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The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by Veton Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the name of Koha Ditorë. With the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org. - 1 - Koha Digest # 90 DATE: 7 February 1996 FRONT PAGE: UNCLE LEADS US TO EUROPE EDITORIAL THE REPUBLIC AND SELF-DETERMINATION by VETON SURROI The Kosovan public functions based on injections. In the first years of the disintegration of Yugoslavia those were optimistic injections the population was getting from political leaders and newspapers and sometimes from international institutions and associations, meanwhile reality gave injections of pessimism. In the last years, the roles changed a bit and now the only ones who are giving injections of optimism are the political activists. I recalled this last week, when the (bilateral) recognition of Belgrade's sovereignty over Kosova arose from the local newspapers and some statements of foreigners. A friend of mine, one of the best jurists we have, made a list of our pessimistic statements. I, on the other hand, asked my friend how relevant was it to be optimistic or pessimistic when taking a case to defend in court. "Not at all", he said, "Facts are relevant in court". The truth is that Kosova is not at trial, and if it were, it would be one of the trials we are used to in this area, when the chairmen of the Party committees (today it is the Serbian administration) dictate the verdict and sentence by phone. Thus we would reach the answer to the question why isn't Kosova being recognized as an independent state, when this is a just solution for 90% of the Kosovan people. It is a just solution, but in this historical moment it is not a product of political balance in the Balkans, Europe and the world. In this balance, justice plays almost no role, and who doesn't believe this should just look at Bosnia. The issue of the recognition of the Republic of Kosova as an independent state is a political movement that seeks the approval of many actors (the ones who declare this reality want the others to recognize it) and this issue has become more or less clear to the Kosovan leaders after Dayton. Dayton is not surprising, for these things were clearly said since The Hague and London conferences: borders will not change. At least for the time being. The disappointment and surprise of those who were waiting to have the recognition of the Republic of Kosova to sort of happen somehow in some conference is surprising. But, the reality is so and it is thrown to our faces, but there is the other side of reality which is being easily eliminated in the comments: Kosova, needs self-determination to fulfill the interests of its people. Even more, based on this need and its juridical development so far and the general development of legal notions in the world, it has the right to self-determination. And, finally, in the recomposing Balkans, the right to self- determination is in the interest of the new architecture of security nd cooperation in the Balkans. There is not much need for more actors to give this interpretation of the Kosovan reality; and if one says that Kosova is this or that, no one has the right to deprive Kosova from feeling the right to decide about its
Transcript
Page 1: Koha Digest 90 (1996)

The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by Veton

Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha

soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the

name of Koha Ditorë. With the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on

http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org.

- 1 -

Koha Digest # 90DATE: 7 February 1996FRONT PAGE: UNCLE LEADS US TO EUROPE

EDITORIAL

THE REPUBLIC AND SELF-DETERMINATION

by VETON SURROI

The Kosovan public functions based on injections. In the first years of the disintegration ofYugoslavia those were optimistic injections the population was getting from political leadersand newspapers and sometimes from international institutions and associations, meanwhilereality gave injections of pessimism. In the last years, the roles changed a bit and now theonly ones who are giving injections of optimism are the political activists. I recalled this lastweek, when the (bilateral) recognition of Belgrade's sovereignty over Kosova arose from thelocal newspapers and some statements of foreigners. A friend of mine, one of the best juristswe have, made a list of our pessimistic statements. I, on the other hand, asked my friend howrelevant was it to be optimistic or pessimistic when taking a case to defend in court. "Not atall", he said, "Facts are relevant in court". The truth is that Kosova is not at trial, and if itwere, it would be one of the trials we are used to in this area, when the chairmen of the Partycommittees (today it is the Serbian administration) dictate the verdict and sentence by phone.Thus we would reach the answer to the question why isn't Kosova being recognized as anindependent state, when this is a just solution for 90% of the Kosovan people. It is a justsolution, but in this historical moment it is not a product of political balance in the Balkans,Europe and the world. In this balance, justice plays almost no role, and who doesn't believethis should just look at Bosnia. The issue of the recognition of the Republic of Kosova as anindependent state is a political movement that seeks the approval of many actors (the oneswho declare this reality want the others to recognize it) and this issue has become more orless clear to the Kosovan leaders after Dayton. Dayton is not surprising, for these things wereclearly said since The Hague and London conferences: borders will not change. At least forthe time being. The disappointment and surprise of those who were waiting to have therecognition of the Republic of Kosova to sort of happen somehow in some conference issurprising. But, the reality is so and it is thrown to our faces, but there is the other side ofreality which is being easily eliminated in the comments: Kosova, needs self-determination tofulfill the interests of its people. Even more, based on this need and its juridical developmentso far and the general development of legal notions in the world, it has the right toself-determination.

And, finally, in the recomposing Balkans, the right to self- determination is in the interest ofthe new architecture of security nd cooperation in the Balkans. There is not much need formore actors to give this interpretation of the Kosovan reality; and if one says that Kosova isthis or that, no one has the right to deprive Kosova from feeling the right to decide about its

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own fate and to express this feeling. And, any international policy which wouldn't take intoaccount this element would play the game of the ostrich, sinking the head in sand. In a nearfuture we will be surprised: there are more people on the side of this idea outside Kosova thatwe imagine, especially in these moments of collective depression.

