Kosi Deluge: The Worst is Still to Come

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Kosi DelugeThe Worst Is Still To Come

September 2008

The report of the Fact Finding Mission on theKosi

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Kosi Deluge: The Worst Is Still To Come: The report of the fact finding mission

on the Kosi

Written and edited by Sudhirendar Sharma and Gopal Krishna for and on behalf ofthe Fact Finding Mission to the Kosi river basin in North Bihar, March 1-9, 2008.

The multi-disciplinary Fact Finding Mission comprised of noted flood expert DrDinesh Mishra, development analyst Dr Sudhirendar Sharma, ecologicalcampaigner Pandurang Hegde, environmental researcher Gopal Krishna, riverecologist, Rakesh Jaiswal and landscape architect Laxman Singh.

Associate members of the Fact Finding Mission included: Manas Bihari Verma, C UdayShankar, Rakesh Bhatt, Kavinder Pandey, Kameshwar Singh and Amarnath.

The Fact Finding Mission wishes to acknowledge the support of the AshokaInnovators for the Public towards this mission, however, it is not obligatory for it(Ashoka) to concur with the contents of this report, in parts or in full.

The members of the Fact Finding Mission wish to acknowledge the support andguidance of activists and experts who spared time for sharing their experiences andinsights that helped develop an understanding on the issues and concerns related torecurring floods in the Kosi river basin. The support of Barh Mukti Abhiyaan isgratefully acknowledged.

Any part(s) of this report may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any

means, verbal, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by anyinformation storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from theauthors. However, the authors request attribution of the source such that theinformation and perspectives contained in the report get widely disseminated.

This report has been published in public interest and has hence been placed in publicdomain for wider distribution and circulation. The authors and the mission memberswould be encouraged if they receive critical views on the contents of this report.

This report has been published by Sudhirendar Sharma, under the aegis of theAshoka Innovators for the Public, for and on behalf of the Fact Finding Mission. Forfurther information on any aspect of this report, contact the following: SudhirendarSharma ([email protected]), Gopal Krishna ([email protected]) and

Dinesh Mishra ([email protected])

For copies of the report,

Fact Finding Missionc/o Dr Sudhirendar Sharma7 Triveni, A6 Paschim ViharNew Delhi 110063

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Preface

The 2008 Kosi deluge may have been adequately flashed by the print and electronic

media, but the diagnosis and prescription has remained largely predictable and

grossly repetitive. No wonder, the floods in the Kosi have turned into an annual ritual

of aerial surveys, flood relief, dubious assurances, judicial probe and the like. Theobjective of the Fact Finding Mission, undertaken prior to the deluge, was to get a

first-hand account of the altered land architecture, on account of misguided and

failed engineering, that plays involuntary host to the manmade floods each year.

For what we witnessed cannot be easily transcribed into words, wondering how

politicians get a better sense of the situation while flying over a submerged

landmass! We salute the incredible resilience of people of north Bihar who were- at

the time of our travel through the region in the first week of March 2008- preparing

for the annual event (floods) to occur. They were seemingly resigned to their fate at

the hands of the outdated science of flood control. Unlike politicians and engineers

who consider the river worth `taming, the flood-affected people continue to regard it

as `mother!

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The official perception on the Kosi must change, sooner the better! There is an

urgent need to acknowledge peoples perception in building an integrated framework

for co-existence within the river basin. This will warrant radical actions, of `doing as

well as some `undoing, for which a political will based on engagement with a cross-section of the society is of utmost importance. The hydrocratic arrogance must

make room for political humility. David Hume had rightly remarked: `When men are

most sure and arrogant, they are commonly most mistaken!.

The Fact Finding Mission is convinced that the aggravated problem of the Kosi is well

beyond technical and engineering solutions, as most of these lie submerged under

the deluge anyway. It demands commonsense solution based on closer observations

of ground realities and peoples perception. A mix of short-term measures and long-

term strategies ought to be put in place through creative pooling of expertise into a

new institutional mechanism that may not only promise but deliver on a timeline too.

This is possible and doable!

Sudhirendar Sharma, Dinesh Mishra and Gopal Krishna

Unveiled Prophecy

The dilapidated state of the Bhimnagar barrage on river Kosi, inside Nepalese

territory north of Bihar, could not convince the Fact Finding Mission about its tenacity

to hold its designed discharge of 950,000 cusecs. It was observed that the silt

choked east bank and the west bank canals emanating from the barrage, with their

combined irrigation capacities reduced by two-third on account of defunct silt

ejectors, could only add pressure on the main structure and the already weakened

embankments upstream.

Speaking to the press at Patna on March 9, 2008, the Fact Finding Mission issued a

press note that had warned: `..not only are floods in Bihar manmade but that the

worse is yet to come should political economy of flood control continue to promoteembankment as only solution to the scourge of floods.Embankments symbolize

present and proposed structural flood control measures. That the worst will

come so soon could not have been predicted although it had the making of a

catastrophe in it.

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That the upstream breach will be created by less than 1/7th of the designed discharge

has turned our prophecy into an understatement. As the unprecedented 8th breach in

last five decades, this first major rupture upstream of the barrage, tossed up

familiar pictures of human misery, predictable stories on failed hydrocracy, frequent

allegations of relief misappropriation and misplaced disaster managementinterventions, the Fact Finding Mission painfully reiterates and reaffirms its

assessment that:

`The Worst Is Still To Come

As flood waters recede and the trading of charges subside, the hapless victims will be

left to fend for themselves yet again. That has been the story of Kosi and its floods,

year after year, decade after decade; justifying the title of the `Sorrow of Bihar

given to her. If Don Williams profound words about `God were to be rephrased in

the present context, these would read: Kosi talks incessantly but, as it turns out,

hydrocracy is found deaf.

Being deaf, the government and media have conveniently converted the recurring

floods in Kosi into a myth, ignoring how misplaced governmental intervention

through junk science of flood control continues to enjoy political patronage of the

kind unheard of. No wonder, flood-relief-flood cycle over past five decades has been

turned into a lucrative engagement for a failed state and an apathetic society.

Band-aid Dilemma

As irresistible maggi noodles get dropped and mineral water bottles get ferried

across to the flood-affected areas in 14 districts of Bihar, insult is being hurled at

hapless 3 million people impacted by the deluge that the media has unequivocally

termed as `man made injury. Band-aid is being applied to the injury, as breach

plugging works gets underway to bring the river back to its `original course.

Conservative estimates indicate that the breach on the embankment at Kusaha (in

Nepal) may not get fully plugged before March 2009, the unwritten assumption being

that till then the river will flow at or below the current level of discharge. This

assumption may be seriously flawed as Kosi gets its peak flow towards the closing

stages of the rainy season, the maximum ever discharge in Kosi has been a

whopping 913,000 cusecs on October 5, 1968. Since floods are known to follow a

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pattern, one wishes that the river does not embarrass the engineers fraternity and

their masters any further.

