Nitto Enterprises v. NLRC & Roberto Capili / GR No. 114337 / 9.29.95 / Apprenticeship and LearnershipF: Capili (PR) is an employee of Nitto Enterprises. Capili, an apprentice machinist accidentally injured the leg of the office secretary, on the same day Capili also managed to injure himself on while working, he was hospitalized and P incurred 1K-hospital bill. The day after, PR was asked to resign, subject to payment of his salary and further medical requirement. PR signed a quitclaim. Days later PRs family sued for illegal dismissal and payment of monetary benefits. LA favored P. LA said PR acted w/ gross negligence and that he does not have the proper attitude in such employment. NLRC reversed. P argues that since PR is only an apprentice and that he signed a apprenticeship agreement. Hence this petition.I: WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.R: Petitioners argument is erroneous. In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "core maker/molder." On the same date, an apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed. Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national apprenticeship program through the participation of employers, workers and government and non-government agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices." To translate such objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLE to any apprenticeship program has to be secured as a condition sine qua non before any such apprenticeship agreement can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and agreements cannot be debased. Also, the twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process.And since the apprenticeship is invalid, PR is considered as a Regular Employee.

LVN Pictures v. Philippine Musicians Guild & CIR / GR L12582-12598 / 1.28.61 / Employer-Employee Relationship - Importance / Concepcion, J P:F: LVN and Sampaguita (P) seeks to de-certify CIRs (PR) certification that PMG-The Musical Directors as the sole and exclusive bargaining agency of all musicians working with P. P also maintains that the certification cannot be granted since there is no Employee-Employer relationship, PR argues otherwise.I: (1) WON the musicians working for P are its employees; (2) WON there could be any legal relationship between the P and the musicians.R: Affirmed.The musical directors in the instant case have no control over the musicians involved in the present case. Said directors control neither the music to be played, nor the musicians playing it. The film companies summon the musicians to work, through the musical directors. The film companies, through the musical directors, provide the transportation to and from the studio. The film companies furnish meal at dinner time. The motion picture director who is an employee of the company not the musical director supervises the recording of the musicians and tells them what to do in every detail, and solely directs the performance of the musicians before the camera. Held: An employer-employee relationship exists between the musicians and the film companies. The relationship exists where the person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end. (Alabama Highway Express Co. vs. Local, 612, 108 S. 2d 350.)212 E: "Employer" includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. The term shall not include any labor organization or any of its officers or agents except when acting as employer.212 F: "Employee" includes any person in the employ of an employer. The term shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Code so explicitly states. It shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a result of or in connection with any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice if he has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and regular employment.Employer-employee relationship is an agreement between parties to render service in exchange for compensation. [Compania Maritima v. Ernesta Cabagnot Vda. de Hio, G.R. No. L-17367-69, February 28, 1963]. However, these contracts are impressed with public interest that they must yield to the common good. [Article 1700, Civil Code]. Hence, the presence or absence of employer-employee relationship is a question of law. [Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 119930, March 12, 1998; Tabas v. California Manufacturing, G.R. No. 80680, January 26, 1989; SSS v. CA, G.R. No. 100388, December 14, 2000].Employer Any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries on in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his order as regards the employment [Section 8(c), R.A. No. 8282].Employee Any person in the employ of an employer. The term shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Labor Code so explicitly states. It shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a result of or in connection with any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice if he has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and regular employment. [Art 212 (f), Labor Code].A better definition is provided by Azucena: a natural person who is hired, directly or indirectly, by a natural or juridical person to perform activities related to the business of the hirer who, directly or through an agent, supervises or controls the work performance and pays the salary or wage of the hiree. [Cesario Azucena, Jr., Everyones Labor Code, p. 56 (2012)].

