ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Concept

Administrative Law belongs to the field of public law. It embraces all the laws that regulate or control the administrative organization and operations of the government including the legislative and judicial branches. In general, it means that part of the law which governs the organization, functions, and procedures of administrative agencies of the government to which quasi legislative powers are delegated and quasi judicial powers are granted, and the extent manner to which such agencies are subject to control by the courts. (De Leon, 2013)

Scope

The administrative law embraces not only the law that governs administrative authorities, that is, the Constitution, statutes, and judicial decisions that construe and apply them as well as appropriate principles of justice and equity in particular cases but also the law made by the administrative authorities. (De Leon, 2013)

1. The Law which fixes the administrative organization and structure of the government.

2. The law, the execution or enforcement of which is entrusted to administrative authorities

3. The law which governs public officers including their competence (to act), rights, duties, liabilities, election etc.

4. The law which creates, administrative agencies, defines their powers and functions, prescribes their procedures.

5. The law which provides the remedies, administrative or judicial available to those aggrieved by the administrative or judicial decisions

6. The law which governs the judicial review of or relief against administrative actions or decisions

7. The rules, regulations, orders and decisions made by administrative authorities dealing with the interpretation and enforcement of the laws entrusted to their administration

8. The body of judicial decision and doctrines dealing with any of the above.

Administration defined.

In the institution sense, administration refers to the aggregate of individuals in whose hands the reins of government are for the time being. It refers to the “persons who actually run the government”. However, government is the agency or instrumentality through which the will of State is formulated, expressed and realized.

In the function sense, administration means the actual running of the government by the executive resources through the enforcement of laws and the implementation of policies.

Administrative Agency

It is a body endowed with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers for the purpose of enabling it to carry out laws entrusted to it for enforcement or execution.

Theoretically, the Administrative Agency is composed of persons who are, at the outset, or at least eventually, experts in the particular field of specialization under jurisdiction. They are “appointed by law and informed by experience”

Major Powers of Administrative Agencies

1. Quasi-legislative authority or rule- making power

· Legislative in nature, the rule making power of the administrative body is intended to enable it to implement the policy of the law and to provide for the more effective enforcement of its provisions. (Cruz, 2007)2. Quasi-judicial power or adjudicatory function

· This is the power the administrative agency to determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself. The administrative body exercises the quasi judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. (Cruz, 2007)

Sources of Administrative LawAdministrative law is derived from four sources or is of four (4) kinds: 1. Constitution or statutory enactments· a set of fundamental principles or established precedents according to which a state or other organization is governed; formal written enactment of a legislative authority that governs a state, city or country. Currently, the 1987 Constitution is in place. Specifically, provisions of the constitution in Articles VI (The Executive), VII (The Legislative), VIII (The Judiciary), X (The Local Government), XI (Accountability of Public Officers) pertain to the administrative organization of the government.– e.g. Social Security Act which established the Social Security Commission. 2. Decisions of courts interpreting the charters of administrative bodies · Court decisions regarding the interpretations embodied in the description of basic laws and principles of a particular administrative body. 3. Rules and regulations issued by the administrative bodies· e.g.Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. 4. Determinations and orders of the administrative bodies in the settlement of controversies

ELECTION LAW

Election is defined as the act of casting and receiving the ballots from the voters, counting the ballots, and making the returns thereon (Hontiveros v. Atlavas, 24 Phil. 632), it is also a choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote through the use of the

ballot, and the elected officials which are determined through the will of the electorate, the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign will of the people (Rulloda vs. Commission on Elections, 395 SCRA 535). Since election involves the whole process of nominating, selecting, voting, and processing the votes for candidates who will hold public office, election laws fall under administrative law. Election law, thus, are all laws related to the whole electoral process and remedies on electoral contests and violations. These laws cover the preparations leading to the election such as the registration of voters and filing of candidacy, limits on the manner of conducting electoral campaigns including limits on electoral contributions and expenditures, how the actual election should be conducted, the proclamation of winners in the election, and manners as to how to address electoral competitions and how to remedy electoral violations if they occur. (Hillary, 2004)