That the embankments have been temporary solution to the scourge of floods and

that these have outlived their age three times over raises serious question onstrengthening them to plug the breach in the present scheme of things. It creates a

set of discomforting scenarios and compelling questions:

Will reinforcing a breached portion of the over-aged dilapidated embankment not

leave the remaining stretch of the embankment vulnerable, even at the present

level of discharge? But if band-aid is not applied the human misery may continue

for long.

Given the present timeline the breach is unlikely to be plugged before March

2009, by which time a sizeable population would have (hopefully) moved to

alternate locations. Should then the river not be allowed to follow its new course?

As the existing embankments were neither designed as permanent solutions nor

have these proved to be so, how far investment in maintaining them can be

justified even if it means providing temporary relief in such calamity?

In a politically charged atmosphere, any act of `undoing may amount to treason

that no government can ill-afford. As in the past breaches, the idea will be to wriggle

out of the present emergency even if it amounts to doing what has driven the

present crises. The illusion of having tamed the river has been perpetuated over the

past fifty years, pushing the unsuspecting masses to remain victims of the effects

without being aware that the state has accepted the manmade causes. The Fact

Finding Mission was shocked to observe that the vicious cycle of annual floods has

been conveniently kept in motion.

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The Kosi Empire

Kosi river has an impressive empire that extends on a massive landmass in Nepal and India,

making it a transboundary river of immense significance. With an incredible catchment area of

95,646 square kilometers, which includes Mount Everest and Kanchenjunga, it joins the Ganga

before picking on contributions from Kamla, Baghmati, Budhi Gandak and Bhutahi Balan rivers

within Bihar. As it gorges past Chatara, the river traverses 48 kilometers in Nepal terai before

fanning out into 15 streams in north Bihar. Over the last 250 years, the Kosi River has shifted its

course over 160 kilometers, from east to west, making north Bihar its undisputed playground.

Owing to seven major tributaries contributing their waters, it is called Sapta Koshi in Nepal. The

Sun Koshi, the Tama Koshi or Tamba Koshi, the Dudh Koshi, the Indravati, the Likhu, the Arun

and the Tamore or Tamar. The Dudh Koshi joins the Sun Koshi at village Harkapur. At Triveni Sun

the Koshi is joined by the Arun and the Tamar, after which the river is called Sapta Koshi. As it

descends from the mountains, it is simply called the Kosi. The river travels a distance of 729 km

from its source, at 21,000 ft altitude, to the confluence with the Ganga, of which 260 km flow is

within Indian territory.

Changed Course

The proclamation that the Kosi has changed its course yet again absolves all those

who may have engineered the conditions for the river to do so, diluting the `human

folly adage being attached to the current deluge. That the river, one of the most

vibrant Himlayan rivers, has changed its course several times in recorded history is

known but what seemingly gets ignored is that the natural change in course was not

only subtle but has a definite purpose to extend its ecological services to uncovered

areas.

Given the fact that the Kosi has been embanked for at least 135 km downstream

from the site of the breach at Kusaha, the flow having once left the embanked river

could at no point have rejoined that course. Consequently, the river was compelled to

go into three of its previous channels viz., Sursar, Mirchaiya and Belhi. In all, the

meandering river has 15 different channels (options) through which it flows/has

flown. Since the change in course was sudden and on account of failed embankment,

4 panchayats in Nepal and 14 districts in Bihar were caught unaware by misdirected

waters from the Kosi.

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Locating a river as a blue streak on the map and feeling its currents while traversing

through it makes a world of difference. The Fact Finding Mission had an opportunity

to undertake a boat ride along the then main course of the Kosi, called Tilyuga which

till 1948 was an independent river, to get a feel of the living waters of the river

during March 2008. Moving against the current it was observed that through itsgentle meander the river was engaged in the `act of enriching the land by

depositing rich silt. However, it was slowly but steadily corroding its embankment to

liberate itself from its jacket.

Under extraneous pressure, the river has undoubtedly lost its freedom of expression.

Like some of its tributaries, Kosi is one of the important land-building rivers of the

Indo-Gangetic plains. It shifts course because it has to offload its silt load. However,

in the process the flowing water doesnt lose its memory. To a non-scientist, the idea

that water has a memory is not particularly astonishing but to a scientist who holds

the mechanistic world view a Newtonian perspective it may seem on the sidelines

of conventional science. Einstein worldview alone can help understand the world as a

series of physical forces in dynamic interplay with complex energetic forces

Following the works of French biochemist, Jacques Benveniste, it has become evident

that as water travels it not only carries physical information but picks up more subtle

information as well. It responds to every change in its surroundings by expanding,

contracting, or making rhythmical waves, changing billions of times a second. And

as it changes it not only picks up physical information but responds appropriately,

something the Kosi waters did while breaching the weak embankment at Kusaha.

Thereafter, the river may have used its accumulated memory to stay on its past

course.

What may seem a dramatic change in the Kosis course has indeed been an act by

the river to liberate itself from the jacket to which it had been confined? The fact that

the Kosi resorts to such tactics frequently reaffirms the fact that jacketing has limitedits prime ecological responsibility to which it has stood committed for several

millennia.

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Kathmandu Calling

Nepal Prime Minister has regretted the suicidal agreement on Kosi,1

signed in 1954, as the main

cause behind the flooding of the Nepali territory every year. Nepals sense of grievance on thepoor quality of design, inefficient implementation and bad maintenance of structure on Kosi maynot be fully justified because the treaty revels itself as outdated and unfair to both the parties.

The treaty has remained quite pronounced because a carrot of Kosi High Dam, first raised in1948, has been dangling before the flood victims as one of the `permanent solutions to theproblem of recurring floods. Ironically, embankments as temporary solution have becomereasonably permanent whereas the `permanent solution has remained elusive. What is`permanent and how permanent is permanence?

It must be acknowledged that the proposed site of the Kosi High Dam falls in a geologicallyunstable seismic zone, any undertaking of that scale may endanger the lives of millions up to thecontroversial Farraka Barrage. Also manifest insincerity in proposing the dam for flood controlmust be condemned because the dam is proposed to tap the hydro-power potential.

From a strategic defence perspective neither should India propose it nor should Nepal undertakesuch initiatives with any party. The treaty must be made realistic in admitting that there can beno technology that can find a `permanent solution for a river whose silt yield is highest in the

world. The litmus test for a credible, fair and democratic treaty lies in providing treatment forpermanent water-logging that has come to characterize the Kosi region.

The Fact Finding Mission witnessed that besides the Kosi, other rivers like Kamala, Bhutahi Balanand Bagmati too face the same problems. The team was bewildered to note that the business ofembankment construction has resumed for taming the Bagmati and the tributaries of Mahananda.Clearly, the lessons from human misery have not been learnt.

Indias Leader of the Opposition too has called for immediate review of Indo-Nepal Kosi Treaty.Without doubt, continuing with the same treaty would tantamount to riding a dead horse. In2004, it was reported that the Maoists had subverted plans for a survey of the proposed Kosidam. Changed circumstances require deft diplomacy and new hydraulic approach to disproveMark Twains contention that `whisky is for drinking and water is for fighting over. The treatymust acknowledge that technology can only help create irreparable problems.

