Legitimacy in the United Kingdom: Scotland and the Poll Tax

Legitimacy in the United Kingdom: Scotland and the Poll TaxAuthor(s): Rodney BarkerSource: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Oct., 1992), pp. 521-533Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/194025 .

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B.J.Pol.S. 22, 521-533 Printed in Great Britain 521

Notes and Comments

Legitimacy in the United Kingdom: Scotland and the Poll Tax

RODNEY BARKER*

The community charge has been described as the flagship of Thatcherism. It was also the issue which, together with Europe, brought the Prime Minister's voyage to an end and set her adrift as a political Captain Bligh whilst her parliamentary and cabinet crew sailed on without her. But though the prospect of English electoral disaster was the most immediate and obvious political effect of the new tax, its introduction a year earlier in Scotland had other and possibly longer-lasting consequences.

OPPOSITION TO THE POLL TAX IN SCOTLAND

It is easy to see why the impact of the poll tax' in Scotland has been eclipsed by events in England and Wales. Scottish objections involved rather more civil disobedience but considerably less public disorder. On the day of the national poll tax demonstration in March 1990, when there was a riot in central London with 341 arrests and concern over both public order and police tactics, there was a large but entirely peaceful demonstration in Glasgow with only eight arrests for minor offences, and a commendation to the organizers from the Assistant Chief Constable of Strathclyde.2 The parliamentary repercussions of the community charge were English rather than Scottish. Conserva- tive seats north of the border were already a 'thin blue line'. It was government back- benchers with marginal seats in England whose own unease in turn unsettled the government. And it was from English Conservative MPs, rather than Scottish Labour or Nationalist ones, that the government felt most pressure.

But resistance to the tax in the form of non-payment was and remains more widespread in Scotland than in England and Wales, collection rates are lower and the respectability of resistance is more widespread and deeply entrenched. At the end of June 1990 it was estimated that approximately 20 per cent of those on the register in England and Wales had made no payment. By the end of August approximately 62.5 per cent of

* Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science. I am grateful to Tony Travers and two anonymous reviewers for the Journal for comments on an earlier version of this Note and to Angus Erskine, Archie Fairley, Lindsay Hall, Marian Keogh and Bill Miller.

As Deacon and Golding point out, the almost universal employment of the term 'poll tax' represented a public relations defeat for the government. A charge is a fee for services received, and therefore the wealth of the fee payer is not relevant. A tax, on the other hand, has redistributive implications, and thus if the levy is at the same rate for all payers, inequity is more likely to be perceived (David Deacon and Peter Golding, 'When Ideology Fails: The Flagship of Thatcherism and the British Local and National Media', European Journal of Communication, 6 (1991), 291-332).

2 Financial Times, 2 April 1990; Glasgow Herald, 2 April 1990. Such differences in the level, or even presence, of violence could be a function of the absolute as opposed to the relative size of the opposition and the possibilities this opened for the violent consequences of mistaken police tactics. John Dickson, Assistant Chief Constable of Strathclyde, attributed the lack of disorder at the Glasgow demonstration to the work of the organizers and their co-operation with the police (Glasgow Herald, 2 April 1990).

B.J.Pol.S. 22, 521-533 Printed in Great Britain 521

Notes and Comments

Legitimacy in the United Kingdom: Scotland and the Poll Tax

RODNEY BARKER*

The community charge has been described as the flagship of Thatcherism. It was also the issue which, together with Europe, brought the Prime Minister's voyage to an end and set her adrift as a political Captain Bligh whilst her parliamentary and cabinet crew sailed on without her. But though the prospect of English electoral disaster was the most immediate and obvious political effect of the new tax, its introduction a year earlier in Scotland had other and possibly longer-lasting consequences.

OPPOSITION TO THE POLL TAX IN SCOTLAND

It is easy to see why the impact of the poll tax' in Scotland has been eclipsed by events in England and Wales. Scottish objections involved rather more civil disobedience but considerably less public disorder. On the day of the national poll tax demonstration in March 1990, when there was a riot in central London with 341 arrests and concern over both public order and police tactics, there was a large but entirely peaceful demonstration in Glasgow with only eight arrests for minor offences, and a commendation to the organizers from the Assistant Chief Constable of Strathclyde.2 The parliamentary repercussions of the community charge were English rather than Scottish. Conserva- tive seats north of the border were already a 'thin blue line'. It was government back- benchers with marginal seats in England whose own unease in turn unsettled the government. And it was from English Conservative MPs, rather than Scottish Labour or Nationalist ones, that the government felt most pressure.

But resistance to the tax in the form of non-payment was and remains more widespread in Scotland than in England and Wales, collection rates are lower and the respectability of resistance is more widespread and deeply entrenched. At the end of June 1990 it was estimated that approximately 20 per cent of those on the register in England and Wales had made no payment. By the end of August approximately 62.5 per cent of

* Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science. I am grateful to Tony Travers and two anonymous reviewers for the Journal for comments on an earlier version of this Note and to Angus Erskine, Archie Fairley, Lindsay Hall, Marian Keogh and Bill Miller.

As Deacon and Golding point out, the almost universal employment of the term 'poll tax' represented a public relations defeat for the government. A charge is a fee for services received, and therefore the wealth of the fee payer is not relevant. A tax, on the other hand, has redistributive implications, and thus if the levy is at the same rate for all payers, inequity is more likely to be perceived (David Deacon and Peter Golding, 'When Ideology Fails: The Flagship of Thatcherism and the British Local and National Media', European Journal of Communication, 6 (1991), 291-332).

2 Financial Times, 2 April 1990; Glasgow Herald, 2 April 1990. Such differences in the level, or even presence, of violence could be a function of the absolute as opposed to the relative size of the opposition and the possibilities this opened for the violent consequences of mistaken police tactics. John Dickson, Assistant Chief Constable of Strathclyde, attributed the lack of disorder at the Glasgow demonstration to the work of the organizers and their co-operation with the police (Glasgow Herald, 2 April 1990).



522 Notes and Comments 522 Notes and Comments

what should have been collected had been received in the London boroughs, 70 per cent in the English and Welsh metropolitan authorities, and 82.5 per cent in the shire districts.3 By 31 December 1990 local authorities in England and Wales had collected 73 per cent of the tax and estimated that by the end of the financial year, on 31 March 1991, they would have received 91 per cent of the collectable tax.4

In Scotland by the end of the same financial year, just under 75 per cent had been collected.5 Whether the comparison is between the same two years, or between the first year of the charge in Scotland with the first year in England and Wales, Scottish non-payment is higher. Scottish non-payment at the end of the first year of taxing north of the border was 13.7 per cent of net billings, whereas in England and Wales it was just over 9 per cent.6 Figures for Scotland showed an escalating rate of non- payment in the second year of the tax, which was increased even further in the third year. At the end of July 1991, only 15 per cent, as against an expected 33.3 per cent, of the current year's tax had been paid and at the end of February 1992 fully 37.7 per cent of the year's tax remained unpaid.7 But by then the abolition of the tax had been announced and other calculations may be presumed to have entered the minds of citizens both north and south of the border.8

During the collection year 1989-90 in Scotland, 1,420,825 summary warrants were taken out against the approximately 3,700,000 people registered for the community charge, and in the year 1990-91 1,406,454 warrants were taken out.9 By January 1992, an estimate of 7 million was given for the number of similar orders issued in England and Wales.'? A survey conducted by the Local Government Information Unit of the

3 Audit Commission for Local Authorities and the National Health Service in England and Wales, The Administration of the Community Charge (London: Audit Commission, 1990), sections 81-2.

4Collectable tax is the amount legally due after all deductions for rebates, etc., have been made.

5 Institute of Public Finance, Progress on the Collection of the Community Charge (London: Institute of Public Finance, 1991); Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA), The Sham- bles of the Poll Tax (Edinburgh: COSLA, 1991; COSLA Finance Committee 28 June 1991, Item 4.1). By April 1992, this figure had improved only slightly, with a collection rate for the year 1990-91 of 80.1 per cent (COSLA, Poll Tax Non-Payment - ?623m (Edinburgh: COSLA, 1992). Figures for Scotland are more accessible than those for England and Wales, in part because of differences in the relative number and variety of collecting authorities. Figures issued by the Depart- ment of the Environment for England are percentages not of the legally collectable tax, but of the estimated collectable tax or 'budgeted yield'. This means that in some case receipts can be over 100 per cent of budgeted yield. Department of the Environment figures for England, again because of the number of authorities involved, and perhaps also because of the uncertainty of how to calculate 'budgeted yield', do not cover all collecting authorities - 'over 89 per cent'. All of this makes them of limited use for north-south comparison (Department of the Environment, Community Charge Collection - Fourth Quarter Results (London: Department of the Environment, 1991)).

6 Institute of Public Finance, Progress on the Collection of the Community Charge; Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, The Shambles of the Poll Tax; COSLA Finance Committee 28 June 1991, Item 4.1. By March 1992, the outstanding amount in Scotland for 1989-90 was still 12.4 per cent (COSLA, Poll Tax Non-Payment).

7 COSLA Minutes 22 August 1991, Item 4.2; COSLA, Poll Tax Non-Payment. 8 Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, The Shambles of the Poll Tax. 9 Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, Summary Warrants Now Top 3 Million (Edinburgh:

COSLA, 1991). '0 'Pressure growing to end poll tax turmoil', The Independent, 23 January 1992.

what should have been collected had been received in the London boroughs, 70 per cent in the English and Welsh metropolitan authorities, and 82.5 per cent in the shire districts.3 By 31 December 1990 local authorities in England and Wales had collected 73 per cent of the tax and estimated that by the end of the financial year, on 31 March 1991, they would have received 91 per cent of the collectable tax.4

In Scotland by the end of the same financial year, just under 75 per cent had been collected.5 Whether the comparison is between the same two years, or between the first year of the charge in Scotland with the first year in England and Wales, Scottish non-payment is higher. Scottish non-payment at the end of the first year of taxing north of the border was 13.7 per cent of net billings, whereas in England and Wales it was just over 9 per cent.6 Figures for Scotland showed an escalating rate of non- payment in the second year of the tax, which was increased even further in the third year. At the end of July 1991, only 15 per cent, as against an expected 33.3 per cent, of the current year's tax had been paid and at the end of February 1992 fully 37.7 per cent of the year's tax remained unpaid.7 But by then the abolition of the tax had been announced and other calculations may be presumed to have entered the minds of citizens both north and south of the border.8

During the collection year 1989-90 in Scotland, 1,420,825 summary warrants were taken out against the approximately 3,700,000 people registered for the community charge, and in the year 1990-91 1,406,454 warrants were taken out.9 By January 1992, an estimate of 7 million was given for the number of similar orders issued in England and Wales.'? A survey conducted by the Local Government Information Unit of the

3 Audit Commission for Local Authorities and the National Health Service in England and Wales, The Administration of the Community Charge (London: Audit Commission, 1990), sections 81-2.

4Collectable tax is the amount legally due after all deductions for rebates, etc., have been made.

5 Institute of Public Finance, Progress on the Collection of the Community Charge (London: Institute of Public Finance, 1991); Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA), The Sham- bles of the Poll Tax (Edinburgh: COSLA, 1991; COSLA Finance Committee 28 June 1991, Item 4.1). By April 1992, this figure had improved only slightly, with a collection rate for the year 1990-91 of 80.1 per cent (COSLA, Poll Tax Non-Payment - ?623m (Edinburgh: COSLA, 1992). Figures for Scotland are more accessible than those for England and Wales, in part because of differences in the relative number and variety of collecting authorities. Figures issued by the Depart- ment of the Environment for England are percentages not of the legally collectable tax, but of the estimated collectable tax or 'budgeted yield'. This means that in some case receipts can be over 100 per cent of budgeted yield. Department of the Environment figures for England, again because of the number of authorities involved, and perhaps also because of the uncertainty of how to calculate 'budgeted yield', do not cover all collecting authorities - 'over 89 per cent'. All of this makes them of limited use for north-south comparison (Department of the Environment, Community Charge Collection - Fourth Quarter Results (London: Department of the Environment, 1991)).

6 Institute of Public Finance, Progress on the Collection of the Community Charge; Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, The Shambles of the Poll Tax; COSLA Finance Committee 28 June 1991, Item 4.1. By March 1992, the outstanding amount in Scotland for 1989-90 was still 12.4 per cent (COSLA, Poll Tax Non-Payment).

7 COSLA Minutes 22 August 1991, Item 4.2; COSLA, Poll Tax Non-Payment. 8 Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, The Shambles of the Poll Tax. 9 Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, Summary Warrants Now Top 3 Million (Edinburgh:

COSLA, 1991). '0 'Pressure growing to end poll tax turmoil', The Independent, 23 January 1992.



Notes and Comments 523 Notes and Comments 523

experience of district councils in England and Wales up to 30 September 1991 found that summonses for non-payment had been issued against just under 23 per cent of those registered and a similar figure of 'just under a quarter' was suggested by a survey undertaken at the same time by the Association of Metropolitan Authorities." This suggests that a far higher proportion of the registered population was being pursued by legal means in Scotland than in England and Wales.

However, comparisons must be qualified by the uncertainty of the English and Welsh figures, the differences in the law, the escalating uncertainties of the law in England and Wales and the fact that by the beginning of 1992 the poll tax, if not quite buried, had had the date of its interment announced. There are a number of difficulties in making comparisons between Scotland and England and Wales. On the one hand, non- payment had had one more year in Scotland to escalate. On the other hand, whereas non-payment in 1989-90 in Scotland required political initiative, English and Welsh non-payers in their first year of poll tax demands already had the example of the Scottish campaign from which to learn and to give a degree of support and justification to their own non-payment.

Differences in the law meant that Scottish 'wilful' non-payers, unlike English and Welsh ones, did not face the ultimate sanction of imprisonment. They did, though, face the prospect of forfeiture and sale of their personal possessions (poinding), arrest of earnings, arrest of income support and freezing of bank accounts. Nor should the difference be taken to suggest that all poll tax non-payers in England and Wales have been under a close threat of criminal sanctions. The Local Government Information Unit survey of twenty-one district councils found that 'most authorities reported that the police were not helpful'. Thames Valley Police, for instance, said that it was their view 'that there should be no Police involvement in the execution of warrants for non payment of the Community Charge'.'2

There is also the difficulty that non-payment figures only indicate the proportion of non-payment from those registered. One of the tactics of non-payment was to avoid registration and the extent of such statistical invisibility is by its very nature difficult to calculate. Ronan Paddison finds 'circumstantial' evidence of poll tax avoidance by non-registration in Strathclyde; more direct evidence is, in the nature of things, almost impossible to come by. There appears to have been 'an urban/rural split overlain by class, divisions which match the popular expectations of likely winning and losing areas and social groups under the poll tax'. Areas where 'the decline in registration has been above-average, and in some cases this is by a factor of more than two, include the most deprived areas of the city'.13 But whatever the qualifications, whether the comparison is between the first year of collection in Scotland and the first year of collection in England and Wales, or between collection in 1990-91 in both instances, Scotland has a higher rate of non-payment.

There are other similarities, and disimilarities, between Scotland and England and Wales. An NOP survey in January 1990 found almost uniform rates of disapproval

Local Government Information Unit, Not for Want of Trying (London: Local Government Information Unit, 1992), p. 2; Association of Metropolitan Authorities, Poll Tax Non-Payment (London: Association of Metropolitan Authorities, 1992).

'2 Local Government Information Unit, Not for Want of Trying (London: Local Government Information Unit, 1992), p. 5.

3 Rowan Paddison, Dodging The Voters' Roll? A Preliminary Assessment of the Poll Tax Effect on Voter Registration in Strathclyde (Glasgow: Applied Population Research Unit, Department of Geography, University of Glasgow, 1990), p. 17.

experience of district councils in England and Wales up to 30 September 1991 found that summonses for non-payment had been issued against just under 23 per cent of those registered and a similar figure of 'just under a quarter' was suggested by a survey undertaken at the same time by the Association of Metropolitan Authorities." This suggests that a far higher proportion of the registered population was being pursued by legal means in Scotland than in England and Wales.

However, comparisons must be qualified by the uncertainty of the English and Welsh figures, the differences in the law, the escalating uncertainties of the law in England and Wales and the fact that by the beginning of 1992 the poll tax, if not quite buried, had had the date of its interment announced. There are a number of difficulties in making comparisons between Scotland and England and Wales. On the one hand, non- payment had had one more year in Scotland to escalate. On the other hand, whereas non-payment in 1989-90 in Scotland required political initiative, English and Welsh non-payers in their first year of poll tax demands already had the example of the Scottish campaign from which to learn and to give a degree of support and justification to their own non-payment.

Differences in the law meant that Scottish 'wilful' non-payers, unlike English and Welsh ones, did not face the ultimate sanction of imprisonment. They did, though, face the prospect of forfeiture and sale of their personal possessions (poinding), arrest of earnings, arrest of income support and freezing of bank accounts. Nor should the difference be taken to suggest that all poll tax non-payers in England and Wales have been under a close threat of criminal sanctions. The Local Government Information Unit survey of twenty-one district councils found that 'most authorities reported that the police were not helpful'. Thames Valley Police, for instance, said that it was their view 'that there should be no Police involvement in the execution of warrants for non payment of the Community Charge'.'2

There is also the difficulty that non-payment figures only indicate the proportion of non-payment from those registered. One of the tactics of non-payment was to avoid registration and the extent of such statistical invisibility is by its very nature difficult to calculate. Ronan Paddison finds 'circumstantial' evidence of poll tax avoidance by non-registration in Strathclyde; more direct evidence is, in the nature of things, almost impossible to come by. There appears to have been 'an urban/rural split overlain by class, divisions which match the popular expectations of likely winning and losing areas and social groups under the poll tax'. Areas where 'the decline in registration has been above-average, and in some cases this is by a factor of more than two, include the most deprived areas of the city'.13 But whatever the qualifications, whether the comparison is between the first year of collection in Scotland and the first year of collection in England and Wales, or between collection in 1990-91 in both instances, Scotland has a higher rate of non-payment.

There are other similarities, and disimilarities, between Scotland and England and Wales. An NOP survey in January 1990 found almost uniform rates of disapproval

Local Government Information Unit, Not for Want of Trying (London: Local Government Information Unit, 1992), p. 2; Association of Metropolitan Authorities, Poll Tax Non-Payment (London: Association of Metropolitan Authorities, 1992).

'2 Local Government Information Unit, Not for Want of Trying (London: Local Government Information Unit, 1992), p. 5.

3 Rowan Paddison, Dodging The Voters' Roll? A Preliminary Assessment of the Poll Tax Effect on Voter Registration in Strathclyde (Glasgow: Applied Population Research Unit, Department of Geography, University of Glasgow, 1990), p. 17.




of the tax in Scotland and in England and Wales, with a slightly higher rate of approval in Scotland. On the other hand, of those who believed themselves to be worse off or about to become worse off as a result of the change from rates to poll tax, 73 per cent in Scotland blamed the government, but only 55 per cent did so in England and Wales.'4 In 1986, before the tax was introduced into either Scotland or England and Wales, opposition to it was higher in Scotland and higher there amongst both Conservative and Labour supporters than south of the border. The community charge was favoured by 50 per cent south of the border but by only 30 per cent north of it.15 It is of course possible that Scottish opposition was greater because the new tax was more imminent north of the border. But whilst that might explain greater opposition amongst Labour voters if they were seen as anticipating a taxation change that would materially disadvantage them, the same is less likely to be the case with Conservative voters. The following year opposition to the poll tax was 57 per cent in Scotland, England and Wales as a whole, but 73 per cent in Scotland.'6

The tax was introduced in England and Wales in April 1990, but in Scotland a

year earlier. It was not introduced at all into Northern Ireland. Whilst objections to the tax in England and Wales were as vociferous as those in Scotland, they had a

significantly more limited base. The tax, it was alleged, introduced new burdens on

large numbers of people. Insofar as it reduced the burden of local taxation, it did so to the benefit of the better off. It was thus argued to be both onerous and unfair. This provided sufficient grounds for people to object and sufficient reasons for Conserva- tive MPs in marginal constituencies to fear for their re-election prospects. But the closest the argument against the tax came to invoking principles, as against mere dissatisfactions or disgruntlement, was in the allegation that it was class legislation. This, according to the Labour MP Dave Nellist, who was associated with the All-Britain Anti-Poll Tax Federation, justified non-payment because the tax was 'Robin Hood in reverse - a wealth transfusion from the poor to the rich'.'7 But even that argument has not, in the United Kingdom generally, been thought a basis for questioning not merely the desirability of a law but its legitimacy. The English campaign was resistance against a law that was thought to be unjust but not rejection of one dismissed as illegitimate. In Scotland, on the other hand, a quite different order of objection was articulated.

