G.R. No. 174420 March 22, 2010MIGUELA SANTUYO, CORAZON ZACARIAS, EUGENIA CINCO, ELIZABETH PERALES, SUSANA BELEDIANO, RUFINA TABINAS, LETICIA L. DELA ROSA, NENITA LINESES, EDITHA DELA RAMA, MARIBEL M. OLIVAR, LOEVEL MALAPAD, FLORENDA M. GONZALO, ELEANOR O. BUEN, EULALIA ABAGAO, LORECA MOCORRO, DIANA MAGDUA, LUZ RAGAY, LYDIA MONTE, CORNELIA BALTAZAR and DAISY MANGANTE,Petitioners,vs.REMERCO GARMENTS MANUFACTURING, INC. and/or VICTORIA REYES.1Respondents.D E C I S I O NCORONA,J.:From 1992 to 1994, due to a serious industrial dispute, the Kaisahan ng Manggagawa sa Remerco Garments Manufacturing Inc.- KMM Kilusan (union) staged a strike against respondent Remerco Garments Manufacturing, Inc. (RGMI). Because the strike was subsequently declared illegal, all union officers were dismissed. Employees who wanted to sever their employment were paid separation pay while those who wanted to resume work were recalled on the condition that they would no longer be paid a daily rate but on a piece-rate basis.Petitioners, who had been employed as sewers, were among those recalled.Without allowing RGMI to normalize its operations, the union filed a notice of strike in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on August 8, 1995.2According to the union, RGMI conducted a time and motion study and changed the salary scheme from a daily rate to piece-rate basis without consulting it. RGMI therefore not only violated the existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) but also diminished the salaries agreed upon. It therefore committed an unfair labor practice.On August 24, 1995, RGMI filed a notice of lockout in the NCMB.3On November 11, 1995, while the union and RGMI were undergoing conciliation in the NCMB, RGMI transferred its factory site.On November 13, 1995, the union went on strike and blocked the entry to RGMIs (new) premises.In an order dated November 21, 1995,4the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code5and ordered RGMIs striking workers to return to work immediately. He likewise ordered the union and RGMI to submit their respective position papers.In its position paper, the union denied going on strike and blocking entries (and exits) at RGMIs premises. Furthermore, the union enumerated RGMIs alleged unfair labor practices. RGMI not only changed its salary scheme but also refused to pay wages to its employees for three weeks and transferred the plant to a new site. The union therefore asked for the reinstatement of all employees to their former positions at the old worksite and payment of their unpaid salaries based on the daily rate (as provided in the CBA).RGMI, on the other hand, insisted that its employees refused to obey the November 21, 1995 order. Thus, it prayed that the strike be declared illegal and that all union officers and those employees who refused to return to work be declared to have abandoned their employment.After evaluating the respective arguments of the union and RGMI, the Secretary of Labor held that RGMI did not lock out its employees inasmuch as it informed them of the transfer of the worksite. However, he did not rule on the legality of the strike.Furthermore, based on the time and motion study, the Secretary of Labor found that the employees would receive higher wages if they were paid on a piece-rate rather than on a daily rate basis. Hence, the new salary scheme would be more advantageous to the employees. For this reason, despite the provisions of the CBA, the change in salary scheme was validated.In an order dated September 18, 1996,6the Secretary of Labor ordered all employees to return to work and RGMI to pay its employees their unpaid salaries (from September 25, 1995 to October 14, 1995) on the piece-rate basis. Neither the union nor RGMI appealed the aforementioned order.On October 18, 1995, while the conciliation proceedings between the union and respondent were pending, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against RGMI and respondent Victoria Reyes, accusing the latter of harassment.7Petitioners subsequently amended their complaint,8demanding payment of their accrued salaries from September 25 to October 14, 1995 (computed at the daily rate ofP145 plus the CBA-decreed increase ofP11 per day) and the monetary equivalent of benefits they were entitled to under the CBA but allegedly withheld by RGMI, namely:(1)P200 Christmas package andP50 per person budget for the 1994 and 1995 Christmas party which was not held and(2) 17-day vacation leave in 1994 and 1995.Later, petitioners again amended their complaint, stating that respondents suspended them for questioning their decision to pay salaries on a piece-rate basis.9Respondents, on the other hand, moved to dismiss the complaint in view of the pending conciliation proceedings (which involved the same issue) in the NCMB. Moreover, alleged violations of the CBA should be resolved according to the grievance procedure laid out therein.10Thus, the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over the complaint.The labor arbiter found that respondents did not pay petitioners their salaries and deprived them of the benefits they were entitled to under the CBA. Thus, in a decision dated July 15, 1999,11he ordered respondents to pay petitioners their unpaid salaries according to their daily rate with the corresponding increase provided in the CBA and benefits, separation pay and attorneys fees.Respondents appealed the decision of the labor arbiter in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)12but it was denied.13Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) claiming that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the labor arbiter. They argued that since the complaint involved the implementation of the CBA, the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over it.In a decision dated April 27, 2006,14the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the NLRC on the ground that the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over the complaint.15Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.16Hence, this recourse.17Petitioners insist that the labor arbiter had jurisdiction inasmuch as the complaint was for illegal dismissal. Furthermore, they claim that the September 18, 1996 order of the Secretary of Labor was inapplicable to them. Despite being members of the union, they were not among those who went on strike.The petition has no merit.Petitioners clearly and consistently questioned the legality of RGMIs adoption of the new salary scheme (i.e.,piece-rate basis), asserting that such action, among others, violated the existing CBA. Indeed, the controversy was not a simple case of illegal dismissal but a labor dispute18involving the manner of ascertaining employees salaries, a matter which was governed by the existing CBA.With regard to the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter, Article 217(c) of the Labor Code provides:Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.x x x x x x x x x(c)Cases arising fromthe interpretation orimplementation of collective bargaining agreementsand those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policiesshall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrationas may be provided in said agreements. (emphasis supplied)This provision requires labor arbiters to refer cases involving the implementation of CBAs to the grievance machinery provided therein and to voluntary arbitration.Moreover, Article 260 of the Labor Code clarifies that such disputes must be referred first to the grievance machinery and, if unresolved within seven days, they shall automatically be referred to voluntary arbitration.19In this regard, Article 261 thereof states:Article 261. Jurisdiction of voluntary arbitrators and panel of voluntary arbitrators. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from theinterpretation orimplementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreementand those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding Article.Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement,except those which are gross in character,shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this Article, gross violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. (emphasis supplied)x x x x x x x x xUnder this provision, voluntary arbitrators have original and exclusive jurisdiction over matters which have not been resolved by the grievance machinery.Pursuant to Articles 217 in relation to Articles 260 and 261 of the Labor Code, the labor arbiter should have referred the matter to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Because the labor arbiter clearly did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter, his decision was void.1avvphi1Nonetheless, the Secretary of the Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the union and RGMI and resolved the same in his September 18, 1996 order. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code20gives the Secretary of Labor discretion21to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute likely to cause a strike or a lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest and to decide the controversy or to refer the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. In doing so, the Secretary of Labor shall resolve all questions and controversies in order to settle the dispute. His power is therefore plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the issue.221avvphi1The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the controversy because RGMI had a substantial number of employees and was a major exporter of garments to the United States and Canada.23In view of these considerations, the Secretary of Labor resolved the labor dispute between the union and RGMI in his September 18, 1996 order.24Since neither the union nor RGMI appealed the said order, it became final and executory.Settled is the rule that unions are the agent of its members for the purpose of securing just and fair wages and good working conditions.25Since petitioners were part of the bargaining unit represented by the union and members thereof, the September 18, 1996 order of the Secretary of Labor applies to them.Furthermore, since the union was the bargaining agent of petitioners, the complaint was barred under the principle of conclusiveness of judgments. The parties to a case are bound by the findings in a previous judgment with respect to matters actually raised and adjudged therein.26Hence, the labor arbiter should have dismissed the complaint on the ground ofres judicata.WHEREFORE, the petition is herebyDENIED. Costs against petitioners.