Killer Embankments

There was a time when anyone wishing to die was directed to go to Purnea because

the Kosi river once used to flow through that district. Thanks to embankment, the

river had shifted its course westward to Saharasa. However, much to the anguish of

the local residents the latest breach has brought the river and its folklore back to

Purnea.

The Kosis embankments have a long and intriguing history. One reference that is

worth mentioning relates to the prophetic observations made by a British Engineer

Captain F C Hirst in 1908. Said he, In recent times, on the left bank of the Kosi, in

1Kosi Agreement between India and Nepal was made in April 1954, between the Government of theKingdom of Nepal. This was result of Indias desire of constructing a barrage, head-works and otherappurtenant work [s] about 3 miles upstream of Hanuman Nagar town on the Kosi River with afflux andflood banks, canals and protective works, on land lying within the territories of Nepal, for the purpose offlood control, irrigation, generation of hydroelectric power and prevention of erosion of Nepal areas on theright side of the river, upstream of the barrage. Nepal agreed to the construction of the said barrage,head-works and other connected works by and at the cost of India in consideration of the benefits.

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the Purnea district, private enterprise has copied the work of the makers of the Bir

Bund (an embankment), giving temporary relief, which, as will be seen later, is

probably a menace to future welfare. Without any regard to such wisdom and

accumulated evidences of the negative impact of embankments, the Bihar

government has turned `temporary solution into permanence by building over 3,465kilometer long embankments to jacket some of its major rivers.

The Fact Finding Mission observed massive earth-moving work along the Bagmati

river in Muzzafarpur. It is a shocking reality that once a major river gets jacketed it

becomes imperative for the proponents to jacket the tributaries as well; else the so-

called protected area by the embanked river will become vulnerable to flooding by

the other. The cycle of embankment perpetuates itself as vested interests take a slice

from each unloading of earth on a new site. It has been reliably learnt that Rs. 792

crore package to tame the Bagmati has been approved and another proposal to

embank the tributaries of Mahananda at an estimated cost of Rs. 850 crore has been

planned.

Embankment has been a double edged sword. It jackets the river with the

engineering assumption that a reduced cross section of the river will indeed increase

its velocity and the power to dredge its base. Neither has happened in the case of

the Kosi as its massive cross section, varying in length from 9 to 16 km at different

locations along its length, has become a silt-dumping ground. Nothing could have

been more shocking for the members of the Mission to observe from atop the

embankment that the river bed was several feet higher than the adjoining land. The

high lands and low lands have been separated by the ubiquitous embankment,

turning the low lying area permanently water-logged as the natural drainage from

the area gets choked.

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Benipur beseized

A pair of embankments along the Bagmati river is under construction from Runni Saidpur in

Sitamarhi to Hayaghat in Darbhanga district in Bihar. The Bagmati has a length of about 270

kilometres in Bihar. Benipur, is the ancestral village of legendary Ram Briksha Benipuri, a noted

Hindi litterateur, has faced sedimentation due to the flood waters. The villagers were outraged

when states benign response through its relief measures was mentioned. In his

acclaimed piece Barh Ke Beta (Son of Flood), Benipuri who equated relief seeking with

begging wrote- do not be afraid of floods. In the absence of floods there will be no

fishes and no fertile land. Do not look at skies that are laden with politicians, engineers

and officials on calamity survey for the salvation of the victims! Thatched houses had to

be constructed above some of the pucca buildings to accommodate the flood victims, who had to

stay in these makeshift huts for over two months. The house of Ram Briksha Benipuri had to be

cleared of about two feet of mud to celebrate his birthday on 23 December last year. The entire

kharif crop was washed away and the 750 acres land of the village has now been covered under

sand.

The planners and engineers must be complemented for altering the geography of the

area, turning the Kosi basin into a permanent watery grave for millions. It is tragic

that a worst flood only sends alarming signals, emergency aerial surveys and fresh

relief packages being the temporary outcome. That an estimated 1 million people in

380 villages are permanently trapped between the Kosi embankments and an

estimated 8 million are faced with acute water-logging outside of the embankments

are hard facts that continue to get ignored, year after year. Is there an annual

drainage management plan for this region inhabited by these people?

While the Fact Finding Mission observed that there was general discontent among

people about the disastrous impact of embankments, there has been lack of

consensus on what must be done with these failed structures. This is a result of

the fissures that has been engineered by the politicians. As people continue to

cope up with the inevitability of living either inside or outside of the embankment,

they have seemingly facilitated the politician-engineer-contractor nexus to go about

doing its business. The impact of embankments has been left unattended:

The jacketing of the Kosi has prevented its annual estimated silt load of 92.5

million cubic meters from spreading and improving soil fertility in the basin.

Conversely, the deposition of silt has contributed to increasing the river bed by as

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much as 4 meters. Consequently, the raised bed of the river has obstructed the

adjoining drainage (water) from entering the river course, creating permanent

water-logging in as much as 8,360 square kilometer area, or 16 per cent of the

total area of north Bihar.

Far from protecting land from floods, embankments have contributed to

increasing flood prone area in the state from a low of 2.5 million hectares in the

1950s to as high as 6.8 million hectares now. Not only that, the four-day flood of

the 50s has become a four-month ordeal now. People were used to dealing with

the river on equal terms ala living with floods, as the behaviour of unobstructed

river was predictable. Caging Kosi has made a tiger out of a cat, making the

river ferocious and unpredictable.

Shockingly, however, people living within the two embankments of the river do not

exist as per government records. And those outside of the embankments remain at

the mercy of occasional breach on the one hand and the rising waters on account of

obstruction of drainage into the river on the other. But for those who build and

maintain these, embankments have become a losing proposition forever. Such well-

entrenched beneficiaries have an incestuous relationship with the embankments and

their victims that preventrational vulnerability assessment based interventions to

remove the impediments to the drainage of the ecological flow of water.

Lessons Unlearnt

All endeavors at course correction at this stage must be both short-term as well as

long term that addresses crying concerns that go beyond the exigencies of the

upcoming parliamentary elections. It must take into account how did the

transformation of flood dependent agrarian regimes into flood vulnerable landscapes

took place since it was primarily driven by the need to secure private property in

land, which was a key concern of the colonial powers. It `soon disrupted natural flowregimes and ended up aggravating flood lines and thereby opening up the deltas to

enhanced flood vulnerability; Constructed a network of roads, railway lines, and

bridges, which by running in the east- west direction ended up interrupting natural

drainage lines that mostly dropped from north to south! These structures, in time,

not unexpectedly, began to unsettle a complex and fragile arrangement for drainage.

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Thus, north Bihar has been deprived of the most fertile land in the world. 2 The Royal

Commission of Agriculture had blamed lack of adequate drainage for it. Traditional

systemsmade the agricultural districts of north Bihar Ganga basin prosperous in the

early part of the 19th century. The neglect of that system over the years led to the

area being impoverished by the late 19th century.

It was revealed to the team members of the Fact Finding Mission from the narratives

of the villagers that no political party both within the state and at the center can be

absolved of acts of omission and commission that has brought perennial misery to

north Bihar. It is their policy decisions that have contributed to it. Having invented

explicit lame excuses umpteen times, the politicians and their acolytes of all hues are

now arguing that the river has changed its course and it now wants to move to east.

