Democratic Revisionism RevisitedAuthor(s): Lawrence B. JosephSource: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Feb., 1981), pp. 160-187Published by: Midwest Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2110918 .Accessed: 27/07/2011 17:44

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THE WORKSHOP

Democratic Revisionism Revisited *

Lawrence B. Joseph, Washington University

This paper will examine recent developments in liberal-democratic theory that represent different reactions to theoretical challenges to postwar "democratic revisionism," as well as different reactions to the "crisis" of contemporary liberal democracy. One sort of response, exemplified by Samuel Huntington and Giovanni Sartori, has been a reassertion of the "elitist" theory of democracy. A rather different response is represented by Charles Lindblom and Robert Dahl, who have made attempts to reformulate the "pluralist" theory of democracy. Both groups, the "neo-elitists" and the "revisionist pluralists," acknowledge, either implicitly or explicitly, that the theory and practice of contemporary liberal democracy face a crisis of some sort. Their contrasting assessments suggest profoundly different agendas for the future of liberal-democratic theory.

During the two decades following World War II, many liberal-demo- cratic theorists attempted to reformulate the "classical" theory of democracy in the hope of making it more "realistic." For this reason, their basic approach has often been called "democratic revisionism" (see, for example, Kariel, 1970). Instead of constructing theories in terms of "demo- cratic ideals," these revisionists typically began by examining the distin- guishing characteristics of contemporary Western liberal democracies (e.g., Dahl, 1956, p. 63). Various versions of democratic revisionism were par- ticularly influential among political scientists and political sociologists dur- ing the 1950s and early 1960s, although the theory appeared under a number of different designations. Proponents used terms such as "polyarchy" (Dahl and Lindblom, 1953; Dahl, 1956; Sartori, 1965, pp. 124-128) and "pluralist democracy" (Dahl, 1961, 1967). Critics of revisionism, on the other hand, referred to "democratic elitism" or "elitist democratic theory" (Walker, 1966; Bachrach, 1967; Thompson, 1970, pp. 22-26). One of the reasons for this confusion in terminology (aside from the tendency of both proponents and critics to use persuasive definitions) is that postwar demo- cratic revisionism actually contained two distinct components, i.e., both

*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1979 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. The author is grateful to Barry Ames, Morris Fiorina, Robert Booth Fowler, John Layson, Michael Parkinson, Robert Salisbury, John Woolley, and several anonymous referees for their comments on various drafts of the manuscript. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 1, February 1981 ( 1981 by the University of Texas Press 0092-5853/81/010160-29$02.30

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pluralism and elitism. The elitist component was derived from Schum- peter's now-famous definition of democracy in terms of elite competition in elections (1950, p. 269). Democratic elitists deemphasized the role of wide- spread citizen participation, conceiving democracy in terms of "the forma- tion of a political elite in the competitive struggle for the votes of a mainly passive electorate" (Lipset, 1963, p. 238). The pluralist element was the idea of dispersion or diversification of power. Thus, democratic pluralists proposed descriptive as well as normative models of the political process in terms of bargaining, compromise, and mutual adjustment among compet- ing centers of power. Although the intellectual roots of these two strands were distinct, and although different democratic revisionists put different degrees of emphasis on elitism and pluralism, the most important and influ- ential expressions of this type of theory involved both components, in effect combining the idea of competing elites with the idea of dispersion of power among competing groups (Dahl and Lindblom, 1953; Dahl, 1956).'

There was a strong consensus on general pluralist/elitist principles among liberal-democratic theorists well into the 1960s.2 Moreover, demo- cratic revisionism usually went hand-in-hand with a celebration of Western liberal democracies such as the United States, or at least with the assump- tion that those polities were healthy and stable, as well as democratic. The American political system, for example, was seen as "a relatively efficient system for reinforcing agreement, encouraging moderation, and maintain- ing social peace" (Dahl, 1956, p. 151), and, more generally, Western democracy was characterized as "the good society itself in operation" (Lipset, 1960, p. 403).

Times have changed, however. Throughout the 1970s, there has been a widespread perception that liberal democracy (in the United States and else- where) is in a period of crisis. From the beginning of the decade, there seemed to be a new "intellectual consensus" concerning challenges to American democracy posed by economic dislocation, racial conflict, an un- popular war in Vietnam, social disintegration, and the inability of govern- ment to respond to such problems (Tinder, 1970, pp. 65-66). Going beyond

'For a very useful discussion of these distinctions, see Holden (1974, pp. 154-173). Cf. also Macpherson (1977, p. 77), who refers to the "pluralist elitist equilibrium model."

2During this same period, democratic revisionism was not without its critics. The "elitist" component, for example, was attacked for downgrading the importance of citizen participa- tion and for neglecting classical democratic ideals in its quest to be realistic (e.g., Duncan and Lukes, 1963; Davis, 1964; Walker, 1966; Bachrach, 1967; Thompson, 1970; Pateman, 1970). The "pluralist" component was charged with, among other things, failing to recognize the effective domination of the political process by a small handful of powerful and well-organized groups and failing to address the problem of interests in society which are not effectively repre- sented-including the "public interest" (e.g., Kariel, 1961; McConnell, 1966; Lowi, 1969).

162 Lawrence B. Joseph

the American situation, some scholars spoke of a "withering away" of Western liberal democracy (Hartley, 1970). Writings on America's bicen- tennial were hardly optimistic, noting that "the general crisis of the Ameri- can political system remains a cardinal reality of our time, even if students no longer protest over the war and ghetto riots do not typically occur in the mid-1970s as they did in 1967-1968" (Burnham, 1976, p. 147). The ap- parent decline of the party system, for example, had contributed to political disorganization, ideological polarization, and "total confusion" (Lipset, 1975, p. 164). One commentator suggested the possibility of a " 'crisis of regime,' if not a crisis of disintegration and revolution" (Bell, 1975, p. 220). The end of the decade brought little respite: "There is no question that liberal democracy is now again facing crises of magnitude, crises that deserve our real concern . . ." (Livingston, 1979, p. 16).

This paper will examine recent developments in liberal-democratic theory that represent different reactions to the "crisis" of contemporary liberal democracy, as well as different reactions to theoretical challenges to postwar democratic revisionism. One sort of response, exemplified by Samuel Huntington and Giovanni Sartori, has been a reassertion of the elitist theory of democracy. These "neo-elitists" see the basic problem as a "crisis of governability" resulting from "demand overload," particularly unreasonably egalitarian demands. They propose greater democratic self- restraint and a greater recognition of authority based on competence and expertise.3 A rather different response is represented by Charles Lindblom and Robert Dahl, who have made attempts to reformulate pluralist demo- cratic theory. These "revisionist pluralists" argue that the theory and prac- tice of liberal democracy are flawed by the undemocratic ramifications of socioeconomic inequality and corporate power. They see government authority being undermined by structures of private power, and they raise the possibility of extending the scope of democratic decision-making to the economic realm. Both the neo-elitists and revisionist pluralists acknowl- edge, either implicitly or explicitly, that contemporary liberal democracy faces a crisis of some sort. They differ, however, over the nature of the crisis and over possible solutions. Most importantly, they suggest signifi- cantly different agendas for liberal-democratic theory.4

3Huntington and Sartori are merely the clearest examples of this sort of argument. A rather more moderate version of their general position can be found in Daniel Bell (1976, pp. 177-282). For other examples of the "demand overload" thesis with respect to the United States, see Wildavsky (1973), Wilson (1979). On demand overload in Great Britain, see, e.g., Brittan (1977). For other recent arguments linking the excesses of democracy with the excesses of egalitarianism, see Nisbet (1975), Diamond (1975), and Mansfield (1978).

