Knowledge Reality and Objectivity

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Mind Association

Knowledge, Reality, and Objectivity (I.)Author(s): H. F. HallettReviewed work(s):Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 49, No. 194 (Apr., 1940), pp. 170-188

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III.-KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, ANDOBJECTIVITY (I.).BY H. F. HALLETT.

THEpurposeofthis discussions to lay bare some fundamentaldifficultiesn the common conceptionof "knowledge" as asubject-object elation; to consider heir mplications orouraccountof thereal; and to indicatewhat taketo be themeta-physical tiology f " experience and its objects. I make nosecret fromthe start, then, that I believe the subject-objectexperience,hat idealists have taken to be ultimate, o be de-rivative, nd the" subject to be ontologicallyrior o theobject.I am not so naive, however, s to suppose thatthe subject quaknowing bjects s epistemologicallyrior o the objects that it.knows: if we limit ourselves to experiencewe therebymakesubject and object co-ordinate; but to arguefrom his derived.co-ordinationhat experiences a limiting onceptions a plainand vicious circle. To take subjectand objectin experience s.ontologically o-ordinates, in my view, the fallacyofidealism;,just as it is thefallacy f realism o taketheobjectfor hereal.The " subject" that claim o be ontologicallyrior o theobjectis primarily he " self that among its constituent ctionsincludes hat of" knowing its " other"; but also, and equallypriorto the object, there s the " other" that among ts con-stituent ctions includes that of " manifestingtself to the" self . The " manifestation ofthe " other answers o the." knowledge of the " self ; and " self and " other haveconcourse, artly n the directpossession f the " other by the" self in " enjoyed " community (which s knowledge arexcellence),ndpartlyntheobjective ppearance fthe" otherto the " self which " contemplates it. This is knowledgecommonlyo-called, .e., a relation fsubjectand object,but is.only excusably o-called n so far as in its perfectiont involvesthe complete pprehensionf the object,thoughnot ofthe realas a thing-in-itself. shallpropose hatthisobjective ppearanceor" object" is a joint expressionfthe" self and its" other ,owingfactors o each, factorswhich f isolated would not be,objects t all,butwhich ecome uch n their nion.


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H. F. HALLETT: KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 171I.

KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY.Let me beginwith something elatively oughand common-place: to believea proposition,r to believe a fact,means toacceptthepropositions true,or thefactas genuinerresistibledatum. But theactual tru,thftheproposition, rthe genuine-ness ofthe datum,does not give us the right o call our belief" knowledge , for we may, and perhapsoftendo, accidentally

believewhathappensto be truethoughourbelief n it was ill-founded.' Our beliefin what is true is only rightly alled" knowledge if the belief s well-groundedr certified.Theterm" grounded suggests demandforrational groundsorpremisses,.e.,fordemonstration,nd it is clear that n principlethis cannot always be provided,or even rightlydesiderated.All demonstrationeadsback to ndemonstrableases, ndgroundsmustthemselves e grounded nwhat s self-grounded.We arethus ed back to propositionsnd data of sucha nature s to beself-evidentr ndubitable. Thus though heremaybe conditionsunderwhich ruebelief s knowledge, etbelief n whatis true,i.e., the acceptanceof what is actuallythe case as being so, orthetaking s factofwhat sfact, s not n itself nowledgexceptwherethe truth s self-evidentr the fact ineluctable. In allother cases groundsmustbe provided eading up to such self-evidentpropositions r indubitablefacts. Thus all knowledgedepends n theend uponour acceptanceof a form f knowledgethat s indubitable. My mmediate urpose s to inquirewhethersucha form f knowledges to be found, .e.,whethernd,ifso,how,it is possible, nd whether nd, if so, in what form, t isdiscoverablen human experience.I must,however,make one importantimitation f I am tokeep the discussionwithin the limitsof my space: the dis-tinction etween ur knowledge ftruths nd principlesnd ourknowledge f mattersof factis long-established,nd evidentlyhas a primafacie validityeven forthose whodo not accept itsultimacy; and I propose orestrictmy nquiry,o far s possible,to ourreputedknowledge fmatters ffact where he relationof knowledge o reality s most direct and crucial,not to sayfamiliar,nd the notions freality, eing, nd existence an betaken as congruent. There s also a reasonotherthan that of

1Cf.Descartes,Medit. V: " If I affirm hat s nottrue, t is evidentthat deceivemyself;eventhough judge accordingotruth, hisoccursonlybychance . Cf.alsoRussell, roblernsfPhilosophy,p. 205-207.


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172 H. F. HALLETTspacefor ettinghis imit o our nquiry, iz., hat t willformallyexculpate s from hecharge hat has often een evelled gainstthosewhoattempt o estimate he validity fknowledge b extra:thatthey reemploying ognitive rinciples, ell orill,and thusimplyingheir rustworthiness,n theircriticism fknowledge;thatthey re thusassuming hevalidity fknowledgenthe veryactofquestioningt; and that thereforeftheir esultsnegativeit dubitates tself,while fit is affirmativet is so faranalyticaland thus nconclusive.1By confiningurselves o knowledge fmatters f fact we may escape between he horns of this epis-temological ilemma, orwemay egitimatelyontinue o supposethat ouruse of cognitive rinciples,whether egulative r evenconstitutive,aisesnospecialdifficultieselevant o our mnmediateinquiry, nd may thus concentrate ur attentionmore strictlyupon tscrucialpoint,viz., herelation fknowledgeoreal exist-encein thatregionof ourreputedknowledge f matters ffactthat. as been,ormay be, held to be immediate nd indubitable.The precisepointat which thisguarantee ppliesneed not yetbe determined.