Rosario Brothers Inc. v. Ople & NLRC, etc. / GR No. L-53590 / 7.31.84 / Employer-Employee Relationships Test to Determine / Relova, J p:F: P argues that there exists no EER between them and PR, it is Ps submission, because of the series of memorandas issued by them from 1973-77, which reveals that P had no control and/or supervision over the work of the PRs. PR are workers in the clothing business of P, where they are working under a Piece-Work basis; SSS registered through P; members of the UNION acknowledged by P. PR then claimed that P violated PD 851 and 525 (13th month pay & Emergency Living Allowance), LA favored P and declared that there is no EER. NLRC affirmed, Minister of Labor ruled otherwise. Hence this.I: WON there is EER.R: Affirmed. As held in Mafinco Trading Corporation vs. Ople, 70 SCRA 139, the existence of employer-employee relationship is determined by the following elements, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee (done by PR); (2) the payment of wages (Weekly wages on a piece-work basis [Art 97(F) Labor Code; (3) the power of dismissal (as in the memorandas issued by PR); and (4) the power to control employees' conduct (Operation Conduct) although the latter is the most important element. On the other hand, an independent contractor is one who exercises independent employment and contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and without being subjected to control of his employer except as to the result of his work. The control test is the most important element. It is based on the extent of control the hirer exercises over a worker. The greater the supervision and control the hirer exercises, the likelihood that the worker is an employee is higher. [Sonza v. ABS-CBN, G.R. no. 138051, June 10, 2004]. However, it is not theactual exerciseof the right to control but the mere existenceof the right to control that determines the power of control. [Zanotte Shoes v. NLRC, G.R. No. 100664, February 13, 1995]. The existence of the right to control, in order to prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship, must be established by substantial evidence, which is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion [Legend Hotel v. Titanium Corp., G.R. No. 153511, July 18, 2012].Two-Tiered Approach (Economic Dependence Test)1. First Tier: Control Test2. Second Tier: Existing economic conditions between the parties are used to determine whether EER exists [Francisco v. NLRC, G.R. No. 170087, August 31, 2006].3. The standard of economic dependence is whether the worker is dependent on the alleged employer for his continued employment in that line of business. [Orozco v. CA, GR No. 155207, August 13, 2008].

Manila Golf v. IAC & Llamar / GR No. 64948 / 9.27.94 / Employer-Employee Relationships Test to Determine / Narvasa, C.J p:F: Caddies of P, are demanding that they be included in the coverage of the Social Security System through the SSC, arguing that they are employees of P. P on the other hand, they have no direct control over PR. SSC Dismissed the Petition. IAC ruled for P, hence this petition.I: WON there is EER.R: As long as it is, the list made in the appealed decision detailing the various matters of conduct, dress, language, etc. covered by the petitioner's regulations, does not, in the mind of the Court, so circumscribe the actions or judgment of the caddies concerned as to leave them little or no freedom of choice whatsoever in the manner of carrying out their services. In the very nature of things, caddies must submit to some supervision of their conduct while enjoying the privilege of pursuing their occupation within the premises and grounds of whatever club they do their work in. For all that is made to appear, they work for the club to which they attach themselves on sufferance but, on the other hand, also without having to observe any working hours, free to leave anytime they please, to stay away for as long as they like. It is not pretended that if found remiss in the observance of said rules, any discipline may be meted them beyond barring them from the premises which, it may be supposed, the Club may do in any case even absent any breach of the rules, and without violating any right to work on their part. All these considerations clash frontally with the concept of employment. The IAC would point to the fact that the Club suggests the rate of fees payable by the players to the caddies as still another indication of the latter's status as employees. It seems to the Court, however, that the intendment of such fact is to the contrary, showing that the Club has not the measure of control over the incidents of the caddies' work and compensation that an employer would possess. The Court agrees with petitioner that the group rotation system so-called, is less a measure of employee control than an assurance that the work is fairly distributed, a caddy who is absent when his turn number is called simply losing his turn to serve and being assigned instead the last number for the day.