'The purpose of this paper is both analytical and normative. The reader will no doubt observe that my own normative bias disposes me to be more sympathetic to the Lindblom-Dahl position (although not by any means uncritical of it). While I attempt to present a fair and accurate analysis of the various theorists, I make no pretense of "value neutrality."

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The Democratic Distemper Samuel Huntington was not a central figure in debates over democratic

theory during the 1950s and 1960s. For example, he was never a pluralist in the sense of advocating diffusion of power. To the extent that his earlier writings dealt with the United States (e.g., 1965; 1969, pp. 93-139), he was rather critical of fragmentation of governmental authority. At the same time, his stress on strong leadership could be said to make his views com- patible with "democratic elitism." Regardless, Huntington's more recent work, particularly his contribution to the Trilateral Commission's "Report on the Governability of Democracies" (Crozier et al., 1975), constitutes the most elaborate formulation of what I am calling the "neo-elitist" theory of democracy.

Huntington argues that a "democratic upsurge" during the 1960s has contributed to a "democratic distemper," involving both an expansion of governmental activity and an erosion of governmental authority (1975, p. 102). More specifically, he maintains that the upsurge of political partici- pation since the 1960s, in the form of campaign activity, protest move- ments, and interest group activity (although not, of course, in the form of voter turnout in elections, which has declined), has overloaded the political system with an excess of demands, has contributed to a decline in govern- mental authority, and has led to a crisis in the governability of democracy. A major government response to the democratic surge of the 1960s was what Huntington calls the "welfare shift," i.e., a substantial and significant increase in government spending for social welfare programs of various sorts. Huntington argues that this expansion of government activity was the result not of elite leadership, but of response to "popular expectations and group demands" (1975, p. 65). These developments have resulted in a de- mand overload on government, one effect of which is the problem of finan- cial solvency. The excess of demand results in an excess of government ex- penditures, which, in turn, contributes to the problem of runaway inflation (1975, pp. 72-75). The capacity of government to impose restraints on any major economic group is especially difficult in the American political sys- tem, where a pluralistic policy-making structure provides multiple points of access for so many interest groups (1975, pp. 103-104).

Huntington argues that another adverse effect of increased political participation has been ideological polarization, which has contributed to the recent decline in public confidence in government. The democratic surge of the 1960s involved a citizenry more politically active as well as more ideo- logically consistent on policy issues. Increases in political participation have, accordingly, been closely related to polarization of opinions on policy issues (particularly social and racial issues). Government, however, has dif- ficulty responding to such a situation through its traditional politics of com-

x64 Lawrence B. Joseph

promise. Thus, issue polarization generates distrust in government, as the politically active and ideologically intense strata lose their confidence in in- stitutions which fail to act in accordance with their policy preferences (1975, pp. 76-78).

The democratic distemper is also seen as closely related to excessive de- mands for equality. According to Huntington, the "dominant thrust of political and social action" during the 1960s was clearly egalitarian, and the democratic surge involved the "reassertion of the primacy of equality as a goal in social, economic, and political life" (1975, p. 62). He sees this de- velopment as a recurring problem in American society, a society with a markedly democratic and egalitarian (as well as liberal) political structure. Fortunately, in Huntington's view, commitment to democratic and egali- tarian values is generally not intense; during periods of rapid social change, however, these values are reasserted: "In this respect, the democratic surge of the 1960s shares many characteristics with the comparable egalitarian and reform movements of the Jacksonian and Progressive eras" (1975, pp. 112-113).

Taken together, the resurgence of the democratic norms of participa- tion and equality are seen by Huntington as contributing to the undermin- ing of government authority. In part, this is due to the expansion of govern- ment activity generated by mass demands and the inability of government to meet the growing demands made upon it (1975, pp. 72-75). There is, how- ever, an additional argument about too much democracy contributing to a decline in government authority. Here the emphasis is on the failure to recognize the need for competent, expert leadership. Huntington sees the democratic surge as, in part, a challenge to authority itself-particularly to existing systems of authority based on hierarchy, expertise, and wealth (1975, pp. 74-75). "Every form of society," says Huntington, "needs a cer- tain measure of deference, authority, and hierarchy to function well." More specifically, the political conflicts and tensions which are likely to be characteristic of postindustrial society "will probably require a more authoritative and effective pattern of decision-making." At the same time, however, trends such as ideological polarization and increased participation will make this more difficult (1974, p. 190).

Huntington suggests that these sorts of problems of governability may be endemic to a postindustrial society with a more highly educated and par- ticipant population. A citizenry with higher levels of education and a greater sense of political efficacy is also a citizenry with greater knowledge about political and social problems and a greater desire to do something about them. A more active, participatory citizenry, however, makes effec- tive government action more difficult: "Innovation is easier when substan-

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tial portions of the population are indifferent" (1974, p. 177). The dangers resulting from demand overload suggest to Huntington the need for a "greater degree of moderation in democracy." He maintains that "the ef- fective operation of a democratic political system usually requires some measure of apathy and non-involvement on the part of some individuals and groups" (1975, p. 114). The integration of previously marginal social groups (e.g., blacks) into the political system makes the system more demo- cratic, but also heightens the danger of demand overload. Thus, insofar as more groups move out of the sphere of marginality, all groups need to exer- cise more self-restraint. In addition, the crisis of governability can be miti- gated only if we moderate democracy by acknowledging the legitimacy of claims to authority based on expertise, seniority, experience, and special talents. A proper "democratic balance" must be restored by recognizing that democracy is not the only way of constituting authority (1975, pp. 113-114). According to Huntington, maintaining this suitable balance be- tween governmental authority and limits on that authority is "what con- stitutional democracy is all about" (1975, p. 63).

A Defense of "Vertical" Democracy Giovanni Sartori was one of the foremost theorists of postwar demo-

cratic revisionism, particularly the more elitist variety. Sartori identified with Dahl and Lindblom by adopting the idea of polyarchy (Sartori, 1965, pp. 124-128), but, unlike other revisionists, he was not adverse to the elitist label. He went so far as to say that "the democratic theory of elites is in the light of present-day factual knowledge the core of democratic theory itself" (1965, p. 128). More recently, Sartori has steadfastly defended the elitist theory of democracy against its "anti-elitist" or participatory critics, such as Peter Bachrach (1967) and Carole Pateman (1970). Sartori argues that the "anti-elitists have been preoccupied with the 'horizontal' extension of democracy (i.e., participation), while neglecting the 'vertical' dimension (i.e., leadership)" (1978a, p. 63). He warns against a "very naive demo- cratic primitivism which pitches direct and participatory democracy against control and representation" (1975, p. 154). While Sartori claims to favor a more informed, interested, and active citizenry, he is also wary of participa- tory democracy conceived in terms of more widespread participation in ac- tual decision-making, for "what is gained in terms of power-sharing is dis- proportionately lost in terms of efficacy and efficiency." In this sense, par- ticipatory democracy can undermine representative democracy (1975, pp. 156-157).