In seeking to explain disparities in collection and in attribution of the blame for the deleterious effects of the tax, one clear difference between Scotland and England and Wales is the presence north of the border of an additional argument against the tax and in justification of non-payment. The Scottish argument involved notions of

legitimacy in a way that objections south of the border did not. The fortunes of the tax may thus provide an illustration of the character of legitimacy in a parliamentary democracy. This may be particularly apposite at a time when the concept has fallen into relative disuse but when it or something like it seems increasingly necessary in order to give an account of the abdication, overthrow, destabilizing and creation of regimes.

One of the principal ways in which government can enjoy legitimate command over its subjects is if it is accepted as representative of them or of some characteristic that is believed to distinguish them. Representative democratic procedures are one, but not

14 NOP 6092, New Decade Quickie, February 1990. '5 W. L. Miller, Irrelevant Elections (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 253-5. 16 David Scott, '73 per cent against poll tax - MORI survey' The Scotsman, 6 October 1987. 17 Financial Times, 16 March 1990.

of the tax in Scotland and in England and Wales, with a slightly higher rate of approval in Scotland. On the other hand, of those who believed themselves to be worse off or about to become worse off as a result of the change from rates to poll tax, 73 per cent in Scotland blamed the government, but only 55 per cent did so in England and Wales.'4 In 1986, before the tax was introduced into either Scotland or England and Wales, opposition to it was higher in Scotland and higher there amongst both Conservative and Labour supporters than south of the border. The community charge was favoured by 50 per cent south of the border but by only 30 per cent north of it.15 It is of course possible that Scottish opposition was greater because the new tax was more imminent north of the border. But whilst that might explain greater opposition amongst Labour voters if they were seen as anticipating a taxation change that would materially disadvantage them, the same is less likely to be the case with Conservative voters. The following year opposition to the poll tax was 57 per cent in Scotland, England and Wales as a whole, but 73 per cent in Scotland.'6

The tax was introduced in England and Wales in April 1990, but in Scotland a

year earlier. It was not introduced at all into Northern Ireland. Whilst objections to the tax in England and Wales were as vociferous as those in Scotland, they had a

significantly more limited base. The tax, it was alleged, introduced new burdens on

large numbers of people. Insofar as it reduced the burden of local taxation, it did so to the benefit of the better off. It was thus argued to be both onerous and unfair. This provided sufficient grounds for people to object and sufficient reasons for Conserva- tive MPs in marginal constituencies to fear for their re-election prospects. But the closest the argument against the tax came to invoking principles, as against mere dissatisfactions or disgruntlement, was in the allegation that it was class legislation. This, according to the Labour MP Dave Nellist, who was associated with the All-Britain Anti-Poll Tax Federation, justified non-payment because the tax was 'Robin Hood in reverse - a wealth transfusion from the poor to the rich'.'7 But even that argument has not, in the United Kingdom generally, been thought a basis for questioning not merely the desirability of a law but its legitimacy. The English campaign was resistance against a law that was thought to be unjust but not rejection of one dismissed as illegitimate. In Scotland, on the other hand, a quite different order of objection was articulated.

In seeking to explain disparities in collection and in attribution of the blame for the deleterious effects of the tax, one clear difference between Scotland and England and Wales is the presence north of the border of an additional argument against the tax and in justification of non-payment. The Scottish argument involved notions of

legitimacy in a way that objections south of the border did not. The fortunes of the tax may thus provide an illustration of the character of legitimacy in a parliamentary democracy. This may be particularly apposite at a time when the concept has fallen into relative disuse but when it or something like it seems increasingly necessary in order to give an account of the abdication, overthrow, destabilizing and creation of regimes.

One of the principal ways in which government can enjoy legitimate command over its subjects is if it is accepted as representative of them or of some characteristic that is believed to distinguish them. Representative democratic procedures are one, but not

14 NOP 6092, New Decade Quickie, February 1990. '5 W. L. Miller, Irrelevant Elections (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 253-5. 16 David Scott, '73 per cent against poll tax - MORI survey' The Scotsman, 6 October 1987. 17 Financial Times, 16 March 1990.




the only, way in which this may be achieved.'8 Benedict Anderson has claimed that 'nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time'.19 If that is so, then Scottish opponents of the poll tax had a unique weapon in their

campaign, which provided powerful reasons why it was not simply unfair but wrong to impose the tax and for justifying their non-payment not simply in terms of good or bad public policies but in terms of constitutional propriety and political principle.

SCOTTISH POLITICAL IDENTITY

A combination of material deprivation and a sense of national identity has meant that issues that would, in England, be polarized along lines of class or party have, north of the border, a further dimension. It has been increasingly argued that the steady decline of electoral support for the Conservative party, combined with a direction of central government policy that conflicts with what are widely seen to be the interests of people living in Scotland, has created a sense of political alienation drawing heavily on feelings of national distinctiveness.20

The failure to increase many benefits in line with average earnings excluded many from the increased national prosperity of the late 1980s. Increasingly, these issues have come to be seen as territorial, rather than in purely class or sectoral terms, strengthening the sense of Scottish identity and its political significance.2'

Though the standard accounts of Scottish government and politics disagree about the character and causes of Scottish distinctiveness and whether it is appropriate to talk of a 'political system', or a 'culture', or a 'tradition', they share a view of a Scottish political dimension.22 The unrepresentativeness of policies applied in Scotland by governments without any Scottish electoral mandate has frequently been used as an argument against such policies. One of the charges laid against Conservative educational

18 I have discussed this more fully in Rodney Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

19 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nation- alism (London: Verso, 1983), p. 12.

20 This argument has not changed as a result of the general election of April 1992, in which the Conservatives increased the number of their seats in Scotland from nine to eleven and their share of the vote from 24 per cent to 25.7 per cent. The change in parliamentary representation between general elections, on the other hand, was only from ten to eleven, since the lower figure of nine was a result of a by-election defeat.

21 See Arthur Midwinter, Michael Keating and James Mitchell, Politics and Public Policy in Scotland (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 19. Discussing the available arguments in terms of economic interest for the rejection of Conservative candidates by the electorate in 1987, A. D. R. Dickson comments 'The crucial factor that all of these existing accounts neglect is the nature of "Scottish- ness" and its implications for political action' (Dickson, 'The Peculiarities of the Scottish: National Culture and Political Action' Political Quarterly, 59 (1988), p. 359).

22 See James Kellas, The Scottish Political System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, 1975, 1984, 1989); Midwinter, Keating and Mitchell, Politics and Public Policy in Scotland; Michael Fry, Patronage and Principle. A Political History of Modern Scotland (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987). Once a specifically Scottish argument over legitimacy is identified, a connec- tion is implied with the debate over whether it is appropriate to talk of a 'Scottish political system', insofar as system is defined in Eastonian terms by reference to 'the authoritative allocation of values'. It lies outside the scope of this Note to pursue those implications.

the only, way in which this may be achieved.'8 Benedict Anderson has claimed that 'nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time'.19 If that is so, then Scottish opponents of the poll tax had a unique weapon in their

campaign, which provided powerful reasons why it was not simply unfair but wrong to impose the tax and for justifying their non-payment not simply in terms of good or bad public policies but in terms of constitutional propriety and political principle.

SCOTTISH POLITICAL IDENTITY

A combination of material deprivation and a sense of national identity has meant that issues that would, in England, be polarized along lines of class or party have, north of the border, a further dimension. It has been increasingly argued that the steady decline of electoral support for the Conservative party, combined with a direction of central government policy that conflicts with what are widely seen to be the interests of people living in Scotland, has created a sense of political alienation drawing heavily on feelings of national distinctiveness.20

The failure to increase many benefits in line with average earnings excluded many from the increased national prosperity of the late 1980s. Increasingly, these issues have come to be seen as territorial, rather than in purely class or sectoral terms, strengthening the sense of Scottish identity and its political significance.2'

Though the standard accounts of Scottish government and politics disagree about the character and causes of Scottish distinctiveness and whether it is appropriate to talk of a 'political system', or a 'culture', or a 'tradition', they share a view of a Scottish political dimension.22 The unrepresentativeness of policies applied in Scotland by governments without any Scottish electoral mandate has frequently been used as an argument against such policies. One of the charges laid against Conservative educational

18 I have discussed this more fully in Rodney Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

19 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nation- alism (London: Verso, 1983), p. 12.

20 This argument has not changed as a result of the general election of April 1992, in which the Conservatives increased the number of their seats in Scotland from nine to eleven and their share of the vote from 24 per cent to 25.7 per cent. The change in parliamentary representation between general elections, on the other hand, was only from ten to eleven, since the lower figure of nine was a result of a by-election defeat.

21 See Arthur Midwinter, Michael Keating and James Mitchell, Politics and Public Policy in Scotland (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 19. Discussing the available arguments in terms of economic interest for the rejection of Conservative candidates by the electorate in 1987, A. D. R. Dickson comments 'The crucial factor that all of these existing accounts neglect is the nature of "Scottish- ness" and its implications for political action' (Dickson, 'The Peculiarities of the Scottish: National Culture and Political Action' Political Quarterly, 59 (1988), p. 359).

