Labstan Cases

7/28/2019 Labstan Cases

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. L-69870 November 29, 1988

NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION (NASECO) AND ARTURO L. PEREZ,petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE THIRD DIVISION, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,

MANILA AND EUGENIA C. CREDO,respondents.G.R. No. 70295 November 29,1988

EUGENIA C. CREDO,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL SERVICES CORPORATION AND ARTURO L. PEREZ,respondents.The Chief Legal Counsel for respondents NASECO and Arturo L. Perez.

Melchor R. Flores for petitioner Eugenia C. Credo.

PADILLA,J.:

Consolidated special civil actions for certiorari seeking to review the decision *of the Third Division, National Labor RelationsCommission in Case No. 11-4944-83 dated 28 November 1984 and its resolution dated 16 January 1985 denying motions forreconsideration of said decision.

Eugenia C. Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation (NASECO), a domestic corporation which provides securityguards as well as messengerial, janitorial and other similar manpower services to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and its agencies.She was first employed with NASECO as a lady guard on 18 July 1975. Through the years, she was promoted to Clerk Typist, then

Personnel Clerk until she became Chief of Property and Records, on 10 March 1980.1

Sometime before 7 November 1983, Credo was administratively charged by Sisinio S. Lloren, Manager of Finance and Special Projectand Evaluation Department of NASECO, stemming from her non-compliance with Lloren's memorandum, dated 11 October 1983,regarding certain entry procedures in the company's Statement of Billings Adjustment. Said charges alleged that Credo "did not complywith Lloren's instructions to place some corrections/additional remarks in the Statement of Billings Adjustment; and when [Credo] wascalled by Lloren to his office to explain further the said instructions, [Credo] showed resentment and behaved in a scandalous mannerby shouting and uttering remarks of disrespect in the presence of her co-employees."2

On 7 November 1983, Credo was called to meet Arturo L. Perez, then Acting General Manager of NASECO, to explain her side beforePerez and NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs in connection with the administrative charges filed against her. After said meeting,on the same date, Credo was placed on "Forced Leave" status for 1 5 days, effective 8 November 1983.3

Before the expiration of said 15-day leave, or on 18 November 1983, Credo filed a complaint, docketed as Case No. 114944-83, with the

Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region, Ministry of Labor and Employment, Manila, against NASECO for placing her on forced leave,without due process.4

Likewise, while Credo was on forced leave, or on 22 November 1983, NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs deliberated andevaluated a number of past acts of misconduct or infractions attributed to her.5As a result of this deliberation, said committee resolved:

1. That, respondent [Credo] committed the following offenses in the Code of Discipline, viz:

OFFENSE vs. Company Interest & Policies

No. 3 Any discourteous act to customer, officer and employee of client company or officer of the Corporation.OFFENSE vs. Public Moral

No. 7 Exhibit marked discourtesy in the course of official duties or use of profane or insulting language to any superior officer.OFFENSE vs. Authority

No. 3 Failure to comply with any lawful order or any instructions of a superior officer.

2. That, Management has already given due consideration to respondent's [Credo] scandalous actuations for several times in the past.Records also show that she was reprimanded for some offense and did not question it. Management at this juncture, has already met itsmaximum tolerance point so it has decided to put an end to respondent's [Credo] being an undesirable employee. 6

The committee recommended Credo's termination, with forfeiture of benefits.7

On 1 December 1983, Credo was called age to the office of Perez to be informed that she was being charged with certain offenses.Notably, these offenses were those which NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs already resolved, on 22 November 1983 to havebeen committed by Credo.

In Perez's office, and in the presence of NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs, Credo was made to explain her side in connectionwith the charges filed against her; however, due to her failure to do so,8she was handed a Notice of Termination, dated 24 November1983, and made effective 1 December 1983.9Hence, on 6 December 1983, Credo filed a supplemental complaint for illegal dismissal inCase No. 11-4944-83, alleging absence of just or authorized cause for her dismissal and lack of opportunity to be heard.10

After both parties had submitted their respective position papers, affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of their claimsand defenses, on 9 May 1984, the labor arbiter rendered a decision: 1) dismissing Credo's complaint, and 2) directing NASECO to payCredo separation pay equivalent to one half month's pay for every year of service. 11


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Both parties appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which, on 28 November 1984, rendered a decision:1) directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former position, or substantially equivalent position, with six (6) months' backwages andwithout loss of seniority rights and other privileges appertaining thereto, and 2) dismissing Credo's claim for attorney's fees, moral andexemplary damages. As a consequence, both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration, 12which the NLRC denied in aresolution of 16 January 1985.13

Hence, the present recourse by both parties. In G.R. No. 68970, petitioners challenge as grave abuse of discretion the dispositive portionof the 28 November 1984 decision which ordered Credo's reinstatement with backwages.14Petitioners contend that in arriving at saidquestioned order, the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding that: 1) petitioners violated the requirements mandated bylaw on termination, 2) petitioners failed in the burden of proving that the termination of Credo was for a valid or authorized cause, 3)

the alleged infractions committed by Credo were not proven or, even if proved, could be considered to have been condoned bypetitioners, and 4) the termination of Credo was not for a valid or authorized cause.15

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 70295, petitioner Credo challenges as grave abuse of discretion the dispositive portion of the 28November 1984 decision which dismissed her claim for attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages and limited her right tobackwages to only six (6) months.16

As guidelines for employers in the exercise of their power to dismiss employees for just causes, the law provides that:Section 2. Notice of dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particularacts or omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal.xxx xxx xxxSection 5. Answer and Hearing. The worker may answer the allegations stated against him in the notice of dismissal within areasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defendhimself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.

Section 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearlythe reasons therefor.17

These guidelines mandate that the employer furnish an employee sought to be dismissed two (2) written notices of dismissal before atermination of employment can be legally effected. These are the notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissionsfor which his dismissal is sought and the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him.Likewise, a reading of the guidelines in consonance with the express provisions of law on protection to labor18(which encompasses theright to security of tenure) and the broader dictates of procedural due process necessarily mandate that notice of the employer'sdecision to dismiss an employee, with reasons therefor, can only be issued after the employer has afforded the employee concernedample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.

In the case at bar, NASECO did not comply with these guidelines in effecting Credo's dismissal. Although she was apprised and "given thechance to explain her side" of the charges filed against her, this chance was given so perfunctorily, thus rendering illusory Credo's rightto security of tenure. That Credo was not given ample opportunity to be heard and to defend herself is evident from the fact that the

compliance with the injunction to apprise her of the charges filed against her and to afford her a chance to prepare for her defense wasdispensed in only a day. This is not effective compliance with the legal requirements aforementioned.

The fact also that the Notice of Termination of Credo's employment (or the decision to dismiss her) was dated 24 November 1983 andmade effective 1 December 1983 shows that NASECO was already bent on terminating her services when she was informed on 1December 1983 of the charges against her, and that any hearing which NASECO thought of affording her after 24 November 1983 wouldmerely be pro forma or an exercise in futility.

Besides, Credo's mere non-compliance with Llorens memorandum regarding the entry procedures in the company's Statement ofBillings Adjustment did not warrant the severe penalty of dismissal of the NLRC correctly held that:... on the charge of gross discourtesy, the CPA found in its Report, dated 22 November 1983 that, "In the process of hertestimony/explanations she again exhibited a conduct unbecoming in front of NASECO Officers and argued to Mr. S. S. Lloren in asarcastic and discourteous manner, notwithstanding, the fact that she was inside the office of the Acctg. General Manager." Let it benoted, however, that the Report did not even describe how the so called "conduct unbecoming" or "discourteous manner" was done by

complainant. Anent the "sarcastic" argument of complainant, the purported transcript19

of the meeting held on 7 November 1983 doesnot indicate any sarcasm on the part of complainant. At the most, complainant may have sounded insistent or emphatic about her workbeing more complete than the work of Ms. de Castro, yet, the complaining officer signed the work of Ms. de Castro and did not sign hers.As to the charge of insubordination, it may be conceded, albeit unclear, that complainant failed to place same corrections/additionalremarks in the Statement of Billings Adjustments as instructed. However, under the circumstances obtaining, where complainantstrongly felt that she was being discriminated against by her superior in relation to other employees, we are of the considered view andso hold, that a reprimand would have sufficed for the infraction, but certainly not termination from services.20

As this Court has ruled:... where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequenceso severe. It is not only because of the law's concern for the working man. There is, in addition, his family to consider. Unemploymentbrings untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on the wage-earner.21