KOSOVA

NATIONAL TEAM OR LEAGUE?

by YLBER HYSA / Prishtina

The initiative for the celebration of a Consultation ofoutstanding individuals and subjects in the Albanian politics,whose intention was to gather leaders of the political life andacademicians, seems to have slowed down its pace after the firstmeeting. Seemingly, the non-participation of president Rugova wasthe reason of the non-celebration of the meeting as projected. Tomake the situation even more complicated, the press, the rumorsand tattling made the continuation of the Consultation uncertain.Rugova couldn't (or didn't according to another version)participate in the meeting because he was busy (he met with IvorRoberts, the Aspen Group and Chris Hill), although there werealso unofficial explanations coming even from the LDK that he hadbeen ill. (A foreign diplomat says that Rugova told him that heas President of the Republic is not obliged to participate inthese Consultations). Anyhow, it became clear, or maybe it wasimposed by his absence, that Rugova was the central figure ofsuch Consultation. Building this impression was aided by the factthat some individuals were willing to mystify everything, thusmaking normal communication between Albanian personalitiesimpossible, in times when it is needed most. "I believe there ismore prejudice than disagreements" - says our collocutor from theLDK, who wishes to remain anonymous, maybe also because he wishesnot to incite new prejudice. Many other actors of thisConsultation join this logic of silence, always fearing that theywould start unnecessary polemics in the media, in times whenthere are attempt to celebrate the second round of Consultations.This time, the question is how many and how will the meeting becelebrated (if celebrated), and of course, whether presidentRugova will participate. Again, according to a LDK source, whoalso remains anonymous, the issue of his participation will besolved by his decision (although it is said that he doesn't havea negative posture toward his participation), but there will beLDK participation, by all means. There are even rumors that aprevious agreement was reached about a draft Declaration, whichbesides the introduction, describes the difficult situation ofthe Albanians and their aspirations, insisting on thereconfirmation of the plebiscitary will expressed in the

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Referendum stressing the necessity of starting serious Albanian-Serb negotiations, between the legitimate and equalrepresentatives of both sides, with the assistance of aninternational mediator, but not mentioning the temporary civilianadministration (as a guarantee for the peaceful and justsolution), and expressing the need for institutional coordinationbetween Kosovan and Albanian subjects in general. According toour sources, this project-proposal was approved to a significantextent by the LDK and this may mean that an obstacle to thecelebration of the meeting has been eliminated. On the otherhand, it is not certain whether his (non) participation willbring up a misunderstanding, but the statements made by anotherundisputable person, Demaçi, in the meeting with the Swedishdiplomats, "that no one wishes to replace Rugova" seems to be anexplanation meant for the public that the Consultation should notbe understood as a putsch venue. On the other hand, one of theorganizers of the Consultation, PPK's chairman Bajram Kosumi, inthe last issue of "Zëri i Kosovës", published by the People'sMovement of Kosova (whose last issue speaks widely of Rugova'sunderestimation of the meeting" and the fact "that the inviteesdidn't show up") declares that the beginning of the Consultationis a very important act in Albanian politics, because we arelooking into the situation without wasting time or looking backand because there is willingness of the Albanian intellectualpotential towards the realization of Kosova. He finalizes bysaying that "the seriousness of the political moment incites theneed of unity of the political subject and the need to enliventhe Albanian politics...". This should in a way eliminate some ofthe "obstacles" to convene the meeting, even though it is veryhard to imagine an institutionalized political movement, as thePresidency of the Republic of Kosova pretends to be, could bereplaced by a Consultation. If it is so, then either theConsultation is not one, or the Presidency is not one either.

Anyhow, such hypothetical polarization is seemingly being evadedby the participants themselves. Especially if it is stressed thattwo vice-chairmen of the LDK will participate in the reunion.Nevertheless, it seems that two questions remain open, and itseems early to give replies to. First, this is facing the ideathat we must wait to see how things evolve (see what happensafter Christopher's visit) - which always takes us back to theinitial stadium - "are we maybe rushing" and the completelydifferent dilemma "maybe we are late". It seems that the twocorners comprising these dilemmas are in fact the fundament ofthose who participate in the Consultation and to many inside theAlbanian political subject. These are the starting point forparticipation in such initiatives, which can be illustrated withsample thoughts: "should we be moving on" or "should we bewaiting" (because "we can do something in our organization" and"anyway this doesn't depend much on us"). Anyhow, as one of the

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actors of this drama said - "I don't believe that all of thesedilemmas and prejudices could take us that far that we will stoptalking to each-other"! This leads to the conclusion thatdilemmas - "in favor" of organized action, or "against" result inthe misinterpretations helped with a series of rumors thatobserve this initiative as a "national championship" (matchbetween the teams) or "national team" (playing against othernational teams). The "institutionalization" of this Consultation,or keeping alive one team and idea - which as Kosumi said -allows "the Albanian subject to be maximally prepared to face thepolitical movement", should be observed from this aspect. Howmuch can this idea stand, we will see soon, maybe even this weekwhen the next meeting could take place. Until then, we couldwitness an attempt to "institutionalize the national team" or"the national league" (which also implies it's "captain"). Maybethe most pessimistic option would be the non-existence of thegame, therefore, of the teams too. For the time being, the wishexpressed by the participants, at least in public, is in favor ofthe first variant ("the national team"). Let's wait and see...