22 See James Kellas, The Scottish Political System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, 1975, 1984, 1989); Midwinter, Keating and Mitchell, Politics and Public Policy in Scotland; Michael Fry, Patronage and Principle. A Political History of Modern Scotland (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987). Once a specifically Scottish argument over legitimacy is identified, a connec- tion is implied with the debate over whether it is appropriate to talk of a 'Scottish political system', insofar as system is defined in Eastonian terms by reference to 'the authoritative allocation of values'. It lies outside the scope of this Note to pursue those implications.




policy in Scotland was that it was an attempt at 'Englishing' Scottish education.23 From 1979 onwards, a divergence between consensus within Scotland and the radical policies of the Conservative government created a sense of both policy and national division between Scotland and England.24 The arguments of the SNP accentuated this sense of distinctiveness, but nationalism was far more widespread and diffuse than Nationalism.

SCOTTISH HOSTILITY TO THE POLL TAX

From the 1985 revaluation onwards, 'systems of local taxation were a matter of public debate in Scotland but much less so in England and Wales'.25 From the first proposal of the change in local government finance, there was public criticism in Scotland that drew on assumptions about Scotland as a distinct national identity and that stated or implied that legitimacy arose from the consent of the Scottish people. The normal reference was not to 'the electorate' or 'the voters' but to 'the Scottish public'.26 The Daily Record spoke of Scottish anger at being used as a guinea pig, and Labour's John Maxton wrote of the poll tax as a measure 'imposed in Scotland by a government with no mandate to do so and one that the Scottish people have so clearly rejected'.27

At the same time, criticism of the community charge was frequently accompanied by the assertions that it would prove both administratively too complex to collect and that popular resistance and evasion were to be expected. When to this was added the claim that non-payment would be a justified form of resistance, a combination of claims was made current that could readily provide a nationalist justification for refusing to pay the poll tax or for simply avoiding doing so.

The Conservative party did not enjoy, north of the border, the overall press support 23 Scottish Centre for Social and Economic Research, Scottish Education. A Declaration of Princi-

ples, A Joint AdCAS/SCSER Report (Edinburgh: SCSER, 1989) quoted in Midwinter, Keating and Mitchell, Politics and Public Policy in Scotland, p. 171.

24 Midwinter, Keating and Mitchell, Politics and Public Policy in Scotland, p. 166. To that extent it is simply the latest example of the dilemma of governing an increasingly non-Conservative Scotland on the basis of a Conservative majority in the Parliament of the United Kingdom remarked on by W. L. Miller in 1981 when he asked, 'On what basis then can a Conservative Secretary (of State for Scotland) govern without further alienating the Scots electorate?' W. L. Miller, The End of British Politics? Scots and English Political Behaviour in the Seventies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 261. Stephen Kendrick and David McCrone argue that in the past the Conservative party has contributed to, fostered and profited from a sense of Scottish identity. Its economic policies since 1979, on the other hand, accentuate that Scottish identity in a way wholly inimical to Conservative support (Stephen Kendrick and David McCrone, 'Politics in a Cold Climate: The Conservative Decline in Scotland', Political Studies, 34 (1989), 589-603. Midwinter et al. argue that 'There is, though, a serious argument about political legitimacy, whether a government rejected by a large majority of Scots will be able to govern with the consent which has underlain the British democratic system' (Midwinter, Keating and Mitchell, Politics and Public Policy in Scotland, p. 206.

25 William L. Miller, Irrelevant Elections (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 252. 26 Thus the City Treasurer of Glasgow, Councillor Jean McFadden, commenting on a System

Three Scotland poll which showed 80 per cent of Scots opposed to the introduction of the poll tax in Scotland a year before it was introduced in England and Wales, claimed that this showed 'the Scottish public has not been conned by the Government's arguments' (Evening Times, 12 January 1987).

27 Daily Record, 13 January 1987; John Maxton, 'Poll tax: a solution far worse than the problem', Glasgow Herald, 13 February 1987.

policy in Scotland was that it was an attempt at 'Englishing' Scottish education.23 From 1979 onwards, a divergence between consensus within Scotland and the radical policies of the Conservative government created a sense of both policy and national division between Scotland and England.24 The arguments of the SNP accentuated this sense of distinctiveness, but nationalism was far more widespread and diffuse than Nationalism.

SCOTTISH HOSTILITY TO THE POLL TAX

From the 1985 revaluation onwards, 'systems of local taxation were a matter of public debate in Scotland but much less so in England and Wales'.25 From the first proposal of the change in local government finance, there was public criticism in Scotland that drew on assumptions about Scotland as a distinct national identity and that stated or implied that legitimacy arose from the consent of the Scottish people. The normal reference was not to 'the electorate' or 'the voters' but to 'the Scottish public'.26 The Daily Record spoke of Scottish anger at being used as a guinea pig, and Labour's John Maxton wrote of the poll tax as a measure 'imposed in Scotland by a government with no mandate to do so and one that the Scottish people have so clearly rejected'.27

At the same time, criticism of the community charge was frequently accompanied by the assertions that it would prove both administratively too complex to collect and that popular resistance and evasion were to be expected. When to this was added the claim that non-payment would be a justified form of resistance, a combination of claims was made current that could readily provide a nationalist justification for refusing to pay the poll tax or for simply avoiding doing so.

The Conservative party did not enjoy, north of the border, the overall press support 23 Scottish Centre for Social and Economic Research, Scottish Education. A Declaration of Princi-

ples, A Joint AdCAS/SCSER Report (Edinburgh: SCSER, 1989) quoted in Midwinter, Keating and Mitchell, Politics and Public Policy in Scotland, p. 171.

24 Midwinter, Keating and Mitchell, Politics and Public Policy in Scotland, p. 166. To that extent it is simply the latest example of the dilemma of governing an increasingly non-Conservative Scotland on the basis of a Conservative majority in the Parliament of the United Kingdom remarked on by W. L. Miller in 1981 when he asked, 'On what basis then can a Conservative Secretary (of State for Scotland) govern without further alienating the Scots electorate?' W. L. Miller, The End of British Politics? Scots and English Political Behaviour in the Seventies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 261. Stephen Kendrick and David McCrone argue that in the past the Conservative party has contributed to, fostered and profited from a sense of Scottish identity. Its economic policies since 1979, on the other hand, accentuate that Scottish identity in a way wholly inimical to Conservative support (Stephen Kendrick and David McCrone, 'Politics in a Cold Climate: The Conservative Decline in Scotland', Political Studies, 34 (1989), 589-603. Midwinter et al. argue that 'There is, though, a serious argument about political legitimacy, whether a government rejected by a large majority of Scots will be able to govern with the consent which has underlain the British democratic system' (Midwinter, Keating and Mitchell, Politics and Public Policy in Scotland, p. 206.

25 William L. Miller, Irrelevant Elections (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 252. 26 Thus the City Treasurer of Glasgow, Councillor Jean McFadden, commenting on a System

Three Scotland poll which showed 80 per cent of Scots opposed to the introduction of the poll tax in Scotland a year before it was introduced in England and Wales, claimed that this showed 'the Scottish public has not been conned by the Government's arguments' (Evening Times, 12 January 1987).

27 Daily Record, 13 January 1987; John Maxton, 'Poll tax: a solution far worse than the problem', Glasgow Herald, 13 February 1987.




it received from the London press. A hostility in the Scottish media to the introduction of the poll tax led to complaints by defeated Conservative candidates after the 1987 general election that the Scottish press was anti-Conservative.28 The Scotsman and the Glasgow Herald were both critical of Thatcherism and in favour of a Scottish assembly. The Daily Record on the day before polling described Scotland as Thatcher's 'blind spot'.29 In 1987 the impending tax had been a major issue in the campaign in Scotland.30 In England and Wales, on the other hand, the poll tax, which was of course a year further away, was not one of the principal issues in the election campaign.31 The poll tax maintained its position on the political agenda north of the border. In September 1989 MORI found it ranked with unemployment and the National Health Service as the most important issues for Scots voters. In a MORI poll in the following February it was ranked above anything else.32

THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE POLL TAX

Although the Labour party took care never to back a campaign of non-payment in Scotland, there was vociferous support within the party for such a policy, and Scottish constituency delegates argued for it at the Brighton conference in October 1987 and at the Scottish Labour local government conference at Stirling in November.33 The Labour party in Scotland initially responded to the prospect of the poll tax by advocating a form of legal go-slow, the 'Stop It' campaign. People were advised in advertisements in the press to return their registration forms with queries designed to slow down the implementation of the new charge, and district councils were asked by the executive committee of the party in Scotland not to become involved in collection.34 In addition, the 'Stop It' campaign sought, unsuccessfully, injunctions against the drawing up of the community charge register on the grounds of the alleged illegality of literature accompanying the registration forms.35

It has been argued that, by drawing attention to the penalties for non-payment, the 'Stop It' campaign in fact assisted the collection of the tax. On the other hand, the Registration Officer of Tayside estimated that between 10 per cent and 15 per cent of forms had been returned with queries that required a response and that this had

2' Archie Fairley, 'The Community Charge and Local Government Finance in Scotland', in David McCrone and Alice Brown, eds, The Scottish Government Yearbook 1988 (Edinburgh: Unit for the Study of Government in Scotland, Department of Politics, University of Edinburgh, 1988), p. 59.

29 Martin Harrop, 'Press', in David Butler and Denis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1987 (London: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 175.

30 James Mitchell, Conservatives and the Union (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), pp. 117-18.

3' They were unemployment, inflation, health and education, nuclear weapons, defence/foreign affairs and trades unions/industrial relations (William L. Miller, Harold C. Clarke, Martin Harrop, Lawrence LeDuc and Paul F. Whiteley, How Voters Change. The 1987 British Election Campaign in Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 103-5.

32 The figures were: September 1989 - unemployment named by 50 per cent, poll tax 36 per cent, NHS 26 per cent; February 1990 - poll tax 48 per cent, unemployment 40 per cent, NHS 24 per cent (The Scotsman, 5 March 1990).

