LAND ACQUISITION CASES

Soumyadipta ChandaGNLU

Bombay Improvement Trust v. Jalbhoy ILR 1933 Bom 483

• The market value of land was stated to mean the price which would be obtainable in the market for that concrete parcel of land with its particular advantages and its particular drawbacks, both the advantage and the drawback being estimated with reference to commercial value than with reference to any abstract legal rights.

Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Anr. 1969 ALL 604

• Section 3(a) of the Act provides that the expression land includes benefits to arise out of land etc. The definition is of the expression land and not of land. When it is said that the expression land includes benefits, it means that the expression connotes benefits to arise out of land and things attached to the earth and or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth which may be independent of the land. The lease hold interest in land can therefore come within the definition of the expression land.

Special Land Acquisition Officer v. M. S. Seshagiri Rao & Anr AIR 1968 SC 1045

• Where certain lands are granted by the Govt. with a condition that in the event of the Govt. requiring the land for any reason whatsoever the grantee shall surrender the land to the Govt. without claiming any compensation but the Govt. without exercising the power reserved by the terms of the grant, adopts the procedure under the Land Acquisition Act then it has to pay compensation for the acquisition of land. The measure of that compensation was the market value of the land at the date of the notification and a measure of the market value was what a willing purchaser might pay for the land for the rights to the land subject to the option of the Govt.

Damodar Das v. Secretary of StateILR 1938 All 994

• For the purpose of Land Acquisition Act, a bungalow is included in the definition of land and the case lies for compensation to be awarded for a bungalow where the Govt. claims title to the land and does not propose to pay compensation on the land. The Court held that the Government has to pay compensation to the appellant.

Kako Bai v. Land Acquisition Collector AIR 1966 Punj 231

• Certain lands situated in Mauza Basti Bewan, Tahsil Fatehabad, District Hissar, has been acquired by the Punjab Government for the purpose of constructing a mandi, township and a factory under the Land Acquisition Act. Smt. Kako Bai is an allottee of about 32 acres out of this area. Notices were issued to her as a person interested in the acquired land. Kako Bai applied to the Collector under Section 18 of the Act. The Collector, however by his order dismissed the application on the ground that it is open to the Collector not to make the required reference in the exercise of his discretion and she was not entitled to any compensation. He further found that Kako Bai erected constructions on the acquired land after publication of the notice under Section 4 of the Act and, therefore, she was not entitled to compensation for improvements effected by her. The High court observed that the award that the Collector makes under Section 11 of the Act after holding this enquiry is not a final award binding on the claimant. It is merely a tender or an offer of an amount mentioned in the award as compensation payable by the Government to the claimant. This offer is binding only on the claimant who has a right under Section 18 of the Act to get the matter decided by a Civil Court. Any opinion expressed by the Collector in his award under Section 11 of the Act on any matter is not binding on the claimant. A person who has not accepted this offer or tender appears to me to have an absolute right to get the matter determined on all matters mentioned in Section 18 by a civil Court provided he conforms to the formalities laid down-in this section. These formalities are that he must make an application in writing to the Collector within the period specified in the section. This application has to be made by an 'interested person' which expression in Section 3(b) of the Act is defined as including a person claiming an interest in the compensation. Under this definition it is immaterial whether there is any substance in the claim made by the person applying under Section 18 or not. Consequently it is not open to the Collector to decide whether to fact or in law the claimant has any interest in compensation of the land acquired or not. It is also not open to the Collector to decide in these proceedings whether a claimant is entitled to more compensation than allowed by him under Section 11.

Sunderlal v.s ParamsukhdasAIR 1968 SC 366

• The definition of person interested is inclusive. It is not necessary that an interested person should have an interest in the land which has been acquired. A person becomes interested only if he claims an interest in the compensation to be awarded. He is entitled to be heard under Sections 20 and 21 of the Act.

Isabhai Musabhai Patel and Anr v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and ors AIR 1971 Guj 145

• Tenants entering into the possession of the land after the award is made cannot be allowed to challenge the award after remaining indifferent for over 5 years and particularly when no infringement of legal or fundamental right is made out. He thus cannot challenge the notifications or the award.