Of course, in justifying Credo's termination of employment, NASECO claims as additional lawful causes for dismissal Credo's previousand repeated acts of insubordination, discourtesy and sarcasm towards her superior officers, alleged to have been committed from 1980to July 1983.22

If such acts of misconduct were indeed committed by Credo, they are deemed to have been condoned by NASECO. For instance,sometime in 1980, when Credo allegedly "reacted in a scandalous manner and raised her voice" in a discussion with NASECO's Acting


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head of the Personnel Administration23no disciplinary measure was taken or meted against her. Nor was she even reprimanded whenshe allegedly talked 'in a shouting or yelling manner" with the Acting Manager of NASECO's Building Maintenance and ServicesDepartment in 198024or when she allegedly "shouted" at NASECO's Corporate Auditor "in front of his subordinates displayingarrogance and unruly behavior" in 1980, or when she allegedly shouted at NASECO's Internal Control Consultant in 1981.25But then, insharp contrast to NASECO's penchant for ignoring the aforesaid acts of misconduct, when Credo committed frequent tardiness in Augustand September 1983, she was reprimanded.26

Even if the allegations of improper conduct (discourtesy to superiors) were satisfactorily proven, NASECO's condonation thereof isgleaned from the fact that on 4 October 1983, Credo was given a salary adjustment for having performed in the job "at least[satisfactorily]"27and she was then rated "Very Satisfactory"28as regards job performance, particularly in terms of quality of work,

quantity of work, dependability, cooperation, resourcefulness and attendance.

Considering that the acts or omissions for which Credo's employment was sought to be legally terminated were insufficiently proved, asto justify dismissal, reinstatement is proper. For "absent the reason which gave rise to [the employee's] separation from employment,there is no intention on the part of the employer to dismiss the employee concerned."29And, as a result of having been wrongfullydismissed, Credo is entitled to three (3) years of backwages without deduction and qualification.30

However, while Credo's dismissal was effected without procedural fairness, an award of exemplary damages in her favor can only bejustified if her dismissal was effected in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.31A judicious examination of the recordmanifests no such conduct on the part of management. However, in view of the attendant circumstances in the case, i.e., lack of dueprocess in effecting her dismissal, it is reasonable to award her moral damages. And, for having been compelled to litigate because of theunlawful actuations of NASECO, a reasonable award for attorney's fees in her favor is in order.

In NASECO's comment32in G.R. No. 70295, it is belatedly argued that the NLRC has no jurisdiction to order Credo's reinstatement.

NASECO claims that, as a government corporation (by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the National Investment and DevelopmentCorporation (NIDC), a subsidiary wholly owned by the Philippine National Bank (PNB), which in turn is a government ownedcorporation), the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Insupport of this argument, NASECO citesNational Housing Corporation vs. JUCO,33where this Court held that "There should no longer beany question at this time that employees of government-owned or controlled corporations are governed by the civil service law and civilservice rifles and regulations."

It would appear that, in the interest of justice, the holding in said case should not be given retroactive effect, that is, to cases that arosebefore its promulgation on 17 January 1985. To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated,because under the same 1973 Constitution ,but prior to the ruling in National Housing Corporation vs. Juco, this Court had recognizedthe applicability of the Labor Code to, and the authority of the NLRC to exercise jurisdiction over, disputes involving terms andconditions of employment in government owned or controlled corporations, among them, the National Service Corporation

(NASECO). 34

Furthermore, in the matter of coverage by the civil service of government-owned or controlled corporations, the 1987 Constitutionstarkly varies from the 1973 Constitution, upon whichNational Housing Corporation vs. Jucois based. Under the 1973 Constitution, itwas provided that:The civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the Government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation. ...35

On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution provides that:The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-ownedor controlled corporations with original charter.36(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the situations sought to be avoided by the 1973 Constitution and expressed by the Court in the National Housing . Corporationcase in the following manner The infirmity of the respondents' position lies in its permitting a circumvention or emasculation of Section 1, Article XII-B of theconstitution. It would be possible for a regular ministry of government to create a host of subsidiary corporations under the Corporation

Code funded by a willing legislature. A government-owned corporation could create several subsidiary corporations. These subsidiarycorporations would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strictaccountability required by the Civil Service Decree and the regulations of the Commission on Audit. Their incomes would not be subjectto the competitive restrains of the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably, allgovernment-owned or controlled corporations could be created, no longer by special charters, but through incorporations under thegeneral law. The Constitutional amendment including such corporations in the embrace of the civil service would cease to haveapplication. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed to exist.37

appear relegated to relative insignificance by the 1987 Constitutional provision that the Civil Service embraces government-owned orcontrolled corporationswith original charter; and, therefore, by clear implication, the Civil Service does not include government-ownedor controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled corporations under the generalcorporation law.

The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission also shed light on the Constitutional intent and meaning in the use of the phrase"with original charter." ThusTHE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas) Commissioner Romulo is recognized.MR. ROMULO. I beg the indulgence of the Committee. I was reading the wrong provision.I refer to Section 1, subparagraph I which reads:


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The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-ownedor controlled corporations.My query: Is Philippine Airlines covered by this provision? MR. FOZ. Will the Commissioner please state his previous question?MR. ROMULO. The phrase on line 4 of Section 1, subparagraph 1, under the Civil Service Commission, says: "including government-owned or controlled corporations.' Does that include a corporation, like the Philippine Airlines which is government-owned orcontrolled?MR. FOZ. I would like to throw a question to the Commissioner. Is the Philippine Airlines controlled by the government in the sense thatthe majority of stocks are owned by the government?MR. ROMULO. It is owned by the GSIS. So, this is what we might call a tertiary corporation. The GSIS is owned by the government. Wouldthis be covered because the provision says "including government-owned or controlled corporations."

MR. FOZ. The Philippine Airlines was established as a private corporation. Later on, the government, through the GSIS, acquired thecontrolling stocks. Is that not the correct situation?MR. ROMULO. That is true as Commissioner Ople is about to explain. There was apparently a Supreme Court decision that destroyedthat distinction between a government-owned corporation created under the Corporation Law and a government-owned corporationcreated by its own charter.MR. FOZ. Yes, we recall the Supreme Court decision in the case of NHA vs. Juco to the effect that all government corporationsirrespective of the manner of creation, whether by special charter or by the private Corporation Law, are deemed to be covered by thecivil service because of the wide-embracing definition made in this section of the existing 1973 Constitution. But we recall the responseto the question of Commissioner Ople that our intendment in this provision is just to give a general description of the civil service. Weare not here to make any declaration as to whether employees of government-owned or controlled corporations are barred from theoperation of laws, such as the Labor Code of the Philippines.MR. ROMULO. Yes.MR. OPLE. May I be recognized, Mr. Presiding Officer, since my name has been mentioned by both sides.MR. ROMULO. I yield part of my time.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Trenas). Commissioner Ople is recognized.MR. OPLE. In connection with the coverage of the Civil Service Law in Section 1 (1), may I volunteer some information that may behelpful both to the interpellator and to the Committee. Following the proclamation of martial law on September 21, 1972, this issue ofthe coverage of the Labor Code of the Philippines and of the Civil Service Law almost immediately arose. I am, in particular, referring tothe period following the coming into force and effect of the Constitution of 1973, where the Article on the Civil Service was supposed totake immediate force and effect. In the case of LUZTEVECO, there was a strike at the time. This was a government-controlled andgovernment-owned corporation. I think it was owned by the PNOC with just the minuscule private shares left. So, the Secretary ofJustice at that time, Secretary Abad Santos, and myself sat down, and the result of that meeting was an opinion of the Secretary of Justicewhich 9 became binding immediately on the government that government corporations with original charters, such as the GSIS, werecovered by the Civil Service Law and corporations spun off from the GSIS, which we called second generation corporations functioningas private subsidiaries, were covered by the Labor Code. Samples of such second generation corporations were the Philippine Airlines,the Manila Hotel and the Hyatt. And that demarcation worked very well. In fact, all of these companies I have mentioned as examples,except for the Manila Hotel, had collective bargaining agreements. In the Philippine Airlines, there were, in fact, three collectivebargaining agreements; one, for the ground people or the PALIA one, for the flight attendants or the PASAC and one for the pilots of the

ALPAC How then could a corporation like that be covered by the Civil Service law? But, as the Chairman of the Committee pointed out,the Supreme Court decision in the case of NHA vs. Juco unrobed the whole thing. Accordingly, the Philippine Airlines, the Manila Hoteland the Hyatt are now considered under that decision covered by the Civil Service Law. I also recall that in the emergency meeting of theCabinet convened for this purpose at the initiative of the Chairman of the Reorganization Commission, Armand Fabella, they agreed toallow the CBA's to lapse before applying the full force and effect of the Supreme Court decision. So, we were in the awkward situationwhen the new government took over. I can agree with Commissioner Romulo when he said that this is a problem which I am not exactlysure we should address in the deliberations on the Civil Service Law or whether we should be content with what the Chairman said thatSection 1 (1) of the Article on the Civil Service is just a general description of the coverage of the Civil Service and no more.Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.MR. ROMULO. Mr. Presiding Officer, for the moment, I would be satisfied if the Committee puts on records that it is not their intent bythis provision and the phrase "including government-owned or controlled corporations" to cover such companies as the PhilippineAirlines.MR. FOZ. Personally, that is my view. As a matter of fact, when this draft was made, my proposal was really to eliminate, to drop from theprovision, the phrase "including government- owned or controlled corporations."