33 The Scotsman, 2 October 1987; Glasgow Herald, 2 October 1987; Glasgow Herald, 30 November 1987.

34 Daily Record, 18 April 1988; Glasgow Herald, 11 March 1988, 20 October 1987.

35 Glasgow Herald, 12 April 1988.

it received from the London press. A hostility in the Scottish media to the introduction of the poll tax led to complaints by defeated Conservative candidates after the 1987 general election that the Scottish press was anti-Conservative.28 The Scotsman and the Glasgow Herald were both critical of Thatcherism and in favour of a Scottish assembly. The Daily Record on the day before polling described Scotland as Thatcher's 'blind spot'.29 In 1987 the impending tax had been a major issue in the campaign in Scotland.30 In England and Wales, on the other hand, the poll tax, which was of course a year further away, was not one of the principal issues in the election campaign.31 The poll tax maintained its position on the political agenda north of the border. In September 1989 MORI found it ranked with unemployment and the National Health Service as the most important issues for Scots voters. In a MORI poll in the following February it was ranked above anything else.32

THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE POLL TAX

Although the Labour party took care never to back a campaign of non-payment in Scotland, there was vociferous support within the party for such a policy, and Scottish constituency delegates argued for it at the Brighton conference in October 1987 and at the Scottish Labour local government conference at Stirling in November.33 The Labour party in Scotland initially responded to the prospect of the poll tax by advocating a form of legal go-slow, the 'Stop It' campaign. People were advised in advertisements in the press to return their registration forms with queries designed to slow down the implementation of the new charge, and district councils were asked by the executive committee of the party in Scotland not to become involved in collection.34 In addition, the 'Stop It' campaign sought, unsuccessfully, injunctions against the drawing up of the community charge register on the grounds of the alleged illegality of literature accompanying the registration forms.35

It has been argued that, by drawing attention to the penalties for non-payment, the 'Stop It' campaign in fact assisted the collection of the tax. On the other hand, the Registration Officer of Tayside estimated that between 10 per cent and 15 per cent of forms had been returned with queries that required a response and that this had

2' Archie Fairley, 'The Community Charge and Local Government Finance in Scotland', in David McCrone and Alice Brown, eds, The Scottish Government Yearbook 1988 (Edinburgh: Unit for the Study of Government in Scotland, Department of Politics, University of Edinburgh, 1988), p. 59.

29 Martin Harrop, 'Press', in David Butler and Denis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1987 (London: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 175.

30 James Mitchell, Conservatives and the Union (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), pp. 117-18.

3' They were unemployment, inflation, health and education, nuclear weapons, defence/foreign affairs and trades unions/industrial relations (William L. Miller, Harold C. Clarke, Martin Harrop, Lawrence LeDuc and Paul F. Whiteley, How Voters Change. The 1987 British Election Campaign in Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 103-5.

32 The figures were: September 1989 - unemployment named by 50 per cent, poll tax 36 per cent, NHS 26 per cent; February 1990 - poll tax 48 per cent, unemployment 40 per cent, NHS 24 per cent (The Scotsman, 5 March 1990).

33 The Scotsman, 2 October 1987; Glasgow Herald, 2 October 1987; Glasgow Herald, 30 November 1987.

34 Daily Record, 18 April 1988; Glasgow Herald, 11 March 1988, 20 October 1987.

35 Glasgow Herald, 12 April 1988.




caused both additional work and additional cost.36 Although the Labour party in Scotland, after an additional special conference in September 1988, finally abandoned both the 'Stop It' campaign and any possibility of civil disobedience, a 'Committee of One Hundred Leading Scots' committed to public, principled non-payment was set up by some Scottish Labour MPs, and twelve Scottish Labour MPs declared their intention of not paying.37 The Scottish executive had only rejected non-payment the month before the special conference by seventeen votes to thirteen.38 Dick Douglas had resigned in February 1988 as chairman of the group of Scottish Labour MPs over Neil Kinnock's rejection of non-payment (he subsequently joined the SNP), and John Home Robertson had been removed as front-bench spokesman on Scottish affairs for continuing to advocate non-payment.39

The best way of resisting the introduction of the poll tax in Scotland was the principal issue in the Govan by-election in November 1988. The Labour candidate, though sup- porting what was by then his party's policy of opposition within the law, none the less declared his own intention of conscientious non-payment, whilst the SNP, which was still advocating a campaign of non-payment, was able to tell the electors that 'No other political party is prepared to stand up for Scotland and her people' over the issue.40 Advocacy of non-payment was thus given considerable publicity in the by-election campaign. Support for it amongst the electorate, which had fallen from 42 per cent to 37 per cent between March and September 1988, was at 40 per cent in December, the month after the SNP took Govan.41 The SNP at its conference in September 1988 voted for a campaign of mass non-payment, with an initial aim of a register of 100,000 non-payers.42 This was not formally abandoned until the announce- ment of the abandoning of the community charge itself by the Conservative government at the beginning of 1991. In April 1989 48 per cent of Labour voters and 49 per cent of SNP voters supported a campaign of non-payment whilst amongst the Scottish electorate as a whole non-payment was supported by 37 per cent.43 By September 1990 ICM found support for non-payment had grown to 42 per cent amongst the electorate as a whole, with 48 per cent of Labour voters and 57 per cent of SNP voters favouring a non-payment campaign.44

The number who expressed support for non-payment was, not surprisingly, greater than the number who said that they would not themselves pay. The latter figure fell from 24 per cent in September 1988 to 20 per cent in December, 19 per cent in April

36 Michael Enston, 'Implementing the Unthinkable: The First Community Charges', in Alice Brown and Richard Parry, eds, Scottish Government Yearbook 1990 (Edinburgh: Unit for the Study of Government in Scotland, 1990), p. 103.

37 Glasgow Herald, 22 July 1988. 38 Glasgow Herald, 15 August 1988. 39 The Scotsman, 3 February 1988; The Times, 11 November 1988. 40 The Times, 22 October 1991; Roger Levy, Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads (Edinburgh:

Scottish Academic Press, 1990), p. 120. 41 The Scotsman, 11 March 1988; 20 September 1990. 42 Enston, 'Implementing the Unthinkable', pp. 103-4. The previous year the SNP conference

had rejected non-payment, though later in 1987 its executive committee called for a mass campaign of non-payment, adding without any apparent humour that to be successful such a campaign would have to be headed by the Labour party (The Scotsman, 12 October 1987; Glasgow Herald, 19 October 1987).

43 David McCrone, 'Opinion Polls in Scotland August 1988-July 1989', in Brown and Parry, eds, Scottish Government Yearbook 1990, p. 285.

44 The Scotsman, 20 September 1990.

caused both additional work and additional cost.36 Although the Labour party in Scotland, after an additional special conference in September 1988, finally abandoned both the 'Stop It' campaign and any possibility of civil disobedience, a 'Committee of One Hundred Leading Scots' committed to public, principled non-payment was set up by some Scottish Labour MPs, and twelve Scottish Labour MPs declared their intention of not paying.37 The Scottish executive had only rejected non-payment the month before the special conference by seventeen votes to thirteen.38 Dick Douglas had resigned in February 1988 as chairman of the group of Scottish Labour MPs over Neil Kinnock's rejection of non-payment (he subsequently joined the SNP), and John Home Robertson had been removed as front-bench spokesman on Scottish affairs for continuing to advocate non-payment.39

The best way of resisting the introduction of the poll tax in Scotland was the principal issue in the Govan by-election in November 1988. The Labour candidate, though sup- porting what was by then his party's policy of opposition within the law, none the less declared his own intention of conscientious non-payment, whilst the SNP, which was still advocating a campaign of non-payment, was able to tell the electors that 'No other political party is prepared to stand up for Scotland and her people' over the issue.40 Advocacy of non-payment was thus given considerable publicity in the by-election campaign. Support for it amongst the electorate, which had fallen from 42 per cent to 37 per cent between March and September 1988, was at 40 per cent in December, the month after the SNP took Govan.41 The SNP at its conference in September 1988 voted for a campaign of mass non-payment, with an initial aim of a register of 100,000 non-payers.42 This was not formally abandoned until the announce- ment of the abandoning of the community charge itself by the Conservative government at the beginning of 1991. In April 1989 48 per cent of Labour voters and 49 per cent of SNP voters supported a campaign of non-payment whilst amongst the Scottish electorate as a whole non-payment was supported by 37 per cent.43 By September 1990 ICM found support for non-payment had grown to 42 per cent amongst the electorate as a whole, with 48 per cent of Labour voters and 57 per cent of SNP voters favouring a non-payment campaign.44

The number who expressed support for non-payment was, not surprisingly, greater than the number who said that they would not themselves pay. The latter figure fell from 24 per cent in September 1988 to 20 per cent in December, 19 per cent in April

36 Michael Enston, 'Implementing the Unthinkable: The First Community Charges', in Alice Brown and Richard Parry, eds, Scottish Government Yearbook 1990 (Edinburgh: Unit for the Study of Government in Scotland, 1990), p. 103.

37 Glasgow Herald, 22 July 1988. 38 Glasgow Herald, 15 August 1988. 39 The Scotsman, 3 February 1988; The Times, 11 November 1988. 40 The Times, 22 October 1991; Roger Levy, Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads (Edinburgh:

Scottish Academic Press, 1990), p. 120. 41 The Scotsman, 11 March 1988; 20 September 1990. 42 Enston, 'Implementing the Unthinkable', pp. 103-4. The previous year the SNP conference

had rejected non-payment, though later in 1987 its executive committee called for a mass campaign of non-payment, adding without any apparent humour that to be successful such a campaign would have to be headed by the Labour party (The Scotsman, 12 October 1987; Glasgow Herald, 19 October 1987).

43 David McCrone, 'Opinion Polls in Scotland August 1988-July 1989', in Brown and Parry, eds, Scottish Government Yearbook 1990, p. 285.

44 The Scotsman, 20 September 1990.




1989 and 11 per cent in September. But by September 1990 it had risen again to 15 per cent.45 In April 1990 NOP found 11 per cent of respondents in Great Britain as a whole who said they would not pay.46 But not only is there disparity between support for non-payment and expressed personal intention of not paying, so also there is a disparity between actual non-payment and willingness to say that one will not oneself pay. The latter figure is the smaller.

The 'Stop It' campaign and the initial reluctance of Scottish local authorities to collect the new tax created a context in which public prominence had been given to strategic lethargy in introducing the register. The year before the tax became law, Coun- cillor Charles Gray, leader of Strathclyde Regional Council, said that his authority would not pursue poll tax non-payers who were elderly, sick, disabled or deprived and who could not afford to pay.47 A number of authorities had, to begin with, made public decisions either to delay drawing up the community charge register or not to collect the tax.48 This strategic lethargy, together with the straightforward advocacy of non-payment from both the SNP and individuals within the Labour party in Scotland, created a context within which non-payment could seem both feasible and justifiable.