Chettiammal v. Collector of Coimbatore AIR 1927 Mad 867

• The reversioners were made parties to the proceedings by the Acquisition officer and he made an award jointly in favour of them and the widow. Then they claimed and obtained a reference under Section 18 with the result that the compensation was enhanced. It was held that the objection as to their capacity to obtain reference could not be considered as an appeal.

Neyveli Lignite Corporation v. Special Land Acquisition Officer AIR 1995 SC 1004

• The local authority, company, statutory authority or co-operative society is a person interested to determine just compensation for the acquired land and is also an aggrieved person. He has the right to be heard by the Collector or the Court. If it is not made a party then it is entitle to seek leave of the court and file an appeal against the award and decree of the Civil Court under Section 26 or the judgment and decree under Section 54. It is also entitled to file a writ petition under Article 226. So it is either a proper party or a necessary party to the proceedings under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC. If not made a person interested, it is a procedure offending Article 14 of the Constitution.

Deputy Collector v. Aiyavu Pillay1909 Ind Cases 341

• In this case the respondent put in a claim at a late stage of the proceedings before the Deputy Collector to be entitled to compensation as Jenmi of Survey No. 54, of which the Government is the registered Jenmi. It was held that the Act does not contemplate or provide for the acquisition of any interest which already belongs to Government in land which is being acquired under the Act but only for the acquisition of such interests in the land as do not already belong to Government. When Government claiming to be the owner of the land seeks to acquire under the Act the interests of other persons therein, and such persons deny the title of Government and set up that they themselves are the owners and claim compensation on that basis, it becomes necessary, for the purpose of fixing the compensation to be paid to them, for the Collector to determine what is the interest in the land to which they are entitled, and whether they are owners as they claim to be or only entitled to the limited interest admitted by Government. For this purpose, it is not necessary that the Secretary of State should be made a party and added as a claimant as stated by the Subordinate Judge.

Arjan Singh v. State of PunjabAIR 1959 Punj 538

• Where a Govt. notification stated that a person was appointed as officiating Land Acquisition officer but did not state whether he was appointed for the purpose of performing the function of the Collector or not, it was held that the officer having not been appointed expressly to perform the functions of the Collector under the Act had no jurisdiction to take proceedings under Section 9 or Section 10 and thus the proceedings and award under Section 11 was deemed to be invalid.

Ratilal Shakarabhai v.s State of Gujarat AIR 1970 SC 984

• In this case, the State of Gujarat made an amendment to the LA Act, wherein S. 3(f) was added whereby housing scheme is to be considered a public purpose if undertaken by the Govt. Accordingly state came out with notification for acquisition of land for housing scheme when it is developed by a cooperative society. One of the persons who lost his land challenged the notification stating it provided accomodation only for 20 families and hence was not public purpose. Guj HC rejected the application and held that it is a society to look after its members and not for public at large but here the benefit was for public purpose. Hence the acquisition was valid.

Musammiyan Imam Haider Bux Razvi and ors v. State of Gujarat AIR 1971 Guj 158

• State of Gujarat acquired land to be transferred to various cooperative societies and this was not held to be a public purpose. Court held that Section 3(f) was liable to be struck down because the land that was transferred for the housing scheme was only for the benefit of the members of the society even though the scheme would benefit the public at large. Hence the notification was liable to be quashed.

K Ankaiah and Ors v. State of Andhra PradeshAIR 1969 AP 231

• There was a narrow lane in front of the Tirupati Temple for which there was a huge crowd in front of the temple. Govt. came out with the notification for widening of the road. Then in 1961 HC struck down the notification since it was 3 years since the Govt. came out with the notification. Then Govt. came out with another notification for the same purpose. There was also to be construction of public urinals and lavatories for the benefit of the pilgrims . It is thus a public purpose and the notification is valid.

