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THE WVORLD BANK Discussion Paper 4 DEVELOPMENT POLICY ISSUES SERIES Report No. \ PFER52 The Costs and Benejfits of Being a Small, Remote, Island, Landlocked or Mini-State Economy T.N. Srinivasan March 1985 Office of the Vice President Economics and Research The views presented here are those of the author, and they should not be interpreted as reflecting those of the World Bank, K Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
Transcript
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THE WVORLD BANK

Discussion Paper

4 DEVELOPMENT POLICY ISSUES SERIES

Report No. \ PFER52

The Costs and Benejfitsof Being a Small, Remote, Island,

Landlocked or Mini-State Economy

T.N. SrinivasanMarch 1985

Office of the Vice President Economics and Research

The views presented here are those of the author, and they should not be interpreted as reflecting those of the World Bank,

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THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF BEING A SMALL,

REMOTE, ISLAND, LANDLOCKED OR MINI-STATE ECONOMY

by

T.N. Srinivasan

March 1985

The author is Professor of Economics, Yale University and Consultant,World Bank. The author thanks Bela Balassa, John Duloy, Gregory Ingram,Deepak Lal and Sarath Rajapatirana for their valuable comments.

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The World Bank does not accept responsibility for the views expressedherein which are those of the author(s) and should not be attributed tothe World Bank or to its affiliated organizations. The findings,interpretations, and conclusions are the results of research supportedby the Bank; they do not necessarily represent official policy of theBank. The designations employed and the presentation of material usedin this document are solely for the convenience of the reader and do notimply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the WorldBank or its affiliates concerning the legal status of any country,territory, city, area, or of its authorities, or concerning thedelimitations of its boundaries, or national affiliation.

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Abstract

Any index of smallness is somewhat arbitrary, but common practice hasbeen to use population and income criteria. Experience suggests thatsmallness is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for poor developmentperformance. Various fora have raised two important issues: 1) Do smalleconomies face special problems that call for special attention? and 2) Ifso, are these problems already being addressed? This paper analyzes thesebroad issues by considering the problems that small economies are most oftenalleged to face, including: absence of economies of scale; vulnerability;remoteness and other factors that raise transport costs; reduced access tocapital markets; problems of macro-economic policy dependence; andoverstatement of real income. After addressing these issues, the authorconcludes by asserting: "It would appear that many (though not all) of thealleged problems of small economies are either not peculiar to small economiesor can be addressed through suitable policy measures."

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Table of Contents

Page No.

I. What Are Small Economies?.. .................................. 1

II. Problems of Small Economies ............................... 8

A. Economies of Scale ................................. 10B. Vulnerability .......................... 13C. Remoteness and Other Factors

Affecting Transport Costs ....................... 18D. Access to Capital Markets ......................... 19E. Macro-economic Policy Independence ................ 25F. Real Income Comparisons ........................... 27

III. Conclusions ............................................. f e 30

Tables

Number and Distribution of Countries Classifiedby Population Size (mid-1983) ............................ 4

Distribution of Countries by Population Size andPer Capita Income, 1982...... e................................. 5

Growth of Real GNP Per Capita, 1970-1980 .. .................. 6

Per Capita Net Resource Flows in 1982 (US$) e.. ........... 21

Per Capita Grpss Domestic Product in IJS Dollarsat Official Exchange Rates, and in InternationalDollars, 1975.. ................................................ 29

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The Costs and Benefits of Being A Small,Remote, Island, Landlocked or Mini-State Economy

T.N. Srinivasan

I. What Are Small Economies?

In order to classify an economy into two citegories -- "small" and

"not small" -- one obviously needs two things: an index or measure of the

size of an economy according to some concept of size, and a cut-off point with

respect to this index so that all economies with an index value at or below

this cut-off value are classified as small. In the theory of international

trade the concept of size is market power, i.e. the ability of an economy to

affect its own terms of trade by changing its volume of trade, and the cut-off

point is zero. As an operational concept, this is not very useful --apart

from the problems in empirically determining whether a country has market

power, the fact that such power may be commodity-specific (that is, a country

may have positive market power in some commodity markets but none in others)

makes it difficult to generalize it into an economy-wide concept.

Another index of size that has been proposed is the size of a

country's potential market for commodities and services measured in terms of

the country's real gross national product (GNP) or better still, gross

domestic expenditure (GDE). Of course, it is recognized that a poor

tountry -- in the sense of having a low per capita income -- may still be

large in terms of its GNP because of its large population but small as a

potential market. For example, if the income distribution is not unduly

concentrated, the bulk of the large population in such a low per capita income

economy will be too poor to be potential demanders of anything but basic

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commodities. This has been taken to imply that an index of market size for

manufactured goods has to be related to the total consumption of such goods

which in turn has to be based on population, per capita income and some

measure of the concentration of the distribution of income. If one goes

beyond the market for manufactured goods to basic services covering

transportation, health and sanitation, edu2ation, etc., then the geographical

area of a country, the average density of its population settlements, a

measure of distribution of the density across settlements, and even the age-

sex distribution of population become relevant as possible determinants of the

size of the market for such services.

In an ever-changing world the definition of smallness may also have

to change, particularly in response to technological change. For instance,

the "optimum" size of a plant for producing ammonia (an input in the

manufacture of nitrogenous fertilizers) increased with the development of high

pressure compressors.

Given the vagueness of the concept and the arbitrariness inevitably

involved in choosing an index of size and a cut-off point with respect to this

index, the literature on "small" economies appears to have settled on a

country's population as the primary measure of size, with total GNP as a

secondary measure, rather than attempting to develop anything more

sophisticated. The population cut-off point in defining smallness has been

set anywhere between 1.5 million to 5 million. Ir cross-country regression

analysis of development processes Chenery and Syrquin 1/ use population as a

measure of size or scale of an economy, and countries with less than 5 million

population are classified by them as small.

1/ Chenery and Syrquin (1975).

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Denoting a country with a population of less than 1.5 million persons

as very small and that with a population between 1.5 million and 5 million

persons as small, the data from the 1983 and 1985 World Bank Atlas for 189

countries and their dependent territories indicate (see Tables 1 - 3 for

details) that:

-- 42 independent countries and 25 dependent territories are very small

and 33 independent countries are small. One could characterize the

42 very small countries as mini-states.