KOSOVA

UNCLE LEADS US TO EUROPE

by ASTRIT SALIHU / Prishtina

Besa, a small girl from my neighborhood, brought me some poemsone day, and asked me to read them. There was no way to avoidreading a poem she wrote about the doll her daddy gifted her onher birthday. The poem was so subtle, so childish. And I likedthis one. But, Besa was surprised, for she had dedicated anotherof her poems to Kosova. This was the one "that all her class-mates liked". There was nothing childish in this poem, it was apoem illustrated with big words: "enemy", "courage" or "freedom".On the other hand, comparing the poem about the Doll and the oneabout Kosova shows something else too. Where Besa writes aboutthe doll, it's Besa, but where she writes about Kosova, she isonly a good pupil who has read many children's poems which wereserved to her in different publications for children, burdenedwith big words.

Besa's case is illustrative if we wish to analyze deeply andthink about this characteristic among us. Many questions couldarise from this case: why do our children write these kind ofpoems? Why are verses full of violence created for our children?Why do our children still sing to our "leaders"? Why do ourchildren write about Democracy, Republic, Enemy, Death, Heroism?

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These are only some questions whose answers penetrate deeply inthe value axis of our system, which reveals a determined mentalstructure, inherited from previous systems. The works forchildren seldom reveal new approaches, and when they appear, theyare marginalized. "Rilindja për Fëmijë" (Rilindja for Children)or "Pionieri" as well as many other works published as specialpublications which are offered as winter lecture and maybesomewhere as summer lecture, are full of old socialist-realistverses with cosmetic changes in the contents. Thus, e.g., in manypoems we can see how "Socialism" is substituted with "Democracy","Xhaxhi Enver" (Uncle Enver) with "Xhaxhi Ibrahim", "Labor Front"with "Patience", "Worker" with "Martyr of Democracy", etc. Anyreplacement of these expressions with one-another gives the samesocialist-realist poetry as a result. The difference is that oneis dedicated to Xhaxhi Enver and the other to Xhaxhi Ibrahim. Theessence is that both are dedicated to the Leader, with a capitalL. This reminds us of the totalitarian slogans which were oftenaddressed to the children or by the children to the Leader, as,e.g., one of them says, "The great Leader loves small children".

DEMOCRACY

Good time has comeA bright day covers usDemocracy has spreadit's roots all over us.

The replacement of one expression in this verse could give a"nice" totalitarian and propagandistic poem we were used to readin times of Socialism:

SOCIALISM

Good time has comeA bright day covers usSocialism has spreadit's roots all over us.

The structure of this verse is the same, identical, if it weren'tfor the fact that we are referring to two systems. But, theapproach is the same, not to say that experiencing democracy andsocialism is the same. This model resembles the samples of theadministrative forms which contain blank spaces for differentwords.

The same goes for the poem dedicated to the Leader:

OUR LEADER

From the first grade

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you teach us patienceYou will be immortalUncle Ibrahim

How does this poem sound if dedicated to another leader, such asEnver Hoxha, it is easily illustrated:

OUR LEADER

From the first grade you teach us to be cleverYou will be immortalUncle Enver

The comparisons to do not speak of Ibrahim Rugova and EnverHoxha, but speak of a similar mental structure inherited andwhich continues to be reproduced among us. Rugova has notmanifested such totalitarian tendencies so far, but this makes usexpress our doubts about Rugova's awareness about the soc-realistatmosphere that is surrounding him ever more. His counsellors andthe system's institutions that he presides, should be consciousof this, by all means.

This is only one aspect in which we could analyze literature forchildren. On the other hand, is we analyze the contents of thepoems, stories and the proverbs served to them, we will soonenter the gender of horror. The verses of our children are fullof blood, death, corpses, black crows, bayonets, rifles, tears,poverty, cold, starvation, etc. We can't explain all of this onlywith the factive reality in Kosova. This approach is beingimposed.

Even the verses of our writers for children are such that theyserve them as models for them to write in the same way. But, thegood luck is that children have always original and ironicreplies.

While Mic Sokoli is very often presented as a historical figurein "Rilindja for Children" and "Pionieri", the joke the childrenmade, contains some amortizing humor to this burdened psycho-pathologic situation. Now the young will ask:

"Why was Mic Sokoli standing in front of the canon?"

"Because he didn't know what it was", is the reply. Maybe this isthe sanest reply of the young Albanians to all that brutalitythat is imposed on them in Kosova, or as an erudite Kosovanwriter for children would say, in the "Albanian-Illyrian-Dardanian" lands. Some stories for children contain formulationssuch as: "When the general fatherland-statal-human interest is

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overlapping with personal interest (!)...." What is thisformulation? What child is aware of what statal interest is? Whenhave the statal and human interest met? This is not something ourpolitical activists know. Not even our national interest has aclear definition, and we want our children to know it, or to havethem define it in their verses!

The child that dedicates its writing to democracy or theRepublic, heroism or martyrs, is an insincere child, he/she isnot a child, because it can't operate with such politicalconcepts. The verses written by children, which express all thisquantity of morbidity, are only imitations created by ourwriters.

The publications for children are full of facts that can orienttowards a fruitful psycho-social analysis. These writings andpublications are accompanied by poor illustrations of non-ecologic factories and primitive socialist technology in times ofsoftware and the elevated ecological conscience.

This only speaks of the fact that our children are still served adetermined pattern of thinking and expression. A totalitarian andauthoritarian pattern, which restricts the rich imagination ofchildren, the imagination that is nourishedfrom chocolate housesin nice fairy tales.

