LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER PROJECT - PORTAL Report 52 - rev5.pdf · Report prepared for Lesotho...

Report prepared for Lesotho Highlands Development Authority

LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER PROJECT

ICM wetland issues at Mohale

REPORT 52

Report prepared by Panel of Environmental Experts

R Hitchcock, A Inambao, J Ledger & M Mentis

Revision 5 October 2009

PoE Report 52, October 2009 – Overview Page 2 of 73

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. The Panel of Environmental Experts (PoE) for the Lesotho Highlands Water

Project (LHWP) undertook a mission from 28 September to 6 October 2009. 2. The purpose of the mission was to help develop and implement critical projects

being undertaken by the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (LHDA). 3. The critical projects addressed during the mission, and the way forward on each,

were briefly as follows. LHDA Compensation PoE was asked to review and comment on progress achieved in distributing 2009 individual compensation. It was found that the grain and pulse and ACP compensation in Katse, Mohale, and ’Muela was largely completed in timely fashion but that there were problems ranging from non-allocation of grains and pulses to the quality of the products given to people. It is recommended LHDA consider (1) providing transport and costs for individuals to obtain their documents; and (2) establishing a system of compensation identification cards with a photo and fingerprint to facilitate the distribution of compensation. On the compensation workflow system, it was found that the system’s procedural steps were sound but that it was very complex and based on assumptions that the information in the compensation data base is up-to-date and accurate, something not the case at present. The backlog of payments of people owed compensation should be taken care of, complaints resolved, and all compensation management and complaints register records brought up to date. It is time to accept that the compensation audit process as having been reasonably successful and move toward ensuring that all outstanding compensation payments are made and complaints resolved. This may require field interviews of people whose records are incomplete and assisting them to compile all missing documentation. Income Generation/Technical Assistance Unit PoE was asked to assess and critically comment on progress made in advising LLEs to engage in developmental projects. TAU and Income Generation and other FOB officers are making good progress in advising LLEs on these development projects which include roads, water systems, hammer mills, and electrification. Constraints include the lack of payment of communal compensation to registered LLEs, lack of capacity of LLEs to manage cash and keep records, something being addressed by LHDA and the Department of Co-operatives, and the complexity and costliness of some of the projects opted for by LLEs such as electrification. Meetings should be held by LHDA with the Lesotho Electricity Company. LLEs should then be given realistic information on these kinds of projects and their likelihood of success. Further efforts should be made to enhance collaboration among LLEs, host communities, government, and community councils. Socio-economic and Epidemiology Study – LHDA Contract 1204 The assessment of the LHDA Contract 1204 was carried out and the assessment findings used to determine the implication for LHDA’s utilization of the results as well as suggestions of strategies to implement the implications of the findings. The report format had greatly improved but the content and deductions made from the findings were speculative in a number of instances, and the report still fails to convincingly provide a compounded impact of the LHWP on the quality of life of the affected population living in the LHWP areas. The presentation of data is weak and sometimes structurally negative to describe positive findings. The main findings of the report are that the LHWP has not negatively impacted on the population areas and has generally contributed to the rapid socio economic development of the of LHWP areas in relative increase of their household incomes, provision of better water and sanitation systems, increase access to health, education and other services; has opened

Prepared by Prof Hitchcock & Drs Inambao, Ledger & Mentis Revision 5


up the Highlands to produce markets and public transportation and has increased the general standard of living through better housing and ownership of durable goods. LHWP has not affected the nutritional status of the population but has led to the negative tendency of dependence on LHDA compensation package for livelihood for the affected families. The project has also contributed to several intangibles such as rapid socio economic development of the LHWP that has benefited even the non affected communities as well as the contribution to general national economic development. LHWP was found to have contributed to a marginal association with the rapid rise in prevalence of HIV and AIDS as compared to similar mountain areas in the rest of Lesotho, and has generated some level of dissatisfaction due to the handling of the compensation payments especially in Phase 1B areas. Based on these findings PoE proposes that as LHDA has accepted the report it is it must do the following

• Request the Consultant to complete the process by preparing presentations to stakeholders

• Contract a professional report writer to write a corporate report for circulation • Require the Consultant to train LHDA staff in the data processing and management

and create an appropriate data base for the study data • Establish a technical team to review the findings and develop strategies for applying

lessons learned from the study findings • Develop a strategic plan to apply lessons learned in the current management of

interventions in the LHWP areas, ensuring that the experience is utilized in the development of strategies for Phase Two.

