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    Lawsuit RefoRmor Competitive State eConomieS

    a Guide or State LeGiSLatorS

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    Lawsuit Reform for Compeve State Economies: A Guide for State Legislators

    2013 American Legislative Exchange Council

    All rights reserved. Except as permied under the United States Copyright Act of 1976, no part of this

    publicaon may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a database or

    retrieval system without the prior permission of the publisher.

    Published by

    American Legislave Exchange Council2900 Crystal Drive, Suite 600

    Arlington, VA 22202

    (703) 373-0933

    www.ALEC.org

    The American Legislave Exchange Council is the naons largest nonparsan, voluntary membership

    organizaon, comprised of nearly one-third of the countrys state legislators and hundreds of leading

    businesses and think tanks. The Exchange Council provides a unique opportunity for state lawmakers,

    business leaders and cizen organizaons from around the country to share experiences and develop

    state-based, pro-growth models based on academic research, exisng state policy and proven busi-ness pracces.

    The Civil Jusce Task Force promotes systemac fairness in the courts through model legislaon that

    discourages frivolous lawsuits, fairly balances judicial and legislave authority, treats defendants in a

    consistent manner, and installs accountability in the trial system.

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    tbl Cnn

    ab h ac Lgsl exchg Ccl

    Wh s Lws r

    usg h Bscs

    dgs rUnderstanding Damages to Understand How to Moderate Them

    elg ph dgs

    Accuracy in Medical Expense Awards

    Lbly aOnly Pay Your Fair Share

    Jg isRationalizing the Interest Charged on Lawsuit Awards

    pc Lbly rEncouraging Innovation While Protecting Consumers

    rgly Clc ds r

    Balancing Liability with Regulation

    tsss rssblyProtecting Property Owners rom Trespasser Lawsuits

    asbss Bkcy tssInstituting Transparency in Recovery

    tscy LwssNo New Unintended Lawsuits

    v r

    Filing Lawsuits in the Proper County

    ex ec rKeeping Junk Science out o State Courts

    Clss ac rKeeping the Class Action Mechanism on Point

    Cs pc S rPromoting Fairness in Consumer Protection and BusinessPractices

    Jy rProtecting the Representative Jury

    p ay Cc SshTransparency in the States Hiring o Private Attorneys

    al rscs

    4

    5

    8

    15

    20

    24

    27

    30

    33

    38

    41

    45

    48

    51

    53

    58

    61

    65

    69

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    4 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    ab h arcn Lglv

    exchng Cncl

    the American Legislave Exchange Council is Americas largest

    nonparsan, voluntary membership organizaon of state leg-

    islators. Made up of nearly one-third of Americas state elected

    ocials, the Council provides a unique opportunity for state lawmakers,

    business leaders and cizen organizaons from around the country to

    share experiences and develop state-based, pro-growth models based on

    academic research, exisng state policy and proven business pracces.

    The ulmate goal of the Exchange Council is to help state lawmakers make

    government work more eciently and move government closer to the

    communies they serve, thereby creang opportunity for all Americans.

    th pcss

    In state legislatures around the country, cizen groups foster ideas, par-cipate in discussions and provide their points of view to lawmakers.

    This process is an important part of American Democracy.

    The Exchange Council and its eight task forces closely imitate the state

    legislave process: resoluons are introduced and assigned to an ap-

    propriate task force based on subject and scope; meengs are conduct-

    ed where experts present facts and opinion for discussion, just as they

    would in commiee hearings; these discussions are followed by a vote.

    Council task forces serve as tesng grounds to judge whether reso-

    luons can achieve consensus and enough support to survive the leg-

    islave process in a state capitol. All adopted model policies are pub-

    lished at www.alec.org to promote increased educaon and the open

    exchange of ideas across America.

    The Civil Jusce Task Force develops model policies that promote sys-

    temac fairness in the courts by discouraging frivolous lawsuits, ght-

    ening loopholes that encourage fraud, fostering sound judgments, and

    installing accountability in the system.

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    WHAT IS LAWSUIT REFORM? 5

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    wh L Rr?

    apoll conducted in the summer of 2012 found that 89 percent of

    voters consider lawsuit abuse a problem and 83 percent think

    improvements need to be made to our lawsuit system.1While

    many recognize that the legal system needs to be reformed,few know

    how to go about doing this.

    This Guide is intended to give policymakers an overview of lawsuit

    reform policy and some of the specic reforms helpful to the end goal

    of tempering excess in the legal system and eciently delivering jusce.

    In short, lawsuit reform is policy aiming to reform state tort systems,

    the legal systems created to provide jusce to the wrongly injured. The

    commonly heralded reform of caps on non-economic damages is a type

    of lawsuit reform but is not the only reform. Enclosed in this book are

    discourses on numerous meaningful tort reforms, some more tradional

    and some more innovave and transparency based.

    t r Hlh C

    Tort reform gets discussed so oen in the health-care debate because

    of its parcular relevance to doctors. Doctors face medical malpracce

    lawsuits, claims involving injury allegedly due to the negligence of med-

    ical professionals. Occasionally, these cases are abusive. A 2006 study

    by researchers at the Harvard School of Public Health and Brigham and

    Womens Hospital esmated that 37 percent of medical malpracce

    claims lack sucient evidence of wrongdoing and are likely meritless.

    Certainly, not all of these claims are won, but ligang cases without

    merit uses valuable resources and bloats medical malpracce insurance

    rates. The same study found that the average expenses of ligang a

    case fall around $52,000.2 Thats just for the legal fees and defense costs

    without giving anything to the paent. $52,000 mes the 37 percent of

    cases supposedly without merit is a large number. Here, the current tort

    system ineciently transfers funds from the injurer to the injured. The

    Councils model legislaon is aimed at reducing such ineciency.

    Another argument for tort reform as part of health-care reform lies

    with the pracce of defensive medicinethe ordering and performing

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    6 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    of unnecessary tests, procedures, and referrals by doctors out of fear of

    ligaon. PriceWaterhouseCoopers esmated that the pracce of de-

    fensive medicine increased health-care expenditures by 10 percent or$210 billion in 2006.3 Ninety-three percent and 83 percent of doctors

    in Pennsylvania and Massachuses, respecvely, admied to pracc-

    ing defensive medicine.4 Thirty-eight percent of Massachuses doctors

    even admied to liming the number of high-risk procedures for fear

    of ligaon. The pracce of defensive medicine is adversely aecng

    both cost and quality of care.5 And reforms to state legal systems will be

    eecve in alleviang the concerns that beget the pracce of defensive

    medicine.

    Lws r h ecy

    In addion to being part of the x for strained health-care systems, law-

    suit reform is essenal in encouraging economic health. It supports a fair

    and producve economy by minimizing frivolous ligaon and boost-

    ing predictability in the business climate. In a recent study, business-

    es conrmed their consideraon of a states legal system when making

    such important business decisions as where to locate or do business. 6

    States with predictable legal systems that discourage abuse will be more

    compeve, and the Councils model legislaon is craed with such a

    purpose. Fostering reliable jusce will in turn promote a fair business

    climate and pave the way for job creaon.

    In tort cases, an average of 50 cents of each dollar spent is actually

    returned to the vicm, with the rest being spent on the costs of liga-

    on.7 The excessive expense of this inecient system oen gets sprung

    on defendants who are forced to pay awards and expenses inated by

    high administrave costs. By enhancing the eciency of the system, this

    burden can be lessened and fewer funds will be detoured from jobs,

    research, and development.

    Gls t r psls

    With the high cost of even ligang cases, lawsuit reform proposals

    should focus in part on ltering out meritless cases before they get totrial and rack up signicant legal expenses. Helpful reforms will fairly and

    cauously raise the standards to bring suits and lessen the incenves to

    bring weakly supported cases. Enclosed in this publicaon are numerous

    such reforms.

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    WHAT IS LAWSUIT REFORM? 7

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    Reforms should also consider removing loopholes in areas of the law

    that beget excessive lawsuits and that are noceably abused. The Coun-

    cils Civil Jusce Task Force works to spot these ineciencies and cralegal reforms to mend state laws.

    Lawsuit Reform for Compeve State Economies is intended to provide

    legislators with the basic training needed to understand and work on lawsuit

    reform. Take advantage of the Councils model legislaon and resources for

    further guidance.

