Learning Lessons From Abroad - ibiblio Democratic Transition-March... · the transfer of power from...

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Learning Lessons From Abroad

Proceedings ofInternational Conference

sponsored by

The Ford Foundationand

The Burma Fund

June 2001

Managing DemocraticTransition in Burma: Learning

Lessons from Abroad

Proceedings of International Conferencesponsored by

The Ford Foundation

&

The Burma Fund

Zaw Oo, editorMarch 2002

Copyright © The Burma Fund1319 F St., N.W., Suite 303Washington D.C. 20004

All rights reserved.First Published March 2002Printed at the Chulalongkorn University Press.

The Burma Fund holds the copyright of this book on behalf of the the Ford Foundation, which contributed to itsdevelopment. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of Technical Advisory Network of Burma or theBurma Fund. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form orby any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission from theeditor.

The Burma Fund encourages dissemination of its work and will normally grant permission to reproduce portions of thework promptly. For permission to copy individual chapters, please fax (+1 202 6390637) or email([email protected]) with complete information to the Burma Fund.

About The Burma Fund

The Burma Fund is dedicated to promoting andsharing knowledge and building capacity essentialto the establishment of durable democracy inBurma.

Further information:

www.burmafund.org

Contents

Acknowledgement i

Background:Managing Democratic Transition in Burma 1

A Summary Report:Conference Proceedings and Discussion Points 7

The Product:How Burma Could Democratize 17

Appendicies

Contributors 51

Participants 52

Conference Agenda 53

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank the Ford Foundation for giving us an opportunity to organize this importantconference, “Managing Democratic Transition in Burma: Lessons Learned From Abroad.” I wouldlike to thank specifically to Prof. Andrew Reynolds whose tireless work on organizing the participationof international scholars to the conference made the final event happen. I also owe deep gratitude toProf. Alfred Stepan and Prof. Stephen Levine who came from far flung places like New York andWellignton on either side of the globe in joining the conference. Again, the conference would notbecome a successful one if I did not get very supportive help from Prof. Mark Tamthai and Prof.Withaya Sucharithanarugse.

Thanks are due to the Johns Hopkins University Press for permiting to re-print the article,“How Burma Could Democratize,” published in their October 2001 issue of Journal of Democracy. Iwas very privileged to co-author the article with Prof. Reynolds, Prof. Stepan and Prof. Levine, and weall agreed that the conference provided the best opportunity for us to make our original ideas a morepractical proposal for Burma.

The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent those of the Burma Fundor the Ford Foundation. The editor and authors take full responsibility for the ideas, organization, andanalysis presented in the article and discussions elsewhere. I hope that readers find in this report auseful reference for their quest in restoring democratic transition in Burma.

Zaw OoDirector, Policy and Research ProgramsThe Burma Fund

Published by The Burma FundMarch 2002

Reorienting civil-military relations, introducing functionalfederalism, and organizing free and fair elections are allcritical steps in the process of national reconciliation anddemocratization in Burma. Such themes constitute a keyfocus of the conference organized by the Burma Fund thatorganizes policy workshop series in facilitating broad dis-cussions on future democratic transition in Burma.

Learning Lessons from Abroad

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Background: Managing DemocraticTransition in Burma

There is an urgent need to promote democratization in Burma, and to preparefuture Burmese leaders for a democratic transition. After 10 years of democraticstruggle, Burma recently witnessed a series of on-going talks between the militaryauthorities and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Although these talks have broughtsome hopes for the future of Burma, the conditions surrounding the talks arevery fragile. It is very important that the democratic opposition is capable ofconsolidating the talks, formalizing the negotiations and making transitionirreversible. As Burma steps into a new phase of political development theBurmese democrats are required to learn new skills and build diverse capacitiesto engage effectively in the ‘transition’ process. The Burma Fund (TBF),therefore, is dedicated to facilitate a series of policy workshops that will informand assist the leadership of the democratic movement in bringing smoothtransition from authoritarian rule in Burma. This particular workshop onmanaging democratic transition will inform the Burmese democrats regardingpolicy options that are available to address the pertinent problems of change inthe country. The workshop focused the following areas:

1) Civil-military relations during democratic transition2) Electoral system3) Structure of the state and federalism

Civil-Military Relations:

In the light of on-going negotiations in Burma, the decision of the Burmesemilitary to withdraw from power will be a very important victory for thedemocratic movement. Although such development can be a majorbreakthrough for democratization in Burma, it is not an end in itself. The newdemocratic regime will face two urgent problems in dealing with Burma’spowerful military. First, it needs to address the accountability of the country’shuman rights violations under military rule. The democratic regime will findthis task a great challenge because of the delicacy of maintaining popular supporton one hand and preventing backlash from the military on the other. Therefore,the democratic regime will have to adopt a mechanism that can meet threerequirements: promoting human rights, accounting for transitional justice andstrengthening national reconciliation. Second, the other fundamental task forthe democratic regime is institution building, which strengthens rule of lawand democratic consolidation for the long run. One key aspect of institutionbuilding is to nurture a proper relationship between civilian and militaryleaderships. Sound civil-military relations strengthen all checks and balanceswithin the governance system that can maintain effective civilian control over

Managing Democratic Transition in Burma

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military affairs. Reforms of the internal security system will be a key to advancingdemocratization.

Electoral System:

Burma gained independence in 1948 after over hundred years of colonial ruleunder the British Empire. Burma therefore inherited British systems includingthe ‘First Past the Post (FPTP)’ electoral system. Anti-Fascist People’s FreedomLeague (AFPFL), the national umbrella front of the liberation movement ledthe transfer of power from the British and won subsequent elections in 1952and 1956. In 1958, the ruling AFPFL split into two factions: Stable and Cleanfactions, the former inherited the League’s title and the latter changed the party’sname into Pyidaungsu (Union) Party. However, the military intervened thesplit and U Nu, then the leader of Clean faction and prime minister, was askedto transfer power to the Burmese army in forming a “Caretaker Government.”

After 18 months of ruling the country, the military’s Caretaker Governmentheld a free and fair election in 1960. Pyidaungsu party won a landslide victoryon the ticket of democracy (somewhat appealing to anti-military sentimentswithin the population), Buddhism and open market policies. However, themilitary intervened again in 1962 with a coup d’etat that decisively set Burmaonto a completely different path under “Burmese way to Socialism.” Duringthe 26-year rule of “Burmese way,” the so-called socialist elections were heldregularly for the public to confirm candidates selected by the Party. Theseelections never provided much needed legitimacy to the BSPP, which failedmiserably and eventually collapsed under popular uprisings in 1988.

In 1988, the military styled itself the State Law and Order Restoration Council(SLORC) took power from the BSPP, declared martial laws, introduced limitedeconomic reforms and welcomed direct foreign investments. Under severeinternational pressure, the SLORC decided to hold elections in May 1990. TheNational League for Democracy (NLD) led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi emergedas the leading political party of the democratic movement and won the election.The NLD won a stunning landslide victory with a total of 392 seats or 80% ofthe total seats, whereas the military-backed National Unity Party (NUP) couldhold only 10 seats. SLORC, however, refused to honor the election results.Since then, the political crisis has continued to overshadow the country and themandate of 1990 national elections have not been implemented yet.

As electoral system is one of the most important mechanisms for shapingpolitical competition, it is worth analyzing the election results of the most recentelection in Burma. In the hindsight, it would have been possible that if Burmaused different electoral system, says, list proportional representation system,then, the election results (share of parliamentary seats) would have been differentas followed:


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Current No. of Seats

Possible Alternative

(Fast Past the Post)

(List PR System)

National League for Democracy 59.9% 392 291Shan Nationalities League for Democracy 1.7% 23 8Arakan League for Democracy 1.2% 11 6National Unity Party 21.2% 10 103Mon National Democratic Front 1.0% 5 5National Democratic Party for Human Rights 0.9% 4 4Chin National League for Democracy 0.4% 3 2Party for National Democracy 0.5% 3 2Union of Pa-O National Organization 0.3% 3 1Kachin State National Congress for Democracy 0.1% 3 0Others 12.8% 28 62

Political Parties Votes (% of total vote)

Federalism

The Union of Burma is a nation-state of diverse ethnic nationalities. It gainedindependence from the British empire in 1948 by the agreement signed in 1947at the Panglong Conference where independent ethnic nationalities such asChin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Rakhine (Arakan), Myanmar (Burman),and Shan made the principle of equality as a basis of coming together into aUnioin.

During the colonial period, the British applied two different administrativesystems: “direct rule” and “indirect rule”. The first was applied to the peoplesand areas they conquered together with the Burman Kingdom, i.e., “BurmaProper”. “Indirect rule”, on the other hand, was applied to the peoples whowere “pacified” or added by treaty (the Shan principalities, for example) to theBritish empire after the annexation of the Burman kingdom. Under the Britishpolicy of “indirect rule”, the traditional princes and local chiefs of the Chin,Kachin and the Shan were allowed to retain a certain level of administrativeand judiciary powers within their respective territories.

The Second World War and the Japanese invasion of Burma brought Britishrule to an abrupt end. The British could return to Burma after the SecondWorld War in the spring of 1945. They outlined their long-term plan for thefuture of Burma in the form of a White Paper. This plan provided for a three-year period of direct rule under the British Governor, during which economicrehabilitation from the ravages of war was to be undertaken. Next, the LegislativeCouncil of Ministerial Burma would be restored in accordance with the 1935Burma Act. Only after the elections had been held under this Act would the


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legislature be invited to frame a new constitution “which would eventuallyprovide the basis on which Burma would be granted dominion status.”

For the Frontier Areas, the White Paper provided a means of maintaining thepre-war status quo. The Karenni (Kayah) State was still bound by the pre-colonial treaty as an independent nation. Likewise, the Kachin State and theFederated Shan States were also excluded from the administration of BurmaProper, they would, according to the White Paper, have “a special regime underthe Governor”.1 When the Labour Government came to power, Britain reversedits policy, and Burma’s political agenda became largely a matter of bilateralnegotiation between the British Labor government and U Aung San’s AFPFL(Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League).2 British prime minister Atlee invitedU Aung San to London in January 1947. The meeting’s outcome was thesigning of “Aung San-Atlee Agreement,” which guaranteed full independenceto Burma within a year. With British’s concession of independence, U AungSan came back to Burma and organized Panlong Conference in February 1947to discuss the formation of new independence state with leaders of ethnicnationalities. The agreement obtained in Panlong facilitated the final passageof independence in 1948 in the form of a federal union, despite of the loss ofU Aung San and other top leaders who were assassinated in July 1947.

In January 1948, the first independent government was formed with U Nu asprime minister and Sao Shwe Thaike, a Shan leader, as President of the Union.Although U Nu offered a consociational-style administration to other prominentleaders who did not won constituent assembly elections in 1947, BurmaCommunist Party and Karen National Union did not accept the offer and stagedrebellion against the government. As a result, a civil war broke out in Burma,which took many years for the AFPFL to regain control over insurgencies whilerebuilding the country from the destructions of two world wars.

While Burma regained stability in early 1960s, there were many concerns madeby the ethnic nationalities regarding the actual practice of federalism within theUnion. Many nationalities leaders regarded the issues such as revenue-sharing,natural resource use, the autonomy of federated states, and the promulgationof Buddhism the “state religion of the Union of Burma” in 1961 as deviationsfrom the Panglong Agreement. In response, U Nu invited all the political leadersand legal experts from all nationalities to what became known as the FederalSeminar at which “the issues of federalism and the problems of minoritieswould be discussed with a view to finding a peaceful solution.”5 While themeeting was about to make another historic agreement, the military led byGeneral Ne Win seized state power on March 2. With this coup, the federalismin Burma was abolished and one-party socialist state was established.


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Endnotes:

1. The White Paper, Part 11, Section 7, cited also in Aung San Suu Kyi, Freedom from Fear,(London: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 24.2.Clive Christie, Modern History of South East Asia (London: Tauris Academic Stdies, 1998), p.155.


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A Summary ReportIntroduction

The conference on “Managing Democratic Transition in Burma: LessonsLearned From Others” was held at the Siam Intercontinental Hotel in Bangkokon June 11-12, 2001. The conference was organized by the Burma Fund witha grant from the Ford Foundation. About 30 Burmese participants attendedthe conference together with a few scholars from the U.S., New Zealand,Australia, United Kingdom, and Thailand. Burmese participants came from allwalks of life: cabinet ministers of the exile government, members of parliament,leaders of ethnic nationality groups, representatives of civil-society organizationsand academics.

The conference was part of the series of policy workshops organized by theBurma Fund to facilitate broad discussions on the critical issues facingdemocratic transition in Burma. Hon. Mr. Teddy Buri, President of theMembers’ of Parliament Union opened the conference by thanking scholarstaking interest in Burma issues and by encouraging frank and active interactions.The conference produced a very fruitful exchange of views between thosewho have comparative knowledge and experience about transitions around theworld and those who have deep insights on the dynamics of Burmese context.

There were four sessions in two-day conference; each session consisted of onepresenter and either one or two discussants. Each session was followed bydiscussions among the participants who had adequate time to reflect their viewsand clarify some rationale behind certain policy recommendations made by thepresenters.

Session One: Transitions from Military RulePresenter: Prof. Alfred Stepan

Prof. Stepan focused upon three central issues in his presentation: (1) the modelof military professionalism; (2) modes of transition from military rule; and (3)post-military structure of the state. Prof. Stepan commented on Huntington’smodel of “old professionalism of external defence,” which had five interrelatedsubarguments: (a) the function of the military is “external defence”; (b) themilitary skills required are “highly specialized skills incompatible with politicalskills”; (c) the scope of military action is “restricted”; (d) such professionalsocialization “renders the military politically neutral’; and (e) the impact on civilmilitary relations “contributes to an apolitical military and civilian control”. Heexplained that his model model of military professionalism differed fromHuntington’s model of military professionalism in that, using the same fivevariables as Huntington, an equally interrelated, but fundamentally opposed,set of arguments. In the new professionalism (1) the function of the military is


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“primarily internal security”; (2) the military skills required are “highly interrelatedpolitical and military skills”; (3) the scope of military professional action is“unrestricted”; (4) professional socialization is such that it “politicizes themilitary”; and (5) the impact of the new professionalism on civil-military relationsis that it “contributes to military political managerialism and role expansion.”In relating to the case of Burma, one in which a clear military government isthe central base of power, he explained that democratization may originatefrom within such an institutional base. In addition, he also thought that therecan be a case in which the military-as-institution, though at one time a componentpart of the authoritarian regime, seeks to overhrow the military-as-governmentbecause it comes to believe that the continuation of the authoritarian regime isdetrimental to its long-term core institutional interests. In cases in which themilitary-as-institution sees the leaders of the authoritarian government ascarrying out policies that create a crisis for the military-as-institution, it may bewilling to sacrifice many of its own fellow officers-especially the leaders of themilitary-as-government-in order to transcend the crisis and reequilibrate thesituation.