La Suerte Cigar v. Director of BLR / GR No. L-55674 / 7.25.83 / Employer-Employee Relationships Test to Determine / Guerrero, J p:F: P argues that 14 of the alleged members of the UNION, whose petitioning for certification to become a recognized labor union in the company, are not employees of P, but where independent contractors, which is necessary to meet the 30% consent requirement. Med Arbiter dismissed Ps petition. Director of BLR reversed, hence this petition.I: WON the 14 dealers are employees or independent contractors.R: They are Dealers or Independent Contractors. Accordingly, after considering the terms and stipulations of the Dealership Contracts which are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties in establishing the relationship between the dealers on one hand and the company on the other as that of buyer and seller, the Supreme Court finds that the status thereby created is one of independent contractorship, pursuant to the first rule in the interpretation of contracts that the literal meaning of the stipulations shall control. (Article 1370, New Civil Code)The Supreme Court rulings in Mafinco Trading Corp. vs. Ople, 70 SCRA 139, where the Court reiterated the "control test" earlier laid down in Investment Planning Corp. vs. Social Security System, 21 SCRA 924 and Social Security System vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Shrino (Phils.) Inc., 37 SCRA 579 are authoritative and controlling. In the Shrino case, the Court held that the common law rule of determining the existence of employer-employee relationship, principally the "control is test" applies in this jurisdiction. Where the element of control is absent; where a person who words for another does so more or less at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and in turn is compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, relationship of employer and employee does not exist.

Tabas v. CMC / GR No. 80680 / 1.26.89 / Employer-Employee Relationships Test to Determine / Sarmiento, J p:F: P demands reinstatement and benefits. CMC filed to dismiss, claiming that there is no EER since Ps are promotional merchandisers pursuant to a manpower supply agreement with LIVI manpower services, w/c agreement provided that CMC has no control or supervision whatsoever over Ps. On the other hand it is also stipulated that cola and holidays will be charged directly to CMC, whose payroll will be delivered through LIVI at CMC. Ps now claims that they became regular CMC employees. LA ruled that there is no EER in light of the manpower supply contract.I: WON there is an EER.R: Reversed. The fact that the petitioners have been hired on a "temporary or seasonal" basis merely is no argument either. As we held in Philippine Bank of Communications v. NLRC, a temporary or casual employee, under Article 218 of the Labor Code, becomes regular after service of one year, unless he has been contracted for a specific project. And we cannot say that merchandising is a specific project for the obvious reason that it is an activity related to the day-to-day operations of California. The records show that the petitioners had been given an initial six-month contract, renewed for another six months. Accordingly, under Article 281 of the Code, they had become regular employees of California and had acquired a secure tenure. Hence, they cannot be separated without due process of law.It has been likewise held, based on Article 106 of the Labor Code, that notwithstanding the absence of a direct employer-employee relationship between the employer in whose favor work had been contracted out by a "labor-only" contractor, and the employees, the former has the responsibility, together with the "labor-only" contractor, for any valid labor claims, by operation of law. The reason, so we held, is that the "labor-only" contractor is considered "merely an agent of the employer," and liability must be shouldered by either one or shared by both.The nature of one's business is not determined by self-serving appellations one attaches thereto but by the tests provided by statute and prevailing case law. The bare fact that Livi maintains a separate line of business does not extinguish the equal fact that it has provided California with workers to pursue the latter's own business.

Insular Life v. NLRC & Basiao / GR No. 84484 / Employer-Employee Relationships Test to Determine / Narvasa, J p:F: PR entered into a contract to solicit for insurance applications in 1968 later, on 1972, they entered into an Agency Management Contract (AMC) P later terminated the AMC, w/c prompted PR to sue, which led to P terminating also his original contract. Basiao complained for the unclaimed commissions to the MOL, P argues that MOL has no jurisdiction and that since PR is an independent contractor. LA found for PR, NLRC affirmed, hence this.I: WON PR had become the Companys employee.R: Reversed. What is germane is Basiao's status under the contract of July 2, 1968, not the length of his relationship with the Company to justify employment relationship. Basiao was not an employee but a commission agent, an independent contractor whose claim for unpaid commissions should have been litigated in an ordinary civil action.The rules that merely serve as guidelines towards the achievement of the mutually desired result without dictating the means or methods to be employed in attaining it do not create employer- employee relationship. While, the rules that control or fix the methodology and bind or restrict the party hired to the use of such means create employer-employee relationship.Rules and regulations governing the conduct of the business are provided for in the Insurance Code and enforced by the Insurance Commissioner. It is usual and expected for an insurance company to promulgate a set of rules to guide its commission agents in selling its policies that they may not run afoul of the law and what it requires or prohibits. But none of these really invades the agent's contractual prerogative to adopt his own selling methods or to sell insurance at his own time and convenience, hence cannot justifiably be said to establish an employer-employee relationship between him and the company.

