Lecture 2: The Rise & Development of the Sino-Soviet Alliance (1949-1963)

Evolution of Sino-Soviet Alliance

Emerging in late 1940s and early 1950s;

Serious disputes began to develop in the latter part of 1950s;

Collapsing in the mid-1960s; Bloody border clashes in 1969.

Rise of Sino-Soviet Alliance

Anastas Mikoyan’s secret trip to Xibaipo in early 1949;

Liu Shaoqi’s secret trip to Moscow in summer 1949

Mao Zedong’s trip to Moscow

Lean-to-One-Side

On June 30, 1949, Mao issued this statement in the article entitled “On People’s Democratic Dictatorship”

在国外，联合世界上以平等待我的民族和各国人民，共同奋斗。这就是联合苏联，联合各人民民主国家，联合其他各国的无产阶级和广大人民，结成国际的统一战线……

中国人不是倒向帝国主义一边，就是倒向社会主义一边，绝无例外。骑墙是不行的，第三条道路是没有的。

CCP’s 3 Principles

Making a fresh start; Cleaning the house before

entertaining guests; Leaning to one side.

Reasons

Ideological commitments; Security concerns; Mao’s determination to set a

model for other “oppressed nations” and to reestablish China’s central position in the international community.

Mao’s Moscow Visit (Dec. 16,1949-Feb. 14, 1950)

“bring about sth. that not only looks nice, but also tasted delicious”– a new Sino-Soviet Treaty, abolishing 1945 treaty with GMD;

3 weeks’ stalemate; Jan. 20, Zhou Enlai arrived in Moscow; Feb. 14, signed the treaty.

Key Events

the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance

Korean War

Content of the Treaty

Allowing the Soviets to maintain their privileges in China’s Northeast and Xinjiang;

Soviets agreed to increase military and other material support to China, including providing air-defense installations in coastal areas of the PRC.

Influence of the Treaty The alliance will enhance the PRC’s security

and promote the post-victory revolution, helping CCP cope with domestic and international threats to the Chinese revolution;

Sino-Soviet divergences persisted, Mao’s feeling as the inferior “younger brother” and the way the agreement was designed doomed the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

The Alliance & The Korean War

Soviet’s Misperception on US military intervention

(1) The end of Jan, 1950, Acheson’s statement indicates that Korea would be excluded from US western Pacific defense perimeter;

(2) During Mao’s Moscow visit, Mao shared with Stalin that it was unlikely for US to involve itself in a revolutionary civil war in East Asia.

Mao’s Thinking

Realistic Thinking: jeopardizing the CCP’s effort to liberate Taiwan;

Idealistic Thinking: reviving China’s central position on the international scene through supporting revolutionary movements in other countries.

Stalin’s hesitation in offering air support

Early July, Stalin promised to provide air-cover for China’s NEBDA.

Sept. 15, US landed at Inchon;

Oct. 1, Stalin urging CCP to dispatch troops, not mentioning Soviet’s support;

Oct. 2, Mao’s meeting with Soviet ambassador in China;

Oct. 7, Stalin pointed out grave consequences of China’s failure of intervention, not mentioning Soviet’s support;

Oct. 11, Zhou & Stalin’s negotiation: Stalin agreed to provide China with substantial military support, and air support in 2 to 2.5 months since China’s intervention;

Mao’s caution in seeking Soviet’s support

By Oct. 7, China had made decision to enter the war;

Oct. 11, in Zhou & Stalin’s negotiation, not informing Stalin of China’s decision;

2 times ordering China’s troops to halt preparations for entering war (Oct. 12 & 17);

Oct. 13, after CCP politburo conference, Mao authorized Zhou to inform Stalin of the decision;

Oct. 18, Mao ordered troops to enter the war after being assured of Soviet’s support, including air defense for major Chinese cities and air cover for Chinese troops fighting in Korea in a later stage of the

Reasons for China’s Entering in the Korean War

China’s physical security concerns; Mao’s idealistic thinking: to pursue a glorious victory over the

US led UN forces can not only secure CCP’s control of China’s state and society, but promote the international prestige and influence of PRC.

Mao’s consultation with Stalin in the Korean War

Dec. 1950 and Jan. 1951, on the issue of crossing the 38 parallel;

May-June 1951, on shifting the policy emphasis from fighting to negotiation to end the war;

After 1952, POW issue in Panmunjom armistice negotiation.

Soviet’s support

Providing large amounts of ammunition & military equipment;

Committing Soviet financial and technological resources to China’s economic reconstruction.

China’s domestic movements

Dec. 1950 – Oct. 1951, suppressing “reactionaries and reactionary activities”;

Late 1951 – Oct. 1952, “Three Antis” & “Five Antis”;

June 1950 – winter of 1952, Land Reform.

China’s victory in the Korean War

Forcing the US/UN force to retreat

from the Chinese-Korean border to

the 38th parallel.

Subtle relationship between Sino-Soviet Alliance

Stalin’s hesitation in providing air support to China during key weeks of Oct. 1950;

Soviet requested that China pay for much of the military support Beijing had received during the war.

The Alliance’s Golden Years (1954-1955)

Sept. 29 – Oct. 12, 1954 Khrushchev visited China, signed a series of agreements:

Returning Port Arthur (Soviet’s Military Base) to China, together with its equipment;

Giving up Soviet’s shares in four Sino-Soviet joint ventures;

Providing China with loans totaling 520 million rubles;

Offering technological support to China in initiating or upgrading 156 key industrial projects for PRC’s first 5-year plan.

China’s support Purging Lavrenty Beria; Khrushchev became CPSU’s first

secretary; Formation of Warsaw Pact Organization; Establishment of diplomatic relations

between Soviet & West Germany; Signing Peace Treaty with Austria; Improvement of relations with

Yugoslavia.

Alliance at Geneva Conference

Zhou twice visited Moscow before the conference;

Exchanging opinions & intelligence on a daily basis at conference;

Persuading Vietnamese Communists to accept temporary division of Vietnam.

Reasons for the Golden Years

Khrushchev needs Mao’s support to consolidate his leadership;

1953-54, introduction of 5-year plan; liberating Taiwan; Eager to escape China’s isolation.

Gao Gang Affair

CCP politburo member & vice chairman of PRC central People’s Government.

Dec. 1953, “conspirator who intended to split the party” & removing from his position;

Reported to have committed suicide in Aug. 1954.

Informing Soviet of it after 2 weeks.