In the absence of even an iota of accountability towards habitual criminal neglect,

the million dollar question posed by flood experts that remains unanswered is: why

were the embankments constructed along the river supposedly to prevent the river

from moving either east or west?

Incessant annual fiscal flow for maintenance, raising, strengthening and re-

sectioning of embankments has created powerful vested interests whose lobbying

powers across all political parties is so enormous that no one wishes to become

unpopular among contractors both at the center and at the state by arguing against

embankments. Even when there is wisdom within the government, it fails to muster

enough political courage, making the absence of a so-called welfare state quite

conspicuous. The manifest political patronage that nurtures a hydraulic capitalism of

sort has ensured a staus quo, which has resulted in dehumanizing misery faced by

millions of people year after year.

Embankments have breached, it is breaching and it would breach again. Law of

unintended consequences is clearly at work.

The Fact Finding Mission was aghast to observe that neither central nor Bihar

government `conducts any survey to assess the effect of flood control measures on

socio-economic condition of the society. The Experts Committee to Review the

2Rohan D'Souza, Framing India's Hydraulic Crises: The Politics of the Modern Large Dam, Monthly ReviewPress Jul/Aug 2008

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Implementation of recommendations of the Rashtriya Barh Ayog (National Flood

Commission, 1980) corroborates our observations. Submitted to the Government of

India in March 2003, the Commission had noted, `Systematic study has not been

carried out on the utility of zamindari embankment as it is under the supervision of

District Administration and Revenue Department.

Ironically, following 2004 floods of Bihar, Prime Ministers Task Force for Flood

Management/ Erosion Control had recommended `Community Participation in

maintenance of embankments should be encouraged among other things. It is,

however, another matter that though benefits to be derived from as well as the

possible inconveniences due to floods (and flood control works) are undoubtedly of

great relevance to the people, their participation during the planning, implementation

and subsequent operation and maintenance has been deemed irrelevant by the

`credible agencies of the peoples government.

The Flood damages are primarily collected by District Collectors of the region,

however it is inexplicable as to how despite the losses being recorded embankments

still find unquestionable support within both state and central government. The

structural solutions like these have culminated in the recurring and perennial

problem of water-logging on an estimates 16 per cent of cultivable area in north

Bihar. This water-logging is entirely due to the embankments and creation of canal

network without proper drainage system in place. The construction of railway lines,

roads, canals and urban settlements without proper drainage system in place has

further deteriorated the condition.

Blunders Galore

Drainage problem, be it in Kosi or Mumbai, has failed to alter the policy regime of the

country that favours structural solutions regardless of the natural drainage it may

impede. Proposals like High Dam on Kosi is as good as jumping from the frying pan

into the fire if the experience with embankments is anything to go by. No one seems

willing to examine existing failures and learn from it. Vested interests that procreate

during crisis find status quo more beneficial.

Union Ministry of Water Resources misled the Rajya Sabha on March 11, 2008 on the

issue of Floods in North Bihar by claiming, Government has taken various steps in

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the direction of water management to stop the flood in north Bihar coming from the

rivers of Nepal. To control the floods in rivers Baghmati and Kamala-Balan in north

Bihar, the government has approved two schemes, namely, (i) Raising and

strengthening of embankments along River Baghmati at an estimated cost of Rs

135.16 crore and (ii) Raising and strengthening of embankments along River Kamalaat an estimated cost of Rs 52.09 crore.

Despite ground facts and published data confirming the role of embankments in

aggravating and sustaining water-logging in north Bihar, the hydrocracy of the

country continues to mislead the government (and its elected representatives) into

believing that embankments are indeed the solution to the problem. If there is one

chink worthy of judicial probe then the obsession with embankment is clearly

frontrunner as it has `earned the state the dubious distinction of being the leading

claimant of this kind of manmade submergence. The Fact Finding Mission was

shocked to note that there has been no significant shift in the way the Kosi issue was

perceived in the 1950s and in 2008.

The first five-year plan prepared in 1952 made a rather bold statement, `The

construction of large dams to store these flood waters is the most effective way of

preventing flood damage. In pursuance of this policy statement, Union Minister for

Planning and Irrigation & Power had made a statement in the Parliament on

September 3, 1954, saying, I may in the conclusion express the conviction that

floods in the country can be contained and managed. However, within two years

`conviction gave room for `doubt when the same minister had informed the

Parliament on July 27, 1956 that `absolute immunity from flood damage was not

physically possible even in the distant future, because of the unpredictability of

several natural forces which might cause unprecedented situation and, that`we shall

have to learn to live with floods to an extent.

Since the issue of high dam will resurface in the upcoming negotiations with Nepal, itis pertinent to refer to the observations of the National Flood Commission, 1980:

The flood problem being more acute in the basins of rivers originating from the

Himalayas, the reservoirs for flood moderation have to be sited in the Himalayan

region, where there are complex problems to be dealt with in putting up large dams

due to geological, seismic and topographical constraints. Because of narrow valleys,

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capacities of reservoirs on Himalayan Rivers are not very large. Also, the rivers carry

very large silt charge. These factors limit the economic life of the reservoirs, which,

in turn, affects the economic feasibility of the project.

Refusing to learn from the consistent failure of flood control and management efforts

of the recent past, the Government of Bihar had sought central assistance of Rs

17,059 crore through its `Bihar Floods 2007-Proposals for Special Plan Assistance to

repeat the past mistakes which include embankments and desilting. What has

conveniently been forgotten that the proposal to desilt heavily silt laden rivers like

the one debauching into the Gangetic plains from Himalayas has been rejected by

the National Flood Commission. Previous attempt at Eastern Kosi Main Canal in the

past was without any success as no one knew where to dump the excavated

material!

The Union Water Resources Ministry has taken the Parliament for a ride by stating,

`Government of India has initiated steps for creation of storages in the Nepal

territory, which will help in mitigating the problem of floods being faced in north

Bihar. It has been said time and again that the government would negotiate with

Nepal to construct a dam over the Kosi as a placebo to calm down the victims during

each flood season.

In the context of interlinking of rivers as a potent solution, the ministry had also

informed the Parliament, ` Six intra-state link proposals have been identified in Bihar

by the state government of Bihar, namely, (i) Kohra-Chandravat, (ii) Burhi-Gandak-

None-Baya-Ganga, (iii) Bagmati-Burhi-Gandak through Belwabhar, (iv) Kosi-Ganga,

(v) Kosi-Mechi (Indian portion) and (vi) Karmanasha-Suara links in Bihar. The state

government of Bihar has commenced the study of these intra-state links.

Inteestingly, however, a Report of the Expert Committee to study impact of

interlinking of rivers on Bihar (April 2005, Chapter III, p16) says, But the

proposed Sapt Kosi Dam has not been provided with any flood cushion which shouldbe provided for flood moderation

Instead of undertaking urgent measures to undo the damages that appear beyond

redemption, the Fact Finding Mission has observed that such proposals condone and

encourage massive land use change that has adversely affected the ecosystem of the

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region contributing to the rupture of its carrying capacity. Ignoring this, large-scale

storage structures impound and divert river water get justified on the basis that

floods are caused due to upstream catchment. It is myopically claimed that

controlling this catchment water through large dams will reduce flooding in the

downstream, the stored water can be utilised to generate power and for irrigation inthe flood plains.