In addition to his distinction between vertical and horizontal democ- racy, Sartori distinguishes between "responsible government" and "re-

i66 Lawrence B. Joseph

sponsive government" and is concerned with maintaining a proper balance between the two. A "responsible government" behaves responsibly and competently; a "responsive government" responds to external demands (1976, p. 22). On this issue, Sartori echoes much of Huntington's demand- overload argument. Democratic governments are becoming overloaded with an excess of demands "arising from the revolution of rising expecta- tions" (1979, p. 209). Sartori maintains that the major risk to democracy lies not in elites, but in the inflation triggered by governments that yield to too many demands: "Here inflation points to a political class that over- promises and then gives in" (1978a, p. 65). These developments, he asserts, are dangerous, but at the same time they refute criticisms that Western rep- resentative democracies are not genuinely democratic because they are not sufficiently responsive to the mass public. To the contrary, demand over- load is an indication of the extent to which Western societies have maxi- mized responsiveness-to the point of neglecting responsibility. Sartori's stress on elites and leadership, then, goes beyond a rejection of participa- tory theories of democracy. He is also fearful of representative democracies becoming too responsive to mass demands. He insists that "the more we have indulged in responsiveness, the greater the need for independent re- sponsibility-which is what leadership is really all about" (1978a, p. 66).

A final important distinction stressed by Sartori is that between the "liberal" and "democratic" components of liberal democracy. The former is concerned foremost with limiting and controlling the power of the state, and hence emphasizes the value of liberty (i.e., "freedom from"). The latter is concerned with injecting popular power into the state and empha- sizes the value of equality (1978b, pp. 11-12; 1979, p. 206). Thus, "liberalism has a vertical impetus (in favor of differentiation, unevenness, and eminence) while democracy has a horizontal urge (in pursuit of cohe- sion and distributive evenness)" (1978b, p. 11). Along similar lines, Sartori sees a potentially dangerous link between democratic and egalitarian values. He regards the meaning or definition of "equality" as the core issue at stake in the dispute between the elitist and anti-elitist theories of democracy. He sees an extreme conception of equality as the central value of horizontal, or participatory, democracy-and this is the theory's main flaw. By contrast, vertical democracy recognizes the existence and need for genuine "elites"- i.e., those with superior qualities of various sorts (1978a, pp. 63-64). Sar- tori's fears are perhaps expressed most strongly in commenting on Schatt- schneider's famous remark that "the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent" (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 35). Sartori avers that such an observation "may appear profound but can only help the downgrading of democracy into a system of social

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envy" (1978a, p. 65). In Sartori's view, then, the choices are clear-cut: meritocracy or "immeritocracy," selection or "disselection," equality in "deserts" or equality in "demerit." The legacy of the late 1960s was, on balance, a very negative one: "Its message will not eliminate verticality (i.e., elite leadership]; it can only drag it down" (1978a, p. 61). The Privileged Position of Business

Charles Lindblom's Politics and Markets is conceived both as a recon- sideration of liberalism and pluralism and as a revision of the theory of democracy formulated earlier by Lindblom and Dahl (Lindblom, 1977, pp. ix-xi; see Dahl and Lindblom, 1953). Lindblom's basic conception of democracy is, however, essentially the same as before. He restates the idea of polyarchy, the Dahl-Lindblom term for pluralist democracy (or the real- world approximation of democracy in operating political systems). Poly- archy is defined by Lindblom as a political system where citizens are able to choose top policy-makers through free competitive elections and where they also are guaranteed freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, etc., so as to have the opportunity to try to influence political leaders in various ways (1977, pp. 132-133). In a polyarchy, the role of citizens involves the choos- ing of leaders, not policies, although through the choosing of leadership citizens are able to influence policy indirectly (1977, p. 148).' Moreover, democratic governments are characterized by pluralistic decision-making. Authority is diffused, i.e., divided among a plurality of officials (1977, p. 29). (Here, by the way, Lindblom's distinction between polyarchy and democracy seems to disappear.) Thus, Lindblom also retains his view of democratic policymaking as a process of pluralistic mutual adjustment among competing interests and competing centers of power. Within this framework of polyarchy (or pluralist democracy), however, Lindblom per- ceives a number of significant problems.6

The most important and fundamental revision is Lindblom's view of the relationship between corporate power and democracy. Lindblom criti- cizes liberal-democratic theory for failing to consider the privileged position of business.7 Aside from some interest-group analysis, democratic theory

'Cf. Dahl and Lindblom, 1953, pp. 272-286, and Lindblom, 1968, pp. 43-52. In the latter work, Lindblom omits the distinction between democracy and polyarchy, stating, "The most conspicuous difference between authoritarian and democratic regimes is that in democratic regimes citizens choose their top policy makers in genuine elections" (1968, p. 45).

6In addition to Politics and Markets, Lindblom's revisionist pluralism is reflected in the second edition of The Policy-Making Process (1980).

7Here, Lindblom's position is rather different from some of his earlier writings, where he declared himself "not at all interested . .. in whether the powers of corporate leaders are dis- proportionate." The real question instead is "to what degree their powers are inconsistent with democracy in government" (1960, p. 73).

i68 Lawrence B. Joseph

has ignored the corporation (1977, p. 5). Moreover, most contemporary social science makes the mistake of treating all interest groups as having comparable power (1977, p. 193). But the political role of business in capi- talist societies (or, as Lindblom prefers to call them, "private enterprise market-oriented societies") is not merely that of one interest group among many others (1977, p. 170). Under the American system of law, for example, corporations are treated as persons; these fictitious "persons" not only make demands of various sorts on government, but they are also much more powerful than ordinary citizens and often have rights ordinary citizens do not (1977, p. 5). In a capitalist market economy, private business cor- porations perform essentially public functions by making decisions of major social importance within the market system. Moreover, because of its crucial role in the performance of the economy, business is given a privi- leged position within the governmental process itself (1977, pp. 171-175).

Lindblom's concern about corporate power thus leads him to revise his assessment of pluralism. Lindblom still views democratic policymaking in pluralistic terms, as a system of diffused power and as a process of mutual adjustment among a plurality of public officials and other political leaders (1977, pp. 29, 158). He now acknowledges, however, that there are a num- ber of serious defects in the actual practice of pluralistic mutual adjustment. Because of such factors as the distribution of economic resources among participants and the advantages held by organized as opposed to unor- ganized interests, the pluralism of pluralist democracies is far from egali- tarian (1977, pp. 140-141).8 The most serious problem for pluralism, how- ever, is the ability of some groups to veto policy initiatives, particularly on issues involving possible solutions to collective problems (e.g., energy policy). The most important source of such veto power is not the fragmen- tation of government authority, but rather the privileged position of busi- ness. A serious shortcoming of democratic theory, therefore, has been its failure to conceive of a system of pluralism without business vetoes-i.e., a pluralist democracy free of business privilege (1977, pp. 345-347).9

A related revision in Lindblom's position is his emphasis on the role of ''socioeconomic class." While not wanting to embrace Marxist arguments,

"Lindblom remarks here that such defects in pluralism are "widely acknowledged" (1977, p. 141), citing critics such as Kariel (1961), Lowi (1969), and Bachrach (1967). He also refers to some representative pluralist theorists of the 1950s-Riesman (1950), Dahl (1956), Key (1961), and Truman (1951; 1959). Ironically, he fails to mention his own earlier work along these lines. Thus, we are not enlightened as to the reasons for Lindblom's seemingly sudden discovery that the corporation is not just another interest group.

9Lindblom fails to suggest possible solutions, however, claiming that his task "is not to write prescriptions" (1977, p. 348).