BRUSSELS

THE GAME ON KOSOVA'S BACK

by VISAR REKA / Geneva

The recent developments in Brussels - when a conference discussedthe recognition of FRY - Serbia and Montenegro- by the EU,reminded us of the days of high tensions in the relations betweenEurope and the USA about the Western policy towards Bosnia.According to the first reactions of the involved governments, butalso of the commentators, it seems as if the same play is beingperformed by the same actors. The Americans will not recognizeFRY "until a satisfactory solution for Kosova is found", while apart of Europeans believes that Serbia should be recognizedbecause of its assistance to peace in Dayton! This controversialsituation certainly needs a deep geo-political expertise, butsome of the known facts give sufficient grounds to more or lessforesee what directions will the events in Kosova and aroundKosova be developed in the next couple of months. This because,despite the differences in the rows of the western allies, theyagree in one: the Kosova question should be solved, the sooner

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the better.

The process of finding peace in Bosnia and Croatia, wascharacterized with large over-seas frictions in regard to jointpostures towards the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Thesefrictions, which at one stage brought the relations between USAand Britain to the lowest level since the Suez crisis, are againemerging.

The euphoria of the western allies after the treaty was signedand the beginning of its implementation by NATO, is getting everpaler. And, instead of statements about "the great success" andthe "renewed unity" among the westerners, there are againcontradictory opinions about the next steps to be undertaken inthe Balkans, first of all in Bosnia but also in rump-Yugoslavia,in which the Kosova question is (at least publicly) verydisputable. In regard to Bosnia, the western allies have startedquarrelling about IFOR's mandate in the field and about theAmerican plans to train the governmental army of Bosnia for self-defence. The Europeans are not happy with the American idea to"create a military balance between the parties in conflict", norwith Washington's posture to withdraw its' soldiers after oneyear in Bosnia. The British and the French have started warningthat they will stay in Bosnia even after the American's withdraw.How do they think they will manage without the Americans - theyare the only ones to know, but he experts say that this is only abluff so the Americans are kept longer in Bosnia.

As in the case of Bosnia, it is evident that the Europeans wishto take a milder posture towards Serbia, compared to theAmericans who wish the contrary.

If we go back, during the past four years, the differencesbetween Bosnia were mostly connected to the lifting of theembargo of arms against the Bosnian government and the air-strikes against Bosnian Serbs and as a consequence, the Europeansbarely saved their respect, for the Serbs ere finally bonded, thepeace was signed and the Americans are (re)organizing the Bosnianarmy.

The international public asked and keeps asking why wasn't thisaction undertaken earlier, but so many victims had to fall so thehard option against Serbs would win. The UN was sacrificed inBosnia, because it was evident that the application of a moreaggressive policy against Serbs was being stopped by the Europeangovernments, mainly France and Great Britain, but also in a waybut differently, Germany, which is very important for Kosova too,because of the Albanian "myth" on the "historical friendship" or the "traditional" one between the Albanian and the Germanpeoples.

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Anyhow, the recognition of the FRY and conditioning therecognition with Kosova, is only the peak of the ice-berg in thedivergences about Kosova. These is a huge gap between the alliesfor the final solution of Kosova's problem.

The old/new crack among the western allies, first of all, is inthe relations between the USA and Europe.

When we talk about Europeans, if we rely on Bosnia's experience,we will see that the British and the French were during the wholeprocess against the "any military intervention in a civil war"and in this way, they were actually trying to acknowledge astatus quo created by force. The Germans on the other hand, bysiding with Croatia, diplomatically and through the economicpower managed to take the advantage of the Bosnian misery and theUS sympathy to convert Croatia into a winner. This was achievedpolitically, when the Federation/Confederation was signed andmilitarily by arming the Croat army and bombing Bosnian Serbs,always exerting economic and political pressure against Serbia -because of its role in the aggression against Bosnia.

The Bosnians say now that they will never forget the arms'blockade imposed them as well as the obstacles that the GermanIntelligence Agency puts before them in their attempts topurchase weapons in the former East Germany. At the same time,this service has actively worked on arming the Croats and givinglogistic assistance to the Croat Army. But, Bosnians' angerreaches the culmination because of "badly kept secret" that theGerman diplomacy in Dayton, promised the Serbs that the Muslimpart of Bosnia will soon "be placed" under Croat patronage. Inthe meantime, the same rumors claim that in relation to Kosova,the Germans were very active to convince the Americans that itshould not be part of the Dayton package. The controversial roleof Hans Koschnik, the administrator of Mostar - and his idea todivide Mostar in two towns, is the freshest example of the Germanpolicy in the former Yugoslavia.

Germany's role in the former Yugoslav issues is very important,and in some cases was even proven decisive. Its real influence offormer Yugoslav states, including Serbia is big, before allbecause of the German economic strength. Germany is anirreplaceable economic partner for all republics and any economicrevival can't be imagined without the active Germanparticipation, which could mean that Serbia would have toactivate it's relations with Germany if it wishes to come outfrom the social misery it is living in. The Americans are alsoaware of this fact, and this is why when there is talk about thenormalization of life in the former Yugoslav space, it is evidentthat the most valuable vote belongs to Germany. having all thisin mind, it would be logical to conclude that Germany could exert

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pressure on Serbia to solve Kosova's problem. However, theexperience so far proves that reality is different from rhetoric.Instead of the pressure, the German government favors Belgradeand Shkup respectively.

Apart from the Dayton story, in other two occasions was Germanyan obstacle to the American initiatives. Firstly in 1994, whenthe German diplomacy insisted on not including Kosova as one ofthe conditions for the lifting of the sanctions and secondly,last week when the German minister Kinkel categorically refusedthe American request to have Kosova as one of the conditions forthe recognition of FRY. Kinkel has reportedly told Christopherthat the only condition will be the recognition of Macedonia byBelgrade.