MR. ROMULO. Would the Committee indicate that is the intent of this provision?MR. MONSOD. Mr. Presiding Officer, I do not think the Committee can make such a statement in the face of an absolute exclusion ofgovernment-owned or controlled corporations. However, this does not preclude the Civil Service Law to prescribe different rules andprocedures, including emoluments for employees of proprietary corporations, taking into consideration the nature of their operations.So, it is a general coverage but it does not preclude a distinction of the rules between the two types of enterprises.MR. FOZ. In other words, it is something that should be left to the legislature to decide. As I said before, this is just a general descriptionand we are not making any declaration whatsoever.MR. MONSOD. Perhaps if Commissioner Romulo would like a definitive understanding of the coverage and the Gentleman wants toexclude government-owned or controlled corporations like Philippine Airlines, then the recourse is to offer an amendment as to thecoverage, if the Commissioner does not accept the explanation that there could be a distinction of the rules, including salaries andemoluments.MR. ROMULO. So as not to delay the proceedings, I will reserve my right to submit such an amendment.xxx xxx xxxTHE PRESIDING OFFICE (Mr. Trenas) Commissioner Romulo is recognized.MR. ROMULO. On page 2, line 5, I suggest the following amendment after "corporations": Add a comma (,) and the phrase EXCEPTTHOSE EXERCISING PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS.THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas). What does the Committee say?SUSPENSION OF SESSIONMR. MONSOD. May we have a suspension of the session?


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THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas). The session is suspended.It was 7:16 p.m.RESUMPTION OF SESSIONAt 7:21 p.m., the session was resumed.THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas). The session is resumed.Commissioner Romulo is recognized.MR. ROMULO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am amending my original proposed amendment to now read as follows: "including government-owned or controlled corporations WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS." The purpose of this amendment is to indicate that governmentcorporations such as the GSIS and SSS, which have original charters, fall within the ambit of the civil service. However, corporationswhich are subsidiaries of these chartered agencies such as the Philippine Airlines, Manila Hotel and Hyatt are excluded from the

coverage of the civil service.THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas). What does the Committee say?MR. FOZ. Just one question, Mr. Presiding Officer. By the term "original charters," what exactly do we mean?MR. ROMULO. We mean that they were created by law, by an act of Congress, or by special law.MR. FOZ. And not under the general corporation law.MR. ROMULO. That is correct. Mr. Presiding Officer.MR. FOZ. With that understanding and clarification, the Committee accepts the amendment.MR. NATIVIDAD. Mr. Presiding officer, so those created by the general corporation law are out.MR. ROMULO. That is correct:38

On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case because it is the Constitution in place at the time of decisionthereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord relief to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB,the NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter.

Dr. Jorge Bocobo, in his Cult of Legalism, cited by Mr. Justice Perfecto in his concurring opinion inGomez vs. Government InsuranceBoard(L-602, March 31, 1947, 44 O.G. No. 8, pp. 2687, 2694; also published in 78 Phil. 221) on the effectivity of the principle of socialjustice embodied in the 1935 Constitution, said:Certainly, this principle of social justice in our Constitution as generously conceived and so tersely phrased, was not included in thefundamental law as a mere popular gesture. It was meant to (be) a vital, articulate, compelling principle of public policy. It should beobserved in the interpretation not only of future legislation, but also of all laws already existing on November 15, 1935. It was intendedto change the spirit of our laws, present and future. Thus, all the laws which on the great historic event when the Commonwealth of thePhilippines was born, were susceptible of two interpretations strict or liberal, against or in favor of social justice, now have to beconstrued broadly in order to promote and achieve social justice. This may seem novel to our friends, the advocates of legalism but it isthe only way to give life and significance to the above-quoted principle of the Constitution. If it was not designed to apply to theseexisting laws, then it would be necessary to wait for generations until all our codes and all our statutes shall have been completelycharred by removing every provision inimical to social justice, before the policy of social justice can become really effective. That wouldbe an absurd conclusion. It is more reasonable to hold that this constitutional principle applies to all legislation in force on November15, 1935, and all laws thereafter passed.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the challenged decision of the NLRC is AFFIRMED with modifications. Petitioners in G.R. No.69870, who are the private respondents in G.R. No. 70295, are ordered to: 1) reinstate Eugenia C. Credo to her former position at thetime of her termination, or if such reinstatement is not possible, to place her in a substantially equivalent position, with three (3) yearsbackwages, from 1 December 1983, without qualification or deduction, and without loss of seniority rights and other privilegesappertaining thereto, and 2) pay Eugenia C. Credo P5,000.00 for moral damages and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees.

If reinstatement in any event is no longer possible because of supervening events, petitioners in G.R. No. 69870, who are the privaterespondents in G.R. No. 70295 are ordered to pay Eugenia C. Credo, in addition to her backwages and damages as above described,separation pay equivalent to one-half month's salary for every year of service, to be computed on her monthly salary at the time of hertermination on 1 December 1983.

SO ORDERED.Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, J., is on leave.Gutierrez, Jr., J., in the result.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ,J.,concurring:While concurring with Mr. Justice Padilla's well-researched ponencia, I have to express once again my disappointment over still anotheravoidable ambiguity in the 1987 Constitution.It is clear now from the debates of the Constitutional Commission that the government-owned or controlled corporations included in theCivil Service are those with legislative charters. Excluded are its subsidiaries organized under the Corporation Code.If that was the intention, the logical thing, I should imagine, would have been to simply say so. This would have avoided the suggestionthat there are corporations with duplicate charters as distinguished from those with original charters.All charters are original regardless of source unless they are amended. That is the acceptable distinction. Under the provision, however,the charter is still and always original even if amended as long it was granted by the legislature.It would have been clearer, I think, to say "including government owned or controlled corporations with legislative charters." Why thisthought did not occur to the Constitutional Commission places one again in needless puzzlement.


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ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. 78909 June 30, 1989

MATERNITY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, represented by ANTERA L. DORADO, President, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF LABOR, REGION X,respondents.

MEDIALDEA,J.:

This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the Decision of the respondent Secretary of Labor dated September 24, 1986,affirming with modification the Order of respondent Regional Director of Labor, Region X, dated August 4, 1986, awarding salarydifferentials and emergency cost of living allowances (ECOLAS) to employees of petitioner, and the Order denying petitioner's motionfor reconsideration dated May 13, 1987, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner is a semi-government hospital, managed by the Board of Directors of the Cagayan de Oro Women's Club and PuericultureCenter, headed by Mrs. Antera Dorado, as holdover President. The hospital derives its finances from the club itself as well as from payingpatients, averaging 130 per month. It is also partly subsidized by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Cagayan De Oro Citygovernment.

Petitioner has forty-one (41) employees. Aside from salary and living allowances, the employees are given food, but the amount spenttherefor is deducted from their respective salaries (pp. 77-78, Rollo).

On May 23, 1986, ten (10) employees of the petitioner employed in different capacities/positions filed a complaint with the Office of the

Regional Director of Labor and Employment, Region X, for underpayment of their salaries and ECOLAS, which was docketed as ROX CaseNo. CW-71-86.

On June 16, 1986, the Regional Director directed two of his Labor Standard and Welfare Officers to inspect the records of the petitionerto ascertain the truth of the allegations in the complaints (p. 98, Rollo). Payrolls covering the periods of May, 1974, January, 1985,November, 1985 and May, 1986, were duly submitted for inspection.