Prof. Stepan also questioned the possibility of “pacted transition” in Burma.He argued that although four-player pacts- involving regime hardliners andregime softliners, and opposition moderates and opposition militants-wereincreasingly being seen by important scholars in comparative politics as anattractive, and almost a necessary, part of the construction of democratictransitions, there were limits to how one can construct democratic transitionsunder this mode of transition in certain situations. Like many regimes-“sultanism,” “totalitarianism,” and “early post-totalitarianism”- four-player gamesof pacted transitions might not be possible in Burma because all of the playersdo not, and cannot, exist. He further suggested how can a moderated oppositionplayer exist and carry out tactical and strategic bargaining with moderate regimesoftliners in a sultanistic or a totalitarian regime.

Another important issue Prof. Stepan touched upon was the issue of practisingfederalism in the context of multiethnic socieities. He explained the nature ofethnic conflicts based on identities that (1)Human beings can have multipleand complementary identities. (2) Identities, because they are to a great extentsocially and politically constructed, can change extremely rapidly. (3) Politicalleadership and political choices (such as the choice to make the first multipleand complementary, or polarized and conflictual, political identities. He broughtthe integrating and disintegrating states of Spain, Yugoslavia, and the USSR ascase examples to make all three of these claims painfully clear.

On federalism, he counted that of the nine states that once made up communistEurope, six were unitary and three were federal. The six unitary states are nowfive states (East Germany has united with the Federal Republic), while the threefederal states- Yugoslavia, USSR, and Czechoslovakia-are now twenty-three


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independent states and most of postcommunist Europe’s ethnocracies andethnic bloodshed has occurred in these postfederal states. He questioned therelevance of conventional wisdom on federalism such as the classic one madeby William Riker, who sees all enduring federations as emerging out of avoluntary bargain to pool sovereignty by polities all of which have a substantialdegree of previous sovereignt, or namely “coming together” federalism ofUnited States type.

Prof. Stepan put forward the examples of Belgium, Spain, and India, all oforiginally unitary states with multinational populations, states which, in orderto facilitate different groups living together democratically in one state, devolvedby constitutional means into federations. He called this “holding together’federalism. Prof. Stepan commented that the US model will not be a model formost new federations, especially if they are multinational, because the US federalmodel is coming together, demos constraining, and constitutionally symmetrical.He suggested that the possibly new federation in Burma can be “holdingtogether,” “demos enabling” federation with “constitutionally asymmetrical”structures binding together various ethnic nationality populations.

The discussion that followed Prof. Stepan’s presentation elicited debates onpossible transitions in Burma, the future role of the armed forces, and theadvantages and disadvantages of federalism for democratic consolidation inBurma. Prof. Stepan in his response gave the example of Brazil’s transitionwhere liberalization commenced under the aegis of the military-as-government.However, liberalization was sustained and broadened by a complex processinvolving governmental concessions and societal conquest--a gradual processof change that can be too possible in Burma.

Session Two: Designing Electoral System in Democratic TransitionPresenter: Prof. Andrew Reynolds

The choice of electoral system in Burma was the result of the influence ofBritish colonialism and the effects of difficult independence struggle thatunwittingly nurtured zero-sum political culture. The choice of first-past-the-post electoral system had a profound effect on the post-independence politicallife of the country, where many rival political parties shunned away from electoralexercise and got involved in extra-constitutional means of competing thedominant political party. The result was a tragic civil war that brought not onlymassive destructions but also the reign of military rule to the country.

After three decades of political gap between two elections of 1960 and 1990,most political actors and general population in Burma lack basic knowledgeand information regarding the choices and consequences of different electoralsystems. Against this background, Prof. Reynolds introduced the session inthree basic themes of designing electoral system in democratic transition:

Prof. Alfred Stepan

"the possibly newfederation inBurma can be“holding together,”“demos enabling”federation with“constitutionallya s y m m e t r i c a l ”structures"


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(1) variations of different electoral system and rationale of each system, (2)special considerations for disenfranchised groups, and (3) the administrationof the system.

Prof. Reynolds explained the importance of electoral system in democratictransitions. He maintained that the particular outcome of election can con-tribute to political stability in a given country. Political stability is critical foradvancing democratic consolidation and rebuilding economy during transition.Prof. Reynolds argued that the elections can enhance stability if people per-ceive the system to be fair avoiding any discriminations against particular par-ties or interest groups, and the elected government can efficiently enact legisla-tion and govern the country.

As many participants have requested further clarification on proportional rep-resentation options for Burma, Prof. Reynolds provided 4 types of PR optionsthat can be considered for Burma (all options based on 485 members of parlia-ment):

1. National List PRØ Entire nation constitutes a single constituencyØ Political parties present a list of up to 485 candidatesØ One single voteØ Threshold - 5%, 3%, 1% or no imposed threshold

2. Regionally-based List PRØ Eight regional multi-member constituencies based on existingstates:n Each region receives seats in proportion to its share of na-tional electorate.n Kachin (13), Kayah (4), Karen (14), Chin (10), Burman (339),Mon (28), Arakan (29), and Shan (48).

Ø Political parties register lists of candidates in each region theywish to contest.Ø One single voteØ Thresholdn No national threshold imposed.n Regional constituency threshold anywhere between 5%-0%.

3. National and Regional List PRØ One nationalconstituency - 200 seatsØ Eight regional multi-member constituencies (based on States)sharing 285 seats:n Kachin (7), Kayah (3), Karen (8), Chin (6), Burman (200),Mon (14), Arakan (18), and Shan (29).


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Ø Political parties present both a national list of candidates andregional lists.Ø One or two votes (one national and one regional)Ø Thresholds - Both national and regional thresholds can be ap-plied.

4. Mixed Member ProportionalØ 285 single member constituencies - Candidates elected by asimple plurality (current First Past the Post System)Ø 200 members elected from a national party list - Political par-ties present candidates list of up to 200 names.Ø The list (or ‘top up’/compensatory) MPs ensure that overallparties win seats in proportion to their national vote.Ø One vote (in the constituency which is then used for the na-tional seat allocation) or Two votes - one constituency vote and onenational list PR vote.Ø Thresholdn No threshold in the constituencies.n Threshold between (5% - 0%) for the national seat alloca-tion.

Prof. Reynolds further provided a detailed explanation of how an MMP systemmight work in Burma. Under the system to be used parties and independentsstand candidates in the single member constituencies. Parties also present a listof candidates for the national PR seat allocation. The 200 directly elected“national” party list MPs are allocated after the first past the post seats are won,in such a way as to esnure the overall proportionality of the system. These arein effect “top up” seats which would correct for any disproportionality arisingout of the FPTP constituency elections. Ultimately the system will be nationally proportional. If a party wins 50% of the national vote they will win approxi-mately 243 of the 485 seats. If they won 10% they will win approximately 49seats.

A hypothetical example serves to illustrate how these ‘top up’ seats ensure pro-portionality:

Party Vote % FPTP seats National seats Total seats won Seat %

A 60% 250 54 304 63%B 20% 5 97 102 21%C 5% 0 26 26 5%D 3% 15 1 16 3%E 2% 0 11 11 2%F 2% 0 11 11 2%Indep. 8% 15 - 15 3%

100 285 200 485

Note: Lower house of 485: 285 constituencies and 200 compensatory list PR seats.

Prof. Andrew Reynolds

"the elections can en-hance stability if peopleperceive the system to befair"


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Prof. Reynolds also brought in related issues of the representation of womenin the parliament and whether any electoral preference should be made on theelection of more women candidates to the parliament. He discussed on whethersuch mechanism should be applied to a party’s candidate lists or theirparliamentary caucuses. He also touched upon the advantage and disadvantageof PR lists be ‘open’ or ‘closed’ and with regard to whether the voters can alterthe order of names on the party list or not. Like reservations for womencandidates, the discussions also focused on the pros and cons of ‘preferredrepresentations’ for the military and distinct ethnic groups at least in transition.He ended the session with an optimistic note that if less resourceful countrieslike Cambodia and Sierra Leone could reform their antiquated electoral systemsto more advanced ones, Burma should be able to develop a better electoralsystem that can promote further democratization in the country.

Session Three: Issues of Federalism, Autonomy and DecentralizationPresenter: Prof. Stephen Levine

Prof. Levine used the constitutional examples of United States, Japan, NewZealand, Tonga and others to highlight the themes for his presentations: (1) theimportance of popular sovereignty in constitutional writing; (2) the origins ofsovereignty in different levels of governments; and (3) the spirit ofconstitutionalism.

“We the People” is the most common form of preamble in many constitutionsof the world, which emphasized the importance of popular sovereignty.Constitutions are meant to serve people, and constitutions have emergedaccording to the people’s will of designing political structures that are mostsuited to their needs. People of Japan have enshrined Article 9 in theirconstitutions that have deprived the Japanese military to wage war against anyother nations on earth, making Japan a strictly pacifist state. The humiliatingexperiences of war on Japan made their people to utilize constitutional meansto begin a new chapter in its history, i.e. to prevent militarization of thegovernment while advancing democratization within the country. Like Japan,Prof. Levine said, many other countries and their constitutions place popularsovereignty as the ultimate source of constitutional power of the land.

Prof. Levine reminded that the constitutions are man-made, therefore, they aresubjected to errors and failures. Most states that have attempted federalism inparticular do not fare very well with their experiments. Nevertheless, it is thepermission of ‘amendments’ in most constitutions make the citizens able tochange their constitutions without having needed to go through anotherrevolution or lengthy constitutional conventions. The possibility of‘amendments’ make constitutions not so rigid that they can adapt to the practicaland changing circumstances of the country.


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Here, he emphasized that it is important to realize the origins of sovereignty indifferent levels of governments. In some countries like the United States, statesform the federal government, while in many other countries like New Zealand,federal government form the provincial governments. Therefore, in NewZealand, the federal government at one point abolished the provincial levels ofgovernment administration and made the country a unitary state. This kind ofamendment cannot be possible in the United States even in the time of severeeconomic contraction like the years under ‘Great Depression’ when the federalgovernment wanted to combine all states into manageable economic units.Because the states form the federal goverment in the United States, the federalgovernment cannot abolish the states.

Constitutions are set up to circumscribe ‘powers,’ as governments are no angle.The lack of trust among citizens toward their governments are one of thecommon obstacles facing newly democratic countries; and Prof. Levine thoughtthat Burma can also face a similar problem. Since federalism can be a kind ofconstitutional arrangement for distribution of authority or sharing of power, itis an excellent tool for the Burmese to overcome mistrust. However, it is amuch more complex system with many power centers, it will take time to makecitizens familiar to the practice of federalism. On the other hand, federalism isonly one of many tools for power sharing, other methods such as coalitionformation, seperation of power within the government such as executive andlegislative branches and independent judiciary mechanisms should be thoroughlystudied to make them available to the citizens.

Last not least, Prof. Levine stressed that federal principles are dedicated to thecore values of peace, power-sharing and democracy, it is more important topromote these values in the transition of Burma. Such federal principles orvalues can be nourished even without a federal structure, and the principles notthe structures that matter most in the end.

Session Four: Transition in ThailandPresenters: Prof. Mark Tamthai

Prof. Mark Tamthai shared his experience in dealing with some critical issuesfacing Thailand during the last seven years since the Thai military’sdisengagement from politics following bloody uprisings in 1992. He discussedat length on the changing trends of national security policy development inThailand over the last few years, which he and other scholars played a leadingrole in shaping them. Thailand’s security policy has shifted its focus on ‘territorialsecurity’ to ‘human security’ with more participatory development in its making.Prof. Tamthai said that it is very important for the scholars to engage withmilitary professionals and engage them on the issues that concern them most.Security policy is one of such issues; it happens often that sincere discussionson simple questions can lead to dynamic interactions that can shape national

Prof. Stephen Levine

"federal principles arededicated to the corevalues of peace, power-sharing andd e m o c r a c y . . . . . S u c hfederal principles orvalues can be nourishedeven without a federalstructure"


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policies. It is very instructive for the Burmese participants to learn that asimple type of dynamic can affect the policy-making process at the nationallevel. He also shared Thailand’s success in integrating Southern provinces thathave been at odds with the central government for many years in the past.Security policy of the past emphasized the ‘sameness’ among all the regions ofthe Kingdom, which did not work well. Unity in diversity is increasingly acceptednowadays in Thailand, and security policy for all citizens of Thailand regardlessof their regional origin was developed with full participation from the grassroots.As a result, a proper relationship between civilian and military leaders wereachieved with more confidence-building engagements on common issues.

Prof. Withaya Sucharithanarugse of Chulalongkorn University added his insightover working with the past in Thailand. He emphasized the importance oftrust building among various entities within the body politic during a transitionalperiod. People need to regain their trust in government institutions, while thegovernment cannot rule the country without public trust. He called for morecooperation between Burmese and Thai scholars to work on common interests.

Conclusion

The conference brought a very lively discussions among the participants whodebated all the themes set out by the organizers. Although many participantsfelt that two-day conference has a rather limited time frame to set out anyconcrete proposals for democratic transition in Burma, they recognized thatthis conference gave them an opportunity to brainstorm some of the criticalissues facing Burma in a most comprehensive and constructive manner. Whilethere are many questions are raised than being answered durin the conference,the following points are worth noting:

1) Some concepts which have become local buzzwords, such as federalism, arefound to be understood at a very superficial level among Burmese politicalactivists and leaders. It is thus crucial to provide more opportunities for the keyplayers within Burmese democracy movement to understand commoninterpretations of the concepts and that their basic rationales are clearlyunderstood.

2) For many Burmese participants at the conference, the question of electoralchoices for democratic Burma is being introduced for the first time. Moreworkshops and training on the issue is warranted.

3) Many participants agreed the ultimate importance of confidence buildingamong various elements within the democratic movement, as well as with themilitary. Technical solutions and legal structures will not solve all the humanproblems; and it is clear that it is human will that can resolve deep-seatedproblems within a country.

