Leibniz Greatest Discovery

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Leibniz's Greatest DiscoveryAuthor(s): Charles HartshorneSource: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 7, No. 4, Leibniz Tercentenary Issue (Oct., 1946),pp. 411-421Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2707032

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LEIBNIZ'S GREATEST DISCOVERYBY CHARLES HARTSHORNE

Philosophical discoveries may be positive or negative. ThusPlato made a positive discovery when he characterized the soulas the self-moving, hat is, the ultimate principle of change fromwhich all change and motion must somehow derive (Laws, X);and Hume made a negativediscoverywhen he pointedout that ourobservation of the externalworld yields no impressionof causalconnection or power. Hume claimed to have made the furthernegative discovery that observation of the streamof experiencesas such-feelings, thoughts,and desires-is similarly barren ofthe impression in question, and this, if correct,would disprovePlato's positive statement,ust as Hume's denial of power in theexternal world as observed tends to confirm lato by indicatingthatthere s no principleof motion n mere "matter" as such. Ishall assume, without much discussion, the validity of White-head's criticism of Hume's negation of psychic power. What Iwish to set forth s Leibniz's discovery of how to make Plato'spoint incomparablymore fruitfuland convincingthan it wouldotherwisebe.Leibniz, of course, professed to affirm ather than deny, andif he made any negative discoveries it was in spite of himself.Thus his deductionsfrom the principle of sufficienteason, mak-ingityieldsuch consequences as that this world s thebestpossible,or that the will is infallibly nclinedyetwith a purelymoral ratherthan metaphysical necessity, amount, many would think,to areductio ad absutrdum f "sufficient eason," as understood.But Leibniz made at least one superlative positive discoveryof whichhe was fully conscious. This is his discovery that theelement of truth n atomisticmaterialismis not only compatiblewith the truth of Plato's spiritual dynamics,but that the twotruthsmay be fused so as to strengthenboth. This discoverymight, vaguely, be called that of spiritual atomism. But thephrase puts theemphasis in the wrong place. "Psychical micro-cosmicpluralism" is a more accuratedesignation. For the elementof truediscovery n ancientatomism was not the idea of an abso-lutely simple, indestructiblelittle being (this was rather theelementof fantasy) but was ratherthis: observed bodies as such

411


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412 CHARLES HARTSHORNEare a sort of composite perceptual photograph of numerous con-stituent ntitiesnot a single one of which is ever observed as adistinct ndividual,since it is in every case too "small," too slighta factor n our environment o register by itselfupon our percep-tual experience. Thus macroscopicbehavior is merelya confusedrecord of microscopic behavior; the microscopic world, thoughinferred fromthe macroscopic,neverthelessmust be viewed asits explanation-rather than conversely. The ground of ourknowledge s here precisely notthe ground of being. If this seemsa paradox, we should rememberthat some non-human type ofknowledgemight be able to have direct and distinctawareness ofatoms (or electrons); and such a knowledge might be merelyamused that we human beings imagined that the signs by whichwe knowthingsare their basic characters and movingforces-asthough,because we know physics chiefly hroughbooks and con-versation,wewere to suppose thatthe physicalworld s essentiallybookish and loquacious.However, there s one aspect of genuine paradox in atomism assometimes conceived. If the microscopic is inferred from themacroscopic, then the categories by which we describe it musthave illustration n the macroscopicdata fromwhich t is inferred.For without llustration n principle, concepts have no meaning.The "in principle" is important, or it means thatthe illustrationmaybe widely different romthat to whichtheconcept s applied.If I experience two pains, one more "intense" than the other,cannotI then mean somethingby "a pain more intense than anyI ever felt?" Similarly, f I know thatbodies visible in some cir-cumstances re invisible n others, nd ifI see one bodyto be muchsmaller than another, t seems I may have some grasp of what itwould be for a bodyto be "smaller than any I can see." So far,atomism nvolvesno paradox.But paradox may arise when we tryto make a complete listofcategorieswhichapply both to our experienceand to thatwhichis inferredfrom it. Observed bodies are all capable of beingbrokenup; can the unobservedbe unbreakable? What observedcharacter would -explain this? Leibniz has some splendidexamples. If a solidbody s one entity ecause itsparts touch, henso is a pile of sand.1 On the otherhand, f the"solidity" is thought' See the last fewparagraphs of the seventeenthetter n the correspondencewithArnauld. This letter omes close to summing p theimportant oints n the"discovery."