Sonza v. ABS-CBN / GR No. 13051 / 6.10.04 / Employer-Employee Relationships Test to Determine / Carpio, J p:F: ABS-CBN entered into an agreement w/ MEL&JAY Management and Development Corp. (MJMDC) to host a TV program, there will be a monthly talent fee of 310K for the 1st year and 317 for the 2nd and 3rd year. Sonza later wrote to ABS-CBN for the rescission of the agreement in view of PRs failure to pay him his salaries and other benefits. LA ruled in favor of PR, which NLRC affirmed and the CA dismissed.I: WON Sonza is an Employee of ABS-CBN.R: Petition denied. Unique skills, talent and celebrity status not possessed by ordinary employees are indicative of an independent contractor; The power to bargain talent fees way above the salary scales of ordinary employees indicates an independent contractual relationship A radio/television broadcast specialist who works under minimal supervision is an independent contractor; The KBP code applies to broadcasters, not to employees of radio and television stations; Not all rules imposed by the hiring party on the hired party indicate that the latter is an employee of the former; In the broadcast industry, exclusivity is not necessarily the same as control; Three parties involved in labor- only contracting; Talents as Independent ContractorsIf SONZA did not possess such unique skills, talent and celebrity status, ABS-CBN would not have entered into the Agreement with SONZA but would have hired him through its personnel department just like any other employee.Applying the control test, SONZA is not an employee but an independent contractor. The greater the supervision and control the hirer exercises, the more likely the worker is deemed an employee. The converse holds true as well the less control the hirer exercises, the more likely the worker is considered an independent contractor.

Brotherhood Labor Unity Movement of the Philippines v. Zamora / GR No. L-48645 / 01.07.87 / Employer-Employee Relationships Test to Determine / Gutierrez, Jr., J:F: Ps are cargadores and pahinantes working on for as long as 7 years on average, on a piece rate basis working to load, unload, or piling of bottles produced by SMC. 140 organized and affiliated themselves to BLUMP (PR), they later striked, and SMC refused to bargain w/ them, alleging that they are not employees, rather they were independent contractors they were later denied work. Sued for illegal dismissal, SMC moved for dismissal. LA and NLRC ruled for SMC, hence this.I: WON there exists an EER.R: Petition Granted, reinstatement w/ back wages. Payment by piece does not define the essence of employment relation. In this case, the alleged independent contractors were paid a lump sum representing only the salaries the workers were entitled to, arrived at by adding the salaries of each worker which depend on the volume of work they had accomplished individually.The existence of an independent contractor relationship is generally established by the following criteria: "whether or not the contractor is carrying on an independent business; the nature and extent of the work; the skill required; the term and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the performance of a specified piece of work; the control and supervision of the work to another; the employer's power with respect to the hiring, firing and payment of the contractor's workers; the control of the premises; the duty to supply the premises tools, appliances, materials and labor; and the mode, manner and terms of payment"In this case, none of the above criteria exists. Highly unusual and suspect is the absence of a written contract to specify the performance of a specified piece of work, the nature and extent of the work and the term and duration of the relationship. Also, for an average of seven (7) years, each of the workers had worked continuously and exclusively for the company's shipping and warehousing department. Thus, they were engaged to perform activities necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the respondent, and are therefore regular employees.