G.R. No. 178409 June 8, 2011YOLITO FADRIQUELAN, ARTURO EGUNA, ARMANDO MALALUAN, DANILO ALONSO, ROMULO DIMAANO, ROEL MAYUGA, WILFREDO RIZALDO, ROMEO SUICO, DOMINGO ESCAMILLAS and DOMINGO BAUTRO,Petitioners,vs.MONTEREY FOODS CORPORATION,Respondent.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xG.R. No. 178434MONTEREY FOODS CORPORATION,Petitioner,vs.BUKLURAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MONTEREY-ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA, YOLITO FADRIQUELAN, CARLITO ABACAN, ARTURO EGUNA, DANILO ROLLE, ALBERTO CASTILLO, ARMANDO MALALUAN, DANILO ALFONSO, RUBEN ALVAREZ, ROMULO DIMAANO, ROEL MAYUGA, JUANITO TENORIO, WILFREDO RIZALDO, JOHN ASOTIGUE, NEMESIO AGTAY, ROMEO SUICO, DOMINGO ESCAMILLAS and DOMINGO BAUTRO,Respondents.D E C I S I O NABAD,J.:These cases are about the need to clearly identify, for establishing liability, the union officers who took part in the illegal slowdown strike after the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute.The Facts and the CaseOn April 30, 2002 the three-year collective bargaining agreement or CBA between the union Bukluran ng Manggagawa sa Monterey-Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (the union) and Monterey Foods Corporation (the company) expired. On March 28, 2003 after the negotiation for a new CBA reached a deadlock, the union filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). To head off the strike, on April 30, 2003 the company filed with the DOLE a petition for assumption of jurisdiction over the dispute in view of its dire effects on the meat industry. In an Order dated May 12, 2003, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and enjoined the union from holding any strike. It also directed the union and the company to desist from taking any action that may aggravate the situation.On May 21, 2003 the union filed a second notice of strike before the NCMB on the alleged ground that the company committed unfair labor practices. On June 10, 2003 the company sent notices to the union officers, charging them with intentional acts of slowdown. Six days later or on June 16 the company sent new notices to the union officers, informing them of their termination from work for defying the DOLE Secretarys assumption order.On June 23, 2003, acting on motion of the company, the DOLE Secretary included the unions second notice of strike in his earlier assumption order. But, on the same day, the union filed a third notice of strike based on allegations that the company had engaged in union busting and illegal dismissal of union officers. On July 7, 2003 the company filed a petition for certification of the labor dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration but the DOLE Secretary denied the motion. He, however, subsumed the third notice of strike under the first and second notices.On November 20, 2003 the DOLE rendered a decision that, among other things, upheld the companys termination of the 17 union officers. The union and its officers appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA).On May 29, 2006 the CA rendered a decision, upholding the validity of the companys termination of 10 union officers but declaring illegal that of the other seven. Both parties sought recourse to this Court, the union in G.R. 178409 and the company in G.R. 178434.The Issues PresentedThe issues these cases present are:1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that slowdowns actually transpired at the companys farms; and2. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that union officers committed illegal acts that warranted their dismissal from work.The Rulings of the CourtFirst.The law is explicit: no strike shall be declared after the Secretary of Labor has assumed jurisdiction over a labor dispute. A strike conducted after such assumption is illegal and any union officer who knowingly participates in the same may be declared as having lost his employment.1Here, what is involved is a slowdown strike. Unlike other forms of strike, the employees involved in a slowdown do not walk out of their jobs to hurt the company. They need only to stop work or reduce the rate of their work while generally remaining in their assigned post.The Court finds that the union officers and members in this case held a slowdown strike at the companys farms despite the fact that the DOLE Secretary had on May 12, 2003 already assumed jurisdiction over their labor dispute. The evidence sufficiently shows that union officers and members simultaneously stopped work at the companys Batangas and Cavite farms at 7:00 a.m. on May 26, 2003.The union of course argues that it merely held assemblies to inform members of the developments in the CBA negotiation, not protest demonstrations over it. But as the CA correctly observed, if the meetings had really been for the stated reason, why did the union officers and members from separate company farms choose to start and end their meetings at the same time and on the same day? And if they did not intend a slowdown, why did they not hold their meetings after work. There is no allegation that the company prevented the union from holding meetings after working hours.Second. A distinction exists, however, between the ordinary workers liability for illegal strike and that of the union officers who participated in it. The ordinary worker cannot be terminated for merely participating in the strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during its conduct. On the other hand, a union officer can be terminated upon mere proof that he knowingly participated in the illegal strike.2Still, the participating union officers have to be properly identified.3The CA held that the company illegally terminated union officers Ruben Alvarez, John Asotigue, Alberto Castillo, Nemesio Agtay, Carlito Abacan, Danilo Rolle, and Juanito Tenorio, there being no substantial evidence that would connect them to the slowdowns. The CA said that their part in the same could not be established with certainty.But, although the witnesses did not say that Asotigue, Alvarez, and Rolle took part in the work slowdown, these officers gave no credible excuse for being absent from their respective working areas during the slowdown. Tenorio allegedly took a break and never went back to work. He claimed that he had to attend to an emergency but did not elaborate on the nature of such emergency. In Abacans case, however, he explained that he was not feeling well on May 26, 2003 and so he decided to take a two-hour rest from work. This claim of Abacan is consistent with the report4that only one officer (Tenorio) was involved in the slowdown at the Calamias farm.1avvphi1At the Quilo farm, the farm supervisor did not include Castillo in the list of employees who failed to report for work on May 26, 2003.5In Agtays case, the evidence is that he was on his rest day. There is no proof that the unions president, Yolito Fadriquelan, did not show up for work during the slowdowns. The CA upheld his dismissal, relying solely on a security guards report that the company submitted as evidence. But, notably, that report actually referred to a Rolly Fadrequellan, another employee who allegedly took part in the Lipa farm slowdown. Besides, Yolito Fadriquelan was then assigned at the General Trias farm in Cavite, not at the Lipa farm. In fact, as shown in the sworn statements6of the Cavite farm employees, Fadriquelan even directed them not to do anything which might aggravate the situation. This clearly shows that his dismissal was mainly based on his being the union president.The Court sustains the validity of the termination of the rest of the union officers. The identity and participations of Arturo Eguna,7Armando Malaluan,8Danilo Alonso,9Romulo Dimaano,10Roel Mayuga,11Wilfredo Rizaldo,12Romeo Suico,13Domingo Escamillas,14and Domingo Bautro15in the slowdowns were properly established. These officers simply refused to work or they abandoned their work to join union assemblies.In termination cases, the dismissed employee is not required to prove his innocence of the charges against him. The burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the employees dismissal was for just cause. The employers failure to do so means that the dismissal was not justified.16Here, the company failed to show that all 17 union officers deserved to be dismissed.Ordinarily, the illegally dismissed employees are entitled to two reliefs: reinstatement and backwages. Still, the Court has held that the grant of separation pay, instead of reinstatement, may be proper especially when as in this case such reinstatement is no longer practical or will be for the best interest of the parties.17But they shall likewise be entitled to attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award for having been compelled to litigate in order to protect their interests.18WHEREFORE, the CourtMODIFIESthe decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 82526,DECLARESMonterey Foods Corporations dismissal of Alberto Castillo, Nemesio Agtay, Carlito Abacan, and Yolito Fadriquelan illegal, and ORDERS payment of their separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service up to the date of their termination. The Court also ORDERS the company to pay 10% attorneys fees as well as interest of 6% per annum on the due amounts from the time of their termination and 12% per annum from the time this decision becomes final and executory until such monetary awards are paid.