It is disgusting to observe that after compounding the misery of north Bihar through

embankments; those living today in the flood-affected region are being promised

other ecologically disastrous projects like the Barahkshetra Dam and interlinking of

rivers which is like proposing one catastrophe to solve another.

Omissions & Commissions

About 40 million hectares of land in the country is liable to flooding, out of which

Central Water Commission (CWC)3 claims that 32 million hectares is `protectable,

out of which around 16.5 million hectares has been provided with `reasonable

degree of protection.

CWC is responsible for flood forecasts but its predictions need to be taken with a

pinch of salt because till date there has been no independent assessment about the

accuracy or effectiveness of its forecasts. Also it needs to be assessed how specific

the forecasts are and if they are reaching in time to the concerned that are going to

benefit from it. It also needs to be assessed as to how well the forecasts reflect

ground realities. It needs to be checked as to how many of the floods were not

forecast by the CWC, though they could have forecast the same.

One of the CWC forecast4 makes interesting reading. On September 15, 2006, CWC

website made a forecast that Kamala Balan river near Jhanjharpur in north Bihar was

flowing at 49.33 m, above warning level of 49 m, hence as per CWC definition, a

flood was forecast. Some newspapers uncritically published the forecast as facts,

saying Kamala Balan was in floods. When a journalist in Delhi called his contact in

3Central Water Commission under the Ministry of Water Resources is maintaining 157 flood forecastingstations on 62 major rivers comprising of 8 river basins spread over 13 States.

4South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People (SANDRP) is a voluntary initiative. It published a widelyrespected journal called Dams, Rivers & People

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Jhanjharpur, he was told that the river had very little water there. It later came to

light that the warning level mark on the river at Jhanjharpur is submerged in sand.

Ganga Flood Control Commission (GFCC)5, one of the key promoters of dams and

embankments as a flood control solutions acted with exemplary promptnessat its

35th and 36th meeting held in 2005 and 2006 by discussing progress made in

implementation of recommendations of National Flood Commission of 1980

pertaining to Ganga basin.

In post independent India no story of human misery caused by mismanagement of

floods would be complete without implicit or explicit reference to the

recommendations of the National Flood Commission6 and its 207 recommendations

made. It said that no credible assessment of performance of the embankments overany river has been done by any state. Neither it has been done till date nor the

recommendations have been complied with. The Flood Commission had observed,

`Any assessment of the partial negation of these benefits, due to accumulated

drainage water over the protected area from year to year, were also not done. The

annual benefits from embankments were, therefore, by and large, a matter of overall

opinion of some individual, with no supporting data. We were, therefore, reluctant to

draw any conclusion from the trend of such opinions.

Another noteworthy official effort has been the Report of the Government of Indias

National Commission for Integrated Water Resources Development on the issue of

`Flood Control and Flood Management (1999). It reiterates: ` there are no5Ganga Flood Control Commission (GFCC) was set up in 1972. GFCC has divided Ganga basin into 23 riversystem viz. Gomati, Adhwara, Ghaghra, Mahananda, Kamla-Balan, Punpun, Ajoy, Bagmati, Gandak, BurhiGandak Kosi, Mayurakshi, Damodar, Kiul-Harohar, Yamuna, Tons, Ramganga, Badua-Chandan,Rupnarayan-Haldi-Rasulpur, Jalangi, Sone, Tidal rivers and Main Ganga system and Comprehensive MasterPlans for flood management in all these river systems have been completed between 1975-1990. Thesecomprehensive plans were then circulated to the concerned State Governments for preparing specificschemes for implementation in order of priority. Follow up action from the State Govt. is awaited. Due torapid changes in the behaviour of the rivers, in Ganga basin and for other reasons, it was considerednecessary to update the Master Plans for flood management of all the river systems. This work was

started in 1986 and till March 2002, GFCC has updated Master Plans for nineteen river system viz.Gomati, Ghghra, Mahananda, Adhwara, Kamla-Balan, Bagmati, Burhi Gandak, Kiul-Harohar, Damodar,Punpun, Mayurakshi, Ramganga, Jalangi, Tons, Yamuna, Ajay, Badua Chandan, Roopnarayan-Haldi-Rasalpur and tidal river system. These comprehensive Plans have been circulated to the concerned StateGovernments for further follow up action.

6Rashtriya Barh Ayog (National Flood Commission) was set up in July 1976 under the Chairmanship ofJaysukhlal Hathi, the main TOR of the Commission was to review the flood protection measuresundertaken since 1954 with special reference to construction of embankments and to evolve acomprehensive approach to the problem of floods. This is the only really comprehensive review of floodmanagement policies and practices in post independent India, so let us look in some detail the findings ofthe commission.

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universal solutions, which can provide complete protection against floods. The

country has, therefore, to shift its strategy towards efficient management of flood

plains, flood proofing including disaster preparedness and response planning and

flood forecasting and warning and other non structural measures such as disaster

relief, flood fighting including public health measures and flood insurance. Theserecommendations have not been implemented so far.

In October 2001, the Union Ministry of Water Resources set up an Expert Committee

to review the implementation of recommendations of the National Flood Commission.

This committee has also submitted its report. This Committee identified the

bottlenecks faced by the State Government in its implementation and suggested

measures for implementation of recommendations made by National Flood

Commission for effective flood management. If this was not enough, the Union

Ministry of Water Resources set up an Expert Committee under the Chairmanship of

R. Rangachari to review recommendations of the Flood Commission. The Committee

came to the same conclusion: the recommendations have not been implemented by

the states. The Committee has identified 40 important recommendations for

implementation on priority, which the Ministry of Water Resources has accepted.

These have been forwarded to the states as well as central Government agencies for

follow-up.

This Committee has summed up the main difficulties in implementation of the

recommendations: `. that uncontrolled and serious incursion is taking place into

the flood plains and river beds and lack of infrastructure as major bottle necks being

faced. Unabated and unplanned intrusion into the flood plains and river beds,

sometimes with the approval or acquiescence of Government has now reached

alarming dimensions. If this is not managed, flood losses will continue to mount.

Flood damage assessment, from year to year, is not being done realistically or on

scientific basis. It underlines the lack of representative, scientific and credible post-

project performance evaluations of past flood management works is a serioushandicap.

No effort has been made by either the Bihar government or the central government

to respond to the glaring denunciation regarding misplaced claims about the

usefulness of flood control measures. The Fact Finding Team was shocked to find that

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so far there has been no performance evaluation in order to justify the expenditure

incurred on various flood control works and their impacts on the socio-economic

development of the so-called `protected area.