Prof. Mark Tamthai

"a simple type ofdynamic can affect thepolicy-making process atthe national level"


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HOW BURMA COULDDEMOCRATIZE

Journal of Democracy, Vol. 12, No. 4, October 2001

Reprinted with permission from Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, USA.


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HOW BURMA COULD DEMOCRATIZEAndrew Reynolds, Alfred Stepan, Zaw Oo, and Stephen Levine

Andrew Reynolds is assistant professor of political science at the University of North Carolina,Chapel Hill. Alfred Stepan is Wallace S. Sayre Professor of Government at Columbia University.Zaw Oo, a native of Burma who was active in the democratic student movement there, isresearch director of the Washington, D.C.–based Burma Fund and a Ph.D. candidate atAmerican University. Stephen Levine is head of the School of History, Philosophy, PoliticalScience, and International Relations at Victoria University in Wellington, New Zealand.

In June 2001, Burma’s long-ruling military regime began to intensify itson-again, off-again talks with the leader of the country’s largest democraticopposition party, 1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi. Observershave split over the meaning of this move. Some see the renewed dialogue aspotentially the most important opening in a decade, while others dismiss it aslittle more than a ruse to forestall further sanctions and perhaps to get some ofthe current sanctions lifted.

At the request of the Burmese democratic opposition, we recently metwith some of its leaders in Thailand.1 Drawing on our knowledge of comparativepolitics, we discussed three questions: 1) What has, and has not, beenaccomplished in the Burmese talks so far? 2) How do military regimes give wayto democracy, and how might that happen in Burma? 3) What sort of electoralsystem and federal arrangements will work best to ensure that free and fairelections are held and honored in Burma? This article is a report and a reflectionupon these discussions, out of which emerged both new problems and surprisingpossibilities.

The military has ruled Burma continuously since 1962. From 1988 to1997, the junta called itself the State Law and Order Restoration Council(SLORC), a name it changed to the State Peace and Development Council(SPDC) in the latter year. Currently, the SPDC has 19 members. All of themare high-ranking military officers, mostly army generals. The armed services(collectively called the Tatmadaw) are led by Senior General Than Shwe, anarmy officer who is also the SPDC chairman, head of state, prime minister, anddefense minister. Than Shwe may be ill, and on occasion has expressed a wishto retire.

The talks with Aung San Suu Kyi would not have happened without aminimal consensus among the top five generals of the SPDC. However, thetalks seem to be under the control of Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, who isan SPDC member, the longstanding head of military intelligence, and the headof the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) charged with political and internationalaffairs. Khin Nyunt, who historically has been seen as close to the dying NeWin (the longtime armed-forces chief), is the leader of what is reputed to be a“soft-line” faction within the upper echelons of the regime. The 12 majorgenerals who are regional commanders are ex officio members of the SPDC.Most are close to a reputedly “hard-line” faction led by army commander-in-

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chief General Maung Aye (who himself, however, has also met with Aung SanSuu Kyi). The military’s dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi appears closed, butwith two top generals possibly leaving the scene, it may in fact be partly open.

Institutionalized oppression, ethnic fragmentation, and political distrusthave been facts of life in Burma ever since it won full independence fromBritain in 1948.2 Indigenous rulers, invariably presenting themselves as theembodiment of “the State,” have adopted and refined the old British-colonialstrategy of divide-and-rule. Electoral democracy lasted for just 12 years beforethe military swept away the civilian government in March 1962, but even duringthe years of multiparty competition, ethnic issues were never entirely laid torest. The military has always seen itself as the mainstay of the state’s integrity.

Burma’s minority “nationalities” have never been truly assimilated intothe polity of this land of 48 million, as many as 68 percent of whom are thoughtto be ethnic Burmans. Aside from the Burmans, there are at least eight identifiableethnic communities based on linguistic, religious, and regional divisions. TheShan represent roughly 9 percent, with the rest of the ethnic breakdown moreor less as follows: Karen, 7 percent; Arakanese, 4 percent; Chinese, 3 percent;Mon, 2 percent; Indians, 2 percent; and Chin and Kachin together, 5 percent.While the Burmans are clearly a majority, the political fragmentation of theBurmese state remains a highly charged problem against a historical backgroundof insurgencies and ethnic-secessionist movements. Religious differences arealso important: Christians have long filled a leadership role in Karen State,while Arakan State is home to about a million Muslims and Hindus, few ofwhom are citizens.

The military’s hold on power was rocked by a nationwide wave ofprodemocracy protest strikes in August and September 1988, but a bloodycampaign of repression restored the generals’ grip. Aung San Suu Kyi, thedaughter of Burma’s assassinated founder Aung San, had returned to Rangoonin April of that year in order to care for her ailing mother. As a result of hervisible presence and rousing speeches, she emerged as the prodemocracymovement’s natural leader.

The generals surprised some by honoring a pledge to hold free electionsfor the unicameral national legislature in May 1990. Most likely they werecounting on a fragmented outcome that would allow them to dominate anynew government. In the event, Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League forDemocracy (NLD) won nearly 60 percent of the vote. Moreover, thanks toBurma’s British-style “first-past-the-post” electoral system, this gave the NLDan overwhelming 81 percent of the seats. Throughout the campaign, Aung SanSuu Kyi had been kept under house arrest at her home in Rangoon, where sheremains as of this writing. The military responded to its defeat at the polls byinsisting that the new parliament could not meet until a regime-appointedNational Convention drafted a new constitution. The generals then proceededto grant the NLD only 86 of the 703 seats in this body, which first met inJanuary 1993. (The NLD walked out in late 1995.)Let us now move to our first question: What has, and what has not,


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ctober 2001been accomplished in the talks to date?

The Talks in Burma

Except for a three-month hiatus between February and May 2001, AungSan Suu Kyi has been serving tea to her jailers—the Burmese generals—on afortnightly basis at her home in Rangoon since October 2000. Most of thetalks have been with the military-intelligence wing of the army, up to andincluding General Khin Nyunt. The discussions, which have been private andconfidential, are generally thought to be stuck at the “confidence-building”stage. Yet since June 2001, more than 150 political prisoners have been freed,among them between 35 and 40 members-elect of parliament. Eighteen of the40 NLD offices in the Yangon (Rangoon) Division have been allowed to reopen.The stateowned media have stopped attacking Suu Kyi and her associates. Thissequence of moves is in line with what informed observers consider to beAung San Suu Kyi’s conditions for a broader set of talks: the staggered releaseof all political prisoners, a relaxation of the regime’s efforts to suppress NLDactivities, and the ending of house arrest for herself and her principal lieutenants,Tin Oo and Aung Shwe.

International pressure has also been mounting. Malaysian Prime MinisterMahathir Mohammad, who has influence with the Burmese generals, encouragedthe talks. His compatriot Ismail Razali, the UN Secretary General’s specialrepresentative in Burma, has had some success in prodding the generals toenter into and continue dialogue with the democracy movement. In April 2001,Brazilian political scientist Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, UN Special Rapporteur forHuman Rights in Burma, was allowed to visit the country, and was able tospeak to senior military officers and NLD leaders. There have been recentassessment efforts by the European Union and Red Cross. But perhaps mostimportant of all, the International Labor Organization (ILO) has recommendedsome of the most severe sanctions in its history against Burma due to widespreadforced labor. The ILO has insisted that sanctions not be softened until a teamof its experts makes on-site inspections to verify that forced labor has ceased.

If Aung San is reminiscent of Ireland’s Michael Collins—a youngmastermind of independence from Britain who was murdered by rivals angryat his willingness to compromise—then his daughter Suu Kyi’s situationresembles that of Nelson Mandela under apartheid. She is the iconic leader ofan oppressed people, a world-famous symbol of moral resistance to unjustpower. Her authority comes not only from her imprisonment, but from hersheer refusal to be intimidated. Like Mandela, she has been able to open adiscreet dialogue with her jailers despite the not entirely unfounded misgivingsof her own supporters, apprehensions that have flourished in the absence ofinformation. As in the South African case, the talks are beginning to show signsof hope, but is Suu Kyi in as strong a bargaining position as Mandela was in thelate 1980s?


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Might the Generals Let Go?

How and why do military governments leave power, and leave in such away that the successor regime is democratic? Are there other cases that canfurnish insights into the Burmese situation?

The scenario of military defeat and foreign occupation bringingdemocracy (as in Japan after World War II) is not on the horizon in Burma. Aslightly more likely possibility would see a weakened and divided military regimetrying and failing to regain its footing through a misbegotten foreign militaryadventure. In such a case, a faction of the senior officer corps, fearing for theinstitutional unity and prestige of the military, could overthrow the losing juntaand either hand power to a civilian caretaker (as in Greece in 1974) or encouragerapid elections (as in Argentina after the Falklands War). For Burma, such anadventure would take the form of violating Thai territory in order to attackBurmese rebels, as it has briefly done recently, but it is highly unlikely thatborder skirmishes will lead to major hostilities.

In a country with a strong democratic past, the military may holdelections in which it hopes to do well, so as to legitimate its rule. If it loses itmay give up power, but only after imposing constraints (such as no trials ofsenior officers) on the first successor democratic governments. This is whathappened in Uruguay and Chile in the 1980s. The Burmese military, in a countrywith a much weaker democratic past, allowed elections in 1990, but then barredthe winners from taking power.

Lastly, in the cases of South Korea and Taiwan, which had weaktraditions of democracy, military-backed parties that had already participatedin semi-free elections (and in the case of Taiwan had undergone political renewalwhich included the party being led by a civilian) believed that they could retaincontrol through free elections, and were correct for two successive cycles. Butultimately the militarybacked parties lost the voting, and accepted the verdictof an entrenched democratic process. The problem with this scenario is thatthe Burmese generals remember 1990 all too well and harbor no illusions thatthey can win a fair vote. What may revive this possibility, however, is the chanceof new constitutional arrangements assuring them of seats in the legislatureand influence over government.

In a context of a deteriorating economy and widespread repression, aspontaneous revolt may occur, as it did in Burma in 1988. But if the militaryresponds with a reprise of the mass killings of that year, the opposition mustmanage to do what neither the Burmese students nor the non-Burman nationalmovements could do the first time: They must summon the resolve to mountand sustain a unified struggle.

Indeed, in the modern history of defeated mass uprisings, only thenondemocratic regimes of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968managed to recover as effectively from a suppressed revolt as the Burmesemilitary did after September 1988. But the communist rulers in Budapest andPrague had help from Soviet tanks. How did the Burmese generals manage to


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ctober 2001restore their grip on power without foreign help? How stable is their regime?And what are the implications for democratization?

Part of the explanation of the Burmese generals’ successful politicalrecovery—or “re-equilibration,” as political scientists call it—lies in their successover the last decade at forging “standfast” agreements with 17 of the 24 ethnicarmies that operate in or near sections of Burma’s enormously long and remoteland frontiers. As part of these agreements, some of the more potent ethnicinsurgent groups have tacitly been handed control over smuggling and the drugtrade in their respective zones. In return, the insurgents refrain from attackingthe Burmese Army, and share the wealth from drugs and smuggling with selectedBurmese officers. These quid pro quo arrangements mean that the Burmesestate (unlike such “failed states” as the government of Sierra Leone, for instance)has managed to reassert a degree of control over the disposition of the “lootable”resources that its country offers.3

The cost to both Burma and the world of the junta’s path toreascendancy has been immense. Before 1988, Burma accounted for a tenth ofthe world’s heroin supply. It now accounts for more than twice that, and itsshare is increasing (thanks partly to the Taliban’s efforts to curtail opium-growingin Afghanistan). The bloated military, moreover, may be swelling beyond thepoint of sustainability. Burma has about seven million men aged 15 to 35;estimates put the number in uniform at around a half-million, or about 1 out ofevery 14. This is a stunningly high proportion by world standards, and representsa more than threefold increase from the 1980s.

The military has grown in other ways, too. It now controls virtuallyevery aspect of Burmese society: education, the media, public expression. Plus,the top generals have gained ownership over large segments of both privateand nationalized companies, a source of wealth considerably enlarged throughthe illicit drug trade.

While some generals (especially commanders in the drug-rich east) maythrive by milking the black market and drug trade for all it is worth, the nationas a whole steps closer to economic implosion each day. For Burma, the late-1990s Asian financial crisis was devastating. Foreign direct investment flowsnearly vanished, plummeting from US$2.8 billion in 1997 to US$54 million in1999, and have scarcely recovered since. Not only did foreign investment dryup, but exports stagnated while imports burgeoned, leading to a trade deficitthat has been rising by an average of about 20 percent a year. A balance-of-payments crisis is now a constant threat. The government had just US$312million in net foreign reserves last year, enough to pay for less than two monthsof vitally needed imports.

Given Burma’s weak foreign-exchange earning capacity, its currency(the kyat) has come under heavy speculative assault in the black market. Theregime’s reaction has been to sweep across the capital, arresting more than fourhundred exchange traders and effectively shutting down the private currencymarket.4 The latest arrests came in April 2001, as the government attempted tostop the currency’s slide from the official rate of 6 kyat to the dollar to a black-


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market rate as high as 800 kyat to the dollar.The sudden depreciation of the kyat dramatically harms many citizens,

particularly those living in border areas, as many lower-ranking soldiers andtheir families do. Not surprisingly, desertions are up as troops find themselvesforced to live off the land. Military involvement in extortion, drug dealing, andforced-labor conscription has become common.

What Might a Transition Look Like?

In considering how the changes to date in Burma fit into what we knowabout democratic transitions, it is well to note at the outset that those activists,analysts, and policy makers who look askance at the current dialogue have amplereason to be suspicious. The Burmese military has held tightly to power foralmost 40 years, slaughtering civilian protesters, refusing to honor the resultsof free elections, and continuing to let political prisoners die in its custody. It ishardly a promising partner for those who wish to see a democratic opening.

It is important, first of all, to avoid confusing democratization withliberalization. For example, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan argue that liberalizationmay entail “less censorship of the media . . . greater space for autonomousworking class activities . . . the releasing of most political prisoners . . . andmost important, the toleration of opposition.” All those things are fine, butdemocratization means more, for it “requires open contestation over the right towin control of the government, and this in turn requires free competitiveelections, the results of which determine who governs.”5

The key to democratization, in other words, is holding free and fairelections—and then letting the winners rule. So far, there have been absolutelyno steps toward this in Burma. Liberalization is not the same thing, andliberalizations can be—and have been—reversed. History is full of examples.Warsaw Pact tanks shut down the Prague Spring; China’s Tiananmen Squarestudent movement was crushed under soldiers’ boots. What the regime gives, itcan take away.