On July 17, 1986, the Labor Standard and Welfare Officers submitted their report confirming that there was underpayment of wages andECOLAs of all the employees by the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, deficiency on wage and ecola as verified and confirmed per review of the respondent payrolls andinterviews with the complainant workers and all other information gathered by the team, it is respectfully recommended to theHonorable Regional Director, this office, that Antera Dorado, President be ORDERED to pay the amount of SIX HUNDRED FIFTY FOURTHOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY SIX & 01/100 (P654,756.01), representing underpayment of wages and ecola to the THIRTY SIX(36) employees of the said hospital as appearing in the attached Annex "F" worksheets and/or whatever action equitable under the

premises. (p. 99, Rollo)

Based on this inspection report and recommendation, the Regional Director issued an Order dated August 4, 1986, directing thepayment of P723,888.58, representing underpayment of wages and ECOLAs to all the petitioner's employees, the dispositive portion ofwhich reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Maternity and Children Hospital is hereby ordered to pay the above-listed complainantsthe total amount indicated opposite each name, thru this Office within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Thenceforth, the respondenthospital is also ordered to pay its employees/workers the prevailing statutory minimum wage and allowance.SO ORDERED. (p. 34, Rollo)

Petitioner appealed from this Order to the Minister of Labor and Employment, Hon. Augusto S. Sanchez, who rendered a Decision onSeptember 24, 1986, modifying the said Order in that deficiency wages and ECOLAs should be computed only from May 23, 1983 to May23, 1986, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the August 29, 1986 order is hereby MODIFIED in that the deficiency wages and ECOLAs should only be computed fromMay 23, 1983 to May 23, 1986. The case is remanded to the Regional Director, Region X, for recomputation specifying the amounts dueeach the complainants under each of the applicable Presidential Decrees. (p. 40, Rollo)

On October 24, 1986, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Secretary of Labor in his Order datedMay 13, 1987, for lack of merit (p. 43 Rollo).

The instant petition questions the all-embracing applicability of the award involving salary differentials and ECOLAS, in that it coversnot only the hospital employees who signed the complaints, but also those (a) who are not signatories to the complaint, and (b) thosewho were no longer in the service of the hospital at the time the complaints were filed.

Petitioner likewise maintains that the Order of the respondent Regional Director of Labor, as affirmed with modifications by respondentSecretary of Labor, does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which the award was based. In its "Rejoinder toComment", petitioner further questions the authority of the Regional Director to award salary differentials and ECOLAs to privaterespondents, (relying on the case of Encarnacion vs. Baltazar, G.R. No. L-16883, March 27, 1961, 1 SCRA 860, as authority for raising theadditional issue of lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings, p. 52, Rollo), alleging that the original and exclusive jurisdictionover money claims is properly lodged in the Labor Arbiter, based on Article 217, paragraph 3 of the Labor Code.


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The primary issue here is whether or not the Regional Director had jurisdiction over the case and if so, the extent of coverage of any award

that should be forthcoming, arising from his visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128 of the Labor Code. The matter of whetheror not the decision states clearly and distinctly statement of facts as well as the law upon which it is based, becomes relevant after theissue on jurisdiction has been resolved.

This is a labor standards case, and is governed by Art. 128-b of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. No. 111. Labor standards refer to theminimum requirements prescribed by existing laws, rules, and regulations relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance andother monetary and welfare benefits, including occupational, safety, and health standards (Section 7, Rule I, Rules on the Disposition ofLabor Standards Cases in the Regional Office, dated September 16, 1987). 1 Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises bothvisitorial and enforcement power over labor standards cases, and is therefore empowered to adjudicate money claims, providedthere

still exists an employer-employee relationship, and the findings of the regional office is not contestedby the employer concerned.

Prior to the promulgation of E.O. No. 111 on December 24, 1986, the Regional Director's authority over money claims was unclear. Thecomplaint in the present case was filed on May 23, 1986 when E.O. No. 111 was not yet in effect, and the prevailing view was that statedin the case ofAntonio Ong, Sr. vs. Henry M. Parel, et al., G.R. No. 76710,dated December 21, 1987, thus:. . . the Regional Director, in the exercise of his visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128 of the Labor Code, has no authorityto award money claims, properly falling within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. . . .. . . If the inspection results in a finding that the employer has violated certain labor standard laws, then the regional director must orderthe necessary rectifications. However, this does not include adjudication of money claims, clearly within the ambit of the labor arbiter'sauthority under Article 217 of the Code.

The Ong case relied on the ruling laid down in Zambales Base Metals Inc. vs. The Minister of Labor, et al., (G.R. Nos. 73184-88, November26, 1986, 146 SCRA 50) that the "Regional Director was not empowered to share in the original and exclusive jurisdiction conferred onLabor Arbiters by Article 217."

We believe, however, that even in the absence of E. O. No. 111, Regional Directors already had enforcement powers over money claims,effective under P.D. No. 850, issued on December 16, 1975, which transferred labor standards cases from the arbitration system to theenforcement system.

To clarify matters, it is necessary to enumerate a series of rules and provisions of law on the disposition of labor standards cases.Priorto the promulgation of PD 850, labor standards cases were an exclusive function of labor arbiters, under Article 216 ofthe then Labor Code (PD No. 442, as amended by PD 570-a), which read in part:Art. 216.Jurisdiction of the Commission. The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by theLabor Arbiters and compulsory arbitrators.The Labor Arbiters shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers whether agricultural ornon-agricultural.xxx xxx xxx(c) All money claims of workers, involving non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay, maternity

leave and other money claims arising from employee-employer relations, except claims for workmen's compensation, social securityand medicare benefits;(d) Violations of labor standard laws;xxx xxx xxx(Emphasis supplied)The Regional Director exercised visitorial rights only under then Article 127 of the Code as follows:ART. 127. Visitorial Powers. The Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives, including, but not restricted, to the laborinspectorate, shall have access to employers' records and premises at any time of the day or night whenever work is being undertakentherein, and the right to copy therefrom, to question any employee and investigate any fact, condition or matter which may be necessaryto determine violations or in aid in the enforcement of this Title and of any Wage Order or regulation issued pursuant to this Code.With the promulgation of PD 850, Regional Directors were given enforcement powers, in addition to visitorial powers. Article 127, asamended, provided in part:SEC. 10. Article 127 of the Code is hereby amended to read as follows:Art. 127. Visitorial and enforcement powers.

xxx xxx xxx(b) The Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to order and administer, after due notice andhearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of this Code based on the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial safetyengineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of theirorder.xxx xxx xxxLabor Arbiters, on the other hand, lost jurisdiction over labor standards cases. Article 216, as then amended by PD 850, provided in part:SEC. 22. Article 216 of the Code is hereby amended to read as follows:Art. 216. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear anddecide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:xxx xxx xxx(3) All money claims of workers involving non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime or premium compensation, maternity orservice incentive leave, separation pay and other money claims arising from employer-employee relations, except claims for employee'scompensation, social security and medicare benefits and as otherwise provided in Article 127 of this Code.xxx xxx xxx(Emphasis supplied)Under the then Labor Code therefore (PD 442 as amended by PD 570-a, as further amended by PD 850), there were three adjudicatoryunits: The Regional Director, the Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Arbiter. It became necessary to clarify and consolidate all


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governing provisions on jurisdiction into one document. 2 On April 23, 1976, MOLE Policy Instructions No. 6 was issued, and provides inpart (on labor standards cases) as follows:POLICY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 6TO: All ConcernedSUBJECT: DISTRIBUTION OF JURISDICTION OVER LABOR CASESxxx xxx xxx1. The following cases are under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Director.a) Labor standards cases arising from violations of labor standard laws discovered in the course of inspection or complaints whereemployer-employee relations still exist;xxx xxx xxx

2. The following cases are under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Conciliation Section of the Regional Office:a) Labor standards cases where employer-employee relations nolonger exist;xxx xxx xxx6. The following cases are certifiable to the Labor Arbiters:a) Cases not settled by the Conciliation Section of the Regional Office, namely:1) labor standard cases where employer-employee relations no longer exist;xxx xxx xxx(Emphasis supplied)MOLE Policy Instructions No. 7 (undated) was likewise subsequently issued, enunciating the rationale for, and the scope of, theenforcement power of the Regional Director, the first and second paragraphs of which provide as follows:POLICY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 7TO: All Regional DirectorsSUBJECT: LABOR STANDARDS CASESUnder PD 850, labor standards cases have been taken from the arbitration system andplaced under the enforcement system, except where

a) questions of law are involved as determined by the Regional Director, b) the amount involved exceeds P100,000.00 or over 40% ofthe equity of the employer, whichever is lower, c) the case requires evidentiary matters not disclosed or verified in the normal course ofinspection, or d) there is no more employer-employee relationship.The purpose is clear: to assure the worker the rights and benefits due to him under labor standards laws without having to go througharbitration. The worker need not litigate to get what legally belongs to him . The whole enforcement machinery of the Department ofLabor exists to insure its expeditious delivery to him free of charge. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the foregoing, a complaining employee who was denied his rights and benefits due him under labor standards law need notlitigate. The Regional Director, by virtue of his enforcement power, assured "expeditious delivery to him of his rights and benefits free ofcharge",provided of course, he was still in the employ of the firm.

