RIHGT AGAINST IMPRISONMENT FOR NON PAYMENT OF DEBT

DEBT: LOZANO VS MARTINEZ FACTS:

The petitioners herein assails the constitutionality of BP 22 (Anti Bouncing Check Law). They insist that it is violative of the constitutional provision against imprisonment against nonpayment of debt. !

ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision against imprisonment for nonpayment of debt. !

HELD: Petitioners insist that since the offense under BP 22 is consummated only upon the dishonor of nonpayment of the check when it is presented to the drawee bank, the statue is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check law". What it punishes is the nonpayment of the check, not the act issuing it. !The graven of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the nonpayment upon its presentation for payment. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes. The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of the worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. !The law has been made as malum prohibitum in the exercise of police power. What the law punishes the effect of the offense in the community. !

DOUBLE JEOPARDY TWO KINDS:

SAME OFFENSE: PEREZ VS COURT OF APPEALS FACTS:

Petitioner herein was initially charged with consented abduction in the CFI of Pampanga. The accused pleased not guilty, but the trial on the merits ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered against Perez. !On appeal, the CA reversed and acquitted Perez of the crime of Consented Abduction. !Subsequent to petitioner’s acquittal, complainant Yolanda Mendoza filed another criminal complaint against Perez, but this time is for Qualified Seduction.

!Petitioner filed a motion to quash invoking double jeopardy. !

ISSUE: Whether or not subsequent filing of case in the form of qualified seduction after acquittal to consented seduction constitutes double jeopardy. !

HELD: No. In the case at bar, the issue posed by the petitioner relates to the identity of the two offenses of Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction. !It is true that the two offenses for which the petitioner was charged arose from the same facts. This. however does not preclude the filing of another information against him if from those facts two distinct elements, arose. !

A single act may be an offense against two statutes and if each statutes requires proof of an additional fact, which the other does not, and acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant f rom prosecution and conviction under the other. !The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law however closely they may appear to be connected in fact. !

The similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction.

1. That the offended part is a virgin 2. That she must be over twelve and under 18

years of age. !Consented Abduction requires that:

1. The taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender.

2. The taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs. !

Qualified Seduction requires that: 1. The crime ben committed by abuse of authority,

confidence or relationship. 2. The offender has sexual intercourse with the

woman. !LAMERA VS COURT OF APPEALS FACTS:

Petitioner while driving an owner type jeepney hit and bumped a tricycle with three passengers. Two information were filed against the petitioner. !

1. Reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property with multiple injuries under Article 365 of RPC and,

2. In violation of Paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the RPC on Abandonment of one's victim. !

The petitioner was found to be guilty of the crime of Abandonment of one's victim as defined and penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the RPC. !In the meantime, the petitioner was arraigned in criminal case as regards to the first information, which is reckless imprudence resulting to physical injuries. !During the appeal for the conviction for the second information charged, the court affirmed with modification consisted merely in the reduction of the penalty of imprisonment from 6 to 2 months, arresto mayor. !Upon arraignment for the first information, the petitioner contended that he should not be charged under Abandonment of one's victim since he was already prosecuted with violation of Article 365 of RPC. Hence, accident and reckless imprudence cannot arise in the same act. !

ISSUE: Whether or not prosecution of the first information (Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Physical Injuries) shall put a bar to the second information charged against the petitioner (Abandonment in one's victim) !

HELD: No. In the case at bar, the judgement of conviction in the former was rendered on June 29, 1987, while his arraignment in the latter took place only on April 1989. Among the conditions for double jeopardy to attach is that the accused must have been arraigned in the previous case. !In People Vs. Bocar: !

Legal jeopardy attaches only 1. upon a valid indictment, 2. before a competent court, 3. after arraignment, 4. a valid plea having been entered and 5. the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. !

Moreover he was charged for two SEPARATE OFFENSES under the RPC. !It is a cardinal rule that double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offense. A simple act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision required proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal under one does not bar prosecution under the other. !In the case at bar, the informations were for separate offense - the first against a person and the second against

public peace and order - one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy. !Wherefore, petition is denied. !

