Legal Jargon Issue One Is

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EGAL JARGON FEBRUARY 2010

A CONTEMPORARY KIWI LEGAL PUBLICATION

LEGAL JARGON is a scholarly flagship journalpublished quarterly by MR HUMAN, BARRISTER(Auckland, New Zealand) focusing on real and

relevant legal issues of the day and of the future inAotearoa, New Zealand. As a law review thesearticles serve an important purpose in that theyexpress the ideas of legal practitioners, in NewZealand and overseas, with regard to the directionthe law should take in any and all areas. We invitelegal practitioners in New Zealand to write articlesand members of the public to submit comments.

MR HUMAN is the new barrister on the block. Mr Humanis a barrister currently practicing in the Central BusinessDistrict, Auckland, New Zealand. He has experience,expertise in and is passionate about criminal, humanrights, immigration, intellectual property, family,employment, civil, mental health and refugee law and litigation. Mr Human is a lawyer you can trust. Mr Humancan be retained through a solicitor. Kind regards, HU.

THE PARADOX OF CULPABILITY

YOUR CAT

KILLED MY SPARROW

IN THEIR YARD!

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE 2: PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW:INTRODUCING SOCRATES

PAGE 3: HELP ME!IM AN OVERSTAYER!

PAGE 6: THE RISE AND RIGHTS OF THEINTERNATIONAL KIWI CHILD

PAGE 9: WHICH WITCH?: THE STRANGEWORLD OF LEGAL MAGIC ( FEAT . E VGENY ORLOV )

HIEROPHANTIC H HUMAN, LEVEL 4, 369 Queen Street,Auckland Central. Phone: (09) 306 8939. Fax: (09) 306 8889.Email: [email protected]


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PHILOSOPHY AND LAW:INTRODUCING SOCRATES

In Minos , one of Platos philosophicaldialogues, Socrates asks an unnamed

comrade for a definition of law. Thecomrade replies: "Law is what is legislated."To which Socrates objects that just as sight isn't what we see, but rather that by whichwe see, so likewise law is not what islegislated but that by which we legislate. Thecomrade, accepting this criticism, retractshis definition. Surprised, one might protest,Surely law is the product of legislation, not vice versa. Yet in saying that law is that by which we legislate, Socrates is in fact appealing to a very old and deep-seatedidea, as we will discover.

The comrade's second definition is this:"Law is the judgment of the state." Onceagain, through repeated questioning,Socrates quickly proves that this definitionclashes with other things the comradebelieves; thus the comrade is committed toan inconsistent triad of beliefs:

Law is the judgment of the state. Lawfulness is just. The judgment of the state is sometimesunjust.

If the comrade accepts any two, he must reject a third. Clearly, Socrates' comrade isattracted both to a positivist conception of law (according to which law is whatever thegovernment says, be it just or unjust) and toa moralized conception of law (according towhich law is inherently just); and Socrateseruditely exploits this tension.

So Socrates suggests a revision: "Law is thecorrect judgment of the state." Thus onlythose judgments of the state that are correct count as genuine laws. This may seem odd tous; when state decrees are incorrect, wetend to say that they are bad laws or unjust

laws, not that they aren't laws at all. Being alaw is a purely descriptive fact with noevaluative weight: anything the legislaturecooks up, whether good or bad, is ipso facto a law.

Socrates' conception of law is arguably thedominant one historically, and ourpositivistic one a mere anomaly; the concept of law as an objective standard to bedeclared or discovered (rather than created)by legislators was the dominant notion bothin legal practice and in legal philosophythroughout most of history called rta ordharma in India, ma'at in Egypt, and torah inJudea. That's why Socrates can speak uncontroversially of law as not what islegislated but that by which we legislate. It was a standard principle of jurisprudencefor the next two millennia that lex injustanon est lex : an unjust law is not a law. Not until the Enlightenment did the notion of Natural Law degenerate from its originalnotion, a constraint on what law was, to amere constraint on what law ought to be.