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LEIBNIZ S GREATEST DISCOVERY 413to be shownbythe difficultyf tearingthe thingto pieces, thenwemust remember hat a chain of metal links may be just as hardto pull to pieces, and yet it is a pluralityof links (whichmay noteven toucheach other),not a single entity. How can we have anyconceptionof a thing iterally ust "one," and strictly ncapableof disintegration Nothingphysicallyobserved offers he slight-esthelphere. If (to givemyownexamples, n thespiritof Leibniz)a mountain s, in a sense,one thing,whynot the whole earth? Onthe other hand, if the earth is manythings,whynot a mountain?And if the mountain,whynot a crumb? And indeed,whynot an"atom," if this be somethingextended in space? And if it benot extended,thenwhat analogy does it have to anythingwe ob-serve? But if there is no analogy, what meaning does the ideahave for us? Part of Leibniz's great "discovery," then, is hisacute perceptionof the total lack of illustration n experienceofcertain atomisticcategories,or alleged categories.Anotheraspect of this same lack is in the idea that while inexperiencethere re colorqualities,and other secondary" charac-teristics, in reality there are only atoms and the void," thesoundless, colorless, odorless causes of our sensations of quality.The atoms have size and shape, yet we never observe, it seems,a size or shape, save as theoutlineof some quality,somevisual ortactual, or otherallegedly secondarycharacter. And apart fromsuch character, spatial ideas are mere relational patterns-relat-ing what?We see thenthatatomism nvolvestwonegativecharacters par-adoxically related to experience,the character of absolute inde-structibility,nd thatof "relation withoutquality." No less par-adoxical are thepositivecharactersassigned to atoms. Theymoveincessantly; yet nothing n thenotionof "bits of stuff ccupyingspace" suggestsany impossibilityn a completeabsence ofchangeor motion. (Concerning the modern view of space-timeI shallsay a word ater.) The motions re approximately rderly; yettheimpliedpartialityof stuff ororder s based onno insightderivablefromvisual or tactual images of what "stuff" mightmean. Inmodernscience,at least, everyatom takes account,as it were, ofthepositions of everyother; yetwe certainlyneithersee nor feelby touchany characterof thingsthatwould make positivelycon-ceivable sucha universalrelationshipofinterdependence. In sum,atomism s requiredtoexplain thebehavior,especiallythechemical


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414 CHARLES HARTSHORNEbehavior,of visual or tactual objects, but the concepts employedby atomism seem sheer riddles or paradoxes when interpretedthroughvisual or tactual experiencesalone. (Cf. Hume's discus-sion of physical causality, a discussion whichmade more explicitwhatLeibniz had already seen.)We are now ready to consider the solutionwhichLeibniz dis-covered for this problem. He reasoned substantiallyas follows.The principlethat illustrationmust be foundforall conceptsdoesnot mean that the illustrationmust come fromthose aspects ofexperience fromwhichwe infer the detailed facts to which theconceptsare to be applied. (I can understand"he had on a bluesuit" in a book even thoughthe color blue does not appear in thebook, provided I have blue sensation in some other aspect of myexperiencethan thevisual percepts of thebook; and I can under-stand the word "pain" even though no pain could very well beprintedon the page. Similarly,a visual percept can, through n-ference,yield the idea of certain individual realities, atoms, in acertain pattern,even thoughvision does not tell me what it is tobe an individual.) Afterall, I inferthe atoms to explain (or pre-dict),not todescribe, he (momentary)visual percepts; and thoughI cannot infer an explanation for which I have not illustrativefoundationsomewhere n myexperience,there is not the slightestreason for requiringthat this foundationbe in direct visual ex-perience,or even tactual. (Present knowledgeof past vision isnot vision, but memory.) Once it is admittedthat vision is uni-versallya highlyblurred,or as Leibniz said, confused,reportuponmasses of invisible entities, t becomes illogical to look to visionfor illustrationofwhat is meantby individual entity And touchis in the same case. It was the great oversightof materialisticatomists thattheydid not see this,but characterizedthe atoms assmaller editions of visible objects-except for the arbitrary sub-tractionofall non-structural ropertiesand thearbitrarydenial ofcomposition nd dissolubility. Leibniz is thefirstman to see withnoondayclearnesswhatthe problemhere is, and to take thelogicalstepfordealingwith t. The problem s, obviously, hatoffindingillustrationfor microscopiccategories in macroscopic experiencesother than the visual and tactual. For these latter,according toatomism,are always the perceptions of masses as such. Henceno illustrationcould be found in themof "individual as such."Could any logical pointbe much clearer?


