En tergy PNP 2014-087 October 06, 2014 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Palisades Nuclear Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, Ml 49043 Tel 269 764 2000 AnthonyJ. Vitale Site Vice President SUBJECT: Compensatory Measures Not Performed As Required Palisades Nuclear Plant Docket 50-255 License No. DPR-20 Dear Sir or Madam: The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER), 2014-S05-00, is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 73, Appendix G, section 1(c). This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments. Sincerely, vbk Attachment: LER 201 4-S05-00, Compensatory Measures Not Performed As Required CC Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Project Manager, Palisades, USNRC Resident Inspector, Palisades, USNRC Director, Division of Security Policy, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, USNRC ajv/tad • PNP 2014-087 October 06, 2014 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Palisades Nuclear Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043 Tel 269 764 2000 Anthony J. Vitale Site Vice President SUBJECT: Compensatory Measures Not Performed As Required Palisades Nuclear Plant Docket 50-255 License No. DPR-20 Dear Sir or Madam: The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER), 2014-S05-00, is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 73, Appendix G, section I (c). This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments. Sincerely, ajv/tad Attachment: LER 2014-S05-00, Compensatory Measures Not Performed As Required CC Administrator, Region III, USNRC Project Manager, Palisades, USNRC Resident Inspector, Palisades, USNRC Director, Division of Security Policy, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, USNRC
Transcript
Entergy
PNP 2014-087
October 06, 2014
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionATTN: Document Control DeskWashington, DC 20555-0001
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.Palisades Nuclear Plant27780 Blue Star Memorial HighwayCovert, Ml 49043Tel 269 764 2000AnthonyJ. VitaleSite Vice President
SUBJECT: Compensatory Measures Not Performed As Required
The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER), 2014-S05-00, is submitted in accordancewith 10 CFR 73, Appendix G, section 1(c).
This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.
Sincerely,
vbkAttachment: LER 201 4-S05-00, Compensatory Measures Not Performed As Required
CC Administrator, Region Ill, USNRCProject Manager, Palisades, USNRCResident Inspector, Palisades, USNRCDirector, Division of Security Policy, Office of Nuclear Security and IncidentResponse, USNRC
ajv/tad
• ~Entergy
PNP 2014-087
October 06, 2014
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Palisades Nuclear Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043 Tel 269 764 2000 Anthony J. Vitale Site Vice President
SUBJECT: Compensatory Measures Not Performed As Required
The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER), 2014-S05-00, is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 73, Appendix G, section I (c).
This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.
Sincerely,
ajv/tad
Attachment: LER 2014-S05-00, Compensatory Measures Not Performed As Required
CC Administrator, Region III, USNRC Project Manager, Palisades, USNRC Resident Inspector, Palisades, USNRC Director, Division of Security Policy, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, USNRC
ATTACHMENT
LER 201 4-S05-00
COMPENSATORY MEASURES NOT PERFORMED AS REQUIRED
2 Pages Follow
ATTACHMENT
LER 2014-S05-00
COMPENSATORY MEASURES NOT PERFORMED AS REQUIRED
2 Pages Follow
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/201701-2014)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information CollectionsBranch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or byinternet e-mail to [email protected], and to the Desk Officer, Office of Intormation and(See Page 2 for required number of Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC
digits/characters for each block) 20503. It a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MBcontrol number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to,the information collection.
1. FACILITY NAME . DOCKET NUMBER PAGEPALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT 05000255 1 0F2
4. TITLE Compensatory Measures Not Performed As Required
5. EVENT DATE I 6. LER NUMBER I 7. REPORT DATE I 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVEDI SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBERMONTH DAY YEAR YEAR I I MONTH DAY YEAR
NUMBER NO. I k5OOOFACILITY NAME ‘DOCKET NUMBER
08 15 2014 2014 - S05 -00 10 06 2014 5OO0 —
9. OEPRA11NG MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMIHED PURSUANT TO ThE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
DATEBSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewlitten lines)
On July 26, 2014, a Security Owner Controlled Area (SOCA) early warning system (EWS) zone was removed from servicedue to frequent alarms caused by environmental conditions. A security vehicle and officer were promptly dispatched to thevicinity of the out-of-service EWS zone to perform the required compensatory measures. On July 28, 2014, the EWS zonewas returned to service and compensatory measures were suspended.