    EndnotEs

    1 Luce Research Group, July 11-19, 2012.

    2 Frank A. Sloan and Lindsey M. Chepke, Medical Malpracce, Massachuses Instute of

    Technology (2008).

    3 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, The Factors Fueling Rising Healthcare Costs2006 (2006),

    hp://www.ahip.org/redirect/PwCCostOfHC2006.pdf.

    4 David M. Studdert ET AL., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in

    a Volale Malpracce Environment, 293 J. of the Am. Med. Assn. 2609, 2609-17 (2005),

    available at hp://jama.jamanetwork.com/data/Journals/JAMA/4978/JOC42215.pdf.

    5 Massachuses Medical Society. Invesgaon of Defensive Medicine in Massachuses.

    (November 2008), available at hp://www.ncrponline.org/PDFs/2008/Mass_Med_Soc.

    pdf.

    6 U.S. Chamber Instute for Legal Reform, Ranking the States: Lawsuit Climate 2010.

    7 Lawrence J. McQuillan ET AL.,Jackpot Jusce, Pacic Research Instute (2007).

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    8 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    How does a lawsuit work?

    Pleadingdurig pleaig,

    the plain submits

    a complaint to

    he cur allegig

    injury caused

    by the named

    efea a hedefendant has a

    specied amount

    of me to le its

    answer.

    discovery

    Discovery is the

    process by which

    relevant informaon

    is shared between

    the lawyers for

    the plain and

    efea (a a

    mes requested

    from third

    pares).

    TrialMost civil cases

    ha g rial are

    decided by juries.

    At the conclusion of

    he rial, he juge

    instructs the jury,

    providing it withspecic quesons

    that it must answer

    based on the

    applicable law.

    undrndng h Bc

    seTTlemenT

    A lawsuit can be seled out of court at any point during ligaon if the pares reach

    an agreement.

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    UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS 9

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    verdicT

    The jurys answer

    the quesons

    posed by the judge

    is the verdict. The

    jury weighs the

    evidence presented

    a rial reach a

    conclusion on the

    facts.

    JudgmenTAer the jury

    reaches a verdict,

    the judge is tasked

    with applying

    the jurys factual

    ndings to the law

    before enteringa judgment.

    PossiBLeaPPeaL

    A party may appeal

    a decision if they

    believe there was

    a errr i he

    interpretaon or

    applicaon of the

    law. Here, briefs are

    led on each side

    and oral argument

    may be held.

    seTTlemenT

    A lawsuit can be seled out of court at any point during ligaon if the pares reach

    an agreement.

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    10 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    Wh s l lg?During pleading, the plain submits a complaint to the court alleging

    injury caused by the named defendant. Once the defendant receives

    the complaint, it has a specied amount of me to le its answer. The

    defendant may also le a moon to dismiss, which must show that even

    if the allegaons made in the complaint are true, the law does not sup-

    port liability. Moons to dismiss are rarely granted and, when there is

    a deciency, it is common for courts to allow plains to amend their

    complaints. Here, well before the lawsuit goes to trial, legal fees and

    expenses start adding up.

    Wh s scy?

    Discovery is the process by which relevant informaon is shared be-

    tween the lawyers for the plain and defendant (and at mes request-

    ed from third pares). The discovery process typically includes inter-

    rogatories (quesons submied for response), request for producon

    of documents relevant to the dispute, and deposions of the plain,

    defendant, and potenal witnesses. In complex cases, discovery also

    may involve submission of reports by expert witnesses. With techno-

    logical advances and no shortage of mediums for communicaon, there

    is quite a bit of data to be shared. Between emails, computer les, text

    messages and phone calls, and data storage devices, discovery can bean expensive undertaking. In fact, in mid-sized cases , discovery is es-

    mated to cost about $3 million. It is oen the longest part of the li-

    gaon process. Aer discovery ends, either side may le a moon for

    summary judgment, through which a judge may nd that the plain

    or defendant wins all or part of the case, based on undisputed facts. If

    factual disputes prevent such a decision, then the case goes to trial.

    Pleading

    discovery

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    UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS 11

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    Wh hs l?Most civil cases that go to trial are decided by juries, which serve as

    the nders of fact. The size of juries in civil trials varies from state to

    state, with some providing a full 12 person jury plus alternates, and oth-

    ers providing for a small number of jurors, frequently 6 members. At

    the conclusion of the trial, the judge instructs the jury, providing it with

    specic quesons that it must answer based on the applicable law. The

    average jury trial lasts about four days, but complex trials can go signi-

    cantly longer.

    Hw s h jy ch c?

    The jurys answer to the quesons posed by the judge is the verdict.

    The jury weighs the evidence presented at trial to reach a conclusion on

    the facts. Its ndings are typically based on a preponderance of the

    evidence, meaning that it is more likely than not. This is a signicantly

    lower standard than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard used in

    criminal trials. Only about one-third of state courts require a unanimous

    verdict in civil cases.

    Wh s jg?Aer the jury reaches a verdict, the judge is tasked with applying the

    jurys factual ndings to the law. For example, if a state legislature has

    enacted a limit on the size of an award for pain and suering and the

    jurys award exceeds the maximum amount, the judge will reduce the

    award in accordance with the law before entering a judgment.

    Wh gs lg c cs?

    In most states, a defendant with an outstanding judgment must

    pay a bond to suspend collecon of the judgment while it appeals a

    Trial

    verdicT

    JudgmenT

    PossibleaPPeal

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    12 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    decision. (See the secon on Appeal Bond Reform for more informaon.)

    Appealing a decision typically involves each side ling briefs arguingwhether there were errors made by the trial court judge in interpreng

    and applying the law, or in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. The

    appellate court may hold oral argument in which each side presents its

    argument and answers the judges quesons. This process may take

    anywhere from a few months to several years.

    Wh css sl?

    A lawsuit can be seled out of court at any point during ligaon. A

    court may aempt to facilitate a selement through asking the pares

    to agree to mediaon.

    is h s lwss sl?

    Yes, an overwhelming majority of cases sele. Most esmates nd that

    somewhere between 95 and 98 percent of cases sele. But that doesnt

    mean that legislave reforms are any less impacul. Meaningful and fair

    laws on the books create an important framework to encourage appro-

    priate selement.

    seTTlemenT

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    UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS 13

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    Wh s ?

    Tort reform is a more technical way of saying lawsuit reform. A tortclaim is a personal injury lawsuit. Some prefer to use the phrase civil

    jusce reform because the need for legal reform oen extends beyond

    personal injury lawsuits to consumer ligaon, public nuisance claims,

    or even liability for harm to pets. Those who support tort reform view it

    as means for restoring balance to a system in which liability has signi-

    cantly and connually expanded over me, oen through court rulings

    in individual cases.

    d lws ys js c ss?

    A signicant poron of lawsuit awards against companies are paid by

    their insurers, but businesses also incur expenses. Small businesses,

    on average, directly cover about a quarter of their ligaon costs. This

    does not include the higher insurance premiums paid once a business

    becomes a target of ligaon. In addion, most insurance coverage has a

    policy limit and liability above that me must be covered by the business.

    Wh ks gs c b w lws

    c?

    Compensatory damages, including economic and noneconomic dam-

    ages, are most common. Courts may also award punive damages to

    punish misconduct. Plains can also obtain injuncve relief, which is a

    court-ordered acon or prohibion.

    What are economic damages? Economic damages are the amount

    of money that will fairly and adequately compensate a plain for

    measurable losses of money or property caused by the defendants

    fault. Economic damages include reimbursement for such items as

    medical expenses, lost wages or other income, and property damage.

    What are non-economic damages? Noneconomic damages are in-

    tended to provide monetary relief for aspects of loss and harm that

    cannot be precisely measured. They can include recovery for pain and

    suering, emoonal distress, loss of companionship or consorum,

    and loss of enjoyment of life. Given the highly subjecve nature of

    common

    quesTions

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    14 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    non-economic damages, and the signicant public policy implicaons

    of rising awards, about two-thirds of state legislatures have adoptedreasonable limits on such awards either in medical negligence or all

    personal injury cases.

    What are punive damages? Punive damages may be awarded

    against a defendant whose conduct was parcularly egregious. These

    damages are not intended to compensate a plain for an injury, but

    are used to punish the defendant and deter future similar acvity.