Today's positivistic conception of law is thustruly something of a historical aberration;though it seems to have had some currency


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in ancient Greece as well, as is shown by thecomrade's resistance, as well as by the fact that the Greek word nomos means both"law" and "convention." (A similar tensionbetween positivist and moralizedconceptions of law is found in the Greek statesman Pericles' confused responses toAlcibiades' Socratic questioning inXenophon's Recollections of Socrates . Perhaps the fact that Athens was ademocracy, and the average Athenian wasconstantly engaged in passing and repealinglaws, served to weaken the traditionalmoralized conception of law.)

Socrates argues that only decrees based onknowledge of objective justice and injusticecan count as true laws; he adds that allstates legislate the just, but they makemistakes about what in fact is just.

If the law says that government employeesmust be paid in gold, then they may not bepaid in iron pyrites, since iron pyrites is not in fact gold, even if those who wrote the lawwere ignorant of the difference. If the lawsays that fishermen may not hunt mammals,then in fact the law says they may not hunt dolphins, even if the lawmakers had thought dolphins were fish. Likewise, if the law saysthat involuntary servitude is forbidden, thenthe government may not conscript soldiers,since military conscription is in fact involuntary servitude, even if those whowrote the law did not recognize this.

The conclusion of Plato's Minos, then, might be described as follows: All states legislateboth the concept of justice, and particular

conceptions of it. Insofar as they legislate theconcept, they all legislate the same thing,and these legislations are genuine laws.Insofar as they legislate different conceptions, their decrees (or most of them)are not genuine laws, and their legislatorsare simply proving themselves to beignorant of what the law truly requires.

HELP ME! ... IM ANOVERSTAYER!

As cases such as Ye v Minister of Immigration [2008] NZCA 291, whichconcerned the removal of two families of failed refugees who had New Zealand-bornchildren, ultimately turn on theinterpretation of the relevant statutorypowers, it is it is necessary by way of background to outline relevant provisions inthe Immigration Act 1987 governing thesituation of overstayers.

The starting point is that a person who is not a New Zealand citizen is entitled to be inNew Zealand only if he/she is a holder of apermit granted under the Act or is exempt under the Act from the requirement to holda permit. Conversely, a non-New Zealand

citizen who does not hold a permit is in NewZealand unlawfully and is under anobligation to leave New Zealand:Immigration Act 1987, ss 4, 34 & 45.

Generally speaking, a person who is in NewZealand lawfully (for example, because theyare the holder of a temporary permit) isentitled to apply, in the prescribed manner,


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for a residence permit: Immigration Act 1987, s17. Although the grant of residence isa matter of discretion, applications must beconsidered in conformity with applicablegovernment residence policy: ImmigrationAct 1987, s13C. The content of the policy is amatter for the government of the day.

Typically, the Tavita -type cases concern aperson(s) whose temporary permit has beenexpired and has not been removed. As anoverstayer, the continued presence in termsof the Act is unlawful, and according to theImmigration Act 1987, s17(2) no longerentitled to apply for residency and is underan obligation to leave New Zealand.

At this point, section 47 of the ImmigrationAct 1987 provides a right to appeal therequirement to leave New Zealand to theRemoval Review Authority (the RRA) onhumanitarian grounds. The RRA determinesthe appeal on the papers and may grant it if the RRA considers that there areexceptional circumstances of a humanitariannature that would make it unjust or undulyharsh for the person to be removed fromNew Zealand and, in addition, it would not in all circumstances be contrary to thepublic interest to allow the person to remainin New Zealand: Immigration Act 1987, s47(3).

If no appeal has been brought within 42days, or if the appeal is unsuccessful, theperson becomes liable for removal fromNew Zealand: Immigration Act 1987, s 53.Section 54 provides that the chief executiveof the Department of Labour or a designated

immigration officer may make a removalorder if satisfied, in essence, that theperson is unlawfully in New Zealand and hasexhausted any appeal right. The removalorder authorizes any member of the Policeto take the person into custody and toproceed to execute the order (i.e., to put theperson on a plane): Immigration Act 1987,s53. It was the exercise of statutory powers

during this removal phase that was at issuein Ye.