SMC v. NLRC / GR No. 80774 / 5.31.88 / EER Jurisdiction / Feliciano, J p:F: Vega (PR) and employee of P, submitted a proposal to render the product of PR to be a more sustainable product (Beer). P dismissed his proposal and denied him of the cash award that is mandatory to any employee who can deliver such advancement. PR sued, P in MOLE, claiming that P is using his proposal and is claiming the cash award. P on the other hand claimed that PRs submission was turned down because it lacks originality, and claims that the LA had no jurisdiction, because PR bypassed Ps grievance machinery. LA turned down PR, NLRC ruled otherwise, hence this.I: WON the LA and NLRC had Jurisdiction.R: Set Aside. The important principle that runs through these three (3) cases is that where the claim to the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to Labor Arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies disappears.While paragraph 3 above refers to "all money claims of workers," it is not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money claims that might be asserted by workers against their employers has been absorbed into the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. It is evident that there is a unifying element which runs through paragraphs 1 to 5 of Art. 217 and that is, that they all refer to cases or disputes arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee relationship. This is, in other words, a situation where the rule of noscitur a sociis may be usefully invoked in clarifying the scope of paragraph 3, and any other paragraph of Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended.Thus, whether or not an enforceable contract, albeit implied and innominate, had arisen between petitioner Corporation and private respondent Vega in the circumstances of this case, and if so, whether or not it had been breached, are preeminently legal questions, questions not to be resolved by referring to labor legislation and having nothing to do with wages or other terms and conditions of employment, but rather having recourse to our law on contracts.PEPSI Cola v. Gal-lang, et. al / GR No. 89621 / 9.24.91 / EER Jurisdiction / Cruz, J p:F: PRs were employees of the petitioner who were suspected of irregular disposition of empty Pepsi Cola bottles, they were criminally charged which was dismissed, in the course they were terminated from employment. PRs lodged a complaint with NLRC Tacloban, they also sued for malicious criminal prosecution in RTC Tacloban. P claimed that since there is now a case with the LA, civil suit should be dismissed. Dismissed, but was reconsidered by PR judge, hence this.I: WON RTC Leyte had jurisdiction.R: Dismissed. It must be stressed that not every controversy involving workers and their employers can be resolved only by the labor arbiters. This will be so only if there is a "reasonable causal connection" between the claim asserted and employee-employer relations to put the case under the provisions of Article 217. Absent such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by the regular courts of justice in the exercise of their civil and criminal jurisdiction.The case now before the Court involves a complaint for damages for malicious prosecution which was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Leyte by the employees of the defendant company. It does not appear that there is a "reasonable causal connection" between the complaint and the relations of the parties as employer and employees. The complaint did not arise from such relations and in fact could have arisen independently of an employment relationship between the parties. No such relationship or any unfair labor practice is asserted. What the employees are alleging is that the petitioners acted with bad faith when they filed the criminal complaint which the Municipal Trial Court said was intended "to harass the poor employee" and the dismissal of which was affirmed by the Provincial Prosecutor "for lack of evidence to establish even a slightest probability that all the respondents herein have committed the crime imputed against them." This is a matter which the labor arbiter has no competence to resolve as the applicable law is not the Labor Code but the Revised Penal Code.

Medina & Ong v. Judge Bartolome, Aboitiz and Pepsi Cola / GR No. L-59825 / 9.11.82 / EER Jurisdiction / Abad Santos, J p:F: Ps former employees of PRs company, alleging that PR Aboitiz dismissed and publicly humiliated Ps w/o provocation. Ps sued. PR argues that CFI Makati had no jurisdiction, w/c was denied, pending litigation the Labor Code was amended, PR now re-raised their jurisdiction contention basing from Art. 217(b), PR judge granted. Hence this petition.I: WON the Labor Code has any relevance to the relief sought.R: Granted. It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for damages for tortious acts allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being the case, the governing statute is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code. It results that the orders under review are based on a wrong premise.Where plaintiffs' complaint for damages arising from the alleged disgraceful termination of employment does not allege any unfair labor practice, theirs is a simple action for damages for tortious acts allegedly committed by the defendants.