The diplomats and experts following the developments in theformer Yugoslavia evaluate that Germany has realized fully itsstrategic goals in the north-western part of this ex-country, andthat it now very much interested in starting doing business, andin this aspect, the Albanians' secessionism in Kosova is apotential danger for the destabilization of the whole region andtherefore such ambitions of the Albanians should be "killed"immediately. Another issue should not be forgotten: the issue ofKosova asylum seekers in Germany - they can't come back withoutBelgrade's cooperation. The negotiations with Belgrade are goingon since some time, and the requests of the Serbian side can onlybe imagined - they are probably not in favor of Albanians and area strong card in Milosevic's hand.

In these circumstances, in the coming months, according to awestern diplomat, proposals that would favor the Albanianexpectations should not be expected. differing from Bosnia wherethe end to the war was the motive for a more determined action ,the interest about Kosova is totally restricted "to humanrights", which according to this diplomat "is a process that goesparallel to the development of democracy".

BRUSSELS

THE CHRONICLE OF AN ANNOUNCED RECOGNITION

by BATON HAXHIU / Prishtina

Brussels displayed the dilemma about the recognition of newYugoslavia. The recognition of this new state was "pending" inthe last ministerial meeting and drew the differences of the EUmember states about this problem. Brussels EU Conferencediscussed whether this was the successor to the former state or

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was it a newly created country - because of the importance of therights that derive from succession. If the previous state wasdisintegrated (and this was Badinter Commission's posture) thenall the states created in the territories of the FormerYugoslavia must undergo the procedure to be recognized. SinceFrance and England are requesting the recognition of thecontinuity of Yugoslavia, then what will happen with theprinciples of Badinter's and the Dayton documents? And, if thepolitical arbitrage and international relations rules are stillvalid?

It is precisely that these violations of international rules (theproblem of the recognition of states was codified in 1885), risesthe dilemmas whether the third factor has not harmonized theproclaimed principles with the concrete interests. And, is itevident that each time the interest of a subject of theinternational community is endangered, it hardly waits to changeeven the principles. Or is this matter of lack of power, whichas became evident in the case of Bosnia and Croatia is taken intoaccount by the third factor?

These are questions arising in political couloirs in Kosovabecause of the French-British insisting on recognizing thesovereignty of FRY and consequently it's sovereignty on Kosova.In regard to this, Zejnullah Gruda, professor of InternationalLaw, declared to KOHA that "the British-French posture pretendsto make the recognition of FRY possible without subjugating it tothe juridical criteria, but only based on the politicalopportunity of only some countries, which is no surprise forthose who know the policy applied by these states in theBalkans".

The French minister De Charette and the French Charg‚ inBelgrade, Keller, spoke of the recognition of the new state,immediately after Brussels Conference ended. Their declaration isidentical: "In regard to the recognition of the new state ofYugoslavia, France will individually recognize it. The debateabout the recognition doesn't pertain France, because we neverinterrupted the diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, we onlyreduced them. Our jurisprudence, says De Charette, states that ifwe have diplomatic relations, then we should only elevate them tothe level of ambassadors".

What is the comment to this? The President of the ConstitutionalCourt of France, Badinter, has declared that "the state ofYugoslavia is dismantled and that all states coming out from theformer Yugoslavia must undergo the procedure to be recognized".It is true that the recognition of new states is always doneindividually by other states, which can also be done by France.But, if it is said that diplomatic relations should only be

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continued, then this would mean to accept the continuity of thisstate. Therefore, France is the first one to violate the gamerules by denying Badinter's document and the Dayton Agreement,which France has signed. France's posture was also supported byEngland and Italy, i.e., both ministers of exterior, MalcolmRiefkind and Susana Agnelli. Riefkind thinks that "Kosova'sproblem should not be linked to the outer wall sanctions, becausewe have signed a peace document on the Former Yugoslavia andKosova's problem should be solved within Yugoslavia'ssovereignty". Agnelli was even more cynical to say that "Somethink that Kosova is more important than the recognition ofYugoslavia".

This is a clear view of the new political bloc in Europe and thedivergences about the recognition of the new state.

President Rugova almost forgot the importance of the recognitionof Yugoslavia and declared to KOHA: "I wish not to commentdifferent statements, but it is important that we have gooddiplomatic relations with these states and in the future theywill open their embassies here". This is what Rugova says,knowing that these states recognize the sovereignty of Serbiaover Kosova. On the other hand, Fehmi Agani declared that "...itshould be clearly said that the initiative of France and Englandas well as the violation of Badinter's and Dayton documents,doesn't oblige us to respect the decisions linked to them".Professor Gruda comments on the EU initiative. "The posture ofthe EU is completely normal having in mind that one of the mostimportant purposes of the EU is to rigorously defend and advancehuman and minority rights. The respect of these rights is almostthe most important criteria for the recognition of new states inEuropean structures, and this derives from the EuropeanConvention of Human Rights and Badinter Commission's document.Some are trying to avoid these criterions, and this can only beexplained by political and not juridical criteria. I believe thata just decision would be only the one made after the consultativeopinion of the International Tribunal of Justice is obtained onwhether the new state fulfills the conditions to be acknowledgedby the European Union. For example, the reinstallment ofambassadors would be interpreted as something that belongs to thepolitical and not juridical opportunity".