Regarding the timing of the removal order,since 1999 the 42-day period for lodging anappeal is triggered by the mere expiry of thepersons temporary permit rendering theirpresence in New Zealand unlawful:Immigration Act 1987, s 47(2). It is onlyonce the appeal right has been exhaustedthat the removal order is served (and,potentially, quickly executed): TheImmigration Bill 2007.

Under section 58, a designated immigrationofficer may, at any time, cancel a removal

order. However, section 58 is one of anumber of provisions in the Act to be cast aswhat the Immigration Bill 2007 describesconveniently as an absolute discretion:Immigration Bill 2007, no 132-2, cl 5D.Specifically, section 58(5) stipulates that:

Nothing in this section gives anyperson a right to apply to animmigration officer for thecancellation of a removal order,and where any person purportsto so applyThe immigration officer is underno obligation to consider theapplication; andWhether the application isconsidered or not,The immigration officer is underno obligation to give reasons for


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any decision relating to theapplication, other than the reasonthat this subsection applies; andSection 23 of the OfficialInformation Act 1982 does not apply in respect of theapplication.

The apparent stringency of this provision issomewhat belied by the fact that it is at thisstage that the Immigration Service hasinterposed a humanitarian interviewprocess. As a result of observations made bythe Court of Appeal in Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257, theImmigration Service introduced guidelinesto ensure that a humanitarian assessment isconducted before removal orders areexecuted. These guidelines were updated in1999.

The relevant paragraphs in the ImmigrationServices Operational Manual note that it isessential that New Zealands obligationsunder International Law are taken intoaccount when executing removal ordersand lists several treaties that may apply in

such circumstances the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights (theICCPR), the Convention Relating to theStatus of Refugees and associated protocol,the Convention Against Torture, and theConvention on the Rights of the Child(UNCROC). The Manual then directsimmigration officers, when determiningwhether or not to execute a removal order,

to take into account the particulars of thecase and the impact of removal on the rightsof the person being removed and theirimmediate family, and to balance thosefactors against various itemized factorsrelating to the right of the State to control itsborders: New Zealand Immigration ServiceOperational Manual (1999) paras D4.45 and4.45.5.

Regarding the legislation, two otherprovisions enable (but not require) thegrant of a permit to an overstayer. First,under section 35A, the Minister of Immigration may, at any time, grant apermit to an overstayer, as long as there isno deportation order or removal order inforce in respect of that person. At allrelevant times, the section 35A power hasbeen delegated to immigration officers of acertain status. It is, essentially, themechanism by which a person whoseremoval order has been cancelled undersection 58 is then granted a permit: NewZealand Immigration Service Operational Manual (1999), paras A.15.4.1. Like section58, section 35A is cast as an absolutediscretion: there is no right to apply for apermit under section 35A, no obligation forany such an application to be considered,and no obligation to give reasons for anydecision: Immigration Act 1987, s35A(2).

Finally, section 130 of the Act, read togetherwith section 7(3)(ii), These paragraphs inthe Operational Manual are supplementedby a detailed humanitarian questionnaireto be completed at [the] time of proposedservice or execution of [the] Removal

Order: New Zealand Immigration Service,Humanitarian Questionnaire. Stage one of the questionnaire is designed to elicit general information to establish whetherfurther investigation (at stage two) iswarranted. A stage two investigation istriggered in all cases, amongst others, wherethe interviewee has New Zealand bornchildren and/or immediate family living in


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New Zealand. The stage two interviewprocess includes a range of questionsrelating to the situation of any dependent children. At stage three, the immigrationofficer documents his/her assessment, first,of the interviewees personal situation andsecondly, of countervailing public interest factors. He/she then weighs the competingmatters and documents his/her conclusion.

