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ConnectionsandDistinctions:PostKeynesianismandCriticalRealism

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Connections and Distinctions: Post Keynesianism and Critical RealismAuthor(s): Tony LawsonSource: Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Autumn, 1999), pp. 3-14Published by: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4538662 .

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TONY LAWSON

Connections and distinctions: Post Keynesianism and critical realism

What if anything is the connection between Post Keynesianism and the project of critical realism in economics? The following papers are collected together in the form of a symposium precisely because each broaches this question. Because they also connect with an earlier paper of my own that raises the same question (Lawson, 1994), I have been asked to introduce the current discussion and provide some background to it by way of clarifying my own position on the matter in question. This I am very happy to do.

The context of my earlier piece was the then recent emergence of a number of contributions questioning the nature of Post Keynesianism and whether it constituted a coherent project. On the latter issue specif- ically, many commentators were concluding negatively, some appar- ently viewing coherence as a near impossibility. My argument to the contrary was, and remains, that the more enduring and seemingly widely accepted tenets of Post Keynesianism can be explained and rendered mutually coherent by seeing the project as underpinned by the philo- sophical perspective recently systematized as critical realism in eco- nomics. I thus offered the suggestion that it is an implicit adherence to this sort of seemingly coherent philosophical perspective that provides the basis for coherence within Post Keynesianism. Here I shall sketch something of my understanding of the nature of critical realism, briefly defend the noted suggestion, and draw out some of the latter's more significant implications for Post Keynesianism.

The nature of critical realism

The project systematized as critical realism in economics is a broadly philosophical one. As such, it does not carry direct substantive claims or concrete policy implications. The latter are the tasks of the specific

The author is a Lecturer in the Faculty of Economics and Politics, Cambridge University.

Journal of Post Keynesian Economics / Fall 1999, Vol. 22, No. 1 3 c 1999 M.E. Sharpe, Inc.

0160-3477 / 1999 $9.50+0.00.

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4 JOURNAL OF POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS

sciences. It does not thereby follow, however, that a project such as critical realism is detached from, or external to, social practices; to the contrary, it is rooted in them (see, for example, Lawson, 1997, ch. 5). Even so, it is essentially an underlaborer for science, including social science; it cannot act as a substitute for scientific enquiry. Instead, it seeks to provide insights pitched at a higher level of abstraction than substantive theory. At the level of ontology in particular (i.e., inquiry dealing with the nature of being or existence), arguments are made for supposing that reality, both natural and social, is structured (it includes, but is irreducible to, actualities such as events and states of affairs and our experiences of them), open (event regularities are not ubiquitous-due especially to the multiple, and perpetually shifting mix of, causes ofevents), and differentiated (closures, sustaining event regularities, do occur under some, but only under some, very specific conditions, in certain realms); and that social reality in particular is especially dynamic and constituted to a significant degree by internally related totalities.1 However, it is not a part of the critical realist project to uncover or

investigate the specific structures, including totalities or processes (etc.), that emerge. Such work is down to the individual sciences themselves. Nor can or should critical realism suggest, at any level other than a very abstract one, the criteria that will prove relevant in any explanatory situation. These, too, are a matter of context and the proper concern of the

1 Two types of relations can be distinguished: external and internal. Two objects, features, or whatever are said to be externally related when each is what it is and does what it does, irrespective of the relation in which it stands to the other. Exam- ples include bread and butter, coffee and tea, or two passing strangers. A world of only external relations could be described as atomistic. In contrast, two objects or as- pects are said to be internally related when at least one is what it is or does what it does because of its relation to the other. Examples include employers and employees, teachers and students, landlords/ladies and tenants, etc. Ex posteriori, it has been found that it is positions rather than their occupants that are subject to the most inter- esting and enduring internal relations in the social domain. For example, teacher-stu- dent relations tend to endure even though the student occupants often change every year. Also, it is found that rules, rights, obligations, prerogatives, etc., are typically ascribed to positions rather than their occupants per se. Thus, the obligations and perks I enjoy as a university lecturer are attached not to myself but to the post I oc- cupy, and will fall on someone else if I quit my post and a replacement is appointed. Now it is easy to see that any position can be internally related to numerous others: e.g., a university lecturer to each of students, the university authorities, the govern- ment, grant giving bodies, etc. Thus, it is also easy to see that all the familiar social systems, collectivities, and organizations-the economy, firms, households, hospi- tals, trade unions-depend upon, presuppose, or consist in, internally related position- rule systems of this form. Thus, the social world is found ex posteriori to be densely populated with internally related totalities.

