Equity regards done what ought to be done

This maxim means that when individuals are required, by their agreements or by

law to have done some act of legal significance, Equity will regard it as having

been done as it ought to have, even before it has actually happened. This makes

possible the legal phenomenon of equitable conversion(Equitable

conversion is a doctrine of the law of real property under which a

purchaser of real property becomes the equitable owner of title to the

property at the time he/she signs a contract binding him/her to

purchase the land at a later date. The seller retains legal title of the

property prior to the date of conveyance, but this land interest is

considered personal property (a right to the payment of money, rather

than a right to the property). The risk of loss is then transferred to the

buyer – if a house on the property burns down after the contract has

been signed, but before the deed is conveyed, the buyer will

nevertheless have to pay the agreed-upon purchase price for the land.

Such issues can and should be avoided by parties by stipulating in the

contract who will bear the loss in such occurrences. The above rule

varies by jurisdiction, but is the general rule).

Sometime this is phrased as "equity regards as done what should have

been done. "The consequences of this maxim, and of equitable conversion, are

significant in their bearing on the risk of loss in transactions. When parties enter a

contract for a sale of real property, the buyer is deemed to have obtained an

equitable right that becomes a legal right only after the deal is completed.

Due to his equitable interest in the outcome of the transaction, the buyer

who suffers a breach may then be entitled to the equitable remedy of specific

performance (although not always, see below). It also is reflected in how his

damages are measured if he pursues a legal, substitutionary remedy instead of

an equitable remedy. At law, he is entitled to the value at the time of breach,

whether it has appreciated, or depreciated.

The fact that the buyer may be forced to suffer the depreciation means

that he bears the risk of loss if, for example, the improvements on the property he

bought burn down while he is still in escrow.

Additional Examples: Problems may sometimes arise because, through

some lapse or omission, cover is not in force at the time a claim is made. If the

policyholder has clearly been at fault in this connection, because, for example, he

has not paid premiums when he should have, then it will normally be quite

reasonable for an insurer to decline to meet the claim. However, it gets more

difficult if the policyholder is no more at fault than the insurer. The fair solution in

the circumstances may be arrived at by applying the principle that equity regards

that as done that ought to be done [See para 1, above]. In other words, what

would the position have been if what should have been done had been done?

Thus, in one case, premiums on a life policy were overdue. The insurer' s

letter to the policyholder warning him of this fact was never received by the

policyholder, who died shortly after the policy consequently lapsed. It was clear

that if the notice had been received by the policyholder, he or his wife would have

taken steps to ensure the policy continued in force, because the policyholder was

terminally ill at the time and the cover provided by the policy was something his

wife was plainly going to require in the foreseeable future. Since the policyholder

would have been fully entitled to pay the outstanding premium at that stage,

regardless of his physical condition, the insurer (with some persuasion from the

Bureau) agreed that the matter should be dealt with as if the policyholder had

done so. In other words, his widow was entitled to the sum assured less the

outstanding premium. In other similar cases, however, it has not been possible to

follow the same principle because there has not been sufficiently clear evidence

that the policy would have been renewed.

Another illustration of the application of this equitable principle was in

connection with motor insurance. A policyholder was provided with cover on the

basis that she was entitled to a ' no claims' discount from her previous insurer.

Confirmation to this effect from the previous insurer was required. When that was

not forthcoming, her cover was cancelled by the brokers who had issued the

initial cover note. This was done without reference to the insurer concerned,

whose normal practice in such circumstances would have been to maintain

cover, but to require payment of the full premium until proof of the no claims

discount was forthcoming. Such proof was eventually obtained by the

policyholder, but only after she had been involved in an accident after the

cancellation by the brokers of the policy. Here again, the fair outcome was to look

at what would have happened if the insurer's normal practice had been followed.

In such circumstances, the policyholder would plainly have still had a policy at

the time of the accident. The insurer itself had not acted incorrectly at any stage.

However, in the circumstances, it was equitable for it to meet the claim.

