Legal Prof Reviewer

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THIRD DIVISION

BGen. (Ret.) JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., Petitioner,

- versus -

G.R. Nos. 173057-74

Present:

CARPIO MORALES,J.,Chairperson,

PERALTA,* BERSAMIN,

VILLARAMA, JR., andSERENO, JJ.

HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, as Justice of theSandiganbayan; 4 THDIVISION, SANDIGANBAYANand THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondents.

Promulgated:

September 20, 2010

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR.,J .:

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order

(TRO) seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutio n [1]dated May 4, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case

Nos. 28022-23 and 25122-45. The assailed Resolution denied petitioners motions for inhibition , [2] which sought to

disqualify respondent Justice Jose R. Hernandez, Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, from

taking part in said cases.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner, Retired BGen. Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., then President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines-

Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) ,[3] signed several deeds of sale for the acquisition of parcels

of land for the development of housing projects and for other concerns. However, it appears that the landowners

from whom the AFP-RSBS acquired the lots executed unilateral deeds of sale providing for a lesser consideration

apparently to evade the payment of correct taxes. Hence, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an

extensive investigation in 1998 on the alleged anomaly.

In its Report dated December 23, 1998, the Committee concluded that there were irregularities committed

by the officials of the AFP-RSBS and recommended the prosecution of those responsible, including petitioner, who

had signed the unregistered deeds of sale as AFP-RSBS President. Accordingly, on January 28, 1999, fourteen (14)
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informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner for violation of Section 3(e ) [4] of Republic Act

(R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and for the crime of estafa through

falsification of public documents as defined under paragraph 4 of Article 171 [5] of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended .[6] The informations charging petitioner with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act were

docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 25122-25133 while those charging estafa through falsification of public documents

were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 25134-25145.

Then, on July 27, 2003, junior officers and enlisted men from elite units of the AFP took over the Oakwood

Premier Apartments at Ayala Center in Makati City to air their grievances about graft and corruption in the

military. In response to the incident, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo created a Fact-Finding Commission

(Feliciano Commission) wherein respondents wife, Professor Carolina G. Hernandez, was appointed as one of the

Commissioners. On October 17, 2003, the Feliciano Commission submitted its Report recommending, among others,

the prosecution of petitioner. President Arroyo then issued Executive Order No. 255 on December 5, 2003, creatingthe Office of a Presidential Adviser under the Office of the President to implement the recommendations of the

Feliciano Commission .[7] Professor Carolina G. Hernandez was appointed as Presidential Adviser in the newly created

office. Shortly thereafter, respondent Justice Hernandez was appointed as Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan

and assigned to its Fourth Division.

On October 11, 2004, eight additional informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner.

Two were assigned to the Fourth Division of the court, one for violation of R.A. No. 3019, docketed as Criminal Case

No. 28022, and the other for estafa through falsification of public documents, docketed as Criminal Case No. 28023.

On April 6, 2006, petitioner filed two motions to inhibit Justice Hernandez from taking part in Criminal Case

Nos. 25122-45 and Criminal Case Nos. 28022-23 pendingbefore the Fourth Division. Petitioner cited that Justice

Hernandezs wife, Professor Hernandez, was a member of the Feliciano Commissi on and was tasked to implement

fully the recommendations of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, including his criminal prosecution. Further, the

spousal relationship between Justice Hernandez and Professor Hernandez created in his mind impression of partiality

and bias, which circumstance constitutes a just and valid ground for his inhibition under the second paragraph of

Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.

In its Consolidated Comment/Opposition ,[8] the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) asserted that the

grounds raised by petitioner in his motions for inhibition were anchored on mere speculations and conjectures. It

stressed that the recommendation of the Feliciano Commission was a product of consensus of the members of the

Commission which was a collegial body. And even if Professor Hernandez signed the Report of the Commission to

implement the recommendations of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the findings of the said Commission did not

rem ove the presumption of innocence in petitioners favor. Hence, the OSP argued that the mere membership of
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Prof. Hernandez in the Feliciano Commission did not automatically disqualify Justice Hernandez from hearing the

criminal cases against petitioners.

On May 4, 2006, Justice Hernandez issued the assailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, accused Jose S. Ramiscals Motions for Inhibition are DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner did not seek reconsideration of the Resolution, but instead filed a petition for certiorari and

prohibition before this Court on the following grounds:

I

THE RESPONDENT HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO INHIBIT HIMSELFFROM THE CASES PENDING BEFORE THE 4TH DIVISION AGAINST PETITIONERNOTWITHSTANDING THAT UNDER RULE 137 HE IS DISQUALIFIED TO TRY OR SIT IN JUDGMENTIN THESE CASES;

II

THE RESPONDENT 4TH DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS PROCEEDING TO HEAR THESECASES WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETIONNOTWITHSTANDING THAT ITS MEMBER, THE RESPONDENT JUSTICE JOSE HERNANDEZ, ISDISQUALIFIED FROM SITTING OR TAKING PART IN ITS PROCEEDINGS; AND,

III

THE HON. JUSTICE HERNANDEZ IS DISQUALIFIED FROM TAKING PART IN SITTING OR HEARINGTHE CASES AGAINST PETITIONER IN ALL THE CASES PENDING BEFORE ALL THE FIVE (5)DIVISIONS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN IN CONSEQUENCE OF HIS DISQUALIFICATION UNDERRULE 137.[9]

Essentially, the issue is: Did Justice Hernandez commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess

of jurisdiction in not inhibiting himself from the cases against petitioner pending before the Sandiganbayan?