SAME ACT: PEOPLE VS RELOVA FACTS:

Respondent herein is the judge who rendered the decision dismissing the petition of the prosecutor to charge Manuel Opulencia in violation of Municipal ordinance S1 of 1974 for illegal installation of electric wire do reduce electric consumption for his factory - Opulencia Ice Plant. An information however was filed after almost 9 months. The responded herein then moved to quash the charges for grounds of prescription, that since the violation is classified as light felony, only two months is given for prescription. !The lower court granted the motion to quash. The prosecutor then, after the motion was granted, filed another charge against the respondent company owner, on ground of theft. That according to the prosecutor, illegal installation which is punishable under the municipal ordinance and theft of electricity punishable under the RPC are different. !

ISSEUE: Whether the dismissal of the first case can be properly pleaded by the accused in the motion to quash. !

HELD: The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of facts. !But the protection against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of facts. !The first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put to jeopardy provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charges is not included or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of the statues. If two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution under other. !

In the case at bar, the Supreme held that the theft of electric current contended by the prosecutor is indeed part of the offense charged under the municipal ordinance of Batangas, which is the illegal or unauthorized installation of electrical wiring because immediate physical effect of the installation is the inward flow of electric current into Opulencia’s ice plant. !The petition is dismissed. !

REQUISITES: IVLER VS MODESTO-SAN PEDRO

FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner herein, Jason Ivler was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig with two separate offenses: !

1. Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries !2. Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property !

Petitioner pleaded guilty for the first charge, but moved to quash the second charge invoking double jeopardy having been convicted for the previous offense. !MeTC however, refused quashal finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. !

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's conviction in the first offense charged, bars his prosecution in the second offense charged. !

HELD: Reckless imprudence is a Single Crime, its consequences on persons and property are material only to determine the penalty. !The two charges against the petitioner, arising from the same facts were prosecuted under the same provision of the RPC, as amended, namely Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi offenses. !The proposition (inferred from Art 3 of the RPC) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simple a way of committing it. !Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi offense. !The Court thru Justice JB Reyes: Reason and precedent both coincide in that ones convicted or acquitted to a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determined the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of an offense. !!

Tests to determine double jeopardy: !1. Whether or not the second offense charged necessarily

includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

2. Whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or whether the crime is an ingredient of the other. !

NAVALLO VS SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS:

Petitioner herein is the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia Naitonal Vocational School in del Carmen, Surigao del Norte. He was entrusted, as a Collecting and Disbursement Officer to hold in trust moneys and/ properties of the government of the Republic of the Philippines. That while being in the said position, he intentionally, feloniously and without lawful authority appropriate and misappropriate to his own private benefit, public funds he was holding in trust for the Government of the Philippines in the total amount to PHP16, 483.62. He as unable to account for the said amount during the audit. !Warrant of arrest was issued to arrest the petitioner but he was nowhere to be found. !On December 10, 1978, Sandiganbayan was created pursuant to PD No 1606, conferring to it original and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers embraced in Title VII of the RPC !November 1984, when the petitioner herein was finally arrested. He was released on provisional liberty upon the approval of the bail bond. When arraigned by the RTC, he pleaded not guilty. Upon motion of the prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan. Special Prosecutor Quiñones-Marcos however opined that since Navallo had already been arraigned before the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the case. That matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held otherwise. The information was however docketed in Sandiganbayan. A new order of arrest for the petitioner was issued by the Sandiganbayan. !Navallo filed a motion to quash contending that since he had already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy. !

ISSUE: Whether or not double jeopardy sets it when petitioner was arraigned by the RTC. !

HELD: NO. In the case at bench, the RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused which by then had already been conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed. !Petition is dismissed. !

PEOPLE VS JUDGE VILLARAMA FACTS:

The petitioner herein did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously have in his possession, custody and control 0/08 grams of Methampethamin Hydrochloride wrapped in aluminum foil, which is a regulated drug. !During the arraignment petitioner plead not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued, and the counsel for the petitioner on that time, was willing to change the plea of not guilty to guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17 RA No 6425, as amended. The trial judge of the lower court granted the plea of guilty to the lesser offense !The prosecutor however, filed Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense on the grounds: !

1. the prosecution already rested its case. 2. the possibility of conviction of private responded for the crime originally charged was high because of strong evidence of the prosecution. 3. the valuable time which the court and the prosecutor had expended would be put to waste. !

Hence this petition. !!ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent judge erred in convicting private respondent of the lesser offense of violation of section 17, RA No. 6425, as amended, instead of the offense originally charged of violation of Section 16 of the same law, in view of the absence of a valid change of plea. !