Everyone s familiar o-daywith some analogue or other ofthe distinction etweenthat part of our knowledgewhichisepistemologicallymmediate nd thatremainder hich smediate.The distinctionn itsmodern orm oes back, I think, o JohnGrote who used the terms" knowledge f acquaintance and" knowledge bout "; though imilardistinctions re signalizedin severalancient nd modern anguagesby the use ofdifferentterms for analogous distinctionsof apprehension.3Grote'sdoctrinewas seizedupon and emphasized y thinkers s widely1Cf. B.D.S., De Intell.Emend., ? 30-32; Eth. II., xliii,Sch. As thisis an objectionhat havemyselfften aisedperhaps ought o say thatI nowthink hat t is valid onlyas appliedto the magined oubtsofasupposed erfect nower. Its weakness ies in thesupposition hat sucha knower ouldhavedoubts, nd also,more mportants weshallsee, nthe radical defect f subject-object nowledge hroughwhicha perfectknower would necessarilybe condemned o perfect gnorance. InSpinozistic erms: the one thinga " perfect eing cannot be is an" object ; thus heobjectof a perfect nowerwouldbe no object t all.

Ofcourse, hough he terms re Spinozistic,he doctrines not: Spinoza,I think, suallyconceives is agents s objectsthatare active; and hisobjects s real nproportiono their gency: and this s trueeven ofhis"perfect being".2Exploratiohilosophica,. 60.3E.g., connaitre,avoir; Kennen,Wissen; noscere,cire, tc. In viewofthe vagaries f inguistic sage the questionofthe exact equivalenceofthese distinctions ith each other nd withthat ofGroteneed notdetain us.


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KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 173divergent s WilliamJames1 and BertrandRussell,2 nd it iswithout oubtofgreat mportance,ven f t is not as exhaustiveas has sometimesbeen supposed. Russell expressesthe dis-tinction s lyingbetween " knowledgeby acquaintance and"knowledge by description, of which the former s episte-mologically uperior. Indeed he is readyto defineknowledgewholly nterms facquaintance, oing o far s to assert hat theobject towhich description pplies " is not, strictly peaking,known ousat all ".3 Knowledge y descriptionsknowledge fdescriptionandhathedescriptionpplies oanobject. Acquaint-ance with objects, on the otherhand, "essentiallyconsists na relation etween he mind nd something ther hanthe mind;it is this that constituteshemind'spowerof knowing hings .4Knowledgeby description, owever,s much moreamplethanourknowledge yacquaintance, or t can enableus to apprehendtheexistence fthingswithwhichneitherwe nor anyoneelse areacquainted. But it restsupon acquaintance, s well as upon our" knowledgeftruths , which gainaregrasped y " intuitions"or derived inferentially rom such intuitions: " intuition"being the formof acquaintance appropriate o principles ndtruths. " The fundamental rinciple n the analysis of pro-positions ontaining escriptionss this: Every roposition hichwe can understandmustbe composedwholly f constituents ithwhichweareacquainted."Let mepointout at thisearly tage, nd in no polemical pirit,the special difficultyn which the knower s placed accordingto thisaccount of his relation o reality: knowledge n thefullsensemeans directacquaintance with the object; but this,tospeakwith obriety,s limited n scope and depth. " I knowthecolorblue when see it, and the flavor f a pear when tasteit; I know n inchwhen move my fingerhrought; a secondoftime,when feel tpass; an effortf attention hen make t;a differenceetween wo thingswhen notice t; but about heinnernatureof thesefacts, r what makes hemwhatthey are,cansay nothing t all. I cannot mpart cquaintancewith hemto anyone whohas notalreadymade t himself. cannotdescribethem,makea blindmanguess what blue is like,define o a childa syllogism,rtell a philosophern just what respectdistance sjust what t is, and differs rom therforms f relation." Myacquaintance gives me the " that" and the incommunicablesuperficial what . but not the real innernatureofthe object,

I Principles fPsychology,h.viii. 2ProblemsfPhilosophy,h.v.3 bid., p. 75. 4Ibid.,pp. 66-67. 5lbid., . 91.6James,Principles ofPsychology,, p. 221.


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174 H. F. HALLETT:notwhat wewantalwaysto knowabout t: whatmakes twhatit is. The morewe pursue the innernature of the object bydescription,hefurtherreweremoved romertain nowledgefit; themoreweseekan indubitablepprehensionf t,themorewe are compelled o rest contentwithwhat is knownby directacquaintance. Acquaintance sknowledge-par-excellencefsuper-ficial act; descriptionsdubiousknowledgeffact-par-excellence.For thepresent, owever,wemay etthispass as no more hananotherexpression f the characteristicimitations f humanknowledge. At least in ourknowledge y acquaintancewe aresaid to have genuineknowledgen the fullsense,thoughof arange of objects limited n scope and, it will be admitted, e-latively uperficial. f this can be established t will constituteno meanbarrier o epistemologicalcepticism. But can it ?There s an argumenthat has often eenusedby neo-Kantianidealists nd by thosewho, likemyself, ave comeundertheirinfluence,o the effect hat no genuine ognition an be purelyimmediate; thatthepurestpieceofknowledge y acquaintanceis already infectedwithmediacy. It is a "such and such"andno other it s a " seen", or" heard", or " felt ,momentaryor enduring,imultaneouswith or successive o another; it is" now" and not " then", extendedor restricted; and so on.And ftheseelements fmediacy rerigorouslyxcluded, ndwerestricturselves o theabsolutely ure mmediate atum, hereremains othing t all: a " whatless hat". I do not,however,wish to makeuse ofthisargument; forthough agreethat ithas point in the analysis of knowledge-as-such,mphasizingtheessential o-operationf" self and " other in thegenera-tionofthe" object" that s related o the" self as known ndto the " other as appearance,yet it can hardlybe regarded sad rem n ourpresent iscussion hat s directed o humanknow-1ladCra Fm'r it iv nlQ;inl al1+ TXTC.n n rb-d-1 , A-L

1To taketheformalnalysis fthegenesis ftheobjectsofknowledge-as-such s an account ffactorshatexplicitlyo-operatehroughouthewhole ange f mpiricalbjectswouldbetooverlookhe pecial haracter-isticsofhumanknowledge ntailedby man'splace in the hierarchy fbeing. It is a mistake o supposethatwhereverhere s a knowerhisknowledgexplicitlyxhibits hemarks f ts metaphysical enesis, ndis limited nly n scope,and not in character. I have sometimes eenaskedwhy makeso muchofthedistinction fhumanknowledgendknowledge-as-such,henknowledgemust lwaysbe ofthesamecharacter,varyingnly ntherange f tsobjects: I reply hatoneofthemarks fthefinitenessfhuman nowledgesthe oncealmentfmuch f tsmediacywithin he ostensiblemmediacy f its elementarybjects. Knowledgevariesnotonly n its extentbut also, and evenmore mportant,n itsprofundity,n its insightntotheessenceofthereal " other achieved