PNB v. Cabansag / GR 157010 / 6.21.05 / EER Jurisdiction / Panganiban, J p:F: Cabansag (PR) was hired by PNB as a Branch Credit Officer in Singapore, in a probationary status for 3 months, pending regularization. 4 months into job, performing well with mentions, PR was advised by co-employees that the Branch manager is asking him to resign, because of retrenchment, and that they need a chinese for his position, PR did not resign. PR was eventually terminated. PR sued in Manila, LA ruled in favor of PR, w/c NLRC affirmed, so did CA.I: WON NLRC Manila had jurisdiction, and is it most convenient.R: Affirmed. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC is specified in Article 217 of the Labor Code as follows: "ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. . . . "SECTION 10. Money Claims. . . . Based on the foregoing provisions, labor arbiters clearly have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations, including termination disputes involving all workers, among whom are overseas Filipino workers (OFW).That permit (SG Laws), however, does not automatically mean that the non-citizen is thereby bound by local laws only, as averred by petitioner. It does not at all imply a waiver of one's national laws on labor. Absent any clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, such permit simply means that its holder has a legal status as a worker in the issuing country.Noteworthy is the fact that respondent likewise applied for and secured an Overseas Employment Certificate from the POEA through the Philippine Embassy in Singapore. The Certificate declaring her a bona fide contract worker for Singapore. Under Philippine law, this document authorized her working status in a foreign country and entitled her to all benefits and processes under our statutes, covered by Philippine labor laws and policies upon certification by the POEA. Hence, petitioner cannot escape the application of Philippine laws or the jurisdiction of the NLRC and the labor arbiter.The appellate court was correct in holding that respondent was already a regular employee at the time of her dismissal, because her three-month probationary period of employment had already ended. This ruling is in accordance with Article 281 of the Labor Code: "An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee." As a regular employee, respondent was entitled to all rights, benefits and privileges provided under our labor laws.

Urbanes v. Secretary of DOLE & SSS / GR No. 122791 / 2.19.03 / EER Jurisdiction / Carpio Morales, J p:F: Petitioner, provides security services to SSS. During the effectivity of the agreement, petitioner requested the SSS for upward adjustment of their contract rate in view of Wage Order No. NCR-03. For failure to heed the request, petitioner pulled out his agency's services from the premises of SSS and filed a complaint seeking the implementation of Wage Order No. NCR-03 to the DOLE. Regional LA ruled in favor of P, which was later overturned by the Secretary of DOLE, hence this.I: WON DOLE has jurisdiction.F: The relief sought here has to do with the enforcement of the contract between petitioner and the SSS which was deemed amended by virtue of Wage Order No. NCR-03. The controversy subject of the case at bar is thus a civil dispute, the proper forum for the resolution of which is the civil courts. At any rate, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of cause of action. The liability of the SSS to reimburse petitioner arises only if and when petitioner pays his employee-security guards "the increases" mandated by Wage Order No. NCR-03. The records do not show that petitioner has paid the mandated increases to the security guards. The security guards in fact have filed a complaint with the NLRC against petitioner relative to, among other things, underpayment of wages.

Yusen Air & Sea Services Phils, Inc. v. Villamor / GR No. 154060 / 8.16.05 / EER Jurisdiction / Garcia, J p: F: PR is employed by P as a branch manager; w/c was later reclassified as a Division Manager, w/c he held until he resigned in 2.1.02. PR then worked for another company in the same line of business. P Sued, citing the undertaking which PR agreed with P in lieu of his employment. On the other hand P apparently sued through the NLRC P for illegal dismissal, PR also did not answer the civil suit, instead he submitted a motion to dismiss, and arguing that said court had no jurisdiction. RTC dismissed Ps complaint. Hence this recourse.I: WON RTC had the proper jurisdiction.R: Remanded for Trial. Actually, the present case is not one of first impression. In a kindred case, Dai-Chi Electronics Manufacturing vs. Villarama, with a substantially similar factual backdrop, we held that an action for breach of contractual obligation is intrinsically a civil dispute. Petitioner does not ask for any relief under the Labor Code of the Philippines. It seeks to recover damages agreed upon in the contract as redress for private respondent's breach of his contractual obligation to its "damage and prejudice." Such cause of action is within the realm of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to the regular courts. The cause of action is based on a quasi-delict or tort, which has no reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 217, jurisdiction over the action is with the regular courts.The Court, therefore, believes and so holds that the "money claims of workers" referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 217 embraces money claims which arise out of or in connection with the employer-employee relationship, or some aspect or incident of such relationship. Put a little differently, that money claims of workers which now fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters are those money claims which have some reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship. (SMC v. NLRC)It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein, which is a matter resolved only after and as a result of a trial. Neither can jurisdiction of a court be made to depend upon the defenses made by a defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant.