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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

79

Chapter Four: Institutionalisation of the

Global Information Order

This chapter attempts to explain the role of

international organisations in coordinating the material and

discursive power of the dominant social forces in the global

information order. The ITU and the WSIS are selected for

analysis in this chapter due to their relevance for ICAIS.

The first section deals with ITU‘s transformation in

terms of objective, organisational model and membership

following the changes in the pattern of production of ICT. The

ITU tackled the ICAIS dispute was as part of its new mission

of supporting liberalisation and deregulation of the

international telecommunications market.

The second section discusses the articulation of the

information society and communication society visions and

strategies at the World Summit on Information Society.

The ITU and the Global Information Order

The first sub-section highlights the original mandate of

the ITU and how it accommodated the concerns of its developing

country members. The second sub-section traces the changes in

political philosophy and organisational mission introduced in

the 1980s and 1990s. The third sub-section elaborates the

change in ITU‘s telecommunication settlement rates and its

impact on ICAIS.


80

Origins of the ITU development mandate

The ITU has regulatory, distributive, and developmental

functions. In particular, it is responsible for

standardisation of telecommunications services and equipment,

allocation of radio spectrum and orbital slots, setting tariff

rates for international telecommunications services, and

development assistance to third world countries (ITU, 2005;

Cowhey and Aronson, 1991).

Members of the ITU include states and private operating

agencies. The former are represented in the highest organ of

the ITU, the Plenipotentiary Conference, which is held every

four years. Recognised Private Operating Agencies (RPOAs) i.e.

operators endorsed by their respective governments, were

allowed to have a non-voting membership since 1976. These

bodies together with International Standard Organisations

(ISOs), which were brought on board since 1989, play a central

role in the standard making process of the ITU. The conference

draws up the Union's general policies, strategic and financial

plans, and elects the senior management team (ITU, 2005).

The members of the ITU embraced two central values.

Firstly, they viewed telecommunications activities as services

provided by single designated national operators. The only

exceptions were the US, UK and Japan which had multiple

providers of telecommunications services. ITU's role was to

facilitate cooperation between these designated Post,

Telephone, and Telegraph (PTTs) providers for the exchange of

international telecommunications traffic. The idea of joint

ownership of telecommunications facilities between the


81

national monopolies justified this cooperation (Rutkowski,

1991, p.292).

Secondly, telecommunications services were agreed to be

public services, not tradable items. The ITU, unlike the GATT

or WTO, did not aim to provide a multilateral framework of a

global telecommunication market. There was no direct

relationship between users in the originating country and the

telecommunications operator in the destination country.

Besides, each national operator had sovereign right to

regulate its local telecommunications services (Woodrow,

1991).

The ITU incorporated a development assistance role to

respond to the needs of its developing country members. In the

1970s, the North-South conflict occupied the organisation like

the other UN specialised agencies. The developing country

members demanded abolition of inequities in international

tariffs, access to radio frequency spectrum and geostationary

satellite orbit, and transfer of technology, equipment, and

systems (Segal, 1983, p.330)

The Nairobi Plenipotentiary Conference of 1982

entertained the North-South conflict in the ITU. At the time

this conference, the movement for the New International

Economic Order (NIEO) was an international agenda. The cause

of disagreement in the ITU related to access to funds for

technical assistance to the developing countries. The ITU's

major source of funds for its development activities was the

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). As multilateral

aid was declining and UNDP financing was insufficient, many

developing countries requested for diversion of the regular

budget of the ITU to fund technical assistance. The developed


82

country members, on the other hand, insisted that aid should

be provided only through the UNDP.

As a compromise, the Conference participants agreed to

establish a special voluntary programme for technical

cooperation that would solicit finance and other forms of

assistance. In addition, an International Commission for

Worldwide Telecommunications Development, commonly known as

the Maitland Commission, was set up to identify mechanisms of

resource transfer to the poor countries (Näslund, 1983).

The Conference resolution to establish this commission

referred to the MacBride report. The latter was also based on

a similar study to address the communication imbalances

between the North and the South. One of the measures

recommended by MacBride report was the establishment of an

International Programme for the Development of Communication

(IPDC). This organ was later established under UNESCO.

However, funding problems faced by the IPDC led to its failure

to address the needs of developing countries (Carlsson, 2003,

p.25).

The Maitland Commission also made a number of specific

recommendations to address the problem of "financing the

development of telecommunications" in the third world. One of

the observations made by the commission was that opening up

the telecommunications equipment market on a competitive basis

would ensure access to technology. The finding of the

Commission about this market was that it had excess capacity

while, at the same time, developing countries had a lot of

unmet demand for telecommunications. In view of this, the

Commission surmised that developing countries have a strong

bargaining position and that they can demand open tendering,

international bid on prices and repayment terms (The


83

Independent Commission for Worldwide Telecommunications

Development, 1984, p.57).