-- 38 countries and 24 dependent territories are islands, of which 24

countries and 22 dependent territories are very small and 4 countries

and 2 dependent territories are small.

-- 26 countries are landlocked, of which 5 are very small and 6 are

small. The remaining 15 landlocked countries have populations

greater than 5 million.

Available GNP figures show that:

-- Of the 67 very small economies 4 can be classified as low-income with

per capita income below $410 but 21 can be classified as upper-

middle-income with per capita GNP exceeding $1,670.

-- For the 33 small economies 6 are considered low-income while 7 are

upper-middle-income.

-- For those 46 economies which are both very small and islands, 3 are

low-income, 18 are upper-middle-income.

-- Of the 6 small island economies none are classified as low-income and

2 are upper-middle-income.

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Table 1: Number and Distribution of Countries a/Classified by Population Size (mid-1983)

Population Oceania North and All RegionsSize and Central South Independent Dependent

(millions) Africa Asia Europe Indonesia America b/ America Countries Territories Total

A. ALL ECONOMIES

Less than 1.5 15 (2) 8 (1) 9 (5) 16 (7) 16 (9) 3 (1) 42 25 671.5 - 5.0 11 8 4 2 6 2 33 - 33More than 5.0 27 22 (1) 22 2 8 8 88 1 89Total 53 38 35 20 30 13 163 26 189

B. ISLAND ECONOMIES

Less than 1.5 6 (1) 2 7 (4) 16 (9) 15 (8) - 24 22 461.5 - 5,0 - 1 1 2 (1) 2 (1) - 4 2 6More than 5 1 4 - 2 20 - 10 - 10

Total 7 7 8 20 - - 38 24 62

C. LANDLOCKED ECONOMIES

Less-than 1.5 3 1 1 - - - 5 - 5195 - 5.0 3 2 - - - 1 6 - 6More than 5 8 2 4 - - 1 15 - 15

Total 14 5 5 - - 2 26 - 26

a/ Figures in parentheses indicate number of dependent territories.

b/ Includes Caribbean nations.

Source: World Bank Atlas, 1985, World Bank, Washington, D.C.

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Table 2: Distribution of Countries by Population Si-e and Per Capita Income, 1982 a!

A. Very Small and Small Economies

Country OCEANIA & NORTH AND SOUTH ALL

Grouping b/ AFRICA, ASIA EUROPE INDONESIA CENTRAL AMERICA AMERICA REGIONS

VS S VS S VS S VS S VS S VS S VS S TOTAL

Low-income 4 6 - - 4 6 10

Lower-middle-income 4 3 - - - - 4 1 7 4 1 1 16 9 25

Upper-middle-income 3 - 1 4 2 - 5 - 8 2 2 1 21 7 28

High-incomeOil exporters - - 5 1 - - - - - - - - 5 2 7

Industrial - - - - 7 3 - 1 1 - - - 8 4 12

Data not available 4 1 2 3 - 1 7 - - - - - 13 5 18

TOTAL 15 11 8 8 9 4 16 2 16 6 3 2 67 33 100

B. Island Economies

Country OCEANIA & NORTH AND SOUTH ALL

Grouping b/ AFRICA ASIA EUROPE INDONESIA CENTRAL AMERICA AMERICA REGIONS TOTAL

VS S O VSS O VS S O VS S O VS S 0 VSS O VSS O

Low-income 3 -1 -- 1 -- - - - - - I - - = - 3 6

Lower-middle-income 1 - - - 1 - -- 9 1 1 5 1 1 - - - 15 2 3 20

Upper-middle-income 2 - - - 1 1 2 - - 5 - - 9 1 - - - - 18 2 1 21

High-incomeOil exporters - - -1 - - - 1

Industrial - - 1 5 1 - - 1 1 1 - - - - - 6 2 2 10

Data not available - - - 1 - - - - - 2 - - - - 1 - - - 3 - 1 4

TOTAL 6 - 1 2 1 4 7 1 - 16 2 2 15 2 3 - - - 46 6 10 62

C. Landlocked Economies

Country OCEANIA & NORTH AND SOUTH ALL

Grouping b/ AFRICA ASIA EUROPE INDONESIA CENTRAL AMERICA AMERICA REGIONS TOTAL

VS S O VS S O VSSO VS S O VS S 0 VS S O VSS O

Low-income - 3 6 - - 1 - - - - - 3 7 10

Lower-middle-income 3 - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 3 1 3 7

Upper-middle-income - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1 1High-income

oil exporters - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

industrial - - - - - 2 - - 2 1 - 2 3

Data not available - - - 1 2 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - 1 2 2 5

TOTAL 3 3 8 1 2 2 1-4 --- - - - -1 1 5 6 15 26

- a/ I.ncluding dependent territories,

Countries are divided by size according to population:

vs - very small: population less than 1.5 million

s - small: population between 1.5 and 5 million

o - other: population greater than 5 million

b/ income categories are compatible with 1984 WOR per capita classifications:

Low-inccme: S0 - $410Lower-middle-income: $410 - $1670

Upper-middle-income: 31670 - 56900

High-income oil exporters: $6240 - $21,340

Industrial countries: $4810 - $16,390

Source: World Bank Atlas, 1983, 1985, World Bank, Washington, D.C.

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Table 3: Growth of Real GNP Per Capita, 1970-1910 a!

Oceania North Total

and & Central South All

Africa Asia Europe Indonesia America America Regions

ALL ECONOMIES

Negative growth rate 17 2 1 4 8 2 34

Zero to +2% growth rate 14 6 5 5 7 4 41

Greater than +2% growth rate 17 20 22 4 13 7 83

Data not available 5 10 7 7 2 - 31

TOTAL 53 38 35 20 30 13 189

VERY SMALL ECONOMIES

Negative growth rate 3 1 1 4 6 1 16

Zero to +2% growth rate 1 2 - 2 2 1 8

Greater than +2% growth rate 8 4 7 3 7 1 30

Data not available 3 1 1 7 1 - 13

TOTAL 15 8 9 16 16 3 67

SMALL ECONOMIES

Negative growth rate 6 - - - 2 - 8

Zero i'o +2% growth rate 5 1 - 2 3 - 11

Greater than +2% growth rate - 4 3 - 1 2 10Data not available - 3 1 - - - 4

TOTAL 11 8 4 2 6 2 33

OTHER ECONOMIES

Negative growth rate 8 1 - - - 1 10

Zero to +2% growth rate 8 3 5 1 1 3 21

Greater than +2% growth rate 9 12 12 1 5 4 43Data not available 2 6 5 - 1 - 14

TOTAL 27 22 22 2 7 8 88

a! Including dependent territories.

Source: World Bank Atlas, 1983, World Bank, Washington, D.C.

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-- Of the 6 small landlocked economies only 3 are low-income, none of

the 5 very small landlocked economies fall into this category; there

are no very small or small landlocked economies which are upper-

middle-income.

The data on the average rate of growth of real GNP per capita during

1970-80 (available for 158 economies) shows that:

The economies of 34 countries had negative growth rates. Of these

34, 16 (of which 14 are islands) were very small and 8 (1 island, 2

landlocked) were small. Among the remaining 10 countries, 6 were

landlocked and 1 was an island.

On the other hand, 83 economies had growth rates of real GNP per

capita of greater than +2 per cent. Of these, 30 (of which 19 are

islands and 4 are landlocked) are very small and 10 (of which 2 are

islands) are small.

The United Nations characterizes 36 countries as least developed, of

which 12 are very small, and 9 are small and the remaining 15 have population

greater than 5 million. A total of 15 least developed countries (3 very

small, 4 small and 8 others) are landlocked, and 5 are very small islands.

The rest, 16, are neither landlocked nor islands. Thus, it would appear that

if low population size is a criterion of smallness, a significant number of

least developed countries are very small or small economies, and/or islands or

landlocked countries. And in 8 least developed countries per capita real GNP

had declined in the decade 1970-1980.

Presumably, the expected interrelationship between smallness, low-

income, poor growth performance and geographical isolation reinforced by

specific country cases is what prompted international agencies to focus

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-8-

attention on the least developed, island and landlocked countries. On the

other hand, the fact that many small economies (a third of them including

islands like Singapore and Trinidad and Tobago) are neither poor nor even in

some respects less developed, and many have experienced significant positive

growth in per capita income and several have grown very rapidly, cannot be

altogether ignored, particularly from the point of view of analyzing policies

that may retard or promote the growth of a small economy. Smallness obviously

is not a necessary nor sufficient condition for poor development performance.

II. Problems of Small Economies

Among the international organizations, UNCTAD has probably devoted

the most time and effort to the special problems believed to be characteristic

of small island and landlocked economies. The Development Committee in

1982 1/ "noted the problems of small island and landlocked states, and

recognized the urgent need to review mechanisms and adjustment prescriptions

appropriate to the particular circumstances of such states." At the same

time, the Ministers of the Group of 24 2/ also "urged that the international

community pay particular attention to small island and landlocked developing

states, having regard to their limited size, their openness, their

vulnerability to the vagaries of the international economic environment."

They agreed with the Development Committee to an urgent need for "immediate

action to review the mechanism and format of conditionality and the nature and

1/ Press Communique of the World Bank Development Committee, September 5,1982.

2/ Communique of the Group of 24, September 3, 1982.

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content of adjustment prescriptions requested by multilateral financing

institutions in small island and landlocked economies." 1/ In the context of

graduation criteria (as contrasted with adjustment processes), the perceived

problems of small economies have been raised in recent discussions at the

World Bank. 2/

There are two related questions that need to be answered in

addressing the concerns expressed above. The first is, of course, the

question of whether such economies do face special problems not faced by large

or non-island or non-landlocked developing economies, and thus call for

special attention. If there are indeed a number of such problems, a further

question arises as to whether they are already being addressed to a

considerable extent in the operational policies of multilateral financing

institutions and international agencies, and through bilateral aid programs.

Besides these two broad questions, there is also the issue of whether the

criteria actually used in implementing policies that are in principle fair to

all, nevertheless are biased against small island economies. For instance, it

has been said that the use of real per capita national income in constant US

dollars as a trigger in initiating a graduation exercise is subject to such a

bias because it is suggested that converting conventionally measured real

national income in domestic currency into US dollars through official exchange

1/ Communique of the Group of 24, September 3, 1982.

2/ See World Bank document EDS84-4, "Executive Directors' seminar -

February 21, 1984, Special Problems of Very Small Economies" . Inaddition, the economic difficulties faced by small island economies werethe subject of a paper prepared for members of the Executive Board of theIMF entitled: "Small Tropical Island Countries - an Overview", Dec. 19,1983, EBD/83/325.

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rates will overstate the "true" income of small economies relative to large

economies.

The special problems most often said to be faced by such economies

can be grouped into the following categories:

(A) Problems related to economies of scale and of agglomeration.

(B) Problems of vulnerability, including susceptibility of these

economies to external economic shocks because of their degree of

openness and dependence on a few commodities or services for foreign

exchange earnings, and to non-economic shocks such as natural

disasters (cyclones, hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions) and

man-made shocks (epidemics, ecological degradation, denmographic

changes, etc.).

(C) Problems, of landlocked countries and islands remote from the nearest

natural market of any reasonable size, that arise from scale

economies and technological changes in transportation.

(D) Problems of access to markets for exports and in particular to

external capital markets. It can be argued, however, that these

problems are in fact a reflection of the above points (1) and (3).

(E) Problems of limited policy independence, particularly in respect of

macro-economic policies relating to exchange rates, monetary policy,

etc.

(F) Problems of real income comparisons.

A. Economies of Scale

The exploitation of economies of scale in the manufacture of goods

traded in international markets need not, of course, be constrained by the

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limitations imposed by the small size of the domestic market. However, to the

extent remoteness i.tcreases the cost of transportation to the world markets,

the returns from manufacture for exports are reduced relative to more

favorably located competitors. On the other hand, the same factor provides

greater natural protection for import-substituting manufacture. Be that as it

may, even if there are no constraints on size of the market for a product

because of possibilities for export, to the extent the penetration into

foreign markets depends on the experience gained in producing and selling in

the domestic market, smallness of the latter may preclude export

development. Since market size for this purpose is not measured just by the

size of a country's population, and is not directly related to its status as

an island or its being landlocked, a similar problem arises in any country

(small or large) with a limited domestic market. The significance of this

problem is, in the final analysis, an empirical matter. The analysis of

Chenery and Syrquin (1975) suggests that there are substantial differences

even among small countries in their sources and patterns of

industrializations, with some successfully industrialized small countries

having a composition of exports similar to that of large countries even though

they depend on trade to a greater extent. In primary-product-oriented small

countries, on the other hand, they found that industrialization takes place

later and is due to import-substitution and perhaps to inapprop7iate policies

as well. l/

1/ In the study of the "Growth Experience of Small Economies", Metzler andHughes found that there was no "significant correlation (positive ornegative) of scale with growth for small and large countries", see Jalan(ed.) (1982), p,91.