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KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 175certain objects as distinctfromthe wider and more dubiousrange of objectsthat we supposeourselves o knowsomethingabout,though t may be truethat what is psychologicallym-mediate ncludes actors fenistemological ediacv.1 The nues-throughtscompletepprehensionf the" appearance, generatedy thecommunityf " self" and " other , thatwe call " object . The im-mediateobjectsof humancognitionmay thusbe bothobjects and im-mediate n spiteof the formalnalysis fobjectivity. The developmentof cognition hat is constantly imed at in knowledge y descriptiondesubstantializesheobjectsof mmediacy y the furthernd ostensibledevelopmentf their mplicitmediacy. We thus conceive wolimits fdevelopment: on the one hand, that of a "knower" forwhomthe" datum would be a " thatlesswhat , constituted y mediacythatmediatesnothing-a pure possibility, bjectivelyndistinguishableromnonentity; ndonthe other and, hatofa just-awakeningonsciousnessforwhich ll mediacy s implicit n the " one confused act " which sdatum James, rinciples fPsychology,i, p. 8). Belowthis, n a com-pleteformal urvey, herewould be that of a " knower forwhom he" datum would be a " whatless that , constituted y immediacy,devoidof all mediation,xplicit rimplicit,nd thuscomplete onentity.Knowledge s contemplationfobjects husdisappears t boththe upperand lower deallimits; it belongs o themiddle tagesofepistemologicaldevelopment,hat s, to theconsciousnessfthe finitendividual. Andit cannot onstitutehis. Atbirth here s purepsychologicalmmediacyforwhich pistemological ediacy essential orthe constitutionfanyobject) is implicit; developedhumanknowledgefobjects s generatedthroughhe xplication f hesemplicitactors,nd sextended ygrowingexperience nd by descriptionhrough xplicitmediation: its objectsremain that-whats onlybytheir elation o psychologicalmmediacy.Yet the objectsofdescriptione.g.,physical bjects) and the objectsofacquaintance e.g., ense-data) re ill bedfellows,nd theirmarriage asneverbeen consummated. n what direction, hen,shall we look fora satisfactoryssue ? The process of emending cquaintanceby de-scription eads towards he " thatlesswhats ofpurepossibility hichobjectivelys indistinguishablerom onentity.Suchcannotbe the true" emendation f theintellect . We must ook for omeform rfactorordevelopmentfourapprehensionhat will ead us,not to nonentities,but to thereal: andthis s theend have nview. It willbe seenas weproceed hat findt in passagebeyond heconception fknowledge sa subject-objectelation, othfor cquaintancend fordescription:withtheformeryreferenceo the nature fultimatecquaintance s no con-templation felementarybjectsbut as theenjoymentf ction; with helatterby thetranscendencefobjectivityn theintuitionftheessenceofthe " thatlesswhat ofperfectedescriptions non-objectivection,theground f all possibility,nd thusagainsupersedingontemplation.Butthis ndwillnotbeadvanced y thedenial f hegivennessf hedataofouter enseon theground hat, as I have admitted, bsolutely ureimmediacys empty.1Cf.Russell'sdistinctionf twokindsof" primitiveness(Our Know-ledge f theExternalWorld, p. 69-70). The distinctionhusdrawn lsoallowsfor he llusions fsense o whichwe aresubject; though do notforget hatRusselldenies heir ossibilityibid., . 85), and I amnotsurethat hisdenial nvolves o more han differencefexpression.


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176 H. F. HALLETT:tionwhether he objectsof acquaintanceare purely mmediateor not may thus receive an Aristotelian uietus. What is ofimportances to ask whether, aking heobjectofacquaintanceas it is ostensibly iven, t is of such a nature as to be capableof independent eality s an ens in se.According o Russell1 we are acquainted with: (i) outersense-data; (ii) our own innerthoughts nd feelings; (iii) re-membered ata of senseand innerconsciousness; (iv) perhapswiththe Self; and (v) certainuniversals. Of theseobjectsofacquaintanceperhaps maybe allowedto neglect he astthree:universals ecause amlimitingmy nquiry osingular xistents;the Self because Russell himself ppears to be very doubtfulaboutit; and memories ecausewhat shallhave to say aboutthe presentdata ofsenseand innerconsciousnesswill applytothema fortiori.(i) Consider,hen, ur outer ense-datas objectsof ndubitableacquaintance. I do not consider hepurity ftheir mmediacyunder n ultimate nalysis, ut their stensible haracter s pre-sented. Let it be grantedthat our knowledge f them is in-dubitable: thiswouldappearto entailtheirreality; butwhatkindof a reality s a sense-datum It is an objectiventity, hereality f an " other presenteds externalo theknower. Thisexternalitys signalized y thephrase" outer ense" as appliedto the mode of our knowledge f sense-data. This is, indeed,thedifferentiafsense-experiences distinct romwhatRussellcalls " self-consciousnessor " innersense". Sense-data areexternally resented and since externalitys a symmetricalrelation, ur knowledge f sense-datamust be an apprehensionof some entity r entities iewedexternally, s they are fromoutside,nd not as they re in themselves. f they reoutsideofus, we are outsideof them,and thus cut offfrom heir nneressence. The " red patch" is presented o us externally: wedo notgather rom his what" red" is in itself, hat t is like tobe " red" and notmerely o be presented s redto another orto the elfn external erception). This, nfact, s I havealreadysaid, is the verysourceof our effort,everrelaxed,to proceedbeyondacquaintanceto description,nd thusto graspthe fullnatureof the objectsthat are presented orour acquaintance.The aim of knowledge-abouts precisely o discoverthe innernatureoffacts, o know" whatmakesthemwhattheyare .2That efforts largelyfruitless ecause ofits failure o take due

1ProblemsfPhilosophy, p. 73-81. Cf.OurKnowledgeftheExternalWorld, p. 70-75.2 James, rinciplesfPsychology,, p. 221.