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POST KEYNESIANISM AND CRITICAL REALISM S

relevant science(s). Of course, many who have contributed to, or who are informed by, the project of critical realism, also engage directly in science including social theory. However, any resulting substantive positions and policy orientations achieved still do not warrant being distinguished as the critical accounts; all that can reasonably be acknowledged is precisely that they are produced by researchers acting on the basis of the critical realist understanding of the nature of science, nature, and society.

But why not attach the label "critical realist" to theories or explanations uncovered by individuals acting on the insights, or accepting the per- spective, of critical realism? Notice, first of all, that, given the open, dynamic, and holistic nature of features of reality, it would not be surprising if different social scientists informed by a critical realist perspective came up with competing explanations of a given phenom- enon. Indeed, they frequently do. Where they do, it is obviously inap- propriate to refer to any one explanation as the critical realist account ofthe phenomenon in question. Of course, a primary aim ofthe scientific process remains the pursuit of truth, and it is generally to be hoped that by way of subjecting competing hypotheses to empirical and other forms of assessment, an account emerges that is seen to outperform the others in terms of explanatory power, and the like, and thereby to gain wide- spread acceptance. But even if and where agreement of this sort is reached, there can be no supposition that the account in question will not be revised or displaced in due course. All knowledge is fallible, partial, and likely transient. Indeed, if progress is to be achieved, continuous transformations in even our currently most explanatorily powerful accounts are to be encouraged. Thus, at no stage can a substantive theory be said to qualify as the critical realist one.2 Critical realism is thus ontologically bold but epistemologically cautious.

Of course, not only substantive claims but also ontological ones (claims about the nature of reality) are fallible, including, needless to say, those systematized within the project of critical realism. Where the latter are found wanting, the outcome will presumably be a transformation in, or a transcendence or sublation of, critical realism. But this recognition does not affect the claim that critical realism per se is not supported by, and does not lead directly to, particular substantive theories.3 The relevance

2 For a lengthier discussion of this point, see especially Lawson (1996).

3 Rather, the defense of critical realism turns upon transcendental arguments starting from premises concerning generalized features of experience accepted by proponents and opponents of critical realism alike (see Lawson, 1997, 1998; Fleetwood, 1999).

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6 JOURNAL OF POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS

and sustainability of critical realism is quite consistent with the fact that a range of often competing substantive and political positions is to be found among those who contribute to the project. But, if the nature of the project of critical realism is as described above, and

there is indeed no direct link between it and any specific substantive social- scientific theory or explanation, the question arises as to the nature of the relationship of critical realism to a broad project or tradition such as Post Keynesianism. What, specifically, are the comections and distinctions?

Connections

I start with the connections. Obviously both projects are concerned in a significant way with relevance. But I believe we can identify more commonality than this. Here I want to reaffirm my earlier assessment that the possibility of coherence within the Post Keynesian project seems to presuppose (or warrant acceptance of) something like the perspective of critical realism. As noted at the outset, I claim this precisely because most of, and perhaps all, the recurrent and widely accepted nominal manifestations of Post Keynesianism are rendered intelligible, and I believe uniquely so, by the project of critical realism. Let me briefly expand on this claim.

In the previous paper (Lawson, 1994), I identified, as prominent, enduring, and widely agreed manifestations of Post Keynesian writing, such features as: a persistent opposition to mainstream contributions in economics; a heavy emphasis on explicit methodological reasoning; an enduring focus on uncertainty and historical processes; an acceptance of the reality of human choice understood as being able always to have acted otherwise; a prevalence of sets of competing substantive accounts of any given phenomenon; an association with the claims of certain classical economists; and so forth. Let me briefly consider each in turn and indicate why they can be seen as manifestations of something like the insights systematized as critical realism.