Petitioner submits that it was erroneous for Justice Hernandez to deny the motions to inhibit himself under

the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, when in fact the basis for his disqualification

was the latters spousal relationship with Professor Hernandez, which situation was governed by the first paragraph

of the said section. According to petitioner, while Professor Hernandez was not directly pecuniarily interested in

the case, she was more than so interested in them because as an appointee of President Arroyo, she was receiving

emoluments to monitor the progress of the cases and to see to it that the recommendations of the Feliciano

Commission are fulfilled.
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We deny the petition.

The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is laid down in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges . No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case inwhich he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or inwhich he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counselwithin the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has beenexecutor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferiorcourt when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all partiesin interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in acase, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. Under the first paragraph of the

cited Rule, it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in the instances mentioned. Thesecond paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the sound discretion of the judges concerned

whether to sit in a case for other just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide . [10]

In denying the motions for his inhibition, Justice Hernandez explained that petitioner failed to impute any act

of bias or impartiality on his part, to wit:

What can reasonably be gleaned from jurisprudence on this point of law is the necessityof proving bias and partiality under the second paragraph of the rule in question. The proofrequired needs to point to some act or conduct on the part of the judge being sought for

inhibition. In the instant Motions, there is not even a single act or conduct attributed to JusticeHernandez from where a suspicion of bias or partiality can be derived or appreciated. In fact, it isoddly striking that the accused does not even make a claim or imputation of bias or partiality onthe part of Justice Hernandez. Understandably, he simply cannot make such allegation all becausethere is none to be told. If allegations or perceptions of bias from the tenor and language of a

judge is considered by the Supreme Court as insufficient to show prejudgment, how much moreinsufficient it becomes if there is absent any allegation of bias or partiality to begin with . [11]

We find the above explanation well-taken and thus uphold the assailed Resolution upon the grounds so

stated. We have ruled in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi , [12] that the mere imputation of

bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. Extrinsic evidence

must further be presented to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which

may be inferred from the decision or order itself. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly

indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial.

An allegation of prejudgment, without more, constitutes mere conjecture and is not one of the just or valid

reasons contemplated in the second paragraph o f Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court for which a judge may
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inhibit himself from hearing the case. The bare allegations of the judges partiality, as in this case, will not suffice in

the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble

role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence, and without fear or favor. Verily, for bias and

prejudice to be considered valid reasons for the involuntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not enough .[13]

Petitioner contends that his motions were based on the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, but a closer

examination of the motions for inhibition reveals that petitioner undoubtedly invoked the second paragraph by

underscoring the phrase, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. This was an express

indication of the rule that he was invoking. Moreover, it was specifically stated in paragraph 7 of both motions that

in accuseds mind, such circumstances militates against the Hon. Justice Hernandez and constitutes a just and valid

ground for his inhibition under the 2 nd paragraph, Section 1 of Rule 137, in so far as the cases against accused are

concerned. Hence, there is no question that petitioner relied on the second paragraph of the Rule which

contemplates voluntary inhibition as basis for his motions for inhibition.

And even if we were to assume that petitioner indeed invoked the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 in his

motions to inhibit, we should stress that marital relationship by itself is not a ground to disqualify a judge from

hearing a case. Under the first paragrap h of the rule on inhibition, No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in

which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise.... The relationship

mentioned therein becomes relevant only when such s pouse or child of the judge is pecuniarily interested as

heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise. Petitioner, however, miserably failed to show that Professor Carolina G.

Hernandez is financially or pecuniarily interested in these cases before the Sandiganbayan to justify the inhibition of

Justice Hernandez under the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated May 4, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan

in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45 and Criminal Case Nos. 28022-23 is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
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CUI VS CUI

FACTS:Jesus and Antonio are the legitimate children of Don Mariano Cui and Doa Antonia Perales who died intestate in1939. Jesusalleged that during the marriage of Don Mariano and Dona Antonia, their parents acquired certain properties inthe City ofCebu, namely, Lots Nos. 2312, 2313 and 2319. Upon the death of their mother, the properties were placed under the

administration of their dad.that while the latter was 84 years of age, Antonio by means of deceit, secured thetransfer to themselves the said lotswithout any pecuniary consideration; that in the deed of sale executedon March 8, 1946, Rosario Cui appeared as one of the vendees, but on learning of this fact shesubsequently renounced her rights under the sale and returned her portion toDon Mariano Cui by executing adeed of resale in his favor on October 11, 1946; that defendants, fraudulently and with thedesire of enriching themselvesunjustly at the expense of their father, Don Mariano Cui, and of their brothers and co-heirs,secured aloan of P130,000 from the Rehabilitation properties, and with the loan thus obtained, defendantsconstructedthereon an apartment building of strong materials consisting of 14 doors, valued atapproximately P130,000 and another building on the same parcels of land, which buildings were leasedto some Chinese commercial firms a monthly rental of P7,600, which defendants have collected and will continue tocollect to the prejudice of the plaintiffs;Jesus alleged that the sale should be invalidated so far as the portion ofthe property sold to Antonio Cui is concerned, for the reason that when that sale was effected, Antonio was thenacting as the agent or administrator of the properties of DonMariano Cui.Jesus lays stress on the power of attorney Exhibit L

which was executed by Don Mariano in favor of Antonio Cui on March 2,1946, wherein the former has constituted thelatter as his "true and lawful attorney" to perform in his name and that of theintestate heirs of Doa AntoniaPerales.ISSUE : WON the sale of the property to Antonio was valid.HELD : YES.While under article 1459 of the old Civil Code an agent or administrator is disqualified from purchasing property in hishandsfor sale or management, and, in this case, the property in question was sold to Antonio Cui while he was already theagentor administrator of the properties of Don Mariano Cui, we however believe that this question cannotnow be raised or invoked.The prohibition of the law is contained in article 1459 of the old Civil Code, but this prohibition has alreadybeenremoved. Under the provisions of article 1491, section 2, of the new Civil Code, an agent may now buy property placed inhis hands forsale or administration, provided that the principal gives his consent thereto. While the new Code cameintoeffect only on August 30, 1950, however, since this is a right that is declared for the first time, thesame may be givenretroactive effect if no vested or acquired right is impaired (Article 2253, new Civil Code). During thelifetime Don Mariano,and particularly on March 8, 1946, the herein appellants could not claim any vested or acquired right inthese properties, for,as heirs, the most they had was a mere expentancy. We may, therefore, invoke now this practical andliberal provision of our new Civil Code even if the sale had taken place before its effectivity.