Previous Sources for Election Law are as follows:

1. Philippine Commission Act No. 1582, modified by Act Nos. 1669, 1709, 1926, and 1786. All of which were incorporated in the Administrative Code.2. Philippine Legislature Acts No. 2310, 3336, 3387.3. Commonwealth Act Nos. 233, 357 until June 21, 1947.4. Republic Act No. 180 (The Election Code) superseded all previous legislations.5. Republic Act No. 6388 superseded R.A. 180 in 1971.6. Presidential Decree No. 1296 (Election Code of 1978).

As of 1983, Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines) is the primary source for Election Law . Other sources which supplement the Omnibus Election Code include the following (Bellosillo et al., 2007):

1. Republic Acts amending the provisions of B.P. 811.

Some noteworthy revisions of are Republic Act Nos. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), 7166 (Synchronized Elections Law of 1991), 7941 (Party-List System Act of 1995), 8189 (Voter’s Registration Act of 1996), 8436 (Election Modernization Act of 1997), 9006 (Fair Elections Law of 2001), 9369 (Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)

2. The 1993 Commission on Elections Rules of Procedure. 3. The 2004 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. 4. The Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. 5. The 2005 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. 6. Recent Jurisprudence by the Supreme Court on elections.

RESEARCHED CASES Researcher: Dane Juriel Malate

Samalio vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 140079, March 31, 2005

FACTS:Weng Sai Qin, a Chinese with Uruguayan passport was taken to Augusto R. Samalio, an Intelligence Officer of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), because Juliet Pajarilla, an Immigration Officer, suspected that her passport was fake. Qin, sensing a demand for money in exchange for her passport, flashed $500 in front of Officer Samalio which the latter grabbed. Samalio returned Qin’s passport but without an immigration arrival stamp. Thereafter, Qin complained against Samalio.On February 4, 1993, the City Prosecutor’s Office of Pasay City, through its resolution No. 0-93-0224, recommended that Samalio be prosecuted for Robbery and Violation of Section 46 of the Immigration Law before the Sandiganbayan.In an Indorsement Communication dated February 9,1993, former NAIA General Manager Gen. Guillermo Cunanan enclosed a copy of the said resolution. Thereafter, BID Commissioner Zafiro L. Respicio issued Personnel Order No. 93-179-93 commencing an administrative case against Samalio for violation of CSMC No. 46 Rule 2 Section 1 and asking Samalio to submit his answer to the charges together with supporting statements and documents, and whether or not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory.

Samalio was preventively suspended for 90 days because the charge against him involves dishonesty, oppression and misconduct as stated in the same Personnel Order. Samalio then petitoned to lift his preventive suspension but was denied. In his Answer, Samalio denied the charges against him and elected a formal investigation if the same was not found to be satisfactory. His answer contained the affidavits of his witnesses namely Rodrigo Pedrealba, Dante Aquino, Florencio Austria and Winston Vitan. Given that his answer was found to be unsatisfactory, the case was set for formal hearing before the Board of Discipline of BID.On July 25, 1996, BID Acting Commissioner Ramon J. Liwag, issued the decision finding Officer Samalio guilty of the charges and was ordered dismissed from service. In the initial Indorsement dated August30, 1996, former Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr. confirmed the consequence of dismissal. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated June 2, 1997. Guingona’s decision was appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) but the CSC in its Resolution No. 974501 dated November 26, 1997, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decisions of Acting Comm. Liwag and Secretary Guingona. A subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the CSC. Samalio filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals but the latter dismissed it.ISSUE:Whether or not Samalio was not accorded due process.HELD:No. Officer Samalio was accorded due process. He was heard through the various pleadings he had filed and was likewise heard when in the submission of his answer. In addition, Administrative bodies are not bound by the technicalities of law and procedure, and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Rules of procedure are not strictly applied in and due process in its strict judicial sense is different from administrative due process. Thus, there was ample evidence which satisfied the burden of proof required in administrative proceedings — substantial evidence or that quantum of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion — to support the decision of the CSC.||| WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48723 dated May 24,

