organization(Oxford University Press, 1947).

3 These biographical details are from J. Buchanans foreword to Frank H Knight (1982).

86 M. T. Brouwer

Knight translated Webers book on economic history, which was published inGerman in 1923. Webers book was compiled out of lecture notes of a class he hadtaught a year before his death. Knight was an ardent admirer of Weber, to whom hereferred asthe most outstanding name in German social thought since Schmollerin his preface toGeneral Economic History(GEH). Weber had more admirersamong American academics. Talcott Parsons, a leading sociologist, who worked atHarvard, translated Webers essays on the protestant ethic in English4. The bookwas first published asThe Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism(PE) in1930. Parsons also translated part II of WebersWirtschaft und Gesellschaftwhichhad been published posthumously in 1921 and came out in English asSocial andEconomic Organization(SEO) in 1947. Apparently, prominent American scholarstook great efforts to get acquaintedwithGerman scientific publications, tantamountto the fact that the German-speaking world was considered foremost in the socialsciences at that time.

Knight contributed to the debate by making uncertainty instead of rationalityor innovation the central feature of his theory of entrepreneurship. In this way hesolved some of the puzzles which had emerged out of the (implicit) debate betweenWeber and Schumpeter.

3 Weber on Calvinism and economic development

Weber sought the reason for the relatively rapid growth of western capitalism inthe specific attitude to life of the Calvinist Puritan. InThe Protestant Ethic and theSpirit of Capitalism(PE), his most well known book, he associated the economicrise of Holland, England and the American colonies with the presence of Puritanand Calvinist religious groups in those regions, such as the Gereformeerden, theMennonites, the Methodists and the Baptists. These Calvinist groups distinguishedthemselves from Catholics and Lutherans by their specific concept of salvation,which cannot be attained through the church, but will only fall upon the predestinedelect. The concept of predestination did not lead to fatalism, as Weber explained.The true believer held it to be an absolute duty to consider oneself chosen and tocombat all doubt as temptations of the devil(PE, 111). Lack of self-confidencecould be seen as a sign of insufficient faith. People were thus largely self-elected,although a community of believers needed to endorse their beliefs. Calvinism fa-vored rationality in business matters, because material success acted as proof ofbeing one of the chosen (PE, 114). Weber calls the Calvinist attitude to life a ra-tionalization of the world, because magic had been banned as a means of salvation(PE, 117). Calvinism also honored the acquisitive motive, whereas other Christiandenominations had often denounced riches. Confession and good works had beenreplaced by duty and hard work and by abstinence of worldly pleasures. Calvinism- inWebers view- perfectly fitted a society of free laborers, whowere no longer tiedtomaster and soil by extra-economic considerations as in tribal and feudal societies.

4 The Protestant Ethic was the translation of the first part of WebersGesammelte Aufsatze zurReligionssoziologie(1920) and contained the revised version of the articles that were published in theArchiv fuer Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitikin 1904 and 1905.

sanchezloperaHighlight




Such a situation existed in 17th century England, after the enclosuremovement haddriven many peasants from the land. The Puritans, in Webers view, followed theexample given by the Catholic monks, who also had applied rational methods toeconomic activities. Weber considered rationality the outstanding characteristic ofboth (industrial) capitalism and Calvinism. He drew a sharp line between adven-turous and rational capitalism (PE, 20), locating speculative voyages for land andbooty the results of which could not be calculated in advance in the first category.

Weber thus portrays the Puritans as a group that was driven by religious zeal toapply rationality to the pursuit of economic activities. This differs sharply from theidea of the Austrian economists of his days, such as Menger and Boehm-Bawerk,who saw the equation of (marginal) utility to revenue as the main motivation ofrational economic man. Such a scheme of things was insufficient to explain savingand entrepreneurship in Webers view, because economic man would only put inas many hours as were required to meet his daily needs. The Puritan, however,would be forward-looking. He would save to obtain wealth, which was considereda sign of godly approval. There was no room for feelings of class resentment inthe Puritan world, because the unequal distribution of goods of this world wasseen as divinely ordained in a pursuit of secret ends unknown to men (PE, 177).However, the wealthy could never rest in comfort, because their wealth wouldmake it more difficult for them to lead the life of the righteous. But Puritanismhad its hard, judgmental side. The consciousness of divine grace by the elect andholy was accompanied by utter hatred and contempt towards people who wereconsidered sinners. Since the dividing line between saints and sinners was neverknown, sectarian divestitures were common among Puritans in order to keep apure church (PE, 122).Moreover, the formationof anewsect gave its followers theopportunity to escape from ecclesiastical regimentation of life as this had happenedin the Calvinist State churches, which amounted almost to an inquisition (PE,152). Such despotism would enforce external conformity but would weaken themotives for rational conduct, according to Weber (PE, 152). Calvinism thus hadits authoritarian features, which is also apparent from the iron collectivist wayCalvin had organized his church in Geneva5. However, protestant religion couldnot prohibit the foundation of new sects due to its lack of central control.

The late 15th and 16th century constituted a period of religious revolts. Manycities in southern Germany and northern Italy had gained autonomy after the Ger-man Empire had disintegrated around 1100 (McNeill, 541). The cities used theirnewlywon freedom topromote tradeandcommerce.TheReformationalsoemergedin this relatively liberal era. Religious sects such as the Huguenots and Wederdop-ers emerged that wanted to establish their ideal communities. Many towns and vil-lages were converted, but commercial cities stuck to secular laws and government.The protestants clashed fiercely with rulers who based their claims to authorityon the inmutable truths as professed by the Mother Church. Spain and its Inqui-sition championed the Counter Reformation. The Jews and Moors were evictedfrom Spain to create a mono-religious country. The same happened to the French

5 Tawney in his foreword to the english translation of the Protestant Ethic.

88 M. T. Brouwer

Huguenots, who were persecuted by the unified French State under Henry IV. TheItalian cities were brought under Spanish rule in 1498.

The Dutch Freedom war against Spain (15681648) was also inspired by reli-gious rebellion, but did not result in religious tolerance right away. The Reformerspillaged the Dutch Catholic churches and monasteries in 1566 at the beginning oftheir insurrection. TheDutchCalvinists succeeded in grabbing state power and con-stituted a theocracy for a limited period of time. However, some forces counteractedthemovement towards a Calvinist state. Most important was the loose federal char-acter of the United Provinces, which lacked strong state power. The cities could,therefore, take their own stance in economic and judicial affairs. The city lawyersandmagistrateswere opposed to harsh persecution of the non-reformers.Moreover,the cities needed extra hands and, therefore, welcomed immigrants from regionswhere the Calvinists were persecuted such as France and Belgium, but also fromother areas. Jews, who fled from Spain and Portugal after being extradited, couldtake shelter in Dutch cities, predominantly in Amsterdam. Catholics and adherentsof other religions were tolerated after 1630, which meant that they could practicetheir religion, if it was done non-conspicuously. However, only members of the Re-formed Church could fulfill official positions in the 16th and 17th centuries in theNetherlands (Schama, 1987). Some Dutch practices seem to fit Webers portrayalof the Calvinist. Weber describes the repugnance of idleness and begging as a traitof the Puritan for whom work is a holy duty. This attitude is reflected in the harshpolicies pursued by the 17th century Dutch cities towards vagabonds, beggars andidle people, who were either put to work in the towns workhouses or deported(Schama). This contrasted with Catholic (and Buddhist) attitudes in which beggingwas seen as a respected way of living.