Equity regards as done that which ought to be done. This relates most obviously to specifi c performance. If vendor and purchaser have entered into a specifi cally enforceable contract (for example, for the sale of land), in equity the purchaser acquires a benefi cial interest and the vendor holds the land on constructive trust for the purchaser. However, it should be noted that the duty of the constructive trustee is simply to convey the land to the purchaser in accordance with the terms of the contract. The trustee does not take on all the other duties normal to trusteeship, nor, for example, is the purchaser entitled to rents from the property until sale. As Cotton LJ stated in Rayner v Preston (1881) 18 Ch D 1:

An unpaid vendor is a trustee in a qualifi ed sense only, and is so only because he has made a contract which a Court of Equity will give effect to by transferring the property sold to the purchaser, and in so far as he is a trustee he is so only in respect of the property contracted to be sold. The purchaser was not therefore able, as the law then stood, to recover insurance money obtained by the vendor for a fi re which occurred after he had contracted to sell the house (see further at page 309). The maxim was also applied to a bribe received by a fi duciary in A-G for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 All ER 1 (see further at page 289 below).

Equality is equity In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, equity will tend

towards the adoption of equal division of any fund to which several persons are entitled. One example of this and one which it will be seen has wide-reaching implications, is to be found in Burrough v Philcox, discussed in Chapter 5 at page 125. The testator having left his estate to certain relatives or such of them as his child should nominate, and the child having failed to nominate, the court held that the funds were held on trust for all the relatives in equal shares. There is even some authority for the proposition that, upon failure of an express trust for uncertainty of benefi cial share, the property is to be held on trust for all the benefi ciaries equally. Another instance is the division of a joint bank account upon divorce where it is impractical to make an accurate division of the fund between husband and wife: the court will order equal division. The adoption of equal division is, however, subject to any evidence to the contrary; so, for example, the court in McPhail v Doulton, discussed in Chapter 5 at page 126, would not order equal division, which in any event would have been impossible, because it was clearly not what the settlor intended.

The Burden

The burden of proof lies on him who asserts the fact, not on him whodenies it, because from the very nature of things a negative cannot beproof.

This is the law in every court of our land.It is also a key to winning in a court of law, for decisions courts are called upon to

make are always subject to this maxim. The burden of proof is a critical issue in everydispute. The burden is always on the person who seeks to prove his point.The other party does not have a burden to disprove his opponent’s point.

It is remarkable how few people are aware of this simple truth, yet every victory in court depends on it. If the other side says you did something wrong, you don’t have to prove you didn’t do it. The other side has to prove you did.Put the burden where it ought to be.

The burden may shift from one party to the other in a dispute. For example, thefirst party may complain that the second party failed to pay a bill. At this point the firstparty has the burden to prove his point. The second party may then say he did pay thebill. At this point the second party now has the burden to prove the bill was paid. Theburden may shift back and forth at various times, depending on who is claiming what, butalways the burden is on the party who must prove his point.The burden never shifts to require a party to prove the other party is wrong.

Maxims such as this protect the innocent. They are an important part of ourAmerican legal heritage. They deserve public attention and should be taught in all ourschools, for by the wisdom of these maxims and the self-evident truths they teach ourpeople are protected from adversity, and justice is preserved for al

Villavert v. Employee’s Compensation CommissionCase No. 313G.R. No. L-48605 (December 14, 1981)Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124FACTS:The Petitioner is the mother of the late Marcelino Villavert, who died of acutehemorrhagic pancreatic, employed as a code verifier in the Philippine Constabulary.She filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under P.D. 626, asamended, with the GSIS. The said claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground thatacute hemorrhagic pancreatic is not an occupational disease and that Petitionerhad failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal ailment ofMarcelino and the nature of his employment. The Petitioner appealed to the ECCwhich affirmed the denial.

ISSUE:W/N the ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the claim ofthe Petitioner.