Apart from the market solution, the Maitland Commission

explored such mechanisms like a revolving fund and

Telecommunications Investment Trust to finance development in

the third world23. However, the most practical source of fund

for modernisation of third world telecommunications was the

cash receipt from international calls. Third world

telecommunications agencies derived their revenue mainly from

termination of long distance calls from developed countries.

Generally, there is more incoming call from developed

countries to developing countries than vice versa. This

traffic imbalance worked to the advantage of developing

countries24.

The accounting rate system implements the principle of

joint ownership of facilities by member states by allocating

the cost of provision of this service among the carriers

involved in a transaction. The accounting rate is a

bilaterally negotiated rate for average cost per minute of a

23 A Centre for Telecommunications Development was set up by the ITU

as recommended by the Maitland Commission. The function of the centre was

to consult developing countries on matters of organization, planning,

maintenance, tariff policy, etc. The centre, which came into existence in

1987, was financed by the private sector and the World Bank (Cowhey &

Aronson, 1991, p.309). As its budget was inadequate, however, the centre

could provide only a limited consultancy service.

24 Accounting for international telecommunications between and among

countries was carried out within an international framework of standards

known as Recommendations, developed and approved by members of the ITU. The

specific body entrusted with this task was the International Telegraph and

Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), now known as the

Telecommunications Standardization Sector (ITU-T) (Stern & Kelly, 1997, pp

3-4).


84

call between countries A and B. It is usually stated in U.S.

dollars or Special Drawing Rights per minute of traffic

(Thuswaldner, 2000). Afterwards, the originating carrier shall

share the revenue it acquired from the caller in its

jurisdiction with the destination carrier. In other words, the

latter shall be reimbursed by the call-originating carrier for

the cost of termination. The amount of this reimbursement is

fixed in a separate rate known as the settlement rate.

In principle, the settlement rate is 50/50.Though there

are a variety of settlement methods, the equal sharing of the

accounting revenue is the most commonly used one. Accordingly,

if the accounting rate between A and B is $1.00 per minute,

then one pays to the other $0.50 per minute to deliver each

call to its destination. Therefore, if more calls have been

terminated in a country than originating in it, the telephone

company of that country receives a net settlement.

Consequently, the direction of the traffic determines which

operator has to pay the settlement (Minges, Kelly & Staple,

1996, p. 16).

Developing countries have been beneficiaries of the

accounting rate system. For example, Ethiopia had 60% of its

telecommunications revenue derived from international calls,

most of it from net settlement payments. However, the largest

recipients of the benefit were still countries like Mexico,

Canada, Japan, China, India and South Korea. Sub- Saharan

Africa received only 2% of the total in 1996/7. Socio-

political factors like immigration, population size, proximity

with trading partners also influence volume of traffic, and

hence receipt of settlement payments (Deane, 1998, pp.6-7).

In spite of this limitation, for the poorest countries,

the revenue derived from the settlement payment is the single


85

most important source of finance. Firstly, many developing

countries do not have access to credit, or if they receive

credit, it is at a high interest rate. Hence, the foreign

exchange earnings from the accounting rate system are even

irreplaceable. Secondly, the cost of equipment and lease of

cable and satellite system demand upfront payment for which

these countries lack the financial resources. Thirdly, least

developed countries cannot afford to open direct telephone

links with many countries. Thus, they have to pay for transit.

As a result, the cost of telephone call from these countries

is higher than from developed countries. More importantly,

providing access to people living in the rural areas is

expensive in these countries, as it requires huge

infrastructure investment (Deane, 1998, p.10). The Maitland

Commission recommended creation of a special fund for

accumulation of a fixed part of the receipt from the net

settlement. Thus, the ITU would be able to make disbursement

for telecommunications development projects from this fund.

The development mandate of the ITU was revamped following

the transformation of the telecommunication industry in the

1990s. A case in point is the freezing of the ITU initiative

to introduce subsidy scheme for infrastructure construction in

developing countries25.

25 The value of a network increases for previous customers when new

customers join a network. Thus, as per the request of developing country

members of ITU, a study was conducted to determine the positive

externalities accruing to developed country networks due to new customers

in developing countries joining their national networks. According to a

study conducted by Neu (2004), a 1% increase in fixed and mobile

subscription in a developing country leads to a 0.66% increase in calls

from and to USA. In the new telecommunication environment, subsidies from

developed countries to finance infrastructure construction in developing

countries could be justified on such grounds only. The externality premium

paid by the rich telcos is conditional. It should a) be used exclusively


86

In the discussion of this initiative at the ITU, the

principal participants were Vodafone, MCI, FCC, and KDDI (Neu,

2003). The main objection raised by these transnational

corporations was that this subsidisation scheme entails

additional burdens on their clients26. Hence, 22 developed

country members rejected the final recommendation.

The next sub-section discusses the nature and scope of

the changes in the ITU and the implications of these changes

to developing countries. It also explains how these changes

affected the approach adopted to address the issue of ICAIS.

ITU in a changing business environment

International telecommunications as a non-tradable

service run by national monopolies faced a challenge in the

momentum of international trade liberalisation in the 1980s.

At the 1986 Punta del Este multilateral round of trade

negotiations, a step was taken to incorporate these components

into the existing GATT regime (Drake & Noam, 1997).The push

came from large corporations such as American Express,

Citicorp and Reuters, which are major telecommunications user

groups in developed countries. These transnational

corporations had opened up branches and subsidiaries or sales

outlets in far-flung areas in search of cheap labour, tax

for extending networks and awareness campaigns and b) have a positive

effect on the number of customers (ITU-T Study Group 3,2008(a)).

26 The ITU has made it clear that ―Membership to ITU-T is a means to

actively take part in the Sector‘s standardization work and thus secure an

influence of a company's business goals and policies on the development of

standards within its business sphere‖ (http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-

T/membership/Pages/why.aspx ) .

http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/membership/Pages/why.aspx

http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/membership/Pages/why.aspx


87

haven and profit repatriation. This meant that their

telecommunications fees constituted a significant portion of

their cost of production. As a result, telecommunications,

both as a service sector and a mode of delivery for other

services, became key issue of trade liberalisation

negotiations led by the US27 (Woodrow, 1991).

The ITU, as the organisation responsible for regulation

of international telecommunications, had to handle these

changes. Most member states and monopoly telecommunications

providers in the ITU were initially cautious and concerned

about this takeover of the mandate of the organisation by

trade officials. Besides, though ITU had also some members

with competitive service providers, it never had a drive to

promote progressive liberalisation of international

telecommunications.

In addition to the organisational philosophy of the ITU,

its voting procedure also allowed active participation by

developing countries. The equal vote system gave full rights

to each member, at least formally. However, the preponderance

of developing countries in ITU has a limited significance

since the organisation relied on financial support from the

developed countries. Yet, developing countries could exercise

their voting rights to block some decisions (Woodrow, 1991;

Rutkowski, 1991).

At the World Administration of Telegraph and Telephone

Conference of 1988 in Melbourne, the ITU's long held view

about the nature of telecommunications services was challenged

from within its membership. The Conference attempted to

27 This is comparable to the process that led to the privatization of

the U.S. backbone network discussed in chapter 2.


88

include the new telecommunications services known as leased

line and value added services. The USA and the UK argued that

such incorporation would subject the providers of these new

services to regulation against the current trend of free

competition. Developing countries and European PTTs demanded

that these activities must be included in the ambit of the ITU

regulations as part of international telecommunications

services. Eventually, a special arrangement to allow for

exceptions to these new services was introduced (Woodrow,

1991).

The next step in coming to terms with the WTO regime was

taken at the Nice Plenipotentiary Conference of 1989. The

Conference set up a High Level Committee to study the reform

needs of the ITU. The dominant concern behind this study was

that ITU's role would be increasingly marginal due to the

changes happening in global telecommunications. The entry of

new global carriers that could provide an end-to-end

telecommunications service touched the core of the ITU. Thus,

members had to take a stand on how the ITU should accommodate

private, competitive international carriers (Codding, 1991).

The question itself anticipated far reaching changes of

the ITU and its relationship with the emerging global

telecommunications industry. Savage (1991) drew a parallel

with the adjustments made in the Commonwealth

Telecommunications Organisations (CTO). In the 1990s, this

organisation had already been administering telecommunications

development programmes for 40 years. The report of the

Maitland Commission commended the CTO as a model for

telecommunications development assistance, particularly for

its preferential tariff scheme. However, in the 1980s and

1990s, the telecommunications carriers of some of the CTO

members were privatised and ready for competition. These


89

carriers were, therefore, unwilling to continue their treaty

obligations to provide preferential treatment to any other

carrier. They rejected the relevance of the CTO and its

‗altruistic‘ development projects. Obviously, in order to

compete in the liberalised market effectively, they had to

seek profitable commercial arrangements.