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It has been suggested that indivisibilities and consequent economies

of scale in the production of internationally non-traded goods and services

(particularly those relating to infrastructure) have the effect of raising

unit cost, both of capacity creation and of production in small economies.

For instance, it has been estimated that small countries experience an average

of 65 percent cost disadvantage in creating additional thermal capacity for

power generation. However, for small countries with high population density

(such as Barbados) this disadvantage is only 20 percent. 1/ To the extent

many of the non-traded goods or services are intermediate inputs in other

activities (including, in particular, foreign exchange earning activities)

international competitiveness of small economies may be affected. The

significance of this factor depends, in part, on the share of capital costs

(which are affected by economies of scale) in the unit cost of production of

infrastructure, and on the share of infrastructural costs in the cost of

production of other goods and services. Obviously, the smaller are these

shares, the more limited is the disadvantage of small economies on this

count. Besides, some of the infrastructural activities such as electric power

generation, education, communications and health facilities can be shared by

neighboring countries if they are not separated by cost-raising natural or

man-made barriers -- in other words, even some infrastructural services could

be internationally traded. Of course, island economies that are remote from

the nearest continental landmass do not have this option.

1/ Legarda (1983).

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It is also suggested that indivisibilities in political and

administrative structures raise costs for small economies (e.g., a very small

and a very large country will each have one President or Prime Minister, the

number of ministers and government departments needed to take care of economic

development is not proportional to a country's size). On the other hand, it

has been argued that there are social and political advantages associated with

smallness, e.g., social and political cohesion, and fewer vested interests. 1/

In the extreme, one could envision a very small economy facing a

choice between the cost of running their own government infrastructure or

becoming part of a larger community. However, as F. Doumenge points out,

small islands may deliberately choose to retain their separate status rather

than form a larger political unit by joining with other islands for the reason

that "islanders are never happier with insularity than when asserting that

they are completely different from their neighbors, particularly in regard to

language, customs and laws, legal and administrative regulations, currency,

system of government and all other symbols which demonstrate the small self-

contained universe. Consequently, small islands tend to band together only

under the influence of external forces...." 2/

B. Vulnerability

Since many of the small island countries are located in the so-called

loring of fire", they are susceptible to volcanic eruptions and earthquakes.

Some of them are also in the tropical latitudes in which cyclonic storms and

1/ Metzler and Hughes in Jalan (ed.) (1982), pp. 85-86.

2/ Doumenge (1983).

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hurricanes develop. Since any country (large or small) located in these areas

is subject to such natural disasters, the particular vulnerability of small

(island) economies is attributed to the disproportionate effect which natural

disasters could have on them. For instance, a strong earthquake could destroy

a large proportion of the housing stock and public buildings on a small

island. Similarly, an epidemic could affect a large proportion of its

population, although their possible remoteness from the nearest continental

population centers provide significant protection from the occurrence of such

an epidemic. Some islands representing the tip of volcanoes may not be

suitable for agriculture but the sea itself is a resource for them, though its

exploitation may require resources that a small economy may be unable to

provide itself.

The presumption that such vulnerability imposes relatively higher

costs on small economies also arises from the fact that the "self-insurance"

available to large economies is not feasible for them. That is to say, a

large economy can absorb a local disaster by spreading its cost over the rest

of the economy unaffected by the disaster, while in a small economy there is

likely to be no sector unaffected by the disaster. On the other hand, even a

small economy may have opportunities for some self-insurance which can help

spread the effects of a disaster over other periods. For example, a buffer

stock of food built during good crop years can help cushion the impact of a

severe drought which reduces crop yields drastically. More generally, in an

open economy buffer stocks of generalized purchasing power in terms of foreign

exchange reserves accumulated over normal years can help augment, more

economically, domestic production shortfalls due to a natural disaster through

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imports. In the absence of o¢:her cheaper ways of insurance, the return to

such stocking activity can be high. Of course, disruptions in the provision

of non-traded and non-storable (e.g., electric power) goods due to a disaster

cannot be made good by imports and stock depletion. However, such disruptions

are likely to be of relatively short duration. At the same time, the

international community has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to provide

disaster assistance.

While the potential exists for a small country to insure itself

against major losses, and in fact all countries need to undertake some level

of insurance against unforeseen negative events, it is also argued that a

small and poor economy cannot afford to tie up a volume of resources in buffer

stocks of commodities and foreign exchange or purchase insurance sufficient to

adequately cover these risks. These forms of insurance do represent a cost to

the economy. If the probability of a disaster occurring is high, the

corresponding insurance costs will also be high. The net result is that these

countries, if they are in fact more vulnerable, are more likely to have to

devote more of their available resources to insurance than other countries.

Small economies allegedly suffer increased economic vulnerability

because, being necessarily more open than large economies, they are more

affected by shocks originating elsewhere in the world. Further, being small

and hence specialized in a few exports while widely dispersed in the

composition of imports, any external shock that affects the market only for

their exports has a disproportionate effect on their economies. Also, a small

economy in the sense of not having or not perceiving to have any influence on

its own terms of trade does not have the option of adjusting to external

demand shocks by varying its optimal export tax. It is of course, true that

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external shocks are transmitted to the domestic economy to a greater extent,

the more open an economy happens to be. Also, small economies with relatively

few and less serious distortions in their foreign trade can and do exploit

their comparative advantage to a much greater extent than large economies. In

any case, if one takes into account gains from trade and the relative severity

of shocks originating at home compared to those originating abroad, it is by

no means always the case that, on balance, small economies have been pushed

(because of their smallness) to a degree of openness that is not optimal

compared to their larger cousins. Further, not all small countries are

affected to the same extent by external shocks, partly because of the

variations in the composition and size of their export basket. Sonme had more

stable export earnings in the period 1967-81 than other not so small but

comparable countries.