HELD: Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to the approval of the court. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge. !Section 2: Plea of guilty to a lesser offense - The accused, with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. !A conviction under the plea of guilty to a lesser offense, shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy. !The Supreme Court held that the rules allow such plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish guilt of the crime charged. !The counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private respondent's change of plea and his conviction to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No 4625, as amended is no longer open

to review otherwise his constitutional right against double jeopardy will be violated. !Such disposition has no basis. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the private respondent's change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private respondent cannot claim this privilege. !Section 7, Rule 117 is more applicable. !However the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily included the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances.. !1. ...., 2. ...., 3. The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and the offended party. !Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section 16 of RA No 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the offended party. !Wherefore, the petition is granted. !

PEOPLE VS BALICASAN FACTS:

Petitioner herein was charged with homicide in Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. !Upon being arraigned, the respondent entered a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted by counsel. At his de officio counsel's petition, however, he was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. Thereupon the accused testified to the effect that he stabbed the victim in self-defense since the latter was strangling him. And he further stated that after the incident he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. !Subsequently, on the basis of the above-mentioned testimony of the accused, the court rendered a decision acquitting the accused. !The prosecution appealed therefrom. !

ISSUE: Whether or not the People of the Philippines through the Solicitor General can appeal the decision acquitting the accused, and that this appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy. !

HELD: Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rule of Court provides that: !The People of the Philippines can not appeal if the defendant would be placed in double jeopardy. This is applicable even of the accused fails to file a brief and raise the question of double jeopardy. !It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy. In the present case, it is true that the accused had

first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently however, he testified in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore - as the court recognized in its decision - had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. !This was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal. There can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein. !Wherefore, judgment appealed from is set aside. !

PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN and VILLAPANDO FACTS:

Petitioner herein was elected as the Municipal Mayor of Palawan, while his relative Orlando Tiape lost the election as Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao. After then, the petitioner appointed Tiape as the Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan. !On February, 2000, Solomon Maagad and Renato Fernandez charged the petitioner herein for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code (Unlawful Appointment) before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. !During the arraignment, Villapando pleaded not guilty. Meanwhile the case against Tiape was dismissed after the prosecution proved his death. !After the prosecution rested its case, Villapando moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. !The lower court rendered a judgment acquitting Villapando for the crime charged on grounds that the legal qualifications pertains to education attainment. By granting the demurrer of evidence. !

ISSUE: Whether or not the granting of demurrer of evidence by the lower court amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. !

HELD: The Ruling that demurrer of evidence followed by the another prosecution equates to double jeopardy cannot be disturbed in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. !In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan's interpretation of the Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. We reiterate the doctrine, Ube lex non distinguit nec nos distenguere debemos. When the law does not distinguish, the court should not distinguish. !Hence, the Sandiganbayan did not grant Villapando a leave for demurrer of evidence but give him a 5 day time frame to which to

inform it in writing whether he will submit his demurrer to evidence for resolution without leave of court. !Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process is void, does not exist in legal contemplation. Thus, in the case at bar, it cannot be said that the demurrer of evidence and acquittal resulting therefrom, violates the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. !

DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING EVENT/ SUPERVENING FACT DOCTRINE

MELO VS PEOPLE FACTS:

Petitioner herein was charged with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different part of the body, requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same period of time. !During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty, but on the same day, during the night, the victim died from his wounds. Evidence of death of the victim was available to the prosecution and the information was amended. !Petitioner filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy, but was denied. Hence this petition. !

ISSUE: Whether or not the amended information constitutes double jeopardy. !

HELD: Rule 106, section 13, 2nd paragraph provides:

If it appears at any time before the judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give the bail for their appearance at the trial. !

“No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense”. It meant that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. !The protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense, the only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. “SAME OFFENSE” under the general rule, has always been construed to mean not only the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the two offenses are identical. !

There is identity between two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. This is called SAME-EVIDENCE-TEST. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS of the former as alleged in the information constitute the latter; vice versa. !This rule however does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. !Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which charges the character of the offense and, together with the fact existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense. !

PEOPLE VS BULING FACTS:

Respondent herein, was charged for less serious physical injuries to the victim, which would require medical attendance of 10-15 days and will incapacitate the victim from the performance of his customary labors for the game period of time. During the arraignment, the respondent pleaded guilty. !However, the injuries of the victim did not heal within the estimated time. The Provincial Fiscal filed a charge against the respondent for serious physical injuries. During the trial, he was found guilty and charged with higher sentence. !

ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of the respondent for less serious physical injuries is a bar to the second prosecution for serious physical injuries. !