G.R. No. 168382 June 6, 2011AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,vs.PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,Respondent.D E C I S I O NDEL CASTILLO,J.:A judgment that has attained finality is immutable and could thus no longer be modified.By this Petition for Review onCertiorari,1petitioner Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) assails the Decision2dated December 22, 2004 and Resolution3dated May 30, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79686, which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas (Sto. Tomas) and Acting Secretary Manuel G. Imson (Imson) in issuing their respective letters dated July 30, 20034and July 4, 2003,5in connection with ALPAPs motions6filed in NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97.Factual AntecedentsThe present controversy stemmed from a labor dispute between respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) and ALPAP, the legitimate labor organization and exclusive bargaining agent of all commercial pilots of PAL. Claiming that PAL committed unfair labor practice, ALPAP filed on December 9, 1997, a notice of strike7against respondent PAL with the DOLE, docketed as NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97. Upon PALs petition and considering that its continued operation is impressed with public interest, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute per Order8dated December 23, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute at the Philippine Airlines, Inc. pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended.Accordingly, all strikes and lockouts at the Philippine Airlines, Inc., whether actual or impending, are hereby strictly prohibited. The parties are also enjoined from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation.The parties are further directed to submit their respective position papers within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.SO ORDERED.9In a subsequent Order dated May 25, 1998,10the DOLE Secretary reiterated the prohibition contained in the December 23, 1997 Order. Despite such reminder to the parties, however, ALPAP went on strike on June 5, 1998. This constrained the DOLE, through then Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, to issue a return-to-work order11on June 7, 1998. However, it was only on June 26, 1998 when ALPAP officers and members reported back to work as shown in a logbook12signed by each of them. As a consequence, PAL refused to accept the returning pilots for their failure to comply immediately with the return-to-work order.On June 29, 1998, ALPAP filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal lockout13against PAL, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-06-05253-98. ALPAP contended that its counsel received a copy of the return-to-work order only on June 25, 1998, which justified their non-compliance therewith until June 26, 1998. It thus prayed that PAL be ordered to accept unconditionally all officers and members of ALPAP without any loss of pay and seniority and to pay whatever salaries and benefits due them pursuant to existing contracts of employment.On PALs motion, the Labor Arbiter consolidated the illegal lockout case with NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97 (strike case) pending before the DOLE Secretary since the controversy presented in the lockout case is an offshoot of the labor dispute over which the DOLE Secretary has assumed jurisdiction and because the factual allegations in both cases are interrelated.14In a Resolution dated January 18, 1999,15the NLRC sustained the consolidation of the illegal lockout case with the strike case, opining that the DOLE Secretary has the authority to resolve all incidents attendant to his return-to-work order.Through then DOLE Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, a Resolution16dated June 1, 1999 was rendered in NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97, declaring the strike conducted by ALPAP on June 5, 1998 illegal and pronouncing the loss of employment status of its officers and members who participated in the strike in defiance of the June 7, 1998 return-to-work order. The decretal portion of the Resolution reads:WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office hereby:a. x x x;b. DECLARES the strike conducted by ALPAP on June 5, 1998 and thereafter as illegal for being procedurally infirm and in open defiance of the return-to-work order of June 7, 1998 and, consequently, the strikers are deemed to have lost their employment status; andc. DISMISSES the complaint for illegal lockout for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.17In a Resolution18dated July 23, 1999, ALPAPs motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, ALPAP filed a Petition forCertiorari19with the CA assailing both the June 1, 1999 and July 23, 1999 DOLE Resolutions. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54880.Meanwhile, several ALPAP members filed separate individual complaints for illegal dismissal and non-payment of monetary benefits against PAL with the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC, questioning their termination as a result of the strike staged by other ALPAP members on June 5, 1998.20While these cases were pending, the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 54880, affirmed and upheld the June 1, 1999 and July 23, 1999 DOLE Resolutions in its Decision21dated August 22, 2001. ALPAP then sought a review of the CA Decision, thereby elevating the matter to this Court docketed as G.R. No. 152306. On April 10, 2002, this Court dismissed ALPAPs petition for failure to show that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion or a reversible error.22This Courts Resolution attained finality on August 29, 2002.23Proceedings before the DOLE SecretaryOn January 13, 2003, ALPAP filed before the Office of the DOLESecretary a Motion24in NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97, requesting the said office to conduct an appropriate legal proceeding to determine who among its officers and members should be reinstated or deemed to have lost their employment with PAL for their actual participation in the strike conducted in June 1998. ALPAP contended that there is a need to conduct a proceeding in order to determine who actually participated in the illegal strike since not only the striking workers were dismissed by PAL but all of ALPAPs officers and members, even though some were on official leave or abroad at the time of the strike. It also alleged that there were some who joined the strike and returned to work but were asked to sign new contracts of employment, which abrogated their earned seniority. Also, there were those who initially defied the return-to-work order but immediately complied with the same after proper receipt thereof by ALPAPs counsel. However, PAL still refused to allow them to enter its premises. According to ALPAP, such measure, as to meet the requirements of due process, is essential because it must be first established that a union officer or member has participated in the strike or has committed illegal acts before they could be dismissed from employment. In other words, a fair determination of who must suffer the consequences of the illegal strike is indispensable since a significant number of ALPAP members did not at all participate in the strike. The motion also made reference to the favorable recommendation rendered by the Freedom of Association Committee of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in ILO Case No. 2195 which requested the Philippine Government "to initiate discussions in order to consider the possible reinstatement in their previous employment of all ALPAPs workers who were dismissed following the strike staged in June 1998."25A Supplemental Motion26was afterwards filed by ALPAP on January 28, 2003, this time asking the DOLE Secretary to resolve all issues relating to the entitlement to employment benefits by the officers and members of ALPAP, whether terminated or not.In its Comment27to ALPAPs motions, PAL argued that the motions cannot legally prosper since the DOLE Secretary has no authority to reopen or review a final judgment of the Supreme Court relative to NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97; that the requested proceeding is no longer necessary as the CA or this Court did not order the remand of the case to the DOLE Secretary for such determination; that the NLRC rather than the DOLE Secretary has jurisdiction over the motions as said motions partake of a complaint for illegal dismissal with monetary claims; and that all money claims are deemed suspended in view of the fact that PAL is under receivership.On January 24, 2003, the DOLE called the parties to a hearing to discuss and clarify the issues raised in ALPAPs motions.28In a letter dated July 4, 200329addressed to ALPAP President, Capt. Ismael C. Lapus, Jr., then Acting DOLE Secretary, Imson, resolved ALPAPs motions in the following manner:x x x xAfter a careful consideration of the factual antecedents, applicable legal principles and the arguments of the parties, this Office concludes that NCMB-NCR-NS-12-514-97 has indeed been resolved with finality by the highest tribunal of the land, the Supreme Court. Being final and executory, this Office is bereft of authority to reopen an issue that has been passed upon by the Supreme Court.It is important to note that in pages 18 to 19 of ALPAPs Memorandum, it admitted that individual complaints for illegal dismissal have been filed by the affected pilots before the NLRC. It is therefore an implied recognition on the part of the pilots that the remedy to their present dilemma could be found in the NLRC.x x x xThus, to avoid multiplicity of suits, splitting causes of action and forum-shopping which are all obnoxious to an orderly administration of justice, it is but proper to respect the final and executory order of the Supreme Court in this case as well as the jurisdiction of the NLRC over the illegal dismissal cases. Since ALPAP and the pilots have opted to seek relief from the NLRC, this Office should respect the authority of that Commission to resolve the dispute in the normal course of law. This Office will no longer entertain any further initiatives to split the jurisdiction or to shop for a forum that shall only foment multiplicity of labor disputes. Parties should not jump from one forum to another. This Office will make sure of that.By reason of the final ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court, the erring pilots have lost their employment status and second, because these pilots have filed cases to contest such loss before another forum, the Motion and Supplemental Motion of ALPAP as well as the arguments raised therein are merelyNOTEDby this Office.ALPAP filed its motion for reconsideration30arguing that the issues raised in its motions have remained unresolved hence, it is the duty of DOLE to resolve the same it having assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. ALPAP also denied having engaged in forum shopping as the individual complainants who filed the cases before the NLRC are separate and distinct from ALPAP and that the causes of action therein are different. According to ALPAP, there was clear abdication of duty when then Acting Secretary Imson refused to properly act on the motions. In a letter dated July 30, 2003,31Secretary Sto. Tomas likewise merely noted ALPAPs motion for reconsideration, reiterating the DOLEs stand to abide by the final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court.Proceedings before the Court of AppealsALPAP filed a petition forcertiorari32with the CA, insisting that the assailed letters dated July 4, 2003 and July 30, 2003, which merely noted its motions, were issued in grave abuse of discretion.In their Comment,33Sto. Tomas and Imson argued that the matter of who among ALPAPs members and officers participated in the strike was already raised and resolved by the CA and this Court. By filing the motions, ALPAP, in effect, initiated a termination case which is properly cognizable by the Labor Arbiter. And since several ALPAP members have already filed complaints for illegal dismissal and claims for salaries and benefits with the Labor Arbiter, ALPAP is thus engaging in forum-shopping when it filed the subject motions.PAL, on the other hand, also claimed in its Comment34that ALPAP violated the principles governing forum shopping,res judicataand multiplicity of suits. It opined that when ALPAP questioned the loss of employment status of "all its officers and members and asked for their reinstatement" in its appeal to reverse the Decision of the DOLE Secretary in the consolidated strike and illegal lockout cases, the matter of who should be meted out the penalty of dismissal was already resolved with finality by this Court and could not anymore be modified.The CA, in its Decision dated December 22, 2004,35dismissed the petition. It found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Sto. Tomas and Imson in refusing to conduct the necessary proceedings to determine issues relating to ALPAP members employment status and