Unmindful of the recommendations of the Flood Commission and the National Water

Policy, 2002 that sought increased adoption of non-structural measures like flood

plain zoning, in practice structural measures like the embankments construction

under way on Bagmati demonstrate how sane solutions are being ignored. GFCC is

reported to be preparing the master plans, sub-basin wise, for the whole Ganga

basin for flood management and also reviewing these master plans on the basis of

information received from the State government.

The Fact Finding Team has been surprised at the Expert Committees observation,

`Bihar has expressed difficulty in separating out the area affected by flood

inundation & drainage congestion and its insensitive assertion, `even though the

law may be against it much of river beds, drains and diara lands, are encroached

upon. While touring Bihar, it was noted that the old drainage courses of the Kosi are

now being cultivated, preventing drainage. The Committee seems unable to

discriminate between livelihood compulsion, legal necessity and law of unintended

consequences despite the fact that the beds of the embanked rivers are silting up

resulting in ineffectiveness of the age-old embankments in confining the flood

waterswithin the river side.

Besides the most recently constituted yet another routine committee in the

aftermath of the breach in Kosi embankment in August 2008, the Fact Finding team

has come across several committees constituted both by the Bihar and the Central

government that have looked at the annual embankment disasters without giving

due attention to massive drainage crisis that is crying for attention. (see annexure)

CWCs Annual Report 2005-6, notes that Action Plan on Flood Management has been

finalized. It is acknowledged that `not much progress has been made in the

implementation of its recommendations of any of these Commissions, Committees

and various Task Forces. Going by the past experience, it does not require

superhuman intelligence to conclude that insincere and unpardonable governmental

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callousness is deliberate and is aimed at exacerbating the flood crisis in order to

facilitate `fishing in the troubled waters for some invincible vested interests.

Nothing can illustrate the fate of various committees, commissions and Task Forces

better than what R Rangachari, Chairman, Expert Committee said on August 19,

2008. In a personal communication, he said, `I am not aware as to what follow up

actions were all taken on this Report. It is my impression that really not much has

been done to implement the suggestions made by the committee's report.

Rangachari has been on Prime Ministers Task Force on Flood Control as well.

Surprisingly, India is adopting an Ostrich Policy. While terming the floods as a

`national calamity Indian Prime Minister and the Bihar Chief Minister reiterated their

support for embankments, dams and de-silting as effective flood control measures

despite the fact that the formers has life span of 25 years and the latter has a life

span of 37 years. It must be remembered that one is yet to witness any `credible

agency present a rational and reasonable method of de-silting Kosi river that brings

92.5 million cubic meters of silt every year after the experience of having de-silted

Eastern Kosi Main Canal.

Failure to adopt Integrated Flood Management approach and inaction in the

implementation of the recommendations of National Flood Commission and all the 11

Five Year Plans with regard to citizens participation, land-use plan, drainage and

flood plain zoning has created a manmade disaster, multiple displacements and

almost unfathomable migration that remains unacknowledged. But 'development'

that destroyed the lives of people of this region still flows along the same course.

Things have come to such as pass that both official flood victims and official flood

protected people have been turned into either relief seekers for good or Bihari

migrant workers who are facing parochial and racist onslaught in Delhi, Gujarat,

Punjab, Haryana, Maharshtra, Assam, Karnataka and other places.

Both central and state government refuse to make anyone liable and accountable

because every relevant `credible government agency has decayed beyond repair.

They seem to love annual fiscal flow for outdated embankment repair works and

relief operations and if popular narratives are anything to go by every political party

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gets a share in it. There is a political consensus to maintain and perpetuate the

status quo.

Compelling Question

Thanks to extensive coverage by the media, both print and electronic, the Kosideluge has caught the imagination of all and sundry, forcing the hydrocracy to come

up with credible options to bring the recurring phenomenon to a halt. Can the

hydrocracy which contributed to the present crises have answers to undo it? If the

findings of the Fact Finding Mission are anything to go by, it can only further

complicate the matter in a rush to overcoming its past follies.

The Fact Finding Mission is convinced that not only has Delhi got its flood action plan

consistently wrong over the years, so has Patna. Consequently, it becomes

convenient to transfer the entire blame on Kathmandu. Like floods, it is an annual

ritual for politicians in Bihar to reiterate that Nepal has released water and that a

high dam on the Kosi in Nepal the only solution to control floods. Little do

unsuspecting masses realize that if there is no dam how water could be stored

upstream? But the myth persists!

Since 1937, when the idea of a dam in Nepal was first mooted, the high dam on the

Kosi has remained elusive and may remain so. Like the embankments, the chances

for the proposed 269 meters high dam to go wrong are self evident. While silt

deposition by the river is one major issue impacting dams lifespan, its proposed

location in Nepals Brahkshetra will capture only 78 per cent of rivers catchment

leaving significant 22 per cent flows dangerously unattended.

Given its distinct geo-morphological features and complicated hydrological

characters, the Kosi is one of the Himalayan rivers that has yet to be understood in

its entirety. Consequently, engineering solutions to the enigma of the Kosi call for

radical and multi-layered steps:

Dismantling Embankments: Having argued that the embankments is the root

cause of the present crises, the Fact Finding Mission is of the opinion that firm

position may need to be taken to remedy the situation. Though considered unlawful,

trapped communities have time and again engaged in creating artificial breaches for

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draining their accumulated water from their surroundings. Although opinions are

divided within the Kosi basin, amidst engineers and amongst social activists, general

perception does favour removal of embankments provided the act of demolishing

does not create undesired conditions.

Interestingly, however, there has been precedence of embankment demolition in

India. The embankments created along a length of 32 kilometers on river Damodar

in 1854 were demolished in the year 1869. The British had soon realized that far

from controlling floods, the embankments were submerging fertile lands for which

the colonial rulers were forced to provide compensation. The first-ever compensation

of Rs 60,000 on account of submergence due to embankment failure was given to a

farmer in 1896 in then Bardwan district.

If compensation clause were to be enforced in the present times, the state will not

only be dissuaded from creating more embankments but may resort to phased-

manner demolition of the existing embankments. The Fact Finding Mission is in

favour of phased demolition of embankments by temporary relocation of the affected

families. If a deluge can involuntarily dislocate large mass of people, there is no

reason why temporary relocation cannot be implemented?

Room for the River: Having failed to tame rivers Rhine and Meuse, the Dutch

hydrocracy has come to the conclusion that absolute safety from flooding could not

be guaranteed through technical-infrastructural measures. They further argue that

traditional mechanisms for policy-making based on assumedly `rational and

uncontested expert knowledge can no longer be taken for granted.

Taking a detour from the infrastructural measures the Dutch hydrocracy has now

adopted spatial flood protection measures called `room for the river. The new

approach not only warrants informed public debate but is based on broad political

support. It is measures like these that need to be discussed and negotiated withcommunities in north Bihar, but not before the political stables in Patna (and in Delhi)

get cleansed of their misconceptions!

The Fact Finding Commission demands a white paper on the current deluge, as also

the reasons for sustained floods in the Kosi basin. Unless the erring officials and

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institutions are held accountable, not only will the folly of the past get repeated but

fresh approaches and strategies would be hard to implement. It is clear from the

origin, functions and constitution of the institutions dealing with water resources.