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KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 177accountof the special defectof outerapprehensionhat I havebeen emphasizing. For the descriptions,houghmorecomplex,or evenmore ubtle nd relatively dequate, areneverthelesse-scriptions f externalobjects still, .e., of " others viewed ex-ternally nd not as they are in themselves,'.e., as real. Do notlet mebe mistaken: I am not saying hatknowledge ailsbecausethere re no things therhan he knower, nd distinct rom im.We oughtto make a serious efforto forget he opposition fidealism nd realism hat has fortoo long been a sort of mono-mania among philosophersnd theiraudiences. No one reallydoubts,or even has reason to doubt, the reality fbeingsotherthanhimself; the point am now making s that the externalobjects of our acquaintance are disqualified or reality by theconditions f their apprehension: their externalityo the selfinvolves the externality f the self to them, and thus the ex-ternality f theirpresentation. So far is it frombeing hecasethat bjectivitys equivalent o reality, t is essentially isqualifiedbyits externality.3 ut this does not implythat the realityofa thing s its mind, ormind s onlyone ofthe actions onstitutingthe nseitas fa real, and it is neither biquitousnorultimate.But, t may be objected,why houldnot a " qualitied ontour"be real though t is not a thing-in-itself Why shouldwe seekto go further han the overt data of experience I reply:we do not need to go beyondthese data to establish ur point;we need not attempt o give a priori reasons for the denial ofreality o sense-data; forwe are especially avourably ituatedwithrespect o one part of what appears as the objectiveworld,viz., what we call our " sense-organs. These we not only con-template externally s qualitied contours,but also enjoy asthings-in-themselves. hus we can say, and in a sense more

1The phrase" thing-in-itselftendsto become cliche' nd to lose itsprimitivend vital significance.No one who held clearly n mind tsostensible onnotationould evendiscussthe questionwhether hysicalobjectsare the things-in-themselves:hey are too clearlythings-from-outside. Nor couldhe take the thing-in-itselfs no more hantheper-manent bjectthatpresentshangingppearances, ornoobject, r thing-from-outside,anbe a thing-in-itself.2 Forto doubt s-tobe so farthwarted: ifbyanother, hen hatotheris at leastas real as theself hatdoubts; ifby the self, hen he self sfinite, nd the same conclusion ollows. We may doubtthe realityofthingsxternalous,andwith eason: wecannot oubt hereality fbeingsother hanthe self.3Let memake tunambiguouslylear hat trict nowledge ith bjectsis impossible, ot becausetheyare other, ut becausethey are external.The subjectcannot ontemplateheinseity ftheobject. The othernessof" self and " other need nno wiseconceal he nseity f he" other"fromthe " self". In love the " self" enjoysthe " other .


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178 H. F. HALLETT:a propos hanBerkeleyndRussell, hat" a man needonlyopenhis eyesto see " that qualitiedcontours s such are lacking nreality. For them he assertion s no more than an analogicalway ofasserting elf-evidence,ut I am asserting hat the very" seeing ofoureyesconvinces s thatthey re not n themselvesrealized as objective qualitied contours. -Sound empiricalevidence s thus available evenas we openour eyes to see. Theeyeis no mere eenobject, an objectfor nother's eeing, ut anactive eeing ntity. Look atyour ye na mirror: t is a colouredsuperficiesf some complexity. Suppose it dissected: still itpresents o sightonlyvaried colouredsuperficies.Take it asan infiniteystem r assemblageof suchactuallyor potentiallycoloured uperficies-stillhisis not the eye that sees,but onlythevisible ye. To discover herealeyewemust urn wayfrom-the objectthat s seen, othe" same" eyeas itis looking t itselfin themirror. Now it is no object,at leastso far as it functionsefficiently:t is a seeing hing, functioningns in se. If it ispresentn vision at all it is as that expanseof visual space-timewithinwhich all particularvisual objects are located. Andevidently,his sthesameeyethatappears s object n themirror,nowappearing nd nowfunctioning,ow objectand now real.The same s trueofeverypartof the sentient ody: thefingerthat is a tangible object to the adjacent thumb, n itself s noobjectbut an actingentity; nota touchedbut a touching; nota qualitied ontour ut an ens n se. And so on.Now there s no reasonto supposethatthe thing call " mybody" is differentn any fundamental ayfrom ourbody thatI contemplate s a qualitied contour,noryour body from heother hings hat appear in objectiveacquaintance: that is, nofundamentalbjectiveifference.And thereasonwhy say thattheobject s notreal s because t doesnothing; it doesnot even" appear" : it is an appearance. But thereal that thusappearsis a thinghat cts,or a communityf things hat act; and thisis trueeven for hosethingswhoseactivity oes not nclude hatofknowing. It may well be thatmany things hat appear donot know; that manythingsthat knowdo not appear; andthatmany hings hatact neither nownor ppear, But nothingis real that does not in someway function. " We exist," saysSirWilliamHamilton,"only as we energize," nd theprinciplemaybe fullygeneralized. The essence ofany real, then, s theaction that it enacts; and by that I do notmean themotionsthatit suffers,heprocess n which t is involved, he objectivechanges hat it exhibits n objectiveappearance. An action nitself s nottemporal, houghwemay cometo regard t as an en-