Contemporary mainstream economics, I have elsewhere argued (see especially Lawson, 1997), ought itselfnot to be associated with substan- tive claims. For a project perceived as the modern mainstream is acknowledged (by proponents and opponents alike) to persist (i.e., to remain the same identifiable project) even while its adherents formulate competing substantive claims and/or generate numerous changes in substantive fashions. The only aspect that remains intact throughout the numerous transformations and differences is an adherence to formalistic

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POST KEYNESIANISM AND CRITICAL REALISM 7

(and so) deductivist or closed-systems modeling. This feature must thus be recognized as the essence of the mainstream project. And the main- stream insistence on the universal application of fonnalistic methods presupposes, for its legitimacy, that the social world is everywhere closed, that event regularities are ubiquitous.

Thus, in consistently opposing the contemporary mainstream project in economics, Post Keynesians are acknowledging (whether or not explicitly) that the world is noteverywhere closed, that event regularities are not ubiquitous, that in general the world is open and subject only to localized (usually experimental) closure. In short, the continuing es- sence of modem mainstream economics is methodological, and in systematically opposing that project across its previous substantive transformations, Post Keynesianism is necessarily adopting a position that is overtly philosophical/methodological.

In similar fashion it is easily shown that the widespread emphasis on uncertainty, historical processes, real choice, and the like, reveals a commitment by Post Keynesians to something like the open, structured, and dynamic ontology such as elaborated and systematized within critical realism. So, too, the classical economists looked to by Post Keynesians can be shown to adopt the same sort of "world view." And, of course, the noted heavy Post Keynesian emphasis on methodology ties in with critical realism directly.

Parenthetically, I might emphasize at this point that if Post Keynesians do join with critical realism in accepting its exposteriori assessment that the world is open and structured, it does not follow (as some have supposed) that Post Keynesians ought thereby not to engage at all in formalistic methods such as econometrics. The possibility of successes with the latter requires local closures. But closures themselves have been shown to presuppose, and indeed to be a special configuration of, an open and structured system, that is, a special case of the sort of system that does widely obtain (see, e.g., Lawson, 1997). Critical realism thus cannot and does not rule out a priori their limited occurrence. Rather, critical realism adopts an essentially exposteriori orientation. And if the primary aim of the project of critical realism in economics in particular is to bring ontological considerations (back) into the economics picture and to indicate real possibilities in the social realm, it cannot determine a priori which possibilities are to be actualized in any local context. It can explain why exposteriori closures do not seem to occur very often in the social realm (given the latter's human agency-dependent, intrin- sically dynamic, and highly internally related nature), and it can and

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8 JOURNAL OF POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS

does indicate ways of proceeding in their absence (e.g., forms of contrastive explanation; see Lawson, 1997, ch. 15). But that is more or less as far as it goes with respect to the relevant issues. In short, critical realism can accommodate, and a priori does not rule out any of, a range of phenomenal situations, and thus is quite consistent with a limited or informed methodological pluralism.

So the opponent of critical realism is not the Post Keynesian or whoever, seriously attempting to find out if (or demonstrate that) in certain conditions some closed-systems methods or whatever could contribute to enlightenment.4 Rather, the opponent is the advocate of any form of a priori dogma. In the context of modem economics specific- ally, the primary opponent is (as it is for Post Keynesians) the current mainstream project with its a priori insistence that formalism (with its implicit, but hardly examined and ungrounded, presuppositions that clo- sures are ubiquitous) is the only proper, and a universally valid, method of modem economics, along with its effective prohibition on alternatives. What about the variety of competing claims found at the level of Post

Keynesian-sponsored substantive theory? As I have already argued, critical realism itself does not directly license any specific substantive theory; it is compatible with a range of competing substantive claims of any given phenomenon. This recognition, as I argued previously, thus holds out the promise that Post Keynesianism, if linked to critical realism, can legitimately profess coherence despite spawning a plethora of substantive claims or explanations.