A Calvinist state was never founded in England, because the Puritan sect mem-bers were outnumbered by the Anglicans. The English Puritans contested the au-thority of the state in religious and economic matters and were considered a threatto the English nation. Their fight against statemonopolies andmilitary conscriptionare cases in point. Weber considers this a main reason for the early emergence of aprofessional army in England. As a consequence they were kept from land leasesand official occupations.

Webers theory of the Puritan ethic was not explicitly directed towards en-trepreneurship. The Puritan ethic did apply equally to the businessman, the profes-sional and the laborer (PE, 177). However, many Puritans took up entrepreneurshipin England, since they constituted a religious minority to which other routes ofsocial advance were closed. The same had applied to other religious minorities inthe civilized world: Jews and Christians were the merchants and moneylenders ofthe Ottoman Empire. But those occupations were not highly esteemed in Orien-tal civilizations that placed them at the bottom of the social pyramid. A career inthe state bureaucracy or army constituted the only road to social prestige in thosecountries. England and the Low Countries, just like the northern Italian cities ofthe 13th and 14th century, had less absolutist forms of government and gave morescope to commerce and manufacturing.


4 Schumpeters theory of economic development

Schumpeter contributed regularly to theArchiv fuer Sozialwissenschaft und Sozial-politik, which was edited byWeber in the 1920s6. It can, therefore, be assumed thathe was well aware of Webers work. Schumpeter sketched a model of a dynamiceconomy in hisTheorie der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung(WE) in 1920. His the-ory can be considered a refutation of Webers hypothesis on the importance of theCalvinist attitude for economic development. Schumpeter defined the entrepreneuras the founder of a new firm and as an innovator, who breaks up established routinesand opposes the old way of doing things. Schumpeters entrepreneur only under-takes those ventures which turn out to be successful (WE, 177). The entrepreneursspecial leadership qualities enable him to see the right way to act. Otherswill followin his wake. There are some overtones of the Nietzschean leader in Schumpetersdescription of the entrepreneur.

In order to introduce his innovations, the entrepreneur needs to withstand theopposition of the environment, which is usually hostile to deviating behaviour andnovelty.All deviatingbehaviourof amemberof acommunitymeetswithdisapprovalfrom the othermembers(WE, 118). Moreover, the individual is also restrained fromdoing something new, due to the psychic and physical efforts it requires to leavefamiliar paths (WE, 120); it is the difference between swimming with the currentand against the current (WE, 121). Schumpeters entrepreneur, however, takes adelight in this opposition (WE, 132). Schumpeters entrepreneur is a creative non-conformist and not a religious dissident. He is not shunned by society, but warmlywelcomed by the banking community that grants him credits to finance his attackon established positions. Bankers are supposed to be gifted with perfect foresight,for they can discern the best and brightest entrepreneurs without difficulty.

The entrepreneur breaks up the circular flow, actively steering the economyaway from old paths and opening up possibilities hitherto unknown. The circularflow describes a stationary economy, in which economic processes are repeatedperiod after period without change. Prices and quantities do not vary in the circularflow and can be completely deduced from the data. The interest rate is equal to zero,and net investments are absent. Schumpeter used the concept of the circular flow asa point of reference to indicate the changes that are caused by the introduction ofinnovations. His concept of the circular flow had many predecessors as is indicatedby the various references to the concept of a stationary state in hisHistory ofEconomic Analysis(HEA). The first reference is to Platos utopian vision of aPerfect State, described in hisRepublic. Born out of dissatisfactionwith the changesthat Athens went through in his lifetime Plato outlined the preconditions for astationary Utopia such as a stationary population, constant wealth, division of laboraccording to ability and limited freedom of speech (HEA, 55-6). The authoritarianaspects of Platos Perfect State are absent in Schumpeters description of a circularflow, which is not directed by command, but by perfect competition and establishedroutines.Schumpeter unravels theway inwhichproductivity increasesareproduced

6 Schumpeter published 27 times in theArchivduring the period 19101920, when Weber was oneof the editors of the journal. Massimo M.Augello (1990).

90 M. T. Brouwer

by the bunchwise appearance of innovative firms, which set off (cyclical) waves ofinvestments and disinvestments.

Entrepreneurs found new firms to introduce innovations, because establishedfirms are reluctant to change their routines. Moreover, established businesses willpostpone innovation until their old assets have become obsolete. New firms are notimpeded by former investments and will, therefore, speed up economic progressby introducing innovations at a date before incumbent firms would. Schumpeterpointed out that innovation could inflict losses on incumbent firms,which he labeledcreative destruction.

Schumpeter explains the way in which the innovative method of productionobtains a premium caused by its inherent superior efficiency. The differential withpreviousmethods accrues to the entrepreneur until it vanishes due to competition byimitators. Schumpeter argued that this premium constitutes the source of all prof-its and of interest payments. Consequently, all former interest theories, includingBoehm-Bawerks were incorrect. Neither waiting nor the lengthening of the pro-duction period constitutes the source of interest and profits, but rather the source isinnovation. Capital deepeningmeans that labor is replaced by capital, but it does notneed to entail overall productivity increases. This can only occur, if fewer produc-tion factors are used to produce a certain product. Schumpeter sketched a theory,in which the interest rate equals the profitability of the marginal entrepreneur (WE,383). This presumes that all entrepreneurs can be ranked unambiguously accordingto their profitability. Hence, innovative profits are split up into interest paymentsto bankers and a residual that accrues to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurial income re-flects entrepreneurial quality. The best entrepreneur receives the highest incomes,whereas the marginal entrepreneurs profits just suffice to pay his banker.