entitlement to employment benefits. The CA held that both these issues were among the issues taken up and resolved in the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution which was affirmed by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 54880 and subsequently determined with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 152306. Therefore, said issues could no longer be reviewed. The CA added that Sto. Tomas and Imson merely acted in deference to the NLRCs jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal cases filed by individual ALPAP members.ALPAP moved for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit in CA Resolution36dated May 30, 2005.Hence, this petition.IssuesI.WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO ACT ON ALPAPS MOTIONS AND MERELY NOTED THE SAME.II.WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN DECLARING THAT THE 01 JUNE 1999 RESOLUTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT HAS ALREADY TAKEN UP AND RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF WHO AMONG THE ALPAP MEMBERS ARE DEEMED TO HAVE LOST THEIR EMPLOYMENT STATUS.37ALPAP contends that it was erroneous for Sto. Tomas and Imson to merely take note of the motions when the issues raised therein sprang from the DOLE Secretarys exercise of authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute which have nevertheless remained unresolved. ALPAP prays that the assailed letters dated July 4, 2003 and July 30, 2003 be declared null and void. It likewise seeks for a conduct of a proceeding to determine who actually participated in the illegal strike of June 1998 and consequently who, from its vast membership, should be deemed to have lost employment status.Our RulingWe deny the petition.There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Sto. Tomas and Imson in merely noting ALPAPs twin motions in due deference to a final and immutable judgment rendered by the Supreme Court.From the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution, which declared the strike of June 5, 1998 as illegal and pronounced all ALPAP officers and members who participated therein to have lost their employment status, an appeal was taken by ALPAP. This was dismissed by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 54880, which ruling was affirmed by this Court and which became final and executory on August 29, 2002.In the instant case, ALPAP seeks for a conduct of a proceeding to determine who among its members and officers actually participated in the illegal strike because, it insists, the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution did not make such determination. However, as correctly ruled by Sto. Tomas and Imson and affirmed by the CA, such proceeding would entail a reopening of a final judgment which could not be permitted by this Court. Settled in law is that once a decision has acquired finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable, thus can no longer be modified in any respect.38Subject to certain recognized exceptions,39the principle of immutability leaves the judgment undisturbed as "nothing further can be done except to execute it."40True, the dispositive portion of the DOLE Resolution does not specifically enumerate the names of those who actually participated in the strike but only mentions that those strikers who failed to heed the return-to-work order are deemed to have lost their employment. This omission, however, cannot prevent an effective execution of the decision. As was held inReinsurance Company of the Orient, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,41any ambiguity may be clarified by reference primarily to the body of the decision or supplementary to the pleadings previously filed in the case. In any case, especially when there is an ambiguity, "a judgmentshall be read in connection with the entire record and construed accordingly."42There is no necessity to conduct a proceeding to determine the participants in the illegal strike or those who refused to heed the return to work order because the ambiguity can be cured by reference to the body of the decision and the pleadings filed.1avvphi1A review of the records reveals that in NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97, the DOLE Secretary declared the ALPAP officers and members to have lost their employment status based on either of two grounds, viz: their participation in the illegal strike on June 5, 1998 or their defiance of the return-to-work order of the DOLE Secretary. The records of the case unveil the names of each of these returning pilots. The logbook43with the heading "Return To Work Compliance/ Returnees" bears their individual signature signifying their conformity that they were among those workers who returned to work only on June 26, 1998 or after the deadline imposed by DOLE. From this crucial and vital piece of evidence, it is apparent that each of these pilots is bound by the judgment. Besides, the complaint for illegal lockout was filed on behalf of all these returnees. Thus, a finding that there was no illegal lockout would be enforceable against them. In fine, only those returning pilots, irrespective of whether they comprise the entire membership of ALPAP, are bound by the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution.ALPAP harps on the inequity of PALs termination of its officers and members considering that some of them were on leave or were abroad at the time of the strike. Some were even merely barred from returning to their work which excused them for not complying immediately with the return-to-work order. Again, a scrutiny of the records of the case discloses that these allegations were raised at a very late stage, that is, after the judgment has finally decreed that the returning pilots termination was legal. Interestingly, these defenses were not raised and discussed when the case was still pending before the DOLE Secretary, the CA or even before this Court. We agree with the position taken by Sto. Tomas and Imson that from the time the return-to-work order was issued until this Court rendered its April 10, 2002 resolution dismissing ALPAPs petition, no ALPAP member has claimed that he was unable to comply with the return-to-work directive because he was either on leave, abroad or unable to report for some reason. These defenses were raised in ALPAPs twin motions only after the Resolution in G.R. No. 152306 reached finality in its last ditch effort to obtain a favorable ruling. It has been held that a proceeding may not be reopened upon grounds already available to the parties during the pendency of such proceedings; otherwise, it may give way to vicious and vexatious proceedings.44ALPAP was given all the opportunities to present its evidence and arguments. It cannot now complain that it was denied due processRelevant to mention at this point is that when NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97 (strike/illegal lockout case) was still pending, several complaints for illegal dismissal were filed before the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC by individual members of ALPAP, questioning their termination following the strike staged in June 1998. PAL likewise manifests that there is a pending case involving a complaint45for the recovery of accrued and earned benefits belonging to ALPAP members. Nonetheless, the pendency of the foregoing cases should not and could not affect the character of our disposition over the instant case. Rather, these cases should be resolved in a manner consistent and in accord with our present disposition for effective enforcement and execution of a final judgment.WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIEDfor lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 22, 2004 and Resolution dated May 30, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 79686 are AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 169704 November 17, 2010ALBERT TENG, doing business under the firm name ALBERT TENG FISH TRADING, and EMILIA TENG-CHUA,Petitioners,vs.ALFREDO S. PAHAGAC, EDDIE D. NIPA, ORLANDO P. LAYESE, HERNAN Y. BADILLES and ROGER S. PAHAGAC,Respondents.D E C I S I O NBRION,J.:Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1filed by petitioners Albert Teng Fish Trading, its owner Albert Teng, and its manager Emilia Teng-Chua, to reverse and set aside the September 21, 2004 decision2and the September 1, 2005 resolution3of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78783. The CA reversed the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator (VA), National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), Region IX, Zamboanga City, and declared that there exists an employer-employee relationship between Teng and respondents Hernan Badilles, Orlando Layese, Eddie Nipa, Alfredo Pahagac, and Roger Pahagac (collectively, respondent workers). It also found that Teng illegally dismissed the respondent workers from their employment.BACKGROUND FACTSAlbert Teng Fish Trading is engaged in deep sea fishing and, for this purpose, owns boats (basnig), equipment, and other fishing paraphernalia. As owner of the business, Teng claims that he customarily enters into joint venture agreements with master fishermen (maestros) who are skilled and are experts in deep sea fishing; they take charge of the management of each fishing venture, including the hiring of the members of its complement. He avers that the maestros hired the respondent workers as checkers to determine the volume of the fish caught in every fishing voyage.4On February 20, 2003, the respondent workers filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Albert Teng Fish Trading, Teng, and Chua before the NCMB, Region Branch No. IX, Zamboanga City.The respondent workers alleged that Teng hired them, without any written employment contract, to serve as his "eyes and ears" aboard the fishing boats; to classify the fish caught by baera; to report to Teng via radio communication the classes and volume of each catch; to receive instructions from him as to where and when to unload the catch; to prepare the list of the provisions requested by the maestro and the mechanic for his approval; and, to procure the items as approved by him.5They also claimed that they received regular monthly salaries, 13th month pay, Christmas bonus, and incentives in the form of shares in the total volume of fish caught.They asserted that sometime in September 2002, Teng expressed his doubts on the correct volume of fish caught in every fishing voyage.6In December 2002, Teng informed them that their services had been terminated.7In his defense, Teng maintained that he did not have any hand in hiring the respondent workers; the maestros, rather than he, invited them to join the venture. According to him, his role was clearly limited to the provision of the necessary capital, tools and equipment, consisting of basnig, gears, fuel, food, and other supplies.8The VA rendered a decision9in Tengs favor and declared that no employer-employee relationship existed between Teng and the respondent workers. The dispositive portion of the VAs May 30, 2003 decision reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the instant complaint for lack of merit.It follows also, that all other claims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit.10The respondent workers received the VAs decision on June 12, 2003.11They filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in an order dated June 27, 2003 and which they received on July 8, 2003.12The VA reasoned out that Section 6, Rule VII of the 1989 Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings (1989 Procedural Guidelines) does not provide the remedy of a motion for reconsideration to the party adversely affected by the VAs order or decision.13The order states:Under Executive Order No. 126, as amended by Executive Order No. 251, and in order to implement Article 260-262 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, otherwise known as the Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings, inter alia:An award or the Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrators becomes final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of copies of the award or decision by the parties (Sec. 6, Rule VII).Moreover, the above-mentioned guidelines do not provide the remedy of a motion for reconsideration to the party adversely affected by the order or decision of voluntary arbitrators.14On July 21, 2003, the respondent-workers elevated the case to the CA. In its decision of September 21, 2004, the CA reversed the VAs decision after finding sufficient evidence showing the existence of employer-employee relationship:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The questioned decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator dated May 30, 2003 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE by ordering private respondent to pay separation pay with backwages and other monetary benefits. For this purpose, the case is REMANDED to the Voluntary Arbitrator for the computation of petitioners backwages and other monetary benefits. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.15Teng moved to reconsider the CAs decision, but the CA denied the motion in its resolution of September 1, 2005.16He, thereafter, filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, claiming that:a. the VAs decision is not subject to a motion for reconsideration; andb. no employer-employee relationship existed between Teng and the respondent workers.Teng contends that the VAs decision is not subject to a motion for reconsideration in the absence of any specific provision allowing this recourse under Article 262-A of the Labor Code.17He cites the 1989 Procedural Guidelines, which, as the VA declared, does not provide the remedy of a motion for reconsideration.18He claims that after the lapse of 10 days from its receipt, the VAs decision becomes final and executory unless an appeal is taken.19He argues that when the respondent workers received the VAs decision on June 12, 2003,20they had 10 days, or until June 22, 2003, to file an appeal. As the respondent workers opted instead to move for reconsideration, the 10-day period to appeal continued to run; thus, the VAs decision had already become final and executory by the time they assailed it before the CA on July 21, 2003.21Teng further insists that the VA was correct in ruling that there was no employer-employee relationship between him and the respondent workers. What he entered into was a joint venture agreement with the maestros, where Tengs role was only to provide basnig, gears, nets, and other tools and equipment for every fishing voyage.22THE COURTS RULINGWe resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.Article 262-A of the Labor Code does not prohibit the filing of a motion for reconsideration.On March 21, 1989, Republic Act No. 671523took effect, amending, among others, Article 263 of the Labor Code which was originally worded as:Art. 263 x x x Voluntary arbitration awards or decisions shall be final, unappealable, and executory.As amended, Article 263 is now Article 262-A, which states:Art. 262-A. x x x [T]he award or decision x x x shall contain the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties.Notably, Article 262-A deleted the word "unappealable" from Article 263. The deliberate selection of the language in the amendatory act differing from that of the original act indicates that the legislature intended a change in the law, and the court should endeavor to give effect to such intent.24We recognized the intent of the change of phraseology in Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. v. Sampang,25where we ruled that:It is true that the present rule [Art. 262-A] makes the voluntary arbitration award final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties. Presumably, the decision may still be reconsidered by the Voluntary Arbitrator on the basis of a motion for reconsideration duly filed during that period.26In Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil., Inc., Sales Force Union-PTGWO-Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.,27we likewise ruled that the VAs decision may still be reconsidered on the basis of a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed within 10 days from receipt thereof.28The seasonable filing of a motion for reconsideration is a mandatory requirement to forestall the finality of such decision.29We further cited the 1989 Procedural Guidelines which implemented Article 262-A, viz:30[U]nder Section 6, Rule VII of the same guidelines implementing Article 262-A of the Labor Code, this Decision, as a matter of course, would become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of copies of the decision by the parties x x x unless, in the meantime, a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is filed within the same 10-day period.31These rulings fully establish that the absence of a categorical language in Article 262-A does not preclude the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the VAs decision within the 10-day period. Tengs allegation that the VAs decision had become final and executory by the time the respondent workers filed an appeal with the CA thus fails. We consequently rule that the respondent workers seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the VAs judgment, and the VA erred in denying the motion because no motion for reconsideration is allowed.The Court notes that despite our interpretation that Article 262-A does not preclude the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the VAs decision, a contrary provision can be found in Section 7, Rule XIX of the Department of Labors Department Order (DO) No. 40, series of 2003:32Rule XIXSection 7. Finality of Award/Decision. The decision, order, resolution or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties and it shall not be subject of a motion for reconsideration.Presumably on the basis of DO 40-03, the 1989 Procedural Guidelines was revised in 2005 (2005 Procedural Guidelines),33whose pertinent provisions provide that:Rule VII DECISIONSSection 6. Finality of Decisions. The decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the decision by the parties.Section 7. Motions for Reconsideration. The decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator is not subject of a Motion for Reconsideration.We are surprised that neither the VA nor Teng cited DO 40-03 and the 2005 Procedural Guidelines as authorities for their cause, considering that these were the governing rules while the case was pending and these directly and fully supported their theory. Had they done so, their reliance on the provisions would have nevertheless been unavailing for reasons we shall now discuss.In the exercise of its power to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, an implementing agency, such as the Department of Labor,34is restricted from going beyond the terms of the law it seeks to implement; it should neither modify nor improve the law. The agency formulating the rules and guidelines cannot exceed the statutory authority granted to it by the legislature.35By allowing a 10-day period, the obvious intent of Congress in amending Article 263 to Article 262-A is to provide an opportunity for the party adversely affected by the VAs decision to seek recourse via a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court filed with the CA. Indeed, a motion for reconsideration is the more appropriate remedy in line with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. For this reason, an appeal from administrative agencies to the CA via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court requires exhaustion of available remedies36as a condition precedent to a petition under that Rule.The requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted is based on the doctrine that in providing for a remedy before an administrative agency, every opportunity must be given to the agency to resolve the matter and to exhaust all opportunities for a resolution under the given remedy before bringing an action in, or resorting to, the courts of justice.37Where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs,38guided by congressional intent.39By disallowing reconsideration of the VAs decision, Section 7, Rule XIX of DO 40-03 and Section 7 of the 2005 Procedural Guidelines went directly against the legislative intent behind Article 262-A of the Labor Code. These rules deny the VA the chance to correct himself40and compel the courts of justice to prematurely intervene with the action of an administrative agency entrusted with the adjudication of controversies coming under its special knowledge, training and specific field of expertise. In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative agencies with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial review, is indispensable.41In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,42we ruled that relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.43There exists an employer-employee relationship between Teng and the respondent workers.We agree with the CAs finding that sufficient evidence exists indicating the existence of an employer-employee relationship between Teng and the respondent workers.While Teng alleged that it was the maestros who hired the respondent workers, it was his company that issued to the respondent workers identification cards (IDs) bearing their names as employees and Tengs signature as the employer. Generally, in a business establishment, IDs are issued to identify the holder as a bona fide employee of the issuing entity.For the 13 years that the respondent workers worked for Teng, they received wages on a regular basis, in addition to their shares in the fish caught.44The worksheet showed that the respondent workers received uniform amounts within a given year, which amounts annually increased until the termination of their employment in 2002.45Tengs claim that the amounts received by the respondent workers are mere commissions is incredulous, as it would mean that the fish caught throughout the year is uniform and increases in number each year.More importantly, the element of control which we have ruled in a number of cases to be a strong indicator of the existence of an employer-employee relationship is present in this case. Teng not only owned the tools and equipment, he directed how the respondent workers were to perform their job as checkers; they, in fact, acted as Tengs eyes and ears in every fishing expedition.Teng cannot hide behind his argument that the respondent workers were hired by the maestros. To consider the respondent workers as employees of the maestros would mean that Teng committed impermissible labor-only contracting. As a policy, the Labor Code prohibits labor-only contracting:ART. 106. Contractor or Subcontractor x x x The Secretary of Labor and Employment may, by appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit the contracting-out of labor.x x x xThere is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by such persons are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of such employer.In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.Section 5 of the DO No. 18-02,46which implements Article 106 of the Labor Code, provides:Section 5. Prohibition against labor-only contracting. Labor-only contracting is hereby declared prohibited.For this purpose, labor-only contracting shall refer to an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal, and any of the following elements are present:(i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job, work or service to be performed and the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal; or(ii) The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of the contractual employee.In the present case, the maestros did not have any substantial capital or investment.1avvphi1Teng admitted that he solely provided the capital and equipment, while the maestros supplied the workers. The power of control over the respondent workers was lodged not with the maestros but with Teng. As checkers, the respondent workers main tasks were to count and classify the fish caught and report them to Teng. They performed tasks that were necessary and desirable in Tengs fishing business. Taken together, these incidents confirm the existence of a labor-only contracting which is prohibited in our jurisdiction, as it is considered to be the employers attempt to evade obligations afforded by law to employees.Accordingly, we hold that employer-employee ties exist between Teng and the respondent workers. A finding that the maestros are labor-only contractors is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship exists between Teng and the respondent workers. As regular employees, the respondent workers are entitled to all the benefits and rights appurtenant to regular employment.The dismissal of an employee, which the employer must validate, has a twofold requirement: one is substantive, the other is procedural.47Not only must the dismissal be for a just or an authorized cause, as provided by law; the rudimentary requirements of due process the opportunity to be heard and to defend oneself must be observed as well.48The employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal was for a just cause; failure to show this, as in the present case, would necessarily mean that the dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal.49The respondent workers allegation that Teng summarily dismissed them on suspicion that they were not reporting to him the correct volume of the fish caught in each fishing voyage was never denied by Teng. Unsubstantiated suspicion is not a just cause to terminate ones employment under Article 28250of the Labor Code. To allow an employer to dismiss an employee based on mere allegations and generalities would place the employee at the mercy of his employer, and would emasculate the right to security of tenure.51For his failure to comply with the Labor Codes substantive requirement on termination of employment, we declare that Teng illegally dismissed the respondent workers.WHEREFORE, weDENYthe petition andAFFIRMthe September 21, 2004 decision and the September 1, 2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78783. Costs against the petitioners.