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THIRD DIVISION

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 Edang St.,Pasay City, Petitioner,

- versus -

JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge, RegionalTrial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, Metro Manila,

Public Respondent.

BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332 Edang St.,Pasay City, Private Respondent.

G.R. No. 154464

Present:

TINGA, J. , * CHICO-NAZARIO,

Acting Chairperson, VELASCO, JR.,* NACHURA, andREYES,JJ.

Promulgated:

September 11, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA,J .:

This is a Petition for Certiorari , Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was directly filed with this Court assailing the

Resolutions dated May 10, 200 2[1] and July 31, 200 2[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay City,

which denied the appearance of the plaintiff Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner, as party litigant, and the refusal of

the public respondent, Judge Priscilla Mijares, to voluntarily inhibit herself from trying the case. No writ of p reliminaryinjunction was issued by this Court.

The antecedents:

On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his

behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement of Nuisance.

Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Cour t [3] that a non-

lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission from the

Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley

Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz

vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares
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then remarked, Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok ? and proceeded to hear the pending Motion

to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.

On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit ,[4] praying for the voluntary

inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the

conduct of the trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts

that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that

justice will not be served .[5]

In an Orde r[6] dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that throwing

tenuous allegations of partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition,

considering that it was said even prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration [7] of the

said order.

On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality . [8] In the same Order, the trial court held

that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to

satisfy the requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.

In a motion for reconsideration ,[9] petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138-A,

but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different

circumstances, but the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Orde r[10] dated July 31,

2002.

On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition and assigns the

following errors:

I.

THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETIONWHEN IT DENIED THE APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE LATTERS BEHALF, INCIVIL CASE NO. 01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE 138, SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF COURT,PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT;

II.

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE THE ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH ANINHIBITION IS PROPER TO PRESERVE THE PEOPLES FAITH AND CONFIDENCE TO THE COURTS.

The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the extraordinary writs of certiorari , prohibition and

mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the respondent court acted with
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of Cruz to prove on record that he is enrolled in a recognized schools clinical legal education program and is under

supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.

However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of Rule 138, which provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a partymay conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for thatpurpose, or with the aid of an attorney . In any other court, a party may conduct hislitigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or bya duly authorized member of the bar.

and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.

From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be conceded that the contention of the

petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a party.The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his

appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may

personally do everything in the course of proceedings from commencement to the termination of the

litigation.[14] Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence

and procedure as those qualified to practice law ,[15] petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into

the snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally

conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party

exercising his right to represent himself.

The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must, therefore,

be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the

petitioners claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a law student may appear

in courts, while the latter rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.

The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is

misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for limited law student

practice. In fact, it was intended as an addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may appear in courts and wasincorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule 138-A.

It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to be heard by himself

and counsel ,[16] this Court has held that during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be waived . [17] The rationale for

this ruling was articulated in People v. Holgado ,[18] where we declared that even the most intelligent or educated
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man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be

convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his i nnocence.

The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous concern that the

Constitution accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party

litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can, without a lawyers assistance, effectively undertake the successful

pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law student and

impliedly asserts that he has the competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident

to this decision.

In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law

student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the supervision of a lawyer, before

inferior courts. Here, we have a law student who, as party litigant, wishes to represent himself in court. We should

grant his wish.

Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed manifest bias and partiality

by ruling that there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negative demeanor during the

pre- trial when she said: Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok ? Petitioner avers that by denying his

motion, the respondent judge already manifested conduct indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing

petitioners and his co -plaintiffs loss of faith and confidence in the respondents impartiality.

We do not agree.

It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative case [19] against the

respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on September 15,

2002. We now adopt the Courts findings of fact in the administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of

discretion on the part of Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.

In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and convincing

evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial , [20] as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of

conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she should inhibit herself

must be based on her rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case beforeher .[21] Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in

favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional

Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City

is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.
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No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990

ANGEL L. BAUTISTA,complainant,vs.

ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES,respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:

In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged withmalpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath. Required by this Court to answer the chargesagainst him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to ordercomplainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, theCourt granted respondent's motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976,complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following acts:

1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, AlfaroFortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to asthe Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee offifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in litigation.

2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143, whereinEusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and, without said case beingterminated, acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490;

3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados, whichproperties are the subject of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-15143, while thecase was still pending;

4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract withhim on August 30, 1971 for the development into a residential subdivision of theland involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929, claimingthat he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from theFortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at apublic auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte andregistered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City;


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5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified documentspurporting to be true copies of "Addendum to the Land Development Agreementdated August 30, 1971" and submitting the same document to the Fiscal's Officeof Quezon City, in connection with the complaint for estafa filed by respondentagainst complainant designated as I.S. No. 7512936;

6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was his client;

7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal basisbefore the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City;

8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office bymaking false assertion of facts in his pleadings;

9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not intentionally tella he, he does not tell the truth either."

Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on November 18, 1976, denying theaccusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to respondent's answer on December 29, 1976 and on March 24,1977 respondent filed a rejoinder.

In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General forinvestigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, complainantpresented himself as a witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to "PP", while respondent appeared both as witness andcounsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to "11". The parties were required to submit their respective memoranda.