    Punive damages may be awarded when the defendant acted with

    actual malice toward the plain, showed deliberate indierence or

    reckless disregard for the safety of others, or commied fraud. Most

    states require juries to nd clear and convincing evidence of such

    misconduct to support an award of punive damages, a standard that

    falls between the preponderance of the evidence standard ordinari-

    ly used in civil trials and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard

    required for criminal convicons.

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    DAMAGES REFORM 15

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    Dg Rr

    Understanding Damages to Understand How toModerate Them

    to be able to understand the case for tempering damages (wheth-

    er through caps, rules, etc.), you must understand the categories

    of damages awarded and the purpose of those damages.

    Economic Damages Economic Damages Punive Damages

    Economic damages

    are the amount of

    money that will fairly

    and adequately com-pensate a plain

    for measurable loss-

    es of money or prop-

    erty caused by the

    defendants fault.

    Economic damages

    include reimburse-

    ment for such items

    as medical expenses,

    lost wages or other

    income, and proper-

    ty damage.

    Noneconomic dam-

    ages are intended to

    provide monetary

    relief for aspects of

    loss and harm that

    cannot be precisely

    measured. They can

    include recovery for

    pain and suering,

    emoonal distress,

    loss of companion-

    ship or consorum,

    and loss of enjoy-ment of life.

    Punive damages

    may be awarded

    against a defendant

    whose conductwas parcularly

    egregious. These

    damages are not

    intended to com-

    pensate a plain

    for an injury, but

    are used to punish

    the defendant and

    deter future similar

    acvity.

    In the United States, the tort system costs us about two percent of GDP,

    while in most developed naons, that number falls around one percent,

    a gap that cost the U.S. economy around $140 million in 2009. That

    $140 million represents an enormous ineciency in the tort system at

    accomplishing its core funcon, transferring funds from the injurer to

    the injured. These costs not only fall to businesses that are forced to pay

    Relevant Types

    o Damages

    The Problem: An

    Expensive and

    Inecient Justice

    System

    $

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    16 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    excessive awards for damages, but they are passed to individuals and

    businesses alike in the form of higher rates of insurance against liabilityand higher costs for products and services. Moreover, absent standards

    to guide awarding of damages, jury verdicts can be highly random, varying

    case to case and district to district. When a parcular torous act earns a

    much higher penalty in one district than in another, or similar vicms are

    compensated dierently in one district than in another, state civil jusce

    systems lack the crical characteriscs of predictability and fairness.

    Cs n-ecc dgs

    Placing caps on the amount that can be recovered for non-economic

    losses can be an eecve way of raoning damages to avoid exces-

    sive awards. A cap on recoverable non-economic damages helps to

    place value on inherently subjecve awards and provides guidance for

    awards aiming to make whole those found to have experienced extreme

    non-economic harm. From this, caps can serve to normalize an inherent-

    ly random system.

    Addionally, among tort reforms, caps are arguably easier to measure

    for their posive eect on the tort system. Businesses looking to open

    facilies in a parcular state and insurance companies looking to set in-

    surance prices based on liability risks will respond accordingly to this

    raonalizaon. And caps upheld over the long run can have the aect

    of tempering insurance premiums and encouraging economic acvity.The Councils Non-Economic Damages Awards Actprovides legislave

    language to cap non-economic damages but leaves the ceiling number

    up to each state.

    p mlls Ss

    Punive damages can be raonalized by ng them within a rao of

    compensatory damages (economic and non-economic combined). The

    Supreme Court has recognized that a 1 to 1 rao of punive to compen-

    satory damages may be the highest level permied by the Constuon

    when those compensatory damages are substanal, and only recog-

    nizes higher raons in cases with low damages or especially egregious

    The Solution:

    Guiding Damage

    Awards

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    DAMAGES REFORM 17

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    defendant conduct. The Councils Punive Damages Standards Actpro-

    vides guidelines for these damages mulpliers, for the egregiousness ofacvity that merits punive damages and for determining whether ren-

    dered punive damages are excessive.

    ll n-ecc dgs

    ALEC developed its Full and Fair Non-Economic Damages Actto aid in

    raonalizing non-economic damages in those states where caps may be

    impraccable or may face constuonal concerns. This model bill would

    ensure that only evidence relevant to the non-economic loss is used in

    determining the amount of non-economic damages awards. Non-eco-

    nomic damages are purely compensatory in nature, but oen plains

    lawyers aempt to use evidence regarding the extent of wrong-doing

    which is relevant separately to punive damagesin order to increase

    the size of the non-economic award. And such an increase in awarded

    non-economic damages can mulply any excess in awarded punive

    damages. The bill maintains the important disncon between evidence

    relevant to punive damages and evidence relevant to non-economic

    damages and enhances the opportunity for judicial review of awards.

    Caps on non-economic damages restore fairness while preserving the

    right of vicms to be compensated.The Councils model does not at-

    tempt to deprive true vicms of their right to be compensated fully forany monetary loss. Rather, it provides reasonable direcon for damages

    that seek to place a monetary value on subjecve non-economic loss, al-

    lowing for predictability and fairness for both plains and defendants.

    Excessive awards for damages aect more than just the pares to a

    lawsuit.Those who have never been involved in major ligaon may

    struggle to sense the impact on the public interest of certain businesses

    and individuals paying large awards. But excess tort costs create eco-

    nomic ineciencies that impact private investment and insurance costs,

    and in turn impact cizens at-large.

    Talking Points

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    18 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    Damages reform delivers economic results.As cizens of states like Tex-

    as have witnessed, curbing rising damages and rising liability insurancescosts can have a signicant impact on the business climate in a state

    and the lives of its cizens. Whereas rural Texans once worried about the

    decreasing presence of adequate medical professionals, liability reform has

    returned them to the state in large numbers to ll a crical economic need.

    A cap is inherently arbitrary and may be unfair to some plains. It

    is important to keep in mind that caps are not appropriate for economic

    damages. Any amount of denable and relevant economic loss should

    be recoverable. Caps on non-economic damages are merely providing

    guidance and normalizaon to awards that are inherently subjecve.

    Such guidance may be needed to encourage fair and equitable recovery.

    Without this guidance, juries may award damages largely outside the

    norm for similar injuries. A 2012 poll found that 75 percent of voters be-

    lieve that jury awards for these subjecve pain and suering damages

    should be reasonably limited.

    Caps may not be viable opon in all states. In lieu of this opon, states

    may consider the Full and Fair Non-Economic Damages Actmenoned

    above.Addionally, various aspects of punive damages reform may be use-

    ful. The standards for awarding punive damages in some states can be

    strengthened to properly apply to the most egregious conduct.

    Sticking Points

    and Questions

    rom the

    Opposition

    Steps in the

    Right Direction

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    DAMAGES REFORM 19

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    *

    *

    *

    *

    *

    *

    *

    *

    *

    *

    *

    ** *

    *

    **

    n-ecc dgs Cs acss h SsWhere states have mulple caps that dier by the type of case, we have highlighted the highest cap.

    States with Caps of $1 Million

    or More

    States with Caps from $500,000

    to $999,999

    States with Caps from $250,000

    to $499,999

    Cap is specic to medicalmalpracce

    Cap is indexed to inaon

    p dgs rs acss h SsMost states have both a compensatory-to-punive rao cap and a staonary cap. In larger cases, the rao will serve

    as the maximum cap. But in smaller cases, where the staonary cap is higher than what one could recover under

    the rao cap, a somewhat higher punive award is allowed. This map only reects states rao caps.

    States with a Cap of One Times

    Compensatory Damages

    States with a Cap of Two Times

    Compensatory Damages

    States with a Cap of Three

    Times Compensatory Damages

    States with a Cap of Five Times

    Compensatory Damages

    States that Only Have a

    Staonary Cap

    *

    States with Caps Based on

    Net Worth or Income

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    20 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    elnng Phn Dg

    Accuracy in Medical Expense Awards

    t

    he invoiced prices on medical bills are rarely paid in full by pa-

    ents or their insurers. When private insurance, Medicare or

    Medicaid covers the treatment, the healthcare provider will typ-

    ically accept a negoated rate that is signicantly less than the scker

    price originally listed on the bill. When a paent is uninsured, a hospital

    or other medical provider will oen write o the expense or accept a

    discounted rate. It is not uncommon for the prices for medical services

    reected on the original invoice to be three or four mes the actual

    price paid.