4 The emphasis on endeavoring in a serious fashion to achieve enlightenment is not merely a "throwaway" line. I take such an approach to stand in contrast to, for exam- ple, the familiar orientation of many modem mainstream economists who seem to pursue given methods uncritically and unerringly, in the face of both repeated failure and persistent inconsistency of their practice and the theory they claim to follow, without concern for resolving the latter confusions, and for seemingly no better rea- son than that most others are acting likewise. The situation in most of modem econo- metrics is a case in point, as (critically) described by Leamer (himself a leading and respected theoretical and practising econometrician):

The opinion that econometric theory is largely irrelevant is held by an embar- rassingly large share of the economics profession. The wide gap between econometric theory and econometric practice might be expected to cause pro- fessional tension. In fact, a calm equilibrium permeates our journals and our meetings. We comfortably divide ourselves into a celibate priesthood of statis- tical theorists, on the one hand, and a legion of inveterate sinner-data analysts, on the other. The priests are empowered to draw up lists of sins and are re- vered for the special talents they display. Sinners are not expected to avoid sins; they need only confess their errors openly. [Leamer, 1978, p. vi]

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POST KEYNESIANISM AND CRITICAL REALISM 9

Distinctions

This latter recognition, however, may be a double-edged sword for Post Keynesians, which brings me to the question of distinctions between Post Keynesianism and critical realism. For, if coherence in Post Keynesianism is achieved through linking this project to critical realism in the manner suggested,5 we arebound to raise the question ofwhether PostKeynesianism, so interpreted, is ultimately anything more than a philosophical posi- tion. Is it indeed just a version or precursor of critical realism? It may not be intrinsically problematic if the answer to the question is yes. But I suspect many Post Keynesians presuppose, and prefer to believe, otherwise. If, however, Post Keynesianism is to be regarded as not merely

consistent with, but also distinct from, and indeed irreducible to, critical realism, it seems to follow that there must be some substantive assess- ments shared by all Post Keynesians that are not necessarily held by all those who accept the broad perspective of critical realism. I speculated in my earlier piece that these will lie at a level of generality below that of ontology but above that of most specific substantive claims. My question here, as before, is: To what extent is this the case?

There is a further and related potentially problematic implication of the above discussion. My earlier (1994) paper was titled "The Nature of Post Keynesianism and Its Links to Other Traditions." I raised the question of "links to others" because it seemed to me that other hetero- dox traditions, such as (old) institutionalism, Austrianism, and so forth, are implicitly also ascribing to, or striving toward, something like the critical realist ontology and general perspective. If this is so, if accep- tance of something like the critical realist ontology is indeed what connects the various competing heterodox traditions, the question also arises as to what distinguishes them. If there is an essential difference between these traditions, the differentiating claims, I previously speculated, must also lie in theoretical social-economic claims formulated at a level of generality below that of social ontology but above that of social-scientific explanations of highly specific phenomena. It is at this intermediate level, it seems to me, that competing heterodox traditions in economics must look to distinguish themselves. My further question at this point was and remains: To what extent is this achieved or even feasible?

5 It remains an open question, of course, whether Post Keynesians do value coher- ence of some sort (though problems clearly arise if they do not). I am merely con- cerned with how, ifcoherence is desired and pursued, it might best be conceptualized and achieved.

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10 JOURNAL OF POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS

Of course, I do not wish to suggest that broadly philosophical hetero- dox traditions in economics cannot themselves make a contribution to critical realism. On philosophical matters, the flow of insights can be, and doubtless is, both ways between critical realism and heterodox traditions. But I believe it is fair to suggest that critical realism does offer far more, and better developed, philosophical resources. The heterodox traditions in economics, it seems to me, still need to distinguish themselves primarily at the level of more concrete economic-scientific theory.

I might mention, parenthetically, that I have sometimes heard certain (old) institutionalists make the empirical claim that the institution con- stitutes the category (of social structure) that (in some sense) matters most in economics. Whether or not this claim (if more fully elaborated) is correct, and/or is accepted by the wide body of (old) institutionalists, it seems to me that it is precisely of the sort of generalized yet reasonably concrete and empirical nature that we are seeking. Certainly this premise is not an ingredient of critical realism per se. My question in my 1994 paper is whether any premise of a similar sort is or can be accepted within Post Keynesianism. This remains my primary question here, although it is not, of course, for me to attempt an answer.