Nainhati Municipality and ors v. Chinmoyee Mukherjee AIR 1997 SC 378

• Resolution was passed by Calcutta Municipal Corporation for rehabilitation of displaced hawkers by acquiring their lands. Funds were also collected from the hawkers to meet the cost of acquisition and deposited with the municipality. Govt. had put a restriction to use the funds. Thereby, the amount had formed and fused into integral part of the municipal funds. It is true that the Government had put restriction that the said money would be used only for the public purpose. It would be obvious that since municipality did not have the required funds, the Government had imposed a condition that the money contributed by the hawkers should be used only for the purpose of cost of the acquisition apprehending that the same may be directed to other purpose. The meat of the matter is that after the deposit by the hawkers, they have no right to withdraw the said amount which formed part of the funds of the municipality.

Suresh Verma v. State of PunjabAIR 1971 P&H 406

• Where the land acquired for an urgent purpose was acquired bonafide for that purpose the owner of the land is not entitled to return of the land when the Govt. subsequently uses the land for some other purpose. Section 48 is not attracted. Thus when the State Govt. acquired land for construction of a bus stand and after having spent a substantial amount on that purpose transferred it to some other purpose, the owner could not claim return of land.

Luchmeshwar Singh v. Chairman, Darbhanga Municipality ILR 1918 Cal 99

• Here the Collector was taking care of the property of a minor and evaluated the land at Rs. 2 and gave it as compensation. This was challenged before the Court that the acquisition was invalid as the person was a minor. Another question was whether the minor can challenge the acquisition on attaining majority.

Somawanti v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 561

• The Court observed that public purpose must include an object in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned. Public purpose is bound to change with the times and the prevailing conditions in a given area and, therefore, it would not be a practical proposition even to attempt an extensive definition of it . It is because of this that the legislature has left it to the Government to say what a public purpose is and also to declare the need of a given land for a public purpose.

• The Constitution Bench of this Court in Somawanti observed that whether in a particular case the purpose for which land was a public purpose or not was for the Government to be satisfied about and the declaration of the Government would be final subject to one exception, namely that where there was a colourable exercise of the power the declarations would be open to challenge at the instance of the aggrieved party.

Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi AIR 1975 SC 2077

• A Constitution Bench of this Court, (Mathew, J. speaking for the Court) after an elaborate consideration, held that the acquisition for planned development of Delhi is a public purpose. In the case of an acquisition of a large extent of land comprising several plots belonging to different persons, the specification of the purpose can only be with reference to the acquisition of the whole area. Unlike in the case of an acquisition of a small area, it might be practically difficult to specify the particular purpose for which every item of land comprised in the area is needed. Under those circumstances, the acquisition of planned development was held to be for public purpose. It is not necessary to burden the judgment with the development of the law in this behalf.

Ratni Devi v.Chief Commissioner, Delhi AIR 1975 SC 1699

• Outlay or improvement made with the sanction of the Collector after notification date will be taken into consideration in awarding compensation. The Town Planning Organization set up to provide for those who live and work in Delhi. So the Government decided to acquire the land and notifications under Section 4 and 6 were passed. The petitioners contentions regarding the vagueness of planned development and inadeqaute compensation was dismissed by the Court.

N Krishanappa Mudaliar v. Government of Tamil Nadu 1977 Mad LJ 406

• There cannot be a writ petition to quash a Government notification regarding acquisition of land for a public purpose under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894

Pran Jivan Jaitha v.s State of West BengalAIR 1974 Cal 210

• The Blind Boys Academy which was to be run partly by the Government and partly by Ramkrishna Mission needed land to expand activities and to build classrooms, hostels and playgrounds. The Court held that such a purpose would be a public purpose even though it is partly funded by a private body since Ramkrishna Mission which is well known not only in this country but also in other countries for its philanthropic activities.

Kshama Sahakari Avas Samiti Ltd.v. State of U.P 2007 AIHC 5

• The Government sought to acquire land to give it to private developers for the Taj Nagari Phase III Project. However, it was challenged by the petitioners since 800 bighas had already been acquired by it for the development of Taj Nagari Phase II which was lying unused. Also since this was to a private realtor it was not to be deemed as public purpose. The petitioners rights under Section 5A were not granted but independantly the notice under Section 4 could not be held to be infructuous. The writ petitions were however dismissed after being entertained.