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LEIBNIZ 'S GREATEST DISCOVERY 415Where then s illustrationto be found? Surely not in smell ortaste,fortheyare blurred,unindividuating ensations, f any suchthere be. We mustforgetabout the fivesenses altogetherat thispoint, and look to some experiencewhich exhibits as one entitysomething hatwe have no reason to doubtreally is one entity. Isnot the self (at least at a given moment-though the importanceof this restriction scaped Leibniz) one entity,fwe know of any?Its unity is directlyfelt fromwithin,not seen in a blur fromadistance. By analogy we have the idea of the unityof otherper-sons, of animals, and more vaguely, as a dubious possibility,ofplants. Vision, it is true,tells us where in space such inwardlyindividual entitiesprobably are; but it is not vision that directlypresents theirindividuality. It is our own self-feeling hat pro-vides thenecessary illustrationfor the analogical apperceptionoforganicunityelsewhere. The observedphysiologicalor behavior-istic unityof others is merelya sign to us of the location of aninstance of the categoryof individual reality. A machine couldindefinitelypproximatetheobservable unity,butyetlack entirelyreal individuality. And apart fromthat possibility,masses arestillmasses, however theirmembersmay skip about accordingtoa pattern.Leibniz's great step is now apparent. In order to findthemeaning of individualityas such, thereforeof individualityonevery level, includingthe microscopic,he turnedto those experi-ences inwhichthere s botha vivid impressionof individualrealityand no indirectevidenceto suggestthat this impression s invalid.Evidence does indeed indicate thatmybody is a mass, not an in-dividual. Butmy"self'"is bythatveryfact shownnot tobe simplyidentical with my body. Obviously no evidence can show thatI simply am my cells or my atoms. As Leibniz said, the mostdistinctperception onceivableof thephysicalstructure fmybodywould onlymake more apparent that it is as littlemy experience,withits self-unity,s a factory s a mind. That I "depend" in-timatelyupon mybody is not to the point,for so does the bodydependupon certainfactors n the environment, ithoutthereforebeing simply denticalwiththe latter. The analogy is significant."Environment" is that set of activitieswithwhich the activitiesofthegiven ndividualare mostcloselycorrelated. My individualself-activity,myflowof thought nd feelingand purposes, is mostcloselycorrelatedwith activitiesof theparts of thebody. So it is