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Lindblom rejects the "conventional" pluralist view of classes as only one of many determinants of social conflict (1977, p. 222). Contemporary demo- cratic theory, he notes, tends to overlook the effects of class (1977, p. 373, n. 2).1o Lindblom not only emphasizes the ways in which the "favored class" (i.e., that class with disproportionate wealth, power, and so forth) dominates important channels of political participation; he also focuses on what he calls "class indoctrination," i.e., the ways in which the favored class is able to inculcate its values in the rest of the population (1977, p. 229). Lindblom remains a defender of the market system, but wants to argue against those (both conservatives and radicals) who maintain that it is impossible to reconcile the market system with a much more egalitarian dis- tribution of income and wealth. Lindblom rejects the argument that greater social and economic equality will endanger efficiency and productivity: "The barrier to greater income and wealth equality in real-world market- oriented systems is not any internal logic. It is, instead . .. a historically in- herited and politically maintained inequality in individual assets, earning power, and income shares" (1977, p. 44).

The undemocratic effects of socioeconomic inequality and class indoc- trination serve to reinforce another problem which concerns Lindblom-the problem of "leadership indoctrination" in pluralist democracy. For Lind- blom, leadership is both inevitable and important. He speaks of a two-way process of mutual persuasion between leaders and citizens (or more broadly, between more active and informed participants and less active and informed participants), which is a central component of pluralist democ- racy (1977, pp. 137-139). Citizens express their "volitions," as Lindblom calls them, while political leaders communicate their views as to what is pos- sible or most feasible. Through this process, the views of citizens and leaders are constantly reconsidered in light of each other (1977, pp. 137-139; cf. Lindblom, 1968, pp. 103-105). In his earlier writings, Lind- blom looked much more favorably on the ability of leaders to alter the pref- erences which might otherwise constrain them. He referred to this as "re- constructive leadership," which facilitated a never-ending process of mov- ing compromise, opening up the possibility of innovative policy initiatives (1968, pp. 105-106). In Politics and Markets, however, he points to the "ominous" possibility of circularity in polyarchy, where citizens may be in- doctrinated to make only those demands which elites have molded and are prepared to meet. Celebration of reconstructive leadership is thus replaced by concern about the dangers of leadership indoctrination (1977, pp. 202,

'"On this point, incidentally, Lindblom cites as examples Dahl (1956) and Sartori (1965), but not his own earlier work.

I70 Lawrence B. Joseph

352)."1 The problem of circularity is reinforced by the process of class in- doctrination. These two processes enable business to legitimize its power in the minds of the mass citizenry. The ability of the corporation to mold public opinion in various ways serves to remove from public debate those "grand issues" which could challenge the privileged position of business (1977, pp. 203-204).

In light of these related problems of corporate power, social inequality, and circularity, Lindblom criticizes liberal-democratic theory for being pre- occupied with problems of authority in government, while being insensitive to problems of authority embodied in property rights. Property is, after all, a system of authority which is established by and protected by government, and we need to understand the adverse effects of property rights (and their unequal distribution) on democratic government (1977, p. 8). The "privi- leged position of business" obstructs democracy in at least two ways: first, business leaders have a disproportionate influence in electoral politics, in in- terest-group politics, and hence in government policymaking, and second, the power of the corporation is a rival to the authority of government. The institution of private business enterprise means that a great number of deci- sions with broad social ramifications are made not by government, but by corporate executives. In effect, then, public affairs in Western democracies are in the hands of two groups of decision makers-government and busi- ness-only one of which is controlled to any extent through a democratic system of authority.

Impediments to Democracy Robert Dahl is generally regarded as the preeminent theorist of postwar

democratic revisionism. His more recent work reflects an important shift in emphasis, focusing not on the theory of polyarchy, but on the "doctrine of procedural democracy." The latter is based on three key criteria: (1) political equality, requiring that the preferences of each citizen be given equal weight in collective decisions, (2) effective participation, requiring that each citizen have equal opportunities for expressing preferences and participating in politics, and (3) enlightened understanding, requiring that citizens have "adequate and equal opportunities" for formulating their

"The tone of these remarks in Politics and Markets is strikingly different from that of Politics, Economics, and Welfare, where "social indoctrination" in the "desirability of democracy" is said to be an important precondition of polyarchy (Dahl and Lindblom, 1953, pp. 287-294).

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preferences (1977, pp. 11-12; 1979a, pp. 101-104; 1979b, p. 363).I2 Dahl now emphasizes the question of making polyarchy in the United States more democratic, particularly in terms of the ideas embodied in his doctrine of procedural democracy. Or, as he puts it in the title of one of his recent articles, he is concerned with "Removing Certain Impediments to Democ- racy in the United States" (1977).

One important impediment to democracy arises from the conflict be- tween America's early historical commitment to a liberal political and con- stitutional order and its later commitment to democracy (in the 1830s). We have been given, Dahl argues, a constitutional legacy adverse to democracy in many ways, particularly in its various institutional impediments to ma- jority rule. Our commitment to this framework of government entails the confounding of two rather different ideas: (1) the classical liberal idea that there are certain fundamental rights which government should not be allowed to violate; and (2) the notion that the particular set of institutional arrangements embodied in the U.S. Constitution is required in order to pre- serve those fundamental rights. Our failure to distinguish between these two ideas has led us to confuse fundamental rights with existing privileges and, at the same time, to fail to see how our constitutional system makes it easier for privileged minorities to prevent changes in the status quo than it is for majorities to enact reforms (1977, pp. 5-6).

The same problem can be seen in the context of the pluralism that re- mains an integral part of Dahl's normative position. Dahl still views social diversity and the autonomy of secondary associations as essential character- istics of democratic political systems, insofar as what he calls "organiza- tional pluralism" is related to the maintenance of freedom of opposition. His emphasis here has changed somewhat, in that he admits that while pluralism has its virtues, it can also create problems. In any pluralist society, political inequalities among associations, and hence among indi- viduals, are bound to develop (1979b, p. 367). More specifically, a pluralis-

'2It should be noted that Dahl also introduces two subsidiary criteria for procedural democracy: (1) control of the agenda, which requires that the demos have "the exclusive opportunity to make decisions that determine what matters are and are not to be decided by means of procedural democracy" (1979, p. 107); and (2) inclusiveness, which requires that the demos "include all adult members of the association except transients" (1979, p. 129). Cf. Dahl, 1977, p. 12. Despite the new terminology, the three main criteria for procedural democ- racy are almost precisely the same as the "three necessary conditions for a democracy" which Dahl set out in his book Polyarchy (1971, pp. 2-3). Moreover, they are not significantly dif- ferent from his "definitional characteristics of polyarchy" listed in A Preface to Democratic Theory (1 956, p. 84).

I72 Lawrence B. Joseph

tic political order can degenerate into a system which reinforces the position of powerful and well-organized groups at the expense of relatively power- less and poorly organized groups: "A particular constellation of organiza- tional pluralism can produce a stable system in which mutual vetoes prevent the reduction of inequalities and, more generally, structural changes in the status quo" (1978, p. 199).

Another set of impediments to procedural democracy and political equality arose from America's commitment to corporate capitalism, begin- ning in the late nineteenth century. Dahl argues that the agrarian social order of early nineteenth-century America, with its Lockean value system, was relatively compatible with democracy, but that the new industrial order was much less so. While the Lockean defense of private property made some political sense in a society composed largely of yeoman farmers, it made rather less sense when applied to corporate capitalism. Nonetheless, this ideology was shifted from the farm to the business enterprise, and the corporation took on the same legitimacy as the yeoman farmer. As a result, the autonomy granted to individuals in an agrarian society was now granted to the corporation (1977, pp. 7-8).