Collector (Dist. Magistrate), Allahabad and another v. Raja Ram Jaiswal, AIR

1985 SC 1622• The Apex Court when faced with the question as to what grounds the

notification under Section 4 of the Act can be challenged in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India stated that:

Power to acquire land for public purpose is conferred to achieve a purpose it has been repeatedly reiterated that the power must be exercised reasonably and in good faith to effectuate the purpose. And in this context 'in good faith' means 'for legitimate reasons'. Where power is exercised for extraneous or irrelevant considerations or reasons, it is unquestionably a colourable exercise of power or fraud on power and the exercise of power is vitiated. If the power to acquire land is to be exercised, it must be exercised bona fide for the statutory purpose and for none other. If it is exercised for an extraneous, irrelevant or non-germane consideration, the acquiring authority can be charged with legal mala fides. In such a situation there is no question of any personal ill-will or motive."

Asgar Ali v.s State of Uttar PradeshAIR 1959 ALL 792

• This is a case for acquisition of Land in Sitapur Mafi village of Banda district. For acquisition of 0.3 acres, notification was given in Hindi and for acquiring 3 acres notification was given in English. When a notification is mislead or illegal, it must be quashed along with subsequent proceedings. Under the UP Official Languages Act 1951, Hindi notification prevails over the English notification in cases of conflict. However the English notification can be used to remove vagueness.

M/S Sharp Tools v. State of Tamil Nadu 2007 AIHC 838

• There was a construction of houses under the Neighborhood Scheme for which there was a notification under Section 4(1). The petitioners own property which is to be acquired by the Government. The objections to the same has to be made within 30 days. The hearing of the objections and further enquiry is mandatory . Personal hearing is mandatory and further enquiry after the hearing is discretionary. Form B is only a notice to the objectors and the Department and not a notice for filing objections.

Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A.P Damodarswamy 2007 AIHC 2321

• The Notification under Section 4(1) authorized Special Tehsildars Unit III to perform functions of sending notice and give opportunities to the interested parties to be heard under Section 5A. But the Act specifies that the Collector is to perform such functions. In such a situation, the acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed because of non compliance with procedure.

Dharam Pal v.s State of Haryana2007 AIHC 2742

• There was acquisition of land for sewage treatment plant and other disposal work. The living descendants of Dharam Pal depended on the land for sustenance . It was held that the Collector should not decide on the objection. It was also held that acquisition proceedings should be carried out irrespective and cannot be quashed on the ground of procedural violation because the Collector did not hear the objection.

Shri Mandir Sita Ramji v.s Delhi Administration AIR 1974 SC 1868

• The Collector must enquire into the objections, give hearing to the parties and make recommendations even though the ultimate decision is taken by the State Government.

Shyam Swarup v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1936 All 426

• The purpose of the Notification under Section 4 is to enable the Government to make up its mind through preliminary investigations, whether or not to continue with the acquisition proceedings. The construction of Government buildings by the PWD was stated as the purpose in the notification under Section 4. But in the declaration under Section 6 it was stated as the Extension of the Mahanagar Housing Scheme by the Municipal Board. Both public purposes are analogous to each other, i.e. development of Lucknow on a planned basis.

Smt Gunwat Kaur v.s Municipality of Bhatinda AIR 1970 SC 802

• A notification under Section 4 declared that land specified was needed for a public purpose i. e., for construction of Mall Road. A notification under Section 6 was issued. In the view of the Municipality of Bhatinda the demarcation of the land according to the plan published with the notification under Section 6 did not tally with the situation on the site. Municipality resolved to reduce the width of the road which was originally intended to be 100 feet to 60 feet and then abandoned the same. The appellants then filed a writ petition in the High Court of Punjab on December 16, 1968, alleging that the substance of the notification under Section 4 and its corrigendum was not published in the locality by the Collector; that the proposed land which was sought to be acquired for the Mall Road was not demarcated at site under Section 4(2) of the Act; that the procedure laid down in Section 5-A of the Act was not followed. The HC dismissed the Petition saying that it could not go into questions of fact. The Supreme Court said that the High Court was not justified in dismissing the petition on the ground that it will not determine disputed question of fact. The High Court has jurisdiction to determine questions of fact, even if they are in dispute, and the present, in our judgment, is a case in which in the interests of both the parties the High Court should have entertained the petition and called for an affidavit in reply from the respondents, and should have proceeded to try the petition instead of relegating the appellants to a separate suit. Case was remanded back to the HC.