Schumpeter agrees with Weber on the non-hedonic nature of the entrepreneur.The entrepreneur does not resemble economic man, who weighs (marginal) costsand benefits and stops working at the moment when the costs of the extra effort(fatigue) exceed the extra satisfaction (WE, 126). Such behaviour, according toSchumpeter is characteristic of the circular flow. The entrepreneur by contrast is prepared to work countlessly more hours in order to achieve his goal. But,Schumpeters entrepreneur is not a Puritan. He does not abstain from worldly plea-sures, but participates fully in politics and culture. He is not motivated by a beliefto belong to the elect, since the banking community has already chosen him.Schumpeters entrepreneur is motivated by the joy of creating and by the pleasuresuccess brings (WE, 141). Schumpeters entrepreneur in contrast toWeber is notmotivated by rewards beyond his lifetime, but by improving his social position (andthat of his family) in this world. Leaders of former times had based their leadershipmainly on military and bureaucratic expedience and less on commercial qualities.But innovative qualities can occur everywhere and are thus not system-specific,in Schumpeters view. The clan-leader could also lead his people into new territo-ries, as could the feudal knight. However, not all economic and social systems areequally well equipped to innovation; he mentions India and China as two countrieswithout much innovation to prove his point that economic development is not ob-vious and automatic (WE, 113). He also remarks that it is harder for individuals to


break up established routines in primitive societies without bothering others due totheir communal way of living as is exemplified by the man-house (WE, 119).

Schumpeter considered entrepreneurial behaviour non-rational, because it didnot fit inwith themodel of economicman designedby themarginalist School.We-bers Puritan and Schumpeters entrepreneur are forward-looking, whereas rationaleconomic man is supposed to live only by the day. But, such long-term thinkingcould be called rational by our modern standards. People will be inclined to forgoimmediate consumption, if interest rates are sufficiently low. Webers concept ofrationality was not always perfectly clear. Schumpeter pointed this out in a seminar,which he gave at Harvard in 1940; among the attendants were Parsons, Sweezy andLeontief7. Schumpeter distinguished between formal or objective and substantiveor subjective rationality in this seminar. Formal rationality applies, if costs and ben-efits can be calculated accurately; a means-end relationship. Subjective rationalityrefers to the achievement of absolute values irrespective of costs. Salvation fits inwith the latter rationality concept.

However, the two concepts coincide in Webers portrait of the Calvinist, whobelieves he is saved if he succeeds in making ends meet. Weber combined bothstrands of rationality as he depicted capitalist enterprise as calculable. Schumpeterrejected Webers portrait of the scrooge capitalist and replaced it by the well-mannered gentleman, who wanted to build his own estate. But calculability alsofeatured largely in Schumpeters work. The absence of uncertainty could explainwhy financiers are only meagerly rewarded by base rate interest payments, whereasthe entrepreneur obtains the rest of the innovation premium in accordance withhis capabilities. Hence, innovative investment is considered devoid of any risk.Schumpeter, however, did mention risk in the first German edition ofTheory ofEconomic Development,where he stated that foreseeable risk can be reduced tocosts (WE, 49). Interest rates will be elevated by a certain percentage, if some ofthe new ventures are expected to fail (WE, 387). The percentage of failures couldbe calculated based on experience. Moreover, losses would mainly occur at the oldfirms, which were unable to adapt to new economic conditions in time (WE, 493).Schumpeters ideas on this matter lie at the foundation of Knights theory of profit,as will be demonstrated below.

5 Knight on investment and entrepreneurship

FrankKnight, in his seminal contribution to economicsRisk, Uncertainty andProfitremedied Schumpeters disregard of uncertainty and in so doing laid the foundationfor modern finance and organization theory. He was one of the founding fathersof the famous Chicago School in economics. Knight was acquainted with Germaneconomics texts. It seems, therefore, plausible to assume that he was familiar withSchumpetersTheorie der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, when he wrote his thesisTheoryofProfitsandUncertainty in1916,whichwaspublishedasRisk,Uncertaintyand Profit(RUP) in 1921.

7 Thearticlewas found in theHarvardArchives andwas first publishedin Zeitschrift fuer dieGesamteStaatswissenschaftin 1984.

92 M. T. Brouwer

Knight agreed with Schumpeter on the matter of capital deepening. He statedthat the length of life of capital goods is a matter of choice and can never bea source of profits (Knight, 1939). Knight also agreed with Schumpeter on thepoint, that profits and interest can only exist in a progressive society, althoughinterest could be paid for consumption loans (RUP, 328). Innovation is the source ofprofits and can only occur when investment is used to create new resources. Knightdiffered somewhat fromSchumpeter on the point of entrepreneurial motivation. Heconsidered the desire to excel, to win at a game, the biggest and most fascinatinggame yet invented, not excepting even statecraft and war most important (RUP,360).

But his theory differs from Schumpeters on an essential point. Schumpeter didnot deal with selection problems, as was mentioned above. Bankers would alwayspick the right entrepreneurs. It might have been Schumpeters (andWebers) famil-iarity with the credit mobilier type of banking and the disastrous consequences ofthe failuresof thesebanks thatmade thememphasizecalculability.Knight, however,contended that only uncertainty could explain profits (and losses). Not all ventureswill become successes; some will fail. However, which ventures will succeed andwhich fail cannot be predicted in advance. He also remarked that the profits ofchange come largely in the form of readjustments of capital values. Hence, whereSchumpeter assumed that bankers do not makemistakes in selecting entrepreneurs,Knight made errors or uncertainty the basis of his theory of entrepreneurial prof-its (and losses). The crucial type of decision in all organized activity, according toKnight, involves the selection ofmen tomake decisions. Any other sort of decision-making or exercise of judgment is automatically reduced to a routine function (RUP,297).

Uncertainty needs to be sharply distinguished from risk in Knights view. Riskis calculable a priori and can, therefore, be treated as a cost. Experience can teach uswhat percentage of bottles is going to burst in a champagne factory. These damagescan be included in our cost calculations (RUP, 213). Other types of risk, such as theincidence of fires, can be insured.Uncertainty, in contrast, is uninsurable, becauseit depends on the exercise of human judgment in themaking of decisions bymen andalthough these estimates tend to fall into groups within which fluctuations cancelout and hence to approach constancy andmeasurability; this happens only after thefact (RUP, 251). The major difference between risk and uncertainty thus consistsof the possibility of makingex antecalculations of the incidence of an event. Thatcan be done for fires, but not with respect to the outcomes of investment projectsthat can only be calculated after everything is said and done. Knight borrowed fromSchumpeter the idea that entrepreneurs are not self-selectedbut chosenby investors,who in contrast to Schumpeters portrayal are not infallible but subject to error.But the vision of the investor is central to his theory and not that of the innovator.

Knights theory portrays investment as a discovery process. Many new ventureswill be launched, but only a few will survive and prosper. Such a sketch of eventsfits actual developments. Many new businesses were launched in the 1990s, ofwhich a few obtained astronomically high valuations. This happened before theyactually made profits, which supports Knights thesis that not actual profits butprofit expectations are the decisive element in investment. Knights theory thus


foreshadowed things to come. The development of financial markets (particularlyin the US) has made it possible to measure success by readjustments of capitalvalues before actual profits have been reaped.We can also conclude that investmentunder conditions of uncertainty requires other methods of finance than debt. (High)chances of failure require a risk premium on interest, which curtails investment.Equity capital is therefore much more suited for the task of financing uncertainventures than debt.