They are all structured for planning, design and implementation of large projects. It

is also clear that they do not even intend to be participation oriented or open bodies.These institutions have failed to encompass the needs, resources and priorities of

whole river basin. Therefore, a complete overhaul of the existing institutions is a

dire necessity.

This white paper must address the drainage congestion crisis to start rethinking on

current policies that diagnoses the problem and the adverse consequences of the so-

called solutions that have caused huge increase in the flood prone area. The paper

must assess Kosis meandering nature coupled with its maximum available energy

producing currents for river basin management based on a comprehensive

assessment of the river system.

The paper must reveal the contours of state's misplaced faith in engineering alone

that has stopped the natural process of `landbuilding' by these rivers, a process that

had ushered in necessary socio-cultural conditions for emergence of `civilisation'. It

must make a case for multi-disciplinary intervention and probe ways and means of

draining vast stretches of waterlogged land because no civilized welfare or even

development state can afford to keep its most fertile lands under water.

Besides, it must uncover states pretensions of colossal ignorance regarding the

primary function of floodwater--draining out excess water and the fact that no

embankment has yet been built or can be built in future that will not breach.

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Notes & References:

1.. Jaisukhlal Hathi, National Commission on Floods (Rashtiya Barh Ayog): Union Ministry ofWater Resources claims that nearly one third of the flood prone area had been affordedreasonable protection by 1976. Having made these claims it occurred to the Ministry that it

has gained considerable experience had also been gained in planning, implementation andperformance of the flood protection and control measures. Advancement in technology hadtaken place not only in India but also in the world over. The National Flood ControlProgramme was launched in 1954 for the first time, in the country but it decided to set up theRashtriya Barh Ayog (National Flood Commission) in 1976 to evolve a coordinated, integratedand scientific approach to the flood control problems in the country and for formulation of aflood control policy. The Rashtriya Barh Ayog was headed by a Part-time Chairman.Commissions terms of reference were as follows:- 1. To review the flood protection measuresundertaken since 1954 and to make an evaluation of the benefits and effectiveness of themeasures undertaken so far with special reference to embankments in reducing the damage2. To identify the areas where a large number of Zamindari and/or unauthorized

embankments, bunds and spurs etc., exist; to assess the effect of such constructions on theflood problem; and suggest remedial measures 3. To identify the areas where construction ofroads, highways, railways etc., and other encroachments into drains have aggravated flood

problems and to suggest measures for improvements including legislative action, if any 4. Toanalyze the damage caused by floods in recent years and to identify areas requiringimmediate flood protection measures 5. To evolve a comprehensive approach to the problemof floods in the country keeping in view the need for optimum and multi-purpose utilization ofwater resources as also the role of soil conservation and afforestation in flood control 6. Tomake an analysis of the cost and benefits of flood protection measures 7. To suggest criteriafor taking up flood protection measures and means of mobilizing resources therefore 8. Torecommend proper land use in the flood plains with a view to minimize damage and to ensureoverall increase in agriculture production 9. To examine the existing arrangements formaintenance of flood protection works and recommend measures for improving the same10. To review the existing administrative and organizational set up for flood control at theCentre and in the States and suggest improvements where necessary, flood control to includeflood forecasting and warning, flood fighting, formulation and implementation of floodprotection measures 11. To examine the present procedure of assessing flood damage and

suggest improvements 12. To examine any other matter related to floods and flood controland make suitable recommendations.

2. Dinesh Kumar Mishra, Barh Mukti Abhiyan, India

3 Himanshu Thakkar, South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People (SANDRP), India

4. K Sinha & R Srivastava, Central Water Commission, India

5. A K Jha & D P Mathria, Joint Project Office-Sapta Kosi Sun Kosi Investigation, Nepal6. R Rangachari, Centre for Policy Research, India

7. Integrated Water Resources Development: A Plan for Action, Report of The NationalCommission for Integrated Water Resources Development, Government of India

8 Bihar Floods 2007-Proposals for Special Plan Assistance, Government of Bihar

9. Tenth Five Year Plans Working Group

10. Eleventh Five Year Plans Working Group

11. Report of The Experts Committee to Review The Implementation of recommendations OfRashtriya Barh Ayog (National Flood Commission)

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12. Report of Task Force for Flood Management/Erosion Control, Government of India

Annexure

Brief Note on Flood Committees and their ReportsBihar government appointed a committee in 1962 to look into the problems of the flood-affected area. The Development Commissioner of the State, the Land Reforms Commissioner

and the Chief Administrator of the Kosi Project were members of the committee. Thecommittee achieved nothing.

Kosi Technical Committee of Bihar headed by Kanwar Sain, former Chairman, Central WaterCommission was appointed in 1965 to make study of the residual flood problems of the Kosiriver and suggest the future steps. The committee submitted its report in 1966. Itrecommended construction of a second barrage lower down at Dagmara for reducing thegradient, velocity and the erosive force of the river. Subsequently, again set up a committeewith Kanwar Sain as its Chairman that submitted its report in April, 1971. It recommendedcontinuous and proper maintenance of the barrage and embankments and a second controlstructure at Dagmara.

The state government constituted another committee in 1967 under the chairmanship of theKosi Area Development Commissioner whose job was to suggest programmes for the

embankment victims in the sectors of agriculture, cooperation, industrial development andeconomic rehabilitation.

After the 1974 flood, Bihar government appointed Kosi Board of Consultants to look into theflood damages and suggest means to combat floods under the Chairmanship of Kanwar Sain,former Chairman of CWC. It reiterated the idea of construction the Barahkshetra Dam on theKosi and said that the embankments could only be a temporary solution to the flood problemof the state.

A High Level Committee on Patna Floods was set up by the state government to look at thecauses of the floods after the severe floods of 1975 in the Ganga and Sone which submergedlarge areas of Patna city and caused havoc. It submitted its report in January 1976. Thecommittee recommended the remodeling of the drainage system in the rural area and raisingof embankments.

In 1981, another committee under the chairmanship of Chandra Kishor Pathak, formerchairman of Saharsa District Board, was constituted by the state government to look into theproblems of economic rehabilitation of the embankment victims. This committee gave itsreport in 1982 and the Government accepted its recommendations in 1987. Acting on therecommendations of the Pathak Committee, the state government constituted Kosi Pirit VikasPradhikar (Kosi Sufferers Development Authority) in the same year. But the Authority remainsa defunct body.

In the aftermath of 1987 floods, a committee under the Chairmanship of Naresh Chandra wasappointed by Bihar Government to look into the causes and remedy of floods in the state. TheReport is gathering dust somewhere in the Central Water Commission.

Most recently, Bihar government constituted a high-level specialist committee for suggesting

measures to check recurring flood in Bihar. The committee headed by Nilendu Sanyal, formerchief engineer was formed on August 31, 2007 to suggest immediate short and long termstrategies to control flood. The committee submitted its report on February 22, 2008 to thechief minister. The other members of the committee included: Z S Tarapore, retired director,Central Water Power Research Centre (Pune), GS Purva, chief engineer, Central WaterCommission (New Delhi), MU Gani, member, Ganga Flood Control Commission (Bihar) andBrajbhushan Prasad Singh, chief engineer (planning and monitoring), state water resourcesdepartment, and LP Singh, director (planning), Ganga Flood Control Commission.