    But, in many states, when calculang a plains losses, a jury learns

    only the billed rates for medical care. Jurors are blindfolded from know-

    ing the amount actually accepted by the healthcare provider as full pay-

    ment for the bill. As a result, juries award inated amounts for medical

    expenses that include phantom damages. Phantom damages are por-

    ons of awards for medical expensesthe dierence between the list

    price on a bill and amount accepted as full paymentthat no one will

    ever pay or receive.

    Inated awards are troubling to defendants, just as abridged awards

    are problemac to plains. Either illustrates a poorly funconing legalsystem. When damages overcompensate a plain, funds are shied

    out of the business economy and can no longer go toward job creaon.

    Excessive damages based on bills that do not reect true expenses only

    serve to make an already costly ligaon system more so.

    The simple soluon to these inated verdicts is accurate disclosure.

    Where a plain or his or her insurer has paid medical bills stemming

    from an injury that is the subject of a lawsuit, damages should reect the

    actual amount paid rather than a rate inially listed on a bill. And where

    The Problem:

    Damages

    or MedicalExpenses Oten

    Exceed Actual

    Costs

    The Solution:

    Cover the Actual

    Price Paid

    $

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    ELIMINATING PHANTOM DAMAGES 21

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    bills are sll outstanding, damages should be calculated as an amount

    that would reasonably cover the bills.The Council has developed model legislaon, the Phantom Damages

    Eliminaon Act, that takes care to bring awards in line with actual or

    expected medical costs rather than billed rates. The legislaon ensures

    that plains are made whole, while avoiding inated awards. This

    commonsense soluon to inated verdicts gives juries the informaon

    they need to calculate awards that reect actual losses.

    Promotes accurate recoveries.The model act restores fairness to per-

    sonal injury ligaon. By determining damages for medical expenses

    based on amounts actually paid, the model act ensures that these dam-

    ages are compensatory in nature, as intended, and that the civil jusce

    system does not require defendants to pay phantom costs that exist only

    on paper. Defendants must fully reimburse vicms for their expenses,

    but they would no longer be held liable for costs that no party ever had

    to bear.

    Helps reduce the price of insurance for businesses and doctors.Phan-

    tom damages signicantly inate liability in all personal injury ligaon,

    from a slip-and-fall case to medical malpracce claim. Insurance rates for

    businesses and doctors reect this higher-than-necessary liability. Such

    costs are passed on to consumers and paents in the form of higher pric-es for goods, services, and medical care. Eliminang phantom damages

    in no way impedes a vicms access to jusce, but it provides real benets

    by reducing excessive liability that serves no compensatory purpose.

    How does this reform aect subrogaon?Subrogaon is a legal prin-

    ciple that allows third pares to recover costs they expended. In this

    scenario, a plains insurance company may be reimbursed out of the

    lawsuit award for money they spent covering medical bills. The Phantom

    Damages Eliminaon Actwould have no eect on such subrogaon. In-

    Talking Points

    Sticking Points

    and Questions

    rom the

    Opposition

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    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    surers could sll argue for subrogaon in states allowing it, and just as

    the awards would be more accurate for plains so could they be just asaccurate for insurers.

    Would this negavely aect healthcare providers? No. The idea

    behind this model act is to make sure that plains get reimbursed an

    amount that accurately reects what a healthcare provider gets paid.

    The model act does not regulate the ability of healthcare providers and

    insurers to oer reduced rates.

    How does this proposal intersect with the collateral source rule?The

    collateral source rule generally keeps the jury from learning of payments

    made to the plain by third pares, such as recovery from a life insur-

    ance policy. This is a much broader issue than perming a jury to de-

    termine an accurate award for medical expenses based on actual costs.

    The Councils model does not aect whether a state chooses to apply

    the collateral source rule.

    Prevenng admission in court of medical bills that do not reect the

    price actually paid is the most eecve way of eliminang phantom

    damages. If this is too large a step, then one policy opon is to disclose

    to the jury both the amount billed and the amount paid for the medical

    care. The jury can then consider and reach a sound judgment on thereasonable value of the medical care.

    Steps in the

    Right Direction

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    ELIMINATING PHANTOM DAMAGES 23

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    ph dgs thgh h Ss

    Allows the Recovery of

    Phantom Damages

    Limits or Prohibits the Re-

    covery of Phantom Damages

    States Law is Uncertain

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    24 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    Lbly apprnn

    Only Pay Your Fair Share

    i

    n a lawsuit with mulple defendants, fault is usually divided among

    them. One defendant may have contributed 20 percent to an injury,

    while another defendant contributed 50 percent, and a third defen-

    dant contributed 30 percent. Logic would tell us that Party 1 would owe

    20 percent of whatever the jury awards to the plain, Party 2 would

    owe 50 percent, and Party 3 would owe 30 percent. This, however, is

    oen not the case.

    In seven states, the rule of joint liability applies: a defendant one per-

    cent at fault could have to cover up to 100 percent of the damages if

    the other defendants lack the nancial wherewithal. Thats right, the

    defendant with a deep enough pocket may have to cover the enre bill,in large part because they can.

    In 28 states, some form of modied joint and several liability is on

    the books. One form of joint and several liability creates a threshold

    of fault over which a defendant may be responsible for full damages.

    For example, in Illinois, defendants more than 25 percent at fault may

    have to cover 100 percent of damages. In Iowa, that threshold falls at

    50 percent. Once again, defendants may have to cover the fault of other

    individuals and businesses in the market, an unfair shi of responsibility

    onto businesses with ample funds.

    In 16 states, pure several liability law is in place. Under several liability,

    each defendant pays what his fault dictates. Here, a defendant will pay

    what the judge and jury rule he deserves to pay and no more. A de-

    fendant 20 percent at fault would be responsible for 20 percent of the

    damages awarded in a case.

    The Councils Fair Share Actgives legislators interested in this issue

    The Problem:

    Penalizing Deep

    Pockets

    The Solution: Pay

    Based on Your

    Responsibility

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    LIABILITY APPORTIONMENT 25

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    guidance on how to go about the change. It suggests several liability

    over joint liability and joint and several liability.

    Legislates fairness. Joint liability and joint and several liability fail to eq-

    uitably distribute liability. They force defendants to pay more than their

    fair share.

    Avoids sing economic acvity. States with liability rules that place

    undue burden on responsible businesses will feel the strain. Businesses

    choosing where to locate take liability systems into account (in a 2008

    survey, 67 percent of corporate general counsel said a states legal sys-

    tem is likely to impact important business decisions, including where

    to do business), and this parcular issue is a top consideraon among

    businesses small and large.

    Avoids heightened insurance rates.When seng rates, insurance com-

    panies most certainly consider the legal climate in which any potenal

    future claims would be handled. If there is a risk of a business (and their

    insurance company) covering the legal awards associated with the fault

    of other companies and individuals, there is no doubt that rates will

    need to be higher to accommodate for the increased risk.

    Joint liability and joint and several liability ensure that plains are

    fully compensated in case of a defendant without ample resources.

    This focuses on the need to pay without caring who pays. And it fails to

    consider the hardship imposed by these laws on individual and business

    defendants that are forced to pay damages beyond their share. The tort

    system was created to make the injured whole at the expense of the

    injurer, and should avoid creang a new class of vicmsthose paying

    more than their fair share.

    Talking Points

    Sticking Points

    and Questions

    rom the

    Opposition

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    26 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    The Councils membership believes several liability to be the fairest

    approach to allong liability, but there are many steps to take in the

    right direcon. Instung modied joint and several liability with a high

    threshold in a state currently upholding pure joint liability would be an

    improvement, as would be implemenng a higher threshold for joint

    and several liability in a state with a low threshold.

    Steps in the

    Right Direction

    J Sl Lbly acss h Ss

    States with Pure Joint Liability

    States with Pure Several

    Liability

    States with a Modied

    Version of Joint & Several

    Liability

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    JUDGEMENT INTEREST 27

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    Jdgn inr

    %Rationalizing the Interest Charged on LawsuitAwards

    as ligaon oen takes years to come to conclusion and pay-

    ments may yet sll be delayed, damages usually accrue inter-

    est to ensure that plains are appropriately compensated.