After PD 850, Article 216 underwent a series of amendments (aside from being re-numbered as Article 217) and with it a correspondingchange in the jurisdiction of, and supervision over, the Labor Arbiters:

1. PD 1367 (5-1-78) gave Labor Arbiters exclusive jurisdiction over unresolvedissues in collective bargaining, etc., and thosecases arising from employer-employee relations duly indorsedby the Regional Directors. (It also removed his jurisdiction overmoral or other damages) In other words, the Labor Arbiter entertained cases certifiedto him. (Article 228, 1978 Labor Code.)

2. PD 1391 (5-29-78) all regional units of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) were integrated into the RegionalOffices Proper of the Ministry of Labor; effectively transferring direct administrative control and supervision over theArbitration Branch to the Director of the Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor. "Conciliable cases" which were thuspreviously under the jurisdiction of the defunct Conciliation Section of the Regional Office for purposes of conciliation oramicable settlement, became immediately assignable to the Arbitration Branch for joint conciliation and compulsoryarbitration. In addition, the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction even over termination and labor-standards cases that may beassignedto them for compulsory arbitration by the Director of the Regional Office. PD 1391 merged conciliation andcompulsory arbitration functions in the person of the Labor Arbiter. The procedure governing the disposition of cases at theArbitration Branch paralleled those in the Special Task Force and Field Services Division, with one major exception: the LaborArbiter exercised full and untrammelled authority in the disposition of the case, particularly in the substantive aspect, hisdecisions and orders subject to review only on appeal to the NLRC. 3

3. MOLE Policy Instructions No. 37 Because of the seemingly overlapping functions as a result of PD 1391, MOLE PolicyInstructions No. 37 was issued on October 7, 1978, and provided in part:POLICY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 37

TO: All ConcernedSUBJECT: ASSIGNMENT OF CASES TO LABOR ARBITERSPursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1391 and to insure speedy disposition of labor cases, thefollowing guidelines are hereby established for the information and guidance of all concerned.1. Conciliable Cases.Cases which are conciliable per se i.e., (a) labor standards cases where employer-employee relationship no longerexists; (b) cases involving deadlock in collective bargaining, except those falling under P.D. 823, as amended; (c)unfair labor practice cases; and (d) overseas employment cases, except those involving overseas seamen, shall beassigned by the Regional Director to the Labor Arbiterfor conciliation and arbitration without coursing them throughthe conciliation section of the Regional Office.2. Labor Standards Cases.Cases involving violation of labor standards laws where employer- employee relationship still exists shall be assignedto the Labor Arbiters where:

a) intricate questions of law are involved; orb) evidentiary matters not disclosed or verified in the normal course of inspection by labor regulationsofficers are required for their proper disposition.

3. Disposition of Cases.


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When a case is assigned to a Labor Arbiter, all issues raised therein shall be resolved by him including those whichare originally cognizable by the Regional Director to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. In other words, the whole case,and not merely issues involved therein, shall be assigned to and resolved by him.xxx xxx xxx(Emphasis supplied)4. PD 1691(5-1-80) original and exclusive jurisdiction over unresolvedissues in collective bargaining and moneyclaims, which includes moral or other damages.Despite the original and exclusive jurisdiction of labor arbiters over money claims, however, the Regional Directornonetheless retainedhis enforcement power, and remained empowered to adjudicate uncontestedmoney claims.5. BP 130 (8-21-8l) strengthened voluntary arbitration. The decree also returned the Labor Arbiters as part of the

NLRC, operating as Arbitration Branch thereof.6. BP 227(6-1- 82) original and exclusive jurisdiction over questions involving legality of strikes and lock-outs.The present petition questions the authority of the Regional Director to issue the Order, dated August 4, 1986, on thebasis of his visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128 (formerly Article 127) of the present Labor Code. Itis contended that based on the rulings in the Ong vs. Parel (supra) and theZambales Base Metals, Inc. vs. TheMinisterof Labor (supra) cases, a Regional Director is precluded from adjudicating money claims on the ground that this is anexclusive function of the Labor Arbiter under Article 217 of the present Code.

On August 4, 1986, when the order was issued, Article 128(b) 4 read as follows:(b) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to order and administer, afterdue notice and hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of this Code based on the findings of laborregulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of execution tothe appropriate authority for the enforcement of their order, except in cases where the employer contests thefindings of the labor regulations officer and raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary

matters that are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, Article 217 of the Labor Code as amended by P.D. 1691, effective May 1, 1980; Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, effectiveAugust 21, 1981; and Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, effective June 1, 1982, inter alia, provides:

ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original andexclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties fordecision, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:1. Unfair labor practice cases;2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation,separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees' compensation,social security, medicare and maternity benefits;4. Cases involving household services; and5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lock-outs.

(Emphasis supplied)

The Ong and Zambales cases involved workers who were still connected with the company. However, in the Ong case, the employerdisputed the adequacy of the evidentiary foundation (employees' affidavits) of the findings of the labor standards inspectors while in theZambales case, the money claims which arose from alleged violations of labor standards provisions were not discovered in the course ofnormal inspection. Thus, the provisions of MOLE Policy Instructions Nos. 6, (Distribution of Jurisdiction Over Labor Cases) and 37(Assignment of Cases to Labor Arbiters) giving Regional Directors adjudicatory powers over uncontested money claims discovered inthe course of normal inspection, provided an employer-employee relationship still exists, are inapplicable.

In the present case, petitioner admitted the charge of underpayment of wages to workers still in its employ; in fact, it pleaded for time toraise funds to satisfy its obligation. There was thus no contest against the findings of the labor inspectors.

Barely less than a month after the promulgation on November 26, 1986 of the Zambales Base Metals case, Executive Order No. 111 wasissued on December 24, 1986, 5 amending Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, to read as follows:

(b) THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 217 OF THIS CODE TO THE CONTRARY NOTWITHSTANDING AND IN CASES WHERE THERELATIONSHIP OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE STILL EXISTS, the Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorizedrepresentatives shall have the power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the laborstandards provisions of this Code AND OTHER LABOR LEGISLATION based on the findings of labor regulation officers orindustrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for theenforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor regulation officer and raisesissues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the normal course ofinspection. (Emphasis supplied)

As seen from the foregoing, EO 111 authorizes a Regional Director to order compliance by an employer with labor standards provisionsof the Labor Code and other legislation. It is Our considered opinion however, that the inclusion of the phrase, " The provisions of Article217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists" ... in Article128(b), as amended, above-cited, merely confirms/reiterates the enforcement adjudication authority of the Regional Directorover uncontestedmoney claims in cases where an employer-employee relationship still exists. 6

Viewed in the light of PD 850 and read in coordination with MOLE Policy Instructions Nos. 6, 7 and 37, it is clear that it has always beenthe intention of our labor authorities to provide our workers immediate access (when still feasible, as where an employer-employeerelationship still exists) to their rights and benefits, without being inconvenienced by arbitration/litigation processes that prove to benot only nerve-wracking, but financially burdensome in the long run.


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Note further the second paragraph of Policy Instructions No. 7 indicating that the transfer of labor standards cases from the arbitrationsystem to the enforcement system is

. . to assure the workers the rights and benefits due to him under labor standard laws, without having to go througharbitration. . . so that. . the workers would not litigate to get what legally belongs to him. .. ensuring delivery . . free of charge.

Social justice legislation, to be truly meaningful and rewarding to our workers, must not be hampered in its application by long-windedarbitration and litigation. Rights must be asserted and benefits received with the least inconvenience. Labor laws are meant to promote,not defeat, social justice.