HELD:From the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino died of acutehemorrhagic pancreatic which was directly caused or at least aggravated by theduties he performed as coder verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of thePhilippine Constabulary. There is no evidence at all that Marcelino had a “bout ofalcoholic intoxication” shortly before he died. Neither is there a showing that he useddrugs. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including itsimplementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of the labor.

LATIN MAXIM:9a9. Ratio legis est anima legis.The reason of the law is the soul of the law.

De Joya v. LantinCase No. 31G.R. No. L-24037 (April 27, 1967)FACTS:Respondent Francindy Commercial purchased bales of textile from Cebu Company Ernerose Commercial. However, the Bureau of Customs discovered that the goods to be delivered by Ernerose were different from those declared. Customs took custody of the shipment.Francindy Commercial filed a petition in the Court of First Instance for Customs to release the goods. Francindy insisted that the CFI had jurisdiction – on the basis of the Judiciary Act – and not the Bureau of Customs. RA 1937 and 1125, on the other hand, vest exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings to the Bureau of Customs.

ISSUE:Who has jurisdiction over the shipment.

HELD:The Bureau of Customs does. RA 1937 and 1125 are special laws, whereas the Judiciary Act is a general law. In case of conflict, special laws prevail over general ones.

LATIN MAXIM:50 Generalia specialibus non derogant.A general law does not nullify a specific or special law.

Chapter X – AMENDMENT, REVISION, CODIFICATION AND REPEALA. REPEAL49. Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.Later statutes repeal prior ones which are repugnant thereto.50. Generalia specialibus non derogant.A general law does not nullify a specific or special law.

ab initio : from the beginning. locus standi

: signifies a right to be heard.

ad hoc : for particular purpose, pertaining to or for the purpose of, this case only.

mens rea : a guilty mind.

ad interim 

: in the meantime mesne profits

: intermediate profits, the profits which a person in wrongful possession of the property actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received therefrom together with interest on such profits excluding the profits due to improvement made by the person in wrongful possession.

amicus curiae

: friend of the court; one who voluntarily or on invitation of the court, and not on the instructions of any party, helps the court in any judicial proceedings. 

modus operandi 

: mode of operating; the way in which a thing, cause etc. operates.

audi alteram

: hear the other side. Both sides should be heard before a decision is arrived at.

mutatis mutandis

: with the necessary changes in points of detail, with such change as may be necessary.

caveat emptor

: let the purchaser beware. A maxim implying that the buyer must be cautious, as the risk is his and not that of the seller.

nexus : bond, link or connection.

cestui que trust

:  a beneficiary under a trust, the person for whose benefit a trust is created.

non obstante

: "notwithstanding clause." A legislative device which is usually employed to give overriding effect to certain provisions over some contrary provision that may be found either in the same enactment, or some other enactment, that is to say, to avoid the operation and defect of all contrary provisions.

de facto : in fact : an expression indicating the actual state of circumstances independently of any question of right or title.

     

de jure : in law : independent of what obtains in fact.

obiter dictum

: an opinion of law not necessary to the decision. An expression of opinion (formed) by a judge on a question immaterial to the ratio decidendi, and unnecessary for the decision of the particular case. It is no way binding on any court, but may receive attention as being an opinion of high authority.

dehors : outside of : unconnected with, unrelated to; 

pendente lite

: during litigation.

de novo : anew. per incuriam

: through carelessness, through inadvertence. A decision of the court is not binding precedent if given per incuriam, that is, without the court's attention having been drawn to the relevant authorities, or statutes.

ejusdem generis

:  of the same kind or nature. Where a list of specific items is followed by general concluding clause, this is deemed to be limited to things of the same kind as those specified.

pro tanto : to that extent, for so much, for as much as may be.

ex gratia : as a matter of grace or favour.

quid pro quo

: the giving of one thing of value for another thing of value; one for the other; thing given as compensation.

ex officio :  by virtue of an office. ratio decidendi

: reasons for deciding, the grounds of decision.

ex parte : expression used to signify something done or said by one person not in the presence of his opponent.

res integra

: an untouched matter; a point without a precedent; a case of novel impression.