HELD: In Melo Vs People, the Supreme Court held that: !

After the first prosecution and a new set of fact supervenes which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accuse cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. !

In the case at bar, the first examination done by the physician did not utilize x-ray, which in the second examination did. Having used X-ray during the first examination to the victim, it could have revealed that there was a fracture which caused the

delay of the healing, more than the estimated time frame of 10-15 days. This fault can be attributed to the incompetence of the physician who first examined the victim. !

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATIONS/ APPEALS

PEOPLE VS TRIA TIRONA FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the annulment of the decision rendered by Judge Tria-Tirona acquitting the accused, respondent herein from the crime charged. !Armed with two search warrants, members of the NBI searched the house of the respondent herein and found 498 grams of shabu. The respondent was charged with violation of RA 6425. !During the arraignment, the accused, respondent herein pleaded not guilty. After the trial on merits, public respondent, Judge Tria-Tirona acquitted the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt. !The Petitioner, People of the Philippines appealed the decision on ground of grave abuse of discretion by ignoring the material facts and evidence on record. !

ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal made by the People of the Philippines after the acquittal of the accused constitutes double jeopardy. !

HELD: The doctrine that double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial may apply only when the court finds that the "criminal trial was a sham" because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due process. !In People Vs Velasco:

That as mandated by the Constitution, statutes and jurisprudence, acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens in trial court level or before the Court of Appeals. In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari canon the had unless there is a finding of MISTRIAL. Only when there is finding of a sham trial scan the doctrine of double jeopardy be not invoked because the people, as represented by the prosecution, were denied due process. !

In the case at bar, the acquittal of the accused was based on merits of evidence and therefore is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy.The only exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a dining of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process. !Wherefore, petition is denied. !!!!

ALMARIO VS COURT OF APPEALS FACTS:

Petitioner herein is one of the accused in estafa thru falsification of public document, and estafa with respondent RCBC, as offended party in both cases. !The hearing to try the information filed against the petitioner herein was cancelled for different reasons, and was scheduled to different dates. !On September 1995, the private complainant failed to appear despite due notice. Hence the motion of petitioner's counsel to dismiss the case on the ground of speedy trial, responded court issued the following order: !The case was dismissed since the complainant was absent despite due notice. !However, upon the petition of the prosecutor and despite the opposition of the petitioner, respondent court, reconsidered the Order dated September 1995. !The court, citing Hipolito Vs CA, held that the right of the accused to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexations, capricious and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured or when without cause, or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to lapse without the party having his case tried. !In the case at bar, there has been no vexations, capricious and oppressive delays, or a long time is allowed to lapse without the party having his case tried which would constitute a violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial. !Since the lower court reconsidered the case for trial, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration to Court of Appeals which was denied. !Hence, this petition. !

ISSUE: Whether or not the reconsideration of the case by the Court of Appeals was a violation of the doctrine double jeopardy, as the criminal cases were initially dismissed for an alleged violation of petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy trial. !

HELD: Clearly double jeopardy attached only:

1. A valid indictment 2. Before a competent court 3. After arraignment 4. After a valid plea had been entered 5. When the defendant had been convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without express consent of the accused. !

Exceptions: 1. Insufficiency of evidence 2. Denial of right to speedy trial !

Double jeopardy may attach when the proceedings have been prolonged unreasonable, in violation of accused's right to speedy trial.

!After a closer analysis by this Court as regards to cancellations of cases/ trial of the accused, it found that there were only three instances which the case was reset. And the cause of the resettings were for valid grounds such as the postponement if the trial for lack o f proof of notice to the accused and their counsel, lack of proof of service of notice to co-accused, the judge suffered gout and arthritis. !The trial was delayed due to circumstances which are beyond the control of the parties and of the trial court. !Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals reconsidering the case was affirmed. !!

LEJANO VS PEOPLE FACTS:

Petitioner herein was one of the accused in the case of Vizconde Massacre. !On 2010, the Court of Appeals acquitted, among others, the petitioner herein on grounds of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. !Complainant Lauro Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims asked the court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it denied the prosecution due process of law, seriously misappreciated the facts, unreasonable regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility, issued a tainted and erroneous decision, decided the case in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice, or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution witness. !Hence this petition. !

ISSUE: Whether or not the reconsideration sought for by the complainant would constitute a violation of the right against double jeopardy. !