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416 CHARLES HARTSHORNEnot far-fetched o say that the body is merelythe primary environ-ment of the mind,and what is usually called "the environment"is (in relation to the self) the environment f the environment,the second envelope, so to speak, of correlated activities, corre-lated at one remove. Thus Leibniz generalizes,with a powerfulsweep, the notion of correlation (he calls it pre-establishedhar-mony) to explain together he mind-body nd the body-world ela-tions. A body-minds a systemof individualswhose activities arecorrelatedwith those of one "dominant" member of the systemwhich s the soul or mindof thatbody. Thus a soul is not an in-dividual made of a different tuff rom other individuals,but anindividual with a privileged status in relation to a group of in-dividuals. This status does involve a qualitative difference, utnot that between "mind" and "matter" (since this could onlymean,betweenan individualand a mass) but ratherbetweenhigh-grade and low-grademind,betweenfeelings lluminated y memory,foresight, nd comparison, nd feelingsnot so illuminated.The venerable distinctionbetweenorganic and inorganic mat-ter yields easily to Leibnizian analysis. A systemof correlatedindividuals may be correlated,as it were, democratically,withoutthe pervasive influence f any one superior or dominant member.Then we have a body, a mass, without a soul. Or there may besuch a dominantmember. Then we have a besouled organism.The signofthe atter s a high degreeofconvergence f diversifiedactivities, highdegreeof"organic unity" of observable behaviorand structure. But between the extreme cases of obvious con-vergenceand obvious lack of it-a man and a pile of sand-thereare intermediateones, themoderately organic systems,wherewecan only guess as to thepresenceor absence of a ruling ndividual.Such a system s found,forexample,in a tree. Here Leibniz wasadmirably cautious. He did not pretend to know (this being aquestion of fact, not of metaphysical necessity) if plants aresentient,besouled, organic systems,or not. He only maintainedthaton somelevel (or even, accordingtohim,on an infinite egressof levels) theremust, n theplant system,be a genuine ndividualor individuals,analogous to the onlydatum on whichwe can basean idea of individuality,our self-feeling. The analogy may beremote,but itmust be genuine.Of course, in one sense there is no system whollywithout adominant member, n whatever sense God is a memberof every


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LEIBNIZ S GREATEST DISCOVERY 417system, s its supremeruler. But God is not a member ocalizedin one system rather than another; so at most he could be the soulof systems only as the soul of the cosmic system. And even thisLeibniz does not dare affirm,o radical a break would it threatenwiththeologicaltradition.I shall not undertake to point out all the respects in whichLeibniz failed to keeptheforegoing discovery" unentangledwitherrors, partly old and partly original with him. I fear such en-tanglementswere extensive. They had the result that the dis-covery tselfbecame almost invisible as such to most ofthelearnedworld,concealed by the accompanyingand more sensational, butin logic irrelevant, absurdities, such as the idea that there is aninfinite egress of organism within organism, or that no soul iscreated save at the beginningof the world. These do not in theleast followfrom the mere idea of psychic microscopic pluralism.One of the extravagances of Leibniz was his attemptto pre-serve for his monads the absolute indestructibilityttributedtoatoms. If visual experiencediscloses no illustration f sucha prop-erty,neitherdoes self-feeling-save in one sense only. We can,by analogical extension of the continuity f personalitythroughmemory nd purpose, conceivean ideally persistent and powerful,and therefore ndestructible, elf, .e., God, the sole completely n-destructible r all-persistentndividual. Apart fromGod, there sno theoreticalneed for such absolute persistence. The need is forreal individuals now. Thus it cannot be that a pile of sand issimply groupofmoleculesand these simplygroups of atoms andthese simply groups of particles, and these-? Somethingmustbe grouped besides just groups! Self-feeling s the only illustra-tive basis in our experiencefor a solution to this problem. Butthere s no necessity hat the unitsgroupedhave always been thereand always will be. Onlythesubject-predicateview of substance,2whichmakes creation of new units or the death of old a logicalriddle (forof whatsubjectcan thecomingto be or passing away ofa subject be a predicate?) explains Leibniz's denial of "natural"beginningor termination f monads.Particularly unfortunate was it that Leibniz was unable tocarry throughhis greatdoctrineoftherelativity fspace and time.Let us briefly onsiderwhy.