In some cases, however, liberalization may become an opening wedgefor democratization. This happened in Brazil in the mid-1970s, where a dynamicof regime concession and societal conquest developed, and to some extent inthe former USSR in the 1980s. In both Brazil and the USSR, this process receiveda big boost as a side effect of intrastate conflicts in which one faction of thestate tried to gain an edge by promoting the emergence of some previouslymarginalized groups. It is not inconceivable that something like this could happenin Burma.

Yet even should an opening somehow come to pass, the conundrum ofdiverse national groups will complicate any attempt at democratization. Burmahas at least eight distinct, regionally concentrated, and often mutually mistrustfulminority ethnic groups. Whether under the country’s early, democratically electedgovernments or the socialistmilitary regimes of the last four decades, thenumerically superior Burmans (who predominate in the center) have never


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ctober 2001managed to reach an accommodation with the minority peoples who clusteralong various stretches of the Thai, Indian, Laotian, Bangladeshi, and Chineseborders. The open wounds of ethnic antagonism have frustrated efforts atnationbuilding and the development of a robust constitutional order. Apartfrom a brief period of postindependence euphoria, Burma has always beenriven by both vertical and horizontal conflict: The people suspect the government,and the disparate Burmese peoples suspect one another. Since 1990, the militaryjunta’s favorite tactic for dealing with the “ethnic question” has been quietly tooffer some insurgent leaders shares in the international drug trade. Less sinisterbut still disturbing examples of politically motivated “side payments” includethe granting of import licenses and mining and lumbering concessions. The“rent seeking” involved in such deals distorts Burma’s economic and politicallife. In the case of the mining and forestry concessions, moreover, there havebeen environmental side effects devastating enough to rouse internationalconcern.

Poor as the omens for democratization may seem, the talks do furnisha glimmer of hope. It is possible that a split is emerging betweenmilitaryintelligence officers who believe that they and the country would bebetter off if talks accelerated, and the drug-rich commanders of eastern unitswho are ever more attached to their fiefdoms. With the grounds for hope inmind, then, we turn to the shape that the democratization process—if there isto be one—could perhaps take.

Constitutional Alternatives: Why Process Matters

Actors on all sides in the Burmese milieu have now begun to considervarious institutional options for their state, seeking to devise a political orderthat will be both internally stable and acceptable to the outside world.

As we weigh the options, it is wise to keep in mind two truisms ofconstitutional design. First, in a fragmented and fragile developing nation likeBurma, there is little room for error. The designers had better “get it right thefirst time.” Second, and perhaps more troubling, even if they do, democracycould still founder amid Burma’s poverty and ethnic mistrust. Free electionsmay solve the problem of “the military asgovernment,” but they cannot, in andof themselves, remedy the multinational question. At the same time, any futuredemocratic order can be expected to collapse quickly if the new politicalinstitutions do not address the realities of ethnic diversity and lingeringdisaffection from the country’s Rangoon-based, ethnic-Burman ruling elite.

The best evidence we have for the Tatmadaw’s constitutional thinkingis the list of proposals that came out of the regime-run National Conventionof 1993–96. From the opposition-in-exile, we have the “first draft” of a proposednew constitution published in November 1998 by the National Council of theUnion of Burma (NCUB), the umbrella organization of the major oppositionand ethnic groups in exile. This draft, though it does not reflect all NLD orminority-group thinking by any means, can nonetheless give us at least a rough


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preliminary idea of what an opposition constitution might look like.

Table 1: Constitutional Alternatives—NCUB and National Convention (Military-Sponsored) Proposals

NCUB Proposals National Convention Proposals FEDERALISM • Symmetrical federalism

(8 national states) • Federal law has precedence • Rights of self-determination

(through referendum)

• Symmetrical federalism (based on 14 regions and states) • Federal law has precedence • No explicit rights of self-

determination.

CAMERALISM • Bi-cameral • People’s Assembly (Lower) (485 directly elected nationally) • National Assembly (Upper)

(4 members from each of the states – method of election determined by State assemblies)

• Bi-cameral • People’s Assembly (Lower) (440

members: 330 elected by population, 110 appointed by military).

• National Assembly (Upper) (12 members per state or region, plus one- quarter of seats set aside for military).

PRESIDENTIAL OR PARLIAMENTARY

• Parliamentary • Prime minister elected by

People’s Assembly • But president of Federal Union,

(elected by upper house), as head of state, is commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

• Presidential • President elected by combination of

People’s Assembly and National Assembly (664 members, one-quarter military nominees).

ELECTORAL SYSTEM

• No mention of any change from plurality voting – assumption of continuity of existing system.

• No mention of any change from plurality voting.

MILITARY PREROGATIVES

• Subordination of the military to civilian control, with its status being equivalent only to other departments of the state, and with no right to participate in politics.

• Ethnic armies may exist.

• 25 percent of seats in both houses of parliament, one-third in state and regional assemblies, one-third of civil- service appointments.

• Jurisdiction over internal law and order.

• Active-duty commander is commander-in-chief.

• President must have “military experience.”

• Retain control over state enterprises – Burma Economic Holdings Ltd.

• Military subject to civilian courts only under highly restricted conditions.


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The Table on the facing page provides a broad summary of some of the majorpoints of contrast between the NCUB draft and the Burmese military’s ownperspective.

The Table reveals the key issues to be: 1) the nature of any form offederalism or decentralization; 2) the type of electoral system; 3) the nature ofthe executive power—whether parliamentary or presidential; and 4) theprerogatives to be enjoyed by the military under any new scheme.

These elements must, of course, be thought of as interrelated. If theydo not complement one another, the whole constitutional web will fall apart.Any redesign of the Burmese polity will perforce represent a new attempt toadapt in the light of previous difficulties. In this respect, it may not be notsufficient simply to decentralize a measure of power to the regions; governmentsneed to be elected in the best possible way, according to broadly accepted nationaland international criteria, with governmental responsibilities distributed in amanner that will allow many if not all groups to feel involved in the nationalexperiment. At the same time, representative institutions must not be set up inways that guarantee legislative deadlock.

Surprisingly, the two constitutional proposals somewhat resemble eachother in their desired federal arrangements. Both call for “symmetricalfederalism,” meaning a system (variants exist in Germany, ustria, and the UnitedStates) in which each constituent unit of the federation enjoys certain identical,constitutionally embedded prerogatives. Furthermore, both Burmese proposalswould allocate each state the same number of seats regardless of population.

A better choice for Burma is “asymmetrical federalism,” under whichthe various states could have somewhat different constitutionally embeddedprerogatives tailored to their key cultural characteristics. In truth, everylongstanding democracy that is also a multinational polity— Belgium, Canada,India, and Spain are the members of this club—is asymmetrically federal, and inall but Canada, even upper-house seats are apportioned mostly by populationsize. Making room for prudent “asymmetries” gives constitution makers andpoliticians more leeway to craft cultural agreements that help “hold together” amultinational country.

The NCUB has outlined a symmetrically federal system with at leasteight national states, as well as a possible but unfixed number of “nationalitiesstates” where no single ethnic group would predominate. For smaller minorityenclaves within the several states, the NCUB draft envisages “autonomousregions or special national areas” with special powers but only indirectrepresentation at the federal level. The military’s version of symmetricalfederalism envisions at least a dozen states and regions as well as concurrentautonomous territories. The upper house would be much larger—with a quarterof the seats to be filled directly by the military—but the National Conventionproposals neither detailed state powers, or clarified the relationship betweenthe upper and lower legislative houses.

Although the superficial consistency of symmetrical federalism mightmake it appealing at first glance, there are ominous precedents which suggest

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that such a system—with the overrepresentation and balancing of small statesit would entail—might be a risky choice for a newly democratizing Burma.While the ethnic-Burman majority may come around to the idea that theminorities need reassurances that their rights and privileges will be respected,members of this majority are still likely to view with unease the prospect of apolitical system in which their 68 percent predominance translates into a mere12 percent share of power. Under the NCUB’s proposals, five of the projectedeight states (representing only 14 percent of the population) could form amajority in the upper house, outvoting the Burman majority.

What may be far more workable is an asymmetrical federal system inwhich each minority group (or state) receives devolved powers tailored to itsspecial needs. This is perhaps best exemplified in Canada’s arrangements forQuebec and in the autonomous regional powers found in the constitutions ofBelgium, India, and Spain (where such powers are most notably utilized in theCatalan region).6

Such an asymmetrical arrangement for Burma might involve certainstates being reserved particular rights specific to their own group, as, for example,religion in Karen State (which has sizable numbers of Christians) or languagerights in Shan State. In return for these specially agreed-upon rights over issuesof particular local salience, states might be willing to accept a weaker upperhouse and the absence of a right of secession. No existing democraticconstitution explicitly allows secession, and whatever the possible differencesbetween reputed “soft-liners” and “hard-liners” in its ranks, the Burmese militarywill never tolerate a constitutional right of secession. Some of the oppositionleaders with whom we spoke seemed to understand this.

Toward a New Electoral System

One of the more productive areas of system change may well be in thedevelopment of a new system for choosing the federal legislature. Burmainherited first-past-the-post voting from Britain. Between 1948 and 1962, thissystem appears to have worked reasonably well. It seldom yielded “seats bonuses”of more than ten percentage points, it allowed for strong oppositionparliamentary caucuses (103 seats in 1956 and 93 in 1960, out of a legislaturenumbering 250 members), and it enabled minority nationalities to achieverepresentation. Shan parties, for instance, took 8 percent of the seats in the1956 parliament at a time when they constituted about 10 percent of thepopulation.

The 1990 election, however, demonstrated the inherent dangers ofplurality voting in the Burmese context. Under any system of proportionalrepresentation (PR), the NLD (with almost 60 percent of the vote) would stillhave won handily, but the military’s party (with 20 percent support) would likelyhave gained more than a hundred seats instead of the paltry ten they actuallywound up with. This would have meant not only a sizable opposition bloc, but90 more senior military politicians probably enjoying legal immunity from


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prosecution as members of parliament.This leads us to wonder: Had Burma used PR instead of plurality voting

in 1990, would the military have been so quick to nullify the results and invitemore than a decade of international opprobrium and ostracism? In retrospect,many in the NLD now think not. More significantly, during our discussionswith them we learned that key members of the opposition find PR appealingeven though they realize that it might cost them seats. The mixed-memberproportional (MMP) version of PR— used in New Zealand and Germany—might do the best job of combining geographical-constituency representationwith a parliament that also reflects nationwide political preferences. NLD andNCUB participants at a June 2001 constitutional workshop in Bangkok wereable to consider how MMP would look in a 485-seat parliament comprising285 singlemember districts and 200 national-list PR seats.

In contrast to the NLD’s preference for parliamentarism, the militaryfavors the hierarchical majoritarianism of a presidential system. The NationalConvention proposals reflect this, calling as they do for a strong executivepresident to be chosen by both houses of parliament (including at least 166hand-picked military appointees).

Even if we abstract from the question of military involvement, robustpresidentialism may be a risky choice for a multinational country such as Burma.A strong presidency is too big a prize, and will always leave some segments ofthe country feeling more or less permanently left out or even threatened. Ethnicvoting could mean that the president might always be a Burman, and minoritygroups (which together contain perhaps as much as 40 percent of the populace)could come to feel at best tangentially connected to national power. This hasbeen the structural flaw of strong presidencies in countries as diverse as Nigeria,Sri Lanka, Kenya, and Guyana. Some scholars argue that presidentialism canhave ethnically moderating and inclusionary potential, but suchrecommendations always presuppose that no single ethnic group is in a positionto dominate the way the Burmans do in Burma.7

Perhaps recognizing the problems with direct, winner-take-allpresidentialism, the National Convention proposed indirect election byparliament. But the type of parliament that the military wants, reserved seatsand all, would itself be hopelessly flawed in the manner of its composition. Asin Indonesia, this could easily lead to the election of a candidate whose partylacked majority or even plurality support. Under the National Conventionproposal, the president would be chosen from three vice-presidents elected bythree groups: the civilian members of the lower house; the civilian members ofthe upper house; and the military members of both. A civilian candidate couldarise from either assembly, but with 25 percent of the seats in each house reservedfor military appointees, any party opposed by the military would have to carrywell over 60 percent of the civilian members in both houses to ensure that itscandidate won the presidency.

In some “pacted” transitions between outgoing authoritarians and theirdemocratic opponents, there have been formal or informal coalition or “national-

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unity” governments. These include all (or most) of the significant political playersregardless of their electoral performance. Some of these have been “sunset”deals that expire after a set time (South Africa), while others have been mademore entrenched (Fiji). Burma does not seem a promising environment forsuch pacts. The military does not represent a significant popular bloc, though itcannot be ruled out that some new version of the old military-run BurmaSocialist Program Party might someday pick up substantial popular support. Atthe regional level, most of the minorities are so small that giving all of themrepresentation in a government of national unity would be counterproductive.

If decentralized or federal arrangements are well wrought, and if theNLD continues to enjoy significant support among non- Burmans, thenmandated power sharing among ethnically based minority parties may proveneedless or even harmful. In the best-case scenario, inclusiveness would be anatural by-product of the existing party system (as it was during the first twodecades of Congress Party rule in India).

The existing military regime is in any case much more concerned withits own prerogatives than with the basics of healthy multiparty government.This is clear from its constitutional proposals. The military’s plans for Burmaenvisage a greater political role for the military than can be found in anydemocratic or even semidemocratic polity. The military hopes to retain asignificant number of seats in legislatures at every level; control of major securityand economic-policy domains; and a predominant decision-making role inbureaucratic and judicial affairs.

If military prerogatives have to be retained—and given the currentbalance of power they may be if a peaceful democratic transition is to comeabout—these need to be as limited and temporary as possible. The example ofChile shows how long it can take for power to be wrested from military handswhen the transition arrangements are full of concessions made to a junta thathas taken care to safeguard its own personal and private interests.