HELD: Yes. The acquittal of the petitioner herein, among others was due to the appreciation of the evidence presented. !Section 21 of Article 3 of the Bill of Rights provides: !No person shall be twice put to double jeopardy for the same offense. If an act is punishable under a law and an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal under wither shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. !To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is reason for tho provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelmed the accused in terms of resources stamina, and the will of fight. !

The Court held that reconsideration may be granted when he trial has been a sham or when there is denial of due process. In the case at bar, the complainant was not able to established that the trial conducted by the Court of Appeals in acquitting the petitioner on grounds of appreciation of evidence and or lack of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, was a sham. !Wherefore the petition is denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. !!

PROHIBITION AGAINST EX POST FACTO/ BILL OF ATTAINDER

KINDS OF EX POST FACTO LAW IN RE: KAY VILLEGAS KAMI

FACTS: This petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., claiming to be a duly recognized and existing non-stock and non-profit corporation created under the laws of the land, and praying for a determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's rights and duties thereunder. In paragraph 7 of its petition, petitioner avers that it has printed materials designed to propagate its ideology and program of government, which materials include Annex B; and that in paragraph 11 of said petition, petitioner intends to pursue its purposes by supporting delegates to the Constitutional Convention who will propagate its ideology. !Petitioner, in paragraph 7 of its petition, actually impugns because it quoted, only the first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the ground that it violates the due process clause, right of association, and freedom of expression and that it is an ex post facto law. !

ISSUE: Whether or not the section 8, paragraph 7 of RA No. 6132' is an ex post facto law. !!

HELD: The claim of petitioner that the challenged provision constitutes an ex post facto law is likewise untenable. !

An ex post facto law is one which:. !(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; !(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; !(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; !

(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; !(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and !(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. !

VALEROSA VS PEOPLE FACTS:

Armed with warrant of arrest and based on the probable reason to believe based on surveillance conducted in herein petitioners hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan and Bulacan, and when the petitioner is about to board a tricycle, he was then arrested and was charged in violation of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under PD 1866, as amended. !The lower court imposed a penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period or from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum and to pay the fine in the amount of Php 15, 000. !Upon motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision with modification of a period of 4 years and 2 months as minimum up to 6 years as maximum. !The petitioner herein was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under the first paragraph of Section 1 of PD No 1866, as amended. It provides that the penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition. !PD 1866 as amended,was the governing law at the time the petitioner committed the offense/ however RA No 8294 amended PD No 1866 during the pendency of the case with the trial court. !

Section 1: Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposit ion or possession of Firearms or ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition. - the penalty of PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Php 15, 000 shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfuly manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, suc as..

!!ISSUE:

Whether or not the amended PD 1866 imposing prisional correccional as punishment shall be imposed to the petitioner in the case at bar. !

HELD: Yes.As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post facto law. An EXCEPTION to this rule, however is when the law is advantageous of the accused. !A new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect. however penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect. These are the rule, the exception and exception to the exception on effectivity of laws. !

BILL OF ATTAINDER PEOPLE VS FERRER FACTS:

Co-respondents herein were charged in violation of RA 1700 or Anti Subversion Law by instigating, recruiting, inciting others to rise up and take arms against the Government with the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Philippines. !Respondents, who were charged in violations of RA 1700 (Anti Subversion Law) moved to quash the charged and alleged that the said law is Bill of Attainder. The Law punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member of the Party or of any other similar "subversive organization.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law in question or the RA 1700/ Anti Subversion Law is a bill of attainder. !

HELD: No.Article 3 Section 22 of the Constitution provides: No ex a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bill of attainders serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining the legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. !The singling our of a definite class, the imposition of burden on it, and a legislative intent to stigmatise statute as a bill of attainder. !1. The Supreme Court held that when the act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the member thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition.

!The term "Communist Part of the Philippines" issues solely for definitional purposes. In fact the act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any organisation having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct. !

CITIZENSHIP WHO ARE FILIPINO CITIZENS

SEC. GONZALEZ VS PENNISI FACTS:

Respondent herein was born on March 13, 1975 in Queensland Australia to Alfio Pennisi and Anita Quinto, an Australian and Filipino citizen respectively. Respondent applied for petition for recognition as Filipino Citizen before the Bureau of Immigration submitting documents as follows:

• Birth certificate of Quintos, issued by the Local Registrar of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, stating the she was born on August 1949, of Filipino Parents.

• Marriage Certificate of his parents, indicating Philippines as Quinto's birthplace.