Knight pointed out that only the investor with above average skills of perceptionwould earn (excess) profits, whereas investors, whose perceptiveness was belowaverage, would lose money on their ventures. Perceptiveness refers both to projectchoice and to the timing of investment. Knight contended that the average rateof return on investment does not need to exceed the riskless rate of return in thelong run (RUP, 284). Hence, both Knight and Schumpeter argued that investors asa group do not need to earn excess profits. But, the interest rate equals marginalprofitability in Schumpeters view and average profitability in Knights. Knightsinvestor/entrepreneurs need to be compensated for losses caused by uncertainty.Schumpeters entrepreneurwasentitled to the residual, which indicated his capacityat innovation. But entrepreneurs are not entitled to the residual in Knights view.Their incomes should take the form of salaries.

It is obvious that uncertainty in investment, just as in sports, only exists, ifmore than one company/team vies for the same prize and if the result cannot bepredicted with any accuracy. The match would be superfluous, if the best teamcould be indicated before the event. The same applies to the business world. Onlyone innovative firm needs to be launched, if the best innovator can be discerned exante. Thebest employeewill also be the best entrepreneur, if standards of excellenceapply equally to entrepreneurs and employees. As a consequence, all investorswould flock towards the designated winner, which would drive up the price ofthat person to the point at which no profits are left for the investor. Moreover,this innovator has no incentive to start his own company but will earn exactly asmuch as an employee (Brouwer, 2000). I hold the view that Knight has correctedSchumpeters theory on an essential point. Profits (and losses) can only appear,if uncertainty is present. In fact, all profits would vanish, if the winning personor company could be indicated ex ante. If everybody had known beforehand thatMicrosoftwould become themost successful companyof the1990s investorswouldhave rushed to provide funding and the list of prospective employees would havebeen infinite. As a consequence Bill Gates could have obtained all the money hewanted at riskfree rates of interest and could have paid his employees just standardwage rates.But,Gateswas fundedbyventure capital firms,which tookequity sharesin his firm. The same applies to himself and his co-founders, who were also paid(partly) by equity shares. Most founders of high tech start-ups receive modestsalaries, but get equity shares in compensation. Microsoft became an enormoussuccess and everybody was handsomely rewarded for his wise choices. However,a host of start-ups, which turned out to be failures and whose investments werelargely lost counterbalance the Microsoft success story.

Uncertainty can explain many features of innovation, such as the relativelysmall size at which innovative ventures are launched. The rationale for this is that

94 M. T. Brouwer

losses are limited in the case of failure. It can also explain why many start-upsare short-lived and why some grow very rapidly. Only firms that are expected tobecome successful will receive several rounds of finance so that they can expand.Moreover, uncertainty is also a big motivating force. This applies to sports, butalso to economics. No firm would wage investment in innovation, if it knew thatit would lose out to an objectively better competitor. But this competitor in turnwould have no incentive to disrupt existing routines, since this could entail creativedestruction. Both Weber and Schumpeter believed that innovation could proceedunhindered in socialism. This becomes plausible when we realize that both authorsdid not incorporate uncertainty into their theories.

6 Webers history of organizations

WebersGeneral Economic History(GEH) andSocial and Economic Organization(SEO) can be considered a response to Schumpeters thesis, that not the Protestantethic but innovation causes economic development. These two books also attemptto refute Schumpeters claim that innovation is not system-specific. Weber gives apowerful sketch of economic history from ancient times until 1920 in hisGeneralEconomic History. He analyses several consecutive historical forms of economicorganization, such as the clan, ancient bureaucracy, the manor, the guilds and thebusiness enterprise. These organizations can be embedded in larger political orga-nizations, such as an empire, state or city.

Most primaryorganizational formsweredirected towardsprotectionof itsmem-bers against outside aggression. This applies to the clan, which Weber saw as theprimal organizational unit and as an agency of blood revenge and the prosecutionof feuds (SEO, 128). The clans did not possess written laws; clan members weretotally dependent on their leaders for their lives and livelihood. The clan and laterthe sedentary agricultural village were composed of several families. The power ofthe clans could only be broken, if a political system was established, which erodedthe absolute power of the chieftain. All early civilizations, in his view, such as theEgyptian, Greek and Roman civilizations, had loosened the grip of clan and familyon people usually by force and had establishedmore rational forms of organiza-tion. (Weber mentioned ancient Egypt as an example of a huge bureaucracy with avery extensive division of labor). Officers in a bureaucracy are chosen on the basisof some kind of proven expertise. This contrasts with the selection of officers (suchas the medicine man) in a tribal society, which relies largely on magic.

Feudalism constitutes another organizational form, which is not (completely)based on kinship and blood ties and thus embodies some rational aspects inWebersview. In feudalism, the tribes are subjugated to an overlord, who in turn has beenappointedby theemperor or prince.Feudalismemergedgradually througheither thecontracting out of taxation benefices to administrators (such as to the mandarinsin China) or through the granting of fiefs to militaries (the feudal lords of theoccident and the Ottoman empire). The power of the clans was completely brokenin the occident, but not in the orient according to Weber (GEH, 45). Life on thecountryside in occidental feudalism revolved around the estate or manor. Peasantswere either obliged to pay fixed or variable fees (such as in sharecropping) to


their landlords and/or were subjected to compulsory labor on the estate. A landedaristocracy replaced the clan leader in its task of defending the life and good of thepeople. But, the manor oroikoswas not organized along rational lines. Holdingswere usually of sub-optimal size. Income was largely determined by privileges andobligations, which were passed on from generation to generation.

Part of the medieval populations lived in cities, which had their own organi-zations. The inhabitants of the towns in Western Europe usually did not start outas free men, but fell under the jurisdiction of a feudal lord. It was only when theybecame engaged in trade that they reached the status of mercator and of free citizen.The citizens of the medieval towns were relieved from feudal obligations but hadto pay taxes to the emperor or king. The lords of the manor were opposed to townprivileges. The prince and the emperor, however, were willing to grant privilegesto the towns in order to increase tax incomes.

The guild organization of craftsmendates back to antiquity. Ancient guildsweremainly based on clan lines. The guilds as associations of free craftsmen did notdevelop outsideWestern Europe (GEH, 137). Instead, every individual belonged toaclanor caste in theOrient.Guildsneverexisted inChina, becauseclanorganizationwas dominant. Guilds did not develop in India either, since the division of laborwas organized along lines of castes, which can be seen as ritualistic guilds (GEH,137).

Craftsmen and merchants populated the towns, whereas peasants, who wereattached to the land by feudal obligations and rights, populated the countryside. Theestablishment of the towns introduced trade, because the town people needed to befed by agricultural surpluses, which were exchanged for handicraft and importedproducts on local markets or by peddlers. Towns were much more numerous inoccidental than in eastern Europe. Weber remarks that the power of the townsdiminished that of the estates.With the decrease of the frequency of towns on themap there is an increase in the frequency of estates(GEH, 89).

