ENVIRONMENTAL

PRAGMATISM

EditedbyAndrew

Lightand

EricKatz

I~London

andNew

York

/1\lb

1

PRAGMATISM

AND

ENVIRONMENTAL

THOUGHT

KellyA.

Parker

"Pragmatism

"here

referstoaschool

ofphilosophical

thought-American

pragmatism

-and

nottothat

shortsighted,allegedly

"practical-minded"

attitudetow

ardsthe

world

thatisamajor

obstacletoenvironm

entallyresponsible

behaviorinour

time.

1Theinsight

behind"environm

entalpragm

atism"isthat

American

pragmatism

isaphilosophyofenvironm

ents.Although

thefounders

ofpragm

atismrarely

hadoccasion

towrite

explicitlyon

what

wewould

todaycall

environmental

concerns,the

fundamental

insightsofenvironm

entalphilosophy

areimplicit

intheirw

ork.The

observationsthat

thehum

ansphere

isembedded

ateverypoint

inthe

broadernatural

sphere,that

eachinevitably

affectsthe

otherin

ways

thatare

oftenimpossible

topredict,

andthat

valuesemerge

inthe

ongoingtransactions

between

humans

andenvironm

ents,for

example,

areallcentral

conceptsfor

thepragm

atists-asfor

many

contemporary

philosophersofenvironm

ent.Part

1ofthis

essayoutlines

themain

featuresofA

merican

prag-matism

.Sothat

readersnewtopragm

atismmaymore

readilysituate

itsmain

tenetswith

respecttoother

philosophicalapproaches,

themajor

pointsare

herepresented

ascritical

responsestofam

iliarpositions

inepistem

ology,metaphysics,

andvalue

theory.Part

2situates

pragmatism

with

respecttosom

eofthe

major

issuesin

currentecophilosophy.H

ere,too,thepresentation

islargelyacritical

responsetoprevailing

views.Itmust

bestressed,

however,

thatpragm

atismisa

constructivephilosophical

approach:the

purposeof

criticism,after

all,istoopen

theway

fornew

insight.Part

2particularly

stressesthe

questionofametaphysical

groundingfor

environmental

ethics,anarea

ofenvironm

entalphilosophy

where

pragmatism

mayhave

themostto

offer.

21

KELLY

A.PARKER

1PRA

GMATISM

Pragmatism

emerged

asaschool

ofthought

aroundthe

beginningofthis

century.2The

major

earlypragm

atistswere

CharlesS.Peirce,

William

James,

JosiahRoyce,

JohnDewey

andGeorge

Herbert

Mead.

Wemight

alsoinclude

Alfred

North

Whitehead

andGeorge

Santayanaas"honorary"

pragmatists

who

rejectedthe

label,but

someofw

hoseview

sbear

closeaffinity

topragm

atism.

Although

thepragm

atists'view

sare

certainlydiverse

when

itcom

estoparticulars,

somecharacteristic

themes

appearthroughout

theirwritings.

First,all

agreeintheir

rejectionoffoundationalist

epistemology.

Thereare

noinnate

beliefs,intuitions

orother

indubitable"givens"

uponwhich

ourknow

ledgeisbuilt,

orinterm

sofwhich

thetruth

ormeaning

ofconcepts

canbeanalyzed.

Tosay

thatabelief

istrue,

accordingtoJam

es,istosay

thatthe

beliefsucceeds

inmaking

senseofthe

world

andisnot

contradictedin

experience.3Peirce's

versionofpragm

atismasserts

thatthe

meaning

ofan

ideaconsists

entirelyinthe

effectsthat

theidea

couldin

principlehave

insubsequent

thoughtand

experience.4Wehave

noabsolutely

indubitablebeliefs;

onlyastock

ofimportantly

undoubtedones.

Wehave

noabsolutely

clear,immutable

concepts;wedo

havemany

conceptsthat

aresufficiently

clearand

stabletolet

usmake

prettygood

senseofexperience.

Experience,how

ever,can

atany

timeexpose

oursettled

beliefsasfalse,

orreveal

anunsatisfactory

vaguenessorconfusion

inour

concepts.Know

ingisthus

anopen-

endedquest

forgreater

certaintyinour

understanding;ifweforget

thatour

understandingisfallible,

thephilosophical

questforw

isdommaydevolve

intoapathological

crusadefor

absolutecertainty.

Themost

interestingaspect

ofpragm

atistepistem

ologyfor

ecophilosophersisitsrejection

ofthe

dualistic"spectator

theory"of

knowledge

anditscom

panion,the

simple

"correspondencetheory"

oftruth.

Toobject

toJam

es'definition

(asmany

have)because

itdoesnot

make

truthconsist

inthe

conformity

ofabelief

inthe

knower's

mind

tothe

objectivestate

ofthings

inthe

externalworld,

istomiss

what

thepragm

atistshave

tosay

aboutthe

natureofmind,

theworld

andthe

activityofknow

ing.Itoften

comes

across,even

inthe

handsofthose

friendlytoprag-

matism

,that

pragmatism

isonly

atheory

oftruth.

Thisisascorrect,

andasincom

plete,assaying

thatdem

ocracyis

onlyatheory

ofpolitical

sovereignty.In

bothcases,

thetheories

havesignificant

practicalimplications.

Itisintracing

outthese

implications

thatwe

canbegin

tosee

ourselvesand

ourworld

inanew

light.22

PRAGMATISM

AND

ENVIRO

NMENTAL

THOUGHT

Thefounders

ofpragm

atismrecognized

thephilosophical

impli-

cationsofevolutionary

theory.The

characteristicsand

activitiesofany

organismare

always

understoodinlight

ofthe

organism's

relationstoitsenvironm

ents.The

human

capacitiesofthinking

andknow

ingare

noexception.

Consciousness,reason,

imagination,

lan-guage

andsign

use(mind,

inshort)

areseen

asnatural

adaptationsthat

helpthe

human

organismtoget

alonginthe

world.

Theworld

weinhabit

isthe

world

asknown.

Itsfabric

iswoven

ofaplurality

ofphenom

enawhich

canbefunctionally

distinguishedinto

twogeneral

types-though

wefallinto

paradoxand

confusionif

thisfUnctional

distinctionisuncritically

takenasametaphysical

one.The

world

ofexperience

dealsharshly

with

absolutedistinctions,

atwhatever

levelthey

aremade.