It is clear that the National Convention’s undemocratic call for military-controlled seats in the legislature was driven by the military’s fear of what freenational elections could hold in store. Simply by switching the rules to PR,however, the military party could win at least a hundred seats in the next election(assuming that it can duplicate its 1990 performance). These seats would probablyalso acquire greater insulation from extradition, and a more easily defendedparliamentary immunity, than would seats held without benefit of electorallegitimation. Thus some of the protection the military seeks would come fromthe normal operation of democratic institutions.

There is some reason to think that the democratic opposition mightwell accept both PR and asymmetrical federalism. First, these proposals wouldgive military officers more of the personal safeguards that they want and thatthe opposition has reluctantly begun to contemplate as the price of militaryextrication. Second, military acceptance of these proposals would make a turnto democratic competition more likely. And third, some of the specific—butdifferent from state to state—national desires of various segments of the non-


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Burman opposition can be more easily accommodated in an asymmetrical federalsystem. (The special arrangements made for the Catalan and Basque regions inSpain are useful examples here.)

The staples of the inherited British-style approach—a unitary state anda majoritarian electoral system—would seem to have little place in a futuredemocratic Burma. At the heart of all federal arrangements lies an acceptanceof the need for partnership among those concerned. If Burma is to be a coherentdemocracy, it will need institutions that work to foster such a sense of partnershipand mutual confidence among Burmans and non-Burmans alike. An electoralsystem better tailored to Burmese conditions can help.

In time, as the reputation of the military begins to recover from itsdescent into authoritarianism and drug-based criminality, it may be possible forthe armed forces to assume once again an honorable place as the lawful defendersof national independence and constitutional democracy. More even than theholding of new elections or the inauguration of a new constitution, theestablishment of a professional army, characterized by integrity and restingfirmly under civilian control, will mark the moment when the transition to anew and democratic Burma has been finally brought to fruition.

It would be foolish to make precise claims about what may happen inBurma, or when, or how. Yet given what we have shown is happening there, itwould be even more foolish for analysts and policy makers not to examineBurma with a greater intensity now than they have in the past.

NOTES

1. The meetings were held in Bangkok and Chiang Mai, Thailand, in June 2001,under the auspices of the Burma Fund (which is closely connected to theBurmese democratic opposition) with the support of the Ford Foundation.

2. For an excellent overview of political developments in modern Burma, seePeter Carey, ed., Burma: The Challenge of Change in a Divided Society (New York: St.Martin’s, 1997). See, in particular, ch. 2, Robert Taylor, “The ConstitutionalFuture of Myanmar in Comparative Perspective”; ch. 4, Martin Smith, “Burma’sEthnic Minorities: A Central or Peripheral Problem in the Regional Context”;and ch. 5, Josef Silverstein, “The Civil War, the Minorities, and Burma’s NewPolitics.” For a recent discussion of constitutional design in a democratizingBurma, see Claire M. Smith, “Adapting Consociationalism: Viable DemocraticStructures in Burma” (Washington, D.C.: Technical Advisory Network ofBurma, 2000).

3. See Richard Snyder, “Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder? The PoliticalEconomy of ‘Chaosocracy,’” unpubl. ms., Department of Political Science,University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, July 2001.

4. Thomas Crampton, “Crackdown Does Little to Help Burma’s Economy,”

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International Herald Tribune, 11 July 2001.

5. See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition andConsolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe(Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 1.

6. For the argument that every democracy with a territorially based and politicallyactive multinational population is federal and asymmetrical, see Alfred Stepan,“Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, (Multi)Nationalism, andDemocracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism,” in Alfred Stepan, Arguing ComparativePolitics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 315–62. See also Alfred Stepan,“Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model,” Journal of Democracy 10(October 1999): 19–34.

7. See, for example, Donald Horowitz, “Presidents vs. Parliaments: ComparingDemocratic Systems,” Journal of Democracy 1 (Fall 1990): 73–79.


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toGiful;ajymif;r_ (transition) w&yfonf rnfodk@toGif&S drnfenf;? ?

u|Ekfyfwkd‹onf yxrOD;pGm ,ae@jrefrmedkifiHwGif rnfodk@aomtajymif;tvJrsm;onfuGsefyfwdk@odxm;orSs 'Drdkua&pDpepf qDodk@ toGiful;ajymif;r_rsm;ESifh rnfokd‹rnfyHkudkufnDr_&Sdonfudk Ed_if;,Of pOf;pm;ygonf? xkdtcg/ OD;pGmowdjyKrdaomtcsufrSm/vuf&S d awG@qH kr _rsm; tay: oHo,jzif h apmif h =unf havhvmae=uaom'Drdkua&pDta&;wuf=uGpGm vSkyf&Sm;olrsm;/ a0zefqef;ppf oHk;oyfolrsm;/ rl0g'csrSwfolrsm;wGif vuf±SdEkdifiHa&;tajctaersm; tay: oHo,jzpfapEkdifonfhta=umif;jycsuf rsm;jym;pGm &Sdaejcif; jzpfygonf?

yxrqH k;ta&;=uD;onfhudpPr Sm 'Dr d kua&pDpepfqDod k @aqmif&Gufjcif;tm;vGwfvyfcGifhrsm; jyKvkyfjcif;udpPESihf&_yfaxG;roGm;ap&eftxl;owdjyK&efvdkonf?Oyrmtm;jzifh Juan Linz ESifh Alfred Stepan wdk@u vGwfvyfcGifhrsm;jyKvkyfjcif;udpPonfrD'D,mwGif qifqmjyKvkyfr_ av#m@enf;vmjcif;/ vkyfief;aqmif&Gufr_vkyfief;&yfrsm;wGifudk,fzmom vGwfvyfpGm aqmif&Gufed kifr_ taetxm;us,fus,fjyef@jyef@&&Sdjcif;/ edkifiHa&;tusOf;om;rsm;udk trsm;qHk;vGSwfay;jcif;eSifhta&;}uD;qHk;udpPtaejzifh [email protected]&Sm;r_rsm;tm; cGifhjyKjcif;ponfwdk@yifjzpfonf[k &Sif;vif; aqG;aEG;cJh=uonf?

xdkudpPrsm;tm;vHk;onftvGefaumif;rGefaomudpPrsm;jzpfygonf// odk@aomf 'Drdkua&pDpepfqDodk@ aqmif&Gufjcif;rSm ,if;wkd@xufydkI t"dy`g,f &Sdygonf? 'Drkdua&pDtpdk;&w&yfrS OD;aqmif csKyfudkifedkifr_ +yKvkyfedkifrSom 'Drkdua&pDpepfokd‹ ul;ajymif;jcif;[k,lqEkdifjyD;/ ,if; tcGifhta&; &&Sd&eftwGuf yGifhvif;aom ,SOf+ydKifr_rsm;&Sd&rnfjzpfonf? ,if;udpPudkwenf;tm;jzifh a&G;aumufyGJ wck usif;yvsuf ,if;.&v'frsm; ESifh tnD rnfolu tkyfcsKyf &rnfudk jyXmef; ay;Ekdif ayonf? okd‹jzpf&m'Drdkua&pD*sme,f

twGJ 12/ trSwf 4/atmufwdkbm 2001ckESpf


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taejzifh rnfokd‹r# r&SifoefEkdifbJ &SdEkdifjcif;yif jzpfonf? vGwfvyfaoma&G; aumufyJGrsm;onf “ppfwyfutpd k ;&jzpfaejcif;” jy\emtm; ajz&Si f;aumif;ajz&Sif;Edkifrnfjzpfonf? odk›&mwGif wdkif;&if;om; vlrsdK;pkH qdkif&m jy\emrsm;udktajz&Smukpm;Edkifvdrfhrnfr[kwfay? wcsdefwnf; rSmyif topfay:aygufvmaomEdkifiHa&;qdkif&mpkzJ G@ aqmif&Gufr_rsm; onf wdkif;&if; om;vlrsdK;rsm; qdkif&muJGjym;jcm;em;r_ ESifh EdkifiH.&efukef tajcpdkuf Armwdkif;&if;om; tkyfpdk;ol vlwef;pm;.taea0;uGmaer_ [laom tajctaerSefrsm; udk rajz&Sif;Ekdifygu tem*gwfwGif&dSvmrnfh rnfonfh'Drdku&ufwpf tpkd;&rqdk tjref jyKdusoGm;rnf jzpfonf?

wyfrawmfu zJG@pnf;tkyfcsKyfykH tajccHOya'ESifh ywfoufI rnfokd‹ pOf;pm;xm;a=umif;ukd u|ekfyfwdk›wGif &&dSxm;onfh taumif;qkH;taxmuftxm;rSmwyfrawmfu 1993-96 twGif; usif;ycJhaom trdsK;om;nDvmcHrS ay:xGuf vmchJonfh tqdkjyKcsufrsm; yifjzpfonf? u|ekfyfwdk›wGif jynfya&muf t"du twdkuftcHrsm;ESifh wdkif;&if;om;tkyfpkrsm;. wyfaygif;pk w&yfjzpfaom jynfaxmifpk jrefrmEdkifiHtrsdK;om;aumifpDu 1998 ck Ekd0ifbmvxJY ykHESdyfxkwfa0onfh zJG@pnf;ykH topfqdkif&m tqdkjyKxm;aom yxrrl=urf;vnf; &dSaejyD;jzpfonf? Trl=urf;onf trsdK;om; 'Drdkua&pDtzJG@csKyf odk›r[kwf wdkif;&if;om;vlenf;pktkyfpkrsm;. pOf;pm;csufrsm;tm;vkH;udk wpkHw&m jcKHikHxif[wfjcif;r&dSonfhwdkif ,if;ukd twdkufcH tiftm;pkrsm;.}udKwifpOfpm;csuf t=urf;zsOf;rlrsm; tjzpf avhvmokH;oyf Edkifayonf?

Z,m;(1)wGif jynfaxmifp k jrefrmEd ki fi H trs d K ;om;aumifp D.rl =urf;E Si f hwyfrawmff.udk,fydkif ¶_jrifcsufrsm; t=um;uGmjcm;r_. t"dutcsufrsm;ukd tESpfcsKyfazmfjyxm;ygonf?



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j yn f axmi f p k j r e f r m E k d i f i Ht r s K d ; o m ; a u m i f p D

t q k d j y K c s u f r s m ;

t r s K d ; o m ; n D v m c Ht q k d j y K c s u f r s m ;

z u f ' & , f p e p f

y k H p H w l n D a o m z , f ' & , f p e p f( t r s K d ; o m ; j y n f e , f& S p f c k & S d o n f ) / z , f ' & , f q k d i f & mO y a ' o n f = u K d w i f p O f ; p m ;c s u f r s m ; & S d o n f ? u k d , f y k d i fj y X m e f ; c G i f h t c G i f h t a & ; r s m ; & S d(qE ` c H, l y G J r Swqi f h ) /

y k H p H w l n D a o m z , f ' & , f p e p f( j y n f e , f E S i f h w k d i f ; r s m ; 1 4 c kt a y : t a j c c H o n f )z , f ' & , f q k d i f & m O y a 't a = u m i f ; = u d k w i f p O f ; p m ; c s u f& S d o n f ? u k d , f y k d i f j y X m e f ; c G i f hE S i f h yw fou fI p O f ; p m ; r _ r & S d ?

v G w f a w m fE S p f & y f p e p f

j y n f o l h v $ w f a w m f ( a t m u fv $ w f a w m f ) ( E d k i f i H v k H ; q d k i f & ma & G ; a u m u f y G J r S 4 8 5 O D ; u d kw k d u f & d k u f a & G ; a u m u f o n f )

t r s d K ; o m ; v $ w f a w m f ( t x u fv $ w f a w m f ) ( j y n f e , f w c k p D r S 4O D ; p D / j y n f e , f v $ w f a w m fr s m ; r S j y X m e f ; x m ; a o ma& G ; aumu f y G J p e p f )

j y n f o l h v $ w f a w m f ( a t m u fv $ w f a w m f ) t r w f O D ; a & 4 4 0t e u f v l x k r S 3 3 0 u k d a & G ;a u m u f w i f a j r S m u f o n f ? 1 0 0 u k dw y f r a w m f r S c e f h t y f o n f ?

t r s K d ; o m ; v $ w f a w m f ( t x u fv $ w f a w m f ) j y n f e , f o k d h r [ k w fa ' o w c k c s i f ; r S 1 2 O D ; p D E S i f ht r w f O D ; a & a v ; y k H w y k H t m ;p p f w y f t w G u f c s e f x m ;a y ; & o n f ?

o r R w p e p f( o k d h r [ k w f )

y g v D r e f0 e f = u D ; c s K y f p e p f

y g v D r e f 0 e f = u D ; c s K y f p e p f / 0 e f = u D ;c s K y f u k d j y n f o l h v $ w f a w m f ua & G ; a u m u f w i f a j r S m u f o n f ?z , f ' & , f j y n f a x m i f p k o r R w u k dt x u f v $ w f a w m f r S a & G ; a u m u fj y D ; E k d i f i H t = u D ; t u J E S i f hv u f e u f u k d i f w y f z G J h r s m ; .pp f O D ; p D ; c s K y f j z p fon f ?

o r R w p e p f ? o r R w u k d j y n f h o l hv $ w f a w m f E S i f h t r s K d ; o m ;v $ w f a w m f E S p f & y f ( t r w f 6 6 4 O D ;E S i f h w y f r a w m f r S t r n fw i f o G i f ; o l a v ; y k H w y k H r S )a & G ; c s , f o n f ?

a & G ; a u m u f y G Jp e p f

r J t r s m ; q k H ; & o l E k d i f w r f ; p e p f( r s m ; o l & p e p f ) r S a j y m i f ; v Jr _ w p k H w & m u k d a z m f j y j c i f ; r & S d /w n f q J p e p f u k d q u f v u fu s i f ho k H ; rn f [ k c e f h r S e f ; & ?

r J t r s m ; q k H ; & o l E k d i f w r f ; p e p f( r s m ; o l & p e p f ) r S a j y m i f ; v J r _wp k Hw&m u k d a zm f j y j c i f ; r & S d ?

p p f w y f q k d i f & mt x l ; t c G i f ht a & ; r s m ;

p p f w y f t m ; t & y f o m ; t k y f c s K y f r _a t m u f w G i f & S d a p j y D ; / , i f ; t q i f ht w e f ; u k d t j c m ; t p k d ; & X m e r s m ;u J h o k d h t n D t r # o w f r S w f o n f ?

y g v D r e f E S p f & y f p v k H ; w G i f t r w fO D ; a & . 2 5 & m c k d i f E _ e f ; / j y n f e , fa ' o q k d i f & m v G w f a w m f r s m ; w G i fo k H ; y k H w y k H O D ; a & / E S i f h t & y f z u fX m e r s m ; w G i f o k H ; y k H w y k H u k dp p f w y f r S w k d u f & k d u f c e f h x m ; & e ftq k d j y K on f ? E k d i f i H awm f v k H j c K H a & ;p D r H c e f h c G J r _ t w G u f u m u G , fa & ; O D ; p D ; c s K y f r S w m 0 e f , l & r n f ?o r R w o n f p p f z u f q k d i f & mt a w G h t = u K H r s m ; & S d x m ; & r n f ?w k d i f ; j y n f p D ; y G m ; a & ; v k y f i e f ; r s m ;w G i f p p f w y f r S y g 0 i fa q m i f & G u f E k d i f o n f ? p p f o m ;r s m ; t m ; t v G e f u e f h o w f a o mt a j c t a e Y o m e , f z u fw & m ; & k H ; r s m ; w G i f w & m ; p D & i f c G i f h& d Son f ?