Regarding the legislation, two otherprovisions enable (but not require) thegrant of a permit to an overstayer. First,under section 35A, the Minister of Immigration may, at any time, grant apermit to an overstayer, as long as there isno deportation order or removal order inforce in respect of that person. At allrelevant times, the section 35A power hasbeen delegated to immigration officers of acertain status. It is, essentially, themechanism by which a person whoseremoval order has been cancelled undersection 58 is then granted a permit: NewZealand Immigration Service Operational Manual (1999), paras A.15.4.1. Like section58, section 35A is cast as an absolutediscretion: there is no right to apply for apermit under section 35A, no obligation forany such an application to be considered,and no obligation to give reasons for anydecision: Immigration Act 1987, s35A(2).

Finally, section 130 of the Act, read togetherwith section 7(3)(ii), authorizes the Ministerof Immigration to make a special direction,granting a permit to a person in respect of whom a removal order is in force. As withsections 35A and 58, a similar worded

absolute discretion clause applies:Immigration Act 1987, ss7(4) and 130(6). At all relevant times, this power had also beendelegated to immigration officers of acertain status (although, in fact, the Yefamily made numerous requests for specialdirections direct to the Ministers office andthey appear to have been dealt with by that office): New Zealand Immigration Service

Operational Manual (1999), para A.15.4.1.

THE RISE AND RIGHTS OF THEINTERNATIONAL KIWI CHILD

In New Zealand, when it comes toimmigration matters and international law,there are two international law instrumentswhich are usually invoked, especially insituations where an immigrant or migrant family may have a New Zealand-bornchild(ren). These are the United NationsConvention on the Rights of the Child, oftenreferred to as CRC or UNCRC (the CRC)and the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights (ICCPR).

THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF A CHILD

The CRC is an international conventionsetting out the civil, political, economic,social and cultural rights of children. Nationsthat ratify this international convention arebound to it by international law. Compliance

is monitored by the United NationsCommittee on the Rights of the Child whichis composed of members from countriesaround the world. New Zealand ratified theCRC on 6 April 1993. The CRC generallydefines a child as any human being underthe age of 18, unless an earlier age of majority is recognized by a country's law.


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Governments of countries that have ratifiedthe CRC are required to report to, andappear before, the United NationsCommittee on the Rights of the Childperiodically to be examined on theirprogress with regards to the advancement of the implementation of the CRC and thestatus of child rights in their country. Theirreports and the committee's written viewsand concerns are available on thecommittee's website.

The CRC deals with the child-specific needsand rights. It requires that states act, in thebest interests of the child. This approach isdifferent from the common law approachfound in many countries that had previously

treated children and wives as possessions orchattels, ownership of which was oftenargued over in family disputes.

The CRC acknowledges that every child hascertain basic rights, including the right tolife, his or her own name and identity, to beraised by his or her parents within a familyor cultural grouping and have a relationshipwith both parents, even if they areseparated.

The CRC obliges states to allow parents toexercise their parental responsibilities. TheConvention also acknowledges that childrenhave the right to express their opinions andto have those opinions heard and acted uponwhen appropriate, to be protected from

abuse or exploitation, to have their privacyprotected and requires that their lives not be subject to excessive interference.

The CRC also obliges signatory states toprovide separate legal representation for achild in any judicial dispute concerning theircare and asks that the child's viewpoint beheard in such cases.

In its General Comment 8 (2000), theCommittee on the Rights of the Child (theCommittee), affirmed again internationallaws recognition of the importance of rightsof the child and further stated that there wasan "obligation of all States parties to movequickly to prohibit and eliminate all corporalpunishment and all other cruel or degradingforms of punishment of children".


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Regarding the application of reasonableness(proportional to the end sought andnecessary in circumstances) in terms of therights to protection against interference inthe family and the notion of family unity,articles 9 and 3(1) of CRC are important.Article 9, referred to in Tavita applies toeven violent offenders. It regards The Right of a child not be separated from its parentsand states:

1. States Parties shall ensure that achild shall not be separated fromhis or her parents against their will,except when competent authoritiessubject to judicial reviewdetermine, in accordance withapplicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for thebest interests of the child. Suchdetermination may be necessary ina particular case such as oneinvolving abuse or neglect of thechild by the parents, or one wherethe parents are living separatelyand a decision must be made as tothe child's place of residence.