In a similar vein, the High Level Committee concluded

that if the ITU is to remain a relevant institution in the

changing telecommunications world, it has to serve the

interests of privatised operators. Otherwise, these will

increasingly rely on other flexible regional or bilateral

arrangements, and thus effectively marginalise the Union. One

mechanism suggested to avoid this scenario was to maximise the

participation of private industry and RPOAs standardisation

activity of the union. In short, the ITU decided to move away

from the "old guard of state owned PTTs" (Savage, 1991,

p.370).

The new secretary General of the ITU, Tarjanne (1999)

outlined the basic changes brought about by the ―new

governance of telecommunications‖. According to Tarjanne, in

the ancien regime, international end-to-end service was

provided by connecting the half-circuits of one national

carrier with that of another. With the recent change in

technology and market structure, however, a carrier from one

country can build or lease its own circuits in another country

and provide the same end-to-end service by itself. Hence,

there will be no need of joint ownership, compensation and

bilateral settlement agreement, which were the foundation

elements of the old telecommunications order of the ITU.

Tarjanne also expounded the impact of this "revolution"

on third world telecommunications development. The chronic


90

lack of capital the poor countries have suffered will be

addressed by introduction of foreign investment. Besides, the

accounting rate system has "outlived its usefulness‖. Thus, it

shall be replaced by a new cost-based arrangement. In this

regard, the WTO will set down the rules for entry of new

operators and service providers into previously closed

markets. The commitment to liberalise in the context of the

WTO will have an impact on the revenue system of the national

monopolies. However, according to Tarjanne, "undoubtedly there

will be winners and losers"(p.57).

As regards the organisation and role of the ITU, the

anticipated changes were significant. Firstly, the ITU shall

provide a forum for adapting the revenue-sharing mechanism in

line with the new ownership structure of telecommunications.

Tarjanne cited the task of study Group 3 in reforming the

existing bilateral accounting rate agreements as a case in

point.

Secondly, the ITU would work to incorporate developing

countries into the new international telecommunications order.

We are conscious that many of the ITU's 188 Member States are not

members of the WTO. Many developing countries -including those who

did not take part in the negotiations on basic telecommunications-

need to be convinced that the benefits that trade in

telecommunications can bring will actually materialize for them, and

the measures to protect their national interest will be effective.

The ITU Development Sector has a role to play in providing this

information and in helping governments to use the process of

progressive liberalization under the GATS to strengthen

telecommunications reforms in their countries...Marketplace ideology

which sees commercial trade and other general schemes as a

replacement for the old regime has much to commend it, and has

produced spectacular results in many countries in a very short period

of time (Tarjanne, 1999, pp.60-61).

The accounting rate system and ICAIS

The ITU Study Group 3, which is responsible for

developing recommendations for tariff and accounting rate


91

agreements between telecommunications operators, became a

subject of criticism in the 1990s28.

The U.S. government put pressure for reduction of the

absolute level of the accounting rate i.e. the calculation of

cost of termination of calls by destination countries. The

U.S. Federal Commission for Communication alleged that since

the accounting rate was high above cost, U.S. net settlement

payment was exorbitant. The OECD also affirmed that the

traffic imbalance between developing and developed countries

has cost the latter exorbitant sums of money in the form of

settlement payment (Walker, 1996). Consequently, the U.S.

Federal Commission for Communication took a unilateral measure

to fix the ceilings of accounting rates that U.S.

telecommunications operators should negotiate with their

foreign counterparts (Cave & Waverman, 1999)29.

28 A series of articles in early 1990 in the Financial Times accused

this organ as "an anti-competitive cartel of the 'old order' of PTTs and

international monopoly carriers". The newspaper alleged that this body

orchestrated a '10 billion a year rip off‘ through its instruments that

enable international telecommunications providers to garner substantial

profit (Cited in Savage, 1991, p.366; Woodrow, 1991, p.333).

29 This unilateral measure has, however, been criticized for

different reasons. Tarjanne deplored the unilateralism of the act as a

flagrant violation of the multilateralism of the new international

telecommunications order. Walker (1996), on the other hand, underlined that

the crux of the matter is not reduction of the absolute level of the

accounting rate. It is the division of the revenue from the accounting rate

which is the commercial bone of contention. The unilateral measure has

still embraced the 50:50 divisions. Hence, it merely introduces a reduction

of the absolute amount to be shared. If a cost-based accounting rate is to

be followed, third world countries would not be worse off because of the

higher cost of termination of international calls in these countries. If

such cost is higher, then these countries are entitled to a bigger share of

the revenue. Thuswaldner (2000), in contrast, concluded that the equal

sharing of revenues between carriers with disparate costs is detrimental to


92

The ITU Study Group responded by carrying out a series of

revision of the accounting rate system to "better reflect the

new telecommunications environment‖. A member of the WTO

secretariat participated as an observer in the meetings of the

Study Group. The recommended procedures for remunerating the

destination carrier included a cost-orientated, asymmetric

settlement rate. However, any bilaterally negotiated

commercial arrangement was approved. The Study Group also

proposed transitional arrangements to help developing

countries graduate to a cost-orientated remuneration system

(ITU-T Study Group 3,2000a).