On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming that the long delay in theresolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation of his constitutional right to due process and speedydisposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the Solicitor General filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on

August 8, 1988, explaining that the delay in the investigation of the case was due to the numerous requests forpostponement of scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the motions for extension of time to file theirrespective memoranda." [Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365]. Respondent filed a reply to theSolicitor General's comment on October 26, 1988. In a resolution dated January 16, 1989 the Court required the

Solicitor General to submit his report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice.

On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that Atty. Ramon A. Gonzalesbe suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that respondent committed the following acts ofmisconduct:

a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency of the casewhere the properties were involved;

b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land developmentagreement had already been sold at a public auction prior to the execution of said agreement; and

c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document where two signatories whohad not signed the original (or even the xerox copy) were made to appear as having fixed theirsignatures [Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].

Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) forinvestigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent manifested that heintends to submit more evidence before the IBP. Finally, on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplementalmotion to refer this case to the IBP, containing additional arguments to bolster his contentions in his previouspleadings.


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I.

Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is respondent's contention thatthe preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General was limited to the determination of whether or notthere is sufficient ground to proceed with the case and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file anadministrative complaint against him. Respondent claims that the case should be referred to the IBP since Section 20of Rule 139-B provides that:

This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule 139 entitledDISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All cases pending investigation by the Office ofthe Solicitor General shall be transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board ofGovernors for investigation and disposition as provided in this Rule except those cases where theinvestigation has been substantially completed.

The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent's claim, reference to theIBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusiveprocedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court [ Ibid ]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by referring cases forinvestigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court. In such a case,

the report and recommendation of the investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. TheCourt shall base its final action on the case on the report and recommendation submitted by the investigating officialand the evidence presented by the parties during the investigation.

Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of Rule 139 -B [June 1,1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General had been substantially completed. Section 20of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases, the investigation of which has not been substantially completed bythe Office of the Solicitor General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the SolicitorGeneral was terminated even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his motion todismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on November 26, 1986, the date when respondentsubmitted his reply memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353].

Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General already made a thoroughand comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to the IBP, as prayed for by the respondent, willresult not only in duplication of the proceedings conducted by the Solicitor General but also to further delay in thedisposition of the present case which has lasted for more than thirteen (13) years.

Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the referral of the case to theIBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General respondent was given ample opportunityto present evidence, his failure to adduce additional evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denialof procedural due process. The record shows that respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented no lessthan eleven (11) documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the complainant whoappeared as a witness against him.

II.

The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent committed the acts of misconductalleged by complainant Bautista.

After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General, theCourt finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by this Court of its disciplinarypower.

The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was signed by theFortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent one-half (1/2) of the properties of theFortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. mm., and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of


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72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal services to the latter. At the time the document was executed,respondent knew that the abovementioned properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143]pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados in saidcase [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the document transferring one-half(1/2) of the subject properties to himself, respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiringhis client's property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession [Article1491, New Civil Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interest inlitigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920);Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)].

However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he lawyershould not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting," does not appearanymore in the new Code of Professional Responsibility. He therefore concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer ofproperty in litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinaryaction under the new Code of Professional Responsibility.

This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall uphold theConstitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process " (Emphasis supplied),Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws[of the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." And for any

violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, RevisedRules of Court]. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The transgressionof any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not countenance. In theinstant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be held accountable both to his client andto society.

Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are prohibited frompurchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust relationship with the latter. A lawyer isdisqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship withsuch property and rights, as well as with the client. And it cannot be claimed that the new Code of ProfessionalResponsibility has failed to emphasize the nature and consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "alawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." Onthe other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that maycome into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision on the matter in the new

Code, the Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code,as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property in litigationconstitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought against him.

Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really implemented, because the landdevelopment agreement on which the transfer depended was later rescinded, is untenable. Nowhere is i t provided inthe Transfer of Rights that the assignment of the properties of the Fortunados to respondent was subject to theimplementation of the land development agreement. The last paragraph of the Transfer of Rights provides that:

... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, Filipino, married toLilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon City, rendered to our entiresatisfaction, we hereby, by these presents, do transfer and convey to the said ATTY. RAMON A.GONZALES, his heirs, successor, and assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights and interests in theabovedescribed property, together with all the improvements found therein [Annex D of theComplaint, Record, p. 28; Emphasis supplied].

It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to respondent to be absoluteand unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land development agreement was implemented.

Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at the time the landdevelopment agreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT No. T-1929 had already been sold at apublic auction. The land development agreement was executed on August 31, 1977 while the public auction was heldon June 30, 1971.


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Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance for the complainant in ananti-graft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon the request of complainant and wasunderstood to be only provisional. Respondent claims that since complainant was not his client, he had no duty towarn complainant of the fact that the land involved in their land development agreement had been sold at a publicauction. Moreover, the sale was duly annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, servesas constructive notice to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part.

The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was annotated at the back ofTCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform the complainant of the sale of the land toSamauna during the negotiations for the land development agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to live up tothe rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitousconduct. The fact that complainant was not a former client of respondent does not exempt respondent from his dutyto inform complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of their negotiation. Since he was aparty to the land development agreement, respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the land ata public auction so that the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the project they were jointlyundertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and fairness even in his private dealings andfailure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22,1978, 81 SCRA 517].

Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents purporting to be true copies of

an addendum to the land development agreement.

Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the document filed by respondentwith the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to the addendum to the land development agreementnamely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautista were made to appear as having signed the original document on December 9, 1972, as indicated by the letters(SGD.) before each of their names. However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and complainant who signedthe original and duplicate original (Exh. 2) and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado, neverdid. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith and Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. 2-A) afterrespondent wrote them on May 24, 1973, asking them to sign the said xerox copy attached to the letter and to sendit back to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover, respondentacknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had merely agreed by phone to sign, but had not actually signed, thealleged true copy of the addendum as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent's Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the addendum

on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, he knowinglymisled the Court into believing that the original addendum was signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado.Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistentwith the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law[Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01,Code of Professional Responsibility].

Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was committed by respondentin entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados [Report and Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394].The Court, however, finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in partthat:

We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent RamonGonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees.

Alfaro T.Fortunado[signed]Editha T.Fortunado[signed]


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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 96333. September 2, 1992.]

EDUARDO C. DE VERA,Petitioner , v. HON. COMMISSIONER ERNESTO L. PINEDA; NATIONALCOMMISSION ON BAR INVESTIGATION AND DISCIPLINE OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE

PHILIPPINES; THE HON. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OR THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES(IBP); AND ROSARIO P. MERCADO, JESUS K. MERCADO AND J.K. MERCADO & SONS AGRICULTURAL

ENTERPRISES INCORPORATED,Respondents .

Eduardo C. De Vera in his own behalf.

Carmen Leonor M. Alcantara for Private Respondents .

The IBP Director for Legal Affairs for public respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; WHEN NOT AVAILABLE; RULE. It is now well-settledthat certiorari is not available to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judges findings and conclusions (Pacisv. Averia, 18 SCRA 907, 915, ci ting Regala v. CFI of Bulacan, 77 Phil. 684; Ong Sit v. Piccio, 78 Phil. 785; Icutamin v.Hernandez, 81 Phil., 161; Verhomal v. Tan, 88 Phil. 450; Matute v. Macadaeg, 99 Phil. 340), and that certiorari willnot be issued to cure errors in proceedings or correct erroneous conclusions of law or fact. As long as a court oradministrative agency acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction, willamount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civilaction of certiorari (Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. [INPORT] v. The Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, Et

Al., 171 SCRA 579, 584, citing Santos, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 56114, July 28, 1987, 152 SCRA 378).

2. LEGAL ETHICS; DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS; RULE IN CONDUCTING THEREOF. Section 12 of Rule 139-Bprovides that" (e)very case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon therecord and evidence submitted to it by the Investigator with his report" and that" (i)f the Board, by a vote of amajority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law ordisbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the wholerecord of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action."cralaw virtua1aw library

3. ID.; ID.; CONCEPT AND PURPOSE THEREOF. At this juncture, it may well be re-stated that "proceedings for thedisbarment of members of the bar are not in any sense a civil action where there is a plaintiff and the respondent isa defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. Theyare undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preservingcourts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer tothe court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of thecourt to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome exceptas all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice." (Tajan v. Hon. Vicente Cusi, Jr., G.R. No. L-28899, 30 May 1974, 57 SCRA 154). Since disciplinary actions against members of the bar are impressed with publicinterest, they should be resolved with dispatch. The filing of the instant petition has served no purpose other than todelay the proceedings in A.C. No. 3066.

R E S O L U T I O N


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This is a petition for certiorari , prohibition and injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/orpreliminary prohibitory injunction, premised upon the following facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sometime in 1984, respondent Rosario P. Mercado filed with the RTC of Davao City, Branch 14, presided over byJudge Jose R. Bandalan, a complaint for dissolution of conjugal partnership, support, recovery of conjugal share,damages, etc. against Jesus K. Mercado, J.K. Mercado & Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. and Stanfilo, docketed asCivil Case No. 17215.

Petitioner herein Eduardo C. De Vera was the counsel of respondent Rosario P. Mercado in the aforesaid civil case.

On 15 December 1986, Judge Bandalan rendered a decision in favor of respondent Rosario P. Mercado, awarding tothe latter some P9 million more or less. Thereafter, said respondent through her counsel, petitioner herein, filed amotion for execution pending appeal which Judge Bandalan granted in his order dated 5 January 1987 (p. 131,rollo).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On 12 January 1987, a writ of execution pending appeal (p. 43, rollo) was issued, after which, notices of garnishmentunder execution pending appeal (p. 146, rollo) were served on 14 January 1987 on the Manager of RCBC, ClaveriaSt., Davao City and RCBC, Tagum, Davao del Norte; and on the Manager, Traders Royal Bank, City Hall Drive, DavaoCity and on Traders Royal Bank, R. Magsaysay Ave., Davao City, by RTC Deputy Sheriff Aquillo Angon therebygarnishing the bank deposits of Dr. Jesus K. Mercado and the family corporation and Stanfilo, in the total amount ofP1,270,734.56 (p. 213, rollo).

Sometime thereafter, the respondent Rosario P. Mercado terminated the legal services of petitioner, and offered tothe latter the sum of P350,000.00 as his attorneys fees. The petitioner refused, claiming that under the decision ofthe RTC, he is entitled to 25% or P2,254,217.00. Respondent Rosario P. Mercado in turn demanded from petitionerthe "excess" of P350,000.00 of the garnished funds still in his custody. The petitioner refused and told his formerclient that he had already applied the demanded amount in partial satisfaction of his atto rneys fees.

In the meantime, Judge Jose R. Bandalans courtesy resignation was accepted by the President of the Philippines.

On or about 8 June 1987, respondent Rosario P. Mercado, together with other respondents in this case, filed withthis Court a complaint for disbarment against petitioner herein and former Judge Jose R. Bandalan, docketed as A.C.No. 3066. The complaint alleges, among others, that petitioner, in alleged breach of legal ethics, was trying to

"extort unconscionable" attorneys fees fr om Mrs. Mercado, by refusing to "return" the excess P350,000.00 in hiscustody and that said Mrs. Mercado did not know how the garnished funds had been spent or disbursed andtherefore, asked petitioner herein to render an accounting of the funds; that respondent Rosario P. Mercado sawpetitioner giving a "supot", allegedly containing P100,000.00 to Judge Bandalan at the lat ters house, after thegarnishment on 14 January 1987; and that petitioner told respondent Rosario P. Mercado that it was he (petitioner)who wrote the decision of Judge Jose R. Bandalan in Civil Case No. 17215 (pp. 216-217, rollo).