It is but natural that given a narrow resource base, an economy may

specialize in the production of a few commodities and services, although some

otherwise small economies (Singapore or Hong Kong, for example) apparently

have resources, mainly entrepreneurship and skilled labor, that appear to have

enabled them to have a diversified production structure. There are some

otherwise large economies which have at least as high a commodity

concentration, in their exports if not in their total production. Thus, being

small and having a high commodity concentration are not synonymous. In any

case, the really important point is that a high commodity concentration,

either in export earnings or in domestic production (and in domestic value

added), need not imply that the changing fortunes of exports or of domestic

production are mirrored in foreign exchange expenditure on imports or in

aggregate domestic expenditure. To the extent that an economy invests in an

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17

appropriately diversified portfolic of domestic assets (inclusive of

inventories) and foreign assets (particularly reserves) expenditures can be

more stable than earnings and incomes.

Again the issue is whether the probability of major fluctuations

constitute a substantial cost for many of the small and low-income countries

which exceeds that imposed on other countries. Furthermore, portfolio choice

and management are generally not inexpensive in terms of skills, information

needs, access to swift communication channels, etc. And fixed costs involved

in setting up the needed institutions may make it prohibitively expensive for

"small" economies. One could envision that several "small" countries could

share in the costs of setting up and operating such an institution, However,

there are numerous political and operational problems to such arrangement

which make this an unlikely and unrealistic option for most countries.

Apart from diversification of its financial asset portfolio, an

economy may have the option of diversifying its portfolio of human capi:al,

i.e., have some of its workers emigrate and remit part of their earnings

abroad to their families at home. A number of island economies appear to have

a significant proportion of their labor force working abroad.

Appropriate choice and management of the asset portfolio, coupled

with the use of international facilities (e.g., the IMF compensatory

financing, food facility, STABEX) available to finance temporary (and

reversible) shocks and to ease the cost of adjustment to permanent shifts, can

reduce the unfavorable effects of external shocks. Given these facilities and

small countries' access to them, it is unclear as to ;hether any additional

facilities aimed specifically at helping these countries are needed.

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C. Remoteness and Other Factors Affecting Transport Costs

It has been argued that the location of many island countries far

away from the nearest major port places them at a considerable disadvantage in

spite of the relative cost advantage of sea transport over land transport. It

is also claimed that technological change in air and sea transportation in the

form of the long-haul wide-bodied passenger jets and containerized cargo

traffic has resulted in economies of cargo size and, as such, some island

ports handling limited amounts of cargo are left out of trunk routes

altogether or have become less frequent scheduled ports of call. And

alternative arrangements for connecting these islands to the nearest major

port on a trunk route could increase transportation costs. In the case of

landlocked economies, besides their having to bear relatively higher costs of

land transportation, dependence on their neighbors' transportation network for

their access to the sea places them in a disadvantageous position because: the

design of the network and its operation need not necessarily be based on their

requirements; and it has been argued, the transit countries have at times

utilized their monopolistic control over land transportation to charge

additional "rents" on transshipments.

The small size in combination with remoteness is also likely to lead

to stronger tendencies for market imperfections and monopolistic situations in

the country itself. This results from the fact that, ceteris paribus, the

smaller the market and the higher the transportation costs, the greater the

danger that competition will not be effectively felt by individual producers

(domestic and foreign) in the small country, thus permitting the producer to

capture and exploit a monopolistic position in specific markets. Given this

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danger, small and remote economies need to be vigilant of this potential and

take steps to reduce or prevent its occurrence.

It is undoubtedly true that the high costs of transport can reduce

their foreicga trade just as tariff barriers can. One can even show how, in a

simple Ricardian model, the introduction of sufficiently high transport costs

will eliminate trade altogether. As a consequence, compared to an otherwise

identical economy, an unfavorably located island economy will have lower real

income. Of course, the cost of its remoteness can be taken into account by

appropriately computing real income comparisons (section 6 below discusses

these comparisons in some detail) when per capita incomes are being used as a

decision criteria, e.g., aid allocation, graduation. Focussing on high

transport costs per se, however, ignores the extent to which economies have

adapted to these costs by the choice of its export products; a classic example

is Switzerland, which produced and exported high value but low weight per unit

value products such as watches and instruments.

There is yet another sense in which remoteness is sometimes used. It

is argued that many small economies (in particular, dependent territories) are

at the remote periphery of the centers of power at which decisions affecting

them are made. To the extent such remoteness means less interference from the

center, it could have positive effects. In any case, remoteness in this sense

is not unique to small island territories -- areas within a large economy

could be remote from the center of decision-making.

D. Access to Capital Markets

One of the disadvantages from which small economies are said to

suffer is their alleged limited access to private external capital. The

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limited evidence sometimes offered on the basis of observed flows of private

capital is hard to interpret. Such flows are influenced by the general

policies towards external capital, and a country's policies perceived to be

unfavorable by the market can result in limiting capital flows to that country

regardless of its size. And the policy stance of a country may affect the

perception of foreigners of the political risk associated with lending or

investing in that country. It would appear that some small economies have

succeeded not only in borrowing abroad in private capital markets but also in

attracting private foreign investment, particularly by multinationals. A few

island countries have attracted off-shore banking and tax sheltering

investments. However, this is perhaps more a consequence of the banking

regulation and tax codes of rich and large countries than of comparative

advantage of small islandsl In any case, whether or not small economies are

disadvantageously placed with respect to access to private capital markets,

they seem to receive much higher levels of official development assistance on

a per capita basis than do many large economies, as is evident from the data

presented in Table 4. 1/ In almost every region, very small and small

countries received much higher net official transfers per capita and a larger

share in terms of IDA loans than large countries.

1/ An analysis of this small country bias 4n aid allocations is contained inIsenman (1976).