Sukumar M Khot v.s State of Maharashtra AIR 2007 Bom 2514

• The Notification for acquisition was made on 20/9/04 and the final declaration on 23/6/05. The Court quashed the final declaration and remitted the matter to the Collector for hearing. The fresh final declaration was issued on 10/8/06. There was a failure to comply with requirements of Section 5A in this notification and not in the previous notification. The Court still set aside the declaration and directed the Collector to complete the inquiry and submit report with recommendations.

Padma Sundar Rao v.s State of Tamil Nadu AIR 2002 SC 1334

• Whether a fresh period of 1 year is available to the Government after quashing of notification under Section 6 is the question to be considered. Once a delcaration has been quashed, fresh declaration cannot be issued beyond the prescribed period under Section 6(1). Hence there is no fresh 1 year period and the limitation continues to run.

Madan Mohan v.s State of PunjabAIR 1961 Punj 507

• 28.5 acres of land to be acquired under the Notification and 30.7 acres of land was acquired . It was held by the Court that excess acquisition does not make the entire proceedings invalid. The principle underlying Section 49 of the Act has no application to the case. The acquisition of land to extent of which it was notified would be valid but beyond that would be unauthorized and would not confer any title on the Government.

Bangalore City Municipality v. K Rangappa AIR 1954 Mys 171

• Acquisition of 2 shops for widening road was held to be illegal. The acquisition was partly for the widening of the road and partly for the private purpose of adding land to Siddharurda Swamy Mandali. No declaration of acquisition can be made unless compensation is awarded out of public funds. Here compensation was paid out of the funds of the Mandali. Hence it was held that the proposed acquisition was not warranted by the Karnataka Municipalities Act.

Uggarsen Kashyap v. Union of IndiaAIR 1972 Del 256

• A plot was wrongfully mentioned for acquisition in the final declaration. Government was directed to issue fresh declaration in respect of that plot .

Tipperah Hill Development Co. Ltd v. State of Tripura 1956 Tri 28

• A 15 day notice period is mandatory. The notice was served on 24th February 1926 and the person was requested to appear on 4th March 1926. There was less than 15 day notice period. Hence, Claimant cannot be estopped from moving an objection for adequacy of compensation.

Lakbhir Chand v. Land Acquisition Officer AIR 1979 Del 53

• The object of the notice is to give an opportunity to the interested parties to make a claim for compensation. The proceedings resulting in the award after the notice under Section 9(3) and Section 10(1) are administrative and not judicial. The Collector had taken possession and no notice was issued to the owner before the award. It was held that the acquisition was not invalid but the award against the person is invalid. The land acquisition officer was directed to issue a notice under Section 9(3) of the Act in order to proceed. The proceedings of the Collector does not get vitiated.

Land Acquisition Collector v. Parvati Devi 1964 HP 32

• The date of service of the notice and the date fixed for appearance are to be excluded while computing the 15 day period. The notice was issued on 19/08/25 and the appearance was on 3/09/25. Thus only a 14 day notice period was given. Hence the claimant is not debarred from claiming enhancement of compensation in the civil court.

V.S Subramaniam Chettiar v. The State of Madras AIR 1953 Mad 943

• The notice regarding acquisition of land was issued by the Collector under Section 9. The notice required the claimant to state the amount and particulars of his claim to compensation. The Claimant submitted that he would state facts about the rate of compensation from the land at a later stage. He had obtained sanctions for the purpose of constructing a bungalow and an oil mill and the question of compensation did not arise at this stage. He had to state amount of compensation only if an adverse order is passed by the Government. In this case, the Collector fixed the compensation but did not allow enhancement of the same.