    Historically, the common law did not allow for the charging of interest

    between the me the incident occurred and the me the case conclud-

    ed. However, as cases take more me to be concluded than they did

    historically, most states have adopted rules or statutes that allow for this

    awarding of prejudgment interest. Many prejudgment and post-judg-

    ment interest laws, however, set interest rates well above standard in-

    terest rates. For this reason, defendants can be required to pay signi-cantly more than the jury awarded, and arguably more than necessary

    to oset inaon. Set interest rates of 10 percent, for example, signi-

    cantly over compensate the vicm injured while the U.S. Treasury rates

    are 2 percent. Parcularly with the mul-million dollar judgments that

    were much less common in the 1970s and 1980s when many of these

    statutes were put into law, defendants get saddled with inated verdicts.

    The Council suggests common-sense reform that does allow for the

    recovery of interest on damages awarded, even prejudgment interest.

    Rather than xing these rates to numbers that may under and over val-

    ue awards depending on the economic cycle, the model Prejudgment

    and Post-Judgment Interest Actxes the interest rate to that of the U.S.

    Treasury.

    The model also allows for a 6-month grace period for interest accrual,

    acknowledging that ligaon takes me to no fault of the plain or de-

    fendant. Addionally, in part to counter any concern that lower interest

    rates would decrease incenves to sele, the model bill provides for

    The Problem:

    LawsuitsShouldnt Be

    Considered an

    Investment

    The Solution:

    Interest Rates

    Tied to the

    Economy

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    28 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    lower interest if the plain refuses a defendant-suggested selement

    that turns out to be fair and provides for higher interest if the defendant

    refuses a plain-suggested selement that proves fair on judgment.

    Furthermore, the model legislaon would limit prejudgment interest

    to accrual on interest for economic damages from the past, not for pu-

    nive and non-economic damages nor for damages to compensate the

    plain for future economic loss. Interest should only accrue on those

    payments that should have technically been paid in the past.

    Ensures that plains are accurately compensated and avoids incen-

    vizing prolonged ligaon.By xing the interest rate to that of the

    U.S. Treasury, the plain will be fairly compensated for the dierence

    in value of their loss had no injury occurred. Furthermore, by seng a

    fair interest rate and by incenvizing selement, the plain wont be

    tempted to prolong ligaon to boost returns and the defendant wontunnecessarily prolong ligaon on awards with interest accrual.

    Avoids punishing the defendant for mounng a defense.Defendants

    should have the right to follow cases through to trial they believe lack

    any merit and to appeal verdicts they believe are unfair and unjust with-

    out fear of addional retribuon. Excessively high interest rates may

    punish defendants for exercising these rights to trial.

    Minimizes responsibility on defendant for delays in ligaon they may

    not have caused.Defendants, plains, and standard court congeson

    may cause delays in the adjudicaon of a case. It is unfair to place this

    nancial burden solely on the defendant. Minimizing interest rates will

    help to alleviate this burden.

    Talking Points

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    JUDGEMENT INTEREST 29

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    Sticking Points

    and Questions

    rom the

    Opposition

    Higher interest rates encourage early selement.Fair interest rates

    pegged to U.S. Treasury rates adequately incenvize selements while

    ensuring accurate compensaon as opposed to overcompensaon. Fur-

    thermore, while a higher interest rate may encourage a defendant to

    resolve cases quickly, the plain may have the opposite incenve to

    prolong ligaon to accumulate more interest. Provisions in the Coun-

    cil model help to normalize incenves and encourage selement where

    appropriate.

    Moving to a oang interest rate is the most important and benecial

    provision in the model bill. Such a policy change will preserve fair judg-

    ment interest rates over the long term. If moving to a oang interest

    rate doesnt quite seem viable, lowering excessively high xed rates will

    provide some benet. Parcularly in the current economic environment,

    judgment interest rates may far exceed average investment returns and

    Treasury rates.

    Steps in the

    Right Direction

    Ss h t h Jg is r lg G is rsSome of these states e interest rates to the Federal Reserve rate, some e them to the U.S. Treasury Bond rate,

    and some e them to these rates but add a few percentage points to the oang rate.

    States with Floang Rates

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    30 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    Prdc Lbly Rr

    Encouraging Innovation While ProtectingConsumers

    Product liability ligaon is just what it sounds like: lawsuits

    claiming physical injury as a result of a defecve product. Prod-

    uct liability law has wide implicaons for both product safe-

    ty and consumer choice. When a product is unreasonably dangerous,

    holding product manufacturers liable can protect consumers. However,

    when liability is applied erroneously, prices needlessly rise and valuable

    products may be removed from the market.

    For example, gas can manufacturers have faced lawsuits in recent

    years for injuries sustained by individuals who used the product to pour

    gasoline on open ames. Despite signs on the gas cans warning that gas-oline and re dont mix and the expectaon that this is common adult

    knowledge, the expense of defending against such lawsuits put the larg-

    est U.S. manufacturer of gas cans into bankruptcy. Product liability law

    should disnguish between products that are dangerous because they

    are defecve and those that result in injuries because they are misused.

    In other cases, products that benet numerous consumers but may

    cause adverse side eects for a small percentage of people, may be re-

    moved from market because of ligaon. This may occur even when

    such risks are considered and the product is approved by government

    experts. See the secon on Regulatory Compliance for informaon

    about how this can be problemac.

    A few courts have even misapplied product liability law to require

    drug manufacturers to pay for injuries caused by products they never

    manufactured. The Supreme Court of Alabama held in 2013 that brand-

    name drug manufacturers may be held liable for the injuries of people

    who used a generic version of the drug. A competor manufactured

    and sold the drug, and yet the brand-name company, which invested

    millions to inially create the drug, is held liable. Such a transfer of li-

    ability is anthecal to the funcon of the free market. It discourages

    The Problem: The

    Lawsuit Blame

    Game

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    PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM 31

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    innovaon and could impede development of life-saving and -improving

    treatments.

    The Council has recently refreshed its Product LiabilityAct as an amal-

    gamaon of sound and meaningful state product liability laws. It sets

    forth generally accepted standards for determining whether a product

    is defecve because of a aw in its manufacturing, design, or warnings.

    These principals result in safer products and properly impose liability on

    those who are responsible for injuries. Among its secons is a provision

    that ensures that only the manufacturer of the actual product used by a

    plain is subject to liability in order to avoid misdirected ligaon like

    the scenario with brand-name and generic drug makers. The model act

    also provides protecons for product sellers, such as small retailers, who

    have not had a hand in the development of the product. The Product

    Liability Actis a useful resource for state legislators looking to improve

    various aspects of their state product liability laws.

    In early 2013, the Council approved the Raonal Use of a Product Act

    to provide a legislave answer to those looking to protect responsible

    businesses, like the gas can manufacturers, from lawsuits for injuries

    due to the unreasonable misuse of their products. The model policy

    claries product liability law to ensure that the reasonableness of the

    consumers conduct is taken into account when determining a manufac-

    turers liability. The Raonal Use of a Product Act, as well as several oth-er separate product-liability related acts, is incorporated by reference

    into the Product Liability Act.

    Aligns liability with responsibility.The Councils model legislaon en-

    sures that those actually responsible for an injury are held accountable.

    It would not impose liability where the injury is not the fault of the man-

    ufacturer named in the lawsuit.

    The Solution:

    Making Sure

    Responsibility

    Lies in Its Proper

    Place

    Talking Points

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    32 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    Creates an economic environment that allows product innovaon

    to ourish. Placing liability on a manufacturer whose product actual-ly caused the plains injury upholds the fairness and accountability

    needed for a well-structured marketplace to thrive.

    Keeps properly funconing products in the market. Where lawsuits

    arise from a persons unreasonable misuse of a product, the Raonal

    Use of a Product Act would help keep essenal items from being re-

    moved from the marketplace. It would not punish manufacturers who

    carefully design their products and provide appropriate warnings to con-

    sumers of potenal hazards.

    Expansive product liability is important to protect consumers from

    unsafe products.A product liability system funcons best when liability

    is appropriately linked to the party at fault. Blaming the wrong party

    does nothing to provide the right incenves to protect consumers. The

    Councils model legislaon will promote safer products while avoiding

    excessive, pointless liability.

    The Product Liability Actcombines a number of important product liabil-

    ity reforms in one locaon so state legislators can have a nearly exhaus-ve resource of product liability law xes. The product liability law of

    each state has its own nuances. Although some states have codied as-

    pects of their product liability law, courts oen develop a states product

    liability law through their rulings. For this reason, reviewing court rulings

    may be necessary to idenfy which reforms a state needs.