This view is in consonance with the present "Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standard Cases in the Regional Offices " 7 issued by theSecretary of Labor, Franklin M. Drilon on September 16, 1987.

Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Rule II on "Money Claims Arising from Complaint Routine Inspection", provide as follows:Section 2. Complaint inspection. All such complaints shall immediately be forwarded to the Regional Director who shall refer the caseto the appropriate unit in the Regional Office for assignment to a Labor Standards and Welfare Officer (LSWO) for field inspection. Whenthe field inspection does not produce the desired results, the Regional Director shall summon the parties for summary investigation toexpedite the disposition of the case. . . .Section 3. Complaints where no employer-employee relationship actually exists . Where employer-employee relationship no longerexists by reason of the fact that it has already been severed, claims for payment of monetary benefits fall within the exclusive and originaljurisdiction of the labor arbiters. . . . (Emphasis supplied)Likewise, it is also clear that the limitation embodied in MOLE Policy Instructions No. 7 to amounts not exceeding P100,000.00 has beendispensed with, in view of the following provisions of pars. (b) and (c), Section 7 on "Restitution", the same Rules, thus:xxx xxx xxx

(b) Plant-level restitutions may be effected for money claims not exceeding Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00). . . .(c) Restitutions in excess of the aforementioned amount shall be effected at the Regional Office or at the worksite subject to the priorapproval of the Regional Director.which indicate the intention to empower the Regional Director to award money claims in excess of P100,000.00;provided of course the

employer does not contest the findings made, based on the provisions of Section 8 thereof:Section 8. Compromise agreement. Should the parties arrive at an agreement as to the whole or part of the dispute, said agreementshall be reduced in writing and signed by the parties in the presence of the Regional Director or his duly authorized representative.E.O. No. 111 was issued on December 24, 1986 or three (3) months after the promulgation of the Secretary of Labor's decisionupholding private respondents' salary differentials and ECOLAs on September 24, 1986. The amendment of the visitorial andenforcement powers of the Regional Director (Article 128-b) by said E.O. 111 reflects the intention enunciated in Policy InstructionsNos. 6 and 37 to empower the Regional Directors to resolve uncontested money claims in cases where an employer-employee relationshipstill exists. This intention must be given weight and entitled to great respect. As held in Progressive Workers' Union, et. al. vs. F.P. Aguas,et. al. G.R. No. 59711-12, May 29, 1985, 150 SCRA 429:. . The interpretation by officers of laws which are entrusted to their administration is entitled to great respect. We see no reason to

detract from this rudimentary rule in administrative law, particularly when later events have proved said interpretation to be in accordwith the legislative intent. ..

The proceedings before the Regional Director must, perforce, be upheld on the basis of Article 128(b) as amended by E.O. No. 111, datedDecember 24, 1986, this executive order "to be considered in the nature of a curative statute with retrospective application."(Progressive Workers' Union, et al. vs. Hon. F.P. Aguas, et al. ( Supra); M. Garcia vs. Judge A. Martinez, et al., G.R. No. L- 47629, May 28,1979, 90 SCRA 331).

We now come to the question of whether or not the Regional Director erred in extending the award to all hospital employees. Weanswer in the affirmative.

The Regional Director correctly applied the award with respect to those employees who signedthe complaint, as well as those who didnot sign the complaint, but were still connected with the hospital at the time the complaint was filed (See Order, p. 33 dated August 4,1986 of the Regional Director, Pedrito de Susi, p. 33, Rollo).

The justification for the award to this group of employees who were not signatories to the complaint is that the visitorial andenforcement powers given to the Secretary of Labor is relevant to, and exercisable over establishments, not over the individualmembers/employees, because what is sought to be achieved by its exercise is the observance of, and/or compliance by, suchfirm/establishment with the labor standards regulations. Necessarily, in case of an award resulting from a violation of labor legislationby such establishment, the entire members/employees should benefit therefrom. As aptly stated by then Minister of Labor Augusto S.Sanchez:. . It would be highly derogatory to the rights of the workers, if after categorically finding the respondent hospital guilty ofunderpayment of wages and ECOLAs, we limit the award to only those who signed the complaint to the exclusion of the majority of theworkers who are similarly situated. Indeed, this would be not only render the enforcement power of the Minister of Labor andEmployment nugatory, but would be the pinnacle of injustice considering that it would not only discriminate but also deprive them oflegislated benefits. . . . (pp. 38-39, Rollo).

This view is further bolstered by the provisions of Sec. 6, Rule II of the "Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards cases in theRegional Offices" (supra) presently enforced, viz:

SECTION 6. Coverage of complaint inspection. A complaint inspection shall not be limited to the specific allegations orviolations raised by the complainants/workers but shall be a thorough inquiry into and verification of the compliance byemployer with existing labor standards and shall cover all workers similarly situated. (Emphasis supplied)


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However, there is no legal justification for the award in favor of those employees who were no longer connectedwith the hospital at thetime the complaint was filed, having resigned therefrom in 1984, viz:

Jean (Joan) Venzon (See Order, p. 33, Rollo)Rosario PaclijanAdela PeraltaMauricio NagalesConsesa BautistaTeresita AgcopraFelix MonleonTeresita Salvador

Edgar Cataluna; andRaymond Manija ( p.7, Rollo)

The enforcement power of the Regional Director cannot legally be upheld in cases of separated employees. Article 129 of the LaborCode, cited by petitioner (p. 54, Rollo) is not applicable as said article is in aid of the enforcement powerof the Regional Director; hence,not applicable where the employee seeking to be paid underpayment of wages is already separated from the service. His claim is purelya money claim that has to be the subject of arbitration proceedings and therefore within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of theLabor Arbiter.

Petitioner has likewise questioned the order dated August 4, 1986 of the Regional Director in that it does not clearly and distinctly statethe facts and the law on which the award is based.

We invite attention to the Minister of Labor's ruling thereon, as follows:

Finally, the respondent hospital assails the order under appeal as null and void because it does not clearly and distinctly state

the facts and the law on which the awards were based. Contrary to the pretensions of the respondent hospital, we havecarefully reviewed the order on appeal and we found that the same contains a brief statement of the (a) facts of the case; (b)issues involved; (c) applicable laws; (d) conclusions and the reasons therefor; (e) specific remedy granted (amount awarded).(p. 40, Rollo)

ACCORDINGLY, this petition should be dismissed, as it is hereby DISMISSED, as regards all persons still employed in the Hospital at thetime of the filing of the complaint, but GRANTED as regards those employees no longer employed at that time.SO ORDERED.Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO,J., concurring:

Subject to my opinion in G.R. Nos. 82805 and 83205.MELENCIO-HERRERA,J., concurring:I concur, with the observation that even as reconciled, it would seem inevitable to state that the conclusion in the Zambales and Ongcases that, prior to Executive Order No. 111, Regional Directors were not empowered to share the original and exclusive jurisdictionconferred on Labor Arbiters over money claims, is now deemed modified, if not superseded.It may not be amiss to state either that under Section 2, Republic Act No. 6715, which amends further the Labor Code of the Philippines(PD No. 442), Regional Directors have also been granted adjudicative powers, albeit limited, over monetary claims and benefits ofworkers, thereby settling any ambiguity on the matter. Thus:SEC. 2. Article 129 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:Art. 129. Recovery of wages, simple money claims and other benefits. Upon complaint of any interested party, the Regional Director ofthe Department of Labor and Employment or any of the duly authorized hearing officers of the Department is empowered, throughsummary proceeding and after due notice, to hear and decide any matter involving the recovery of wages and other monetary claimsand benefits, including legal interest, owing to an employee or person employed in domestic or household service or house helper underthis Code, arising from employer-employee relations: Provided, That such complaint does not include a claim for reinstatement:

Provided, further, That the aggregate money claims of each employee or house helper do not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).The Regional Director or hearing officer shall decide or resolve the complaint within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the filingof the same. ...


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ManilaSECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68147 June 30, 1988

AMADA RANCE, MERCEDES LACUESTA, MELBA GUTIERREZ, ESTER FELONGCO, CATALINO ARAGONES, CONSOLACION DE LA

ROSA, AMANCIA GAY, EDUARDO MENDOZA, ET AL., petitioners,vs.THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, POLYBAG MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, VIRGINIA MALLARI, JOHNNY

LEE, ROMAS VILLAMIN, POLYBAG WORKERS UNION, PONCIANO FERNANDEZ, AND ANTONIO ANTIQUERA,respondents.