G.R. No. 190515 November 15, 2010CIRTEK EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION-FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS,Petitioner,vs.CIRTEK ELECTRONICS, INC.,Respondent.D E C I S I O NCARPIO MORALES,J.:Cirtek Electronics, Inc. (respondent), an electronics and semi-conductor firm situated inside the Laguna Technopark, had an existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with Cirtek Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free Workers (petitioner) for the period January 1, 2001 up to December 31, 2005. Prior to the 3rd year of the CBA, the parties renegotiated its economic provisions but failed to reach a settlement, particularly on the issue of wage increases. Petitioner thereupon declared a bargaining deadlock and filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board-Regional Office No. IV (NCMB-RO IV) on April 26, 2004. Respondent, upon the other hand, filed a Notice of Lockout on June 16, 2004.While the conciliation proceedings were ongoing, respondent placed seven union officers including the President, a Vice President, the Secretary and the Chairman of the Board of Directors under preventive suspension for allegedly spearheading a boycott of overtime work. The officers were eventually dismissed from employment, prompting petitioner to file another Notice of Strike which was, after conciliation meetings, converted to a voluntary arbitration case. The dismissal of the officers was later found to be legal, hence, petitioner appealed.In the meantime, as amicable settlement of the CBA was deadlocked, petitioner went on strike on June 20, 2005. By Order1dated June 23, 2005, the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the controversy and issued a Return to Work Order which was complied with.Before the Secretary of Labor could rule on the controversy, respondent created a Labor Management Council (LMC) through which it concluded with the remaining officers of petitioner a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)2providing for daily wage increases ofP6.00 per day effective January 1, 2004 andP9.00 per day effective January 1, 2005. Petitioner submitted the MOA via Motion and Manifestation3to the Secretary of Labor, alleging that the remaining officers signed the MOA under respondents assurance that should the Secretary order a higher award of wage increase, respondent would comply.By Order4dated March 16, 2006, the Secretary of Labor resolved the CBA deadlock by awarding a wage increase of fromP6.00 toP10.00 per day effective January 1, 2004 and fromP9.00 toP15.00 per day effective January 1, 2005, and adopting all other benefits as embodied in the MOA.Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the Decision as petitioners vice-president submitted a "Muling Pagpapatibay ng Pagsang-ayon sa Kasunduan na may Petsang ika-4 ng Agosto 2005,"5stating that the union members were waiving their rights and benefits under the Secretarys Decision. Reconsideration of the Decision was denied by Resolution6of August 12, 2008, hence, respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.By Decision7of September 24, 2009, the appellate court ruled in favor of respondent and accordingly set aside the Decision of the Secretary of Labor. It held that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion in not respecting the MOA. It did not give credence to the minutes of the meeting8that attended the forging of the MOA as it was not verified, nor to the "Paliwanag"9submitted by respondent union members explaining why they signed the MOA as it was not notarized.Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution10of December 2, 2009, the present petition was filed, maintaining that the Secretary of Labors award is in order, being in accord with the parties CBA history respondent having already grantedP15.00 per day for 2001,P10.00 per day for 2002, andP10.00 per day for 2003, and that the Secretary has the power to grant awards higher than what are stated in the CBA.Respecting the MOA, petitioner posits that it was "surreptitiously entered into [in] bad faith," it having been forged without the assistance of the Federation of Free Workers or counsel, adding that respondent could have waited for the Secretarys resolution of the pending CBA deadlock or that the MOA could have been concluded before representatives of the Secretary of Labor.The relevant issues for resolution are 1) whether the Secretary of Labor is authorized to give an award higher than that agreed upon in the MOA, and 2) whether the MOA was entered into and ratified by the remaining officers of petitioner under the condition, which was not incorporated in the MOA, that respondent would honor the Secretary of Labors award in the event that it is higher.The Court resolves both issues in the affirmative.It is well-settled that the Secretary of Labor, in the exercise of his power to assume jurisdiction under Art. 263 (g)11of the Labor Code, may resolve all issues involved in the controversy including the award of wage increases and benefits.12While an arbitral award cannotper sebe categorized as an agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties because it requires the intervention and imposing power of the State thru the Secretary of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction, the arbitral award can be considered an approximation of a collective bargaining agreement which would otherwise have been entered into by the parties, hence, it has the force and effect of a valid contract obligation.13That the arbitral award was higher than that which was purportedly agreed upon in the MOA is of no moment. For the Secretary, in resolving the CBA deadlock, is not limited to considering the MOA as basis in computing the wage increases. He could, as he did, consider the financial documents14submitted by respondent as well as the parties bargaining history and respondents financial outlook and improvements as stated in its website.15It bears noting that since the filing and submission of the MOA did not have the effect of divesting the Secretary of his jurisdiction, or of automatically disposing the controversy, then neither should the provisions of the MOA restrict the Secretarys leeway in deciding the matters before him.1avvphi1The appellate courts brushing aside of the "Paliwanag" and the minutes of the meeting that resulted in the conclusion of the MOA because they were not verified and notarized, thus violating, so the appellate court reasoned, the rules on parol evidence, does not lie. Like any other rule on evidence, parol evidence should not be strictly applied in labor cases.The reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. In labor cases pending before the Commission or the Labor Arbiter, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling. Rules of procedure and evidence are not applied in a very rigid and technical sense in labor cases. Hence, the Labor Arbiter is not precluded from accepting and evaluating evidence other than, and even contrary to, what is stated in the CBA.16(emphasis supplied)While a contract constitutes the law between the parties, this is so in the present case with respect to the CBA, not to the MOA in which even the unions signatories had expressed reservations thereto. But even assuming arguendo that the MOA is treated as a new CBA, since it is imbued with public interest, it must be construed liberally and yield to the common good.While the terms and conditions of a CBA constitute the law between the parties, it is not, however, an ordinary contract to which is applied the principles of law governing ordinary contracts.A CBA, as a labor contract within the contemplation of Article 1700 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which governs the relations between labor and capital, is not merely contractual in nature butimpressed with public interest, thus, it must yield to the common good. As such, it must beconstrued liberallyrather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must place apractical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to serve.17(emphasis and underscoring supplied)WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 24, 2009 and the Resolution dated December 2, 2009 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Order dated March 16, 2006 and Resolution dated August 12, 2008 of the Secretary of Labor are REINSTATED.G.R. No. 190515 June 6, 2011CIRTEK EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION-FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERSPetitioner,vs.CIRTEK ELECTRONICS, INC.,Respondent.R E S O L U T I O NCARPIO MORALES,J.:This resolves the motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration filed by respondent, Cirtek Electronics, Inc., of the Courts Decision dated November 15, 2010.Respondent-movant avers that petitioner, in filing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, availed of the wrong remedy, hence, the Court should have dismissed the petition outright. It goes on to aver that the Court erred in resolving a factual issue whether the August 24, 2005 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was validly entered into , which is not the office of a petition for certiorari.Respondent-movant further avers that the MOA1signed by the remaining officers of petitioner Union and allegedly ratified by its members should have been given credence by the Court.Furthermore, respondent-movant maintains that the Secretary of Labor cannot insist on a ruling beyond the compromise agreement entered into by the parties; and that, as early as February 5, 2010, petitioner Union had already filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a resolution of disaffiliation from the Federation of Free Workers resulting in the latters lack of personality to represent the workers in the present case.The motion is bereft of merit.Respondent indeed availed of the wrong remedy of certiorari under Rule 65. Due, however, to the nature of the case, one involving workers wages and benefits, and the fact that whether the petition was filed under Rule 65 or appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 it was filed within 15 days (the reglementary period under Rule 45) from petitioners receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals Resolution denying its motion