1999, affirming the decision and resolution of the Civil Service Commission is AFFIRMED Researcher: Dane Juriel Malate

Conte, et al vs. COAG.R. No. 116422, Nov 4, 1996

FACTS:Former employees of SSS namely, Avelina Conte and Leticia Boiser, availed of compulsory retirement benefits provided for in RA No. 660. They also claimed with the SSS “financialassistance” benefits as provided for under SSS Resolution No. 56,Series of 1971. The Court of Appeals rejected the subject SSS resolution in its previous ruling for the reason that the financial scheme provided for by the SSS will results to the increase of benefits beyond what is allowed under the existing retirement laws.Thereafter, the SSS sought Presidential authority, which the executive secretary replied to stating that the office of the President is not inclined to favor such request and to overrule the COA’s earlier ruling.Above mentioned petitioners sought reconsideration of COA’s ruling disallowing their claim, and also sought payment from the SSS as prescribed in Res. 56, both of which were denied by COA and SSS.ISSUE:Whether or not the benefits provided for in the Res. 56 is to be considered as simply a financial assistance or does such scheme constitute a supplementary retirement plan as stated by RA. 4968HELD:The Supreme Court ruled that Res. 56 constitute a supplementary retirement plan. Sec 28(b) of CA 186 as amended by RA. 4968, bars the creation of any insurance or retirement plan other than the GSIS for government officers and employees in order to prevent the undue and iniquitous proliferation of such plans. Hence, Resolution No. 56 is therefore invalid, void, and of no effect.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, there having been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission. The assailed Decision of public respondent is AFFIRMED, and SSS Resolution No. 56 is hereby declared

ILLEGAL, VOID AND OF NO EFFECT . The SSS is hereby urged to assist petitioners and facilitate their applications under RA 1616, and to advance to them, unless barred by existing regulations, the corresponding amounts representing the difference between the two benefits programs. No costs.||| Researcher: Precious Morante

Casimiro vs. TandogG.R. No. 146137, June 8, 2005

FACTS: The CSC Resolution affirmed the Decision of Municipal Mayor Filipino Tandog of San Jose, Romblon, finding Haydee Casimiro guilty of dishonesty and ordering her dismissal from the service. Haydee Casimiro was appointed as Municipal Assessor. However, during her office Administrative Officer II Nelson M. Andress submitted a report based on an investigation he conducted into alleged irregularities in the office of Casimiro. The report spoke of anomalous cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 0236 in the name of Teodulo Matillano and the issuance of a new one in the name of petitioner’s brother Ulysses Cawaling and Tax Declarations No. 0380 and No. 0376 in the name of Antipas Sebastian and the issuance of new ones in favor of petitioner’s bother-in-law Marcelo Molina. Upon knowing the said allegations in the office of petitioner Casimiro, Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order No. 13 dated 06 September 1996, placing the petitioner under preventive suspension for thirty (30) days. Three days later, Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order No. 15, directing petitioner to answer the charge irregularities in her office. Casimiro denied all the allegations against her claiming that the cancellation of the tax declaration in favor of her brother Ulysses Cawaling was done prior to her assumption to office as municipal assessor, and that she issued new tax declarations in favor of her brother-in-law Marcelo Molina by virtue of a deed of sale executed by Antipas San Sebastian in Molinas favor. On October 23, 1996, thru Memorandum Order No. 17, Mayor Tandog extended Casimiro’s preventive suspension for another thirty