fait accompli

: an accomplished act. res judicata

: a case or suit already decided.

in limine : at the outset. rule nisi : a rule to show cause why a party should not do a certain act, or why the object of the rule should not be enforced.

in pari : upon the same matter or rule : when, having heard counsels, court

materia subject absolute directs the performance of that act forthwith.

in personam

: against the person; an act or proceeding done or directed against or with reference to a specific person.

sine die : without day.

in rem : an act/proceeding done or directed with reference to no specific person or with reference to all whom it might concern.

sine qua non

: an indispensable requisite.

inter alia : amongst other things. stare decisis

:  to stand by things decided; to abide by precedents where the same points come again in litigation.

inter vivos

: between living persons status quo

: existing condition.

intestate : a person is deemed to die intestate in respect of property of which he or she has not made a testamentary disposition ("will") capable of taking effect. 

sub judice

: before a judge or court, pending decision of a competent count.

intra vires

: within the powers; within the authority given by law.

ultra vires

: beyond one's powers.

ipse dixit : he himself said it; there is no other authority for it.

     

ipso facto

:  by the mere fact, automatically

     

ipso jure : by the law itself; by the mere operation of law.

     

lis pendens

: a pending suit.      

  

Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate CourtCase No. 11G.R. No. L-72873 (May 28, 1987)Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No.54FACTS:Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered inthe name of their deceased parents. Two siblings sold their share to the samevendee. By virtue of such agreements, the Petitioners occupied after the said sales,2/5 of the lot, representing the portions bought. They subsequently enclosed theirportion with a fence and built a semi-concrete house. One of the sisters filed acomplaint invoking the right to redeem the area sold. The trial court dismissed thiscomplaint because the time had lapsed, not having been exercised within 30 daysfrom notice of the sales.

ISSUE:1. W/N there was a valid notice.2. W/N Art. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted correctly.

HELD:Although there was no written notice, there was actual knowledge of thesales satisfying the requirement of the law. It is unbelievable that the co-heirs wereunaware of the sale, with the erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure. WhileArt. 1088 of the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale; the Petitionersclaimed that because there was no written notice, despite their obvious knowledgeof it, the 30-day period for redemption had not yet begun. The intent of thelawmakers was to ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified of the sale andto indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period ofredemption. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales althoughno notice in writing was given to them.

LATIN MAXIM:1, 8, 9a, 10, 11d, 11e, 12a, 17

Co v. Electoral Tribunal, House of RepresentativesCase No. 66G.R. Nos. 92191-92 and 92202-03 (July 30, 1991)Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote No.82FACTS:Respondents declared Jose Ong Jr., elected representative of NorthernSamar, as a natural born Filipino citizen. Petitioners contend that based on the 1987Constitution, Jose Ong, Jr. who was born on June 19, 1948 (during which the 1935Constitution was operative), is not a natural born Filipino citizen having been born toa Chinese father, Jose Ong Chuan and a Filipina mother Agrifina Lao.ISSUE:1. W/N people who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935Constitution are to be considered natural born Filipino citizens.2. W/N this provision should be applied retroactively.HELD:Yes. Under of Art. 4 Sec. 1 par. 3 of the Constitution, children born of Filipinomothers before January 17, 1973 shall be accorded natural born status if they electPhilippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. They need not perform anyact of “election” granted that his father was naturalized and declared a Filipinocitizen by 1957, when he was only 9 years old. The provision in question must beapplied retroactively since it seeks to remedy the inequitable situation under the 1935Constitution wherein people born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers wereconsidered natural born while children born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers werenot.LATIN MAXIM:8a, 9a, 42a - Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis. Equity never acts in contravention of the law.

B. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION8. Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis.

Equity never acts in contravention of the law.Aequum et bonum est lex legume.What is good and equal is the law of laws.Jus ars boni et aequi.Law is the art of equity.