THE LEGITIMACY OF THE POLL TAX IN SCOTLAND

A widely expressed argument against the poll tax in Scotland was that it was not legitimized by the choice of the Scottish people. This was a nationalist argument but not necessarily a Nationalist one. It was neither the monopoly of Nationalists nor by any means restricted to the SNP. It was, rather, the standard currency of democratic debate within Scotland. Attacking the bill in the Commons, Gordon Wilson of the SNP said it 'would never have seen the light of day if the parliamentary majority in Scotland had control of the legislation'. The bill had been 'pushed through on the basis of an English majority in the House of Commons'.49 In the same debate Donald Dewar attacked the bill for having no support across the range of Scottish public opinion.50 Launching the 'Stop It' campaign the following year, the Labour MP Brian Wilson spoke of the need to give 'the people of Scotland a platform' and claimed that 'enforce- ment of the Poll Tax would involve an authoritarian operation out of all proportion to the issue at stake'.5' For the Alliance, Robert Maclennan complained that the poll tax 'shifts power from Scottish local government to the Treasury'.52 The Labour party's Scottish affairs and Scottish local government spokesmen, John Home Robertson and John Maxton, issued a statement that compared the fate of poor Scots with the bounty which the tax would confer on the Queen: 'The royal estate will find a reduction of

45 The Scotsman, 12 December 1988, 20 September 1990; McCrone, 'Opinion Polls in Scotland August 1988-July 1989', p. 285.

46 NOP/JN 6432, 20-22nd April 1990. 47 Glasgow Herald, 28 November 1986. 48 Lothian Regional Council decided at the end of 1987 to delay the preparation of the register,

a decision commended by Henry McLeish Labour MP for Central Fife, who urged the council to take legal advice in order to discover what was the minimum they might legally do by way of administering the new tax (The Scotsman, 9 October 1987). Edinburgh and Glasgow District Councils decided, in the autumn of 1987, not to act as collecting agents for their respective regional councils (The Scotsman, 30 October 1987; Glasgow Herald, 5 November 1987).

49 The Independent, 14 May 1987. 50 The Guardian, 14 May 1987. 5 Evening Times, 20 October 1987. 52 The Scotsman, 28 November 1986.

1989 and 11 per cent in September. But by September 1990 it had risen again to 15 per cent.45 In April 1990 NOP found 11 per cent of respondents in Great Britain as a whole who said they would not pay.46 But not only is there disparity between support for non-payment and expressed personal intention of not paying, so also there is a disparity between actual non-payment and willingness to say that one will not oneself pay. The latter figure is the smaller.

The 'Stop It' campaign and the initial reluctance of Scottish local authorities to collect the new tax created a context in which public prominence had been given to strategic lethargy in introducing the register. The year before the tax became law, Coun- cillor Charles Gray, leader of Strathclyde Regional Council, said that his authority would not pursue poll tax non-payers who were elderly, sick, disabled or deprived and who could not afford to pay.47 A number of authorities had, to begin with, made public decisions either to delay drawing up the community charge register or not to collect the tax.48 This strategic lethargy, together with the straightforward advocacy of non-payment from both the SNP and individuals within the Labour party in Scotland, created a context within which non-payment could seem both feasible and justifiable.

THE LEGITIMACY OF THE POLL TAX IN SCOTLAND

A widely expressed argument against the poll tax in Scotland was that it was not legitimized by the choice of the Scottish people. This was a nationalist argument but not necessarily a Nationalist one. It was neither the monopoly of Nationalists nor by any means restricted to the SNP. It was, rather, the standard currency of democratic debate within Scotland. Attacking the bill in the Commons, Gordon Wilson of the SNP said it 'would never have seen the light of day if the parliamentary majority in Scotland had control of the legislation'. The bill had been 'pushed through on the basis of an English majority in the House of Commons'.49 In the same debate Donald Dewar attacked the bill for having no support across the range of Scottish public opinion.50 Launching the 'Stop It' campaign the following year, the Labour MP Brian Wilson spoke of the need to give 'the people of Scotland a platform' and claimed that 'enforce- ment of the Poll Tax would involve an authoritarian operation out of all proportion to the issue at stake'.5' For the Alliance, Robert Maclennan complained that the poll tax 'shifts power from Scottish local government to the Treasury'.52 The Labour party's Scottish affairs and Scottish local government spokesmen, John Home Robertson and John Maxton, issued a statement that compared the fate of poor Scots with the bounty which the tax would confer on the Queen: 'The royal estate will find a reduction of

45 The Scotsman, 12 December 1988, 20 September 1990; McCrone, 'Opinion Polls in Scotland August 1988-July 1989', p. 285.

46 NOP/JN 6432, 20-22nd April 1990. 47 Glasgow Herald, 28 November 1986. 48 Lothian Regional Council decided at the end of 1987 to delay the preparation of the register,

a decision commended by Henry McLeish Labour MP for Central Fife, who urged the council to take legal advice in order to discover what was the minimum they might legally do by way of administering the new tax (The Scotsman, 9 October 1987). Edinburgh and Glasgow District Councils decided, in the autumn of 1987, not to act as collecting agents for their respective regional councils (The Scotsman, 30 October 1987; Glasgow Herald, 5 November 1987).

49 The Independent, 14 May 1987. 50 The Guardian, 14 May 1987. 5 Evening Times, 20 October 1987. 52 The Scotsman, 28 November 1986.




nearly ?3,000 while a couple of pensioners living on State benefit in the same area of Grampian region will face an increase of between ?60 and ?100'.53

The president of the Scottish Convention of Local Authorities, Councillor Ken Fagan, called for the committee stages of the community charge legislation to be held in Edin- burgh.54 The Glasgow City Treasurer, Councillor Jean McFadden, complained of young Scots having to pay a novel tax that would not be imposed south of the border for another twelve months.5 In a joint statement in December 1987, Archbishop Winning of the Roman Catholic Church, the Reverend Maxwell Craig, Convenor of the Church of Scotland's Church and Nation Committee, and the Episcopalian Bishop Rawcliffe wrote that ignoring 'the wishes of the Scottish people on such a fundamental change can do nothing to maintain respect for the democratic values of which we are justly proud'.56 The most romantic use of the national legitimacy argument was left to Judith Gillespie of Citizens Against the Poll Tax, who suggested that if it came to warrant sales protestors should offer up to the sheriffs for auction copies of the Declaration of Arbroath.57

Scottish non-payment too, more so than English, has been characterized by the public, symbolic character of disobedience, a particularly important feature when prominent public figures resist the law. When role models for non-payment were provided by people such as the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, Mrs Eleanor McLaughlin, who carried her refusal to pay to the point where a legal order froze her bank account,58 non-payment by ordinary citizens could be encouraged and legitimized; 37 per cent of Scots voters approved of protest non-payment by 'prominent' individuals. The proportion of Labour and SNP voters who did so was higher: 48 per cent and 51 per cent respectively.59 On the other hand, this is an identical proportion of those polled to that which two and a half years earlier, before the introduction of the tax in Scotland, had said that they would support civil disobedience against it.0

Such principled resistance occurs where the argument against the tax has a dimension that is missing south of the border. To argue that a tax imposes burdens is, after all, simply to say something about the nature of taxation. Even to argue that the tax is regressive is not to distinguish the poll tax from most other forms of state income levying. But to argue that the tax is alien and undemocratic is another matter entirely. If Scotland is seen as a distinct political community, either by virtue of its history and culture, or by virtue of its geographical and economic relationship with the rest of the United Kingdom, or by virtue of its voting patterns at recent general elections, then the poll tax can be presented as one foisted on a small community by its larger neighbour, voted through by English MPs against both the general and the particular

53 Glasgow Herald, 29 January 1987. 54 Glasgow Herald, 16 December 1986. 55 The Scotsman, 3 June 1987. 56 The Scotsman, 15 December 1987. 57 Judith Gillespie, 'How to Beat the Poll Tax', The Scotsman, 23 November 1987. 58 Financial Times, 16 March 1990. 59 MORI, 23-4 April 1990. Comparison with England and Wales on this point is difficult.

Although questions about non-payment or support for non-payment were asked on a number of occasions in Scotland, only NOP asked such questions south of the border, and only once. In April 1990 4 per cent of respondents in England, Wales and Scotland said that they would 'probably not pay', 5 per cent that they would 'definitely not pay' (NOP/JN.6432 20-22 April 1990). Speculation on this point must remain open.

60 Midwinter, Keating and Mitchell, Politics and Public Policy in Scotland, p. 210.

nearly ?3,000 while a couple of pensioners living on State benefit in the same area of Grampian region will face an increase of between ?60 and ?100'.53

The president of the Scottish Convention of Local Authorities, Councillor Ken Fagan, called for the committee stages of the community charge legislation to be held in Edin- burgh.54 The Glasgow City Treasurer, Councillor Jean McFadden, complained of young Scots having to pay a novel tax that would not be imposed south of the border for another twelve months.5 In a joint statement in December 1987, Archbishop Winning of the Roman Catholic Church, the Reverend Maxwell Craig, Convenor of the Church of Scotland's Church and Nation Committee, and the Episcopalian Bishop Rawcliffe wrote that ignoring 'the wishes of the Scottish people on such a fundamental change can do nothing to maintain respect for the democratic values of which we are justly proud'.56 The most romantic use of the national legitimacy argument was left to Judith Gillespie of Citizens Against the Poll Tax, who suggested that if it came to warrant sales protestors should offer up to the sheriffs for auction copies of the Declaration of Arbroath.57

Scottish non-payment too, more so than English, has been characterized by the public, symbolic character of disobedience, a particularly important feature when prominent public figures resist the law. When role models for non-payment were provided by people such as the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, Mrs Eleanor McLaughlin, who carried her refusal to pay to the point where a legal order froze her bank account,58 non-payment by ordinary citizens could be encouraged and legitimized; 37 per cent of Scots voters approved of protest non-payment by 'prominent' individuals. The proportion of Labour and SNP voters who did so was higher: 48 per cent and 51 per cent respectively.59 On the other hand, this is an identical proportion of those polled to that which two and a half years earlier, before the introduction of the tax in Scotland, had said that they would support civil disobedience against it.0

Such principled resistance occurs where the argument against the tax has a dimension that is missing south of the border. To argue that a tax imposes burdens is, after all, simply to say something about the nature of taxation. Even to argue that the tax is regressive is not to distinguish the poll tax from most other forms of state income levying. But to argue that the tax is alien and undemocratic is another matter entirely. If Scotland is seen as a distinct political community, either by virtue of its history and culture, or by virtue of its geographical and economic relationship with the rest of the United Kingdom, or by virtue of its voting patterns at recent general elections, then the poll tax can be presented as one foisted on a small community by its larger neighbour, voted through by English MPs against both the general and the particular

53 Glasgow Herald, 29 January 1987. 54 Glasgow Herald, 16 December 1986. 55 The Scotsman, 3 June 1987. 56 The Scotsman, 15 December 1987. 57 Judith Gillespie, 'How to Beat the Poll Tax', The Scotsman, 23 November 1987. 58 Financial Times, 16 March 1990. 59 MORI, 23-4 April 1990. Comparison with England and Wales on this point is difficult.