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Table 4: Per Capita Net Resource Flows in 1982 (US$) '-;2/--

Official PrivateTotal IDA Total Financial Markets

AFRICA, SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

Very Small Countries

Botswana 22.7 -0.1 2.5 2.3

Cape Verde 80,0 0ob 0.0 0.0Comoros 39.4 5,*, 1.6 1.6

Djibouti 59.1 0.0 10.6 -1.5Gabon 0.3 0.0 -146.0 -185.6

Gambia 36.5 6.2 0.4 -2.2

Guinea-Bissau 26.9 3.4 .5 .8

Lesotho 31t4 5.9 -1.1 -1.1

Mauritius 28.8 .1 20.4 21.6

Seychelles 89.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Swaziland 48.5 0.5 -6.0 6.0

Average: Very Small

Countries 42.1 1.9 -10.6 -14.4

Small Countries

Benin 12.6 2.9 7.2 4.3

Burundi 11.1 4.2 0.2 0.4

Cent. Africa Rep. 7.8 0.8 0.1 0.0

Chad 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Congo 54.5 4.8 145.2 109.0

Liberia 22.8 3.7 -2.7 -2.0

Mauritania 113.9 3.3 10.5 7.1

Sierra Leone 4.5 1.8 -6.8 -1.7

Somalia 17.7 3.7 7.6 7.6

Togo 14.9 3.9 -0.7 -0.7

Average: Small Countries 26.0 2.9 16.1 12.4

Other Countries

Burkina Faso 8.0 1.6 2.0 1.7

Cameroon 9.6 3.4 -5.5 -5.3

Ethiopia 2.4 0.8 0.3 -0.1Ghana 4.9 1.2 -.2 0.0

Guinea 3.7 2.0 2,0 0.7

Ivory Coast 31.2 0,0 20.0 23,3Kenya 15.1 4.7 -6.6 -4,0

Madagascar 17.4 3.6 5.2 4.0

Malawi 8.8 4.0 -2.7 -1.7

Mali 17.4 2.0 0.2 0.2

Niger 6.9 2.1 1.6 2.4

Nigeria 2.0 0.0 11.8 11.8

Rwanda 4.5 2.0 0.0 0.0Senegal 27.7 3.4 1.2 2.7

Sudan 20.0 4.2 -2.6 -2.6

Tanzania 9.8 3.9 0,0 -0.1Uganda 5.0 2.8 -1,0 -0.3

Zaire 4.0 1.2 0.4 0.0

Zambia 25.6 1.2 10.0 6.3

Zimbabwe 16.7 0.0 45.5 42.0

Average: Other Countries 12.0 2.2 4.1 4.1

Average: All Countries 23.5 2.3 3.1 -0.7

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- 22

Table 4: Per Capita Net Resource Flows in 1982 (US$) (continued)

Official PrivateTotal IDA Total Financial Markets

NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EASTVer ~Sm all1

Oman 2.7 0.0 138.7 143.8

Small Countries

Jordan 86.6 1.2 -9.1 -8.7Yemen, PDR 67.4 9.0 0.0 0.0

Average: Small Countries 77.0 5.1 -4.6 -4.4

Other

Algeria 21.5 0.0 -26.1 -16.8Egypt 13.2 0.0 4.2 -1.8Lebanon 1.0 0.0 -12.3 -12.3Morocco 31.9 0.0 37.1 34.5Syria 16.5 0.2 -2.9 -.9Tunisia 39.0 0.0 -16.3 -18.2Yeman, AR 29.0 2.3 0.1 0.2

Average: Other Countries 21.7 0.4 -2.3 -2.2Average: All Countries 30.9 le3 11.3 12.0

MORE DEVELOPED MEDITERRANEAN

Very Small

Cyprus 79.0 0.0 132.6 129.7

Small

Israel 215.5 0.0 30.4 32.5

Other

Greece 44.9 0.0 67.4 68.2Malta 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0Portugal 51.1 0.0 166.6 165.5Turkey 20.2 -0.1 1.4 0.6Yugoslavia 7.6 0.0 12.1 12.4Hungary 5.8 0.0 15.2 0.0

Average: Other Countries 21.9 0.0 43.8 41.0Average: All Countries 53.2 0.0 53.2 51.1

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Table 4: Per Capita Net Resource Flows in 1982 (US$) (conL.nued)

Official PrivateTotal IDA Total Financial Markets

SOUTH ASIA

Very SmallCountries

Maldives 57.7 0.6 -2.5 -1.2

Other

Bangladesh 6.3 2.0 0.1 0.2Burma 8.1 1.4 1.4 0.9India 1.8 1.5 0.7 0.7Nepal 4.4 2.2 0.0 0.0Pakistan 7.2 1.6 -0.6 -0.5Sri Lanka 11.1 3e5 7.7 6.0

Average: Other Countries 5.5 2.0 1.6 1.3Average: All Countries 13.8 1.8 1.0 0.9

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFICVery Small Countries

Fiji 71.7 0.0 -1.8 0.0Singapore -11.4 0.0 70.4 62.7Solomon Is. 18.0 0.4 0.0 0.0Vanuatu 13.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Western Samoa 40.3 7.0 -6.3 -6.3

Average: VerySmall Countries 26.3 1.5 12.5 11.3

Small Countries

Papua New Guinea 11.2 2.8 33.4 33.6

Other

Hong Kong 1.1 0.0 -2.4 -2.2Indonesia 8.8 0.5 11.6 9.0Korea 27.0 0.0 27.8 37.2Malaysia 13.6 0.0 16.8 165.1Philippines 0.9 0.2 18.8 18.1Thailand 14.7 0.4 8.2 6.3

Average: Other Countries 11.0 0.2 13.5 38.9Average: All Countries 16.1 1.3 9.7 17.4

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Table 4: Per Capita Net Resource Flows in 1982 (US$) (continued)

Official PrivateTotal IDA Total Financial Markets

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Very Small Countries

Bahamas 17.0 0.0 170.6 153.7Barbados ^ 85.7 0.0 165.3 165.3Belize 14.0 0.0 16.7 22.7Guyana 68.5 0.4 -8.5 2.4Trinidad & Tobago -2.7 000 4.0 4.0

Average: Very SmallCountries 36.5 0.1 70.0 69.6

Small Countries

Costa Rica 53.2 0.0 2.5 0.9Honduras 35.2 0.7 3.0 5.1Jamaica 81.2 0.0 -17.3 -9.6Nicaragua 52.4 0.7 -6.0 -6.1Panama 55.6 0.0 178.1 178.1Paraguay 32.0 0.0 44.1 47.4Uruguay 17.3 0.0 153.4 152.7