Onthe

onehand,

however,

wecan

identifythe

matrix

ofconceptual

constructs,both

tacitand

theo-retical,

thatbring

ordertoraw

experience.Onthe

otherhand,

we

findthe

"stuff"ofchaotic,

unassimilated

rawexperience.

Theworld

welive

inissurrounded

byafringe

ofthe

unknown,

anineffable

butinsistent

existentialreality

thatislarger

thanourselves

andour

settledknow

ledge.5Itison

thisfringe,

andinthose

pansofour

knowledge

thatoccasionally

becomeunsettled,

thatthe

transformative

activityofknow

inggoes

on.Mind

isnot

apartfrom

theworld;

itisapart

ofthe

world.

"Know

ingthe

world"

isnotadetached

activity.Itis,rather,

amutual

transactionbetw

eenthe

organismand

itssurroundings.Inthis

transac-tion

anuncertain,

doubtful,indeterm

inatesituation

isreconstructed

soastomake

more

sense,tobemore

intelligible.6The

processof

reconstructiontransform

sboth

theknow

ingsubject

andthe

known

object.T.S.Eliot

describedhis

poetryas"a

raidon

theinarticulate."?

Thephrase

aptlycharacterizes

anymode

ofknowing,

anditiscrucial

tonote

that,inaraid,

bothsides

areliable

tobeaffected

inunforeseen

ways.

Increating

apoetic

vision,developing

ascientific

theory,orarticulating

aconception

ofethics,

weliterally

transformboth

ourselvesand

theworld

asitpreviously

stood.Subjects

andobjects

arenot

absoluteentities;

knower

andknow

nare

inextricablytwined

togetherfrom

thebeginning.

Subjectsand

objectsare

nexusof

relationsinanever-shifting

universeofcom

plexrelationships.

Thevenerable

distinctionbetw

eensubject

andobject

isthus

acon-

venienceof

speechthat

doesnot

bearup

undermetaphysical

scrutiny.Itnam

esan

important

butobjectively

vaguedistinction

between

twopoles

inaprim

ordiallycontinuous

fieldofexperience.8

Any

reconciliationbetw

eenself

andworld

inthe

actofknow

ingis

23

KELLY

A.PARKER

tentativeand

fallible.To

saythat

knowledge

istrue

means

onlythat

thereconciliation

issatisfactory.To

saythat

itisabsolutely

truemeans

thatitw

illnever

standinneed

ofreadjustm

ent-som

ethingwecan

perhapsaccom

plish,but

cannever

judgewith

certaintytobe

thecase.

Experiencemay

shockusinto

doubttom

orrow.

Clearly,this

epistemology

involvesafundam

entalcritique

oftraditional

metaphysics,

butthe

pragmatists'

attitudetow

ardsmetaphysical

speculationwasambivalent.

Peircereportedly

openedone

lectureatthe

JohnsHopkins

University

with

awholesale

denun-ciation

ofmetaphysics

asmere

moonshine

unworthy

ofattention.

Heended

thesam

electure

byurging

hisstudents

toestablish

ameta-

physicalclub

where

thesecrucial

issuescould

bediscussed.

Thestory

nicelyillustrates

what

Itake

tobethe

pragmatists'

typicalattitude:

traditionalaccounts

ofreality

aresomisleading

astobebest

ignored,but

allthe

same,weneed

asound

metaphysics.

AsPeirce

observed,those

who

resolvenot

toengage

inmetaphysical

speculationdo

notthereby

avoidmetaphysics

-they

onlycondem

nthem

selvestoseeing

theworld

throughthe

filterofwhatever

"crudeand

uncriticizedmetaphysics"

theyhave

pickedupalong

theway.9

Peirceand

Royceenthusiastically

embraced

theproject

ofarticulating

ametaphysics;

James

andDewey

were

oftenreluctant

touse

theword

exceptinapejorative

sense.Whether

theycalled

itmetaphysics

ornot,

though,the

pragmatists

were

allconcerned

todevelop

ananalysis

ofreality

thatboth

makes

senseofexperience

anddoes

notoverstep

thebounds

ofknowledge

legitimately

derivedfrom

experience.(Peirce

andJam

esfrequently

citeHegel

asaphilosopher

whose

speculativesystem

wasaspectacular

failureinboth

respects.)The

valueofmetaphysical

thoughtdepends

uponitsmaking

onlyjustifiable

assumptions

andon

following

amethodology

thatallow

sfor

correctionofitsassertions.

Immanuel

Kant

providedthe

startingpoint

forpragm

aticmetaphysics.

Thenoum

enalworld,

theworld

asitisinitself

inde-pendent

ofthe

orderingcategories

ofthe

mind,

isby

definitionincapable

ofentering

intoknow

ledgeorexperience.

Toapragm

atist,the

conceptofaworld,

entityorproperty

existingapart

fromthe

orderinginfluence

ofmind

isstrictly

meaningless.

Tospeak

ofthe

world

atall

isthus

tospeak

ofwhat

Kant

calledthe

phenomenal

world.

Toberealis

tobecapable

ofenteringinto

experience;athing's

effects,itsrelations

toother

phenomena,

arethus

allthereistobe

knownabout

thething.

Theearly

pragmatists

accordinglydropped

talkofform

s,essences

andsubstances,

andset

aboutdeveloping

a24

PRAGMATISM

AND

ENVIRO

NMENTAL

THOUGHT

newmetaphysics

bornofexperience.

Theirresulting

viewstend

tocut

acrosssuch

standardphilosophical

dichotomies

as"idealism

vs.realism

."While

itiswrong

tosuggest

thatthere

isa"consensus

metaphysics"

among

thepragm

atists(and

recognizingthat

"neo-pragmatists"

suchasRichard

Rortywould

maintain

thatitisamistake

totalk

aboutmetaphysics

atall),

wecan

identifYsom

echaracteristic

themes

inpragm

aticthought

aboutthe

world.

Thereisan

irreduciblepluralism

inthe

world

weencounter.

Thereisthe

idea(supported

bycon-

temporary

physics)that

indeterminacy

andchance

arereal

featuresof

theworld.

Change,developm

ent,and

noveltyare

everywhere

therule.

Thepragm

atistsalso

attendtocertain

common

-perhaps

evenuniversal-

structuresand

relationsthat

appearthroughout

ourexperi-

ence.Pragm

atism,

then,sees

realityasprocess

anddevelopm

ent,and

seesbeingsas

relationallydefined

centersofmeaning

ratherthan

assingular

entitiesthat

simply

standalongside

oneanother

inthe

world.

Itemphasizes

notsubstantial

beings,but

interrelations,connectedness,

transactionsand

entanglements

asconstitutive

ofreality.

Allofthis

isbased

onrigorous

attentiontowhat

isactually

thereinexperience,

andnot

onwhat

thisorthat

philosophysuggests

weshould

find.This

commitment

toexperience

itselfasthe

primary

authorityinspeculative

matters

ledJam

estocall

hisphilosophy

"radicalempiricism

."loThe

pragmatists

proposedreform

sofepistem

ologyand

meta-

physicsthat

turnEnlightenm

entthought

insideout.

Theimplications

ofpragm

aticthought

aboutvalue

areno

lessrevolutionary.

Thecentral

emphases

onexperience,

andon

theexperim

entalapproach

toestablishing

ourknow

ledgeand

practices,make

foravalue

theorythat

highlightsthe

aestheticdim

ension,sees

ethicsasaprocess

ofcontinual

mediation

ofconflict

inanever-changing

world

andlays

thegroundw

orkfor

asocial

andpolitical

philosophythat

placesdem

ocraticand

humanitarian

concernsat

thecenter

ofsocial

arrangements.

Allvalue

emerges

inexperience.

Thequestion

ofethics-"What

isgood?"

-ultim

atelybrings

usback

toconcrete

questionsabout

what

isexperienced

asgood

inthe

interactionofthe

organismwith

itsenvironm

ent.The

inquirydoes

notendwith

theindividual's

affectiveexperience,

ofcourse,

butitrecognizes

thisasthe

onlypossible

birthplaceofvalue.

Indeterm

iningthe

aestheticsignificance

ofexperience,

pragmatists

maintain

aJam

esianradical

empiricism

:nothing

isintroduced

thatisnotexperienced,

butdue

consideration25

KELLY

A.PARKER

must

beafforded

toallthat

isexperienced.IIThe

firstquestion

aboutvalue,

then,isnot

"What

oughtwetodesire?"

but"What

dopeople

infact

desire,and

why?"

Theansw

ersare

many

andcom

plex,and

arenot

fullyreducible,

forexam

ple,tothe

categoriesofautilitarian

pleasure-paincalculus.

Inaesthetics,

asinmetaphysics,

thesheer

pluralismthat

appearsin

livedexperience

givesuspause.

Thevalued

elements

arethere,

andnot

justinprivate

consciousness.Satisfactions

ariseinthe

semi-

private,sem

i-publicdom

ainthat

isthe

organism-in-environm

ent,and

assuch

theyhave

significancenot

onlyfor

thebeing

thatappre-

hendsthem

butalso

forthe

environment

itselfand

forall

thoseother

beingsthat

inhabitit.The

diversityand

tangibilityofaesthetic

values,though,

must

giverise

toconflict

assoon

asmore

thanone

valuingorganism

inhabitsanenvironm

ent.12

Thusarises

theneed

forethics,

asystem

aticunderstanding

ofthe

relationsthat

oughttoobtain

among

variousvalues,

atheory

ofwhat

isright.

Basedasitison

theview

thatvalue

arisesinadynam

ic,infinitely

complex

systemoforganism

s-in-environments,

itisabasic

tenetofpragm

aticethics

thatthe

rightnessofan

actionislargely

system-dependent.

TheEnlightenm

entdream

ofauniversally

validethical

theorymay

appearplausible

atfirst

glancebecause

many

morally

problematic

situationsdo

resemble

oneanother

soclosely.

Thepragm

atist,how

ever,attends

todifference

andchange

aswell

astosim

ilarityand

constancy.Asthe

world

evolves,and

ashum

anthought

andactivities

changealong

with

it,new

kindsofethically

problematic

situationsinevitably

emerge.

Tocope,

weneed

todevelop

newways

ofcom

prehendingwhat

isright.

Nolist

ofvirtues,.no

listofrights

andduties,

notable

oflaws,no

accountofthe

goodshould

beexpected

toserve

inevery

possiblesituation

thatwe

confront.Attem

ptstosetdow

nthe

"finalword"

onwhat

isrighthave

adisturbing

tendencytoshow

upasincom

plete,ambiguous

orquaintly

archaicinthe

nextgeneration.

Pragmatism

maintains

thatno

setofethical

conceptscan

bethe

absolutefoundation

forevaluat-

ingthe

rightnessofour

actions.Weknow

frompast

experiencethat

someethical

conceptswork

betterthan

othersingiven

situations,but

ourpast

experienceisthe

onlything

wehave

asanethical

"foun-dation."

AsAnthony

Weston

putsit,ethics

isanendeavor

more

likecreatively

making

ourway

throughaswampthan

itislike

erectinga

pyramid

onabedrock

foundation.13A

ftermany

tripsthrough

theswamp,

wearrive

atthe

means

thatserve

best.Tom

orrowwemay

havetoreadjust,

though,because

itisthe

natureboth

ofswamps

and26

PRAGMATISM

AND

ENVIRO

NMENTAL

THOUGHT

ofthe

world

ofvalues

toshift

continuallybeneath

us.The

aimof

ethicsisnot

perfectrightness,

then,since

thereisno

absolutestandard

forreference,

butrather

creativemediation

ofconflicting

claimstovalue,

aimed

atmaking

lifeon

theplanet

relativelybetter

thanitis.

Atthe

socialand

politicallevel,

thisperspective

implies

thatthe

individualperson

isof

inestimable

importance.

Allindividuals

are,primafacie,

worthy

ofequal

consideration.Since

itisimpossible

tocom

prehendany

individualexcept

inacontext

ofrelations,

however,

theindividual

isalways

tobeseen

asan

integralpart

ofmany

communities.

Social,political

andcultural

institutionsare

theretoprovide

forthe

needsofindividuals.

Ihaveelsew

hereput

thispoint

interm

sofproviding

forthe

adequacyoflife

and,beyond

this,for

thesignificance

oflife.

14That

is,socialarrangem

entsneed

tobe

constantlyre~evaluated

andreconstructed

toensure

thatminim

alrequirem

entsof

theorganism

s-in-environment

aremet.

Beyondthis,

growthought

tobeencouraged.

"Grow

th"here

isnot

reducibleto

"material

growth."

Toequate

thetwoleads

tounfortunate

conclusions-for

example,

thatper

capitaGross

DomesticProduct

measures

well-being,

which

isultim

atelyasuicidal

conceptfor

asociety

toembrace.

Grow

thmight

betterbeunderstood

interm

sof

increasingthe

aestheticrichness

ofexperience,

ofexpanding

theavailable

means

offinding

satisfactioninlife.15

Contrarytowhat

thetelecom

munications

industrytells

us,this

might

well

mean

recyclingone's

televisionset

ratherthan

upgradingthe

cableservice.

Oritmay

mean

gettinginvolved

inthe

publicsphere,

which

bringsustothe

otherside

ofpragm

aticsocial

andpolitical

philo-sophy.

Socialinstitutions

constantlyneed

reform.Their

directioncan

legitimately

beset

onlyby

thepeople

theyserve.

Forthe

pragmatists,

"participatorydem

ocracy"isa

politicalexpression

ofthemetaphysical

ideathat

realityisinvolvem

entand

transformation.

Becausethe

publicconsists

ofavast

pluralityofpeople

andthings

valued,and

becausethe

world

ischanging

atevery

moment,

theways

andmeans

ofbest

providingfor

theindividual

andcom

mon

goodhave

tobeexperim

entallydeterm

ined.The

experimenters,

thepolitical

scientistswho

serveon

avast,

ongoing"ways

andmeans

committee,"

shouldbethe

peoplethem

selves.Innovation

isalways

neededingovernance,

andinnovation

typicallyarises

atthe

levelofone

orafew

peopletrying

toresolve

aparticular

problem,

toreconstruct

theircorner

ofreality.

Pragmatism

(especiallyinDewey's

writings)

emphasizes

thenecessity

ofthese

many

diverseindividuals,

27

KELLY

A.PARKER

activelycom

ingtogether

inthe

publicsphere,

topresent

theirdem

ands,offer

theirinsights,

andham

merout

theirdifferences.16

Thatisan

activitysuitable

forhum

ans,and

itcan

beanintensely

rewarding

mode

ofbeing.Ultim

ately,thatsociety

works

bestwhich

makes

bestuse

ofthe

diverseintelligence

andexperience

ofits

CitIZens.2PRA

GMATIC

ENVIRO

NMENTAL

PHILO

SOPHY

Theearly

pragmatists

were

visionarythinkers,

oftenahead

oftheirtime.They

areour

contemporaries

inmany

respects.Nonetheless,

theynaturally

wrote

fortheirowntime.They

addressedthe

problems

andprom

isesthe

world

facednear

thebeginning

ofthe

twentieth

century.EvenJohnDewey,w

holived

until1952,w

asunablefully

toenvision

theenvironm

entalcrisesw

eface

nearthe

beginningofthe

twenty-first

century.The

classicalAmerican

pragmatists

provideus

with

apow

erfulsetofbasic

philosophicalideas.W

henitcom

esto

applyingthese

insightstocontem

poraryissuesof"the

environment,"

though,todeveloping

thedetails

oflegitimate

environmental

philo-sophy,w

eenternew

territory.Theonly

thingforusto

doisto

begin.What

followsisonly

abeginning,

abroad

attempttointerpret

andreconstruct

ourunderstanding

ofsom

emajor

issuesincurrent

environmental

philosophy,byshow

inghow

theyappear

inthe

lightofpragm

atism.Mypositions

onthese

issuesare

herestated

andeXplained

onlybriefly.The

work

ofconstructingdetailed

arguments

forthese

positionsand

judgingtheir

merits

forenvironm

entalphilosophy

liesahead,inthe

ongoingexam

inationoffundam

entalconcepts,

problems,and

approachesinour

field.Therem

ainderof

thisessay

comprises

abrief

surveyofthe

matters

Itaketobemost

germane

toanexploration

of"environm

entalpragm

atism."These

matters

are(1)

theconcept

ofenvironm

ent,(2)the

placeofenviron-

mentalethics

inphilosophical

inquiryand

(3)thesocialand

politicaldim

ensionsofenvironm

entalethics.U

nder(4)Ipropose

pragmatic

contributionstothe

currentdebates

over(a)

moral

pluralism,(b)

anthropocentrismand

(c)theintrinsic

valueofnature.

(1)Forthe

pragmatist,

theenvironm

entisabove

allnotsom

ething"outthere,"

somehow

separatefrom

us,standingready

tobeused

uporpreserved

aswedeem

necessary.Asthe

Frenchphenom

enologistMaurice

Merleau-Ponty

said,"Ourownbody

isinthe

world

asthe28

PRAGMATISM

AND

ENVIRO

NMENTAL

THOUGHT

heartisinthe

organism".17

Wecannot

talkabout

environment

without

talkingabout

experience,themostbasicterm

inpragm

atism.

Allthatw

eoranybeing

canfeel,know

,value,orbelievein,fromthe

most

concretefact("Iam

cold")tothe

most

abstractortranscend-

entalidea

("Justice,""God"),

hasitsmeaning,

firstofall,insom

easpectofan

immediately

felthereand

now.Environm

ent,inthe

most

basicsense,isthe

fieldwhere

experienceoccurs,w

heremylife

andthe

livesofothersariseand

takeplace.

Experience,again,isnot

merely

subjective.Ithasits"subjective"

side,butexperienceassuch

isjustanothernam

efor

themanifestation

ofwhatis.W

hatisisthe

ongoingseriesoftransactions

between

organ-ism

sandtheirenvironm

ents.The

qualityofexperience-

whether

lifeisrich

orsterile,chaoticororderly,harsh

orpleasant-

isdetermined

atleastasmuch

bythe

qualityofthe

environment

involvedasby

what

theorganism

bringstothe

encounter.Environm

entisasm

uchapart

ofeachofusasw

eare

partsofthe

environment,

andmoreover,each

ofusisapartofthe

environment

-apartofexperience-

with

which

otherbeings

havetocontend.

Inasserting

thefundam

entalrelatedness

among

organismsand

environments,

pragmatism

commits

ustotreating

allenvironments

with

equalseriousness.Urban

andrural;

wilderness,

parkand

city;ocean

andprairie;

housingproject,

hospitaland

mountain

trail-allare

placeswhere

experienceunfolds.The

world,in

thisview,isa

continuumofvarious

environments.

Endangeredenvironm

entsperhaps

rightlyoccupy

ourattention

first,butenvironm

entalphilo-

sophyand

ecologicalscienceareatbottomattem

ptstounderstand

allthe

environments

weinhabit.

Attention

tothe

whole

continuumofenvironm

entsallow

sustoput

intoperspective

whatistruly

valuableabout

each.Theenvironm

entsweinhabit

directlyaffectthe

kindsoflives

thatweand

otherscan

live.Thereisan

unfortunatetendency

todraw

crasslyinstrumentalist

conclusionsfrom

thisline

ofthought.Iwant

tocaution

againstthis

tendency.Ifenvironm

ent"funds"

experience,this

reasoningmight

go,thenletus

usetechnology

toturn

thewhole

world

intoaneasily

manageable,

convenientstock

ofenvironm

entsthat

conduceto

pleasanthumanexperiences.This

ThemePark:

Earthline

ofthinkingneglectsour

inherentlimitations

asfiniteparts

oftheworld,

andsets

usupfordisaster.Repeated

attempts

todom

inatenature

(e.g.,ourdam

ming

theNileand

itsdam

ningusright

back,orourtragicom

ic'effortsto

"tame"the

atom)should

havebeguntoteach

ussomething

aboutthe

limitsofhum

anintelligence.

Suchattem

ptstodom

inate29

KELLY

A.PARKER

natureassum

ethat

nopart

ofthe

environment

inquestion

isbeyond

thefield

ofsettled

experience.Wecan

indeedexert

remarkable

controlover

partsofthe

experiencedworld,

remaking

ittosuit

ourpurposes.

Thismaybeappropriate,

ifourpurposes

make

senseinthe

firstplace.

(Iknow

ofno

reasontoobject

tothe

prudentuse

ofnatural

gastoheat

ourhom

es,for

example.)

Butthe

veryidea

thatthe

environment

fundsexperience

involvesthe

notionthat

thereisan

ineffableaspect

ofthe

world.

Itisindeed

arroganttothink

thatwecan

master

nature;itismoreover

delusionaland

ultimately

self-negating.Ifwehave

ourbeing

inthe

ongoingencounter

with

environment,

thentowill

thatthe

environment

become

afully

settled,predictable

thing,amere

instrumental

resourceinwhich

therecan

beno

furthernovelty,

istowillthat

weundergo

nofurther

growth

inexperience.

Theattem

pttodom

inatenature

completely

isthus

anattem

pttoannihilate

theultim

atesource

ofour

growth,

andhence

toannihilate

ourselves.What

wemust

trytodo

isnot

tomaster

thenatural

world,

butto

cultivatemeaningful

liveswithin

variousenvironm

ents.Weare

exceedinglyefficient

ataltering

anddestroying

partsofthe

earth,but

arefor

themost

partinept

atliving

wellon

it.Toexercise

ourpow

erwisely

would

requirethat

wegenuinely

understandthe

sourcesof

valueinthe

world

andinourselves.

Environmental

philosophymust

beginwith

closeattention

tothe

qualityofexperience

thatarises

(orcould

arise)from

inhabitingvarious

environments.

ISWeneed

toask

what

isvaluable

inexperiences,

what

featuresofenvironm

entsthey

areassociated

with,

andwhat

ways

ofinhabiting

environments

aremost

appropriate.Allthe

while

wemust

retainrespect

forthe

wild

andineffable

aspectofthe

world.

Weneed

toask

oncemore

theaes-

theticquestions

ofwhat

isgood,

andhow

goodnesscom

estobein

ourworld

-aworld

importantly

differentfrom

thatofK

ant,ofJam

esorofJohn

Muir

-before

wecan

gomuch

furtherinimplem

entinganethics

ofenvironm

ent.

(2)Pragm

atismsees

philosophicalethics

asan

ongoingattem

ptto

determine

what

isgood,

andwhat

actionsare

right.The

suddenemergence

ofanew

areaofethical

inquiryisasignal

thatsom

ethinghas

changedatavery

deeplevel

ofour

collectivelife.

Experiencehas

thrownusawhole

newset

ofproblem

sinrecent

years,resulting

ina

batchofnew

intellectualindustries.

Environmental

ethicsisone

among

severalnew

disciplinesthat

haveemerged,

firstto

extend,and

thento

transformsettled

ways

ofthinkingabout

value.

30

PRAGMATISM

AND

ENVIRO

NMENTAL

THOUGHT

Medical

ethics,business

ethicsand

feminist/fem

inineethics

areother

developments

similar

inthis

way

tothe

emergence

ofenvironm

entalethics.

Ineach

ofthese

areas,traditional

theorieswere

firstapplied

tonew

problematics.

Thenew

problematics

soonoutstripped

theavailable

conceptualresources,

showing

thein-

adequaciesofsuch

receivedtheoretical

orientationsasutilitarianism

,contractualism

anddeontological

ethics.Extension

ofconcepts

shadedover

intothe

development

ofnew

concepts,new

theoreticalfram

eworks.

Thetendency

ofenvironm

entaliststorely

onecological

metaphors

intheir

thinkinghas

ledsom

eto

embrace

anethic

thatrecognizes

thecentrality

ofrelations.

Thisethic,

likethat

ofpragm

atism,tecognizes

theinttinsic

value,within

andfor

thesystem

,ofallthe

thingsrelated.

Much

work

infem

inistand

feminine

ethicsalso

focuseson

relations.Anum

berofwriters

havenoted

thatthe

notionofan"ethic

ofcare"

appearstobeaprom

isingdirection

forenvironm

entalethics

topursue,

andthe

literatureon

"ecofeminism

"isgrow

ingsteadily.

19From

thepragm

aticperspective,

thisemerging

ethicofrelationships

appearstobeonto

logicallymore

soundthan

traditionalethical

theories.

(3)Environm

entalethics

hasalso

beenassociated

with

innovativepublic

policy-making

procedures,new

applicationsof

thelegal

system,and

grass-rootsactivism

.These

ways

ofputtingenvironm

entalawareness

intoaction

havecom

ealong

wayinthe

pastfew

decades,but

ofcourse

thereisalong

wayyet

togo.The

aiminallthese

areas,according

tothe

pragmatic

view,istokeep

experimenting

with

ways

torestructure

oursocial

institutionssothat

thepublic

hasareal

voiceindeterm

iningthe

kindofenvironm

entsweinhabit.

Pragmatism

,as

notedbefore,

seesindividuals

asthe

sourceofgenuine

insightinto

what

isneeded,

andaccordingly

triestomaxim

izeparticipation

ingoverning.

Pragmatism

is,inthis

respectasinothers,

closelyallied

with

theideals

ofthe

socialecology

movem

ent.20

(4)Inow

want

toturn

tothree

debatesthat

currentlyloom

largein

environmental

ethics.These

arethe

debatesover

moral

pluralism,

anthropocentrismand

theintrinsic

valueofthe

naturalworld.

What

pragmatism

suggestsabout

eachofthese

debatesisperhaps

contro-versial.

Ihope

thecontroversy

willsuggest

somealternative

ways

tothink

aboutthese

focalissues.

(a)Moral

pluralismcan

bedefined

asthe

viewthat

nosingle

moral

principle,orover-arching

theoryofwhat

isright,

canbe

31

KELLY

A.PARKER

appropriatelyapplied

inall

ethicallyproblem

aticsituations.

Pragmatism

recognizesthat

thereare

genuinedifferences

among

moral

situations,because

thereare

many

kindsofentities

andpossible

relationsamong

them.These

situationsinvolve

asignificantvariety

ofvalues,

andhence

ofkinds

ofconflict

toberesolved.

J.BairdCallicotthasobjected

tomoralpluralism

onthe

groundsthat

changingamong

traditionalethical

frameworks

involveschanging

metaphysical

assumptions.21

Wecannot

ingood

faithbeKantians

inthe

morning

andLeopoldians

inthe

afternoon.Peter

Wenz

hasidentified

thisgam

e,which

Callicottcalls

"metaphysical

musical

chairs,"asan

implication

ofwhat

hecalls

extrememoralpluralism

.22To

shiftmetaphysical

systemsatw

illindeed

doessuggest

shallowcom

mitment

tobasicbeliefs,ifnot

aprofoundmental

instability.Pragm

atismpoints

towards

what

Wenz

callsmoderate

moral

pluralism.The

movem

entamong

moral

principlesishere

groundedinasingle

metaphysicalview

thatacknowledgesirreducible

pluralisminthe

world

-som

eethically

significantsituations

aresim

plydif-

ferentfrom

others,since

theyinvolve

differinggoods

andkinds

ofentity.Hence

wefind

ourselvesappealingtoavariety

ofprinciplesaswedealw

ithvarious

situations.Ifw

eembrace

moderate

moral

pluralism,environm

entalethicists

inheritthe

serioustask

ofsortingoutw

hatconsiderationshavepriority

when

conflictingprinciples

canbeapplied

inagiven

situation.Twobenchm

arksmayhelp

inthis

task:withitsem

phasisonthe

qualityofthe

experiencedworld,prag-

matism

suggeststhat

thesustainability

anddiversity

ofexperiencesmade

possiblebyacourse

ofactionshould

beprom

otedwherever

possible.23Both

arecrucial

notonly

forthe

landethic,

asAldo

Leopoldnoted,

butfor

anyethic.

(b)The

debateover

anthropocentrismisespecially

tendentious.The

questionconcerns

theprim

arylocusofvalue.A

nthropocentrismmaintains

thatvalueisoforfor

humanbeings.Biocentrism

maintains

thatallform

soflife,assuch,

arevaluable.Ecocentrism

emphasizes

thevalueofecologicalsystem

sasawhole,including

naturalprocesses,relationships

andnon-living

partsofthe

environment.

Anaspectof

thisdebate

concernswhether

valueattaches

toindividual

entitiesor

whether

valuemust

beseen

holistically.The

pragmatist

would

askwhyweshould

beexpected

topledge

allegiancetoany

ofthese

flagsapriori,

andexclude

theothers.

Genuine

valueemergesatallofthese

focallevels.Indeedthere

willbe

conflictsbecause

ofthis,butthe

occurrenceofsuch

moral

conflictisnot

pe<;uliartothis

approach.Antigone

foundthat

"familyvalues"

32

PRAGMATISM

AND

ENVIRO

NMENTAL

THOUGHT

cantragicallyconflictw

iththe

valuesofthestate;today'sCEO

likewise

findsthat

businessvaluesconflict

with

thevalue

ofanendangered

owl'shabitat.

Denying

thatone

orthe

othersphere

isworthy

ofconsideration

mayappear

toprevent

potentialmoral

conflictfrom

arising,butonly

attherisk

ofseriousmoralblindness.Blind

anthro-pocentrism

hasdeplorable

consequencesforthe

non-human

world,

butablindly

misanthropic

ecocentrismisno

lessdeplorable.Again,pluralism

isafactencountered

inexperience.V

aluearises

inavariety

ofrelationshipsamong

differingparts

oftheexperienced

world.

Eachsituation

must

beappraised

onitsowndistinct

terms.

Asbefore,

thetwinvalues

ofsustainability

anddiversity

providereference

points.Sometim

eswerightly

focusonthe

sustainabilityof

thewhole

system;som

etimeson'the

uniquevalue

ofanindividual.

Sometim

esthe

individualorthe

systemishum

anand

sometim

esitisnot.

Fromthis

perspective,environmental

ethicscan

beseen

ascontinuous

withother

areasofethics,adistinct

butintegral

partof

valueinquiry

ingeneral.

Ihavespoken

oftheexperience

oforganisms-in-environm

entsas

centrallyimportant.

Pragmatism

is"anthropocentric"

(orbetter,

"anthropometric")24

inone

respect:thehum

anorganism

isinevitablythe

onethatdiscussesvalue.This

issobecausehum

anexperience,the

human

perspectiveonvalue,isthe

onlything

weknow

ashumans.

Many

otherentities

indeedhave

experienceand

dovalue

things.Again,this

isnottosaythathum

anwhim

isthemeasureofallthings,

onlythat

humans

areinfactthe

measurers.This

must

beafactor

inallour

deliberationsabout

environmental

issues.Wecan

andshould

speakonthe

others'behalfwhen

appropriate,but

wecannot

speakfrom

theirexperience.W

ecan

insom

esense

heartheirvoices,butwe

cannotspeak

intheirvoices.Iseeno

wayoutofour

owndistinctively

human

bodies.Inthis

sense,the

human

yardstickofexperience

becomes,

bydefault,

themeasure

ofallthings.Although

thedebate

overenvironmental

issuesisthuslimited

tohum

anparticipants,

thisisnot

inappropriate-afterall,the

debatecenters

almostexclusively

onhum

anthreats

tothe

world.

Wolves,

spottedowls,and

old-grow

thforestsare

unabletoenter

theethics

debateexceptthrough

theirhum

anspokespersons,

andthat

isperhaps

regrettable.Far

betterthat

theyshould

speakforthem

selves!Lackingthis,they

doat

leasthave

spokespersons-and

thesespokespersons,

theiradvocates,

needtocom

municate

theirconcerns

onlytoother

humans.

Todo

thisinanthropic

valuecategories

isnotsham

eful.Itis,after

all,theonly

waytogo.

33

KELL

YA.PARKER

(c)Thelastpoint

Iwant

totouch

uponisone

thatmany

taketobe

themost

important

issueinenvironm

entalethics.

Itisoften

repeatedthat

theviability

ofenvironmental

ethicsdepends

onestablishing

theintrinsic

valueofthe

non-human

world.

(PerhapsIshould

usethe

term"inherent

value."I'll

dealwith

thatmomentarily.)

Themain

concernisthat

aslong

asthe

non-human

world

isseen

asastock

ofresources

havingonly

instrumental

value,there

canbeno

genuine"environm

entalethic."

Tobemorally

considerableinastrong

sense,the

non-human

world

must

bemore

thanuseful.

Itmust

bevaluable

initsownright.

Pragmatism

cutsthis

Gordian

knotbydenying

thatinstrum

entalvalue

andintrinsic

valueare

evermutually

exclusive.The

beingofany

existentthing,

human

ornon-hum

an,isconstituted

inits

relationswith

otherthings

inacontext

ofmeaningful

connections.Thus

anythingthat

isgood

isboth

instrumentally

valuable(itaffects

somegoods

beyonditself)

andintrinsically

valuable(itisgood

forwhat

itis,a

significantentity

essentialtothe

constitutionofthese

relations).Wecan

indeeddistinguish

thetwokinds

ofvalue,

butnothing

canever

beinstrum

entallyvaluable

without

atthesam

etime

possessingintrinsic

value.Thus

eventhe

"lastman"

onearth,

inRichard

Routley'sclassic

scenario,would

bedoing

something

morally

wrong

inwantonly

destroyingparts

ofthe

naturalworld.25

Hewould

beannihilating

intrinsicallygood

pansofthe

fieldof

experience.Hewould

beneedlessly

damaging

notjust

thosesup-

posedlydiscrete

things,but

intrinsicallygood

partsofhim

selfand

ofallother

beingspotentially

oractually

inthe

eXperiential

web.

Peoplemay

mean

something

elseby

"intrinsicvalue,"

however.

Callicottreserves

theterm

"intrinsicvalue"

forthe

goodnessofsom

e-thing

independentofany

consciousnessthat

might

valueit.26

Thisis

sometim

escalled

the"inherent

value"or"inherent

worth"

ofnatural

objects.Now,pragm

atismwould

pointout

thatwhere

thereisand

couldinprinciple

benovaluing

agent,there

isnoconceivable

experi-ence

-and

henceno

aestheticormoral

valueatall.

Inauniverse

ofmere

objectsabsent

avaluing

consciousness,things

may

havebeing

butnot

value.Perhaps

intrinsic/inherentvalue

isthe

contemporary

equivalentofthe

medieval

conceptof"ontological

goodness"-then

insofar

asitexists,

everythingisgood

inGod's

eyes.Orperhaps

whatever

is,isgood

forsom

enon-hum

anconsciousness

otherthan

God.

(Theselatter

twocases

conformtowhat

Callicottidentifies

asinherent

value.)Irespect

bothofthese

possibilities,but

asahum

anphilosopher

Icannot,

andneed

not,com

prehendthem

fromthe

34

II\

PRAGMATISM

AND

ENVIRO

NMENTAL

THOUGHT

inside.Ifthere

were

nohum

anagent

therewould

afterall

beno

possibility(and

noneed)

forthe

kindofenvironm

entalethic

weseek.

Idonot

knowwhat

itislike

tobeGod,

nordo

Iknowwhat

itislike

tobeabat.

Theconcept

ofintrinsic/inherent

valueisthus

eithermeaningless,

orelse

itreduces

tothe

valueofsom

ethingthat

entersinto

ecologicalrelations

thatdo

notimmediately

affectany

human

agent.Allthat

is,however,

doeseventually,

mediately,

affectsom

ehum

anagent.

Itsvalue

canthus

becognized

byhum

ans,and

itsmoral

considerabilitycan

beacknow

ledgedand

respected.The

lessonhere,

thatweare

connectedatallpoints

toour

environments,

andthey

tous,

isthe

Alpha

andthe

Omega

ofpragm

aticthought

aboutthe

environment.

ACKNOWLED

GMENTS

Anearlier

versionofthis

essaywaspresented

attheannual

meeting

ofthe

InternationalSociety

ofEnvironm

entalEthics

inAtlanta,

GA,

Decem

ber1993.

Iparticularly

wish

tothank

EricKatz,

Andrew

Light,Stephen

Roweand

BethSinger

fortheir

assistance-any

flaws

thatrem

ainare

certainlynot

forwant

ofsuggestionsontheir

part.

NOTES

Thisattitude

isapparently

anoutgrow

thofanother

American-bred

wayofthinking,

which

JohnDeweyidentified

in1929

as"the

busi-ness

mind."

JohnDewey,

Individualism,Old

andNew,

TheLater

Works,

1925-1953,vol.

5,ed.

JoAnn

Boydston(Carbondale,

II:Southern

IllinoisUniversity

Press,1988),pp.

61,69.