2 Cf. Whitehead,Part III of Adventuresof Ideas; or Process and Reality,passim.


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418 CHARLES HARTSHORNEIt will be recalled that the illustrativeproblem involved thequestions of quality as requisite to structure, nd of indivisibleunits as requisite to extended masses. The formerquestion iseasily dealt withby Leibniz, since of course feelingor perceptionalways has its quality,and thus every monad is internally harac-terized. The only difficultys to determine in what sense themonads admit of the spatial relations essential to extension. Ex-tendedmatter s we observe t is a mass of individuals; it is groupsthat extendover a visible area. Given locationfor the members,thegroups will have size and shape, in terms of the distances anddirections n whichthe members ie in relation to each other. Itmay, however,be thoughtthat this does not evade the dilemmawe pointed out for atoms, that either the monads individuallyoccupyspace or theyare merepoints,and if the former heymustbe groups ofindividuals afterall,whileif thelatter,theyare meregeometrical bstractions. This was Kant's argument nhis secondantinomy. But it is not unanswerable. For it is not geometricalextension alone that forced science to suppose that macroscopicbodies are groups. It was theinabilityto predictbehavior on anyotherbasis. Extension, to be sure, makes it always conceivablethatwhat seems a single continuousentity s really a number ofentitieswith ndividual outlines and gaps blurredtogether n ourperceptions;but extension lone perhaps does not makethisneces-sarilya fact. What does make it a patentfactis that behaviorfitsinto a patternonlyon themicropluralistic nterpretation. More-over, physical observation discloses no principle of dynamicalunity by whichwe can express, not only the fact that a certainbody is here now,but the fact that it will be over therelater on.Motion,as observed, s not inherent n the quality or shape thata thing s observedto have at a givenmoment, ut is a sheer addi-tionto them. Onlyin the flow f experiences s therean observedrelationofpresentto past and future. This relationLeibniz callsappetition. It is desire, and (where thought ntervenes) purpose,that point to the future, nd the reverse reading of this pointinggives us the past as immanent n the present. A lump of matteris indifferento where it goes, or has come from,so far as anyvisual or tactual image of matterwe can form s concerned. Nor,Leibniz urges,can theCartesiansmeetthedifficultyyarguingthatmotion s itselfgiven in the present as an indestructible uantityinherent n themovingthingas such. For one thing, he true law


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LEIBNIZ 'S GREATEST DISCOVERY 419of motion s not thatthe amount of motion s constant,since it isthe square ofmotionthat yields a law, and this square of motionis not just the moti-ontselfas observedor as now actual. It is asthoughthe thing could mentallymultiplyand thenbe guided bythe result of this operation. It has a dynamicalyet orderlydes-tinyin addition to its present state, if that state is conceived inimages drawn from vision. But if psychic conceptions are em-ployed, such as that of appetition, henthe presentstate is a senseof destinyand a striving, "force," to achieve it. The thingfol-lows a (Newtonian) patternofmotionbecause it enjoys the beautyof this pattern,perhaps in a blindway of thoughtlessdesire, butstill as influenced ythis beauty. What does patternmean tomerestuff?Of course, one can describe the physical thingas a world linein the fourdimensionsof space-time,but this is only a statementof the problem. There is themere geometryof four-dimensionalstructure, mere relational type,and there is the assertion that"something" real has this structure. This somethingreal needsquality as well as structure. Also, we infer the past and futureonly fromdata in the present,and this presupposes a principleaccordingto which the present as given implicates its origin anddestiny;and onlybecause it is assumed that thisprinciplehas beenprovided can we talk about space-timeor the world system.Thus the situation s that visual images give us patches of colorthattell no tales of origin and destiny, nd are proved by experi-ences ofdissolutionto exhibitno otherunitythan that which couldbe possessed by masses of units individuallytoo insignificant,nproportion o our concerns, o be perceiveddistinctly s units byus.In the experienceof self-feeling,n the contrary,we have a vividsenseof ndividualunity. Discard this sense as illusory alongwiththe visual unities,and nothing s left to give the idea of illusionits essential complementof veridical perception.The foregoing argument makes no use of the geometricaldivisibilityof space except as implying hat theremaybe smallerconstituent nitsand thattheseemingly ivenunitmaybe a group.The may is convertedto must (in the manner we have sketched)by other aspects than that of mere extension. Therefore thepsychicmicroscopicmonads need not necessarily correspond tomere points.Leibniz did not,however,attain a clear doctrineon the nature