One of the undemocratic effects of the rise of the new industrial order was that it created much larger inequalities in income, wealth, and status than had existed earlier. These inequalities in turn generated much greater differences within the demos in terms of political resources and political skills (1977, pp. 7-8). Dahl argues that a serious commitment to procedural democracy must involve either putting "effective limits on the extent to which economic resources can be converted into political resources," or as- suring that "economic resources are much more equally distributed than they are in the United States at present" (1977, p. 16). "At the very least," says Dahl, "the question of distribution of wealth and income ought to be high on the agenda of national politics" (1977, p. 16).'13

In addition to generating greater socioeconomic inequality, the super- imposition of Lockean ideology onto corporate capitalism created another

3 'This line of argument concerning the undemocratic effects of socioeconomic inequality is foreshadowed in After the Revolution?, which can be regarded as a transitional work for Dahl. Here he argues that inequalities in wealth, income, and property constitute a substantial barrier to effective political equality (1970, pp. 105-115). These arguments about the undemo- cratic effects of social and economic inequality should be contrasted with Dahl's earlier views in Who Governs?, where he distinguishes between "cumulative inequalities" and "dispersed inequalities," the latter being characteristic of pluralist democracy (1961, pp. 227-228). Cf. also A Preface to Democratic Theory, where he discusses the effects of social class on political participation. Here he notes the obstacles faced by the lower classes because of their "relatively limited access to resources," but also observes that they "disfranchise themselves" because of "their propensity for political passivity" (1956, p. 81).

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impediment to democracy. The new industrial order legitimized the power of the private corporation so as to protect it from democratic controls- both in terms of the internal authority structure of the enterprise (which was, of course, hierarchical) and in terms of the imposition of external con- trols by government (1977, pp. 7-8). Dahl argues that we need to abandon the extension of the Lockean view of property to the private business cor- poration. The question of the control of corporate enterprise should be posed in terms of its effects on broader social goals-including democratic goals. '4 In this regard, he says, we need to be open to new ideas concerning the governance of corporations, in particular, the application of the prin- ciples of procedural democracy to economic enterprise (1977, pp. 15-16). 15

From Dahl's perspective, then, governmental authority is threatened not by an excess of democracy, but by private structures of power not sub- ject to democratic controls. In contrast to the neo-elitists, Dahl wants to ex- tend the scope of democratic authority, not restrict it. This outlook is mani- fested not only in his criticisms of corporate power, but also in his view of the role of "experts" in a democracy-a view which is rather different from those of Huntington and Sartori. One of Dahl's criteria of procedural democracy is "enlightened understanding" by the citizenry, so that they can have adequate knowledge to formulate and express their preferences on various public issues (1977, pp. 11-12; 1979a, pp. 103-105). Dahl regards the greatest contemporary challenge to democracy to be the idea of meritoc- racy, i.e., the notion that "a meritorious elite of exceptional knowledge and virtue ought to govern" (1979a, p. 109). While Dahl acknowledges the need for expertise in certain matters, he also insists that the citizenry have final control of the agenda in a democracy: "The demos must have the exclusive opportunity to make decisions that determine what matters are and are not to be decided by means of procedural democracy" (1979a, p. 107). On many policy issues, of course, it is unrealistic to expect ordinary citizens to have enough technical knowledge themselves, so they must have adequate access to "experts." On the other hand, notes Dahl, it is difficult to keep experts under democratic control, even if we assume that their role is to be

"Again, this line of argument is similar to that in After the Revolution?, where Dahl maintains that it is misleading to conceive of the large corporation as a private enterprise. He criticizes the "appropriation of public authority by private rulers" (1970, p. 115) and raises the possibility of more democratic governance of economic institutions (pp. 115-140).

'5Along similar lines, Dahl is willing to consider the possibility of combining socialism with pluralism. He denies that organizational pluralism depends upon a capitalist economic system. The key question for him is not private or public ownership of economic enterprises, but rather the degree to which decisions are decentralized. "A decentralized socialist order might . . . generate just as much organizational pluralism as exists in any nonsocialist order, and perhaps a good deal more" (1978, p. 195).

174 Lawrence B. Joseph

confined to providing information about means and not about goals. It is not possible completely to disentangle decisions about means from deci- sions about ends, since the former can often determine the latter. Thus, Dahl concludes: "Democracy only for general ends and meritocracy for means will soon become meritocracy for both means and ends" (1977, p. 18)"6

Neo-Elitism and Revisionist Pluralism What can be gleaned from the foregoing discussion are two contrasting

reassessments of the theory and practice of contemporary liberal democ- racy. First, the neo-elitist and revisionist pluralist positions diagnose the fundamental problem in rather different terms. Huntington and Sartori argue that the main problem with contemporary liberal democracy is that it is too democratic. That is, because of upsurges in certain forms of mass political participation, there are too many demands being made on govern- ment (particularly egalitarian demands). Moreover, democratic govern- ments have been (or have tried to be) too responsive to these mass demands. (Put differently, because too many groups and individuals are articulating too many interests, the equilibrium of pluralist democracy has been upset.) All of this has contributed to an undermining of government authority and a crisis of governability. Lindblom and Dahl, on the other hand, argue that liberal democracy is flawed for rather different reasons. They emphasize the ways in which certain groups in the pluralist system are able to exercise dis- proportionate power by effectively vetoing policies which would threaten their privileges. More generally, Lindblom and Dahl are highly critical of the undemocratic ramifications of socioeconomic inequality and corporate power.

The neo-elitists and revisionist pluralists also advance rather different prescriptions. Huntington and Sartori maintain that government authority is being undermined by too much democracy. Accordingly, they argue that both liberal-democratic theory and democratic practice must recognize the need for the mass public to exercise greater self-restraint in their demands on government, must acknowledge competence and expertise as legitimate bases of authority, and must restore a proper balance between leadership and responsiveness, between indifference and participation, between the power of elites and the power of masses. Lindblom and Dahl, on the other hand, see the idea of political equality being seriously compromised by vast inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth. Moreover, they see

"6Dahl's criticism of meritocracy can be contrasted with his discussion of competence as a criterion of legitimate authority in After the Revolution? (1970, pp. 28-40).

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government authority being undermined by structures of private power, particularly that of the large corporation. Hence, they argue that a serious commitment to democracy requires a substantial redistribution of economic resources, and they raise the possibility of extending the scope of demo- cratic decision-making to the economic realm. Critique of Neo-Elitism

Huntington and Sartori are, in effect, born-again Schumpeterians. I shall not reiterate here the well-known critiques of the elitist theory of democracy made by Duncan and Lukes (1963), Davis (1964), Walker (1966), Bachrach (1967), Pateman (1970), Thompson (1970), and others. It is worth emphasizing, however, that this revived democratic elitism is not simply a reassertion of the idea of democracy defined in terms of competi- tion for leadership. The neo-elitist position is also a resuscitation of the old "virtues of apathy" thesis so prevalent in the 1950s (e.g., Berelson et al., 1954, pp. 305-323), as well as a reincarnation of Schumpeter's argument about "democratic self-control" (1950, p. 294).