2Jam

esnam

edthe

movem

ent"pragm

atism"inan

1898address,

andthere

creditedC.S.Peirce

with

introducingthe

centralinsight

inan

1878article.The

publishedversion

ofJames'

addressappears

as"The

Pragmatic

Method,"

Essaysin

Philosophy,The

Works

ofWilliam

James,

gen.ed.

FrederickH.Burkhardt

(Cambridge,

MA:Harvard

University

Press,1978),

pp.123-139.

(Referencestothe

Harvard

editionofJam

es'writings

aresubsequently

citedby

VolumeTitle,

Works(publication

date).)Peirce's

"How

toMake

OurIdeas

Clear,"towhich

Jameswasreferring,

appearsin

CollectedPapersof

CharlesSandersPeirce,vol.5,ed.Charles

Hartshorne,

PaulWeiss

andArthur

Burks(Cam

bridge:Harvard

University

Press,1931-1958),

5.388.(References

toPeirce's

CollectedPapers

citevolum

eand

paragraphnum

bers:CP

5.388indicates

volume5,paragraph

388.)3See

especially"Lecture

VI"

inPragm

atism,Works

(1975)and

thesequel

toPragm

atism,Jam

es'The

Meaning

ofTruth,

Works(1975).

4See

CP5.1-13

andCP

5.438for

Peirce'sdifferences

with

James

concerningthe

pragmatic

method.

35

KELLY

A.PARKER

5William

James,

"AWorld

ofPure

Experience,"Essaysin

RadicalEm

piricism,Works(1976),

pp.21-44.

Thepoint

ofthis

pivotalessay

istoargue

thatthe

common

distinctionbetw

een"subjective"

and"objective"

aspectsofexperience

ismerely

functional,rather

thanbeing

agiven

metaphysical

fact.6See

Dewey's

accountof"inquiry"

inthese

terms.John

Dewey,

Logic:The

TheoryofInquiry,

TheLater

Works,

1925-1953,vol.

12,ed.Jo

Ann

Boydston(Carbondale,

II:SouthernIllinois

University,

1986),p.

108.7T.

S.Eliot,

"EastCoker,"

CollectedPoem

s1909-1962

(New

York:

Harcourt

BraceJovanovich,1970),

p.189.

8Onthe

notionofvagueness

asanobjective

featureofthe

world,

seePeirce's

discussionofvagueness

andgenerality,

CP5.505.

9CP

1.129.10

ForJam

es'account

ofradical

empiricism

,see

"AWorld

ofPure

Experience,"Essaysin

RadicalEmpiricism

,Works(1976),

pp.21-44.

11That

thismethod

issimilar

toEuropean

phenomenology

hasnot

goneunnoticed.

See,forexample,

thestudies

inJam

esEdie,

William

James

andPhenom

enology(Bloom

ington,IN:Indiana

University

Press,1987).

Itisworth

notingthat

in1902,

independentlyofEdm

undHusserl,

Peircenam

edhis

versionofthis

method

"phenomenology"

(CP5.121).

12Jam

esprovides

asim

ilaraccount

ofthe'genesis

ofvalue

andethical

conflictinSection

11of"TheMoral

Philosopherand

theMoral

Life,"The

Will

toBelieve

andOther

EssaysinPopular

Philosophy,Works

(1979),pp.

141-162.13

Anthony

Weston,

"BeyondIntrinsic

Value:

Pragmatism

InEnvironm

entalEthics,"

Environmental

Ethics7(Winter

1985):

321-339and

"Unfair

toSwamps:

AReply

toKatz,"

Environmental

Ethics10(Fall

1988):285-288

(includedwith

EricKatz's

articleand

responseinthis

volume).

14Idiscuss

thenotions

ofadequacyand

significancein"The

Values

ofa

Habitat,"

Environmental

Ethics12(Winter

1990):353-368.

15Ipresent

amore

detailedexploration

ofthese

twoconcepts

ofgrowth

in"Econom

ics,Sustainable

Grow

th,and

Community,"

Environmental

Values2(Autum

n1993):

233-245.

16Dewey's

idealofparticipatory

democracy

isbest

presentedin

ThePublic

andIts

Problems,The

LaterWorks,1925-1953,

vol.2,ed.

JoAnn

Boydston(Carbondale,

II:Southern

IllinoisUniversity

Press,1988).

17Maurice

Merleau-Ponty,

ThePhenomenologyofPerception,trans.

ColinSmith

(New

Jersey:Humanities

Press,1962),p.203.

18Anthony

Weston

hasproposed

oneapproach

toaccom

plishingthis

in"Before

Environmental

Ethics,"Environm

entalEthics

14(Winter

1992):321-338

(includedinthis

volume).

19Onecofem

inism,see

Karen

J.Warren,

''ThePow

erand

theProm

iseofEcological

Feminism

,"Environm

entalEthics

12(Sum

mer

1990):125-146,

andChristine

J.Cuom

o,"Unravelling

theProblem

sin

Ecofeminism

,"Environm

entalEthics

14(Winter

1992):351-363.

36

\

PRAGMATISM

AND

ENVIRO

NMENTAL

THOUGHT

20Those

wishing

toexplore

thisconnection

may

wish

tostart

with

a

readingofM

urrayBookchin,

ThePhilosophyofSocialEcology:EssaysonDialecticalM

aterialism(Toronto:

BlackRose

Books,1990).

21J.Baird

Callicott,"The

Caseagainst

Moral

Pluralism,"Environm

entalEthics

12(Sum

mer

1990):99-124.22

PeterWenz,

"Minim

al,Moderate,

andExtrem

eMoral

Pluralism,"

Environmental

Ethics15(Spring

1993):61-74.

23This

pointisdeveloped

more

fullyinParker,

"Economics,

Sustainable

Grow

th,and

Community",

op.cit.24

Theterm

"anthropometric"

(literally"hum

an-measured")

isdiscussed

inAlan

E.Wittbecker,

"Deep

Anthropology:

Ecologyand

Human

Order,"

Environmental

Ethics8(Fall

1986):261-270.

25Richard

Routley,"Is

ThereaNeed

foraNew,an

Environmental

Ethic?"Proceedings

ofthe

FifteenthWorld

CongressofPhilosophy

(Sophia,1973),

1:205-210.26

J.Baird

Callicott,"Intrinsic

Value,

Quantum

Theory,and

Environ-mental

Ethics,"Environm

entalEthics7

(Fall1985):

262.

37