Initially, the complaint for disbarment (A.C. No. 3066) was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General forinvestigation, report and recommendation. However, upon the approval and implementation of Rule 139-B,amending Rule 139 of the Rules of Court on disbarment and discipline of attorneys, disbarment cases pending in theOffice of the Solicitor General were transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) through its Commissionon Bar Discipline. Administrative Case No. 3066 was among the cases transferred to the IBP and it was assigned torespondent Commissioner Ernesto L. Pineda for investigation.

Thereafter, the case was set for investigation on 10 and 11 April 1989, but on motion of petitioner, the investigationwas reset to 26 May and 8 June 1989. However, Jose R. Bandalan (co-respondent in said administrative case) movedfor the resetting of the investigation set on 26 May and 8 June 1989. Hence, on 26 April 1989, respondentCommissioner issued a Notice of Hearing (p. 169, rollo) setting the investigation to 13 and 14 June 1989, copies ofwhich notice were received by petitioner and respondent Jose R. Bandalan on 9 May 1989 (pp. 170, 171,rollo).chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

On 6 June 1989, or just a week before the scheduled investigation, petitioner filed by registered air mail an urgentmotion for postponement of the scheduled investigation on 13 and 14 June 1989, and sent a telegram to respondentCommissioner informing him of such motion. The telegram was received by respondent Commissioner on 12 June


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1989, or one day before the scheduled investigation, while the written motion was received by him on 27 June 1989,or 14 days after 13 June 1989 (pp. 10-11, 268-269, rollo).

At the scheduled investigation on 13 June 1989, respondent Commissioner denied the telegraphic motion forpostponement and proceeded with the investigation wherein respondent Rosario P. Mercado took the witness standand testified as a witness for the complainants. After the 14 June 1989 investigation, the complainants rested theircase. Thereafter, respondent Commissioner issued an order considering the petitioner and his co-respondentBandalan as having waived their right to present their evidence and the case submitted for decision.

Upon receipt of the orders dated 13 June 1989 and 14 June 1989, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration (p. 38,rollo) dated 28 June 1989. The complainants filed an opposition thereto. On 21 July 1989, respondent Commissionerissued an order (p. 268, rollo) granting the motion for reconsideration by reopening the investigation and allowingthe petitioner and his co-respondent Bandalan to present their evidence on 26, 27 and 28 July 1989, with a warningthat no further postponement shall be allowed.

At the investigation held on 26 July 1989, petitioner proceeded to Present his evidence. Thereafter, subsequentinvestigations were conducted for the recepti on of petitioners evidence.

During the investigation of 21 October 1989, respondent Commissioner Pineda, in consultation with the parties,adopted a modified form of procedure in conducting the investigation with respect to "out-of-Manila" witnesses bydirecting that the petitioner and his co-respondent Bandalan could take down the affidavits of their witnesses whoare in Davao City or outside Manila, and that the said affidavits could be used by them as "direct testimonies" of theaffiants, but subject to cross-examination by any adverse party, namely, the complainants, and such cross-examination would be done in Davao City. The text of respondent Commissioner Pinedas order reads asfollows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"With regard to the Motion to Take Deposition of Witnesses filed by Atty. De Vera and Atty. Bandalan, instead ofdeposition said respondents will just present the respective affidavits of their announced witnesses to be sent to theCommission copy-furnished the complainants through counsels within five days from receipt of said copies of the saidaffidavits. The complainants shall comment or file any counter-affidavit within a period of ten days. If thecomplainants shall desire to cross-examine the affiants orally, the cross-examination shall be held in Davao Citybefore any authorized representative of the Commission as may be allowed at the proper time. In the event that nooral cross-examination is desired, then the affidavits will just be submitted as the direct, testimony of the saidwitnesses subject to the comments or opposition of the complainants. (TSN, pp. 78-79, Oct. 21/89 hearing)." (p. 13,rollo).

When petitioners co -respondent Atty. Bandalans turn to present his evidence came up, the latter presented theaffidavit (p. 41, rollo) of Roberto Esguerra, an incumbent deputy sheriff of the RTC of Davao City, Branch 14,wherein the said affiant absolved petitioner and respondent Bandalan from the charges in the disbarmentcase.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Subsequently, in one of the hearings that followed, complainants orally moved that they be allowed to cross-examinesaid Roberto Esguerra in Manila, which respondent Commissioner granted, despite the petitioners objections as itwas contrary to the order of 21 October 1989 which directed that the cross-examination would be done in Davao Citywhere the witnesses executed the affidavits.

At the investigation held on 30 June 1990, Roberto Esguerra partially recanted his affidavit.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a MOTION dated 9 July 1990 fo r leave to take Janet Unzons testimony in Davao City thru

deposition (p. 15, rollo). The petitioner also filed with the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines aMOTION (a) to declare a mis-trial in the on-going investigation and invalidate proceedings thus far taken and todisqualify or inhibit Commissioner Ernesto L. Pineda from further investigating this case; (b) to transfer venue of re-investigation to Davao City, under strict compliance with Rule 139-B; and (c) to suspend further investigation in thiscase until final resolution, including that of the Supreme Court, if necessary, of issues therein raised, likewise dated 9July 1990 (p. 49, rollo).

On 9 October 1990, the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued an order (p. 64, rollo), thepertinent portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph


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1990 the Order of October 16, 1990 setting the case on November 27, and 28, 1990 both at 9:00 A.M. and in thatOrder it is indicated that the hearing is intransferrable in nature.

"Considering that the respondent is not ready to present his evidence despite notice of the aforementioned Order, heis hereby deemed to have waived his right to present further evidence.