Its military basis made occidental feudalism rather unstable. The power of aking or prince was never absolute, as he had to rely on the military capabilities oflocal lords to sustain his power. The knights could also use their power at arms tofight each other or the emperor. The inherently instability seems to have contributedto the development of towns and therewith to commerce and enterprise in westernEurope. The emperor or king could curb the power of the aristocracy and expandits tax revenues by granting royal privileges to cities in exchange for a guaranteeof their corporate liberties and protection against the feudal lords (McNeill, 542).However, some cities developed their own military capability and supplanted thefeudal lords. Towns bought up the surrounding countryside and established theirown states. Italian towns such as Florence and Venice are cases in point. Free guildsbecame the dominant organizational form for craft workers inWestern Europe aftercraftsmen had thrown off the feudal shackles. This happened first in the free city-states of southern Germany and northern Italy.

96 M. T. Brouwer

7 Weber on the emergence of capitalist enterprise

Weber indicated that several organizational forms were not up to the transitionto a market economy. The manorial system in agriculture, which had existed inEurope for many centuries, was bound to shatter, when faced with market forces.The newly developed bourgeois interests of the towns promoted the weakeningof the manor to expand their market opportunities. The manorial system curbedthe purchasing power of the rural population due to the compulsory services andpayments it demanded from the tenants. The manorial system also prevented thecreation of a free labor market because it attached the peasants to the soil (GEH,94).

The guilds promoted production for themarket, which gradually supplanted thedivision of labor within the manor. Where the guilds were not victorious or did notarise at all, house industry and tribal industry persisted (GEH, 147). This appliesto eastern European feudalism. Russian peasants could not break loose from thesoil because of eternal rights and obligations to the estate and to the communal mirorganization.

The western guild organization was of a more rational nature than the manor.Craft guildspromotedprofessional competence.People couldonly becomeamasterand open up their own shop after a long period of training. More importantly,admission to the western guilds was usually based on skills and not on familyties, although minorities were often excluded from the guilds. The guilds were firstregulated by the town lords, who demanded both taxes and military services fromguild members, but all these prerogatives were later acquired by the guilds (GEH,148).

After having won these battles the guilds used their newly won freedom to es-tablish an effectivemonopoly in their trade. Guild regulation protected its membersfrom competition. It was impossible to set up a shop without the guilds consent.Moreover, the number of masters and therewith of shops was strictly regulated inorder to restrain output. Equality prevailed within the guild organization. No mas-ter could improve his position beyond that of another. Hence, no shop could everincrease its market share. The guilds initial boost to progress petered out, whenthe adverse effects of their regulations became dominant. Moreover, guild mem-bers could own no capital of their own, and were therefore restricted to non-capitalintensive production methods. The few capital goods in existence such as grain andwood mills were often owned by the town or by a cooperative.

New organizations appeared in the 16th and 17th century, which broke thepower of the guilds. Journeymen, who were not allowed to become masters, setup their own businesses. They could do that outside the jurisdiction of the townsin the countryside. The putting-out system resulted from the attempt to escapeguild regulation. Rural labor was amply available in England due to the enclosuremovement. Production could expandbeyond local demand to supply exportmarkets(GEH, 94). But guild regulation persisted in many trades especially in Germany.The German princes more or less operated on behalf of the guilds and the guildsremained strong within Germany for a long time. The remnants of the guild systemcan still be found in some German trades, in which thehandwerkergesetzeapply.


The putting-out form of enterprise could thus only flourish outside the guildorganizations. The same applies to the trading companies of the 16th and 17th cen-turies, which were organized in a corporate form. The Dutch East India Company(VOC) is a prominent example of such a joint stock company, which raised capitalby issuing shares to participating merchants. The VOC existed from 1602 till 1790and employed several thousand people at its hey-day. It was a multi-plant com-pany consisting of six local chambers (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Delft, Middelburg,Enkhuizen and Hoorn). It exploited shipyards and warehouses apart from organiz-ing maritime expeditions. The VOC and other trading companies had many traitsin common with the modern corporation. However, they needed to be chartered bythe state, because there was no free incorporation in Holland in those days. As aconsequence the VOC was considered to represent the national interest and couldrely on military support to fight rival maritime nations and pirates. The Englishsituation differed from the Dutch since the Statute of Monopolies was adoptedin the early 17th century, which ended the Crowns prerogative to grant monopolyrights. Monopolies could now be challenged in courts and disappeared rapidly fromthe English scene. Incorporation of voluntary groups spread rapidly in 17th cen-tury Elizabethan England as is shown by the popularity of the joint stock company(North and Thomas, 154).

We may conclude that the guilds were initially conducive to progress, but ar-rested progress later on. The guilds came to eschew novelty and wanted tomaintainexisting privileges and therewith the status quo. They began to show traits of thecaste organizations such as in India, which forbade all use of new production meth-ods. Guild organization gradually gave way to capitalist organizations such as thejoint stock company; but this process was initially limited to England.

OtherWesternEuropeancountriesupheldmonopolyprivilegesmuch longerandonly allowed free incorporation at a much later date (Thomas and North, ch. 10).

Weber wanted to demonstrate inGeneral Economic Historythat institutionalchange is not immanent to all types of societies. Only some western countriessucceeded in establishing free enterprise. Weber emphasized that capitalist busi-ness enterprise could only emerge after production factors had become mobile andproperty rights had been established. Labor should not be bound to master andsoil by hereditary and, therefore, irrational traditional ties. Such migration datesback to ancient times, when people moved from the hills to the riverbed valleys ofMesopotamia and Egypt. Consequently, the clan chieftain and also the father as thehead of the family were robbed of (part of) their possessions and privileges. Thesame happened when Greek and later Italian cities rose to prominence. Contractuallabor relations gradually replaced serfdom, royal privileges and communal landownership.

Apart from labour, land also needed to become freely negotiable before cap-italism could take off. Private property in land emerged during the 17th and 18thcenturies in Western Europe, but the process knew several different forms and thedissolution of the feudal system therefore resulted in the different agricultural sys-tems of today.In part the peasantry was freed from the land and the land from thepeasantry as in England; in part the peasantry were freed from the proprietors as

98 M. T. Brouwer

in France; in part the system is a mixture as in the rest of Europe, the east incliningmore to the english conditions(GEH, 108).

France became a country of small and medium sized agricultural firms, whenthe estates were broken up and distributed among the peasants after the Frenchrevolution (GEH, 99). The absence of primogeniture in contrast to England also contributed to the emergence of small lot sizes in France. The landlords werealso expropriated in south and western Germany. The change was the same asin France except that it took place slowly and according to a more legal process(GEH, 100).With the dissolution of the manors and of the remains of the earlieragrarian communism through consolidation, separation etc., private property inland has been completely established(GEH, 111). The occident thus turned into aworld which was dominated by a division of labor based on free labor and privateproperty in land.