Therefore, the Conference didn't link the issue of therecognition of the new state with outer wall sanctions, accordingto which Serbia and Montenegro are obliged to cooperate with TheHague Tribunal and also where Serbia is obliged to solve Kosova'sproblem. This is why Warren Christopher will be visitingBelgrade. According to well informed circles, Christopher willnot give up on Dayton's document and will clearly tell Milosevicthat Kosova's problem is linked to the outer-wall sanctions.

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These sources say that the American Secretary of State will"oblige" Milosevic to start the dialogue with the Albanian partyas soon as possible.

INTERVIEW

RICHARD MOORE, Member of the European Parliament

DAYTON IS JUST A CEASE-FIRE

Interviewed by AFRIM GJONBALAJ / Brussels

KOHA: Killing in Bosnia stopped, or at least this is theimpression. There are many opinions about the actual situation inthe Former Yugoslavia. What is yours?

MOORE: I share my personal opinion with the other 53 Liberals inthe European Parliament. Unfortunately, the majority of the MPs,belonging to the Socialists and the People's parties have atotally different posture about the real situation in Yugoslavia.It is good that killings stopped. I fear that the Daytonagreement is more a pause than peace. Dayton has in factlegitimized ethnic cleansing, which is catastrophic. Thisagreement has it's deficiencies too. In fact, nothing has beensolved in Dayton. This is only a truce.

KOHA: Do you believe that this agreement is only a step towardsthe division of B&H in two or three parts?

MOORE: Yes. Bosnia has been split in two. Either the Serbs leavePale, either B&H will totally be separated in the future, at theadministrative, cultural and political levels. Before war thiscountry was a multi-ethnic state, but the committed crimes willneed too much time to heal. I am sorry that the internationalmedia made no mention or vaguely mentioned the Croat aggressor,and this is why the conflicts in Mostar still continue. TheBosnians had no other way out but accept this "cease-fire", i.e.the Dayton agreement. In fact, all previous agreements were infavor of the Bosnians and the existence of their state. TheCarrington Plan offered more to them than Dayton. They rejectedit - the circumstances and demands then were different.

KOHA: After having isolated Milosevic for 4 years, now Europe issitting with him at the negotiating table. Do you believe thishappened just too soon, before the war criminals were processed?

MOORE: Milosevic is a very elastic person in politics. When I saythis, I mean that he changes his opinion too often. Because of

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his politics, Serbia finds itself in a catastrophic situation. Itshouldn't be forgotten that thousands of Serbs were killed and itis surprising how after all, he comes out a winner. I am reallysurprised why has the Serbian people supported him. I justvisited Belgrade, and there I was told by all that Milosevicmakes all the decisions. When it comes to negotiations, I wouldhave conditioned them with the persecution of war criminals. But,I would like to add one more practical thing: European stateshave supported the Croatian state despite the crimes they havecommitted. I am not against Croatia, but I am against allcriminals, whoever and wherever they are.

KOHA: Is Kosova's peaceful resistance the reason why Kosova wasnot invited to Dayton?

MOORE: It is not Rugova's fault why Kosova was not in Dayton. Itis Milosevic's fault to not have spoken to Albanians beforeDayton. I personally think that Rugova was aiming at evadingbloodshed. It is hard to know whose fault it is.

KOHA: What do you think about the Americans' presence in theformer Yugoslavia and the fat that they will remain there onlyone year?

MOORE: It is true that their stay will be brief and that it islinked to the elections in the USA. However, it shouldn't beforgotten that their presence is indispensable and that they werein Macedonia before that. This presence has prevented the evil,Serbia's invasion, which was ready to do it. But, they willreally be present only in some areas in Bosnia. I believe thattheir presence would be welcome in Kosova and Krajina. We theLiberals believe that their presence is welcome and we supportit.

KOHA: If Yugoslavia is recognized, do you think that Kosova willbe forgotten?

MOORE: No, for sure not. Kosova is in a very difficult situation.It shouldn't be forgotten that it is very expensive for Serbia toact thus towards Kosova. I believe the Americans will do more inthis direction. It is a very small detail, the one to open theUSIS office in Prishtina, but they are the only ones who canprevent the conflict which could explode in the future. In regardto an open conflict in Kosova, I am sorry to be so pessimistic. Iam revolted about the attitude the Europeans have in regard tothe eventual recognition of Yugoslavia. This recognition willtake Europe back to the beginning. If the recognition takesplace, then we will for sure see the weakness of the Europeans inthis direction.

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KOHA: Do you believe that the Balkans problem is in the samephase as before the conflicts?

MOORE: No, I don't believe so. The minorities in the Balkans havemore rights today than they used to have. I am a bit worriedabout Macedonia, for Greece is the only EU member that hasn'trecognized it. But, the essential thing is that if there is aconflict in Europe, it will start in Kosova, and in this case,Albania would intervene, together with Montenegro and Macedonia.This would be catastrophic for us Europeans. And, I repeat again,that the situation in Kosova today has a priority - themisfortune is that it depends on the media.

KOHA: Do you believe that Albanians will be betrayed in thisrump-Yugoslavia?

MOORE: Yes. Dayton doesn't take Kosova into account. The problemis not solved; this will provoke, and this is my personalopinion, war or difficulties in the future.

KOHA: In your visit to Prishtina, you met with Rugova. What doyou think about his politics, don't you think he is too "soft" attimes?

MOORE: I believe that he played an important role trying todefend the human and the legitimate rights of Albanians inKosova. It was a brief meeting in which I was informed about hispolitical vision. I think that if Milosevic doesn't reply toKosova's demands, Rugova's peaceful policy will be invalid in thenew circumstances Kosova is living.