"Further, the parties if they so desire may file their respective memorandum within a period of fifteen (15) days fromtoday, afterwhich, the case is deemed submitted for report and recommendation."cralaw virtua1aw library

Hence, the petitioner filed the present petition for CERTIORARI to annul and set aside (a) the proceedings and/orinvestigation conducted by respondent Commissioner Ernesto L. Pineda in A.C. No. 3066, beginning from 13 June1989 to 27 November 1990 and the order of respondent Commissioner dated 17 November 1990; (b) the orderdated 9 October 1990 of the Board of Governors and its subsequent order dated 23 November 1990, alleging thatrespondent Commissioner Ernesto L. Pineda acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction in denying his telegraphic motion for the resetting of the scheduled investigation on 13 and 14 June 1989and in proceeding and conducting the said investigation ex-parte; in allowing respondent Rosario Mercado to use heraffidavit as a substitute for her question-and-answer type of direct testimony; in directing Roberto Esguerra toappear before him (Commissioner Pineda) in Manila for cross-examination by the complainants in violation of themodified procedure of investigation as provided in the order dated 21 October 1989; in failing to resolve petitionersmotions for leave to take Janet Unzons testimony in Davao City and the motion for his voluntary inhibition; and inissuing the order dated 27 November 1990; and that the respondent Board of Governors also acted with grave abuseof discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the orders dated 9 October 1990 and 23 November1990, and PROHIBITION to enjoin the respondents Commissioner Pineda and Board of Governors from enforcing theorder dated 27 November 1990; from closing or terminating the investigation in A.C. No. 3066; and/or from makingany evaluation, report and/or recommendation with respect to the said case until further order from thisCourt.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The petition is devoid of merit. The issues raised are procedural questions regarding the conduct of the investigationin A.C. No. 3066. It is now well-settled that certiorari is not available to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the

judges findings and conclusions (Pacis v. Averia, 18 SCRA 907, 915, citing Regala v. CFI of Bulacan, 77 Phil. 684;Ong Sit v. Piccio, 78 Phil. 785; Icutamin v. Hernandez, 81 Phil., 161; Verhomal v. Tan, 88 Phil. 450; Matute v.Macadaeg, 99 Phil. 340), and that certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or correct erroneousconclusions of law or fact.

As long as a court or administrative agency acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of

its jurisdiction, will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and notby a special civil action of certiorari (Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. [INPORT] v. The Hon. Intermediate

Appellate Court, Et Al., 171 SCRA 579, 584, citing Santos, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 56114, July 28, 1987,152 SCRA 378).

Moreover, the petition is premature. The respondent Commissioner has not yet submitted his Report to the IBPBoard of Governors, and such report is subject to review by the latter. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 139-B provides that"(e)very case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidencesubmitted to it by the Investigator with his report" and that" (i)f the Board, by a vote of a majority of its totalmembership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shallissue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case,shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action."cralaw virtua1aw library

At this juncture, it may well be re-stated that "proceedings for the disbarment of members of the bar are not in any

sense a civil action where there is a plaintiff and the respondent is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve noprivate interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the publicwelfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of personsunfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. Thecomplainant or the person w ho called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense aparty, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administrationof justice." (Tajan v. Hon. Vicente Cusi, Jr., G.R. No. L-28899, 30 May 1974, 57 SCRA154).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Since disciplinary actions against members of the bar are impressed with public interest, they should be resolved with


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dispatch. The filing of the instant petition has served no purpose other than to delay the proceedings in A.C. No.3066.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the petition. This resolution is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. Therespondent investigator is hereby ordered TO RENDER and SUBMIT his report and recommendation to the IBP Boardof Governors, within ten (10) days from notice hereof.

SO ORDERED.

DOCKET NO. / CASE NO.: G.R. No. 160025

DATE: April 23, 2014

PETITIONER: Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Baguio City

RESPONDENT: Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation

FACTS:

Baguio City and Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation agreed on June 26, 2000 that the latter(Jadewell) will be in charge for the on-street parking as well as the installation of modern parkingmeters (DG4S Pay and Display Parking Meter) in the City. However, the City Council through CityResolution No. 037 s. 2002 alleged that Jadewell failed to comply with the agreement thus theCouncil revoked it. Baguio City informed Jadewell through its President, Rogelio Tan, on a letterdated September 22, 2006 of the rescission and in compliance with the Memorandum of Agreementsection 12, 60 days was given to Jadewell prior to its effectivity. However, Jadewell had notquestioned. Instead, filed a contempt case against Mayor Reinaldo Bautista, Jr., the City Councilincluding the City Legal Officer, Melchor Carlos R. Rabanes. Jadewell sought legal action before theRegional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio questioning the revocation but it was beyond the 60-day periodprovided in the MOA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the revocation of the agreement was valid?

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court held that since Jadewell has not questioned the legal efficacy of the noticebut raised only the issue as a matter of contumacious behavior on the part of the respondents, thusthe rescission had taken effect and the MOA between the City and Jadewell legally ceased to exist.


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G.R. No. 86421 May 31, 1994

SPS. THELMA R. MASINSIN and MIGUEL MASINSIN, SPS. GILBERTO and ADELINA, ROLDAN,petitioners,vs.THE HON. ED VINCENT ALBANO, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X,DEPUTY SHERIFF JESS ARREOLA, VICENTE CAEDA and THE HON. LEONARDO CRUZ, in his capacity asPresiding Judge Regional Trial of Manila, Branch XXV, respondents.

Gregorio T. Fabros for petitioners.

Isidro F. Molina for private respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

VITUG,J.:

Spouses Miguel and Thelma Masinsin, et al., instituted this petition for certiorari , prohibition, relief from judgment, aswell as declaratory relief, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction, asking us to order the Metropolitan TrialCourt ("MTC") of Manila, Branch X, to cease and desist from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 107203-CV.