Z,m;(1) zGJ hpnf;tkyfcsKyfykH tajccHOya'qkdif&mpOf;pm;csufrsm;jynfaxmifpkjrefrmEdkifiHtrsdK;om;aumifpDESifh(ppfwyfrS}uD;rSL;aom)

trdsK;om;nDvmcHwkd h. tqkdjyKcsufrsm;


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Z,m; (1) wGif atmufyg t"du aomhcsuf udpP&yfrsm;ukd azmfjycJhygonf?

1? zuf'&,fpepf(odk›)A[dkcsKyfudkifr_av#mhcsjcif;.ykHo¾mefwckck.obm0?

2? a&G;aumufyJGpepfqdkif&mykHpHrsm;?

3? ygvDref0ef}uD;csKyf (od k ›)orRwpepf ESpfckwd k ›teufrnfodk › jzpfapumrltkyfcsKyfpDrHcef@cJGr_ tm%m. obm0?

4?rnfonfhpepftopfwckck atmufwGifppfwyfrS &&dSEdkifonfhtxl;tcGifhta&;rsm;ponf wdk›udk az:jyxm;onf?

trSefpifppf/ Tta=umif;t&mrsm;onfwckESifhwckqufEG,faeouhJodk›awG;jrif&rnfjzpfonf? tu,fI4if;wdk›tm;vkH;ukd wckESifhwckbufnDpGm qufpyfxm;jcif;r&SdutajccHOya' qdkif&m csdwfqufr_rsm;onf tykdif;ykdif;jyKwfxGufoGm;rnfjzpfonf?

jrefrmedkifiH. EdkifiHa&;b0ZmwfcHkudk topfjyifqifa&;qGJonfh rnfonfh'DZdkif;udkrqdk,cifu awG@=uHKcJh&aom tcuftcJrsm;udk av#mhyg;ap&ef aqmif&Gufonfh }udK;yrf;r_topf w&yftjzpf&Skjrifay:vGif&ayvdrfhrnf? T=uKd;yrf;r_wGif a'orsm;qDodk@tm%m tcsdK@cGJa0ay;onfh A[dktm%mudk avsmhcsapjcif; tay:,H aqmif&Gufjcif;jzifh vHkavmufvdrfh rnf[k r,lqEkdiffyg? tpdk;&opfw&yftm; wedkifiHvHk; twdkif;twmt& vnf;aumif;/ ed kifiHwumpHowfrSwfcsufrsm;t& vnf;aumif;/us,fus,fjyef@jyef@ vufcHedkifonfh pHE_ef;rsm;ESifhtnD jzpfedkiforSs taumif;qHk;enf;vrf;rsm; jzifh a&G;aumufwifajr‡muf&ef vdktyfonf? xdk@twl tpdk;&uvnf;tkyfpktm;vHk; taejzifhr[kwfonfhwdkif trsm;pktaejzifh edkifiHvHk;qdkif&m vufawG@aqmif&Gufr_rsm;xJwGif yg0ifywfoufaeonf[laom cHpm;csufrsdK; &&Sdaeap&eftjrJwap vkdtyfaom wm0efESifh vkyfykdifcGifhrsm;udk cGJa0ay;&ef vdktyfonf? tjcm;wzufwGif / ud k,fpm;vS,fjyKc Gi f hay;onf h tzG J @tpnf;qd ki f&mtaqmufttHkrsm;udkvnf; Oya'jykr_ taqmufttHktqifhqifhf az:aqmifa&;wGiftusyftwnf; awG@aprnfh zGJ‹pnf;ykHrsKd; rwnfaqmufrdap&ef ta&;=uD;ayonf?

zGJ@pnf;tkyfcsKyfyHk tajccHOya' tqkdjyKcsuf eSpf&yfpvHk;onff 4if;wdk›. &nfrSef;xm;onfhzuf'&,fa&;&m pDpOfr_rsm;ae&mwGif xl;xl;jcm;jcm; qifwlaeonf? ,if;ESpf&yfpvHk;onf tm%m wlnDpGm cGJa0onfhzuf'&,fpepfudk tqdkjyKvsuf&Sdonf? t"dyg,frSm



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,if;rlrsm;onf *smr%D/ =op}wD;,m;eSifhtar&duefjynfaxmifpkwdk@wGif wnf&SdaomyHkpHpepfrsm;ESifh qifwljyD;/ jynfaxmifpktzGJ@0ifrsm;. e,fajr,lepfwckwdkif;pDwGiftwdkif;twmwpHkwcktxd wlnDaom txl;tm%mrsm; aqmif&GufedkifcGif h&Sdjcif;yifjzpfonf? xdk@tjyif jrefrmedkifiHqdkif&m tqdkjyKcsufESpf&yfpvHk;wGif jynfe,fwckjcif;pDtm; vlOD;a&tcsdK;tpm;eSifh rqufEG,fyJ wlnDaom ukd,fpm;jyKr_ ta&twGufudk csrSwf ay;xm;rnfjzpfonf?

jrefrmedkifiHtwGufydkrdkaumif;rGefaom a&G;cs,fr_w&yfrSm tm%mwl r[kwfaomzuf'&,fpepf (asymetrical federalism) yifjzpfonf? ,if;pepfatmufwGifjynfe,frsm;onf 4if;wdk@. ,Ofaus;r_qdkif&m t"du vuQ%m&yfrsm;eSif hudkufnDonfh/ uGJjym;jcm;em;r_&Sdaom a'otajccHrsm;ESifh vnf; vkdufavsmnDaxG±Sdonfh/ txl;tm%mrsm;udk &&SdusifhoHk; Ekdifvdrfhrnf jzpfonf? trSefwu,fwGifvnf;'Drdkua&pDpepfudk wm&SnfpGm usifhoHk;onfh EkdifiHwdkif;/ Oyrmtm;jzifh b,f*sD,HedkifiH/uae'gedkifiH/ tdENd,edkifiHeSifh pydefedkifiHwdk@onf txufaz: jyyg tm%mwl r[kwfonfhzuf'&,fyHkpHrsdK;usifhoHk;aom uvyftzGJ@0ifrsm; jzpf=uonf? ,if;rSm jynfe,fwckESifhwck tm%mwlnDr_r&Sdonfh zuf'&,fpepfyifjzpfonf? Tpepf. xl;jcm;csufrSm/pydefeSifh tdEdN,edkifiHwdk@Y txufvGwfawmfae&mrsm;twGuff vlOD;a&tcsKd;tpm;twkdif; trsm;pkudkudk,fpm;jyK a&G;cs,fonf? aocsmpGm pOf;pm;pDpOfjyKvkyfaomtm%muG J jym;onf h jynfe,frsm; z G J ‹pnf; jcif; jzif h (z G J @pnf;tky fcs Ky fy H ktajccHOya'a&;qGJolrsm; eSifh edkifiHa&;orm;rsm;tm;) vlrsdK;pHk aexdkifonfh EdkifiHwckwGif twlwuGvufwGJxm;&Sdedkif&ef tm;ay;onfh/ a'owckESifh wck uGJjym;jcm;em;aom/ ,Ofaus;r_ qdkif&moabmwlnDcsufrsm;udk vG,fviffhwul n‡dE_dif;Ekdifrnfjzpfonf? ,if;okd‹ tm%mukd wajy;nDr[kwfbJ cGJjcm;owfrSwf xm;jcif;jzifh (zGJ@pnf;tkyfcsKyfyHk tajccHOya' a&;qGJolrsm; eSifhedkifiHa&;orm;rsm; t=um;) ydkrdktqifajyonfhwm0efESifh tm%mcGJa0r_rsm;ukd owfrSwfEkdiffrnfjzpfjyD; jynfaxmifpk}uD; tqifajyajyaygif;pnf; wkd;wufEkdifa&; (holding together federalism) ukd a&S‹±–Ekdifrnfjzpfonf?

jynfaxmifpkjrefrmedkifiHtrsdK;om;aumifpDonf tenf;qHk;wdkif;&if;om;vlrsdK;qdkif&mjynfe,f &Spfckyg0ifaom yHko¾mefwlnDonfh zuf'&,fpepfudk a&;qGJaz: jycJhonf?xkd‹jyif/ ,if;eSifhtwlrnfonfh wdkif;&if;om;wckurS vlrsm;pktjzpf vGrf;rdk;jcif;rjyKedkifonfh wdkif;&if;om; vlrsdK;trsm;tjym; a&maESmaexdkifonfhae&m rsm;udkvnf;jynfe,ftjzpf owfrSwfEkdifa=umif; az:jyxm;onf? jynfe,f trsm;tjym;wGifvlrsKd;pk=uDrsm; t=um; oGwfoGif;yg0ifxm;onfh ao;i,faomvlenf;pkrsm;twGuf




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jynfaxmifpkjrefrmedkifiH trsdK;om; aumifpD Oya'rl=urf; onf udk,fydkiftkyfcsKyfcGifh&e,fajrrsm; odk@r[kwf wdkif;&if;om; txl;a'orsm;tjzpf owfrSwfEkdifa=umif;ukdpOf;pm;az:jyxm;on?f odk@aomf ,if;txl; a'orsm; onf zuf'&,fjynfaxmifpktqifhwGif oG,f0dkufudk,fpm;jyKcGifhom yg0ifcGifh &Sdrnf [k pOf;pm;xm;ayonf?wlnDaomjynfe,frsm;jzif hz G J @pnf;onf h wyfrawmfrS tqk d jyKxm;aomzuf'&,fyHkpHwGifrl tem*wfwGif tenf;qHk; jynfe,fESifh wkdif; 14 cktjyif/ udk,fydkiftkyfcsKyfcGifh& e,fajr rsm; yg&Sdrnf jzpfonf? txufv$wfawmfonf ,if;. av;yHkwyHkaomae&mrsm;wGif ppfwyfrSwdkuf&d kuf jznfhwif;jcif;jzif h t&G,ftpm;yd krd k}uD;rm;rnfjzpfonf? odk@aomf trsdK;om; nDvmcH. tqdkjyKcsufrsm;wGif jynfe,frsm;. tm%mrsm;udktao;pdwfaz:jyjcif; aomf vnf;aumif;/ txufvGwfawmfeSifhatmufv$wfawmf Oya'jyKr_ taqmufttHkwdk@ t=um; qufpyfr_udk &Sif;vif;jcif;aomfvnf;aumif; jyKvkyfxm;jcif;r&Sdao;yg?

tm%mnDaomjynfe,frsm;jzifh zGJ@pnf;onfhzuf'&,fpepfukd tay:,HavhvmyguqGJaqmifr_ &SdjyD; pdwf0ifpm;zG,faumif;aomfvnf; (jynfe,ftao;pm;rsm;tm;udk,fpm;vS,fjyKr_ ydkrdkrsm;jym; aejcif;eSifh xdef;n‡dae&jcif; ponfwdk‹ vdktyffvmrnfjzpf&m) ,if;pepffopfonf 'Drdkua&pD pwifwnfaqmuf&rnfh jrefrmedkifiHtwGuftEW&m,f rsm;aoma&G;cs,fr_w&yf jzpfvmEkdifonf? Ttcsufukd t=uHjyKaxmufjyedkifonfh (tqdk;bufudkOD;wnfoGm;aeonfqdkaom) oifcef;pm rsm;&Sdygonf? Armtrsm;pktaejzifh wdkif;&if;om;vlenf;pkrsm;. tcGifhta&; rsm;eSifh,if;[email protected];jcm;aom tm;aumif;csufrsm;ukd av;pm;Ekdifrnf/ wkdif;&if;om;vlenf;pkrsm; pdk;&drfr_r&Sdatmif jyKvkyf&efvdktyfonf/ [laom ,lqcsufrsKd; tm;vufcH&ef 0efrav;vSaomfvnf; Ttrsm;pkArmwdkif;&if;om;rsm; taejzifh4if;wdk@. ajcmufq,f &mcdkifE_ef; vlOD;a& tcsK;dtpm;t& trsm;pk&&Sdaer_onf(wlnDaomz,f'&,frlt&) tm%mcGJa0&mwGif q,fheSpf&mcdkifE_ef;aom tm%mukdom &Ekdifrnf [laom pepf tay:wGif pdwfroufrom jzpfrnfrSm "rRwmjzpffonf?trsdK;om;aumifpD. tqdkjyKcsufrsm;atmufwGif pDrH vsmxm;onfh &Spfjynfe,fteuf ig;jynfe,f rSm (vlOD;a&pkpkaygif;. wpfq,fhav; &mcdkifE_ef; rSsom udk,fpm;jyKxm;aomfvnf;) txufv$wf awmfwGiftrsm;pk nGef‹aygif;rJwck udkzGJ@pnf;edkifrnfjzpfjyD; Armtrsm;pk udktedkif&rnfjzpfonf?

jrefrmEkdifiHESifh ykdrkd tvkyfjzpfEkdifrnfh yHkpHrSm vlenf;pktkyfpkwckwdkiff; (odk@r[kwfjynfe,fwdkif;) wGif4if;wdk@. txl;vdktyfcsufeSifh udkufnDaomaqmif&GufcGifh