Average: Small Countries 46.7 0.2 51.1 52.6

Other

Argentina 4.4 0.0 43.1 8.6Bolivia 13.7 1.9 -2.1 -2.5Brazil 5.0 0.0 25.8 26.7Chile -8.2 -0.1 79.0 83.8Colombia 13.9 0.0 26.7 23.5Dominican Rep. 54.0 0.0 -9.8 -9.6Ecuador -16.3 0.0 -17.1 -16.4El Salvador 25.3 -0.1 0.6 0.6Guatemala 34.7 0.0 5.6 5.6Haiti 9.3 2.7 0.2 -0X1Mexico 24.4 0.0 86.2 86.5Peru 19.4 0.0 34.0 26.1Venezuela 3.3 0.0 23.2 23.9

Average: Other Countries 14.1 0.3 22.7 19.7Average: All Countries 27.7 0.2 40.0 38.9

Sources: World Debt Tables, 1983-84 Edition, World Bank, Washington, D.C.,and World Tables, Third Edition, Volume 1: Economic Data,World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1983.

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E. Macro-economic Policy Independence

It is argued that small economies have very little choice except to

be open; they have very little room for independent exchange rate and monetary

policies; and the range of activities that can be taxed and on which public

expenditures can be made are apt to be limited as well, thus restricting the

scope of fiscal policies. It is clear that autarkic policies are likely to be

costlier for a small economy than for a large economy, and hence small

economies are likely to be more open purely from self-interest. As a

consequence, such an economy has to retain its competitive edge in

international markets, which in turn means that it cannot distort its foreign

trade sector unduly nor for long through disequilibrium exchange rates,

tariffs and/or quotas. Even though, in principle, it can operate a market for

foreign exchange and adopt a floating exchange rate regime, in practice it is

more likely that a regime maintaining fixed parity with a single currency or a

basket of currencies is likely to be adopted. Since the exchange rate of

currencies within the baskets are likely to fluctuate relative to each other

and to others outside the basket, such fluctuations will be transmitted to the

exchange rates of a currency that maintain a fixed par value to the basket.

Ever since the early seventies' shift away from the Bretton Woods

fixed parity system for the major international currencies and particularly

since the progressive integration of international private capital markets,

even large developed countries have found that the scope of independent (i.e.,

internationally uncoordinated) macroeconomic policies is limited. In any

case, the argument about lack of macro-economic policy independence boils dowm

to the assertion that small open economies have greater difficulties in

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successfully employing macro-economic policies to stabilize domestic incomes

or prices in the face of external shocks. It is easy to see that if domestic

income generation is largely through a few export activities and the domestic

consumption basket consists mostly of imported commodities and consumer prices

influence wage rates, etc., external shocks in terms of changes in export and

import prices affect domestic incomes and prices to a greater extent in a

small open economy than in a more diversified and less open large economy.

But the real issue is whether and to what extent a small country should seek

to stabilize income generated and/or prices given the costs which the pursuit

of such an objective could impose on a small economy and the practical limits

the countries face in the development and maintenance of a diversified

portfolio of domestic production and foreign exchange reserves.

In chis context, it has been suggested that policy prescriptions

relating to adjustment to external shocks have to be different in the case of

small island developing economies. Often this suggestion is based on the

belief that in a large, mo-a diversified and less open economy, the effect of

shocks will be relatively less severe and the cost of adjustment could be

spread to a greater extent within the economy, yet little evidence that this

is the case has been presented. Furthermore, the dictum to "finance shocks of

a temporary duration and reversible in direction" and "adjust to permanent

shifts" applies equally to large and small economies. And the problem of

determining whether an observed shock falls into the 'temporary"f or

"permanent" category is no easier in the case of large economies!

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F. Real Income Comparisons

It was argued in section 3 that the transport cost disadvantages of a

remote' economy will be reflected in its real income, properly computed.

Consider, for simplicity, two otherwise identical economies which face the

same prices in world markets, one of which is located sufficiently close to

these markets that the transport costs of taking its exports to and bringing

its imports from these markets can be neglected, while the second is located

so far that transport costs preclude its participation in world trade. Assume

further that there are no distortions in either economy. Clearly, if the

income (i.e., value added) in each of these economies is computed by valuing

its net output at the common set of world prices, then the second, which is

forced into autarky because of high transportation costs, will have a lower

income than the first. The reason being that the first (the second) will have

an output composition that approximates the maximum income that can be

achieved at world prices (domestic prices) and the two sets of prices differ

because of transport costs. Even though in the above argument it is implicit

that both countries produce only internationally traded commodities, it can be

shown to be valid even when non-traded goods are admitted into the analysis as

long as they are valued at prices that equal the value of the inputs used in

their production, the input prices being those prevailing in the first

economy.

In practice, real incomes in units of a common currency such as the

US dollar are often computed by dividing the real income in national currency

unit by the official exchange rate (the national currency price) of the US

dollar. A number of arguments have been made suggesting that such a procedure

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may be biased in some sense or the other against small economies, apart from

the general (i.e., not specific to small economies) problem that per capita

real national income is not necessarily a good index of the welfare of a

country's population or that of its level of economic, social and

institutional development. Since this problem is well understood and other

indices of social and institutional developments are often-used in conjunction

with per capita real income, no further discussion of it is offered here.

It is argued that in many small and poor countries there is a rich

expatriate community which may be sufficiently large to pull the per capita

income of the residents much above that of resident citizens. However, if

valid, this is easily addressed: given an adequate data base, per capita

incomes of resident citizens, or for that matter the per capita income of any

other sub-group of residents, can be computed.