Kolammal v.s State of Tamil NaduAIR 2007 AIHC 3307

•  Whether, award passed by Single Judge was valid and it satisfied first Proviso to Section 11(1) of Act - Held - proceedings of Revenue Officer clearly showed that prior approval as per First Proviso to Section 11(1) of Act was not obtained before passing of award - It was not an empty formality and it was duty of Government or authorised authority to verify all relevant details commencing from notification issued under Section 4(1) of Act and ending with fixation of compensation with reference to various aspects - However, award was passed without prior approval of Government or authorised authority was bad and same was passed on last day of prescribed period of limitation, therefore, entire acquisition proceedings stand lapsed - Even a fresh award at this juncture by Land Acquisition Officer was not permissible in accordance with law - Hence, entire acquisition proceedings were liable to be quashed - Thus, Judge had not adverted to all legal issues and factual details -Therefore, order of Judge was set aside - Appeal allowed.

Smt Sarojamma & ors v. The Land Acquisition Officer AIR 2007 AIHC 2905

• 19879 acres of land to be acquired for Mandal which was a public purpose. But no proceedings were initiated. Till 1994, the compensation amount was not paid. The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking the writ of mandamus to direct the respondent to initiate acquisition proceedings and pay compensation of Rs. 11000 per acre. The Collector is required to conduct an enquiry of the award under Section 11(1) and determine compensation. The petitioners have filed an application under Section 18 for determination of compensation and respondents shall refer the claim of the petitioners within 2 months.

Ramnarain Damodrilal vs State Of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1963 MP 35

• 15 sq ft land belonging to the petitioner was acquired. Proposed Rs. 12,000 as amount payable. Collector requested the P.W.D to submit the report of the value of the property. PWD reported the value of the property as Rs. 350. The collector accordingly passed a award and the award was challenged. It was held that where the award made by the Collector was not on the basis of his own judgment but on the valuation made by the Chief Engineer PWD as desired by the Chief Secretary to the Government, the award is invalid and the proceedings in the District Court have no effect.

Pratik Prakashchand Karnawat v. State of Maharashtra AIR 2007 AIHC 3443

• Award was passed 2 years after the passing of the final declaration under Section 6. It was held that the award under Section 11 had lapsed due to limitation.

Union of India v. Praveen GuptaAIR 1997 SC 170

• The timber business was carried out in the walled city of Old Delhi which had become a source of traffic congestion and therefore required to be shifted urgently by acquiring some other land for public purpose. Therefore the entire land from two villages was acquired. Since the acquisition is for transfer of timber business from the walled city to the outskirts, the acquisition is for urgent purpose. Hence the exercise of power under Section 17(4) cannot be said to be unwarranted.

Union of India v. Mukesh Hans AIR 2004 SC 4307

• In 1987 Anjuman made a representation to the Lt. Governor of Delhi for acquisition of 4000 sq yards for Phoolwalon ki Sair festival at Mehrauli. Since there were a lot of monuments in the area the Govt. thought of acquiring 72 bighas of land. It was held that Section 17(4) is an exception to the normal mode of acquisition and it is not by itself sufficient to dispense enquiry under Section 5-A. The decision of dispensing with the inquiry suffered from the vice of non application of mind by the Lt. Governor.

Om Prakash v. State of U.P. AIR 1998 SC 2504

• Lands were sought to be acquired by the Industrial Development Authority, Noida. State did not think the proposal to be that urgent as to issue notification under S. 17(4). The Authority had deprived the petitioners from filing objections under S. 5-A for urgency and they themselves had taken 9 months for issuing declaration under Section 6. This conduct falsified their claim of urgency. Thus, according to the aforesaid decision of this Court, inquiry Under Section 5-A is not merely statutory but also has a flavour of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution

Yogendra Prasad v.s State of BiharAIR 2010 Pat 331

• Notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by which 20.99 acres of land in Neorais sought to be acquired by the State Government for setting up Maulana Mazharul Haque Arabic and Persian University. The main question that have been raised in this writ application is that adequate notice was not served on the petitioners and that there is no occasion to invoke emergency provisions of Section 17(3) and 17(4) of the Act, thereby depriving the land holders from taking advantage of the provisions under Section 5 A of the Act, which accords the land holder a right to file objections to the acquisition. Court found that there was compliance of Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. This Court also found that the acquisition of land is for a public purpose and there is sufficient application of mind and reason to invoke the provisions of Section 17 (1) and 17 (4) of the Land Acquisition Act.