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tcGifhtm%mrsm; &&SdEkdifrnfh wlnDjcif;r&Sdaomzuf'&,fpepfw&yf (asymmetrical

federalism) yifjzpfvdrf hrnf? ,if;odk@aom aqmif&Gufr_ udk taumif;qHk;Oyrmrsm;tjzpf taumif;qHk;jyedkifonfhudpPrSm uae'gedkifiH. uGdbufjynfe,fqdkif&m pDpOfaqmif&Gufr_rsm;eSifh b,fvf*sD,H/ tdENd, eSifh pydefedkifiHwdk@. zGJ@pnf;yHktajccHOya'rsm;wGif awG@&Sd&aomudk,fydkiftkyfcsKyfcGifh&a'orsm;. tm%mrsm;wGifawG@& S d&rnf? (pyde fe d ki fi HwGi ftqd kygtm%mrsm;ud k uwefvefa'owGifodompGmtrsm;qHk;toHk;jyK=uonf)? jrefrmedkifiHESifh oifhawmfrnfh tqdkyguJhodk@aomjynfe,fwckeSifhwckwlnDr_r&Sdaom pDpOfaqmif &Gufr_rsm;ukd pOf;pm;&rnf qkdygutcsK d ‹ jynfe,frsm;wGif 4if;wd k @.ud k,fyd ki f trsK d ;om;tkyfp krsm;twGufoD;oef@txl;jyktcGif hta&;rsm;xm;&S da&;twGuf pOf;pm;Ek difygonf? Oyrmu&ifjynfe,fwGif bmoma&;qkdif&m tcGifhta&;rsm; (c&pf,mef ta&twGufododomom&Sdaejcif;) odk@r[kwf&Srf;jynfe,fwGif bmompum; qdkif&m tcGifhta&;rsm; ponfh a'oqdkif&m xl;jcm;csufrsm;tay: tcGifhta&;rsm;ukd txl;jyKowfrSwfay;Ekdifrnf jzpfonf? odk@rSom/ txl;tm%mrsm;ukd &±Sdxm;onfhjynfe,frsm;taejzifh tm;enf;aom txufv$wfawmfw&yf ESifh cGJxGufcGifhtcGifhta&; w&yfr&Sdjcif;udk wkH@jyef vufcHpOf;pm;&ef qEN&Sdvdrfhrnfjzpfonf?

a&G;aumufyGJpepfopfrsm;qDodk@

pepftajymif;tvJjzpfaom toGiful;ajymif;r_umv. tusdK;aus;Zl; trsm;tjym;teufrS wckrSm zuf'&,fv$wfawmftwGuf a&G;aumufyGJpepfopf w&yfudkxlaxmifEkdifjcif;yif jzpfonf? jrefrmEdkifiHonf jAdwdo#wdk›xHrS yef;wdkifudk yxrqkH;jzwfEdkifonfhol tEdkif&onhfrJay;r_pepf (omrefrJtrsm;pkpepf) udktarGqufcHchJ&m/1948 ckESpfESifh 1962 t=um; rJay;r_pepfonf aumif;pGm tvkyf vkyfEdkifcJhykH&onf?,if;pepf (,if;pepfonftjcm;EkdifiHrsm;wGif ygwD}uD;rsm;ukd rJtykdqk tomay;avh±Sdaomfvnf;) t& usif;ycJhaom ,cifa&G;aumufyGJrsm;wGif q,f&mcdkifESKef;cef‹om trwfae&mtydk cHpm;cGifh &dSchJonf? odk@jzpfI Ta&G;aumufyGJpepfonftm%m&ygwDtm;rnfokd‹r# tcGifhxl; tykdqkay;jcif; r±SdcJh,kH r#ru/ tiftm;awmihfwif;aom ygvDref twkduftcH tiftm;pk udkyif jzpfwnfcGifh jyKxm;chJonf?Tpepfjzifh 1956 ckESpfwGif Oya'jyKtrwfta&twGuf 250 teuf twdkuftcHygwDrsm;rS 103 ae&m&dSchJjyD; 1960ckESpfwGif trwfae&m 93 ae&m&dSchJonf? xdk›a=umifh,if;pepfwGif vlenf;pkwdkif;&if;om; vlrsdK;rsm;tm; udk,fpm;jyKcGifh ay;tyfchJonf?vufawG@tm;jzif h ±Srf;jynfe,f vlOD;a&onf xdktcsdefu wwdkif;jynfvkH;




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vlOD;a&.q,f &mcdkifESkef; &dSI 1956 ckESpfygvDrefwGif &Srf;trsdK;om;ygwDrsm;utrwfae&mtm;vkH;. &Spf&m cdkifESKef; cef@&&dSchJonf?

odk‹aomf jrefrmEdkifiH.a&G;aumufyGJordkif;wGif( rJtrsm;pkpepf) trsm;pkrJ&onfhpepf(fast past the post) ay: tajccHaom t&SKH;tEdkif pepfonf yifudk,f twGif;obm0t& jrefrmEkdifiHtwGuf tEW&m,frsm; ±Sda=umif;ukd 1990ckESpf a&Gl;aumufyJGY om"ujycJhonf? rnfonfh tcsKd;nDr# udk,fpm;jyKjcif;pepf (proportional representation)

a&G;aumufyGJrsm; atmufwGifrqkd trsKd;om; 'Drdkua&pDtzGJ‹csKyfonf (rJay;r_pkpkaygif;. 60&mckdifE_ef;&&dSonfESifh tnD) trwfae&m trsm;pkjzifh vSvSyytEdkif&rnfom jzpfonf? odk‹aomf wyfrawmf.ygwD wpn rSmrl (rJay;r_pkpkaygif;.20 &mcdkifE_ef;axmufcHr_&&dSonfESifh tnD) rJtrsm;pkpepf atmufwGif trSefwu,f&xm;aom trwf 10 ae&mtpm; tcsKd;nDr#ukd,fpm;jyKjcif;pepf twkdif;omaqmif&GufcJhygu trwfae&m 100 xufru ydkrdk&&dSEdkifayonf? xkdokd‹ a&G;aumufyGJykHpHwckESifh wckt=um; uGmjcm;r_. tusKd;qufrSm wpnu t&G,ftpm; tiftm;tawmftwef±Sdrnfh ygvDref twdkuftcHtiftm;pk wcktjzpf jzpfrvmjcif;yifjzpfonf? xkdr#omru ppfwyf. Ed kifiHa&;orm;t}uD;wrf; 90OD;cef honfygvDreftrwf jzpfvmEkdifcGifh qkH;±_H;cJhjyD;/ trwf wOD;taejzifh (,cifjzpfcJhaomvl‹tcGifhta&; csKd;azmufr_rsm;ESifh qufEG,fonfh) w&m;pJGqdkjcif;rsm;udk Oya't&trwfjzpfI uif;vGwfcGifh&Edkifrnfh tcGifhta&;rsm; ukdvnf; qkH;±–H;cJhjcif; jzpfonf?

TtcsufonfuGsEkfyfwdk‹tm; tHhtm;oifhaponf? 1990ckESpf tajccHa&G;aumufyGJrsm; ukd trsm;pkpepf tpm; tcsdK;nDr#onfh udk,fpm;jyKjcif;pepfudkom usifhoHk;cJhyguwyfrawmftaejzifh (twkdif;twm wcktxd tm%m ±SdEkdifrnfjzpfI) a&G;aumufyGJ&v'frsm;udk todtrSwf rjyK&ef Tr#jrefjrefqefqef vkyfrnfavm[k pOf;pm;&ef±Sdygonf? xkd‹twl EdkifiHwum&_wfcsr_ESif 0kdif;=uOfxm;r_ukdvnf; 10pkESpfwckausmfr#jzpfyGm;atmif zdwfac:jcif;rsdK; jyKvdrfhrnfavm [k pOf;pm;p&mjzpfonf? trsdK;om;'Drdkua&pD tzGJ‹0ifrsm; (jynfya&muf) url aemufa=umif;jyef pOf;pm;=unfhaomtcg(ppfwyfrS ,ckuJhokd‹ t"rRvkyfvmvdrfhrnf) ,ckuJhokd‹ jzpfEkdifcsifrS jzpfvmrnfqdk=uonf? odk ›aomf 4if;wdk ‹ESif htwl uGsef kyfwd k ‹xyfrHaqG;aEG;=uaomtcgrSwfom;p&maumif;onfh tcsufrSm twdkuftcH 'Drkdua&pDtiftm;pkrsm;xJrSt"du acgif;aqmifrsm;onf tcsdK;nDr# udk,fpm;jyKjcif;pepfudk usifhoHk;jcif;jzifh4if;wdk›.trwfae&m tcsdK‹qHk;&_H;edkifa=umif;od&dSvifhupm; ,if;pepfonf jrefrmEkdifiHESifhoifhavsmfa=umif;ukd vdkvm;pGmaxmufcHr_jyK=uonf? tcsdK;nDr#udk,fpm;jyKjcif;pepf.



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enf;vrf; woG,fjzpfaom a&maESmaeaomudk,fpm;jyKtcsdK;nDr#r_pepf (mixed-

member proportional representation) udk e,l;ZDvef ESifh *smr%DedkifiH wdk‹YtoHk;jyK=uonf? ,if;pepf. tm;omcsufw&yfrSm jrefrmEkdifiHwGif yx0Dtaetxm;t& ud k,fpm;jyK jcif;E Si f h r JqENe,fajr ud k,fpm;jyK jcif;wd k ‹aygif;pyfxm;aom ygvDrefw&yfukd zGJ‹pnf;EkdifjyD;/ ,if;pepfonf wedkifiHvHk;twkdif;twmt& ay;xm;aom jynfol‹qENukdvnf; a&mifjyef[wfxm;jyD;om;jzpfEkdifonff? NLD ESifhf NCUB wdk‹rS 2001ckESpf ZGefvtwGif; befaumufYusif;yaom zGJ‹pnf;ykHqdkif&m tvkyf¶kH aqG;aEG;yGJodk› wufa&mufvmolrsm;onfa&maESmudk,fpm;jyKtcsdK;nDr#pepf ta=umif;ukd tao;pdwf aqG;aEG;cJh=ujyD;/ trwf485 ae&m&dSaom v$wfawmfw&yf wGif rJqENe,f wckcsif;pDrS wufa&mufvmaomtrwf 285OD;ESifh EdkifiHvHk;twdkif;twmt& pm&if;jyKxm; aom tcsdK;nDr#udk,fpm;jyKjcif; trwfae&m 200 xm;I pOf;pm;ygu EkdifiHa&;ygwDrsm;twGufrnfonfh tusKd;qufrsm; jzpfvmEkdifrnffudk okH;oyfr_rsm; jyKvkyfedkifcJh=uonf?

tpk d;&zG J ‹pnf;yk HE Si f h ywfoufI trs d K;om;'Dr d kua&pDtzJ G ‹cs Ky fu ygvDref0ef}uD;csKyfpepfay: tav;ay;pOf;pm;cJhaomfvnf; wyfrawmfu tpOftvmtwdkif;aqmif& Gufaeus trsm;p kv$r f;r d k ;aom orRwpepfopf w&yfud k y d kr d kESpfoufae=uonf? trsdK;om;nDvmcH. tqdkjyKcsufrsm;wGifTudpPudk a&mifjyef[yfv#uf&dSjyD; wyfrawmfonf v$wfawmf ESpf&yfpvHk;u (ppfwyfrScef@tyfxm;onfhtenf;qH k;trwfae&m 166 ae&mtygt0if) a&G;cs,f wifajrmufonfhtiftm;aumif;aom tr_aqmiforRwpepfudk vkdvm;a=umif; az:jycJhonf?

tu,fI uGse f ky fwd k ‹onf ppfwyf.yg0ifywfoufr_ ta=umif;uk d acwWab;z,fxm;jyD; pOf;pm;onfhwk dif/ tiftm;aumif;aom orRwpepfonfjrefrmedkifiHuJhodk›aom wdkif;&if;om;aygif;pHk&dSonfhedkifiHwcktwGuf raumif;aoma&G;cs,fr_w&yfyifjzpfayvdrfhrnf? tiftm;aumif;aomorRww&yfonf qkwcktaejzifh wefzkd;}uD;rm;vGef;ygonf? ,if;pepfukd usifhokH;cJhygu jrefrmEkdifiH. tcsdK‹aom tpdwftydkif;rsm;onf ,if;wkd‹ qENukd vlrsm;pk u tjrJ vspfvsL±_xm;ouJhokd‹/jcdrf;ajcmufxm;ouJhokd‹ cHpm;vmEkdifonf? wdkif;&if;om;rJay;r_ (ethnic voting)

rsKd;±SdcJhygu jrefrmEkdifiHwGif ArmwOD;OD;om tjrJwaporRw jzpfaumif;jzpfEkdifjyD;vlten;fpkwdkif;&if;om; rsm;rSm (wEdkifiHvHk; vlOD;a&pkpkaygif;. 40 &mcdkifE_ef;cef‹yif&dSaom wdkif;&if;om;rsm;onf) wEdkifiHvHk;qdkif&m tm%modk‹qufoG,f&mwGifoG,f0dkufqufqHr_ odk›r[kwf av;av;eufeuf r&dSr_ jzpfaeonfudk cHpm;vm=u




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ayvdrfhrnf? TjzpfpOfrSm Edkuf*sD;&D;,m;/ oD&dvuFm/ uifnm ESifh*kdif,mem ponfhwdkif;jynfrsm;wGif tif;tm;aumif; aom orRw pepfa=umifh EkdifiHzGJ‹pnf;ykH wGiftm;enf;csufjzpfapaom om"ursm; jzpfonf? tcsKd‹aomynm&Sifrsm; urlorRwpepfonf wdkif;&if;om;vlrsdK;rsm;ta&; ukd jzefajzudkifwG,f edkifr_&dSjyD; pGrf;aqmifedkifr_tiftm;rsm;vnf; &dSonf[k &_jrif=uonf? odk‹aomf Ttcsufonf jrefrmedkifiHYArmtrsm;pk v$rf;rdk;xm;onfh tajctaew&yfwGif rjzpfEkdifacs?