• Certified copy of Quinto's Australian certificate of registration of alien indicTing her nationality as Filipino.

• Certified true copy of respondent's birth certificate, indicating Philippines as his mother's birthplace.

• Certified true copy of the letter date July 1999, if the Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs stating that as of July 1999, Quintos has not been granted of Australian Citizenship. !

Bureau of Immigration granted his application. In 2nd endorsement, Secretary of Department of Justice disproved the application. But upon submitting additional documents, it was then granted. !Respondent became a member of the Red Bull team in PBA. !On August 2003, the Senate Committees on Games, Amusement and Sports and on Constitutional Amendments jointly submitted a report to deport several Filipino-foreign PBA Players including the respondent. !The presented documents of the respondent herein were held highly suspicious relying on the affidavits of Soliman and Peralta, barangay officials of San Antonio Nueva Ecija. The affidavit stated that there were no Quintos in that Place. !

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent herein is a Filipino Citizen based on the documents that he submitted. !

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the authenticity of the documents submitted by herein petitioners were remain undisputed. The petitioner herein, People of the Philippines, mainly relied on the affidavits of Soliman and Peralta. !Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that Pennisi is a Filipino Citizen is affirmed.

!BIRTH CERTIFICATE IS THE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF CITIZENSHIP, !

TECSON VS COMELEC FACTS:

FPJ was a candidate for presidential election. However his qualification was questioned, specifically he being a natural born Filipino Citizen. Petitioner herein contended that FPJ, being an illegitimate son of an alleged Filipino Citizen and an America Citizen could have not acquired that Citizenship og his father. !

ISSUE: Whether or not FPJ is a natural born citizenship. !!

HELD: In arriving at the answer whether or not FPJ is a natural born citizen, the Supreme Court reviewed the following instances: !1. The citizenship of the father and the grand father of FPJ. 2. The constitutional provision existing at the time the father of FPJ

acquired his citizenship from the former's father, the grand father of FPJ. !

The Supreme court held that,t he the constitutional provision applicable in finding out the answer is the Philippine Organic Act of 1902. !

".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight." !Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term "inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. !

Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light,

confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. !Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines: !

"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. !"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. !"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five. !"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law." !

Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides: !"The following are citizens of the Philippines: !"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. !"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. !"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and !"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law." !

TORRES VS TAN FACTS:

Tan Chim, the petitioner here, arrived at the port of Cebu on January 18, 1937, and sought admission as a minor son of Alejandro Tan Bangco. After hearing, the Board of Special Inquiry decided to deny him entry on the ground that the status of his father had not been passed upon by the Secretary of Labor. A petition for habeas corpus was filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu (civil case No. 308), which ruled that Alejandro Tan Bangco was a Filipino citizen jus soli, having been born in Manila on February 27, 1893. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by decision of February 23, 1939, up- held the conclusion of the lower court and declined to overrule the doctrine in Roa v. Collector of Customs !

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner herein is a Filipino Citizen. !

HELD: Yes. Following the doctrine laid down in Roa Case. !A comparison between this case and that of Roa v. Collector of Customs, supra, will show the following similarities and dissimilarities: Similar (1) in that Roa was born in the Philippines in 1889, whereas Alejandro Tan Bangco (father of the petitioner) was born here in 1893, both before the advent of American sovereignty; (2) the fathers of both Roa and Tan Bangco were of Chinese nationality and their mothers,

Filipino; (3) at the time of the ratification of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, both were minor residents of the Philippines; and (4) both, in their boyhood, went to China for the purpose of studying there, returning thereafter to the Philippines. !When in Roa v. Collector of Customs we declared the applicant therein to be a citizen of the Philippines, that declaration was a statement of a general principle, applicable not only to Tranquilino Roa individually but to all those who were in the same situation, that is to say, to all persons born in the Philippines before the ratification of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, of Chinese father and Filipino mother; residents of the Philippines at the time mentioned in the treaty of peace, although in their minority; thereafter, going to China for the purpose of studying, and returning to the Philippines to live here. !

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPIN BAR, VICENTE CHING

FACTS: Vicente Ching was born on 1964, to a Chinese father and an Filipino mother under the existence of the 1935 Constitution. Vicente , took up Bachelors of Law and passed the same. Upon filing for bar examinations, he submitted documents stating he being a Filipino Citizen. He passed the bar examinations. !Upon passing the bar examinations, he was then required to take the oath. But before he could take the same, additional requirement was asked from him, among others is to elect Filipino Citizenship. In 1999, Ching made an election. !