. ICM - LHDA Contract 1044 Setting up of the institutional arrangements is incomplete and upon termination the ICM contract in 2010 the ICM initiative will stall if LHDA walks away from it. LHDA needs to continue to be involved in catchment management in an advisory, cajoling, coordination and facilitation capacity, working with whomever relevant (individuals, community structures including LLEs, government) in collaboration with Income Generation & TAU. Paperwork on the inventory and catchment management planning tasks should cease, and effort should be directed at identifying, prioritizing and implementing practical measures to improve the sustainability of land-use. Some of the tasks identified by the communities as priorities in the pilot catchment areas might not seem to be directly ICM, but they should implemented with attention to mitigation of environmental impacts so as to promote sustainable land-use. Lesotho Biodiversity Trust A review of progress reveals that LBT Trustees have not met with LHWC to discuss the PoE’s March 2009 recommendations, although it appears that they have in principle agreed to do so. This inaction in the face of a crisis situation is further complicating and delaying interventions to prevent the extinction of the minnow. LHDA and LHWC must urgently establish a Task Team to deal with Maloti Minnow Conservation. Maloti Minnow conservation Smallmouth Yellowfish have been found in the Senqunyane River, as far up as the site for the proposed barrier. Barrier construction must be expedited. Intensive gillnetting in suitable reaches of the Senqunyane River must be implemented. A motivation for barrier construction is offered in this report. Instream flow requirements (IFR) LLEs downstream of Mohale are due for first tranche compensation payment and this should be expedited. The Releases Reports contain mostly the necessary information, but future reports should be more condensed. The 2007-2008 IFR Annual Report is an improvement of previous reports, and again future reports should be more condensed, business-like and focus on the IFR KPIs, identifying the lesson learnt and proposing how to improve IFR policy and implementation. The IFR monitoring protocol warrants revision because the results being yielded are without confidence limits, and the revision must be based on probability theory. A proposed study of fish sampling variability requires slight revision and should be undertaken immediately. Water quality has the same



defects as IFR monitoring in general. For routine water quality monitoring KPIs should be identified, and replicate samples taken every 3-4 months. For full-spectrum water quality monitoring the sampling frequency might be once every year or two. Residual Resettlement The PoE was asked to assess progress on the land re-distribution exercise and advise on the need to implement the Residual Resettlement Policy. The 64 households in the residual resettlement category who lost 50% or more of their land have all been allocated land in the two areas of Mohale, Nthakane and Kolotshane. The Residual Resettlement Policy should be accepted and implemented once some outstanding issues are resolved. LHWP Zonation – LHDA Contract 1255 The Final Report has major deficiencies and omissions. The report does not focus on the specific Lesotho issues and is too much a copy & paste exercise lifting information from elsewhere. LHDA should cut its losses and terminate the contract. Material from the two zoning reports should be used to implement an in-house process to agree on zoning guidelines. Public Health The revision of the LHDA Public Health and HIV/AIDS Policies have been completed and accepted by management for implementation as institutional policies. During the course of the review it was recommended that the HIV/AIDS policy paper be incorporated into the general Public Health Policy of LHDA as it was recognised to be part of the public health realm. In the meeting with the Human Resources and M&E Branches representatives it was agreed that the implementation of the public health policy should be main-streamed into the LHDA administrative and management instruments through active participation and involvement of all the CEO and Divisional Managers. A workshop to initiate the implementation of the policies was suggested, where the CEO will formally initiate the implementation process and openly challenge Divisional Heads and Branch Managers to implement the policies in every aspect of the work and responsibilities once trained. The initial step of the implementation will involve the incorporation of the policies in the Staff Manual and various administrative instruments at every branch level. The Staff manual will then be used as a training tool to educate all staff on the public health issue within the work environment of LHDA and the application and implication of the policy on LHDA processes and responsibilities to its staff and communities in LHWP areas. Implementation was recommended to be initiated immediately. However, it was realized that there are no appropriate public health structures in LHDA and the implementation will have to be coordinated by Human Resources Branch with M&E Branch developing indicators for monitoring the implementation progress and application of the policies on LHDA activities. It is hoped that appropriate structures to manage the public health aspect of LHWP will be considered in Phase Two of LHWP. KLM WATSAN This project has reportedly not made any progress since construction work was stopped in March 2009 following the PoE recommendations to reverse the responsibility of construction to LHDA from the LHWC. The recommendations by the PoE were accepted on the basis that there will be better accountability with LHWC providing overseer function rather than as implementing entity, as well as the reality that LHWC implementation did not reduce construction costs but rather increased the costs. The review of the progress made in the construction of structures indicated that during the LHWC take-over of the construction 65 VIPs and 3 Water systems were completed and further were still under construction at a total cost of M8.3 million. There are unused blocks and block-making equipment on site and these do contribute to the total budget. At the current expenditure level it is estimated that the cost of VIP stands at M129 000 each though this figure would decrease as more VIPs are built due to depreciation of machinery costs. The block-making site will require rehabilitation as there are large piles of concrete materials from discarded breakages, building sand, stone ballast and a fairly large concrete platform.