An additional condition, which needed to be met before capitalism could flour-ish - in Webers view - is the establishment of a rational state. This means a statewhich is based on rational law and expert officialdom (GEH, 339). He contrastedthis with states whose officials were trained in ancient literature or religious textsas was common in theOrient. Many feudal empires such as in China were foremostconcerned with preserving their centralized power structure. Their local represen-tatives were not selected by military or technical criteria but by their expedience inChinese literature. Such vassals had to be completely loyal to the emperor, becauseanother recruit could easily replace them. Themandarins were also prevented frombuilding a local power base among the population, because they were continuallytransferred from one province to another and did not speak the local dialect.

Rational law in Webers view was based on Roman law, which revived in greatparts of the occident, but not in England, during the late Middle Ages and Re-naissance. Weber considers its calculability the main advantage of Roman formal-legalistic law, which contrasts to materialistic, theocratic or absolutist law (GEH,340-1). Roman law also differed from other law systems by its emphasis on civilmatters, which greatly facilitated trade. Roman law provided reasoned and consis-tent principles of jurisprudence, just like English common law. Most empires hadonly developed criminal law apart from the famous Hammurabi Code of ancientMesopotamia that also addressed commercial matters.

8 Authority and change

Weber gave an overview of institutional history, but failed to explain why theseinstitutions had come and gone. His analysis of charismatic authority inSocial andEconomic Organizationcan be interpreted as an attempt to fill this void. Here, hedistinguished three forms of authority; legal-rational, traditional and charismatic.Some leaders derive their authority from tradition, such as the clan leader and thelord of the manor. Bureaucracy, by contrast, is based on rational-legal authority.We can summarize Webers historical view by stating that the western world hadchanged from traditional towards formal-legal societies. However, he failed to ex-plain why such change occurred only in some societies and was absent in others.Parsonsdiscusses this point in his introduction to theAmericanedition ofWirtschaft


und Gesellschaft(1947). Traditional authority is opposed to change by definition.Legal-rational authority spurs efficiency, but it is doubtful whether it can breakup existing routines. Both traditional and rational-legal authority seem, therefore,suited to an established social system of a routine character (SEO, 64). Charismaticauthority, however, wants to lead people away from existing routines and beliefsand is, therefore, an agent of change. The charismatic leader - as described by We-ber - is always in some sense a revolutionary and a dissident. He promises peoplea better future. But, a charismatic leader has to deliver. The accuracy of his visionneeds to be proven by events, or people will turn their backs on him.

Schumpeters innovative entrepreneur, who leads the production process intonew grids, has many things in common with Webers charismatic leader. Theyboth oppose established authority and lead their flock in new directions. Webersanalysis of charismatic authority can, therefore, be considered an attempt to blendthe Calvinist and the innovator. But Weber situates charisma mainly in the realmof religion and the military and not in the business world. A founder of a newreligious sect and his disciples and a military band are the types of organization hehad in mind. Charismatic authority loosens all former ties to family and clan andforges completely new loyalties. The people who have recognized the charismaticleader are completely devoted to him in a non-rational way. There is no such thingas promotion or dismissal in the early stages of new religiousmovements ormilitarybands; there is no hierarchy either. Hence the charismatic organization is exactlythe opposite of the rational-legal bureaucracy. The charismatic organization doesnot demand formal qualifications. Everybody who recognizes the greatness of thecharismatic leader can follow him and become a member of his community. Thecharismatic leader expects much of his disciples. They are expected to achieveextra-ordinary things. Rewards are not formalized but consist of free gifts or booty,which are distributed on a communal basis. However, this charismatic organizationcannot endure in Webers view and will in time turn into an organization basedon either traditional or legal-rational authority.

Some elements of charismatic organizations can be found in entrepreneurialstart-ups. The (innovative) entrepreneur is often mission-oriented. He believes inhis own capabilities and those of his employees. No entrepreneur would ever starthis business, if he were not convinced of its ultimate success. Most of the time heneeds to convince at least a few others to join him in his venture and to defer incomeuntil the moment of success has arrived. He also needs to convince financiers andultimately customers of the superiority of his product or process. Many start-upsare organized along non-bureaucratic lines and the founders are prepared to put inmany extra hours. The lack of hierarchy and formal roles and the vicissitudes ofincome as determined by stock options are also characteristic of start-up firms. Thisapplies most forcefully to the founders of the organization, but also to employees,as the example of Microsoft demonstrates. More than thousand of its (early) hiresbecame millionaires thanks to stock options.

Webers hypothesis of the charismatic leader is certainly powerful, becauseit can explain why people are prepared to leave their old ways of life in orderto start anew. His theory of the charismatic leader attempts to explain theriseof protestant sects, instead of analyzing their characteristics. However, heretics

100 M. T. Brouwer

are of all times, but their rise was often arrested by repression. Examples on thepersecution of deviants or dissidents abound.We can think of ancient Rome, whichpersecuted the Christians, as well as of the Russia of Catharine the Great, whichsent its religious dissidents off to Siberia. It was only when non-absolutist formsof government arose that both freedom of religion and of business incorporationemerged. Hence, freedom of religious incorporation went hand in hand with itscounterpart in business. We could, therefore, conclude that charismatic leadershipcould only occur when certain conditions were met

9 Schumpeters economic development revisited

Schumpeterwrote a second edition of hisTheorie derWirtschaftlichenEntwicklungof about two thirds the size of the original version. The new edition was publishedin 1926 and became the basis of the English translation, which appeared asTheTheory of Economic Development(ED) in 1934.

The second edition apart from its smaller size differs from the first on a num-ber of points. Firstly, all passages criticizing Boehm-Bawerk and other economistshad been eliminated. Schumpeter presented his work as a piece of economic anal-ysis and himself as an economist. The professionalization of the social scienceshad advanced to a stage which seemed to require a strict demarcation betweeneconomics, sociology and history. Schumpeter thus complied with his critics, whohad claimed that Schumpeter had not produced a historical, evolutionary theory ofeconomic change. Schumpeter returned to history in hisBusiness Cycles(1939)andHistory of Economic Analysis(1954). Another criticism involved the emphasisSchumpeter had put on the role of the individual in economic development.Oneof the most annoying misunderstandings that arose out of the first edition of thisbook was that this theory of development neglects all historical factors of change,except one namely the individuality of entrepreneurs (ED,60).

Schumpeter is not prepared to give up his original position that the entrepreneuris the dynamic element in capitalism. He now puts a greater emphasis on the intu-itive capacities of the entrepreneur.Hehas the capacity to see things in away, whichafterwards proves to be true, although it cannot be proven at the time.Schumpetereven adds; thorough preparatory work, and special knowledge, breadth of intellec-tual understanding, talent for logical analysis may under certain circumstances besources of failure(ED, 85).