It was against this background that the Study Group was

called on to make a recommendation on the ICAIS issue upon

complaints made by some Asia-Pacific countries. The Study

Group recognised that when two providers set up an Internet

circuit, they have a choice between peering /sender- keeps-

all or an asymmetrical system whereby the traffic-initiating

provider pays the full-circuit cost. As mentioned earlier in

this paper, Recommendation D.50, 2008 leaves the final

determination of remuneration to the bargaining power of the

providers.

The ITU suggested that a world summit on information

society be convened to debate all issues related to the new

media30. The UN endorsed this recommendation and assigned the

the high cost carrier due to the non-disclosure of the cost of termination

of calls. In the absence of a means of knowing such cost, a resort to the

50:50 sharing rule might be better for the high cost carriers.

30 UNESCO was also interested in organizing a WSIS kind of

conference. O'Siochru cites informal reports that the ITU refused to "share

the summit" with UNESCO. According to O‘Siochru, UNESCO might have treated


93

ITU to take a "leading managerial role" in preparation of the

summit. The purpose of the Summit was to develop a common

vision among governments, international organisations and

civil society actors on the direction of the ―information

society‖ (http://www.itu.int/itu-wsis/).

The World Summit on Information Society: Debating the

Global Information Order

The first sub-section assesses the processes and outputs

of UN summits with the view to demonstrating the political

significance of the WSIS. The second sub-section summarises

the issues discussed in the WSIS and how the ICAIS issue was

framed during the debate. The last sub-section evaluates the

participation of civil society during this summit.

The profile of UN summits

A world summit is a UN institution, which takes the form

of a conference on global issues held on a non-routine basis.

The UN had held at least one summit per year since the 1992

Earth Summit of Rio de Janeiro. These summits covered such

issues as human rights, housing, food, racism, etc.

UN summits have a similar organisational format. The

official world summit is preceded by a long preparatory

process. Thus, prior to the summit, the ITU conducted

Preparatory Committee Meetings (Prepcoms I, II, and III) and

regional meetings. The input for the final documents of the

summit is gathered in these meetings. The summit itself is

the issues of culture and communication in a more favourable way .Civil

society would also have more leverage (2004b, p.212).

http://www.itu.int/itu-wsis/


94

attended by high-level delegates who ceremoniously ratify

these documents within the few days of the conference (Klein,

2004).

Summits are attended by thousands of delegates. The UN

being an intergovernmental organisation, state

plenipotentiaries take the centre stage at summits, flanked by

civil society and private sector participants. Each country

has only one vote. Hence, both developing and developed

countries have a formal status of equality. Civil society

organisations usually attend the summit process itself and

hold parallel conferences on a separate agenda (Clark,

Friedman & Hochstetler, 1998)

The WSIS had, however, some different features from the

other UN summits. Firstly, it was held in two phases, in

Geneva and Tunis in 2003 and 2005 respectively. Secondly, the

WSIS devised mechanisms to formalise the participation of

civil society. The Civil Society Bureau was a kind of self-

governance mechanism to allow civil society organisations to

organise their own agenda, choose their own representatives

and set guidelines for their participation.

Nevertheless, the limit of the Summit form of institution

has also clear implications for the outcomes of the process.

Summits have a defined outcome in the form of two documents,

namely: a declaration of principles and a plan of action

(Klein, 2004, p.5).

The agenda of WSIS

The participants of the Geneva phase of the Summit

identified two clusters of issues for further elaboration,


95

namely: Internet governance and the financing of ICT for

development. The UN Secretary General set up working groups to

study and forward recommendations on these issues.

Internet governance

The Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) was

assigned to develop a working definition of Internet

governance, identify the public policy issues for discussion,

and develop a common understanding of the expected roles of

the various stakeholders.

Internet governance was defined as the process of

development and application of principles, norms, rules,

procedure, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of

the Internet. The definition also envisaged a

multisatakeholder governance approach in which governments,

civil society and private sector will have their respective

roles in the process. Then, the WGIG specified the issues that

needed to be addressed by this governance arrangement. In

fact, the bulk of the activity of the working group related to

identifying and framing the relevant public policy issues for

the WSIS31.The issue of allocation of critical resources such

31 The key public policy areas were agreed to be:

1. Issues relating to infrastructure: management of the domain name, IP

addresses, root server system, technical standards, peering and

interconnection, etc.