days effective 24 October 1996 to give him more time to verify and collate evidence relative to the alleged irregularities. On October 28, 1996, respondent again issued Memorandum No. 18 directing the petitioner to answer in writing the affidavit-complaint of Naraida San Sebastian Cesar and Teodulo Matillano. In response to this, Casimiro submitted a letter stating that with respect to the complaint of Cesar, she had already explained her side in the letter dated 26 September 1996 and with Matillano, she claimed that it was a certain Lilia Barrientos who executed the deed absolute sale. Mayor Tandog was not satisfied with the answer of Casimiro and so he decided to create a fact-finding committee to investigate the matter. After series of meetings, the fact-finding committee submitted its report recommending petitioner’s separation from the service. Based on the said recommendation, respondent Mayor issued Administrative Order No. 1 dated 25 November 1996 dismissing petitioner on the ground of dishonesty and malperformance of duty as Municipal Assesor. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was denied of substantive due process. HELD: “ WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 31 May 2000 and its subsequent Resolution hereby AFFIRMED. With costs.” The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. To be heard does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following:

1. The right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights;2. A real opportunity to be heard personally or with assistance of a counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights;3. A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality;4. A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. In the case at bar, what appears in the record is that a hearing was

conducted on 01 October 1996, which petitioner attended and where she answered questions propounded by the members of the fact-finding committee. Records further show that the petitioner was accorded every opportunity to present her side. She filed her answer to the formal charge against her. After a careful evaluation of evidence adduced, the committee rendered a decision, which was affirmed by the CSC and the Court of Appeals. The said decision is now affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Researcher: Precious Morante

Evangelista vs. JarencioG.R. No. L-29274, November 27, 1975

FACTS: This case as on orginal action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injuction, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of Justice Jarencio dated July 1, 1968 in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled “Fernando Manalastas vs. Secretary Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc.”, which reads as follows: IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P 5, 000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner (private respondent) be issued restraining the respondents (petitioners), their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing of subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner (private respondent) and from instituting contempt proceedings against the

petitioner (private respondent) under Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities: a. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the Philippines.b. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth …c. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency. For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation. Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein." Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an

Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed its legality. ISSUE:Whether or not the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations. HELD: “WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1, 1968, is hereby set aside and declared of no force and effect. Without pronouncement as to costs.” The Supreme Court held that: “We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation” with the authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." 12 Such subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart

from the established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.” Researcher: Roni May L. Samarita

Smart Communication, Inc. et.al. vs. National Telecommunication Commission (NTC)

GR No. 151908, August 12, 2003

Quasi- Legislative & Quasi- Judicial Powers; Rule on Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; When Applicable FACTS: The NTC issued Billing Circular 13-6-2000 which promulgated rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services.1. Provide a grace period for subscribers when their billing statements are not received within the 30 day period of each billing cycle and during said grace period they are prohibited from disconnecting service2. Not charge for calls diverted to voice mailbox or similar facility3. Verify the identification and address of each purchaser of a prepaid SIM card which will be valid for 2 years4. Update subscribers of the remaining value of their cards before the start of every call5. Reduce the unit of billing from 1 minute per pulse to 6 seconds per pulse On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. This was followed by another Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 addressed to all public telecommunications entities, which reads: Ø This is to remind you that the validity of all prepaid cards sold on 07 October 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least two (2) years from date of first use pursuant to MC 13-6-2000.

Ø In addition, all CMTS operators are reminded that all SIM packs used by subscribers of prepaid cards sold on 07 October 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least two (2) years from date of first use. Also, the billing unit shall be on a six (6) seconds pulse effective 07 October 2000. Petitioners filed with the RTC a petition to declare the Circular as unconstitutional since NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as prepaid cards, such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines. That the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void. A motion to dismiss was filed by the NTC on the ground of petitioner’s to exhaust administrative remedies. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss but on certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed RTC. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the NTC has jurisdiction and not the regular courts over the case(2) Whether the Billing Circular issued by NTC is unconstitutional and contrary to law and public policy. HELD:Petitions are GRANTED.Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. The NTC circular was issued pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule making power. Hence, the action must be filed directly with the regular courts without requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. However, where what is assailed is the

validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES- requires that where a remedy within an administrative agency is provided by law, or available against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, and can still be resorted to by giving the said agency every opportunity to decide correctly a given matter that comes within its jurisdiction, relief must first sought by availing this remedy before bringing an action in or elevating it to the courts of justice for review. (De Leon, 2013)DOCTRINE ON PRIMARY JURISDICTION- may also be referred to Exclusive Administrative Jurisdiction or Preliminary resort. It usually refers to cases involving specialized disputes which are referred to an administrative agency of special competence to resolve the same, It applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. This is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain or not from exercising its jurisdiction over a matter or question even if it may well be within its proper jurisdiction where relief may be obtained in an administrative proceeding. (De Leon, 2013) The NTC as a regulatory agency of the national government with jurisdiction over all telecommunication entities is clothed with authority and given ample discretion to grant a provisional permit or authority. The issuance of the provisional permits or authority on the basis of its determination on the applicants’ compliance with the requirements it has promulgated would be an exercise of its quasi-legislative power. If, however, an issue arises from said determination, opposes its application on the basis of the very rules promulgated by the administrative agency is called upon to resolve said contest, such resolution would partake of the nature of an exercise of its quasi-judicial power. (Cruz, 2007) Researcher: Roni May L. Samarita

Eastern Shipping Lines vs Court of Appeals and Davao Pilots Association

GR No. 116356, June 29, 1998 Following the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Laws, because the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) circulars are inconsistent with EO 1088, they are void and ineffective. “Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution”

FACTS: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXECUTIVE ORDER 1088; VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL ACCORDING TO THE RULINGS OF THE COURT. The Davao Pilots Association filed a complaint for the sum of money against Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. The case was about 2 years of unpaid pilotage fees. The Lower court ruled in favor of the respondent. Eastern Shipping Lines disputed the claims against them, they insists on paying pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars instead of EO 1088 because the pilotage fees under PPA is lower than that of EO 1088.Petitioner contends that EO 1088 is unconstitutional, because (1) its interpretation and application are left to private respondent, a private person, and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of powers. Petitioner insists that it should pay pilotage fees in accordance with and on the basis of the memorandum circulars issued by the PPA, the administrative body vested under PD 857 with the power to regulate and prescribe pilotage fees. In assailing the constitutionality of EO 1088, the petitioner repeatedly asks: "Is the private respondent vested with power to interpret Executive Order No. 1088?" . Eastern Shipping Lines argues for the application of PPA Circular instead of being guided by EO 1088 because the pilotage fees prescribed under the former is lower than the latter. ISSUE: Whether EO 1088 is unconstitutional? HELD:

The petition is unmeritorious. EO 1088 is valid. According to the Supreme Court: "It is not an answer to say that E.O. No. 1088 should not be considered a statute because that would imply the withdrawal of power from the PPA. What determines whether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its form but its nature. Here as we have already said, the power to fix the rates of charges for services, including pilotage service, has always been regarded as legislative in character” It is worthy to note that E.O. NO. 1088 provides for adjusted pilotage service rates without withdrawing the power of the PPA to impose, prescribe, increase or decrease rates, charges or fees. The reason is because E.O. No. 1088 is not meant simply to fix new pilotage rates. Its legislative purpose is the "rationalization of pilotage service charges, through the imposition of uniform and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports. We conclude that E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty bound to comply with its provisions. The PPA may increase the rates but it may not decrease them below those mandated by E.O. No. 1088." PPA circulars are inconsistent with EO 1088, they were void and ineffective. “Administrative or Executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to laws or the Constitution.” It is axiomatic that an administrative agency, like the PPA, has no discretion whether to implement the law or not. Its duty is to enforce it. Unarguably, therefore , if there is any conflict between PPA circular and a law, such as EO 1088, the latter prevails. Researcher: Jerome Napoleon Gonzales

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs. Commission on Elections

(COMELEC)G.R. No. 179271

FACTS:The May 14, 2007 national elections included elections for party-list representatives. BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution to the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) on June 27, 2002. On July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections

ISSUES:(1) Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?(2) Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?(3) Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?(4) How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?(5) Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections? HELD: Researcher: Jerome Napoleon Gonzales

Atong Paglaum, et al. vs. Comission on Elections (COMELEC)G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013