Overlapping ambitions

Whatever the precise extent of the connections and distinctions between critical realism and heterodox projects like Post Keynesianism, I think it is clear that those who contribute to all or any of such endeavors are at least fully united in a quest both for greater relevance and for a more open, tolerant, and inclusive forum than is currently to be found in the economics academy.6 These two aspects go together, of course; a more

6Modejn mainstream economics, with its a priori insistence that we all engage in little other than fornalistic modeling (encompassing modem micro-, macro-, and econometric modeling) is, of course, a cognitive ill. Its perpetual failings, easily ex- plained by pointing to the generally open nature of social reality, indicate that its a priori universalizing nature is a constraint on open intellectual thought and progress. This much is clear. But the project in question is worse than this. Notoriously, it has responded to its perpetual failings and persistent inconsistencies primarily by attempt- ing to gag all alternatives. Most obviously, formalistic modeling has been reinter- preted as "core economics," a "subject matter" beyond serious question; alternative approaches such as Post Keynesianism, along with history of thought and the study of economic methodology, have been systematically removed from university curric- ula; journals regarded as prestigious provide little or no space for nonfonnalistic con- tributions; new university posts open to heterodox economists are even rarer, and so on and so forth.

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POST KEYNESIANISM AND CRITICAL REALISM 11

open and prointellectual forum, where competition at the level of ideas is encouraged, interaction is premised upon mutual respect for others, opportunities for all, and the need to be charitable to opponents, appears far more likely to lead to relevance. At least under such conditions it is less likely that methods with some hope of being fruitful in any context will be ruled out a priori, as is currently the case.

It is with the aim of moving us in these more prointellectual directions that groupings like Post Keynesianism have come about and persist, of course. Journals sponsored by heterodox groups are especially impor- tant in this respect. Certainly, in actions like encouraging the current symposium, Paul Davidson is accepting this prointellectual ideal for the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics. Similarly, this more open and positive orientation is reflected in the contributions that follow. And this brings me around to briefly considering the following papers directly.

All the following contributions, ordered alphabetically according to the first-named author of each paper, are reflexive, pondering the direction and boundaries of a more relevant project and formulating criticisms of others and/or positions in an informed but respectful and tolerant fashion. The papers that follow, indeed, seek to initiate as well as to resolve lines of thought, offering up a variety of interesting suggestions and assessments for criticism. Briefly, Sheila C. Dow kicks offwith a very accessible broad overview

of many of the issues central to the discussion. She provides critical support for the idea that critical realism, with its emphasis on ontology in particular, helps delineate Post Keynesianism within nonmainstream economics. Developing this theme, she makes a case for distinguishing different nonorthodox traditions according to their distinctive ontolog- ies or, more specifically, their different visions of open-systems reality. However, she also emphasizes the fallibility of, and importance of continually scrutinizing, critical realism, anticipating a likely two-way flow between Post Keynesianism and critical realism. In connection with this assessment, Dow is especially keen that any apparent incon- sistencies that arise between the two projects (between, say, critical realist findings and the inclinations of econometricians) be dealt with in a progressive and inclusive way, preferably via a process of discussion capable of leading to modifications either in critical realism or in Post Keynesian economic-scientific practice, or in both, as is necessary. She also stresses the view that the debate concerning connections and distinctions is really only just beginning. Paul Lewis and Jochen Runde examine the compatibility of critical

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12 JOURNAL OF POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS

realism and Post Keynesianism in practice. This they do by assessing the extent to which the contributions of Paul Davidson, one of the most significant and influential Post Keynesians, fit with, or diverge from, the output of critical realism. Mostly they find commonality, especially in the shared emphasis on ontology. However, they focus on differences, specifically strategic ones arising from choice of categories. Paul Da- vidson prefers to use various categories as employed by the mainstream, on the grounds that this practice facilitates communication. Lewis and Runde worry that this practice, whatever its strategic advantages, neces- sitates an insufficiently developed social ontology, despite Davidson's own intentions, which in turn inevitably inhibits social-scientific possi- bilities. By way of illustration, they are concerned that Davidson's numerous insights into the role of money and fixed nominal contracts in the economic process end up being undermined by his commitment to the orthodox vocabulary of stochastic processes.