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KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 179during ction. We do so only n so far as the actiongeneratestime, nd is dated byreferenceo the timethat tgenerates roma non-temporal present . Sightqua sight s an eternal ction,for thoughwe may continue o see, the act of seeing n itself snot temporal. So we may believe that the action that con-stitutesthe realityof a " materialthing , that appears as avariouslyqualitiedspatio-temporalontour, s something hatit eternallynacts,notas an objectbutas an ens n se.'(ii) But we have acquaintance, t is said,notonlywithoutersense-data, utwith urown nner houghtsndfeelingsnddesires,and these t least wouldseemto avoid theobjections havebeenraising. Unfortunately,owever,o set sthemindby ts noimalpractical nterestsn objectsto the contemplationfthem, hatit tendsconstantlyo objectifywhat t apprehends venwhen tshouldbe clear thatthis s neither xternalnor other. In thisnaturalbias it is re-inforcedy ourhabitof using bstract ermslike "knowledge , " thought , " desire , " conation , " voli-tion , and the like, whicherectas objectiveabstractionswhatare reallynot objects at all but actions: knowing, hinking,desiring, ndeavouring, illing. To thiswe are also predisposedby the truly candalous ambiguity f the term" object" in itsmodernHydra-headed sage. Of course f anything hat is inany manner pprehendeds to be styled" object" thenknow-ledgemustbe exclusively subject-objectelation,nd" objects"alone can be apprehended. So we find ven so careful writeras Russell speakingof " my seeingthe sun" or " my desiringfood" as " an objectwithwhich am acquainted ,2 when t isevident forthe most superficial eflectionhat " seeing and" desiring are not " objects" of acquaintanceat all whenweare acquainted withthem. And I think hatRussellhimself sconsciousthat thisway of speaking s inappropriatewith" theSelf" " which has the thoughtor feeling : he calls it the" person acquaintedwiththe " object ,3 though venhere onefeels hat thedifficultyhat he findswithreferenceo our reputedacnuaintancewith theSelf is vervlarmelvuietohis inability.

1 I shall return o thesequestions n the secondpart of this article.The distinction etween n ens n se andan object s more ully iscussedin my articles n " The Roots of Duality n HumanKnowledge (Proc.Arist. Soc., 1937-1938, p. 168-188)and " On Things n Themselves"(Philosophy, iv, pp. 155-179).

2 ProblemsfPhilosophy,. 77. 3Ibid., p. 79.4 Whichwithin coupleofyearshe resolved y an unqualified enial.Cf.ProblemsfPhilosophy1912),pp. 78-80; OurKnowledgef he xternalWorld1914),p. 74: " The bare subject, f t exists t all, is an inference,and is not part ofthe data ". In the intervalhe had evidently racedhimselfo the" rashness of" speaking ositively on this very ifficultquestion ".


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180 H. F. HALLETT:withHume,to discover t as an " object . But evenwiththethoughts, eelings, nd desires,of the Self the same difficultyshould have been apparent, nd would,I think,be suggested,almost rresistibly,o anyonewho discardedthe abstractsub-stantives ywhichwe areapt to nametheseforms ftheactivityof the Self,and made use of the, at least more appropriate,gerunds: thinking, esiring,willing, tc.'It is to SamuelAlexander hat we mostnaturally ook for amorediscriminatingccount of our acquaintancewith our ownactions. So impressed ashe, nd sorightly, ith loydMorgan'semphasisupon the distinction f " -eds" and " -ings that,avoiding he alreadyambiguous erm" immediate xperience,he invented hehumorouslynappropriate,nd therefore emor-able, name of " enjoyment for our acquaintancewithcertainof our ownactions, eserving contemplation for uracquaint-ance with,or knowledge n generalof, objects. There can, Ithink,be no doubt that Alexander'soriginalaccount of thisdistinctions in intention t least unexceptionable: " Any ex-periencewhatevermaybe analysednto wodistinct lementsndtheir elation o one another . . theact ofmindortheaware-ness, and . . . the object ofwhich t is aware; the relationbetween hem sthatthey retogetherrcompresentntheworldwhich s thus so farexperienced. . But the two termsaredifferentlyxperienced. The one is experienced . . as theactofexperiencing,heother sthatwhich sexperienced. . . I amaware ofmyawareness. . . Myawareness nd mybeing wareof t are identical . . themindenjoys tselfnd contemplatesits objects. The act of mindis an enjoyment;the object iscontemplated."Thus contemplatingn object involvesalso the enjoyingofthe contemplating:contemplatingnd enjoying ontemplatingare identical; forcontemplatings an actingthat existsas anenjoying. We enjoy the contemplating f objects,but we donot contemplatethe enjoyingof contemplating.We enjoy

1Though admit hat hecase of he erm feelings, that s incommonuse, showsthe extent o which hegrammatical sage thatmakespar-ticiples s such djectival nddrives s tothegerund,swell s thenatural"radical objectivism ofthefinitemind,may idetrack s.I needhardly ay that I am not denying he utility fthe abstractsubstantive n literaturend common peech,or even in philosophicaldiscourse here onfusionsnot ikely o arise, rhas beenforestalled.The objection aisedappliesequallyto theuse oftheterm event"for n action: " Oursensation, hichs a mental vent onsistingnourbeingaware of a sensible bject " (Russell, OurKnowledgef theExternalWorld,. 76).2 Space,Time, ndDeity,,pp. 11-12.


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KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 181contemplating. We must not, Alexander ells us, " regardthemindas contemplatingtself 1: the acceptance of experienceas a relationof " compresence depends upon our taking themind as something njoyedand the object as something on-templated, nd not both as objects of contemplation.2 o far,in the main, so good. Contemplatings an action distinct romits object; but enjoying he contemplatings inseparable romthe contemplating.Contemplatings conscious s an action aswellas inrespect f tsobject. Enjoyment, hen, f t s acquaint-ance at all, s notacquaintancewith n objectbut a certainobject-less realization; and what must nsistuponisthat we must beconstantlynourguard against hinkingf t as a form f know-ledge differingromcontemplation nly in its " object", thatobject beingan action nstead of a thing. That we are liableto thisfundamentalonfusion an be traced, s I have suggested,to the operation f one ofthose inguistic ecoys against whichrecent philosophical movements have made us increasinglyvigilant. It arises, think,from he use of a transitive erbfor n action that is essentiallyntransitive,nd the attempt oescape between hehornsby making t reflexive. " My aware-ness", says Alexander, "and my being aware of it areidentical": 3 that is, contemplatingn objectis the same thingas enjoying he contemplatingf theobject; to enjoy, herefore,thoughtisgrammaticallyransitives epistemologicallyntransi-tive,-a fact thatwe concealby sayingthat " I enjoy mycon-templating, as if the contemplating erethe reflex bject ofthe enjoying. Thisconfusion an be verbally voided fwe say:" we are consciously ware of objects" insteadof: " we areawareof our awareness fobjects", i.e., " we enjoyourcontem-plationofobjects"; but ifwe do so it becomes lear thatto beawareand tobe consciouslyware re dentical,o that, nrelationto ourownactions, njoyings a form fknowledgendeed,butin a very special sense,and certainly ot in the subject-objectsense. It is also a formof being,4 iz., the consciousbeingofcertainof our actions.Such,then, take to be the formal ccountof ouracquaintancewith,or consciousness f,our own actionsgiven by Alexander.I have elsewherexpressed oubtsconcerninghe application fthe distinctiony the author,naming speciallyhis eu d'esprit