for reconsideration, the Court resolved to give it due course. As Almelor v. RTC of Las Pias, et al.2restates:Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. This is to prevent the party from benefiting from ones neglect and mistakes.However, like most rules, it carries certain exceptions. After all, theultimate purpose of all rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)Respecting the attribution of error to the Court in ruling on a question of fact, it bears recalling that a QUESTION OF FACT arises when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts,3while a QUESTION OF LAW exists when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts.The present case presents the primordial issue of whether the Secretary of Labor is empowered to give arbitral awards in the exercise of his authority to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes.Ineluctably, the issue involves a determination and application of existing law, the provisions of the Labor Code, and prevailing jurisprudence. Intertwined with the issue, however, is the question of validity of the MOA and its ratification which, as movant correctly points out, is a question of fact and one which is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The rule, however, is not without exceptions, viz:This rule provides that the parties may raise only questions of law, because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Generally, we are not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence introduced in and considered by the tribunals below. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the followingrecognized exceptions:(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)In the present case, the findings of the Secretary of Labor and the appellate court on whether the MOA is valid and binding are conflicting, the former giving scant consideration thereon, and the latter affording it more weight.As found by the Secretary of Labor, the MOA came about as a result of the constitution, at respondents behest, of the Labor-Management Council (LMC) which, he reminded the parties, should not be used as an avenue for bargaining but for the purpose of affording workers to participate in policy and decision-making. Hence, the agreements embodied in the MOA were not the proper subject of the LMC deliberation or procedure but of CBA negotiations and, therefore, deserving little weight.The appellate court, held, however, that the Secretary did not have the authority to give an arbitral award higher than what was stated in the MOA. The conflicting views drew the Court to re-evaluate the facts as borne by the records, an exception to the rule that only questions of law may be dealt with in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.As discussed in the Decision under reconsideration, the then Acting Secretary of Labor Manuel G. Imson acted well within his jurisdiction in ruling that the wage increases to be given areP10 per day effective January 1, 2004 andP15 per day effective January 1, 2005, pursuant to his power to assume jurisdiction under Art. 263 (g)4of the Labor Code.While an arbitral award cannotper sebe categorized as an agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties because it requires the interference and imposing power of the State thru the Secretary of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction, the award can be considered as an approximation of a collective bargaining agreement which would otherwise have been entered into by the parties. Hence, it has the force and effect of a valid contract obligation between the parties.5In determining arbitral awards then, aside from the MOA, courts considered other factors and documents including, as in this case, the financial documents6submitted by respondent as well as its previous bargaining history and financial outlook and improvements as stated in its own website.7The appellate courts ruling that giving credence to the "Pahayag" and the minutes of the meeting which were not verified and notarized would violate the rule on parol evidence is erroneous. The parol evidence rule, like other rules on evidence, should not be strictly applied in labor cases. Interphil Laboratories Employees Union-FFW v. Interphil Laboratories, Inc.8teaches:[R]eliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. In labor cases pending before the Commission or the Labor Arbiter, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity arenotcontrolling. Rules of procedure and evidence are not applied in a very rigid and technical sense in labor cases. Hence, the Labor Arbiteris not precluded from accepting and evaluating evidence other than, and even contrary to, what is stated in the CBA. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)On the contention that the MOA should have been given credence because it was validly entered into by the parties, the Court notes that even those who signed it expressed reservations thereto. A CBA (assuming in this case that the MOA can be treated as one) is a contract imbued with public interest. It must thus be given a liberal, practical and realistic, rather than a narrow and technical construction, with due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose for which it is intended.9As for the contention that the alleged disaffiliation of the Union from the FFW during the pendency of the case resulted in the FFW losing its personality to represent the Union, the same does not affect the Courts upholding of the authority of the Secretary of Labor to impose arbitral awards higher than what was supposedly agreed upon in the MOA. Contrary to respondents assertion, the "unavoidable issue of disaffiliation" bears no significant legal repercussions to warrant the reversal of the Courts Decision.En passant, whether there was a valid disaffiliation is a factual issue. Besides, the alleged disaffiliation of the Union from the FFW was by virtue of a Resolution signed on February 23, 2010 and submitted to the DOLE Laguna Field Office on March 5, 2010 two months after the present petition was filed on December 22, 2009, hence, it did not affect FFW and its Legal Centers standing to file the petition nor this Courts jurisdiction to resolve the same.At all events, the issue of disaffiliation is an intra-union dispute which must be resolved in a different forum in an action at the instance of either or both the FFW and the Union or a rival labor organization,nottheemployer.An intra-union dispute refers to any conflict between and among union members, including grievances arising from any violation of the rights and conditions of membership, violation of or disagreement over any provision of the unions constitution and by-laws, or disputes arising from chartering or disaffiliation of the union. Sections 1 and 2, Rule XI of Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003 of the DOLE enumerate the following circumstances as inter/intra-union disputes, viz:RULE XIINTER/INTRA-UNION DISPUTES ANDOTHER RELATED LABOR RELATIONS DISPUTESSection 1. Coverage. - Inter/intra-union disputes shall include:(a) cancellation of registration of a labor organization filed by its members or by another labor organization;(b) conduct of election of union and workers association officers/nullification of election of union and workers association officers;(c) audit/accounts examination of union or workers association funds;(d) deregistration of collective bargaining agreements;(e) validity/invalidity of union affiliation or disaffiliation;(f) validity/invalidity of acceptance/non-acceptance for union membership;(g) validity/invalidity of impeachment/expulsion of union and workers association officers and members;(h) validity/invalidity of voluntary recognition;(i) opposition to application for union and CBA registration;(j) violations of or disagreements over any provision in a union or workers association constitution and by-laws;(k) disagreements over chartering or registration of labor organizations and collective bargaining agreements;(l) violations of the rights and conditions of union or workers association membership;(m) violations of the rights of legitimate labor organizations, except interpretation of collective bargaining agreements;(n) such other disputes or conflicts involving the rights to self-organization, union membership and collective bargaining (1) between and among legitimate labor organizations;(2) between and among members of a union or workers association.Section 2. Coverage. Other related labor relations disputes shall include any conflict between a labor union and the employer or any individual, entity or group that is not a labor organization or workers association. This includes: (1) cancellation of registration of unions and workers associations; and (2) a petition for interpleader.10(emphasis supplied)Indeed, as respondent-movant itself argues, a local union may disaffiliate at any time from its mother federation, absent any showing that the same is prohibited under its constitution or rule. Such, however, does not result in it losing its legal personality altogether. Verily, Anglo-KMU v. Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawang Nagkakaisa Sa Manila Bay Spinning Mills At J.P. Coats11enlightens:A local labor union is a separate and distinct unit primarily designed to secure and maintain an equality of bargaining power between the employer and their employee-members.A local union does not owe its existence to the federation with which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation to the will of its members. The mere act of affiliationdoes not divest the local union of its own personality, neither does it give the mother federation the license to act independently of the local union. It only gives rise to a contract of agency where the former acts in representation of the latter. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)1avvphi1Whether then, as respondent claims, FFW "went against the will and wishes of its principal" (the member-employees) by pursuing the case despite the signing of the MOA, is not for the Court, nor for respondent to determine, but for the Union and FFW to resolve on their own pursuant to their principal-agent relationship.WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of this Courts Decision of November 15, 2010 is DENIED.