FACTS:From November 23, 2012 to December 5, 2012, The Comission on Elections disqualified 8 groups; Alagad ng Sining (ASIN), Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (Manila Teachers), Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH), 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party (1AAAP), Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN), Inc., Ako An Bisaya (AAB), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI), and Alliance of Organizations, Networks and Associations of the Philippines, Inc.(ALONA), which manifested their intent to participate in the May 13, 2013 elections.From November 7 to December 5 of the same year, respondent further disqualified 4 groups via the COMELEC En Banc’s automatic review of the COMELEC Division’s resolutions approving registration of groups or organizations; Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM), Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN), Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider, Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc. (GUARDJAN), and Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP) via the COMELEC En Banc’s review on motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC Division’s resolutions denying registration of groups and organizations. Also on December 5, 2012, COMELEC denied Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) participation in

the May 13, 2013 as a party-list. These groups were not able to secure an injunction, thus their names were excluded from the official ballots.In scheduled summary evidentiary hearings, COMELEC issued resolutions from October 10, 2012 to December 4 of the same year disqualifying 39 other groups from participating in the same elections; AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB), Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum), Association for Righteousness Advocacy on Leadership (ARAL), Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC), United Movement Against Drugs Foundation (UNIMAD), 1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (1BRO-PGBI), 1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc. (1GANAP/GUARDIANS), Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List), 1st Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc. (1-CARE), Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT), Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc. (ARARO), Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng Pilipinas Movement (AGRI), Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa (AKMA-PTM), Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong Magsasaka (KAP), Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran (AKO-BAHAY), The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc. (BANTAY), Pilipino Association for Country–Urban Poor Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW), Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG MASDA), Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala, Inc. (KAKUSA), Ang Galing Pinoy (AG), Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD), Green Force for the Environment Sons and Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE), Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K), Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM), Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement for National Progress (AAMA), Social Movement for Active Reform and Transparency (SMART). Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP), Bayani Party List (BAYANI), Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI), Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance, Inc. (A-IPRA), Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG LINGKOD), Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamers, Inc. (ABROAD), Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga Magsasaka (BINHI), Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL), 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS), 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK), and Coalition of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (SENIOR

CITIZENS). However, these groups were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Supreme Court, therefore the names of the 39 organizations were included in the official ballots.COMELEC based its ground for the disqualification for the 52 organizations on their compliance with the requirements set by Republic Act No. 7491 also known as the Party-List System Act and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency vs. COMELEC. ISSUE: (6) Whether or not the Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the upcoming elections, and;(7) whether or not the criteria for party-list qualifications held in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT vs. COMELEC should be applied by the said commission in the upcoming elections. HELD:The Commission did not commit grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the 52 organizations from participating in the upcoming elections. However, all petitions were remanded to the Commission for it to decide on the qualifications of the organizations using the new parameters which the Court created in this decision. It is clear that in the party-list structure as ordained in Art. VI Section 5(1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution is not merely for sectoral parties but also for non-sectoral parties. In order to harmonize the phrase “marginalized and under-represented” in the Party-List System Act with the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, the Court interpreted the phrase to include both in economic and ideological status. In line with this, the Court enumerated the following new parameters; 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in

legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bellosillo, Josue N., Marquez, Jose Midas P., and Mapili, Emmanuel L.J., Omnibus Election Code with Rules of Procedure and Jurisprudence in Election Law. Quezon City: Central Book Supply, Inc., 2007. Cruz, Carlo L. , Philippine Administrative Law . Sixth Edition. Quezon City: Central Book Supply, Inc., 2007. De Leon, Hector S., and De Leon, Hector M. Jr., Administrative Law: Text and Cases. Seventh Edition. Manila: Rex Book Store, 2013.

De Leon, Hector S., and De Leon, Hector M. Jr., The Law on Public

Officers and Election Law. Eighth Edition. Manila: Rex Book Store, 2013.

Hillary, Florin T., A Handbook on Election Law. Quezon City: U.P. Information and Publication Division, 2004. CDASIA ONLINE, cdasiaonline.com