The neo-elitist position can be criticized as seriously deficient on both empirical and normative grounds. First, Huntington's argument is based upon a number of unsubstantiated empirical claims. The idea that the so- called "welfare shift" of the 1960s was a response to mass demands and mass participation is highly questionable. For one thing, the democratic surge of the 1960s was related primarily to the Vietnam War and to social issues, such as civil rights for minorities, feminism, ecology, etc. It is rather implausible, however, that these sorts of political participation translated readily into the welfare shift which so concerns Huntington. The most con- troversial social welfare program of the 1960s was, of course, the War on Poverty. But most of the available evidence suggests that the impetus for the antipoverty program came not from mass demands (from the poor, for example), but rather from governmental elites (see, e.g., Sundquist, 1968, pp. 111-154). ' 7Be that as it may, the War on Poverty was rather short-lived and cannot be identified as the primary source of increases in government spending. By far the largest share of the nonmilitary portion of the federal budget in recent years has been in the form of transfer payments to indi-

"iMoynihan (1970, pp. 21-37) emphasizes the role of "policy professionals" in the execu- tive branch. For a somewhat different interpretation, see Piven and Cloward (1971), who do see a link between the War on Poverty and mass demands. They argue, however, that the Great Society programs were developed by a Democratic administration attempting to manage a new, potentially unstable electoral constituency-urban blacks. An unanticipated consequence of those programs was the stimulation of pressure from below by various sorts of antipoverty and welfare rights groups (Piven and Cloward, 1971, pp. 248-340).

176 Lawrence B. Joseph

viduals, particularly in the area of Social Security-related programs such as old-age assistance, Medicare, aid to the disabled, and unemployment insur- ance (see, e.g., Schultze, 1976, pp. 332-346). The explanation for the growth of government spending in these areas is not self-evident. One might argue that a key factor has been demographic changes that have made mem- bers of Congress particularly sensitive to the concerns of their older consti- tuents. A related contributing factor may have been the development of or- ganized interest-group activity by the elderly. Regardless, this is a somewhat different explanation than the argument about a general democratic up- surge in the 1960s. I8

Huntington's empirical claim linking the democratic upsurge with an upsurge of egalitarianism is likewise mistaken. While certain interest-group activity in the 1960s and 1970s did have a clear egalitarian thrust (e.g., civil rights groups, feminist groups), other interest-group activity did not (e.g., anti-abortion groups, the gun lobby, environmentalist groups). Moreover, those movements which have stressed the idea of equality have been only moderately egalitarian. The egalitarian thrust of the 1960s and 1970s was rooted primarily in the demands of previously excluded groups (such as racial minorities and women) for their "fair share," i.e., for genuinely equal opportunity. Huntington (among others) misleadingly poses the issue as "equality of opportunity" versus "equality of results" (1975, p. 62). Hugh Heclo contends that the main thrust of recent American welfare poli- cies (broadly construed) has not been equal outcomes, but rather the idea of compensation: "The idea of compensatory policy-that the federal govern- ment should put things right-fits equally well for the groups representing the disadvantaged (special treatment is required for truly equal opportunity to prevail) and for those representing the advantaged (any market-imposed loss can be defined as a special hardship). The same holds for new public in- terest groups (government action is required to redress the impact of selfish private interests)" (1978, p. 98). This suggests, of course, that the "masses" are by no means the only ones who make demands on govern- ment. '9

"The broader issue of the economic consequences of the growth of the public sector is obviously well beyond the scope of this paper. The claim by both Huntington and Sartori (among others) that government spending is the prime cause of inflation is a matter of con- siderable dispute among political economists. For various views, see Hirsch and Goldthorpe (1978).

"Samuel Beer (1977) has argued that it is a mistake to attribute government overload pri- marily to factors such as rising mass expectations and demands. An alternative explanation for the growth of public spending focuses on forces within government itself, specifically, the rise of the "professional-bureaucratic complex" (i.e., policy professionals in the federal govern- ment) and the development of the "intergovernmental lobby" (i.e., state and local public offi- cials seeking federal assistance of various sorts).

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There has, of course, been widespread public disaffection with govern- ment in the past decade, but Huntington's explanation for it is not entirely convincing. He is correct in pointing out that one of the distinguishing fea- tures of the 1960s was the emergence of issues not readily resolved through the conventional pluralist politics of bargaining, compromise, and modera- tion. One study suggests that the decline in public trust in government dur- ing those years was closely associated with reactions to racial conflict and the Vietnam War. Both of these issues polarized public opinion in such a way that attempts by government to pursue centrist policies had the effect of generating widespread disaffection on both ends of the political spectrum (Miller, 1974). Just the same, decline in public confidence continued throughout the 1970s, well after those issues were no longer salient. More importantly, it does not necessarily follow from all of this that government authority has been undermined by demand overload generated from below.

The, key factor which Huntington fails to consider is the behavior of various public officials (especially presidents) in relation to events such as the Vietnam War and Watergate. One might argue that governmental authority has been undermined not by too much democracy, but by at- tempts on the part of elites to bypass, ignore, or flout democratic norms and democratic procedures in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives, under the cloak of "national security," or simply in efforts to defeat political opponents. In the light of these sorts of incidents, the claim that democratic authority has been undermined by a failure on the part of the masses to put sufficient trust in elites hardly seems tenable.20

Some comments should also be made about the prescriptions suggested by Huntington and Sartori. In response to the demand-overload problem, Huntington suggests that there is a need for greater self-restraint on the part of all groups (as well as individuals). This argument fails to distinguish, however, among different groups and different interests with rather dif- ferent amounts of both economic and political power. The fact remains that some interest groups (e.g., corporations) are much more successful than others (e.g., welfare recipients) in getting what they want from the govern- ment. To ask both sorts of groups to exercise self-restraint is to ask less powerful groups to accept their subordinate position unquestioningly. Moreover, to plea for restraint on the part of all groups constitutes an implicit acceptance of the legitimacy of unequal distribution of economic and political resources, as well as unequal access to government. In terms of distribution of power, then, Huntington's argument amounts to a blanket endorsement of the status quo.

20Full consideration of the "crisis of governability" thesis is beyond the scope of this paper. For the neo-Marxist perspective on this issue, see, inter alia, Wolfe (1977). Cf., also, Burnham (1978).

I78 Lawrence B. Joseph

Finally, the neo-elitist argument lacks a coherent theory of leadership. As a result, the proposition that we must recognize and defer to authority based on "expertise" and "superior competence" is both misleading and dangerous. If, as Huntington asserts, democracy is only one way of con- stituting authority, how do we know where the claims of "democratic authority" end and where the claims of "expert authority" begin? If, as Sartori contends, we need to recognize the necessity of "genuine elites," what criteria are to be used to identify them? On these questions, Hunt- ington and Sartori are silent. Moreover, even on those public policy issues where expertise has been brought to bear, the so-called experts often dis- agree markedly. Economists do not agree about the causes of inflation; sociologists do not agree about the causes of poverty; physicists do not agree on the potential hazards of nuclear power; demographers do not agree on the question of overpopulation; biologists, chemists, and physicians do not all agree on what substances are carcinogenic; and so on . . . . Most im- portantly, however, policy issues are political issues and, as such, are issues involving value judgments. Deference to the political authority of any set of experts entails, then, the uncritical acceptance of their values, their political beliefs, their ideologies, as well as their "expertise." Huntington and Sar- tori pose the issue in a misleading way. The question is not whether we need competent leadership. Few democratic theorists would deny that. The ques- tion is rather, what kind of leadership, how it is to be chosen, and to whom it will be accountable.