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At the central level in order to implement the country-wide programme of flood control aCentral Flood Control Board was constituted in 1954 under the Chairmanship of the then UnionMinister of Irrigation and Power with representation of the concerned flood prone States andUnion Ministries such as Railways, Transport etc., as its members. The Central Flood ControlBoard, in its 16th meeting held in November, 1977, decided that since the irrigation, floodcontrol and drainage aspects could not be dealt with in isolation and since in almost all theStates, the Ministers in charge of Irrigation were also in charge of Flood Control, the subject of

flood control could be discussed in the State Irrigation Ministers Conference, wherein the floodcontrol aspects are also being deliberated. It is not know what happened to CFCB thereafter,but there is no mention of the CFCB in the reports after 1980.

Following the constitution of the CFCB, four other flood control commissions were set up,including the Ganga Flood Control Commission, the Brahmaputra Flood Control Commission,and a Flood commission for Central and North West India and one for Deccan areas, with theobjective of preparation of integrated flood management plans of the river basins. In addition,some of the flood prone states also set up flood commissions. The National Commission onFloods had chairman of the Ganga and Brahmaputra Flood Commission as members. TheBrahmaputra Flood Control Commission seems to have been dissolved around 1980 and in1981, the Brahmaputra Board was constituted through an act of Parliament.

In April 1957, the Government of India set up a High Level Committee on Floods mostly

related to the policy on the strategy to provide flood control, mainly in view of divided opinionon flood protection through embankments. The Committee submitted its reports in December1957 and November 1958. The committee made a number of recommendations, includingemphasizing that priority should be given to soil conservation and watershed developmentworks and that comprehensive appraisal of the embankment schemes should be taken upbefore their inclusion in the plans. The committee was formed to review the flood controlmeasures taken up after the adoption of the National Flood Policy in 1954. Among therecommendations, the committee said that non-physical measures like flood warning,forecasting to be made integral part of the flood control departments, flood plain zoning andflood insurance should be taken up.

A Committee on Scientific Flood Forecasting in the country was set up in 1963 to review theflood warning system. It submitted its report in 1965, recommending setting up of floodforecasting centers and sub-centres all over the country.

In February 1964, a Ministers Committee on Flood Control was constituted, which submittedits report in December 1964. The committee emphasized the need for preparation of long-range plans for flood control, coordination of flood control with other uses and improvement inthe system of collection of flood damage statistics.

A Committee on Flood Control in the Adhwara Group of North Bihar headed by Jafer Ali wasalso appointed in October 1964 to make an assessment of the problems of floods in the riversbetween the Bagmati and the Kamabalan to evolve adequate plan for flood control on theserivers. It recommended channelisation of the river Darbhanga-Bagmati diversion of part of thedischarge of river Bagmati into the old course of the river Kamla, provision of embankment inthe reaches where the rivers spill and provision of adequate number of sluices in theembankments.

In August 1965, a North Bihar Drainage Committee was constituted headed by Jafar Ali tomake a detailed study of the drainage requirements in North Bihar which traversed by theBagmati, Kamla, Pahar, Kankai, Mahananda, Gandak and Kosi rivers. The committee maderecommendations for provision for adequate drainage systems in Irrigated areas andadditional waterways for road and railway bridges and adequate drainage sluices in theembanked portions.

During the floods of 1970, the 5th Conference of the State Ministers of Irrigation and Powerrecommended setting up of Ministers Committee on Floods and Flood Relief to go into thereasons for the heavy loss of lives and to draw suitable proposals for avoiding loss of lives in

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future. This committee headed by Union Deputy Minister for Irrigation and Power submitted itsreport in March 1972 recommending long range comprehensive plans of flood control andstate legislation to prevent encroachment on the rivers and natural drainage channels.

Gandak High Level Committee headed by A C Mitra was set up in 1971 to study behaviourGandak river from Indo-Nepal border and to evaluate the works undertaken by stategovernments from time to time. The committee submitted its report in March, 1974. It

recommended strengthening of the embankments already constructed and investigation ofmulti-purpose reservoirs in the upper catchment of the Gandak river..

Report of the Working Group on Flood Controlbrought out in November, 1978 by the UnionMinistry of Agriculture and Irrigation made a number of important recommendations, includingthe need for the state governments to critically examine all major existing works and put upproposals for stabilizing existing benefits and that the long term effects (of embankments)on river regimes are yet to be evaluated.

Quite like the flood commission, no one seems to know as to what happened to therecommendations of the Committee for Flood Management in Ganga basin constituted in 1987that was, headed by Secretary, Water Resources.

In September, 1996 Central Government have constituted five Task Forces on flood related

issues and the reports of these Task Forces have been sent to the respective StateGovernments for taking up necessary follow up action. Its fate is also unknown.

In response of unprecedented floods of 1998, the Government of India set up an Expert Groupin November 1998, headed by Chairman, GFCC and members representing the states of UP &Bihar for suggesting effective flood control measures for Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The reportsof the Expert Group and their recommendations have been sent to the State Governments fortheir consideration and implementation. It is not known what the recommendations of theExpert Group were.

The Central Ground Water Board constituted an internal group to undertake a study to preparea conceptual framework for estimating the additional ground water resources that could beavailable by arresting the surplus monsoon run-off and storing in the sub-surface aquifer.Accordingly a conceptual framework of a National Perspective Plan for recharge to ground

water by utilizing surplus monsoon run-off has been prepared.

Status report incorporating a review of the status of implementation of variousrecommendations of National Flood Commission by the States/other Agencies was prepared inFebruary, 1987 and circulated to all the states with a request to expeditiously implement thevarious recommendations. A comprehensive review made in 1987 by Central WaterCommission indicated the up-to-date status on implementation. The Working Group on FloodControl for the VII Five Year Plan (1985-90) identified 25 important recommendations forimmediate implementation. The Working Group on Flood Control Programme for X Five YearPlan in its report presented in August 2001 made a review of implementation and found thatthese have mostly remained unimplemented. It again emphasized the need to implement the25 important recommendations on a priority basis in its report submitted during 2001. It hasalso recommended setting up an Integrated Commission for examination of the flood problemand suggesting measures to tackle the same.

To study the problem of silting in rivers, the Government of India set up a multi disciplinarycommittee in 2002. Its report is not available in the public domain.

The Tenth Plan (2002-2007) document recommended setting up of yet another commission.The Working Group on Flood Control Programme for the 10th Plan in its report submitted tothe Planning Commission had recommended, It would be desirable to consider setting up anIntegrated Flood Management Commission to go into all the details and make review of theflood management programme in the country. The Mid Term Appraisal of the 10th Plan saidthat in view of the report of the Task Force in 2004, this suggestion could be deferred for

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consideration in the 11th Plan. The Working Group recommended setting up of this newCommission to review the follow-up action taken on the recommendations made by the FloodCommission.

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Kosi Deluge: The Worst is Still to Come

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