Subsequently, on August 15, 2014, it was discovered that the required compensatory measures had not been consistentlyimplemented per the guidance of the applicable security procedure. As a result, a one-hour event report was submitted tothe NRC, in accordance with 10 CFR 73, Appendix G, section 1(c).
The direct cause of the event was the failure to adequately implement procedure requirements. The failure to adequatelyimplement procedure requirements was a result of inadequate communications between security supervisors and officers.This led to incorrect assumptions regarding responsibilities for implementation of compensatory measures. Correctiveactions were implemented to ensure compliance with regulatory and procedural requirements.
There were no known actual consequences to nuclear safety as a result of this event. No safety systems were directly orindirectly impacted or threatened.
NRC FORM 366 (01-2014)
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/3112017 (01-2014) /-",. Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours.
'~\. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
\: ..... ~ LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by
(8ee Page 2 for required number of intemet e-mail to [email protected], and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC
digits/characters for each block) 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
1. FACILITY NAME ~. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT 05000255 10F2
4. TITLE Compensatory Measures Not Performed As Required 5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED
YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR ~5000
FACILITY NAME POCKET NUMBER 08 15 2014 2014 -805 - 00 10 06 2014 ~5000
9. 0EPRA11NG MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
Mode 1 020.2201 (b) o 20.2203(a)(3)(i) o 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) o 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
o 20.2201 (d) o 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) o 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) o 50.73(a)(2)(vill)(A)
o 20.2203(a)(1) o 20.2203(a)(4) o 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) o 50.73(a)(2)(vill)(B)
10. POWER LEVEL o 20.2203(a)(2)(i) o 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A) o 50.73(a)(2)(iii) o 50.73(a)(2)(lx)(A)
o 20.2203(a)(2)(1I) o 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A) o 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) o 50.73(a)(2)(x) 100% o 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) o 50.36(c)(2) o 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) o 73.71 (a)(4)
o 20.2203(a)(2)(lv) o 50.46(a)(3)(ii) o 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) o 73.71 (a)(5)
o 20.2203(a)(2)(v) o 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) o 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 181 OTHER
o 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) o 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) o 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER t:ACILITY NAME r ELEPHONE NUMER (Include Area Code)
Jeff Hardy, Regulatory Assurance Manager 269-764-2011 13. COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRBED t.I THIS REPORT
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM ~OMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX
14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR
DYES (/fyes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ~ NO SUBMISSION
DATE ~BSTRACT (Umit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten Unes)
On July 26, 2014, a Security Owner Controlled Area (SOCA) ear1y warning system (EWS) zone was removed from service due to frequent alarms caused by environmental conditions. A security vehicle and officer were promptly dispatched to the vicinity of the out-of-service EWS zone to perform the required compensatory measures. On July 28, 2014, the EWS zone was returned to service and compensatory measures were suspended.
Subsequently, on August 15, 2014, it was discovered that the required compensatory measures had not been consistently implemented per the guidance of the applicable security procedure. As a result, a one-hour event report was submitted to the NRC, in accordance with 10 CFR 73, Appendix G, section I (c).
The direct cause of the event was the failure to adequately implement procedure requirements. The failure to adequately implement procedure requirements was a result of inadequate communications between security supervisors and officers. This led to incorrect assumptions regarding responsibilities for implementation of compensatory measures. Corrective actions were implemented to ensure compliance with regulatory and procedural requirements.
There were no known actual consequences to nuclear safety as a result of this event. No safety systems were directly or indirectly impacted or threatened.
NRC FORM 366 (01-2014)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 31 50-01 04 EXPIRES: 01/31/2017(01-201 4)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80/ ( hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back ton_ industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and InformationS,÷ LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Intocollects.Resource@ nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer,CONTINUATION SHEET Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management
and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. It a means used to impose an information collection doesnot display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and aperson is not required to respond to, the information collection.