2. Issues relating to the use of the Internet: spam, cyber crime, etc.

3. Issues adjacent to the Internet but with much wider impact:

intellectual property rights, and international trade. But these are

issues, which the working group, identified as already within the

ambit of existing international organizations.

4. Issues related to the use of Internet for development such as

capacity building in developing countries.


96

as the root server and domain names was the most controversial

which, according to Gurumurthy and Singh (2005), even eclipsed

other equally important issues32. Some authors also suggested

that the original mission of the WSIS was to put that issue to

rest (Klein, 2004).

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers

(ICANN) is an organisation subject to U.S. domestic law and

government supervision, and responsible for administration,

allocation and coordination of IP addresses, domain names, and

root server systems. Due to the history of the Internet, the

Domain Name System, for example, was under the U.S. Department

of Defence, until it was later transferred to this private

organisation. A number of participants of the WSIS were of the

view that this entity is not truly multilateral, accountable,

and transparent. The ITU had also an interest in appropriating

some of the powers of this organisation and combining the

administration of the new logical infrastructures with the

physical one traditionally under its regulation (Afonso, 2005,

Klein, 2004).

The U.S. and business groups represented in the WSIS were

in favour of the status quo. The official position of the U.S.

was clear and unequivocal.

Specific recommendations were also made in respect of each public

policy issue identified above. These recommendations evaluated the existing

organizations dealing with each of the public issues against the

abovementioned criteria. The working group forwarded different alternative

models of governance mechanisms based on the criteria of transparency,

accountability, multilateralism, and coordination.

32 The root server keeps a database of Top-Level Domain Names. These

are .com, .org, .edu, etc. Without such domain names, users of the Internet

would be forced to remember IP addresses, which are a series of numbers, to

communicate with each other.


97

The United States remains open to discussing with all stakeholders

ways to improve the technical efficiency as well as the transparency

and openness of existing governance structures. However, it is

important that the global community recognize that the existing

structures have worked effectively to make the Internet the highly

robust and geographically diverse medium that it is today. The

security and stability of the Internet must be maintained (USA,

2005).

The challengers of the status quo rejoined that this

argument unduly focuses on technical efficiency and problem-

solving capacity of ICANN, rather than on representation and

democratic decision-making. However, it is clear that

controlling ICANN, and through it, the critical Internet

resources, is consequential. The usual example mentioned to

highlight this problem is the country code top level domain

―.iq", the Iraq domain, which has been in the hands of a

private company outside of the country (Afonso, 2005, p.5).

The European Union was also against the unilateral

control of the core resources by the US (Gurumurty & Singh,

2005). The EU representatives stated that the current ICANN

regime is commendable for the public private partnership it

embodied. However, it should include the participation of more

governments (European Union, 2005).

On the other hand, the issue of ICAIS was raised by

developing countries as a major problem that should be

addressed by the WSIS. In its comments on the report of the

WGIG, the African group insisted that the issue of

interconnection costs should be at the top of the agenda. The

report of the working group framed the issue as one of "uneven

distribution of cost" resulting from "absence of an

appropriate and effective global Internet Governance mechanism

to resolve the issue"(WGIG, 2005, P.4).

The recommended measures included:


98

examination of alternative solutions such as

establishment of regional backbones, and

local and regional access points,

multistakeholder participation in resolving

the issue in various international

organisations,

donor programmes to fund establishment of

exchange points and local content in

developing countries ,and

continuation of the work on ICAIS at ITU and

other organisations (WGIG, 2005, p.16).

Therefore, the issue of ICAIS did not receive any novel

response at the WSIS. While representatives of the developed

countries emphasised technological fixes and market solutions,

the developing countries called for enhanced donor support.

Financing ICT for development and ICAIS

The other contentious issue, which was assigned to a task

force for further study, was the question of financing,

deployment, and use of ICT in the poor countries of the world.

The initiative to address this issue came from African

representatives. President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal proposed

a scheme for transfer of resources from the North to the South

in order to bridge the "digital divide". This transfer was to

be made under what was later called "digital solidarity

agenda". The proposal was to secure financial resources for

ICT projects primarily from taxes levied on sales of

computers, software, and network equipment and the use of

international communications. Donations were also solicited

from governments and financial institutions (www.dsf-fsn.org).

http://www.dsf-fsn.org/


99

This proposal was opposed by the US, EU, Japan and the

business community while a large number of developing

countries supported it. The developed countries insisted that

financing should be sought within the existing mechanisms.

Moreover, it maintained that the solution to the problem of

the digital divide lies in the countries themselves. They have

to open up their market through privatisation, competition,

and liberalisation.