    Sticking Points

    and Questions

    rom the

    Opposition

    Steps in the

    Right Direction

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    REGULATORY COMPLIANCE DEFENSE REFORM 33

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    Rglry Cplnc Dn

    Rr %Balancing Liability with Regulation

    federal and state agencies are charged by legislators with the re-

    sponsibility of regulang, and in some cases pre-approving, cer-

    tain products and services. When developing regulaons or ap-

    proving products, government agencies evaluate the risks and benets

    of a product to its many and varied consumers and come to a reasoned

    decision. Some industries are subject to extensive government over-

    sight. Lawsuits that conict with the orders, standards, or approvals of

    government agencies result in unpredictability in the civil jusce system

    and confusion among businesses as to their legal obligaons.

    For example, if a drug provides signicant health benets to many butmay elicit an adverse response from a very small number of paents,

    should the drug be made available? The Food and Drug Administraon

    (FDA) may decide that so long as a drug is accompanied by specied

    warnings informing doctors of the risks, doctors should be able to pre-

    scribe the drug to paents who, based on their parcular condion, are

    likely to benet from it. Nevertheless, the few paents who unfortu-

    nately suer an adverse reacon may sue, claiming that the approved

    warnings were inadequate. Liability imposed in such cases may result

    in a product being removed from the market, making it unavailable to

    those who need it.

    Furthermore, companies that provide products and services that are

    heavily regulated are oen sued no maer what they do. If an aspect of

    a product does not comply with a government standard, then its devi-

    aon will most certainly be used as evidence of fault for an injury in a

    lawsuit. However, even when businesses carefully adhere to what may

    be a costly and complex regulaon, they sll face liability.

    It is important for legislators to evaluate the interacon of regulaon and

    liability and decide how best to make the two systems work in harmony.

    The Problem:

    Sued I You Do,Sued I You Dont

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    34 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    The Council has developed the Regulatory ComplianceCongruity withLiability Actto provide state legislators with opons for developing con-

    gruity between regulatory and legal systems. The model bill instructs

    courts on how to weigh a products or services compliance with regu-

    latory standards when deciding liability in a civil lawsuit. The legislaon

    would allow the legal system to work with the regulatory system, rather

    than undermine it, maximizing the ecient use of government enforce-

    ment resources.

    The Council took the many laws already in existence in various states

    to give the courts guidance in deciding how much deference should be

    given to regulaons when assessing liability.

    n Lbly Wh Cl

    In Michigan, if a drugs design and label comply with the FDAs approval

    (a process that takes 10 years and over $800 million on average), the

    product may not be considered defecve in a lawsuit. The Council took

    a similar approach based on the understanding that when a company

    has commied signicant resources to adhering to the law and when

    a regulatory agency has struck a balance in evaluang the benets and

    risks to the public, the agencies well-thought-out decision should not

    be second-guessed by ligaon that considers only the individual before

    the court.

    rbbl psAt least seven states have adopted a rebuable presumpon that a

    product is not defecve when it is compliant with regulaons. (A rebut-

    table presumpon is basically an assumpon that remains unl proven

    otherwise.) This opon operates under the idea that when a product or

    service conforms to government standards intended to protect the pub-

    lic, an individual would have to eecvely claim those regulaons were

    inadequate and overcome a higher standard than in ordinary cases. Un-

    der the model act, a plain would be able to proceed with a claim by

    showing that the regulaon at issue is wholly inadequate to protect the

    public from harm.

    The Solution:Congruity

    Between the

    Systems

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    REGULATORY COMPLIANCE DEFENSE REFORM 35

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    n p dgs

    Six states have adopted laws that do not allow punive damages when

    a product or service complies with regulaons. Early adopons of such

    laws focused exclusively on FDA-approved drugs, but more recent en-

    actment apply to all products. Arizona enacted a rebuable presump-

    on in 2012 that also applies to conduct involving services that that are

    authorized by, or comply with, rules, regulaons, or standards of a gov-

    ernment agency. The underlying policy for these laws, and the model,

    is that, at minimum, a company should not be punished when it follows

    the law. Under such laws, plains may recover compensatory damag-

    es, such as medical expenses, lost wages or other economic loss, or pain

    and suering if they establish that the company was at fault, but they

    may not seek punive damages, subject to the excepons noted below.

    n ay pc Wgg

    All of the opons provide excepons that permit liability even when a

    product or service complies with government regulaons. The limits on

    liability do not apply if a company misrepresented or intenonally with-

    held informaon from a regulatory agency during the approval process,

    secured approval of the product through bribery, or sold the product

    aer a government-issued recall.

    Encourages the regulatory and legal systems to work in harmony.By

    tempering liability for companies whose products are in compliance

    with regulaons, government agencies will be able to issue well-rea-

    soned regulaons that serve the public with minimal interference from

    lawsuits that may disturb such policy judgments.

    Provides proper incenves for regulatory compliance.By refocusing li-

    ability on those businesses whose products and services do not comply

    with applicable regulaons, business that comply in good faith will be

    appropriately rewarded for their eorts. This proposal beer balances a

    liability system that treats compliance with regulaons in a manner that

    is all scks and no carrots.

    Talking Points

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    36 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    Upholds predictability for businesses.Lawsuits that conict with the or-

    ders, regulaons, or approvals of government agencies result in unpre-dictability in the civil jusce system and confusion among manufacturers

    and service providers about their legal obligaons. The Councils model

    bill more clearly denes those obligaons, allowing businesses to beer

    plan and manage their risk of liability. A predictable legal climate, as

    supported by the model act, is a factor businesses consider when decid-

    ing where to locate or expand their operaons.

    Lawsuits are an essenal way to regulate businesses. The legal sys-

    tem is intended to compensate those who are injured for losses that are

    the result of anothers fault. Altering a product or service based on what

    happened to one of a few individuals is not necessarily in the public

    interest. This is especially true, as the model act recognizes, when a gov-

    ernment agency, charged with protecng the public, has carefully con-sidered and developed standards or approved a product or service. For

    example, a drug that may have harmful side eects for very few could

    save the lives of many. Were such a product to be removed from the mar-

    ket because of an individual lawsuit, the public would suer.

    These reforms give a free pass to manufacturers. This is not the case,

    nor would that sort of reform be construcve. The limits on liability

    provided by the model act apply only where a government agency reg-

    ulates and permits the parcular aspect of the product or service that

    is challenged in ligaon. Its provisions do not apply when a business

    has engaged in improper or illegal conduct during the approval process

    or sold a product aer a recall. A plain can overcome the rebua-

    ble presumpon against liability that applies when a product or ser-

    vice complies with government regulaon by showing the regulaon is

    wholly inadequate to protect consumers. The principle that a person or

    business should not be punished (through punive damages) when it

    follows the law should not be controversial or viewed as a free pass.

    Sticking Points

    and Questions

    rom the

    Opposition

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    REGULATORY COMPLIANCE DEFENSE REFORM 37

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    The Councils model Regulatory Compliance Congruity with Liability Act

    gives three opons for legislators considering how to harmonize their

    regulatory and legal systems. Where no liability may not be a plausible

    opon in a state, a rebuable presumpon that a business is not liable

    when its product or service complies with regulaons is a reasonable

    alternave. The third, more limited, opon, sensibly precludes lawsuits

    from punishing businesses (through imposing punive damages) that

    follow the law, while not impacng a plains ability to seek compen-satory damages. Some states have chosen to apply such reforms in only

    select cases, typically where they feel regulaon is most stringent, such

    as with respect to FDA-approved drugs or medical devices.

    Steps in the

    Right Direction

    *

    *

    *

    *

    *

    *

    Ss wh rgly Clc pss

    States with a Rebuable

    Presumpon for Compliant

    Products

    States that Dont Allow Puni-

    ve Damages For Compliant

    Products

    States with No Liability for

    Compliant Products

    States law is specic to

    products regulated by the FDA*

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    38 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    trpr Rpnbly

    Protect Property Owners rom TrespasserLawsuits

    in most states, the common law has upheld that landowners owe no

    duty of care to trespassers and thus are not liable to them for civil

    damages except in certain specic situaons. One wouldnt expect

    landowners to owe anything to those on their property without autho-

    rizaon.