Although questions about non-payment or support for non-payment were asked on a number of occasions in Scotland, only NOP asked such questions south of the border, and only once. In April 1990 4 per cent of respondents in England, Wales and Scotland said that they would 'probably not pay', 5 per cent that they would 'definitely not pay' (NOP/JN.6432 20-22 April 1990). Speculation on this point must remain open.

60 Midwinter, Keating and Mitchell, Politics and Public Policy in Scotland, p. 210.




wishes of the people of Scotland.61 As such, both the principle of nationality and the principle of democracy are affronted.

Constitutional arguments, which have been employed when principled non-payers have faced court proceedings, have not been legally effective, but the courts have provided a forum for the elaboration of further arguments against the legitimacy of the tax in particular and Conservative rule from England in general. In the case of Randolph Murray v. Edinburgh District Council before the Court of Session in Edinburgh in May 1990, appeal was made to the 1707 Treaty of Union as well as to the Data Protection Act and the European Convention of Human Rights. The tax, argued the appellant, conflicted with the provision of Article 18 of the Act of Union that no tax should be levied on one kingdom and not on the other, nor laws governing private right altered 'except for the evident utility of the subjects within Scotland'. The court declined to assess the legality of the community charge legislation by reference to the Act of Union, though Murray appears to have developed his argument on this point with some en- couragement from the Lord President, Lord Hope, whilst Lord Kirkwood spent some time commenting on the possible implications and interpretations of Article 18.62

It is not the immediate cost but the potential political consequences of principled refusal to pay the poll tax, or non-payment sustained by nationalist principle, that means that, for government, it presents a problem of a quite different order from normal tax evasion. The more people publicly justify their resistance to a particular measure, the more others are likely to follow their example or to assent in their law breaking or to regard the state's attempts to enforce the law as unfair or wrong.

LEGITIMACY AND THE EXPLANATION OF NON-PAYMENT

The challenge to the poll tax on grounds of its lack of legitimacy gives a unique dimension to the Scottish campaign against the tax. For some, the matter is clear cut. Non-payment in Scotland is 'the greatest popular rejection of unjust law since Chartist times; passive resistance by nearly a quarter of the population'.63 The relation between the legitimacy argument, other arguments against the tax, other reasons for not paying and non- payment itself is not however a simple one.64 The legitimacy argument is not a simple extension of a desire not to pay. Such an extension requires, at the very least, beliefs

6, Aggrieved Scots might have pointed further to the readiness of Conservative MPs to vote through for Scotland a form of income levying against which they increasingly rebelled when it came to be applied to England and Wales.

62 Opinion of the Lord President in causa Randolph Murray against Community Charges Regist- ration Officer for Lothian Region (Edinburgh: Court of Session, 1990); Opinion of Lord Kirkwood in causa Randolph Murray against Community Charges Registration Officer for Lothian Region (Edinburgh: Court of Session, 1990); Neal Ascherson, Independent on Sunday, 27 May 1990, p. 21. Whether or not such legal arguments were spurious is not the point. The facts of the Union of 1707 may be 'irrelevant to current Scottish politics. But the myth of the union is not.' (Miller, The End of British Politics?, p. 1.)

63 W. Hamish Fraser reviewing James D. Young, ed., Scotland at the Crossroads: A Socialist Answer, in Labour History Review, 56 (1991), p. 87.

64 It is not only attempts to relate non-payment of the poll tax to other factors that is set about with difficulties. The early confidence with which new right and rational choice analyses of local politics related rate-paying and non-rate-paying to voting for generous or parsimonious policies has been shown to rest on shaky foundations. See for example the arguments in Arthur Midwinter, 'The Politics of Local Fiscal Reform', Public Policy and Administration, 4 (1989), 2-9; Arthur Midwinter, 'Economic Theory, the Poll Tax, and Local Spending', Politics, 9 (1989), 9-15.

wishes of the people of Scotland.61 As such, both the principle of nationality and the principle of democracy are affronted.

Constitutional arguments, which have been employed when principled non-payers have faced court proceedings, have not been legally effective, but the courts have provided a forum for the elaboration of further arguments against the legitimacy of the tax in particular and Conservative rule from England in general. In the case of Randolph Murray v. Edinburgh District Council before the Court of Session in Edinburgh in May 1990, appeal was made to the 1707 Treaty of Union as well as to the Data Protection Act and the European Convention of Human Rights. The tax, argued the appellant, conflicted with the provision of Article 18 of the Act of Union that no tax should be levied on one kingdom and not on the other, nor laws governing private right altered 'except for the evident utility of the subjects within Scotland'. The court declined to assess the legality of the community charge legislation by reference to the Act of Union, though Murray appears to have developed his argument on this point with some en- couragement from the Lord President, Lord Hope, whilst Lord Kirkwood spent some time commenting on the possible implications and interpretations of Article 18.62

It is not the immediate cost but the potential political consequences of principled refusal to pay the poll tax, or non-payment sustained by nationalist principle, that means that, for government, it presents a problem of a quite different order from normal tax evasion. The more people publicly justify their resistance to a particular measure, the more others are likely to follow their example or to assent in their law breaking or to regard the state's attempts to enforce the law as unfair or wrong.

LEGITIMACY AND THE EXPLANATION OF NON-PAYMENT

The challenge to the poll tax on grounds of its lack of legitimacy gives a unique dimension to the Scottish campaign against the tax. For some, the matter is clear cut. Non-payment in Scotland is 'the greatest popular rejection of unjust law since Chartist times; passive resistance by nearly a quarter of the population'.63 The relation between the legitimacy argument, other arguments against the tax, other reasons for not paying and non- payment itself is not however a simple one.64 The legitimacy argument is not a simple extension of a desire not to pay. Such an extension requires, at the very least, beliefs

6, Aggrieved Scots might have pointed further to the readiness of Conservative MPs to vote through for Scotland a form of income levying against which they increasingly rebelled when it came to be applied to England and Wales.

62 Opinion of the Lord President in causa Randolph Murray against Community Charges Regist- ration Officer for Lothian Region (Edinburgh: Court of Session, 1990); Opinion of Lord Kirkwood in causa Randolph Murray against Community Charges Registration Officer for Lothian Region (Edinburgh: Court of Session, 1990); Neal Ascherson, Independent on Sunday, 27 May 1990, p. 21. Whether or not such legal arguments were spurious is not the point. The facts of the Union of 1707 may be 'irrelevant to current Scottish politics. But the myth of the union is not.' (Miller, The End of British Politics?, p. 1.)

63 W. Hamish Fraser reviewing James D. Young, ed., Scotland at the Crossroads: A Socialist Answer, in Labour History Review, 56 (1991), p. 87.

64 It is not only attempts to relate non-payment of the poll tax to other factors that is set about with difficulties. The early confidence with which new right and rational choice analyses of local politics related rate-paying and non-rate-paying to voting for generous or parsimonious policies has been shown to rest on shaky foundations. See for example the arguments in Arthur Midwinter, 'The Politics of Local Fiscal Reform', Public Policy and Administration, 4 (1989), 2-9; Arthur Midwinter, 'Economic Theory, the Poll Tax, and Local Spending', Politics, 9 (1989), 9-15.




about nationality that were not available in England (though they could have been in Wales). Nor is non-payment the simple result of a prior belief about legitimacy. But resistance is both strengthened by the legitimacy argument and given a dimension lacking south of the border. At the same time, rejection of the legitimacy of 'rule from England' is strengthened by objections to the poll tax. This makes figures on non- payment extremely difficult to interpret, a 'statistical quagmire'.65

A Convention of Scottish Local Authorities survey undertaken at the government's request showed that 70 per cent of those against whom warrants for non-payment had been taken out were either on income support or were qualified, by virtue of their low income, for a reduced level of charge.66 This, it has been suggested, shows that principled non-payment has been exaggerated.67 It, of course, shows nothing of the sort. The assumption underlying such an interpretation is that non-payment by the poor must be wholly accounted for by their poverty whilst those who can afford to pay do not do so only when they have principled objections. It assumes, more funda-

mentally, that there can be a separation of motives whereas non-payment, like any other form of resistance to government, will be guided by a complex of motives and attitudes. It is more plausible to argue that there is a symbiotic relationship between

poverty and principle and that 'economic' non-payment is sustained by nationalist senti- ments, just as nationalist sympathies were increased by the arrival of the tax.68 A survey conducted at the beginning of 1990 in Strathclyde suggests that principled objection to the poll tax did not vary with the poverty of the respondents or with their ability to pay.69

In the case of non-payment in England and Wales, insofar as there is an increase in non-payment associated with a reluctance to pay (increasing) charges whilst others

65 James Buxton, Financial Times, 29 March 1990, p. 10. The relationship between community charge collection rates, non-payment and socio-economic structure is not one investigated in this Note. Whilst the distribution of social classes in Scotland is similar to that in England and Wales, there is a higher proportion of low earners in Scotland than in England, and on indexes of deprivation Scotland scores much higher (Department of Employment, New Earnings Survey 1990 (London: HMSO, 1990) Part E, tables E108.1., E109.1, El 14.2; Vera Carstairs and Russell Morris, 'Depriva- tion: Explaining Differences in Mortality Between Scotland and England and Wales', British Medi- cal Journal, 29 (1989), 886-9). On the other hand some of this distinctiveness may disappear if the comparison is not between Scotland, and England and Wales, but between various regions of the United Kingdom, where what Miller has termed 'peripheral' distinctions emerge, and differences are associated with the distance from the (south-eastern) centre, rather than location north or south of the border (Miller, The End of British Politics?).