Schumpetermade somesuperficial changes in his description of entrepreneurialmotives, but he stuck to his former statement that entrepreneurial motivation is un-like that of economic man, who is balancing probable result against disutility ofeffort. The entrepreneur is still motivated by the dream to found a private kingdom,which most closely resembles the position of medieval lordship. New motives in-volve the will to conquer, the impulse to fight, to prove oneself superior to others,to succeed for the sake of success. Pecuniary gain is therefore not the main motivefor entrepreneurial action, but it is a very accurate expression of success, especiallyof relative success (ED, 93-4). We may conclude that Schumpeter rephrased hisentrepreneurial motives somewhat to get them more in line with Knights descrip-tion of what moves the entrepreneur. Knight emphasized sportsmanship to explain


entrepreneurship, whereas Schumpeter had stressed creativity in his first edition.They nowboth share the view that entrepreneurship can best be understood as an el-ement of the game spirit and the ambition to win. But, Schumpeter rejects Knightsdefinition of the entrepreneur as the capitalist and risk-taker. Schumpeter arguesthat the usual shareholder has no impact on company policy and hence cannot fulfillentrepreneurial functions (ED, 75).

Schumpeter also strongly repudiates theMarshallian definition of entrepreneur-ship, which treats the entrepreneur as a manager. He draws a sharp line betweenmanagers and entrepreneurs.The manager chooses from the most advantageousamong the methods which have been empirically tested and become familiar at acertain point in time, whereas the entrepreneur looks for the best method possibleat the times(ED, 83). He also firmly rejects Webers definition of the entrepreneuras the person with a calling.The carrying out of new combinations can no more bea vocation than the making and execution of strategic decisions(ED, 77).

Theelementsof charismatic leadership that couldbediscerned in thefirst editionhave now faded out. Schumpeter still describes the entrepreneur as a leader, yet theheroism with which the entrepreneur was adorned in the first edition is largelygone. He now calls the entrepreneur a leader against his will, whose only followersare the imitating firms that rob him of his profits. The entrepreneur only needs toconvince or impress one man, that is the banker who is to finance him (ED, 89).Schumpeter contended that the days of the heroic entrepreneur were almost over.The entrepreneur still needed to confront the opposition from the environment,but this opposition has largely succumbed in modern times.The importance of theentrepreneur must diminish just as the importance of the military commander hasalready diminished(ED, 86). He attributed this to the increased calculability andrationality of the capitalist world. Schumpeter had first depicted the entrepreneuras the man of action who could lead society into new ways of doing things. Thisfigurewas replacedby the sociallymuch lessapt entrepreneur,whoonly caredaboutbusiness and left politics to the politicians. This line of reasoningmade Schumpeterpredict that innovation could be delegated to expertswithout affecting performance.Schumpeter foresaw that innovation would become a matter of routine, executedby employees in R&D laboratories. He did not like this course of events, becausethe world would lose much of its splendor due to these changes. But he thoughtthat increasing rationalization would make it inevitable.

Hence, Schumpeter held the view that increased rationality spells the end ofcapitalism. Theorigins of Schumpeters bleak outlook on the viability of capitalism,which he has exposed magnificently inCapitalism, Socialism and Democracy,can thus already be found in the second edition ofTheorie der WirtschaftlichenEntwicklung.

Schumpeter, however, came to retrace his steps and emphasized competitionand liberalism as crucial conditions for economic development in his posthumouslypublishedHistory of Economic Analysis(Brouwer, 1996). Schumpeter describesin HEA how competitive capitalism could only unfold unfettered after liberalismhad become the main political movement. Liberalism - in Schumpeters words -entailed the subjugation of politics to commerce and reigned only from the endof the 18th century till about 1900 (HEA, 761). We could, therefore, conclude

102 M. T. Brouwer

that Schumpeter narrowed his theory even further at the end of his life. His theorynow only applied to 19th century western and especially English capitalism, wherethe state had largely withdrawn from the economic arena and the bourgeoisie hadbecome the leading class

10 Rationality of capitalist enterprise

Weber defined capitalism as rational calculation applied to the pursuit of economicgain. Rational capitalist enterprise exists -in Webers view- when rational methodssuch as bookkeeping and capital accounting are used (GEH, 275). He distinguishedrational from adventurous capitalism. The latter is represented by the overseastrading companies of the 16th and 17th centurywhose ventureswere subject to highuncertainty. This is attested by the fact that many VOC ships never returned fromtheir voyages.Weberdates thebeginningof rational capitalismback to17thand18thcentury mercantilist states. This period was characterized by monopolies grantedby the state. Weber calls mercantilism the first rational economic policy, becausethis policy was primarily directed towards economic welfare instead of reassuringpeace among rival groups and classes. Mercantilism meant that the state was runas a single firm. The objective of the state was to generate as much tax income aspossible through national monopolies. Mercantilism thus favored managed insteadof free trade.

Schumpeter tracked the origins of capitalism back to the medieval city-statesthat largely depended on commerce.Capitalist institutions, such as big business;stock and commodity speculation and high finance had already established them-selves firmly at the end of the 15th century, and had entailed the ascent of the bour-geoisie(HEA, 78). Schumpeter contended that capitalist progress was arrested bythe rise of the absolutist nation states that ascended from the 15th century onwards.The rising bourgeoisie had to submit for centuries to come to the rule of a warriorclass of feudal origins that milked the bourgeoisie to fight their endless series ofwars (HEA, 144). It was only in the 19th century that capitalism regained its bloomunder liberal governments, especially in England.

Weber considered the ability to calculate profits in advance as the most distinc-tive feature of (rational) capitalism to mark it off from its (irrational) predecessors.Capitalist enterprise would take the form of large bureaucracies that would rewardpeople according to their abilities. However, to restrict rationality to capitalismseems somewhat misplaced, as Schumpeter remarked. The lord of the manor alsobehaved rationally within the feudal setting. The same applied to courtiers, wholived at the French royal court in Versailles, or aspirant Chinese mandarins, whotook great efforts to become proficient in reciting Chinese verse. All these peo-ple used the possibilities open to them to improve their social position; a clearmeans-end relationship (Schumpeter, 1991, 325).

Knight launched a more devastating criticism onWebers identification of cap-italism with rationalism. He explained that all ex ante calculations could only beeducated guesses of prospective returns. So, it is not somuch rationality, but percep-tion that makes a capitalist entrepreneur successful. Perception can be consideredsubjective rationality, which can only be borne out by the facts after the investment


has been made. Subjective rationality resembles Webers description of the charis-matic leader, who is convinced that he is right and is eager to prove it. We might,therefore, argue that (objective) rationality is not the distinctive factor of capital-ism. Investment can only be subjectively rational in competitive capitalist societies.Moreover, certain political and institutional conditions are required before compet-itive capitalism could occur. Absolutist rule needed to disappear to make room forboth religious and economic freedom and experimentation.