    However, theres an eort afoot to subject landowners to unprece-

    dented liability for trespassers injured on their property. The American

    Law Instute, a council of legal academics, professionals and scholars

    that sporadically releases bodies of work called Restatements to guide

    judges in interpreng and applying the law, has released such a Re-statement that veers signicantly from the norm on this issue. If judges

    choose to follow the Restatement, which they oen do, landowners may

    now be subjected to civil liability for injuries to trespassers that occur on

    their land. The only excepon given in the Restatement is one ill-dened

    and with potenal to be quite weak in pracce.

    Landowners naonwide should be concerned about the potenal

    shi in the common law, parcularly those with unwatched properes.

    Vacaon home owners, railroad companies, ulity companies, factories,

    and farmers may all be at risk of liability for acvies inherently out of

    their control.

    If judges arent guided by state statute to prevent them from defer-

    ring to the Restatement, an already expensive legal system would likely

    become more so.

    To eecvely freeze the law and preempt the use of the Restatement

    to subject landowners to newfangled liability, the Council developed its

    Trespasser Responsibility Act. The model bill codies what is generally

    The Problem:

    PayingTrespassers

    under New Legal

    Theory

    The Solution:

    Codiy the Status

    Quo

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    TRESPASSER RESPONSIBILITY 39

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    accepted in common law: a property owner, occupier, or lessee owes no

    duty of care to a trespasser except in few, tradional excepons. Legis-lators considering work on this issue should take care to tailor the bill to

    their state. The intent is to codify the common law in a parcular state

    and to maintain the status quo as a prevenve measure.

    Keeps property insurance rates from skyrockeng under the proposed

    law change.Imposing unwarranted liability on landowners for trespass-

    ers could unleash unpredictable and undue cost that would result in

    higher insurance premiums.

    Preserves fundamental fairness in dealing with trespassers.No prop-

    erty owner should be subject to liability for unintenonal injuries of un-

    invited guests. As a maer of common-sense fairness, the model legisla-

    on would safeguard against such uncalled for liability.

    Keeps frivolous trespasser lawsuits from punishing law-abiding prop-

    erty owners. Lawsuits alleging property-owner responsibility for tres-

    passer injury that would not pass muster in state courts prior to the

    inuence of the Restatement would be maintained as meritless were

    legislaon to codify common law rules as intended.

    Would this legislaon hinder judicial exibility?The Councils model

    legislaon is intended to codify the rules judges currently consider when

    ruling on a trespasser case, so lile change would be expected from the

    status quo.

    Would this legislaon overlook exisng excepons to the no-duty-

    owed-to-trespassers rule?The Councils model was draed to include

    secons on many of the most widely recognized excepons to the rule.

    Any legislaon draed based on the model bill should take care to con-

    sider and include all of a states relevant excepons.

    Talking Points

    Sticking Points

    and Questions

    rom the

    Opposition

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    40 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    Some states may already have laws on the books that in part address the

    duty owed to a trespasser. These laws may be specic to categories of

    property owners, like farmers or businesses. Thus, in some cases, a law

    with wide enough applicability to preempt judicial use of the Restate-

    ment may be achieved with tweaks of exisng statutes.

    Steps in the

    Right Direction

    Ss h h pss Lgsl Sl h Trespasser Responsibility Act

    Passed Trespasser

    Responsibility Language

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    TRANSPARENCY IN ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS 41

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    ab Bnkrpcy tr

    %Instituting Transparency in Recovery

    f

    or many years, asbestos was widely used as insulaon and for

    other purposes due to its resistance to re. In the 1970s, as the

    dangers of asbestos were beer understood, and the federal

    government began regulang its use, companies that had used the sub-

    stance for years began to face lawsuits for sicknesses related to expo-

    sure to the ber. Due to the long latency period for asbestos-related

    condions, individuals are sll becoming sick today from exposures that

    occurred decades ago. To date, asbestos ligaon has put over 100 com-

    panies into bankruptcy.

    During the bankruptcy process, companies establish trusts to com-

    pensate those who were exposed to asbestos and might develop a dis-

    ease in the future. To recover from these trusts, individuals le a short,

    simple claim form with documentaon showing that they were exposed

    to asbestos-containing products of the bankrupt enty and developed

    an asbestos-related disease. Anyone who meets the criteria for payment

    gets paid. As the number of bankrupt companies has risen, the number

    of trusts, and the resources they make available to claimants, has expo-

    nenally increased. According to a 2011 report by the U.S. Government

    Accountability Oce, the number of asbestos personal injury trusts in-creased from 16 trusts with combined total of $4.2 billion in assets in

    2000 to 60 with a combined total of over $36.8 billion in assets in 2011.

    Because these bankruptcy trusts operate outside of the tradional

    tort system, there is lile, if any, coordinaon between lawsuits led in

    court and claims made with the trusts of the bankrupt enes. A law-

    yer can therefore recover for his or her client from one or more trust

    funds of bankrupt companies and then sue other companies in court

    for the same injury. Some plains lawyers may make claims in doc-

    uments led with trust funds that are inconsistent with what they ar-

    gue in ligaon. For example, a jury would not know that a plain

    claimed in materials submied to a trust fund that a dierent companys

    The Problem:

    Double Dipping

    in the AsbestosLawsuit Industry

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    42 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    products solely caused her injury. The lack of transparency results in

    double dipping, the potenal for fraud, and diminished funds for thosewho develop asbestos-related injuries in the future.

    Plains aorneys are paid to advocate for their clients and to get

    them the highest recovery. When mulple companies are responsible

    for an injury, or more than one method exists to obtain compensaon,

    plains lawyers can be expected to use all such avenues. When law-

    yers seek recovery without disclosing the whole story, the situaon can

    needlessly deplete resources for those who might develop injuries in the

    future, impose excessive and unwarranted liability on businesses, and

    damage the integrity of the judicial system.

    The Councils modelAsbestos Bankruptcy Trust Actrequires plains

    to disclose any claims made with the trusts when ling lawsuits. The

    model legislaon does not keep plains from both pursuing recovery

    through lawsuits and trust claims. Rather, transparency between the

    trust and judicial system would ensure that courts decide liability and

    evaluate appropriate compensaon based on all of the facts. The model

    act would avoid double dipping and reduce the potenal for fraud.

    Minimizes fraud.TheAsbestos Claims Transparency Actwould promotehonesty in civil ligaon by reducing the potenal for lawyers to tell

    one story of their clients exposures to asbestos in subming a claim to

    the trusts and a dierent story to a jury. Transparency helps ensure that

    each company that contributed to a persons injury is responsible for its

    fair share of liability whether through proper allocaon of fault at trial or

    being able to show that a now-bankrupt enty was wholly responsible

    for the harm.

    Prevents double dipping. This can occur where a company in lit-

    igaon pays what the jury believes is needed to make the plain

    whole, but then the plain les trust claims aer trial and obtains

    The Solution:

    Transparency

    Talking Points

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    TRANSPARENCY IN ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS 43

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    addional money. This gaming of the system is unfair because it facilitates

    duplicave recovery. The Asbestos Claims Transparency Act would re-duce the potenal for overpayment and preserve resources for those

    who may develop an asbestos-related illness in the future.

    The more funds, the beer. These people have been seriously injured.

    We agree that there are serious injuries out of asbestos exposure. For

    this very reason, it is parcularly important that claims are evaluated

    based on all of the informaon available and plains are not, in some

    instances, overpaid. Juries or trusts should decide, based on complete

    and accurate informaon, what is owed and who is responsible, and not

    merely write an open check. The model act helps ensure that compen-

    saon is available in the future.

    Does fraudulent acvity actually exist here? Yes, unfortunately, it

    does. A March 2013 Wall Street Journalanalysis comparing claims made

    in lawsuits and trust fund submissions on behalf of the same individuals

    found numerous apparent anomalies. For example, the study found

    that hundreds of claims to the largest asbestos bankruptcy trust stated

    that the claimant suered from mesothelioma (which gets the largest

    payout), but, in court cases or claims led with other trusts, claimed less

    severe diseases.

    The simplest, fairest soluon for addressing the problems caused by two

    separate and untethered systems for compensang asbestos claimants

    is transparency. The model act places a minimal duty on claimants to

    disclose their past and intended trust claims when also pursing ligaon

    against others.

    Sticking Points

    and Questions

    rom the

    Opposition

    Steps in the

    Right Direction

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    44 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    asbss Cls tscy acss h SsSeveral individual courts have adopted case management orders requiring the disclosure of trust informaon.