Critique of "Revisionist Pluralism"

Lindblom and Dahl pose difficulties of a rather different sort, since they have begun a genuine reassessment at the theoretical level. Lindblom's attempted revision of pluralist democratic theory is marked by vacillation and uncertainty. This is especially evident in regard to the issue of demo- cratic participation, about which he remains quite ambivalent. In Politics, Economics, and Welfare, Dahl and Lindblom maintained that polyarchy requires a "relatively high degree of political activity," so that leaders will be sufficiently representative and responsive (1953, p. 309). On the other hand, they also claimed that low levels of political participation did not nec- essarily indicate a relative lack of democracy; the important thing was the opportunity to participate (1953, p. 312). In the first edition of The Policy- Making Process, Lindblom observed that citizen participation in policy- making, as distinct from citizen participation in choosing policymakers, is often not desirable: "On policy issues, leaders are both more competent and more conciliatory than are citizens" (1968, p. 54n). Here, too, the emphasis was on the idea of the opportunity to participate for those citizens with suf-

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ficient interest and energy (1968, p. 114). In Politics and Markets, he again states the revisionist rejection of the rational-activist model of the demo- cratic citizen found in the writing of classical democratic theorists such as John Stuart Mill, saying that this model "can be suspected of being a form of wishful thinking" (1977, p. 132). At the same time, Ljndblom exhibits more concern about the social-class bias of patterns of political participa- tion (1977, pp. 227-228). In addition, because of his criticism of the power of the corporation, he is open to the possibility of democratizing the authority structure of industry, and he presents a sympathetic discussion of workers' control experiments in Yugoslavia (1977, pp. 330-343).21

Just the same, while Lindblom seems to have modified his views on more participatory forms of democracy, he still has serious reservations. His ambivalence about democratic participation is most clearly manifested when his argument converges with that of Huntington. Lindblom observes that while class indoctrination makes polyarchy less democratic, it also serves the function of dampening social conflict. It is thus conceivable, says Lindblom, that the limited form of democracy called polyarchy can survive only when conflict is moderated in this way, or in some similar way such as leadership indoctrination (1977, pp. 233, 352). Lindblom sees the decline of class indoctrination as a potentially serious problem for the future of pluralist democracy. It is becoming more and more difficult for capitalist democracies (or "market-oriented polyarchies") to reconcile the privileged position of business (necessary to the operation of the economy) with the in- creasing demands of strong unions and the welfare state. The growth of these demands is a reflection of rising mass expectations, which in turn may be due to the decline of class indoctrination (as well as leadership indoc- trination). This suggests the possibility that the breakdown of constraints on mass demands may generate political divisiveness and social disorder, and raises the question of whether democracy needs to be constrained in order to survive; otherwise, democracy may destroy itself (1977, pp. 351-354). In this discussion of the possible excesses of democracy, Lind- blom not only cites Hulitington (Lindblom, 1977, p. 353, n. 7), but he also reaches a remarkably similar conclusion: "in principle at least, there exists an alternative to social order through repression, on the one hand, or through class and leader indoctrination on the other. It is the development of self-restraint both by individuals and groups in society" (1977, p. 355).

2Cf. Dahl, 1970, pp. 130-140. On the issue of the authority structure of industry, Lind- blom's current position is markedly different from his earlier work, where he rejected argu- ments about the authoritarian, undemocratic character of employer-employee relations. See Lindblom, 1960, pp. 66-71; cf. also Dahl and Lindblom, 1953, pp. 473-484.

i8o Lawrence B. Joseph

Dahl's revisionist pluralism is more promising, since he does not ex- hibit this sort of ambivalence and vacillation. Nonetheless, Dahl's view of democracy, while it represents a significant modification of his earlier theory of polyarchy, is still delimited by some of the same assumptions. While Dahl has implicitly (although not explicitly) made some significant concessions to critics of democratic revisionism, and while he has moved closer to the position of participatory democratic theorists, his shift has been more pragmatic than theoretical. There have been important changes in emphasis, particularly as reflected in his greater concern with substantial social and economic equality as a precondition for political democracy and his expanded view of the scope of democratic decision-making to include the economic realm. These are not trivial departures, but it is also important to understand that the philosophical underpinnings of Dahl's democratic theory remain much the same.

The limits of Dahl's reformulation are rooted in his failure to respond directly to earlier radical critics of democratic revisionism. Further develop- ment of the idea of democratization of industry, for example, would require some dialogue with the theories of participatory democrats such as Bach- rach (1967; 1975) and Pateman (1970). For Dahl, the purpose of political participation is still the expression of individual preferences. If, however, the participatory theorists are correct in emphasizing the educative or de- velopmental value of participation for the individual, then such arguments might be incorporated into Dahl's theory. They would presumably rein- force the idea of extending the scope of democratic authority. Dahl ap- parently does not accept these arguments, but neither does he explain why. Similarly, the democratic citizen in Dahl's theory is still an isolated indi- vidual. "Procedural democracy" is seen as a process of responding to pref- erences of individual citizens. There is no conception of a public interest or common good and no conception of community as can be found in critiques of pluralism and liberalism by Robert Paul Wolff (1968, pp. 162-195) and others. Again, theoretical revision (as opposed to mere changes in tone and emphasis) requires clarification along these lines.

Most importantly, Dahl says that if we are going to be serious about democracy, then our "commitment to corporate capitalism needs to be re- considered" (1977, p. 15). If so, then it would seem appropriate for him to confront the arguments of contemporary democratic theorists writing from a Marxist perspective, the most significant of which is C. B. Macpherson, whose work has been neglected by most political scientists in the United States. Macpherson is a rather different sort of democratic revisionist, one who has attempted "to work out a revision of liberal-democratic theory, a revision which clearly owes a good deal to Marx, in the hope of making that theory more democratic while rescuing that valuable part of the liberal tra-

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dition which is submerged when liberalism is identified with capitalist mar- ket relations" (Macpherson, 1976, p. 423).

Macpherson contends that there is an unresolved tension within liberal- democratic theory that is rooted in two different and potentially contradic- tory models of human nature. One model, which can be traced back to Hobbes, Locke, and Bentham, sees individuals as "possessive indi- vidualists," as infinite desirers of private benefit, as infinite consumers of utilities. The other model, exemplified by John Stuart Mill and T. H. Green, sees individuals as doers, as creators, as exerters and developers of their human capacities (1973, pp. 1-23). Corresponding to these two models of the individual are two different meanings of liberal democracy. Histori- cally, it has usually meant the democracy of a capitalist market society. But liberal democracy can also mean (along lines suggested by John Stuart Mill and others) a society striving to ensure equal effective freedom for all indi- viduals to use and develop their capacities, i.e., a society striving to maxi- mize the "developmental power" of individuals (1973, pp. 40-52; 1977b, p. 1). Macpherson proposes that we conceive of democracy not merely as a system for choosing governments, but as a kind of society, as a whole com- plex of relations among the individuals who constitute the political com- munity. When we do so, the "egalitarian principle inherent in democracy" requires not only political equality, but also an "equal effective right of all members of society to use and develop their capacities" (1973, p. 51; 1977b, pp. 5-6).