I saw very difficult circumstances in Kosova. I would like tostress that the Albanian people could react any time and theyhave not much to lose. This political situation needs specialattention, especially of the European politicians who are notundertaking anything to solve this problem.

KOHA: You message at the end?

MOORE: I will be brief: if Milosevic "changes", he'll do this fortactical reasons only. In reality, he will remain the same.

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MACEDONIA

ROBESPIERRE IN THE BALKANS

by SELADIN XHEZAIRI / Shkup

Several days ago, a person named Hashim Toplica died in Tetova.His name is mentioned in the so called White Book dedicated therelations of Yugoslavia with the neighboring countries: after theend if World War II, he fled to Albania, where, with some"interruptions" he spent 37 years in Enver Hoxha's prison,accused of being a "Yugoslav agent". He used to say that he wasthe second in the list of persons that had done the longest timein Albania's prisons. But, what made us referr to the old manthat knew a lot, but whose story was not registered because ofthe unawareness of the journalists, is the following: HashimToplica came back immediately after Communism fell apart. Holdingan alien's passport issued in Albania. In Tetova, he applied fora Macedonian passport. But, the reply was more thandisappointing: since in Tito's time he was deprived of Yugoslavcitizenship, he couldn't get it back now. He was given an alien'spassport issued in Macedonia. The explanation was: because of thefiles...

And, the opening of these files finally came on the agenda of theParliament of Macedonia. The MPs insisted and finally managed tohave this extremely sensitive issue regulated by law. TheMacedonian government (maybe it is the last one belonging to theformer Eastern world to open the files!) claims that there are 14thousand files, while MP Rufi Osmani declares to KOHA that thisnumber is much bigger, without excluding the possibility that apart of the dossiers could have been lost. He also expresses theconviction that 90% of the dossiers are related to Albanians".

The regulation of this burden from the past, undoubtedly, wouldsignify a kind of national (or inter-ethnic) reconciliation inMacedonia, but the Association of the Albanian Former PoliticalPrisoners warns that the "dossiers are still living in the headsof the people and the corresponding Macedonian services", amongothers because the registration of this association is refused,and because the former political prisoners are denied the rightto get a job because of the existing dossiers...

Human rights in Macedonia were at the center of the attentionlast week, when Elizabeth Rehn visited Macedonia. At the end of atwo-days visit she ascertained that the key problem minoritiesare facing is related to education in their mother tongue, butalso to the actions of the Macedonian police which are notaccording to the European standards. In regard to the firstproblem, Rehn compared it to the status of the Swedish minority

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in Sweden: "I finished elementary and superior studies in my ownlanguage, and in areas populated with mixed population, Swedishis in equal use with Finnish - said the Swede, former defenseminister of Finland.

However, in the meeting with her, Gligorov seemed not to shareher opinion: referring to the position of the nationalities inMacedonia, he proposed the elaboration of a study on "Balkanminorities", a proposal commented by Albanian politicians as"drawing the attention elsewhere", as Robespierre used to do...The former "Special Envoy" of president Gligorov, Dr. VasilTupurkovski, while commenting the Macedonian-Albanian relationsin FOKUS weekly reiterated again, that a historical agreementbetween the two was necessary, and it would be based on thefollowing: "First - depoliticize the relations between thenationalities, in the sense of disengaging the elite politicalcircles, which in a way manipulate with national communitiesunder the excuse of "protecting their interests". The secondelement, according to Tupurkovski, is that of developing thecivic dimension in the country and its realization through inter-ethnic relations, through the mobilization of the citizens,taking them to the position of holders of rights and obligationsand the power in the political system, so they can see what theirreal interests are and thus overcome their problems, living inthis state as its citizen: "The ones that can't see thehistorical aspects of the Macedonian-Albanian relations, and ifyou like, of all national relations in the state, and insist onthe dominating position of any nation in our very complicatednational architecture, they are in a position which isobjectively judged to fail historically. Hoverer, this failurewill not have a low price, it will have to be paid with hugenational and statal debts" - ends Tupurkovski, explaining that hedoesn't reduce the historical Albanian - Macedonian agreement tothe level of the solving communal problems.

ROUND TABLE

OUR ARGUMENTS (III)

Conducted by BATON HAXHIU / Prishtina

RAMADAN VRANIQI: It is important to stress, if negotiations withSerbs start, that Badinter's Commission concluded that Yugoslaviadoesn't exist. This would help us, because we used to be an equalunit of the federation, we had the decision-making power. SinceYugoslavia used to be the warrant of the '74 Constitution, theborders of Kosova and some other issues, then we can't be theconstituents of a new Yugoslavia. Secondly, the destruction of

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the former Yugoslavia doesn't mean that the new Yugoslaviashould be recognized the continuity. It should be recognized as anew state. And in that case, we should be asked whether we wantto be part of it or not.

BAJRAM POLLOZHANI: In regard to the juridical principleRestitutio in Integrum, I believe it should be fully applied inthe case of Kosova. It can be presented in the period when Kosovadeclared itself in favor of the association in the FederalYugoslavia that disintegrated. But, we should have in mind thatthis term is being used erroneously in regard to the '74autonomy. This is unacceptable and impossible in the juridicalaspect. Because if Yugoslavia disintegrated, then this means togo back to the positions of the constitution of that federation.

ZEJNULLAH GRUDA: The question is whether the people of Kosova hasthe right to declare itself about its future, and I believe ithas, therefore Kosova has the right to stay where it was, tosecede or to become fully independent.