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420 CHARLES HARTSHORNEof space; partlyforthevery good reason thatwhilehe sees spaceas a relational scheme,his Aristoteliantheoryof substance as sub-ject with private predicates makes the status of relations as suchambiguous at best. If A is related to B (for example, if A per-ceives B), then, since relation to B is nothing withoutB, if Areallyhas this relationas its property, hen t also has B as elementin this propertyand therefore s elementof itself,and thus sub-stancesbecomemembers ne of another. Leibniz as an Aristotelian,in logic and theoryof individuality, annot take this step, so rela-tions are neitherproperties of substances (which thus "have nowindows"), nor can they be substances on their own, for him.What are relationsthen? They are, it seems,propertiesofGod'smind as he contemplatesthe monads. This is as near as one cancome to an answer, and it seems to mean, as Russell has urged,thateitherthe monads are internalto God-pantheism-or God issubject to illusion; and so is Leibniz himself, n continually peak-ing as thoughthe coexistence, hat is, relation,of themonads werea fact.Anotherweakness, not logically inherent n the "discovery,"is in the temporal structureof monads. Leibniz holds that theself-unity f feeling whichis the illustrativebasis of the idea ofindividualrealitymustbe supposed to be a unityofpast and futurestates such that all that ever has qualified and all that ever canqualifythemonad qualifiesit now. The natural question occurs:whatthen s the difference etween past, present,and future, f atanytimethe same total setof predicatesqualifiesthemonad7 Thisbizarre paradox arises because of traditional, especially Aris-totelian,presuppositionsnot usually so sharplyformulated. Theindividual is "substance," substance is what is the same throughchange-the thing which changes from state a of itself to stateb of itself. Now there is a confusionhere betweentwo meaningsof individual selfhood. In a certainlogical sense, "individual" iswhat is concrete and determinate,rather than abstract, or ad-mittingof furtherdetermination. The subject-complete-with-all-its-predicates s the individual in this sense. But the thingwhichcontinues to exist throughchange of states of itself is quite an-other matter. This "changing" subject is never completeor fullydeterminateuntil it ceases to endure through change-until itis dead in fact. The predicational completeness is present andretrospective only, never prospective. Leibniz was trying to


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LEIBNIZ 'S GREATEST DISCOVERY 421identify he predicationally ompletewith the individual as havinga future,whereas the latter is essentially incomplete,with anelement of indeterminacyor generality or abstractness. HereAristotle, though more confused, was wiser than Leibniz in hisclarity. (Only Whitehead, n my opinion, has attained both wis-dom and clarityon this point.)The rathergeneral refusalto accept the" discovery" of Leibnizhas been due, apparently,to one of the followingreasons: failureto grasp clearly the question (concerningthe illustrative basis ofthe atomism so necessary to science) to which it is the uniquelyappropriate answer; failure to distinguish, as Leibniz himselflargely failedtodo, betweenthediscovery and various ideas whoseassociation with it was an accident of Leibniz s mind rather thanany requirement f ogic; inability o enduretherebuketo sluggishimaginationswhich s implied n the doctrinethatthe merest umpofdust containsmyriadsof centers of feeling; thedifficultyf giv-ing clear definition o theposited analogy between thehuman sub-ject and other entities; and finally, he realizationthat, as Leibnizhimself admitted, scientific nvestigation seems to have no needof a complete answer to the "illustrative" question, and no useto make of it. The value of the doctrineseems philosophical notscientific though t is hazardous to speak for the futureof science)in that it enables us to clarify our fundamentalcategories in auniquely satisfyingmanner,and thus gives us a firmfoundationformetaphysics, aturaltheology, nd ethics. In thistechnologicalage there s likelyto be contempt orany doctrinewhich claims notechnologicalapplications. If a man does notwish to understandthe meaning and rationally estimate the truth of such ideas asGod, freedom,the good, to see how "mind"' and "matter," orhow atom and man and God, go together o make a world,he mayhave no need forthe "discovery.'" But if he has such a wish,hecannot afford to neglect psychical micropluralism. It is a gen-eralizationquite comparablein sweep to thecalculus (which n anycase was co-discoveredby Newton), and unlikethe calculus is nomere technical device but a description, eeminglywithoutmean-ingful alternative,of the basic structure f the world as composedof individuals.The Universityof Chicago.

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Leibniz Greatest Discovery

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