Edward J. McKenna and Diane C. Zannoni reply to various earlier charges formulated by Stephen Parsons, also published in this journal (Parsons, 1996). Specifically, they address the claim that critical realism is inconsistent with Post Keynesianism on three counts: its conception of free will, its apparent lack of attention to social change, and its interpretation of Keynes' conception of convention. In helpfully clari- fying various critical realist commentaries on these issues, McKenna and Zannoni argue that, far from being inconsistent with Post Keynesianism on the issues raised, critical realism provides a frame- work for making sense of these, and other important, features of the Post Keynesian contribution. Roy J. Rotheim identifies those aspects of critical realism that he takes

to be the most significant before examining how they inform what he takes to be the most commonly accepted interpretation of the Post Keynesian program. He is particularly keen to assess whether there is justification for the claim that critical realism serves as a foundation for a Post Keynesian perspective on the economy. To this end, Rotheim interestingly elaborates a "Post Keynesian scientific ontology" of struc- tures and mechanisms relevant for addressing questions of employment, output, growth, inflation, and distribution. This framework is captured most fundamentally by the Post Keynesian conception of ontological uncertainty, the monetary theory of production, and the theory of effective demand. Rotheim argues that these aspects, which he regards as in some way the best components of a Post Keynesian economics, collectively express a framework that links comfortably with critical

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POST KEYNESIANISM AND CRITICAL REALISM 13

realism. Rotheim finishes, however, by speculating that the two projects may well be forced to part company over issues of public policy intervention, where Post Keynesians may feel that a reliance upon determinate formal models is indispensable. Finally, Bernard Walters and David Young reject entirely the thesis

of a connection between critical realism and Post Keynesianism. They argue that critical realism is not, after all, essential to obtaining consistency within Post Keynesianism, while its explicitly normative or prescriptive stance necessarily threatens the Post Keynesian incli- nation for pluralism. They lament the fact that critical realism pro- vides few methodological guidelines for Post Keynesianism, also warning that the association with critical realism jeopardizes the Post Keynesian ambition to provide a robust counterweight to the modern mainstream. Although collectively these authors adopt a variety of orientations,

pursue often quite different objectives, and draw a range of conclusions, they are at one in their concern for relevance, respectful and serious treatment of their opponents' position(s), and success in advancing the relevant discussion. Each is a significant contribution. Nevertheless, as Sheila Dow points out explicitly, the discussion and debate over con- nections and limitations are still in a relatively early stage, and there remains a range of issues of relevance yet to be examined, as well as competing and/or contested claims that warrant further thought and analysis. I suspect, too, that some readers will want to respond specif- ically to the contributions collected here. It is thus to be anticipated that this particular discussion will continue and develop. If it does, it is equally to be anticipated that it will continue in the constructive spirit of the episode that follows below.

REFERENCES

Fleetwood, S., ed. Critical Realism in Economics: Development and Debate. Lon- don: Routledge, 1999. Lawson, T. "The Nature of Post Keynesianism and Its Links to Other Traditions." Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 1994, 16 (4), 503-538. [Reprinted in D.L. Prychitko (ed.), Why Economists Disagree: An Introduction to the Contemporary Schools of Thought. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996.]

. "Developments in Economics as Realist Social Theory." Review of Social Economy, 1996, 54 (4), 405-422. [Reprinted in S. Fleetwood (ed.), Critical Realism in Economics: Development and Debate. London: Routledge, 1999.]

- Economics and Reality. London: Routledge, 1997. "Critical Issues in Economics as Realist Social Theory." Ekonomia, 1998, 1

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(2), 75-117. [Reprinted in S. Fleetwood (ed.), Critical Realism in Economics: Devel- opment and Debate. London: Routledge, 1999.] Leamer, E.E. Specification Searches: Ad Hoc Inferences with Non-Experimental Data. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1978.

Parsons, S. "Post Keynesian Realism and Keynes' General Theory." Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 1996, 18 (3), 419-441.

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