ISSUE: Can the election of citizenship, 14 years after reaching the age of majority grant the Filipino Citizenship. !

HELD: No. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. !CA 625, which was enacted pursuant to the provision above, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of the Philippine Citizenship. However it did not prescribed the time to which the election shall be made. !The proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. The interpretation however was mean to be within three years after reaching the age of majority, but may be extended upon presentation of special circumstances. !In the case at bar, Ching was not able to explain the reason of his delay for 14 years before having elected Philippine Citizenship. Hence, the 14 years lapse is clearly beyond the contemplation of "upon reaching he age of majority." !Wherefore, petition is denied.

!NATURALIZATION / DENATURALIZATION

MO YA LIM YAO VS COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION FACTS:

This is a case filed to enjoin the Commissioner of Immigration from causing the arrest and deportation of the petitioner herein - Lau Yuen Yueng. !Petitioner herein applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. She is a Chinese residing in Kowloon, Hongking and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines and to visit her great grand uncle for a period of one month. !When she arrived in the Philippines, Asher Y Cheng filed a bond in the amount of PHP1, 000 to undertake among others that Lau Yuen Yueng would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. !After repeated extensions, petitioner was allowed to stay until Feb. 13, 1962. But on January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino Citizen. !Because of the contemplated action of the respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction. !During the hearing, it was admitted that Lao Yuen Yueng could not write either English or Tagalog. Except a few words she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not even name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. !

ISSUE: Whether or not marriage by Lao Yuen Yueng made her ipso facto a citizen of the Philippines. !

HELD: Pertinent part of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No 473, upon which petitioners rely, reads. !

Any woman who is not or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalised shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. !

Citing several cases decided by the Supreme Court, the phrase, "who might herself be lawfully naturalised," refer to a class or race who might be lawfully naturalized, and that compliance with the other conditions of the naturalization laws was not required. !Being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully naturalised," what should be required is not only that she must not be disqualified under Section 4 but she must also possess the qualifications enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age, residence, good moral character, adherence to the underlying

principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of real estate, capacity to speak and write English or Spanish and one of the principal local languages, education of children in certain schools, etc. !In Philippine jurisprudence it was held that an alien wife is required to prove only that she may herself be lawfully naturalized, that she is not one of the disqualified persons enumerated in the Section 4 of the law, on order to establish her citizenship status as a fact. !Section 15 of the Naturalization law (Commonwealth Act 473), an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalised, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who i subsequently naturalised here follows the Philippines citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. !Seciton 4 reads:

1. Person opposed to organised government or affiliate with any associations or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organised governments. 2. Persons defending or teaching the necessity of propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas. 3. Polygamists, or believers in the practice of polygamy. 4. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. 5. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases. 6. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos. 7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines are at war, during the period of such war. 8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than United States, whose laws does not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof. !

EDISON SO VS REPUBLIC !CHA TEK LAO VS REPUBLIC !

D U A L C I T I Z E N S H I P A N D D U A L ALLEGIANCE

MERCADO VS MANZANO !CALILUNG VS DATUMANONG FACTS:

Petitioner herein prays for the prohibition to stop the respondent from implementing RA 9225 (An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes.” Petitioner avers the constitutionality of RA 9225, specifically its Section 3 and 3:

!Section 2: Declaration of Policy: It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine Citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the condition of this Act. !Section 3: Retention of Philippine Citizenship: Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic. !

ISSUE: Whether sections 2 and 3 of RA 9225, together allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. !

HELD: During the deliberation of the Congress, it was clarified that the purpose of these contended sections is to recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and his loyalty to the Republic. !Further, Rep. Locsin averred that doing what section 2 and 3 say, the problem of dual citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country because the latest oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of the allegiance to the Philippines and to the United States, as the case may be. And by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. !Further it was held that the bill recognizes the Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other citizenship. !Wherefore the petition is denied.

LOSS AND REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

RA 9225 (CITIZENSHIP REACQUISITION AND RETENTION ACT OF 2003) !BENGZON III VS HRET !BURCA VS REPUBLIC !TABASA VS COURT OF APPEALS !IN RE: PETIT ION TO REACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO MUNESES !SOBEJANA-CONDON VS COMELEC !

CANCELLATION OF CITIZENSHIP

REPUBLIC VS LI YAO