Dahl's main objections to corporate capitalism are that it generates large inequalities in political resources and that it creates hierarchical struc- tures of private power that are not subject to democratic controls. Mac- pherson suggests that the undemocratic ramifications of capitalism run deeper, that there is a fundamental contradiction between capitalist market assumptions and the democratic ideal of an equal effective right to indi- vidual self-development. Moreover, there is an unresolved inner tension in liberal-democratic theory between the model of the individual as consumer of utilities and the model of the individual as the exerter and developer of his or her capacities. Liberal-democratic theory can become more fully democratic, Macpherson maintains, only if it recognizes this.22

22Lindblom, incidentally, does make reference to Macpherson's work, although in a rather misleading way. Lindblom claims, for instance, that pluralist democratic theory regards citizens both as seekers of want satisfaction and as "doers" and "achievers" (1977, pp. 253-257). In this discussion, Lindblom (1977, p. 376, n. 26) cites Macpherson's distinction be- tween individuals as consumers of utilities and individuals as exerters and developers of their own powers (Macpherson, 1973, pp. 1-23). At the same time, however, Lindblom fails to note Macpherson's equally important distinction between extractive power (characteristic of capi- talist market relations) and developmental power (Macpherson, 1973, pp. 40-52). Nor does Lindblom acknowledge Macpherson's general argument that the maximization of the develop- mental powers of individuals is severely inhibited in capitalist-market societies.

182 Lawrence B. Joseph

I do not mean to imply, of course, that Dahl (or Lindblom) should in- stantly repudiate his own position for that of Macpherson.23 Dahl would presumably reject the idea of conceiving of democracy as a kind of society rather than as a system of government, since he still defines democracy in procedural terms. I am suggesting, however, that a theory which proposes to reconsider the compatibility of political democracy and corporate capi- talism ought to confront the fundamental issues posed by Macpherson-a need to examine the basic assumptions made in liberal-democratic theory about both the individual citizen and the larger society. Both Dahl and Lindblom seem inclined to reassess their earlier evaluation of the contempo- rary liberal-democratic state. They have not, however, decided how far to go, that is, whether or not to move toward the Macpherson position of reaf- firming the central, ethical principles of liberal-democratic theory, but re- jecting "the present liberal-democratic society and state as having failed to live up to those values, or as being incapable of realizing them" (Mac- pherson, 1977a, p. 224).

Conclusion Sheldon Wolin has observed that political theories can be understood

as "paradigms"-not strictly in the Kuhnian sense of scientific paradigms, but in the looser sense of providing ways of looking at the political world (1968, pp. 139-140). Wolin also notes that the development of new para- digms in political theory often occurs during times of crisis: "The intimate relation between crisis and theory is the result not only of the theorist's belief that the world is deeply flawed but of his strategic sense that crisis, and its usual accompaniments of institutional collapse and the breakdown of authority, affords an opportunity for a theory to reorder the world" (1968, p. 148). Societies undergo political crises of varying magnitude when governments cannot respond effectively to rapid social change. Political theory undergoes a crisis when social and political changes generate an ac- cumulation of anomalies, i.e., situations which cannot be reconciled with the prevailing paradigm (1968, pp. 147-149).

23Nor am I suggesting that Macpherson's position is without problems of its own. Full consideration of Macpherson is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper. A few difficulties with his theory are worth mentioning. While one of the distinctive features of his argument is his conception of democracy as a kind of society, a corresponding weakness is his relative neg- lect of the problems of democracy as a form of government. He does address the latter issue rather briefly at the end of The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (1977b, pp. 108-114). Another problem is that Macpherson does not distinguish the issue of market mechanisms from that of capitalist property relations. For an attempt to separate these issues, see, e.g., Miller (1977). See also Lindblom's discussion of different types of market systems (1977, pp. 93-106).

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While recognizing that we are not dealing here with paradigm builders of the stature of Plato, Hobbes, or Marx (nor with political crises of the magnitude which they faced), we can nevertheless conceive of recent de- velopments in liberal-democratic theory in this way. During the 1950s and much of the 1960s, the prevailing paradigm was democratic revisionism, or the pluralist-elitist theory of democracy. We might say that during this period democratic revisionists were engaged in the equivalent of "normal science," i.e., puzzle solving within the context of the prevailing pluralist- elitist paradigm. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, various political crises began to accumulate into anomalies, i.e., into events or phenomena which could not be accounted for by the prevailing paradigm. While the crises of the 1960s have subsided, the issues that they posed for democratic theory have not. Put differently, various political crises have generated recognition of theoretical anomalies. For example, when Lindblom concludes that the large private corporation "does not fit" into democratic theory (1977, p. 356), he is acknowledging such an anomaly. When Huntington warns that democracy in the United States has become a threat to itself (1975, p. 114), he is calling attention to an anomaly of a somewhat different sort.

Some might say that "pluralist-elitist" democratic theory has been dis- credited or undermined, but no other theory has emerged to replace it as the prevailing paradigm in liberal-democratic thought. We might say, then, that liberal-democratic theory is undergoing a paradigm shift which remains un- resolved. More accurately, we might say that it is undergoing a paradigm split over issues generated by various political events of the past 15 years, as well as by theoretical challenges to democratic revisionism during the same period. This growing cleavage is manifested in the two contrasting "re- formulations" examined in this paper. Huntington and Sartori, on the one hand, and Lindblom and Dahl, on the other, see rather different problems in the theory and practice of contemporary liberal democracy.

The Huntington-Sartori reformulation consists largely of a restatement of earlier themes in democratic revisionism, with particular emphasis on the elitist component of the theory. They warn of the dangers of too much mass participation, echoing earlier arguments about the virtues of apathy, the need for democratic self-restraint, and the importance of elite leadership- all of which can be traced back as far as Schumpeter. In this sense, Hunting- ton and Sartori are unreconstructed "democratic elitists." As for the more strictly pluralist component of democratic revisionism, they accept the em- pirical argument about a multiplicity of competing interests, but avoid pluralism as a normative position. For the neo-elitists, the "crisis of democ- racy" stems from the articulation of too many interests and from too much democracy; the main problem with liberal-democratic theory is that it is too pluralistic and too democratic.

184 Lawrence B. Joseph

The Lindblom-Dahl reformulation takes a rather different direction. For one thing, they have downplayed the idea of democratic elitism, at least compared to Huntington and Sartori, as well as compared to their own earlier arguments. More importantly, perhaps, they have reassessed pluralism's earlier empirical claims about competing centers of power, hav- ing decided that the large business corporation is not simply another interest group. Here, they have implicitly acknowledged some of the problems raised by critics of pluralism. On the other hand, to a large degree, Lind- blom and Dahl remain normative pluralists, distrustful of concentrated power. For them, the "crisis of democracy" stems primarily from the con- flict between democratic government and concentrations of corporate power, and the main problem with liberal-democratic theory is its failure to recognize this. These revisionist pluralists, then, are faced with the problem of what to reject, what to revise, and what to retain in their earlier posi- tions. There seems to be a clear recognition that pluralist democratic theory is inadequate, but at the same time there is uncertainty about what kind of revision is required. Their reformulation of democratic pluralism is hesi- tant, cautious, and often ambivalent. Nonetheless, both Lindblom and Dahl have rediscovered a fundamental issue in liberal-democratic political theory that was submerged during the heyday of postwar revisionism-the problematic relationship between capitalism and democracy. Although they have not yet been able to reformulate pluralist-elitist democratic theory in a radical way, their shift in emphasis ought not to be underestimated. The revisionist-pluralist focus on the undemocratic ramifications of social in- equality and of corporate power suggests a very different direction for democratic theory than does the neo-elitist preoccupation with demand overload and the undermining of authority. These two approaches entail profoundly different agendas for liberal-democratic theory.

Manuscript submitted 17 December 1979 Final manuscript received 7 July 1980

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