BEHLUL BEQAJ: I agree that the conditions have changed and theyare quite unfavorable for the Albanians, but the change of thecircumstances does not change the right to declare the politicalwill of Albanians. I believe that the right to self-determinationhas not been consumed.

ZEJNULLAH GRUDA: The will is eternal.

FATMIR FEHMIU: Since this will is not consumed, then the will ofthis people is going back to the situation when it decided tobecome part of the association. Yugoslavia disintegrated and itis normal for Kosova to declare itself once again.

RAMADAN VRANIQI: Why should the situation go back? The peoplehave the right to decide whom will they live with. This is self-determination. This right belongs to all people.

ZEJNULLAH GRUDA: Nevertheless we must stress that this is acategory that doesn't prescribe - it can't be taken away unlessit's flagrantly violated.

BAJRAM POLLOZHANI: In regard to the issue about the need ofhaving a third party in the negotiations with the Serbs. Thethird party is not necessary to give us advise, but to rather togive guarantees to Kosova and to sanction any eventual agreementto be reached between Albanians and Serbs. With out a welldetermined schedule, there would be no political and juridicallogic for the solution of the problem. The coexistence andexperience so far proves that Albanians should not start anyconversations without the third factor that would sanction the

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juridical effect.

RAMADAN VRANIQI: Albanians need the third party, becauseexperience teaches us that Serbs are not trustworthy. I wouldrather say that people that represent Serbia shouldn't betrusted, and that this regime is just continuing the policy ofthe old Serbian regimes. There are still some sane forces amongthe Serbian people, and we need the third factor. It is hard toconvince the Albanians that they can trust the actual Serbianregime.

BEHLUL BEQAJ: I will mention three reasons why we need the thirdparty's presence. In the reasons I will state, I will alsoexpress my opinion about the grounds the FRY was established on.Firstly, the distrust of Albanians is a result of the centurylong discrimination by the Serbian hegemony - created throughmyths whose victims were the Albanians. Serbia tries to cover upthis discrimination without any witnesses and judges around.Objectively, there are no relevant forces in Serbia which woulddiscuss about Kosova as an issue outside Serbia, therefore thereis no willingness to emend the anti-Albanian policy.

The second reason is formal. Albanians have no trust in the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia because it was created contrary to theconstitutional definition. It practically functions as acontractual association of independent and unequal states, whichwas evident in Ohio, when instead of being represented by itsPresident, it was represented by the presidents of bothrepublics. Albanians can't trust a state which can't trustitself. It is defined as a democratic state and it functions as apolice state. It is defined as a state of equal citizens and itfunctions as a national-chauvinist state.

Thirdly, the dialogue between the two parties without thepresence of the third can't be successful because they arefearing from what they have done to the others, and thus theydon't trust the opponents. In other words, the couldn't solve theSerbian question without the presence of a third factor, theydidn't make it a internal problem of Serbia, but on the otherhand, they treat the Albanian question as an internal matter.Absurd!

ZEJNULLAH GRUDA: Normally, conversations start with theparticipation of the authorized representatives, i.e., thePresident of the country, the Premier, ambassadors or otherexperts. The conversations should be prepared well and thepresence of a third party is more than necessary.

FATMIR FEHMIU: Any disagreement between different subjects shouldbe solved by peaceful agreement. When we are referring to Kosova,

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not only is the presence of the third necessary, but it is acondictio sine qua non at the same time a warrant for therealization of the problem. The reason is the following: thisregime has first ruined the autonomy with police-military forces;further on, it established a colonial - apartheid - rule. Thisregime knows only the language of the force... but, there aremany other arguments that explain why the presence of a thirdparty is necessary.

KURTESH SALIU: If there were will on the side of Serbia to solvethe problem of Kosova, maybe there wouldn't be any need for thethird party. But, in these conditions, it's upmost necessary.The other argument is that all the problems regarding the formerYugoslavia are being solved with the presence of a third party.Kosova's problem, after all, is the most complicated altogether.I would also add that the new Yugoslavia was created in the sameway the old one disintegrated - on anti-Constitutional grounds.Therefore, the procedure of the adoption of this constitution infact started from the war option, the option of force. Themisfortune in all of this is that the MPs from Kosova didn'tparticipate in it's adoption, although grounded on theConstitution in force, should have been invited to declaredthemselves whether they want to be part of the new association ornot. This constitution is not compelling.

BAJRAM POLLOZHANI: Who has the right of representation? First ofall, the Government of Kosova, which is the only institutionalorgan which has continuity and whose mandate was extended withthe Kaçanik constitution, then the President of Kosova who hasgained this right when elected. But, it would be necessary thatthe Parliament of Kosova decides about this. Any other negotiatorfrom this side would not be "valid".

KURTESH SALIU: There is not much doubt about the representation:the President, the Government and the Parliamentary bodies.

RAMADAN VRANIQI: I don't consider things to be that simple. Wehave come to a situation in which we can't enforce the will ofthe people. We can't deny the referendum, therefore I believethat all other subjects in Kosova should participate innegotiations - and we should not restrict the list.

BEHLUL BEQAJ: I believe the political platform should beelaborated by all political subjects - and it must have theirconsent. No one else but our legitimate representatives canrepresent us - but I fear that the legitimacy will be determinedby the external factors rather than the people.

FATMIR FEHMIU: The disintegration of Yugoslavia created a newposition for Kosova. Based on the Constitution of Kosova and the

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elections the legitimacy belongs to the Speaker of theParliament, if constituted, the President, the Premier, all basedon the competencies defined in the constitution.

(The End)


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