Nevertheless, the Digital Solidarity Fund (DSF) was

established as a legal foundation in Switzerland in March

2005, with a dominant membership of municipalities from

different parts of the world. Its major source of fund has

been the 1% voluntary contribution from the contract value of

sale of ICT goods and services by corporations. Then, these

corporations are granted a logo and a permission to advertise

their philanthropic deeds. This voluntary contribution from a

supplier's profit margin is finally invested in community

projects. The Fund is administered by a coalition of

governments, private sector, civil society, and international

organisations (www.dsf-fsn.org).

The Task Force for Financing Mechanisms (TFFM)

underscored the decline in recent years of official aid to the

third world and the inadequacy of government budget. On the

other hand, it emphasised the renewed reliance on private

capital, mainly from foreign investment. In its recommendation

to address the financing issue, it suggested that all sorts of

mechanisms be used, including the old and the new ones such as

the Digital Solidarity Fund (TFFM, 2004, p.13).

As a political document, the WSIS official declaration of

principles and plan of action alluded to principles of

Universal Human Rights, the Millennium Development Goals, and

http://www.dsf-fsn.org/


100

inclusion of small island countries, the disabled and the

young generation. Still, resources for social and

developmental goals are to be obtained from private investment

or charity. The summit in general emphasised the following

policy measures to bridge the digital divide:

the creation of enabling environment i.e.

conducive private investment and ownership

regime,

multistakeholderism i.e. public-private

partnership in which the private sector

plays a key role, and

capacity building with an emphasis on

cultivation of a mass of consumers for ICT

goods and services (Gurumurthy & Singh,

2005; Hamelink, 2004; Mansell &

Nordenstreng, 2006).

Civil society and the WSIS

Though world summits promise to facilitate participation

by different groups, WSIS goes further in its declared aims to

involve civil society actors on co-equal terms with

governments and private sector representatives. There was an

attempt to make the WSIS a model for the multistakeholder

approach (Padovani & Tuzzi, 2004).Accordingly, the Executive

Secretariat of the WSIS created a Civil Society Division,

which was entrusted with the task of facilitating the full

participation of civil society. The rules of procedure of the

Summit allowed the accredited non-governmental organisations,

civil society and business members to sit as observers at

meetings and make oral statements when invited by the

presiding officer of the body concerned. The Civil Society

Division, in consultation with governments, was responsible


101

for determining which civil society organisation should

participate and in what order (Banks, 2005; Cammaerts &

Carpentier, 2005).

After the Geneva phase of the summit in 2003, civil

society participants drew their own declarations, and specific

recommendations in respect of the various issues discussed

during the summit. The Civil Society Declaration, entitled

"Shaping Information Societies for Human Needs", attempted to

challenge as well as to constructively engage with the

official WSIS discourse. The following are the major elements

of the declaration.

The unitary information society concept must

be replaced by the concept of information

and communication societies. This was to

emphasise the importance of communication as

a basic need .Besides, it sought to draw

attention to the diverse visions and

approaches to the problem facing the world.

The primacy of public services and

protection of the public domain must be

promoted. In particular, private ownership

of intellectual property and infrastructure

was singled out as detrimental to the

development of information and communication

societies. ICTs should not be treated merely

as private resources and commodities.

Community use and ownership must be

encouraged as well.

The idea of enabling environment, which in

the official WSIS version emphasised the


102

primacy of the market, must be substituted

by a focus on empowerment of citizens.

The idea of technological neutrality must be

rejected and a participatory approach in

designing and provision of technology must

be adopted.

Despite this statement of common opposition, there are

some areas of convergence between the official and civil

society declarations. The civil society declaration does not

fully represent a coherent set of principles either. The

following section also highlights the differences within civil

society representatives themselves along a North-South fault

line.

With respect to the specific issues of ICAIS, the

declaration had little to add. In order to address the lack of

efficient African backbone network, which is the reason behind

the exorbitant cost of traffic and access, it suggested a

reinforcement of the current efforts to build infrastructure.

An example of such an effort cited in the declaration is

construction of Internet exchange points. The principles to

guide expansion of infrastructure were also stated as

equality, partnership, fair competition, and regulation at

local and global level.

The civil society declaration also endorsed the Digital

Solidarity Fund on condition that it is properly managed to

extend public services to underserved areas. It added its own

proposal for a Community Media Fund by a donor-civil society

partnership to construct community information and

communication initiatives.


103

The WSIS had important implications for the theoretical

and practical analysis of the role of civil society in the

democratisation of global governance. Various questions have

been raised about identity of civil society, the institutional

framework for participation in global governance, and

existential problems for radical actors.