Chapter IV – ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE OF STATUTE LITERALINTERPRETATION

Malanyaon v. Lising et. alCase No. 160GR No. L-56028 (July 30,1981)Chapter V, Page 188, Footnote No.52

FACTS:A Municipal Mayor was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). He was suspended from office but he died during his incumbency, and while the case was pending. The case was dismissed due to his death. Petitioner sought payment of his salary during his period of suspension pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 3019 which provides, “Should he be convicted by final judgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits w/c he failed to receive during suspension”.

ISSUE:W/N the dismissal of the case due to death of the accused constitutes acquittal.

HELD:No. It is obvious that when the statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted" it means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court found that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the case is not equal to acquittal of the accused. In People vs. Salico (84 Phil. 722), " Acquittal is always based on the merits but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty.

LATIN MAXIM:6c, 7a, 25a ( Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but it is the law.)

Velasco v. LopezCase No. 308G.R. No. 905 (February 12, 1903)

FACTS:Santiago Velasco died in Namacpacan, La Union on December 4, 1895, leaving a last will and testament. The Plaintiff seeks to declare such will void on several grounds, most importantly that the hour is not stated.

ISSUE:W/N the will of Santiago Velasco is void because the hour of its execution is not stated.

HELD:Yes. Book III, Title II, Chapter I, Article 695 and 687 of the civil Code explicitly states that said wills without necessary formalities will be void: “The testator shall express his last will to the notary and to the witnesses. After the testament has been drafted in accordance with the same, stating the place, year, month, day and hour of its execution its shall be read aloud,” (art 695) “Any will, in the execution of which the formalities respectively established in this chapter have not been observed, shall be void.” (art 687) The law explicitly defines what shall consist in open wills (art 695) and what the sanctions shall be if such formalities aren’t met. (art 687)It was stated that if the decision would be in favor of the Defendant (overlooking the absence of the hour) the Court may disregard one formality after another until eventually they had to repeal the entire system established by the code.

LATIN MAXIM:6d, 7a ( Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but it is the law.)

Uytengsu vs. Republic of the PhilippinesCase No. 307G.R. No. L-6379 (September 29, 1954)Chapter VI, Page 263, Footnote No.61FACTS:Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents in Dumaguete, NegrosOriental n October 6, 1927. After finishing primary and secondary education here inthe Philippines, he went to the United States to further his studies from the year1947-1950. In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) monthsvacation. On July 15, 1950, he filed for naturalization. Forthwith, he returned to theUnited States and took a post-graduate degree which he finished in July 1951l but hedid not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951. Hence, the original date ofhearing the case, originally scheduled to take place on July 12, 1951, had to bepostponed.

ISSUE:1. W/N the application for naturalization may be granted, notwithstanding the factthat petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and didnot return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof.2. W/N domicile and residence are synonymous.

HELD:

1. No. Section 7 of C.A. No. 473(Commonwealth Act - Section 7. Petition for citizenship. – Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and surname; his present and former places of residence; his occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether single or married and the father of children, the name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife and of each of the children; the approximate date of his or her arrival in the Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation, and, if he remembers it, the name of the ship on which he came; a declaration that he has the qualifications required by this Act, specifying the same, and that he is not disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of this Act; that he has complied with the requirements of section five of this Act; and that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. The petition must be signed by the applicant in his own handwriting and be supported by the affidavit of at least two credible

persons, stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act. The petition shall also set forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case. The certificate of arrival, and the declaration of intention must be made part of the petition.) requires applicant for naturalization to “reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship.

2. No. Although the words “residence” and “domicile” are often usedinterchangeably, each has, in strict legal parlance, a meaning distinct and differentfrom that of the other. Actual and substantial residence within the Philippines, notlegal residence or domicile, is required. Residence indicates permanency ofoccupation, distinct from lodging or boarding, or temporary occupation. Domicile isresidence with intention to stay.

LATIN MAXIM: 7. Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent.6c, 7, 11a, 25a, 37 When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required.

7. Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent. When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but it is the law. Hoc quidem perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est. It is exceedingly hard, but so the law is written.