State of U.P v.s Ram Swaroop2007 AIHC 965

• The State of U.P. acquired certain piece of land for the purposes of establishing Parichha Thermal Power Station at Jhansi. Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued. It was followed by the notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Certain plots of claimant respondents were also acquired by the aforesaid Land Acquisition Notifications. The Special Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 3,000/- per acre by the award dated 1.12.1978. Feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid award, an application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was filed for making the reference to the civil court. The District Magistrate referred to the civil court. The court below on the basis of the material on record enhanced the compensation and awarded it at the rate of Rs. 10, 000/- per acre. It also enhanced solatium from 15 per cent to 30 per cent. Feeling aggrieved against the judgment of the Reference Court the present appeal is at the instance of the State of U.P. The court found that compensation at the rate of Rs. 10000/acre is perfectly justified in law and based on relevant consideration and material on record. The solatium at a higher rate is also justified.

Bhanu Pratap Pandey v. District Magistrate, Banda,2007 (1) AWC 790

• Land was acquired in Tehsil Mau District Banda including the land of the petitioners. In the award given under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, Special Land Acquisition Officer offered to pay the compensation at the rate of Rs. 472/- per bigha. Several persons whose land had been acquired including the petitioners filed applications for making reference to the District Judge under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act as they were not satisfied with the market value determined and offered by Special Land Acquisition Officer. Through the judgment of the District Judge, market value of the land was determined to be Rs. 9000/- per bigha as against market value of Rs. 472/-. It was requested that 35 references should be sent back to the District Magistrate so that detailed enquiry could be made and references could be sent to the District Judge thereafter. The question of limitation was raised. Reference having once been sent by the Land Acquisition Officer/Collector to the District Judge can not be withdrawn. However, the question of limitation can very well be decided by the District Judge/Additional District Judge also while deciding the reference. The references must be immediately sent back by the District Judge to the Special LA Officer.

Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Lakshmanbabu Gayakwad 2007 AIHC 741

• In the present batch of writ petitions filed, lands situate at Nandagaon Village, Athani Taluk, Belgaum District, was acquired by the acquiring authority for establishing a Rehabilitation Centre for the persons displaced on account of construction of Upper Krishna Project. After such acquisition, the petitioners had filed an application in writing before the Special Land Acquisition Officer for passing a consent award. In view of the request made by the petitioners in writing, the Special Land Acquisition Officer had passed an award and in that, had incorporated the request made by the petitioners by determining the compensation payable for dry lands at Rs. 42,000/- per acre, and a sum of Rs. 76,000/- per acre for the wet lands. Issue that arises for our consideration and decision in this appeal is, whether the petitioners (respondents in the appeal), who had opted for passing of consent award, can they be maintaining an application under Section 28-A of the Act for re-determination of the compensation amount awarded on the basis of an award passed by the Civil Court? In the instant case, owners of the lands, whose lands have been acquired by the acquiring authority, had opted for passing of a consent award. Such a consent award has been passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer in exercise of his powers under Section 11(2) of the Act. Compensation amount as agreed is also paid to them. Therefore, they cannot be "aggrieved persons" as envisaged under Section 28-A of the Act and therefore, having opted for passing of a consent award, they cannot be maintaining an application under Section 28-A of the Act. Therefore, the Special Land Acquisition Officer was justified in not entertaining the application filed by the petitioners under Section 28-A of the Act, since they have opted for consent award under Section 11(2) of the Act.

Babua Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1994 SC 377

• Some of the owners of the lands had accepted the compensation amount under protest, and had filed an application before the Collector for reference to the Civil Court for proper determination of the compensation. The Civil Court had enhanced the compensation awarded by the Collector. Some of the persons, who had lost the lands under the very same notification, had received the compensation amount without protest. The question that arose before the Supreme Court was, whether the persons, who had taken compensation amount without protest, could they be filing an application before the authority for re-determination of the compensation amount on the basis of an award passed by the Civil Court? The Apex Court after a detailed consideration of the issue, was pleased to observe, that in view of Section 18 of the Act read with proviso to Section 31 of the Act, even a person, who has received the compensation amount without any protest, can still be maintaining an application under Section 28-A of the Act for re-determination of the compensation amount for the lands acquired on the basis of an award passed by the Civil Court.