Communities are dissatisfied with the lengthy time it has taken LHDA to provide WATSAN facilities since the construction of the Katse Dam more than 10 years ago. LHDA will need to complete the remaining systems urgently to avoid further disgruntlement from the affected communities. Status of sanitation around the dams needs to be looked at especially at the Lejone peninsula where public toilets are overflowing with human waste and urine and likely to contaminate the dam when the rains come. Community Infrastructure Progress on the implementation of the Community Infrastructure and Development Policy was reviewed. Overall, implementation is going reasonably well. Final decisions need to be made regarding lump sum and communal compensation. PoE feels strongly that communal compensation funds should go to the LLEs that are owed compensation, their host communities and councils, and not to government. LHDA should intensify its efforts to work with government ministries, district administration, traditional authorities, and community councils in working out arrangements for the fair use of communal compensation funds. KFF pilot trout production Both KFF and LHDA are not conforming entirely with the RoD, MOU and sub-lease agreement. With interest in commercial fish production from LHWP coming from more than one player, LHDA must develop a regulatory framework so that potential players can bid for concessions. There are in addition wild fish stocks in the reservoirs. To avoid an open access fishery and the usual over-fishing of this, LHDA must monitor fish stocks and fishing pressure, and develop a regulatory framework. Other issues Light pollution is a growing problem throughout the world. A discussion document is offered for consideration by LHDA and project authorities.


PoE Report 52, October 2009 – Contents Page 6 of 73

CONTENTS

Page EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 INTRODUCTION 7 CRITICAL PROJECTS 10

1. LHDA compensation 10 2. Income generation / Technical Assistance Unit 11 3. Population & Epidemiology Study – LHDA Contract 1204 12 4. ICM – LHDA Contract 1044 13 5. Lesotho Biodiversity Trust 15 6. Maloti Minnow Conservation 16 7. IFR 16 8. Residual resettlement 21 9. LHWP Zonation – LHDA Contract 1255 22 10. Public Health 22 11. Community infrastructure 24 12. KFF pilot trout production 25 13. Other issues 28

Appendix 1 Resettlement, relocation and LLEs 30 Appendix 2 Five years of Maloti Minnow conservation 38 Appendix 3 Barrier construction on Senqunyane River 48 Appendix 4 IFR Policy 55 Appendix 5 IFR Monitoring 58 Appendix 6 IFR monitoring design 61 Appendix 7 Katse & Mohale zoning management 62 Appendix 8 Light pollution 68


PoE Report 52, October 2009 – Introduction Page 7 of 73

INTRODUCTION The Panel of Environmental Experts (PoE) for the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) undertook a mission from 28 September to 6 October 2009. The mission was attended by Professor Bob Hitchcock and Drs Amusaa Inambao, John Ledger and Mike Mentis. The overall objective of the Mission was to provide the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (LHDA) with an independent evaluation of its operations, identifying where things might be going wrong, how LHDA might improve its performance, and providing guidance on best practice. The specific terms of reference (ToRs) for the Mission were as follows. Task

# Issue Action

1 LHDA compensation • Review and comment on the progress achieved in distributing the 2009 individual compensation in Katse, Mohale & ’Muela

• Review & comment on the completeness and appropriateness of the compensation workflow system

• Review progress on the reconciliation of compensation with audit files and provide advice on ways to fast-track & complete this exercise

2 Income generation/Technical Assistance Unit

• Assess and critically comment on progress made in advising LLEs to engage in developmental projects

3 Socio-economic & Epidemiology study – LHDA Contract 1204

• Assess the implications of the report(s) produced by the C1204 Consultant and make recommendations on the way forward

4 ICM – LHDA Contract 1044 • Review progress achieved on the Contract since February 2009 PoE Mission

• Review and critically comment on the Final Report on Resources Inventory Report (Task 2) and the ICMPs Draft Report (Task 3)

• Critically review and advise on the implications, advantages and shortcomings of the LHDA strategy to house ICM with LLEs as part of the long-term institutional arrangement

5 Lesotho Biodiversity Trust • Review progress based on the recommendations by PoE 2009 February Mission that o LBT & LHWC meet, establish Barrier