1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISIONPALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT 05000255
NUMBER NUMBER2 OF 2
2014 -S05 -00NARRATIVE
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On July 26, 2014, at 2011 hours, a Security Owner Controlled Area (SOCA) early warning system (EWS) zone wasremoved from service due to frequent alarms caused by environmental conditions. A security vehicle and officer werepromptly dispatched to the vicinity of the out-of-service EWS zone to perform the required compensatory measures. OnJuly 28, 2014, at 1208 hours, the EWS zone was returned to service and compensatory measures were suspended.
Subsequently, on August 15, 2014, during an internal investigation, it was discovered that the required compensatorymeasures had not been consistently implemented per the guidance of the applicable security procedure. Contrary toprocedure requirements for stationary post assignments, several times during the first shift of performing compensatorymeasures, officers left the vicinity of the out-of-service EWS zone to provide vehicle transportation for the officer providingtheir relief.
As a result, a one-hour event report was submitted to the NRC, in accordance with 10 CFR 73, Appendix G, section I (c).
At the time of discovery, the plant was in Mode 1 at 100% power. Palisades utilizes a proprietary on-site security force.No Local, State, or Federal law enforcement agencies were contacted regarding the event and there was no pressrelease.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
The direct cause of the event was the failure to adequately implement procedure requirements. The failure to adequatelyimplement procedure requirements was a result of inadequate communications between security supervisors and officers.This led to incorrect assumptions regarding responsibilities for implementation of compensatory measures.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN
Security supervisors were directed to ensure pre-job briefs are performed for temporary compensatory measures as soonas possible after implementation and create temporary post instructions that ensure assigned officers are knowledgeableon their roles and responsibilities.
ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES
There were no known actual consequences to nuclear safety as a result of this event. No safety systems were directly orindirectly impacted or threatened. Therefore, the safety risk significance is considered to be very low.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
Licensee Event Report, 2014-SO 1 -00, Potential Vulnerability in a Safeguards System
NRC FORM 366A (01 -201 4)
NRC FORM 366A (01-2014)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET
1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET
PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT 05000255
NARRATIVE
EVENT DESCRIPTION
APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/3112017
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons leamed are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by intemet e-mail to [email protected], and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
6. LEA NUMBER 3. PAGE
YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER
20F2 2014 - S05 - 00
On July 26, 2014, at 2011 hours, a Security Owner Controlled Area (SOCA) early warning system (EWS) zone was removed from service due to frequent alarms caused by environmental conditions. A security vehicle and officer were promptly dispatched to the vicinity of the out-of-service EWS zone to perform the required compensatory measures. On July 28, 2014, at 1208 hours, the EWS zone was retumed to service and compensatory measures were suspended.
Subsequently, on August 15, 2014, during an intemal investigation, it was discovered that the required compensatory measures had not been consistently implemented per the guidance of the applicable security procedure. Contrary to procedure requirements for stationary post assignments, several times during the first shift of performing compensatory measures, officers left the vicinity of the out-of-service EWS zone to provide vehicle transportation for the officer providing thei r relief.
As a result, a one-hour event report was submitted to the NRC, in accordance with 10 CFR 73, Appendix G, section I (c).
At the time of discovery, the plant was in Mode 1 at 100% power. Palisades utilizes a proprietary on-site security force. No Local, State, or Federal law enforcement agencies were contacted regarding the event and there was no press release.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
The direct cause of the event was the failure to adequately implement procedure requirements. The failure to adequately implement procedure requirements was a result of inadequate communications between security supervisors and officers. This led to incorrect assumptions regarding responsibilities for implementation of compensatory measures.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN
Security supervisors were directed to ensure pre-job briefs are performed for temporary compensatory measures as soon as possible after implementation and create temporary post instructions that ensure aSSigned officers are knowledgeable on their roles and responsibilities.
ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES
There were no known actual consequences to nuclear safety as a result of this event. No safety systems were directly or indirectly impacted or threatened. Therefore, the safety risk significance is considered to be very low.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
Licensee Event Report, 2014-S01-00, Potential Vulnerability in a Safeguards System