2.

Where such separation results fromany action initiated by a State Party,such as the detention,imprisonment, exile, deportation ordeath (including death arising fromany cause while the person is in thecustody of the State) of one or bothparents or of the child, that StateParty shall, upon request, provide

the parents, the child or, if appropriate, another member of the family with the essentialinformation concerning thewhereabouts of the absent member(s) of the family unless theprovision of the information wouldbe detrimental to the well-being of the child. States Parties shall

further ensure that the submissionof such a request shall of itself entail no adverse consequences forthe person(s) concerned.

Article 3(1) regards The best interest of thechild and states:

1. In all actions concerningchildren, whether undertaken bypublic or private social welfareinstitutions, courts of law,administrative authorities orlegislative bodies, the best interestsof the child shall be a primaryconsideration.

Article 3(1) has been addressed by theCourts in New Zealand on a number of occasions, notably by the Court of Appeal inPuliuvea v Removal Review Authority (1996)2 HR NZ 510. The line of authority hasculminated in the Supreme Court decision of Ye & Ors v Minister of Immigration and Anor SC 53/2009 20 July 2009.

The extent to which rights are to berespected under the CRC is informed by

Article 27(1) which requires state parties torecognize the right of every child to astandard of living adequate for the childsphysical, mental, spiritual, moral and socialdevelopment.

INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL ANDPOLITICAL RIGHTS


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Inquisitors of the Catholic Church, and wasfirst published in Germany in 1487. TheMalleus Maleficarum is an interestingexample of magic and law and sources of law as magic.

The main purpose of the Malleus wassystematically to refute arguments claimingthat witchcraft does not exist, refute thosewho expressed skepticism about its reality,to prove that witches were more oftenwomen than men, and to educatemagistrates on the procedures that couldfind them out and convict them. The treatiseis divided up into three sections. The thirdsection is to assist judges confronting andcombating witchcraft.

The Malleus Maleficarum was not anoriginal text and heavily relied upon earlierworks such as Visconti, Torquemada and,most famously, Johannes Nider' sFormicarius (1435). 1 Notwithstanding thisduring the Spanish Inquisition books likeMalleus Maleficarum were posited asauthoritative statutes used to try, to tortureand to convict so-called witches.

The Spanish Inquisition was an ecclesiasticaltribunal started in 1478 by CatholicMonarchs which had its jurisdiction onlyover baptized Christians. The Inquisitionfunctioned in large part to ensure theorthodoxy of new converts. Torture was

1 Russell, Jeffrey Burton ( 1972 repr. 1984). Witchcraft in the Middle Ages . Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press . ISBN 0801492890. Page 279

always a means to obtain the confession of the accused, which was itself considered theproof of guilt, not as a punishment itself. It was applied without distinction of sex orage, including children and the aged.

Section III is the legal part of the Malleus that describes how to prosecute a witch. Thearguments are clearly laid for the laymagistrates prosecuting witches. Institorisand Sprenger offer a step-by-step guide tothe conduct of a witch trial, from the methodof initiating the process and assemblingaccusations, to the interr ogation (includingtorture) of witnesses, and the formalcharging of the accused. 2 One example of torture used was trial by drowning of suspected witches.

Trial by drowning is a medieval ordealallegedly used on women suspected of witchcraft. The idea was that witches wouldfloat. As part of the trial the accused wasthrown into a lake or river. If the accusedsank, she was innocent and presumed not tobe a witch. If the accused floated, she waspresumed to be a witch and could be hangedor executed by burning. Either way, theaccused faced death, and a no-win situation. Further, Women who did not cry duringtheir tri al were automatically believed to bewitches. 3

There was never an earnest attempt to findthe truth and indeed the ritualistic andmagical systems did not want to investigate heedless of Seneca (Lucius AnnaeusSeneca)s If you judge, investigate - but simply to perpetrate a political act whilst

consolidating and monopolizing power intoone body, the Catholic Inquisition.