1Space,Time, ndDeity, . 17. 2 Loc. cit. 3Ibid., p. 12.4 It willbe seen n the ssuethat do not myselfimit enjoying toour enjoymentf" self , andthusalso to a form f being. For in com-munitywith the " other we also enjoy it: yet withoutontologicalidentity.


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182 H. F. HALLETT:about" the angel'sview", which do notaltogether nderstandbut which feelmaybe ofcrucialmportance;andmore ertainlyhis accountof mental or enjoyed space and time,whichseemsto be essential o hismetaphysical ystem.' I mustnot occupyspace undulywith thesetopicsbut it is instructive, think, oreflect pon their mplications or the theoryof acquaintanceby enjoyment. As I have said, Alexander emphasizes theidentity fcognitionwith hegeneral elation f" compresenceas depending n the view that themindenjoys tself nd con-templatests object. We have not twocompresent bjects,butan action ndanobject. Thereputed uniqueness of hecogni-tive relation s thus transferredrom he relation o the terms,one of which s an enjoymentnd the other n object. But thisdistinction f terms s only possible n the knower'sown per-spectiveofthings, njoyment eingas it were nternal. For ahigher eingboth termswould be objects. For an angel " myconsciousnesswouldbe an object eq'uallywith the tree,and hewould see my enjoyment ompresent iththetree,much n thesameway as I may see a tree compresentwith the earth .2But, ofcourse, ince both I and my object,the tree,wouldbeobjects o theangelhe wouldnot havemyknowledgefthetree:he wouldmiss our specialrelationofcognition ecause thisre-quiresthe compresence f an enjoymentwith an object. Forhimtherewould be compresent mentalobject and a physicalobject.I confess hat I find hispartofAlexander'sdoctrine t oncebewilderingnd intriguing:prima acie twould seemto conflictwith heaccount fenjoyment hich unlike ontemplationhichcan be enjoyed)cannot be contemplated.But it is, of course,only heenjoyerhimself ho cannotcontemplate isenjoyment:theangelcouldnotcontemplate is ownangelicenjoyment, uthe can contemplatehe humanenjoyment. To the form fsuchan objective enjoymentAlexandergivesus no clue; nor doeshe cite nstances nalogousfrom ur ownexperience,nwhichwecontemplateheenjoymentsf owerbeings, tandingn relationto themas the " angel" standsto us. This seemsa littleoddin a thinkerwhoregardsphilosophy s " empiricaln method(if not altogether o in content),3 orpresumablywe have ex-perience f lowerbeingsbettercertified han our experience f" angels . Yet, nevertheless, think hatwehave here meta-physical rinciple fcentralmportance,nd especially or hose

1Cf. Philosophy,iv, p. 157. The relevant assages nAlexander re:Space,Time, ndDeity, , pp. 19-20; bk. , chs.3 and4pa8sim.2Space, Time, ndDeity, , p. 19. 3 Ibid., p. 4.


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KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 183who, like myself, ake the view that realitymeans action, andthat every real thing-in-itselfs real as non-objective ctionyet is able to make objective appearance to other real things,i.e., as qualitied spatio-temporalontour. The " red" of thered-hot oker s thus the objective appearanceofthe action ofthe real " poker : actionthat the poker enjoys appearingforanother gentas contemplated bject in space-time. The maindifferenceetween uch a view and that ofAlexanderwouldthenbe that the space-timemust" emerge with the objectificationof the action,and formally onstitutet, and cannot belong totheaction s enjoyedbythepoker.3 For Alexander inds easonto believe n a space and a time that are mental, .e., enjoyed,and notby us contemplated, hough tandingn relation o ourcontemplated pace and time. This, I confess,s a conceptionthat,at present, find t impossible o accept. "That the mindas the experienced ontinuum f mental acts . . is a time-series , he tells us, " would be admitted on all hands"; it" has Time in its very constitution: 4 but howeverwidelythismay be admitted, can even find t in myheartto denythetemporality,fmental ction: I do notthink hat an enjoyedact of mind s as such and in essencetemporal, hough ts con-ditionsmay be contemplateds havingbeen in time,becausethe time-seriesf events s generated ytheco-operationfsuchactions.5But whatever iewwemaytake about mental ime,whenweconsider the asserted spatialityof enjoyed mental acts ourscepticism rows. How can it be said that the " mindenjoysitself patially , that " mindis spatial like matter 2 6 Evenwith the warning hat mindenjoys tself,not in contemplatedspace,but in " enjoyedspace ", the saying s too hard: unless,

1And not excepting he Real whose objective xpression or us con-stitutes reation.2 So thatto " appear is not merelyopresent selection fcharactersor partsbut,while emainingn tself n enjoyment,o become he objectof contemplation;whileremainingn action,to be contemplateds awqualitiedcontour f space-time.3It is the objectifiedesponse f the contemplatoro the objectifiedactionofthe" other , orrather,whatobjectifieshataction. Thustheobjectcontemplatedwespartof tsnature, oughly,heformal lements,tothe ontemplatingself"; the material and differentiatinglements,to the appearing other . I shall return o this subject in greaterprecisionn Part II.4Space, Time, ndDeity, , p. 94.5WhatI have said above about theeternityf the act ofseeingquaseeingmaybe generalized.Cf.also Part II, below,under Time .