An apparently more serious argument is that conversion at the

official exchange rate understates the transport or other cost disadvantages

of small island economies. One could interpret this as asserting that an

exchange rate that better reflects these costs will be higher than the

official one. The results from the International Comparisons Project funded

in part by the World Bank seem to contradict this assertion (see Table 5):

the exchange rate derivation index, i.e. the ratio of official exchange rate

to the purchasing-power corrected exchange rate is greater than one for all

the developing countries included in the project. In other words, allowing

for the differing relative purchasing power of currencies, applying a common

set of prices representative of the world price structure to the quantities of

the commodities and services entering into each country's final expenditure or

GDP raises the per capita income of each developing country above the level

Page 34: Landlocked 2

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Table 5: Per Capita Gross Domestic Product in US Dollars at Official

Exchange Rates, and in International Dollars, 1975

Per Capita GDP

In international Exchange-rate

Country In US dollars a/ dollars deviation index

(1) (2) (2)/(1)

AfricaKenya (shillings) 241 470 1.95

Malawi (kwacha) 138 352 2.55

Zambia (kwacha) 495 738 1.49

Asia

India c/ (rupees) 146 470 3.23

Iran d/ (rials) 1,587 2,705 1.70Japan (yen) 4,474 4,907 1.10

Korea (won) 583 1,484 2.54Malaysia (ringgit) 780 1,541 1.98

Pakistan (rupees) 189 590 3.12Philippines (pesos) 376 946 2.51

Sri Lanka (rupees) 183 668 3.65Syria (pounds) 718 1,794 2.50Thailand (baht) 359 936 2,61

Europe

Austria (schillings) 5,010 4,995 1.00

Belgium (francs) 6,298 5,574 0.88Denmark (kroner) 7,498 5,911 0.79France (francs) 6,428 5,877 0.91

Germany (DM) 6,797 5,953 0.88Hungary (forint) 2,125 3,559 1.68Ireland (pounds) 2,673 3,049 1.14Italy (lire) 3,440 3,861 1.12Luxembourg (francs) 6,472 5,883 0.91Netherlands (guilders) 6,061 5,397 0.89Poland (zlote) 2,586 3,598 1.39Romania (lei) 1,742 2,387 1.37Spain (pesetas) 2,946 4,010 1.36

U.K. (pounds) 4,134 4,588 1.11Yugoslavia (dinars) 1,664 2,591 1.56

Latin America and Caribbean

Brazil (cruzeiros) 1,149 1,811 1.58

Colombia (pesos) 568 1,609 2.83Jamaica (dollars) 1,406 1,723 1.23Mexico (pesos) 1,465 2,487 1.70

Uruguay (N. pesos) 1,308 2,844 2.17

North America

US (dollars) 7,176 7,176 1.00

Converted at the official exchange rate.b/ The 1975 international dollar has the same purchasing power as a 1975 US dollar.

cJ Reference year beginning April 1.

d/ Reference year beginning March 21.

Source: Kravis, l.B., A. Heston and R. Summers, World Product and Income: International Comparisons of

Real Gross Product, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1982, Table 1.2.

Page 35: Landlocked 2

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obtained by using official exchange rates. On the other hand, an alternative

interpretation could be that even though the use of official exchange rates

instead of the purchasing-power corrected one for conversion understates the

"true" income of all developing countries, it understates it less in the case

of small island economies so that they appear richer relative to other

developing countries than they truly are. If this is valid, the use of

purchasing-power corrected exchange rates may make more small economies

eligible for various concessions than the use of official exchange rates would

suggest. However, there is no evidence that this argument is indeed valid.

In any case, even if data were available (which they are not) for the

computation of purchasing-power corrected exchange rates for small island

economies, a selective use of such rates for small island economies is

obviously out of the question before making that move more locally.

III. Conclusions

It would appear that many (though not all) of the alleged problems of

small economies are either not peculiar to small economies or can be addressed

through suitable policy measures. It is also the case that the transport cost

disadvantage that a small economy suffers because of its location will already

be reflected in its real income. As long as operational decisions about a

country such as its graduation and its eligibility for various forms of

concessions, etc., continue to be-based on flexible applications of a number

of indices and criteria and not rigidly on a single index such as that

country's per capita real income in US dollars at that official exchange rate,

there is little danger that small island or landlocked economies would be

unfairly treated. However, this is not to suggest that all is well with small

Page 36: Landlocked 2

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island or landlocked economies (which clearly they are not, as evidenced by

the decline in per capita real GNP in several of them during the 1970s), nor

to argue that the external environment for developing countries is currently

buoyant. What is being suggested is that causes of economic and social

stagnation in some of these economies cannot be attributed to their smallness

or similar exogenous characteristics nor to the failure or non-existence of

international institutional mechanisms to address their development problems.

Page 37: Landlocked 2

References

1) Chenery, H.B. and M. Syrquin, Patterns of Development 1950-1970, OxfordUniver3ity Press, London, 1975.

2) de Vries, B.A., "The Plight of Small Countries", Finance and Development,Washington, D.C., Volume 10, No.3, September 1973.

3) Dommen, E., "Invisible Exports From Islands", UNCTAD, Discussion PaperNo. 9, undated.

4) Doumenge, F., "Viability of Small Island States", UNCTAD, TD/B/950, July22, 1983.

5) Isenman, Paul, "Biases in and Allocations Against Poorer and LargerCountries", World Development, Volume 4, No. 8, 1976.

6) Jalan, B.M. (ed.), Problems and Policies in Small Economies, St.Martin's Press, New York, 1982.

7) Kuzne,ts, S., "Population Change and Aggregate Output", National Bureau ofEconomic Research, Demographic and Economic Change in DevelopedCountries, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1960.

8) Legarda, Benito, "Small Tropical Island Countries: An Overview", IMF,Washington, D.C., mimeo, December 6, 1983.

9) OECD, Development Cooperation, Paris, 1983.

10) Phelps, E., "Models of Technical Progress and the Golden Rule ofResearch", Review of Economic Studies, 1966.

11) Simon, J. and R. Gobin, "The Relationship Between Population and EconomicGrowth in LDCs", Research in Population Economics, 1980.

12) and G. Steinmann, "Population Growth and Phelps' Technical

Progress Model: Interpretation and Generalization", Research inPopulation Economics, 1981.

13) UNCTAD, "The Incidence of Natural Disasters in Island DevelopingCountries", UNCTAD, TD/B/961, 1983.

14) , "Specific Action Related to the Particular Needs and Problems ofIsland Developing Countries: Issues for Consideration", UNCTAD VI,Item 13C - Policy Paper, June 1983.

15) , "Islands in the Sun -- Have Problems Too", Bulletin No. 1983,

December 1983-January 1984.

16) , "The Least Developed Countries and Actions in Their Favour by the

International Community", A/CONF104/2/Revised, 1983.


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