Identity of civil society

Civil Society at the WSIS identified itself as follows:

Organizations-including movements, networks and other entities-which

are autonomous from the State, are not intergovernmental or do not

represent the private sector, and which in principle, are non-profit-

making, act locally, nationally and internationally, in defense and

promotion of social, economic and cultural interests, defense of

human rights, promotion of development objectives and for mutual

benefit(Banks,2005).

Banks (2005) later reported that, notwithstanding this

assumption about civil society, there were also civil society

organisations that supported the existing intellectual

property regime. Some civil society groups promoted the agenda

of their government. Some civil society members regarded even

the apparently universal value of human rights as a ―sectoral

issue‖, not to have priority in the final text of the WSIS

declaration (Marzouki & Joergensen, 2004).

Chakravartty (2007) also alleged that most civil society

organisations from the North promoted the interests of the

developed countries on many issues. The first was the issue of

freedom of expression. This, however, focussed on condemnation

of states such as China, Singapore, Tunisia and Pakistan.

Civil society also collaborated with EU to push for

democratisation of ICANN. On the other hand, this

―partnership‖ in negotiation did not work on the issues of

intellectual property rights and financing access to


104

resources. In general, civil society prioritised the right to

information while relegating redistributive issues to a

secondary status.

Civil society organisations from the North, according to

Chakravartty, owe their view of state/civil-society

relationship to their history and local political environment.

The Tocquevillian form of voluntary associational groups

advancing the public interest can flourish only in a stable

and democratic state, not in the political and economic

environment prevailing in most developing countries. Civil

society in the global South, therefore, cannot stand against

the state. It must support the state as the only actor that

can press for ―meaningful redistributive policies in the

transnational governance arena‖ (p, 311).

Chakravartty makes a valid point about the dangers of the

marginalisation of the state due to neo-liberal prescriptions

by NGOs and international organisations. The Structural

Adjustment Programme of the 1980s and the consequent erosion

of public service and social welfare have illustrated this

point. However, it is also necessary to pierce the corporate

veil of the state and problematise its ideology of

development. Her argument assumes existence of a developmental

state that is beyond class partisanship.

Secondly, by drawing a sharp contrast between capitalist

states of the North and developmental states of the South, her

analysis obscures the reciprocal relationship between global

capital and peripheral actors.

Moreover, third world countries, with or without

developmental orientation, have not been able to influence

decisions in international institutions for lack of


105

geopolitical and economic capabilities. Hence, the suggestion

to rely on these states to resist global neo-liberal forces

does not draw any lesson from the NWICO and similar previous

initiatives.

The institutional framework of participation

Civil society representatives at the WSIS had to deal

with the problems of effective and meaningful participation33.

The multistakeholder approach to global governance posed two

types of challenges to civil society actors. One is the

superficiality of participation, or in the words of Cammaerts

and Carpentier (2005), ―the unbearable lightness of full

participation‖. On the other extreme, there is the danger of

domestication (Calabrese, 2004b).

The obstacles for full participation of civil society

arise because the decision makers in this intergovernmental

processes are states (Banks, 2005). Hence, civil society

actors not accredited by their own government cannot

participate. Secondly, private sector organisations like the

World Economic Forum and the International Chamber of Commerce

were categorised as civil society actors. The civil society

forum provided by the UN required ―partnership‖ with these

groups. Due to this characteristic problem of participation,

it has been suggested that representation in these

33 The factors militating against effective participation mainly

arose from the reluctance by some state members of the WSIS to involve some

civil society actors. The accreditation process was used to exclude, for

example, Reporters without Borders-a media NGO, for exposing suppression of

free press by some states (Banks, 2005; Cogburn, 2004; Cammaerts &

Carpentier, 2005).


106

international institutions has limited value. Civil society

should also establish alternative forums for a more vigorous

participation (Calabrese, 2004b; Sader, 2002; Cammaerts &

Carpentier, 2005).

While some civil society advocates point at the rough

terrain of the international institution for their poor

participation, others have applied the same criticism to civil

society‘s internal workings. Chakravartty denounced the

dominant civil society organisations from the North for

―centralization and bureaucratization of civil society within

the WSIS‖ (2007, p.301). Likewise, Schmidt (2004) claimed that

the very definition of civil society excluded grassroots

organisations in Africa. In their place, professional NGOs,

which are part of the aid community, were represented.

Existential problems of civil society

The scarcity of material resources to make sustained

political participation in global forums has been an enduring

problem for civil society actors, especially for those

organisations from the developing countries. Cogburn (2004)

observed that the principal form of interaction among global

civil society participants was email exchange. Hence, the

digital divide itself was a major obstacle preventing NGOs in

the South from taking part in global platforms and

transnational networks.

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