This case emerged from an ejectment suit (docketed Civil Case No. 107203-CV) filed by private respondent Vicente

Caeda ("Caeda"), then as plaintiffs, against herein petitioners, as defendants, with the Metropolitan Trial Court ofManila (Branch X). After trial, the MTC, on 01 July 1985, rendered judgment; thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants and all personsclaiming right under them to vacate the premises and to remove their house/apartment andsurrender possession of the subject land to the plaintiff; to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P100.00a month from January 1987 as the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of thepremises until the land is actually vacated, and the costs of suit. 1

No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment became final and executory. On 22 August 1985, petitionersfiled a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXXII) seeking the annulment of theaforesaid decision in the ejectment case and to set aside an order of its execution. The petition was in due timedismissed. Again, no appeal was taken therefrom.

On 07 October 1985, a complaint for "Annulment of Judgment, Lease Contract and Damages" was filed by petitionersbefore the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XLI) asking, in main, for the nullification of the judgment in theejectment case. The complaint was dismissed on the ground of res judicata . This time, petitioners appealed thedismissal to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, a writ of execution was issued by the MTC for the enforcement of itsdecision. The writ, however, was held in abeyance when petitioners deposited with the Court of Appeals the sum ofP3,000.00 in cash plus an amount of P100.00 to be paid every month beginning February 1987. On 11 March 1987,the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of dismissal of the lower court. Petitioners' recourse to this Court was to beof no avail. The petition was denied, and an entry of judgment was made on 14 July 1987.


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Accordingly, the records were remanded to the MTC for execution. When petitioners refused to remove their houseon the premises in question, upon motion of private respondent, an order of demolition was issued. Shortlythereafter, the demolition began. Before the completion of the demolition, a restraining order was issued by theRegional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XIX) following a petition for certiorari , with preliminary injunction andrestraining order, filed by petitioners. On 23 February 1988, the trial court dismissed the petition.

Unfazed by the series of dismissals of their complaints and petitions, petitioners assailed anew the MTC decision in apetition for certiorari , with preliminary injunction, and for declaratory relief (docketed Civil Case No. 88-43944) beforethe Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXV), which, again, issued a restraining order. 2

Private respondent then filed a motion for an alias writ of execution with the MTC. An ex-parte motion of petitionersfor the issuance of a second restraining order was this time denied by the RTC (Branch XXV). 3 On 23 August1990, 4 the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the petition with costs against petitioners.

In this petition, petitioners contend that the MTC of Manila (Branch X) has lost jurisdiction to enforce its decision,dated 01 July 1985, in Civil Case No. 107203, when the property in question was proclaimed an area for prioritydevelopment by the National Housing Authority on 01 December 1987 by authority of Presidential Decree 2016.

The petition is totally without merit.

In resolving this issue, we only have to refer to our resolution of 01 February 1993 in G.R. No. 98446, entitled,"Spouses Thelma R. Masinsin, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," to which this case is intimately related, where weruled:

. . . The singular question common to both cases submitted for resolution of this court is theimplication of Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known as the "Urban Land Reform Law,"and its amendments or ramifications embodied in Proclamation No. 1893, as amended byProclamation No. 1967 and Presidential Decree No. 2016. All the above statutes are beingimplemented by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, and the Housing and UrbanDevelopment Coordinating Council, Office of the President.

There is a prejudicial issue the answer to which hangs the resolution of this case. On May 20,1992, this Court required the National Housing Authority to submit a Comment on the status of the

program of acquisition by the Government of the land area which includes the disputed property,as part of the Areas for Priority Development (APD), under the aforementioned decrees andproclamations.

In compliance with said order of this Court, Mr. Andres C. Lingan, Manager of the Metro ManilaProject Department of the National Housing Authority, submitted the following report on the statusof Lot 6-A, Block 1012, located at No. 1890 Obesis Street, Pandacan, Manila, known as the CarlosEstate, an APD site. Pertinent portions of the report read:

Please be informed that Lot 6-A, Block 1012 located at No. 1890 Obesis St.,Pandacan, Manila which is the subject matter of the case and located within theCarlos Estate declared as APD site pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No.1967, is not for acquisition by NHA .

The Carlos Estate is located outside of the NHA projects under the ZonalImprovement Project (ZIP) and Community Mortgage Program (CMP). The site,however, is under the administration of the Presidential Commission on UrbanPoor (PCUP) for acquisition and upgrading. (Emphasis Supplied.)

The above information answers the uncertainty concerning the status of the alleged negotiation forthe acquisition by the government of certain areas in Metro Manila. The NHA is definitely NOTacquiring the said lot for its program.


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It appearing that the purpose of this Petition for Review is to set aside the decision of therespondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the lower courts, in order to avoideviction from the disputed premises and to be allowed to acquire the same allegedly under theCommunity Mortgage Program of the National Housing Authority, we find the petition without meritand deny the same. Consequently, the petition is DISMISSED. 5

What immediately catches one's attention to this case is the evident predilection of petitioners, through differentcounsel, to file pleadings, one after another, from which not even this Court has been spared. The utter lack of meritof the complaints and petitions simply evinces the deliberate intent of petitioners to prolong and delay the inevitableexecution of a decision that has long become final and executory.

Four times did the petitioners, with the assistance of counsel, try to nullify the same MTC decision before differentbranches of the court, trifling with judicial processes. Never, again, should this practice be countenanced. 6

The lawyer's oath to which we have all subscribed in solemn agreement in dedicating ourselves to the pursuit of justice, is not a mere fictile of words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that we must uphold and keep inviolable.Perhaps, it is time we are here reminded of that pledge; thus -

LAWYER'S OATH

I, . . ., do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I willsupport and defend its Constitution a

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