6 Space,Time, nd Deity, , p. 97.


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184 H. F. HALLETT:indeed, enjoyed pace " werenot, fter ll, an extent rvolume,but somethinglse.' Alexander's xplicit tatements, owever,show the contrary: "My mindis forme . . . spread out orvoluminousn its enjoyment. Withinthis vague . . . volumethe separateand salient mental acts or processes tand out ashaving positionand direction." As against this description,however, t seems to me that voluminousnesss essentially nobjectofcontemplation,nly o be enjoyed n the sense thatthecontemplation eenjoy s a contemplationfvoluminousbjects.If we call thisa " voluminous ontemplation it willbe welltosubstitute he gerundfor the abstract substantive, nd to askwhether he contemplating hat we enjoy is voluminous. Ifit is, we can go on to say that our enjoyment f thatvoluminouscontemplatings a voluminousnjoying; if,as I think,t is not,we are bound to reject the conception fmental pace-except,perhaps, n the derived ense analogousto that allowed n thecase of mental ime. Just s wedateourenjoyment yreferenceto the time generated y our action, o we locateit by referenceto thedistancegenerated your action.3Let menowattempt o bring ogetherhe threads fthispartofmy argument,nd to lay downwhat take to be the essentialnatureof knowledge, nd of reality, nd of the relations oldingbetween hem. Knowledge, have suggested,s not generallydefinables a subject-object elation: so to define t necessarilyentails general cepticism; for, n theonehand,thedistinctionofknowledgend opinionor belief t least involves he assuredtruth f the former,o that what is genuinely nownmust beapprehendedn its real character s it is in itself as a functioningexistent. Yet, on the otherhand,fromtsverynatureno object.as such can be so apprehended: qua objectt has no inseity; itis an ensab extra ndno ens n se; it is an ambiguous ppearanceof a real,orcongress freals, nd not theseas theyare in them-selves. Objects qua objects do not act: all action attributed

'For a suggestionf pace n tselfs action atherhanextentwemusthaverecourse o the Extension fSpinoza,notregardeds an AttributefSubstance,.e.,as conceived ythe ntellect as if constitutingheessenceof Substance , but as actually onstitutinghat essence. But this s aninconception atherthan a conception,hough that is not Spinoza'sview.2Loc.cit. 3Cf.PartIL,under cSpace" and "c ime".4Has anymoredesperatelyceptical ssertion verbeenmade thantheKantian commonplacehatwe have no knowledgefthings-in-themselvesIf thephrase ad notbecome mere lichet wouldbe apparent hat therecan be no knowledgexcept f things-in-themselves,.e., of reals. If wehave not this,we have nothing! For knowledge ust be knowledgefthe real.

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KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 185to themhas been imputed o them,or conveyed hrough hem,and can always, herefore,e deniedbythesceptic. Even whereobjects are apprehendeds " moments ofprocess, hisprocessis an objectivepassagenot apprehended romwithin s agency:the agency s imputed,or conveyed, nd again by the scepticdenied. If knowledge erminatesn objects qua objects it cannever be true, and hence never knowledge. We must look,therefore,o a formof apprehensionhat terminates n reals,in entiaaeterna nd not entiaexterna,n inneractions and not,superficialppearances. We must look, in Alexander'swords,not to contemplationsut to enjoyments.But, itmaybe suggested,may tnot be possible o distinguishin the objectsbetweenthat which makes themexternal, heirspatio-temporality,nd that which signalizes their genuinereality, heir ualitativecontent If so, theformermight henbe taken as signifying nlytheirrelationto our localized anddated incidence,while the latterwould remain s theirdefinitepositiveclaimto reality. I reply: onthe lane of objectivityheattempted istinctions idle,whetherwe applyformal rinciplesor rely upon experience for, n the one case, the qualitativecontentmustvanishwith heabstractionf tsspatio-temporality,e.g.,an enduring edarea must cease to be red if t ceasesto bean area and to endure; and, nthe other ase, t is the remnantsof spatio-temporalityn our empiricaldata that secure theirobjectivity,nd thus o far onceal heir eality. I say " conceal"theirreality, or n spiteof what I have just said I mustagreethat we are not compelledto supposethat the qualityof theobject,or evenits spatio-temporality,s unambiguously nreal:it remains ossible o takethequality s thespatio-temporalizedappearanceof the real action ofthe " other with the " self ,and the spatio-temporalitys the qualitied appearanceof thereal actionof the " self with the " other . A " red" that isnot an " enduring ed area " is not " red , and an " enduringarea " that is not qualitiedis neither xtended nor enduring.Empty space-time 0. Yet if we allow ourselves he liberty-thatwe take when, e.g.,we speakof " blushingmodesty or" keen-eyedvigilance we may well say that the red of theenduring ed area is the spatio-temporalizedppearanceof a"red-action ,.1 Andthis, think, s whatLeibnizmeantwhen

1It is to be noted that " red " is not here the adjectiveof " action " but-is in apposition. So also I read the analogous phrases I have quoted,thoughcommonusage tends to read the gerund as participle,and so pro-*ceeds as, explicitly, n the second example) to the adjective under cover"of figure fspeech.13



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186 H. F. HALLETT:he described ense-qualitiess " occult . In relation o themwe are in theposition f Alexander's angel": we contemplatetheir njoyed gency s objectivequality. We mayevenassumea more xaltedanalogy nd compare urselveswiththe " God "of Spinoza: the agency of the " self co-operateswiththat ofthe " other as joint creator of the qualitiedspatio-temporalobject, s Deus sive Natura (respectuntellectus)ternally reatesits ownactualization. When Spinozaidentifies atura naturanswith Natura naturata, creatingwith a created, e is in factidentifyingctiowithactus, nd it is hisfurtherdentificationfactuswith " object" that is the root of his often-imputed,and generally-decried,intellectualism.1It is importanto noticethat thenatureof thismetaphysicalderivationof objects fromagency renderswholly futileanyrequestor attempt o describe ts stepsor " mechanism as ifit werean objectiveprocess.2 Onlyunusually allow positivistminds will be temptedto interpret his as meaningthat it isadvancedas a meredogma. It has, in fact, tubborn mpiricalfoundationsn our apprehensionf objectsand agents; and ifit is not a uniformlyharddatum" throughouthewholerangeofthese,at least it is " softest at the lowerextremityfthehierarchy, herewe canmost easilytake the objectfor hatandnothingmore; and " hardest wherewe are dealingwith ntitiesfully o-ordinate ithourselves,whereno room s leftfordoubtthatobiectsare informed ith gencv. I have said already hat