Indeed although our legal system pridesitself on rationalism and scientificmethodology, one only needs to look at itsRoman roots to see the fallacy of its attempt

2 Broedel, Hans Peter (2004). The Malleus Maleficarum and the Construction of Witchcraft:Theology and Popular Belief . Manchester University Press . ISBN 0719064414. Page 343 Mackay, Christopher S. (2006). Malleus Maleficarum (2 volumes) . Cambridge UniversityPress . ISBN 0521859778. Page 502
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inquisitionhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catholic_Churchhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viscontihttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viscontihttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Torquemadahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johannes_Niderhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formicariushttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formicariushttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecclesiasticalhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tribunalhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1478http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catholic_Monarchshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catholic_Monarchshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christianhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeffrey_Burton_Russellhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0801492890http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medievalhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordealhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Witchcrafthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Execution_by_burninghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No-win_situationhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0719064414http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0521859778http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0521859778http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0719064414http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No-win_situationhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Execution_by_burninghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Witchcrafthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordealhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medievalhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0801492890http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeffrey_Burton_Russellhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christianhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catholic_Monarchshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catholic_Monarchshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1478http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tribunalhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecclesiasticalhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formicariushttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johannes_Niderhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Torquemadahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viscontihttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catholic_Churchhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inquisition


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to incorporate the ideas, ideals and beliefs of magic into a scientific framework. Romanlaw was devoted to the concept of justicewhich takes its roots from Iustitia, theRoman Goddess of Justice and sometimes,simply Justice.

Lady Justice is an allegorical personificationof the moral force that underlies the legalsystem. Justitia is typically depicted holdinga set of weighing scales suspended from herleft hand, upon which she measures thestrengths of a case's support and opposition.She is also often seen carrying a double-edged sword in her right hand, symbolizingthe power of Reason and Justice, which maybe wielded either for or against any partythat stands before her.

Roman Courts depended very much not onlyon the rhetoric of the lawyer who invokedthe principles of the goddess but also on thesocial status of the tried victims. Romansociety was hierarchical with slaves (servi )at the bottom, freedmen (liberti ) abovethem, and free-born citizens ( cives ) at thetop. Ones social status therefore determinedthe legal rituals and magical remedies to

which one was entitled to.

In the nineteen-twenties and thirties, theAmerican Realists voiced their critique of legal rationality by casting a spersions that judges practiced legal magic 4. According tothe Realists, legal outcomes were actually

4 Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Function Approach 35 COLUM. L REV.809, 821 (1935)

determined the individualized preferencesand prejudices of judges rather thanempirical and evaluative analysis.

At the same time, across the Atlantic, theScandinavian Realists were also contendingthat modern legal practice was historicallydescended from merely magic rituals. In thewords of Karl Olivecrona, According to theRoman view, Hagerstrom maintains, theright of property is a mystical power overthe spirit inherent in the object. This poweris created, and transferred, by means of magical actsAll the ancient legal actsbelonging to the original Roman law weremagical acts.

The Realists catalogued and demystifiedlegal magic and exposed the many ways that the laws magical features can masqueradeas objective truth and costume politics asnature. They showed factually that legalmagic like other forms of magic can beused to whore out ulterior motives andposterior motivations so as to perpetrateideologies of social dominance. Further, theythought they showed convincingly that all

precedential forms, do ctrinal formula s, andprocedural f unctions were infested withmagic solvi ng words 5, word ritual 6, andlegal myth 7 acting ou t so as to obscu re anyreal reasons for legal adjudication and court decisions.

5 Cohen, supra note, at 8206 Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence 28 COLUM. REV. 1014, 1016 (1928)7 Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 12 (2ed. 1931) [1930]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slavery_in_antiquityhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedmanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedmanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slavery_in_antiquity


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