66 Steve Briggs and Derek Bateman, 'Middle class rebel over poll tax rise', Scotland on Sunday, 3 February 1991, p. 5; Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, Summary Warrants Now Top 3 Million, 16 December 1991.

67 Briggs and Bateman, 'Middle class rebel over poll tax rise'. 6X Whilst I have argued that there is a reciprocal relationship between opposition to the poll

tax and a defensive Scottish nationalism, I make no claims about measurable relationships between, for instance, support for the SNP and the introduction of the tax, or nationalism and non-payment, or any other potentially investigable quantifiable relationships. Not surprisingly, support for the community charge was almost negligible amongst SNP supporters, but so was it amongst supporters of the Labour party (MORI, 23-4 April 1990).

69 The author describes this factor in the decision whether or not to pay as the 'perceived legitimacy of the imposition of the community charge' - though this legitimacy failure seems to consist in the tax being regarded as 'unfair' (Angus Erskine, The Community Charge and Poverty. The Impact of the Community Charge on Low Income Households in Strathclyde (Glasgow: University of Glasgow Department of Social Administration and Social Work, 1990), pp. ii, 15, 20, 42).

about nationality that were not available in England (though they could have been in Wales). Nor is non-payment the simple result of a prior belief about legitimacy. But resistance is both strengthened by the legitimacy argument and given a dimension lacking south of the border. At the same time, rejection of the legitimacy of 'rule from England' is strengthened by objections to the poll tax. This makes figures on non- payment extremely difficult to interpret, a 'statistical quagmire'.65

A Convention of Scottish Local Authorities survey undertaken at the government's request showed that 70 per cent of those against whom warrants for non-payment had been taken out were either on income support or were qualified, by virtue of their low income, for a reduced level of charge.66 This, it has been suggested, shows that principled non-payment has been exaggerated.67 It, of course, shows nothing of the sort. The assumption underlying such an interpretation is that non-payment by the poor must be wholly accounted for by their poverty whilst those who can afford to pay do not do so only when they have principled objections. It assumes, more funda-

mentally, that there can be a separation of motives whereas non-payment, like any other form of resistance to government, will be guided by a complex of motives and attitudes. It is more plausible to argue that there is a symbiotic relationship between

poverty and principle and that 'economic' non-payment is sustained by nationalist senti- ments, just as nationalist sympathies were increased by the arrival of the tax.68 A survey conducted at the beginning of 1990 in Strathclyde suggests that principled objection to the poll tax did not vary with the poverty of the respondents or with their ability to pay.69

In the case of non-payment in England and Wales, insofar as there is an increase in non-payment associated with a reluctance to pay (increasing) charges whilst others

65 James Buxton, Financial Times, 29 March 1990, p. 10. The relationship between community charge collection rates, non-payment and socio-economic structure is not one investigated in this Note. Whilst the distribution of social classes in Scotland is similar to that in England and Wales, there is a higher proportion of low earners in Scotland than in England, and on indexes of deprivation Scotland scores much higher (Department of Employment, New Earnings Survey 1990 (London: HMSO, 1990) Part E, tables E108.1., E109.1, El 14.2; Vera Carstairs and Russell Morris, 'Depriva- tion: Explaining Differences in Mortality Between Scotland and England and Wales', British Medi- cal Journal, 29 (1989), 886-9). On the other hand some of this distinctiveness may disappear if the comparison is not between Scotland, and England and Wales, but between various regions of the United Kingdom, where what Miller has termed 'peripheral' distinctions emerge, and differences are associated with the distance from the (south-eastern) centre, rather than location north or south of the border (Miller, The End of British Politics?).

66 Steve Briggs and Derek Bateman, 'Middle class rebel over poll tax rise', Scotland on Sunday, 3 February 1991, p. 5; Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, Summary Warrants Now Top 3 Million, 16 December 1991.

67 Briggs and Bateman, 'Middle class rebel over poll tax rise'. 6X Whilst I have argued that there is a reciprocal relationship between opposition to the poll

tax and a defensive Scottish nationalism, I make no claims about measurable relationships between, for instance, support for the SNP and the introduction of the tax, or nationalism and non-payment, or any other potentially investigable quantifiable relationships. Not surprisingly, support for the community charge was almost negligible amongst SNP supporters, but so was it amongst supporters of the Labour party (MORI, 23-4 April 1990).

69 The author describes this factor in the decision whether or not to pay as the 'perceived legitimacy of the imposition of the community charge' - though this legitimacy failure seems to consist in the tax being regarded as 'unfair' (Angus Erskine, The Community Charge and Poverty. The Impact of the Community Charge on Low Income Households in Strathclyde (Glasgow: University of Glasgow Department of Social Administration and Social Work, 1990), pp. ii, 15, 20, 42).




are not doing so, a different explanation needs developing. There is clearly a heightened sense of the injustice of the tax if it is seen to be being levied less than universally and if its greater incidence on those who pay it arises in part from non-payment by others.7? There is also a sense in which, at this point, it becomes seen as a partly voluntary tax. Hence a question of legitimate domination does arise, but not because the state is seen as not governing legitimately but rather as not governing at all and hence having no legitimate claim on the new non-payer.

If all that can be done is to observe the denial of legitimacy when there is widespread resistance to government, is that denial simply an attendant phenomenon of no significance? And, in order to accord it significance, is it necessary to accord it causal status? Certainly that is not felt to be the case in areas such as voting studies, where it is usually thought sufficient to identify a regular correspondence between one feature and another. In the case of poll tax non-payment, that stills leaves many difficulties unresolved, since clearly housing tenure can explain Labour voting in a way that Labour voting cannot explain housing tenure, whereas non-payment and denial of legitimacy are on a more even footing with one another.

It could be argued that those who opposed the poll tax invoked or created nationalist arguments in order to justify what they wished and intended to do for quite other reasons. But there is no historical priority of the kind the proposed 'cynical' explanation suggests. The statement of the nationalist argument and resistance to payment accom- pany one another and are part of a single range of conduct. If such a deliberate use of the nationalist argument is suggested, moreover, this assumes that there was some point in so doing, that the nationalist argument was a special card, that it would work, that, in other words, the nationalist denial of legitimacy was something more than, and different from, simple complaint.

An alternative objection might be that both nationalism and legitimation are epi- phenomena. It is admitted that, for whatever reason, people appear to need to justify their relations with government. But that justification is a simple function of the extent of their opposition or compliance and in no way explains their defiance or compliance, which is attributable to altogether more rational calculations. The answer to such an objection is that in that case we would expect similar levels of payment and non-payment across the United Kingdom.

Explanations of the effectiveness of attempts to collect the poll tax will always be difficult and must for the moment be tentative. But, at a time when the usefulness of terms such as sovereignty is being called into question, the central importance of legitimacy needs once again to be recognized.

70 As was rather indiscreetly pointed out by the Scottish local government minister Allan Stewart: 'Many people are prepared to pay a rise for inflation but they bitterly resent paying for those who have paid nothing. I completely understand the resentment of those who don't want to pay [an increase due to high levels of non-payment]', Briggs and Bateman, 'Middle class rebel over poll tax rise'.

are not doing so, a different explanation needs developing. There is clearly a heightened sense of the injustice of the tax if it is seen to be being levied less than universally and if its greater incidence on those who pay it arises in part from non-payment by others.7? There is also a sense in which, at this point, it becomes seen as a partly voluntary tax. Hence a question of legitimate domination does arise, but not because the state is seen as not governing legitimately but rather as not governing at all and hence having no legitimate claim on the new non-payer.

If all that can be done is to observe the denial of legitimacy when there is widespread resistance to government, is that denial simply an attendant phenomenon of no significance? And, in order to accord it significance, is it necessary to accord it causal status? Certainly that is not felt to be the case in areas such as voting studies, where it is usually thought sufficient to identify a regular correspondence between one feature and another. In the case of poll tax non-payment, that stills leaves many difficulties unresolved, since clearly housing tenure can explain Labour voting in a way that Labour voting cannot explain housing tenure, whereas non-payment and denial of legitimacy are on a more even footing with one another.

It could be argued that those who opposed the poll tax invoked or created nationalist arguments in order to justify what they wished and intended to do for quite other reasons. But there is no historical priority of the kind the proposed 'cynical' explanation suggests. The statement of the nationalist argument and resistance to payment accom- pany one another and are part of a single range of conduct. If such a deliberate use of the nationalist argument is suggested, moreover, this assumes that there was some point in so doing, that the nationalist argument was a special card, that it would work, that, in other words, the nationalist denial of legitimacy was something more than, and different from, simple complaint.

An alternative objection might be that both nationalism and legitimation are epi- phenomena. It is admitted that, for whatever reason, people appear to need to justify their relations with government. But that justification is a simple function of the extent of their opposition or compliance and in no way explains their defiance or compliance, which is attributable to altogether more rational calculations. The answer to such an objection is that in that case we would expect similar levels of payment and non-payment across the United Kingdom.

Explanations of the effectiveness of attempts to collect the poll tax will always be difficult and must for the moment be tentative. But, at a time when the usefulness of terms such as sovereignty is being called into question, the central importance of legitimacy needs once again to be recognized.

70 As was rather indiscreetly pointed out by the Scottish local government minister Allan Stewart: 'Many people are prepared to pay a rise for inflation but they bitterly resent paying for those who have paid nothing. I completely understand the resentment of those who don't want to pay [an increase due to high levels of non-payment]', Briggs and Bateman, 'Middle class rebel over poll tax rise'.



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Legitimacy in the United Kingdom: Scotland and the Poll Tax

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