    Passed Transparency Legislaon

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    TRANSPARENCY IN LAWSUITS 45

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    trnprncy n L

    %No New Unintended Lawsuits

    w

    hen legislaon is silent or ambiguous on its enforcement,

    plains aorneys may occasionally bring cases encour-

    aging judges to nd what are called implied causes of ac-

    on. These causes of acon are rights for the individual to bring a law-

    suit and they are not arculated in legislaon but rather decided upon

    based in large part on the perceived intent of the legislature at the me

    of enactment. To illustrate, a piece of legislaon requires restaurants to

    post nutrional informaon for menu items in dining areas within 50

    feet of all patrons and lacks clear enforcement policies. One restaurant

    posts this informaon 55 feet away from some diners. Should an indi-

    vidual seated 55 feet away from the posng be able to bring a lawsuitagainst the restaurant for failure to comply with the regulaon whether

    or not they experienced injury as a result of the violaon? Or should

    this regulaon be enforced through an overseeing agency (perhaps aid-

    ed by consumer violaon reports) and with appropriate nes? That is

    a policy-making queson that should be up to the legislature. Courts

    considering single cases in a vacuum without consideraon of the wider

    policy implicaons should not be the ones making these public-policy

    decisions.

    As with many other aspects of the tort system and law-making, in

    this case ambiguity can beget abuse. Plains aorneys may take ad-

    vantage of ambiguity in the law to argue over the intent of the legisla-

    ture and push for a new right for the private individual to sue. Ligators

    spend valuable resources and me playing trial and error with the legal

    system in this manner.

    The Council developed the Transparency in Lawsuits Protecon

    Act to keep ligators from toying with regulatory enforcement

    The Problem:

    Lawsuits out

    o UnclearLegislation

    The Solution:

    Legislate Clarity

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    46 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    provisions, to safeguard legislave authority and government

    enforcement authority, and to protect consumers of the legal systemfrom unintended and unexpected liability. The model bill simply states

    that without explicit language, the court cannot hold that the legislature

    intended to create a new right to sue. This bars courts from nding new

    rights to sue without clear legislave authorizaon, which the legisla-

    ture is required to provide expressly. Eecvely, it creates a standard to

    preserve legislave policy-making authority.

    Facilitates predictability and transparency in the legal system. With

    the enactment of the Transparency in Lawsuits Protecon Act, plains

    know where a lawsuit exists and defendants know for what they can and

    cannot be held liable.

    Allows for the ecient use of resources.The legislaon helps to pre-

    serve the resources of courts no longer needing to consider cases alleg-

    ing implied causes of acon, thus helping to cut down the costs of state

    legal systems.

    Minimizes judicial and private speculaon about legislave intent.Un-

    der the model bill, legislators provide their intent and judges must take

    their intent at face value. The queson that most judges consider before

    deciding on the creaon of a new private cause of acon is What did

    the legislature intend to do? Instead of requiring judges to interpret the

    legislatures consideraons, the Transparency in Lawsuits Protecon Act

    would require legislators to answer the queson themselves.

    Creates fairness in the court system and curtails inconsistent results.

    This legislaon would help ensure the fair and consistent applicaon of

    the law. Removing judicial speculaon would decrease the likelihood

    that diering interpretaons of the law would be applied in courts.

    Talking Points

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    TRANSPARENCY IN LAWSUITS 47

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    Does the Transparency in Lawsuits Protecon Act aect negligence

    per se claims? The model language would have no eect on exisng

    causes of acon that rely on statutes to show negligence or wrongful

    conduct. In fact, the model bill was amended to make this point explic-

    itly clear. Rather, the model legislaon xes the possibility of loopholes

    that would allow claims to move forward without tangible injury.

    Where the Transparency in Lawsuits Protecon Act is not law, legislators

    can focus on legislang and enforcing with clarity. They can be specic

    in enforcement provisions and go so far as to insert language explicitly

    stang their legislave intent on enforcement and the creaon of new

    causes of acon. The Councils Civil Jusce Task Force developed the

    Transparency in Lawsuits Protecon Actwhen legislave members real-

    ized how oen they had to include the same clarifying language in legis-

    laon: nothing in this Act is intended to create a claim or remedy for a

    violaon of a state law where the legislature did not establish a private

    right of acon. The Transparency in Lawsuits Protecon Actsimplies

    this requirement and sets a default standard, but just being precise in

    legislaon could go a long way toward preserving clarity in enforcement

    and keeping unintended lawsuits from being led.

    Sticking Points

    and Questions

    rom the

    Opposition

    Steps in the

    Right Direction

    Ss h H pss Lgsl Sl h Transparency inLawsuits Protection Act

    Passed the Act

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    48 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    Vn Rr

    Filing Lawsuits in the Proper County

    t

    hose unfamiliar with the procedures of ling lawsuits will likely

    be equally unfamiliar with the venue opons plains have. In

    ling a case, a plain can choose the court to host his case

    based on guidelines that are somemes vague. At mes the choice is

    dependant upon convenience variables like the locaon of the plain

    or the locaon of the torous incident. Somemes, however, plains

    aorneys may have experienal knowledge of the tendencies, rules, and

    judges in parcular counes and will use this knowledge to choose the

    venue most likely to return them a favorable outcome. Plains aor-

    neys themselves have called these magic jurisdicons, a phrase coined

    by tort baron Dickie Scruggs. He elaborated, Its almost impossible toget a fair trial if youre a defendant in some of these places... These cas-

    es are not won in the courtroom. Theyre won on the back roads long

    before the case goes to trial.

    Bill Wagner, a super lawyer in Tampa, Florida adds, I used to be able

    to sue the Seaboard Airline Railroad any place I wanted to where they

    had a railroad staon, and therefore I would go to the place where the

    jury would likely give me the most money. Some counes are more like-

    ly to have less favorable views of the defendant in a case; some counes

    may be more lenient with evidence rules. A variety of factors go into

    creang these magic jurisdicons.

    Parcularly troubling in these situaons is that cases ock to areas

    supposedly more lenient to the plain, clogging the court systems in

    these regions and burdening the local economy with the paycheck for

    the court costs and legal services of nonresidents. This has been most

    aptly described by Victor Schwartz, tort reform scholar and the Councils

    Civil Jusce Task Force Co-Chair, as Ligaon Tourism.

    The Problem:

    Shopping or

    the Magic CourtJurisdiction

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    VENUE REFORM 49

    TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE

    The Council developed its Intrastate Forum Shopping Abuse Reform Actto ensure that lawsuits are brought in jurisdicons with which they have

    a tangible connecon. The legislaon allows cases to be brought in ei-

    ther the residence county of the plain, the place in which the incident

    occurred, or the county in which the defendant or its principal in-state

    oce is located. For cases with mulple plains, each plain would

    have to show a relaonship with the venue county or that bringing the

    case in the parcular venue is a maer of convenience for the case and

    does not impede jusce.

    Prevents forum shopping and inslls logic and fairness in the system.

    Plains will no longer be able to cherry pick their venues and favor

    those districts that have been termed magic jurisdicons. The model

    bill creates a system based on logic in that it requires a standard rela-

    onship between the pares of a lawsuit and the jurisdicon in which

    their case is heard.

    Encourages delivery of speedier jusce and more fairly spreads court

    caseloads.With fewer excess cases brought in jackpot jurisdicons,

    these jurisdicons will have more me to spend on residents legal mat-

    ters. Encouraging a spaal relaonship between cases and the counes

    in which they are brought will serve to normalize case loads in relaonto residents.

    Preserves tax-dollar-funded court expenses for the benet of local tax-

    payers.With proper venue reform rules in place, taxpayers in jackpot

    jurisdicons wont be saddled with the court expenses associated with

    supporng the legal claims of nonresidents.

    The Solution:

    Find the Rational

    Venue or Each

    Case

    Talking Points

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    50 LAWSUIT REFORM FOR COMPETITIVE STATE ECONOMIES

    AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL

    The plain brings the lawsuit, so the plain should decide the

    venue. The Councils model policy sll allows plains a relave

    choice in where to bring suit, but the choice is limited to reasonably

    related venues. Some plains aorneys have admied the unfairness

    of overly exible venue laws. Bill Wagner, the major plains aorney

    menoned previously, notes that the law was changed. Everybody rec-

    ognized that was unfair. I now have to sue them where the accident hap-

    pened or at their home place of business. Those are my two choices.

    Any step toward ghtening the venue requirements in states will be

    benecial. The model bill


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