Construction Funds and appoint a Task Team

o Conceptualize design study with blasting specialist

o Appoint EIA consultant and obtain required permissions from NES

o Secure funding and construct barrier



Task #

Issue Action

6 Maloti Minnow Conservation

• Review & critically comment on the progress report on the intensive gillnetting in Mohale to restrict alien fish penetrating Senqunyane River and advise on the best practice

• Review the LBT strategy report for IFR fish monitoring repeatability

7 Instream Flow Requirements (IFR)

• Review and comment on progress made in disbursing communal compensation to LLEs downstream of Mohale Dam

• Review & critically comment on the 2006/07 and 2007/08 Final Annual Releases reports

• Review & critically comment on the 2007/08 Final IFR Annual Report

• Review, critically comment on the IFR Policy review draft Final Report & advise LHDA on the way forward

• Review and compare the C648 & C1237 IFR monitoring protocols & advise LHDA on the most effective methods to use for IFR biophysical monitoring

• Review monitoring results & related parameters of water quality and make recommendations on the way forward with a view to reduce costs

8 Residual resettlement • Assess progress on the land re-distribution exercise and advise on the need to implement the Residual Resettlement Policy

9 LHWP Zonation – LHDA Contract 1255

• Review & provide comments on the final Report on the Zonation Contract

10 Public Health • Review & comment on the revised corporate Public Health and HIV/AIDS policies in order to assist implementation

• Review and comment on the KLM WATSAN progress to date

11 Community infrastructure • Review progress on the implementation of the Community Infrastructure Policy & advise on the best practices

12 KFF pilot trout production • Review KFF progress reports submitted to date & advise on the way forward

• Determine the extent to which the project is meeting the MOU in respect of community involvement

• Review proposals received with regard to large scale fish farming and make comments on the regulatory framework & monitoring & evaluation of these projects




Each of the items of ToR is dealt with in more detail in the matrix that follows. PoE thanks LHDA and the Lesotho Highlands Water Commission (LHWC) for help and hospitality.

PoE Report 52, October 2009 – Critical projects Page 10 of 73

CRITICAL PROJECTS Projects Present situation Recommended action Finish date 1. LHDA compensation Individual compensation at Katse, Mohale & ’Muela See Appendix 1

• The grain and pulse and ACP compensation for 2009 in Katse, Mohale, and ’Muela was largely completed in timely fashion. Several issues arose regarding this compensation (1) approvals of the procurement for grain and pulse procurement took time, (2) in Katse and Lejone the distribution of grains was at 65% and 70% respectively, (3) the quality of some of the grain was questioned by recipients. One of the reasons for the lack of distribution of grains related to the compensation documents and passports of individuals. Some of the documents were not clear in terms of beneficiaries (identification of heirs of deceased individuals). There were problems of lack of various stamped letters (eg from the chief and the DA). Questions were raised about passports and copies of documents relating to temporary passport forms. As a result, individuals were denied their compensation and the goods were returned to LHDA stores. In order to access their compensation, individuals had to go to Leribe or Thaba Tseka to get documents, something that took time, cost money, and incurred travel costs.

• Decisions on procurement should be made in more timely fashion

2010-06-01

• LHDA should consider (1) providing transport to individuals to obtain their documents, (2) establishing a system of compensation identification cards with a photo and fingerprint to facilitate the distribution of compensation

2010-06-01

Compensation workflow system See Appendix 1

• The PoE was asked to comment on the completeness and appropriateness of the compensation workflow system. Documents by FlowCentric on (1) compensation processes, and (2) compensation and complaints were reviewed, and interviews done of LHDA personnel on the workflow system. The workflow system is well laid

• Payments of people owed compensation must be implemented, all records brought up to date, and the data on compensation verified and entered in the compensation management register

2009-12-01



Projects Present situation Recommended action Finish date out and the procedural steps are clear. It assumes, however, that the information in the compensation data base is up-to-date and accurate, copying of the scheduled payment records for the previous year can be carried out relatively easily, and the preliminary grain and ACP schedules will be generated on the basis of the records. There are still problems with the compensation records that need to be addressed. LHDA has not paid all of the people owed compensation, something that must be done in order to bring the records up to date. The system as designed is quite complex, and can only be implemented if the compensation data base is up-to-date and accurate which at present is not the case.

and compensation complaints register.

• Outstanding compensation complaints must be resolved and the process of getting compensation records at the field level copied and forwarded to LHDA headquarters must be improved as must the timeliness of sign-offs especially at headquarters level.

2010-03-01

Reconciliation of compensation with audit files See Appendix 1

• PoE was asked to review the progress on the reconciliation of compensation with audit files and provide advice on ways to fast-track and complete this exercise. The internal audit of the compensation files is largely complete. As noted in PoE Report 51, most of the records reviewed are up to international standards. A system must be put in place to ensure that missing documents and information are obtained so that compensation owed to project-affected people is provided as required by the LHDA Treaty and Order.