1ThusforNatura he dentityfactio nd actus-objects complete ndunambiguous,or self and "other" are one, and the" object is theself-expressionf the identity; but for the finite self" the " other"is complementarynd constitutes given" field witbinwhich ibertyis achieved hrough community(cf. " TheMoralGood , in Hume andPresent ay Problems, rist.Soc. Supp. Vol. xviii, pp. 144-178). Thusthe dentitymusthereremain ccultbecause t is the " self that appre-hends he ambiguous object that s the expression, otof itself lone,but of its congresswith the " other . The importantmetaphysicalquestion hen utstandingould ethe haracterobe mputed o Natwra:whether,nd n what ense, .g., xtensionmaybesaid to be its Attribute.Spinoza akes thisto be onemeaningof" actualization, and holdsthatwithoutome such Attributeo differenceouldbe perceived y the ir-tellect etween ctio nd actus. Yet hedenies hat t is the sole meaning:there re nfinite ays nwhich ctio uraactualizes tself. In the case oftime e smore xplicit:Naturanaturanss eternal,-constitutesternity;and thusNatura naturatamust be conceived sub specieaeternitatis.2 Even the scientific reduction of colouror sound to oscillatoryspatio-temporalrocesses, hich oints nalogicallyowards uch deriva-tion, can exhibitno objective tepsof process: yet a spatio-temporalprocess, oweverminute r ample, s as farfromgency s the colourorsoundderived romt. It differsoto oelo romn actiongeneratingpaceand timeyet n tself emainingnternalnd eternal.



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KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITY. 187" no one reallydoubts,or evenhas reason to doubt,the realityof beingsotherthan>himself: in so speaking was thinkingespecially four assurance fthereality i.e.,theagency)ofthosewithwhomwe are in any relations f" community. I do notdoubtthe real agency of the enemywho opposesme with m-placable enmity, f the alienmindwhose nterestsre so remotethat canonly meethimwithgenerous oleration,fthealter gowhoengagesmy friendshipnd responds o it; least of all doesthe overdoubt herealityndagency fhisbeloved.' Scepticismmainlyconcerns hingsconceivedas objects of purelycontem-plative nterest, r as so much objective" junk" happening ooccupyour bodily nvironment,ut not nuse. For theworkingnavigator he stars and planetsare indisputably eal, and forthe craftsman he tools and materialswith,and within,whichhefunctionsrebeyonddubiety. Is itnot evident hat ourbeliefis a function f what we sometimes all " sympathy withthe" other , i.e., of our entrancento,and our enjoyment f,theagency of the " other ?I am wellaware,ofcourse, hatthus to speakofenjoying heenjoyment f the " other has been condemned s self-contra-dictory,as hyperbole;or at best self-deceptionrisingfrompassionor mysticism; but I believethat these udgments rebased upon an uncritical cceptanceof that ultimacy f objec-tivity hat thas beenmychief im to discredit. It seems o methat we do have experience f identity f enjoymentwith the" other , thoughwe do not ense ts sensations, eel tsfeelings,or act upon its impulses. Sensations, eelings,nd impulses reobjectsofcontemplation,nd not what have said wemay share,viz.,enjoyings. I go furthernd say that if we could not thusenjoytheenjoyings fthe " other , the " other would remaindubiousobject, nd not nstrument,nemy, lien,friend,r over,acting n " community with he" self .3I suggest, hen,that we have here a stubborn mpirical actthat taken n tstotalitysthehardest fharddata: thecraftsmanin thevery ct of usinghis tool cannotdoubt tsreality ecausehe enjoyshisagency n theagencyofthe tool. When he puts taside and philosophizesbout it as a mereobjecthe may waverin his belief s he contemplatest; the assurance hat we have

1 Cf. TheMoralGood" (loc.cit.).2 Cf.Pringle attison,Man's Place in theCosmos,p. 124-127.3This makes clearwhat have already mphasized: thatothernesssno bartoknowledge,utonly xternality. ontemplationails,but enjoy-ment arries s into the inseity fthe " other in the measure f ourhierarchicalelativity.



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188 HR. F. HALLETT: KNOWLEDGE, REALITY, AND OBJECTIVITYof the realityof the " other is indeed our enjoyment f itsactive reality. Ourenjoymentf ourown action s ourcertaintyof our own reality: the principleneed receiveno Cartesianlimitation o thinking; but neithermust t receive solipsisticlimitations if we were confinedn our enjoyments o our ownactions. In love we enjoy the action of the beloved s if t wereour own; and onlyso is our love genuine. As soon as we losethis dentity fenjoyed gency nd beginto use the " other asan amusing bject,ove is degraded o play; as soonas we beginto find n the amusingobjectan agencywithwhichwe can co-operate n a mutualactiveenjoyment, layis elevatedto seriouslove.' And this, think, s the principle hat must governourinterpretationf all that " well-founded pinion that passesunder heequivocalname of" ' knowledge by contemplation:it trembles pon the brinkof illumination. " We are green nHeaven's eyes,"when we take the object qua object as real inits own right; but equally when we take it as mere Schein.The quest is for hose who elevate contemplationnto love, andplayful solation into " comnmunity. To look, as " radicalobjectivists have always done, to the unprejudiced ontem-plationofobjects as the sole and satisfactory ay of knowledge,oreven, n itself,s a way at all, is to sufler rom lindness tooblindto have desire o see ". Ifweare to apprehend he reality,ofwhichthe " object" is but " occult appearance" 2 we mustthrow n our lot with the " other , so that it may convinceusof its agencyby mutually njoyed co-operation. This is art;this s morality; this s knowledgendeed.

(To be concluded.)'The same, mutatismutandis,s of coursetrue of personalhate also.Moralitys not quite the simple hing hatmight therwise e supposed.2Theself-contradictoryhrase s used to indicate he demandmade onthe" self by the" other , and on the" other by the" self .

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Knowledge Reality and Objectivity

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