PARAS,J.:

A review of the records shows that a Collective Bargaining Agreement was entered into on April 30, 1981 by and between respondentsPolybag Manufacturing Corporation and Polybag Workers Union which provides among others:ARTICLE VUNION SECURITYAny employee within the bargaining agreement who is a member of the union at the time of the effectivity of this agreement or becomesa member of the UNION thereafter, shall during the term thereof or any extention, continue to be a member in good standing of theUNION as a condition of continued employment in the COMPANY.

Any employee hired during the effectivity of this agreement shall, within 30 days after becoming regular join the UNION and continue tobe a member in good standing thereof as a condition of continued employment in the COMPANY.

On the basis of a board resolution of the UNION, the COMPANY shall dismiss from the service any member of the UNION who loses his

membership in good standing either by resignation therefrom or expulsion therefrom for any of the following causes:1. Disloyalty to the UNION;2. Commission of acts inimical to the interest of the UNION;3. Failure and refusal to pay UNION dues and other assessments;4. Conviction for any offense or crime; or5. Organizing and/or joining another labor organization claiming jurisdiction similar to that of the UNION.

Provided, however, that in case expulsion proceedings are instituted against any member of the UNION, pending such proceedings, theCOMPANY, on the basis of a board resolution of the UNION, shall suspend the member concerned; and provided further, that the UNION,jointly and severally with the officers and members of the board voting for the dismissal or suspension, shall hold and render theCOMPANY, its executive, owners, and officers free from any and all claims and liabilities. (Rollo, p. 64).

Petitioners herein were among the members of the respondent union who were expelled by the latter for disloyaltyin that they allegedlyjoined the NAFLU a large federation. Because of the expulsion, petitioners were dismissed by respondent Corporation. Petitioners

sued for reinstatement and backwages stating their dismissal was without due process. Losing both in the decisions of the Labor Arbiterand the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), they elevated their cause to the Supreme Court.

Respondent Polybag Workers Union as already stated expelled 125 members on the ground of disloyalty and acts inimical to theinterests of the Union (Resolution No. 84, series of 1982, Rollo, p. 16) based on the findings and recommendations of the panel ofinvestigators. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found the Collective Bargaining Agreement and the "Union Security Clause" valid andconsidered the termination of the petitioners justified thereunder, for having committed an act of disloyalty to the Polybag WorkersUnion by having affiliated with and having joined the NAFLU, another labor union claiming jurisdiction similar to the former, while stillmembers of respondent union (Rollo, pp. 45-46).

Among the disputed portions of the NLRC decision is its finding that it has been substantially proven that the petitioners committed actsof disloyalty to their union as a consequence of the filing by NAFLU for and in their behalf of the complaint in question (Rollo, p. 46).Petitioners insist that their expulsion from the Union and consequent dismissal from employment have no basis whether factual or legal,because they did not in fact affiliate themselves with another Union, the NAFLU. On the contrary, they claim that there is a connivance

between respondents Company and Union in their illegal dismissal in order to avoid the payment of separation pay by respondentcompany.

Petitioners' contention that they did not authorize NAFLU to file NLRC-AB Case No. 6-4275-82 for them is borne out by the recordswhich show that they did not sign the complaint, neither did they sign any document of membership application with NAFLU (Rollo, p.323). Significantly, none of private respondents was able to present any evidence to the contrary except for one employee who admittedhaving authorized NAFLU to file the complaint but only for the purpose of questioning the funds of the Union (Rollo, p. 216).Placed in proper perspective, the mere act of seeking help from the NAFLU cannot constitute disloyalty as contemplated in the CollectiveBargaining Agreement. At most it was an act of self-preservation of workers who, driven to desperation found shelter in the NAFLU whotook the cudgels for them.

It will be recalled that 460 employees were temporarily laid off; some were laid-off as early as March 22, 1982 although the actualofficial announcement and notice of the intended shutdown was made only on May 27, 1982 (Rollo, p. 151). The laid-off employees didnot receive any separation pay because as alleged by respondent company their dismissal was due to serious business reverses sufferedby it. The only aid offered by the company which was offered when the disgruntled employees began to discuss among themselves theirplight, was a 1/2 sack of rice monthly and P 50.00 weekly. Most of the employees did not avail themselves of the aid as those who didwere allegedly made to sign blank papers. To aggravate matters, petitioners complained that their pleas for their union officers to fightfor their right to reinstatement, fell on deaf ears. Their union leaders continued working and were not among those laid-off, whichexplains the lack of positive action on the part of the latter to help or even sympathize with the plight of the members. All they could


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offer was a statement "marunong pa kayo sa may-ari ng kumpanya" ("you know more than the company owners") (Rollo, p. 80). Underthe circumstances, petitioners cannot be blamed for seeking help wherever it could be found.

In fact even assuming that petitioners did authorize NAFLU to file the action for them, it would have been pointless because NAFLUcannot file an action for members of another union. The proper remedy would be to drop the union as party to the action and place thenames of the employees instead (Lakas v. Marcelo Enterprises, 118 SCRA 422 [1982]) as what appears to have been done in this casebefore the Court.

Petitioners claim that the NLRC erred in ruling that the expulsion proceeding conducted by the Union was in accordance with its by-laws. Respondent Union had notified and summoned herein petitioners to appear and explain why they should not be expelled from the

union for having joined and affiliated with NAFLU.

Petitioners contend that the requisites of due process were not complied with in that, there was no impartial tribunal or union bodyvested with authority to conduct the disciplinary proceeding under the union constitution and by-laws, and, that complainants were notfurnished notice of the charge against them, nor timely notices of the hearings on the same (Rollo, p. 48).

According to the minutes of the special meeting of the Board of Directors of respondent Union held on September 14, 1982, theChairman of the Board of Directors showed the members of the board, copies of the minutes of the investigation proceedings of eachindividual member, together with a consolidated list of Union members found guilty as charged and recommended for expulsion asmembers of the respondent Union. The Board members examined the minutes and the list (Rollo, p. 219).

It is to be noted, however, that only two (2) of the expelled petitioners appeared before the investigation panel (Rollo, pp. 203, 235).Most of the petitioners boycotted the investigation proceedings. They alleged that most of them did not receive the notice of summonsfrom respondent Union because they were in the provinces. This fact was not disproved by private respondents who were able to

present only a sample copy of proof of service, Annex "14" (Rollo, p. 215). Petitioners further claim that they had no Idea that they werecharged with disloyalty; those who came were not only threatened with persecution but also made to write the answers to questions asdictated to them by the Union and company representatives. These untoward incidents prompted petitioners to request for a generalinvestigation with all the petitioners present but their request was ignored by the panel of investigators (Rollo, pp. 280, 307). Again,these allegations were not denied by private respondents.

In any event, even if petitioners who were complainants in NLRC-AB Case No. 6-4275-82 appeared in the supposed investigationproceedings to answer the charge of disloyalty against them, it could not have altered the fact that the proceedings were violative of theelementary rule of justice and fair play. The Board of Directors of respondent union would have acted as prosecutor, investigator andjudge at the same time. The proceeding would have been a farce under the circumstances (Lit Employees Association v. Court ofIndustrial Relations, 116 SCRA 459 [1982] citing Kapisanan ng Mga Manggagawa sa MRR v. Rafael Hernandez, 20 SCRA 109). The filingof the charge of disloyalty against petitioners was instigated by the Chairman of the Board of Directors and Acting Union President,Ponciano Fernandez, in the special meeting of the members of the Board of Directors as convened by the Union President on August 16,1982 (Rollo, p. 213). The Panel of Investigators created under the Board's Resolution No. 83, s. 1982 was composed of the Chairman of

the Board, Ponciano Fernandez, and two (2) members of the Board, Samson Yap and Carmen Garcia (Rollo, p. 214). It is the same Boardthat expelled its 125 members in its Resolution No. 84, s. of 1982 (Rollo, p. 219).

All told, it is obvious, that in the absence of any full blown investigation of the expelled members of the Union by an impartial body,there is no basis for respondent Union's accusations.