Modern authors on western history also hold the view that absolutism and itsinherentmonopolization of economic life impededwestern economic ascent. Northand Thomas explain the economic bloom of England and the Low Countries after1500 by the absence of absolutism in those countries. A delicate balance was struckbetween central and local powers, in which neither got the upper hand. In Englandthe power of the crownwas curbed by parliament, which obtained substantial powerunder the Tudors (North and Thomas, 147). A federal form of government, whichderived from a league of autonomous medieval towns, ran the seven unified Dutchprovinces (McNeill, 581). However, these were the exceptions. Absolute monarchsruled in France, Spain Scandinavia, Poland and Hungary. Local taxes were aban-doned and supplanted by national taxes such as the French taille and the Spanishalcabala. Absolute rulers created vast bureaucracies whose functionaries were loyalto the crown. Guild rules and local monopolies were upheld. Trade, free incorpo-ration and labor mobility were impeded. These measures prevented the emergenceof a merchant class in countries that were governed along absolutist lines, whichgreatly hampered their economic progress (North and Thomas, ch. 10).

11 Conclusions

This essay traced the linkages between the theories of Weber, Schumpeter andKnight on the issue of entrepreneurship and economic development. Weber occa-sioned one of the great debates in modern intellectual history with his publicationson the importance of the Calvinist ethic for economic development. He emphasizedthe rational i.c. anti-magical features of Protestantism and especially Calvinism.Schumpeter contested Webers view. He put the innovative entrepreneur centerstage. Knight differed from both Weber and Schumpeter in his analysis of invest-ment under uncertainty. He cast the perceptive capitalist in the leading role.

Comparing the three authors, we can note that Weber did not pay attention toeither financial matters or uncertainty. Savings funded investment and uncertaintywas antithetical to his conception of capitalismas a rational system.Weber sketchedthe course of western economic history as a process of increasing rationalization,which resulted in modern capitalism. Schumpeter contested Webers view of capi-talism as a predominantly rational system, but adopted some of Webers points inhis later work. But rational capitalism, in his view, would make entrepreneurshipobsolete and would blur the lines between capitalism and socialism.

Schumpeter attributed a central role to the financial sector, but largely neglecteduncertainty in his work. His emphasis on credit as one of the main institutionsof capitalism derives from his idea that capitalism allows people from all socialclasses to introduce innovations. It was Knight, who explained how developed

104 M. T. Brouwer

financial markets could absorb uncertainty. Knights analysis stresses the game-likeand intuitive and, therefore, largely non-rational aspects of entrepreneurship. Theentrepreneur can perceive qualities in people, which remain hidden to the averageobserver. This gives the investor/entrepreneur some prophetic features. Only themore than averagely perceptive investor can make a profit, if capital markets arewell organized. But capital and IPO markets (Initial Public Offerings) have onlyrecently and in only a few countries achieved the degree of sophistication requiredfor the smooth operation of investment under uncertainty. Many aspects of the neweconomy such as the vital role of equity markets and of uncertainty can alreadybe found in embryonic form in Knights work.

References

Acs Z, Audretsch D (1988) Innovation in large and small firms; an empirical analysis. American Eco-nomic Review 78: 678690

Augello MM (1990) Joseph Alois Schumpeter: a reference guide. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg NewYork

Baumol WJ (1968) Entrepreneurship in economic theory. American Economic Review 58: 6471Brouwer M (1991) Schumpeterian puzzles, technological competition and economic evolution. Michi-gan University Press, Harvester Wheatsheaf

Brouwer M (1996) Economic evolution and transformation of the economic order. In: Helmstaedter EPerlman M (eds) Behavioral norms, technological progress and economic dynamics, pp 355370.Michigan University Press, Ann Arbor

Brouwer M (2000) Entrepreneurship and uncertainty: innovation and competition among the many.Small Business Economics, an International Journal 15 (2): 149160

He.bert RF, Link AL (1982) The Entrepreneur. Praeger Publishers, New YorkKnight FH (1961) Risk uncertainty and profit. (First edition 1921). KelleyKnight FH (1939) Ethics and economic reform; the ethics of liberalism. Economica 6: 129Knight F.H. (1982) Freedom and economic reform: essays in economics and social Philosophy (with aforeword by J. Buchanan). (First edition: 1947) Harper & Row Liberty Press, Indianapolis

LoringAR (1991)Opening doors: the life andwork of JosephSchumpeter, vol 1. TransactionPublishers,Europe

McNeill WH (1963) The rise of the West, a history of the human community. University of ChicagoPress, Chicago

North DC, Thomas RP (1973) The rise of the western world: a new economic history. CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, MA

OECD (June 2000) Employment outlook: the partial Renaissance of self-employment, pp 155193Schama S (1987) The embarrassment of riches: an interpretation of Dutch culture in the golden age.Knopf, New York

Schumpeter JA (1908) Das Wesen und Hauptinhalt der Theoretischen Nationaloekonomie. Duncker &Humblot, Munchen Leipzig

Schumpeter JA (1912) Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, 1. ed. Duncker & Humblot, LeipzigSchumpeter JA (1978) The theory of economic development: an inquiry into profits, capital, credit,interest and the business cycle, 2. ed. (translated by Redvers Opie). Oxford University Press, LondonNew York (first published in 1934)

Schumpeter JA (1943) Capitalism, socialism and democracy. Allen & Unwin, New York London (firstpublished in the USA in 1942 by Harper and Brothers, New York)

Schumpeter JA (1962) Eugen von Boehm-Bawerk. In: Ten great economists, pp 143190. Unwin Un-versity Books, London (first published in 1951Oxford University Press; with a foreword by ElizabethBoody Schumpeter)


Schumpeter JA (1981) History of economic analysis (with an introduction by Elizabeth Boody Schum-peter). Allen & Unwin, New York London (first published in 1954 by Oxford University Press, NewYork, and Allen & Unwin, London)

Schumpeter JA (1991) The meaning of rationality in the social sciences. In: Swedberg R (ed) Theeconomics and sociology ofcapitalism. The Lowell Lectures. Princeton University Press, Princeton[First published in: (1984) Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 4: 577593, edited andintroduced by Stolper WF, Richter R, from a seminar given at Harvard in 1940)

Weber M (1965) The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism (with a foreword by Tawney RH), 7thimpression (first published in 1930). Unwin University Books, London

Weber M (1995) General economic history (translated by Knight FH). Transaction Publishers, NewBrunswick London (sixth printing, first published in 1927)

WeberM (1947) The theory of social and economic organization (translated by Henderson AM, ParsonsT), with a foreword by Talcott Parsons. Oxford University Press, Oxford (reprinted by Macmillan asa Free Press paperback)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Date post:	17-Nov-2015
Category:	Documents
Upload:	palacaguina
View:	47 times
Download:	0 times

Knight Schumpeter Weber

Documents