TuJhokd‹ wdkuf&dkufa&G;cs,faomorRwpepf odk@r[kwf Edkifoltukef,l [laomorRwpepfrsdK; a=umifh ab;xGuf&v'fqkd;rsm; jzpfvmEkdifonfukd rSef;qrdaoma=umifhtrsdK;om;nDvmcH. tqdkjyKcsufrsm;wGif orRwudk wkduf±kdufr[kwfbJ ygvDrefrSwqifh oG,f0dkufa&G;cs,f&ef tqdkjyKcJh=u[ef wlonf? odk‹aomf wyfrawmfutvdk& d SaeaomygvDrefy H kp Hr Sm ppfwyftwGuf ae&mvsmxm;csuf&d SaomygvDrefjzpf,kHr#ru/ ,if;.pkzGJ‹r_yHkpHwGif ar#mfvifhcsufuif;rJhapaom csdK‹,Gif;tm;enf;csufrsm; vnf; &dSaeonf? Oyrmtm;jzifh/ tif'dkeD;&Sm; EdkifiHwGif TpepfudkusifhoHk;jcif;jzifh trsm;pktedkif&rxm;aom odk‹r[kwf vlrsm;pk.axmufcHr_r&dSaomEdkifiHa&;ygwD w&yf. udk,fpm;vS,fwOD;tm; orRwtjzpfa&G;cs,fjcif;qDodk‹ OD;wnfcJhygonf? trsdK;om; nDvmcH. tqdkjyKcsufrsm;wGiforRwtm; tkyfpkoHk;ckrSa&G;aumufwifajrmufxm;onfh 'kwd,orRw oHk;OD;teufrS a&G;cs,f&efjzpfonf?,if;tkyfpkoHk;ckrSm atmufv$wfawmf. t&yfzufqdkif&m trwfrsm;/ txufvGwfawmf. t&yfzufqdkif&m trwfrsm;ESifh ,if;vGwfawmfESpf&yfpvHk;. ppfwyftrwfrsm;jzpfonf? vGwfawmfw&yf&yfrS t&yfzufqdkif&m orRwavmif;wOD;ay:xGuf edkifygonf? odk‹aomf vGwfawmfw&yfpDwGif ppfwyfrScef‹tyfolrsm; trwfae&m 25&mcdkifE_ef;pD &dS&m ppfwyfrSaxmufcHr_rjyKonfh rnfonfhygwDrqdk v$wfawmfESpf&yfpvHk;Y trwfOD;a& 60&mcdkifE_ef;ausmf&&dSrSomv#if ,if;wkd‹. udk,fpm;vS,favmif;onf orRw jzpf&ef aocsmrnfjzpfonf?

xGufcGmawmhrnfhtm%m&Sifrsm;ESifh ,if;wdk›.twdkuftcH'Drdkua&pDtkyfpkwdk‹t=um;oabm wlnDcsufjyKxm;onfh tcsdK‹aom toGiful;ajymif;r_rsm;wGif trsdK;om;aoG;pnf; nDnGwfa&; qdkif&mtpdk;&rsm; odk‹r[kwf w&m;0ifnGef@aygif;jzpfap/ w&m;r0ifnGef@aygif;jzpfap aygif;pyf zGJ‹pnf;edkifonfh tpdk;&rsm; &dScJhonf? odomxif&Sm;aomEdkifiHa&;upm;olrsm; (OD;aqmifv_yf &Sm;olrsm;) rSm a&G;aumufyGJEkdifp&mrvkdbJESifhtm;vHk;jzpfap odk‹r[kwf trsm;pkjzpfap Ttpkd;& tzGJ‹rsKd;wGif yg0ifedkifonf? ,if;wdk@teuf tcsdK‹rSm (awmiftz&duedkifiHuJhokd@) owfrSwfumv wcktwGif; tpkd;&



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tjzpfaqmif&GufEkdifonfh tcGifhta&;rsdK; &rnf jzpfonf? ae0ifcsdef (sunset clause)

udkifwG,f aqmif&Gufr_rsm;vnf; yg0ifrnfjzpfonf? tcsdK‹rSmrl (zD*sD edkifiHrSmuJhodk‹),if;owfrSwfcsufukd tcGifhaumif;,lI ydkrkdtm;aumif;vmatmif aqmif&Guf=urnfjzpfonf? jrefrmedkifiHwGifrl xdkodk›aom oabmwlnDcsufrsm; &&dS&eftwGuf jzpfay:edkifonfh ywf0ef;usiftaetxm; rawG‹jrif&ao;yg? odk‹aomf ,cifwyfrawmfuaqmif&GufcJhonfh jrefrmhqdk&S,fvpf vrf;pOfygwDuJhokd‹aom vlxkygwD yHkpHopfw&yfonf tem*wfwGif acgif;axmifxvmjyD; odomonfh vlxk axmufcHr_ &Edkifonfudk rjzpfEkdif[k avsmhwGufIr&acs? wzufY a'oqdkif&mtqifhwGif wkdif;&if;om;wpkcsif;. ta&twGufrSm tvGefyifao;i,fv#uf&dS&m trsdK;om; pnf;vHk;nDnGwfa&;tpdk;&w&yfwGif wkdif;&if;om;wpkwkdif;tm; udk,fpm; jyKonfhzGJ‹pnf;r_rsKd;ukd aqmif&Guf&ef rjzpfEkdifacs? tEkwfvuQ%maqmifI tysufyifjzpfEkdifonf? tu,fI A[dktm%mudkav#mhcsjcif; odk›r[kwf z,f'&,f qdkif&maqmif&Gufr_rsm;udk om wdwdusus aqmif&GufEkdifygu/ xdk‹twl NLD onfArmr[kwfaom wdkif&if;om;rsm; t=um; odomaomaxmufcHr_rsKd; qufvuf &dSaeao;ygu/A[kdtpkd;&tm%mtm; (vlrsKd;pktajcpkduf vlenf;pk ygwDrsm; t=um;)jzef@usufcGJa0ay; jcif;onf tusdK;&dSrnfr[kwfbJ xdcdkufr_ yifjzpfay: edkifonf? jrefrmEkdifiH twGuf taumif;qHk; tvm;tvmrsm;ukd axmuf±_&aomf/ vlwkdif;yg0ifr_rl(inclusiveness) onf (oufoufzefwD;jcif; r[kwfbJ) vuf&dS&dSqJ edkifiHa&;ygwDrsm;.ab;xGuf ‘obm0’ &vm'f wcktjzpf om jzpfoifhonf? (tEdN,EdkifiHwGif yxrq,fpkESpf twGif; uGef*&ufygwD tkyfcsKyfcJhr_ uJhodk‹ jzpfEkdifv#if taumif;qkH; jzpfonf?)

wnf&d SqJ wyfrawmfacgif;aqmifrsm;onf a,bk,stm;jzih f tajccHtm;aumif;aom ygwDpHkpepfw&yf ay:xGuf vma&; udpPukd pdwf0ifpm;jcif;r±SdbJ/ 4if;wdk‹udk,fwdkif txl;jyK tm%m&&dSvdkjcif;ukd om ydkI pdwf0ifpm;aeonf? TtcsufrSm4if;. zGJ‹pnf;yHktajccH Oya'qdkif&m tqdkjyKcsufrsm;wGif &Sif;vif;pGm awG‹&Sd&onf?wyfrawmf. jrefrmEdkifiHqdkif&m pDrHudef;rsm;rSm rnfonfh 'Drdku&ufwpf odk‹r[kwf'Drdkua&pD wpfpdwfwpfydkif; EdlifiHrsm;wGif ppfwyfrsm; &xm;aom tcGifhta&;xufrwefwq }uD;rm;aom EdlifiHa&;tcef;u¾w&yf &,lEkdif&ef ar#mfvifhv#uf&Sdonf?,if;. ar#mfvifhcsufwGif tkyfcsKyfr_tqifhqifh±Sd Oya'jyKr_vkyfief;wdkif; wGif odomaomtrwfae&m ta&twGufudk xdef;xm;vdkonfh qEN±Sdonf? xdk‹twl t"duusaom vHkjcHKa&;ESifhpD;yGm;a&;rl0g'rsm; tay: qufvuf csKyfudkifxm;vkdjyD;AsL&dku&ufwpf tkyfcsKyfa&;/ pDrHcef‹cGJa&;ESifh w&m;pD&ifa&; qdkif&m udpP&yfrsm;wGiftqHk; tjzwfay; aom ae&mwkdif;Y tiftm;v$rf;rdk;vdkjcif;&Sdaeonf?




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CONTRIBUTORS

Stephen Levine is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Head of the Schoolof Philosophy, History, Political Science and international Relations at VictoriaUniversity, Wellington New Zealand. He has been Director of the New Zealand PoliticalChange Project and is an expert on the politics of Japan, Taiwan, New Zealand and anumber of Pacific Island nations. He publications include Left Turn: The New ZealandGeneral Election of 1999 (2000); New Zealand Under MMP: A New Politics? (1996); WagingPeace: Towards 2000, Maori Political Perspectives (He Whakaaro Maori Mo Nga Ti KangaKawanatanga) (1985); and The Fijian Provincial Administration Review Regional Report (1985).

Andrew Reynolds is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science atthe University of North Carolina at Chape Hill. He received his M.A. from theUniversity of Cape Town and his Ph.D. from the University of California, San Diego.Reynolds has worked for the United Nations, the International Institute for Democracyand Electoral Assistance (IDEA), and the Organization for Security and Cooperationin Europe (OSCE) and has served as a consultant on issues of electoral andconstitutional design for Angola, Fiji, Guyana, Indonesia, Jordan, Liberia, NorthernIreland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. His interest in Africa hasconcentrated on democratization and electoral politics, political consequences ofelectoral systems, and political theory of representation, for which he has receivedresearch awards from the U.S. Institute of Peace, National Science Foundation, andInstitute on Global Conflict. Among his publications are The Architecture of Democracy(2001); Electoral Systems and Democratization in Southern Africa (1999); Election ’99 SouthAfrica: From Mandela to Mbeki (1999); and Elections and Conflict Management in Africa(1998), co-edited with T. Sisk.

Alfred C. Stepan is Wallace Sayre Professor of Government at the School ofInternational and Public Affairs of the Columbia University. He was the first Rectorand President, Central European University (Budapest, Prague and Warsaw) from1993-1996. Before this, he was the Dean of SIPA from 1983-91. He holds B.A. fromUniversity of Notre Dame, B.A. and M.A. from Balliol College, Oxford University,and Ph.D. from Columbia University. He has written extensively on comparativepolitics, democratic transition and federalism including Problems and Democratic Transitionand Consolidation: Southern Europe South America and Post-Communist Europe (with Juan J.Linz); Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone; and The Military on Politics:Changing Patterns in Brazil.

Mark Tamthai is Director of the Humanities for Society Center, Faculty of Arts,Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok. He has taught at Chulalongkorn University forthe past 27 years, first in the Mathematics Department and then in the Department ofPhilosophy. He is also an Advisor to the Office of the National Security Council ofThailand. His recent publications include "Democracy with a Heart" (1999) and "CanConstitutional Monarchies be Justified" (2000).


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List of Participants

1) Mr. Teddy Buri, MP – President, Members of Parliament Union(MPU)

2) Dr. Chotzang Yawnghwe – Technical Advisory Network ofBurma (TAN)

3) Dr. Sann Aung, MP – Minister, National Coalition Governmentof the Union of Burma (NCGUB)

4) Khun Marko Ban, MP – Minister, NCGUB5) Mr. Maung Maung Latt, MP – Secretary, MPU6) Mr. Bo Thaung, MP – Secretary, MPU7) Mr. Zin Lin – Senior Staff, NCGUB (Thailand)8) Mr. Aung Thin – Director, NCGUB (Thailand)9) Mr. Htan Lian Paung, MP – MPU10) Dr. Thaung Htun – UN Representative, NCGUB11) Dr. Tin Maung Than – Researcher and Former Editor of Thint-

ba-wa Magazine12) Dr. Kyaw Nyunt – Secretary, NCGUB13) Mr. Sunny Mahinda – Secretary, All Burma Student Democratic

Front14) Mr. Soe Aung – Director, National Democratic Development15) Mr. Zaw Min – Secretary, Democratic Party for New Society16) Ms. Shelly – Kachin Women Association in Thailand17) Ms. Khin Ohmar – Women Affairs Coordinator, NCGUB18) Mr. Doe Sae – Director, Foreign Affairs, Karenni National

Progressive Party19) Mr. David Htaw – Secretary of Foreign Affairs, National

Democratic Front, Karen National Union20) Mr. Khun Kyar Nu – Chairman, Shan Democratic Union21) Mr. Than Htut – Joint Secretary, National League for Democracy

(Librated Area)22) Ms. Myint Myint Sann – Burmese Women Union23) Mr. Daniel Aung – Vice President, MPU24) Mr. Myint Cho – Special Assistant to the President, MPU25) Mr. Zaw Oo – The Burma Fund


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Conference Agenda Monday, June 11st

8:30 – 9:00 Registration 9:00 – 9:30

Introduction: Zaw Oo (TBF) Welcoming remarks: Mr. Teddy Buri, MP, President, Members of Parliament Union Prof. Andrew Reynolds, Notre Dame University

9:30 – 10:45 Facilitator: Dr. Chao-tzang Yawnghwe (TAN) Session 1: Transition from Military Rule Prof. Alfred Stepan, Columbia University

10:45 – 11:00 Coffee Break 11:00 – 12:30 Brainstorming on 'Transition from Military Rule in Burma' 12:30 – 2:00 Lunch 2:00 – 3:15 Facilitator: Dr. Thaung Htun (NCGUB)

Session 2: Designing Electoral System in Democratic Transitions Prof. Andrew Reynolds, Notre Dame University

3:15 – 3: 30 Coffee break 3:30 – 5:00 Brainstorming on 'Electoral options for Burma's Transitions' Tuesday, June 12th 9:00 – 10:15 Facilitator: Dr. Myo Nyunt (Edith Cowan University)

Session 3: Issues of federalism, autonomy and decentralization Prof. Stephen Levine, Victoria University

10:15 – 10:45 Brainstorming on "Practical aspects of federal formula for Burma" 10:45 – 11:00 Coffee break 11:00 – 12:00 Continue brainstorming on 'decentralization' 12:00 – 12:30

Facilitator: Dr. Tin Maung Than (University of Pittsburg) Summary: Overall transition issues facing Burma: Where to now?

12:30 – 2:00 Lunch break 2:00 – 3:15 Facilitator: Prof. Witthaya Sucharithanarugse (Chulalongkorn

University) Session 4: Transition in Thailand Prof. Mark Tamthai, Chulalongkorn University

3:15 – 3:30 Coffee break 3:30 – 4:45 Brainstorming on "What next: practical steps?" 4:45 – 5:00 Conclusion:

- Prof. Andrew Reynolds - Zaw Oo

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