G.R. No. 159460 November 15, 2010SOLIDBANK CORPORATION (now known as FIRST METRO INVESTMENT CORPORATION),Petitioner,vs.ERNESTO U. GAMIER, ELENA R. CONDEVILLAMAR, JANICE L. ARRIOLA and OPHELIA C. DE GUZMAN,Respondents.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xG.R. No. 159461SOLIDBANK CORPORATION and/or its successor-in-interest, FIRST METRO INVESTMENT CORPORATION, DEOGRACIAS N. VISTAN AND EDGARDO MENDOZA, JR.,Petitioners,vs.SOLIDBANK UNION AND ITS DISMISSED OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, namely: EVANGELINE J. GABRIEL, TERESITA C. LUALHATI, ISAGANI P. MAKISIG, REY S. PASCUA, EVELYN A. SIA, MA. VICTORIA M. VIDALLON, AUREY A. ALJIBE, REY ANTHONY M. AMPARADO, JOSE A. ANTENOR, AUGUSTO D. ARANDIA, JR., JANICE L. ARRIOLA, RUTH SHEILA MA. BAGADIONG, STEVE D. BERING, ALAN ROY I. BUYCO, MANALO T. CABRERA, RACHE M. CASTILLO, VICTOR O. CHUA, VIRGILIO Y. CO, JR., LEOPOLDO S. DABAY, ARMAND V. DAYANG-HIRANG, HUBERT V. DIMAGIBA, MA. LOURDES CECILIA B. EMPARADOR, FELIX D. ESTACIO, JR., JULIETA T. ESTRADA, MARICEL G. EVALLA, JOSE G. GUISADIO, JOSE RAINARIO C. LAOANG, ALEXANDER A. MARTINEZ, JUAN ALEX C. NAMBONG, JOSEPHINE M. ONG, ARMANDO B. OROZCO, ARLENE R. RODRIGUEZ, NICOMEDES P. RUIZO, JR., DON A. SANTANA, ERNESTO R. SANTOS, JR., EDNA M. SARONG, GREGORIO S. SECRETARIO, ELLEN M. SORIANO, ROSIE C. UY, ARVIN D. VALENCIA, FERMIN JOSSEPH B. VENTURA, JR., EMMANUEL C. YAPTANCO, ERNESTO C. ZUNIGA, ARIEL S. ABENDAN, EMMA R. ABENDAN, PAULA AGNES A. ANGELES, JACQUILINE B. BAQUIRAN, JENNIFER S. BARCENAS, ALVIN E. BARICANOSA, GEORGE MAXIMO P. BARQUEZ, MA. ELENA G. BELLO, RODERICK M. BELLO, MICHAEL MATTHEW B. BILLENA, LEOPE L. CABENIAN, NEPTALI A. CADDARAO, FERDINAND MEL S. CAPULING, MARGARETTE B. CORDOVA, MA. EDNA V. DATOR, RANIEL C. DAYAO, RAGCY L. DE GUZMAN, LUIS E. DELOS SANTOS, CARMINA M. DEGALA, EPHRAIM RALPH A. DELFIN, KAREN M. DEOCERA, CAROLINA C. DIZON, MARCHEL S. ESQUEJJO, JOCELYN I. ESTROBO, MINERVA S. FALLARME, HERNANE C. FERMOCIL, RACHEL B. FETIZANAN, SAMUEL A. FLORENTINO, MENCHIE R. FRANCISCO, ERNESTO U. GAMIER, MACARIO RODOLFO N. GARCIA, JOEL S. GARMINO, LESTER MARK Z. GATCHALIAN, MA. JINKY P. GELERA, MA. TERESA G. GONZALES, GONZALO G. GUINIT, EMILY H. GUINO-O, FERDINAND S. HABIJAN, JUN G. HERNANDEZ, LOURDES D. IBEAS, MA. ANGELA L. JALANDONI, JULIE T. JORNACION, MANUEL C. LIM, MA. LOURDES A. LIM, EMERSON V. LUNA, NOLASCO B. MACATANGAY, NORMAN C. MANACO, CHERRY LOU B. MANGROBANG, MARASIGAN G. EDMUNDO, ALLEN M. MARTINEZ, EMELITA C. MONTANO, ARLENE P. NOBLE, SHIRLEY A. ONG, LOTIZ E. ORTIZ LUIS, PABLITO M. PALO, MARY JAINE D. PATINO, GEOFFREY T. PRADO, OMEGA MELANIE M. QUINTANO, ANES A. RAMIREZ, RICARDO D. RAMIREZ, DANIEL O. RAQUEL, RAMON B. REYES, SALVACION N. ROGADO, ELMOR R. ROMANA, JR., LOURDES U. SALVADOR, ELMER S. SAYLON, BENHARD E. SIMBULAN, MA. TERESA S. SOLIS, MA. LOURDES ROCEL E. SOLIVEN, EMILY C. SUY AT, EDGAR ALLAN P. TACSUAN, RAYMOND N. TANAY, JOCELYN Y. TAN, CANDIDO G. TISON, MA. THERESA O. TISON, EVELYN T. UYLANGCO, CION E. YAP, MA. OPHELIA C. DE GUZMAN, MA. HIDELISA P. IRA, RAYMUND MARTIN A. ANGELES, MERVIN S. BAUTISTA, ELENA R. CONDEVILLAMAR, CHERRY T. CO, LEOPOLDO V. DE LA ROSA, DOROTEO S. FROILAN, EMMANUEL B. GLORIA, JULIETEL JUBAC AND ROSEMARIE L. TANG,Respondents.D E C I S I O NVILLARAMA, JR.,J.:The consolidated petitions before us seek to reverse and set aside the Decision1dated March 10, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 67730 and 70820 which denied the petitions for certiorari filed by Solidbank Corporation (Solidbank) and ordered the reinstatement of the above-named individual respondents to their former positions.The AntecedentsSometime in October 1999, petitioner Solidbank and respondent Solidbank Employees Union (Union) were set to renegotiate the economic provisions of their 1997-2001 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) to cover the remaining two years thereof. Negotiations commenced on November 17, 1999 but seeing that an agreement was unlikely, the Union declared a deadlock on December 22, 1999 and filed a Notice of Strike on December 29, 1999.2During the collective bargaining negotiations, some Union members staged a series of mass actions. In view of the impending actual strike, then Secretary of Labor and Employment Bienvenido E. Laguesma assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute, pursuant to Article 263 (g) of theLabor Code, as amended. The assumption order dated January 18, 2000 directed the parties "to cease and desist from committing any and all acts that might exacerbate the situation."3In his Order4dated March 24, 2000, Secretary Laguesma resolved all economic and non-economic issues submitted by the parties, as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby issued:a. Directing Solidbank Corporation and Solidbank Union to conclude their Collective Bargaining Agreement for the years 2000 and 2001, incorporating the dispositions above set forth;b. Dismissing the unfair labor practice charge against Solidbank Corporation;c. Directing Solidbank to deduct or check-off from the employees lump sum payment an amount equivalent to seven percent (7%) of their economic benefits for the first (1st) year, inclusive of signing bonuses, and to remit or turn over the said sum to the Unions authorized representative, subject to the requirements of check-off;d. Directing Solidbank to recall the show-cause memos issued to employees who participated in the mass actions if such memos were in fact issued.SO ORDERED.5Dissatisfied with the Secretarys ruling, the Union officers and members decided to protest the same by holding a rally infront of the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in Intramuros, Manila, simultaneous with the filing of their motion for reconsideration of the March 24, 2000 Order. Thus, on April 3, 2000, an overwhelming majority of employees, including the individual respondents, joined the "mass leave" and "protest action" at the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) office while the banks provincial branches in Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod and Naga followed suit and "boycotted regular work."6The union members also picketed the banks Head Office in Binondo on April 6, 2000, and Paseo de Roxas branch on April 7, 2000.As a result of the employees concerted actions, Solidbanks business operations were paralyzed. On the same day, then President of Solidbank, Deogracias N. Vistan, issued a memorandum7addressed to all employees calling their absence from work and demonstration infront of the DOLE office as an illegal act, and reminding them that they have put their jobs at risk as they will be asked to show cause why they should not be terminated for participating in the union-instigated concerted action. The employees work abandonment/boycott lasted for three days, from April 3 to 5, 2000.On the third day of the concerted work boycott (April 5, 2000), Vistan issued another memorandum,8this time declaring that the bank is prepared to take back employees who will report for work starting April 6, 2000 "provided these employees were/are not part of those who led or instigated or coerced their co-employees into participating in this illegal act." Out of the 712 employees who took part in the three-day work boycott, a total of 513 returned to work and were accepted by the bank. The remaining 199 employees insisted on defying Vistans directive, which included herein respondents Ernesto U. Gamier, Elena R. Condevillamar,