It is the policy of the state to assure the right of workers to "security of tenure" (Article XIII, Sec. 3 of the New Constitution, Section 9,Article II of the 1973 Constitution). The guarantee is an act of social justice. When a person has no property, his job may possibly be hisonly possession or means of livelihood. Therefore, he should be protected against any arbitrary deprivation of his job. Article 280 of theLabor Code has construed security of tenure as meaning that "the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for ajust cause or when authorized by" the code (Bundoc v. People's Bank and Trust Company, 103 SCRA 599 [1981]). Dismissal is notjustified for being arbitrary where the workers were denied due process (Reyes v. Philippine Duplicators, Inc., 109 SCRA 489 [1981] anda clear denial of due process, or constitutional right must be safeguarded against at all times, (De Leon v. National Labor RelationsCommission, 100 SCRA 691 [1980]). This is especially true in the case at bar where there were 125 workers mostly heads or sole

breadwinners of their respective families.

Time and again, this Court has reminded employers that while the power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer, the same isnot without limitations. The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of his employees especially so when it ismade upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, as in the instant case. Dismissals must not bearbitrary and capricious. Due process must be observed in dismissing an employee because it affects not only his position but also hismeans of livelihood. Employers should, therefore, respect and protect the rights of their employees, which include the right to labor(Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., 90 SCRA 393 [1979], Resolution).

In the case at bar, the scandalous haste with which respondent corporation dismissed 125 employees lends credence to the claim thatthere was connivance between respondent corporation and respondent Union. It is evident that private respondents were in bad faith indismissing petitioners. They, the private respondents, are guilty of unfair labor practice.PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC-NCR-11-6881-82 dated April 26,1984 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and (2) respondent corporation is ordered: (1) to reinstate petitioners to their former positionswithout reduction in rank, seniority and salary; (b) to pay petitioners three-year backwages, without any reduction or qualification,jointly and solidarily with respondent Union; and (c) to pay petitioners exemplary damages of P500.00 each. Where reinstatement is nolonger feasible, respondent corporation and respondent union are solidarily ordered to pay, considering their length of service theircorresponding separation pay and other benefits to which they are entitled under the law.SO ORDERED.


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ManilaTHIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 144664 March 15, 2004ASIAN TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, petitioner,vs.The Hon. COURT OF APPEALS, Thirteenth Division, HON. FROILAN M. BACUNGAN as Voluntary Arbitrator, KISHIN A. LALWANI,

Union, Union representative to the Panel Arbitrators; BISIG NG ASIAN TRANSMISSION LABOR UNION (BATLU); HON.

BIENVENIDO T. LAGUESMA in his capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment; and DIRECTOR CHITA G. CILINDRO in her

capacity as Director of Bureau of Working Conditions, respondents.

D E C I S I O NCARPIO-MORALES,J.:Petitioner, Asian Transmission Corporation, seeks via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1995 Rules of Civil Procedure thenullification of the March 28, 2000 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals denying its petition to annul 1) the March 11, 1993 "ExplanatoryBulletin"2of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) entitled "Workers Entitlement to Holiday Pay on April 9, 1993, Araw ngKagitingan and Good Friday", which bulletin the DOLE reproduced on January 23, 1998, 2) the July 31, 1998 Decision 3 of the Panel ofVoluntary Arbitrators ruling that the said explanatory bulletin applied as well to April 9, 1998, and 3) the September 18,19984 Resolution of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitration denying its Motion for Reconsideration.

The following facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are undisputed:

The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), through Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, issued an Explanatory Bulletin

dated March 11, 1993 wherein it clarified, inter alia, that employees are entitled to 200% of their basic wage on April 9, 1993, whetherunworked, which[,] apart from being Good Friday [ and, therefore, a legal holiday], is alsoAraw ng Kagitingan [which is also a legalholiday]. The bulletin reads:

"On the correct payment of holiday compensation on April 9, 1993 which apart from being Good Friday is also Araw ngKagitingan, i.e., two regular holidays falling on the same day, this Department is of the view that the covered employees areentitled to at least two hundred percent (200%) of their basic wage even if said holiday is unworked. The first 100%represents the payment of holiday pay on April 9, 1993 as Good Friday and the second 100% is the payment of holiday pay forthe same date as Araw ng Kagitingan.

Said bulletin was reproduced on January 23, 1998, when April 9, 1998 was both Maundy Thursday andAraw ng Kagitingan x x x xDespite the explanatory bulletin, petitioner [Asian Transmission Corporation] opted to pay its daily paid employees only 100% of theirbasic pay on April 9, 1998. Respondent Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU) protested.

In accordance with Step 6 of the grievance procedure of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) existing between petitioner andBATLU, the controversy was submitted for voluntary arbitration. x x x x On July 31, 1998,the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered

a decision directing petitioner to pay its covered employees "200% and not just 100% of their regular daily wages for the unworkedApril 9, 1998 which covers two regular holidays, namely,Araw ng Kagitignan and Maundy Thursday." (Emphasis and underscoringsupplied)

Subject of interpretation in the case at bar is Article 94 of the Labor Code which reads:ART. 94. Right to holiday pay. - (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail andservice establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers;(b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall be paid a compensation equivalent to twicehis regular rate; and(c) As used in this Article, "holiday" includes: New Years Day, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth of April, the first of May, thetwelfth of June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth and thirtieth of December and the day designated by lawfor holding a general election, which was amended by Executive Order No. 203 issued on June 30, 1987, such that the regular holidaysare now:

1. New Years Day January 1

2. Maundy Thursday Movable Date3. Good Friday Movable Date4. Araw ng Kagitingan April 9 (Bataan and Corregidor Day)5. Labor Day May 16. Independence Day June 127. National Heroes Day Last Sunday of August8. Bonifacio Day November 309. Christmas Day December 2510. Rizal Day December 30

In deciding in favor of the Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU), the Voluntary Arbitrator held that Article 94 of the LaborCode provides for holiday pay for every regular holiday, the computation of which is determined by a legal formula which is not changedby the fact that there are two holidays falling on one day, like on April 9, 1998 when it was Araw ng Kagitingan and at the same time wasMaundy Thursday; and that that the law, as amended, enumerates ten regular holidays for every year should not be interpreted asauthorizing a reduction to nine the number of paid regular holidays "just because April 9 (Araw ng Kagitingan) in certain years, like1993 and 1998, is also Holy Friday or Maundy Thursday."

In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator, holding that the Collective BargainingAgreement (CBA) between petitioner and BATLU, the law governing the relations between them, clearly recognizes their intent toconsiderAraw ng Kagitingan and Maundy Thursday, on whatever date they may fall in any calendar year, as paid legal holidays during


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the effectivity of the CBA and that "[t]here is no condition, qualification or exception for any variance from the clear intent that allholidays shall be compensated."5

The Court of Appeals further held that "in the absence of an explicit provision in law which provides for [a] reduction of holiday pay iftwo holidays happen to fall on the same day, any doubt in the interpretation and implementation of the Labor Code provisions onholiday pay must be resolved in favor of labor."

By the present petition, petitioners raise the following issues:IWHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ERRONEOUSLY

INTERPRETING THE TERMS OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND SUBSTITUTING ITS OWNJUDGMENT IN PLACE OF THE AGREEMENTS MADE BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVESIIWHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT ANYDOUBTS ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF THE POLICIES ENUNCIATED IN THE EXPLANATORY BULLETIN WAS LAID TO REST BY THEREISSUANCE OF THE SAID EXPLANATORY BULLETINIIIWHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THEVALIDITY OF THE EXPLANATORY BULLETIN EVEN WHILE ADMITTING THAT THE SAID BULLEITN WAS NOT AN EXAMPLE OF AJUDICIAL, QUASI-JUDICIAL, OR ONE OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT [Department of Labor and Employment] DOLE MAYPROMULGATEIVWHETHER OR NOT THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE) BY ISSUING EXPLANATORYBULLETIN DATED MARCH 11, 1993, IN THE GUISE OF PROVIDING GUIDELINES ON ART. 94 OF THE LABOR CODE, COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AS IT LEGISLATED AND INTERPRETED LEGAL PROVISIONS IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO CREATE OBLIGATIONSWHERE NONE ARE INTENDED BY THE LAWVWHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN SUSTAINING THESECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR IN REITERATING ITS EXPLANATORY BULLETIN DATED MARCH 11, 1993 AND INORDERING THAT THE SAME POLICY OBTAINED FOR APRIL 9, 1998 DESPITE THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT TO THECONTRARYVIWHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ACTS WILL DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS BY THE"EXPLANATORY BULLETIN" AS WELL AS EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS

The petition is devoid of merit.

At the outset, it bears noting that instead of assailing the Court of Appeals Decision by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner lodged the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

[S]ince the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the petition under Rule 65, any alleged errors committed by it in the exercise of itsjurisdiction would be errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special ci

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