• It is time to accept the auditing process as having been reasonably successful and move toward ensuring that all compensation payments are made and complaints resolved. This may require field interviews of people whose records are missing, and assisting them to compile all missing documentation.

2010-02-01

2. Income generation / Technical Assistance Unit Advice to LLEs to engage in developmental projects

• PoE was asked to assess and critically comment on progress made in advising LLEs to engage in developmental projects. The TAU and Income Generation and other FOB officers are making good progress in advising LLEs on development projects. TAU and FOB officers are

• Decisions reached at the workshop on lump sum and communal compensation held 2009-02-27 should be finalized and agreed upon. Communal

2010-06-30



Projects Present situation Recommended action Finish date See Appendix 1 working closely with LLEs on various kinds of development projects

including roads, water systems, hammer mills, and electrification. Constraints include the lack of payment of communal compensation to registered LLEs, the need to upgrade the abilities of the various LLEs to manage cash and keeping of financial records (which is being done by LHDA and the Department of Co-operatives), and the complexity and costliness of some of the projects opted for by LLEs such as electrification.

compensation owed to registered LLEs should be paid (eg to downstream Mohale LLEs and in the foothills such as Ha Maja). Further efforts should be made by the LHDA, TAU, and FOBs to enhance collaboration among LLEs, host communities, and community councils.

• Provide compensation 2010-03-31 • Careful thought needs to be given to the

electrification option that some LLEs are choosing. Meetings should be held with the Lesotho Electricity Company to obtain data on implementation and consumer costs. LLEs should then be given realistic information on these kinds of projects and their potential impacts on communities and individuals including the likelihood of success or failure in places far off the grid.

2010-02-01

3. Population & Epidemiology Study – LHDA Contract 1204 C1204 reports and way forward

• Reports still not completed and there are no timelines set for the completion of all the reports.

• Specific reports on nutrition, HIV/AIDS and other have not been completed and are being awaited.

• Tie the Consultant to a date for final delivery of all documents.

2010-02-28

• The general report still lacks the professional finish required of a document for circulation to stakeholders even after extensive comments from LHDA.

• After advice given to the Consultant to improve his analysis and reporting, LHDA must leave the Consultant’s reports so that any of their defects are the Consultant’s not LHDA’s.

On-going



Projects Present situation Recommended action Finish date • The Consultant is also expected to present the report to stakeholders in

a workshop on a date yet to be determined. • Request the Consultant to complete the

process by preparing presentations to stakeholders.

2010-02-28

• The Consultant is yet to complete the remaining reports, submit all the data to LHDA and carry out the data management training for LHDA before final payment is made.

• The Consultant must train LHDA staff in the data processing and management and create an appropriate data base for the study data.

2010-02-31

• Main report indicates that LHWP has impacted on the affected communities as follows. ° The population has not been negatively impacted as individuals

have higher indices for quality of life, higher income, durable property ownership, higher access to social economic services such as health, schools and public transport as well as market outlets.

° LHWP has been suspected in the rapid introduction of HIV and AIDS due to improved road access and contact with population from high HIV prevalent areas.

° In spite of the observed gains in socio economic development nutritional inadequacies have not been improved and stunting of children is still at the same or even increased levels.

° The gains made have been tempered by the general socio economic decline that has enveloped the region.

° LHWP has inadvertently led to household dependence on compensation as a major financial income in the lives of the affected populations.

• Establish a forensic review team to develop a framework for future management of studies.

2010-03-31

4. ICM – LHDA Contract 1044 Progress since February 2009

• Setting up the institutional frameworks is as yet incomplete and by project end will not have reached the state that they are self-sustaining – see more below.

• The inventory and catchment management planning are completed. Implementation has started (home gardens, inter-cropping, minimum

• Avoid using physical structures (sedimentation weirs and runoff plots) to monitor soil loss, and rather expend the limited resources on involving local government structures (community councils in which there is turnover) and

On-going



Projects Present situation Recommended action Finish date tillage, some demonstrations, etc, but not implementation of the catchment management plans) – see more below.

• Monitoring is being developed, including consideration of sedimentation weirs and runoff plots. The costs & benefits of measuring soil loss versus pragmatically arresting it were evaluated previously and it was decided to proceed with the practical soil erosion control (PoE Report 13 March 1998).

• The ICM project ends in 2010 and the question arises about the future of catchment management. If LHDA withdraws now the ICM initiative will stall. Improvement in the sustainability of land-use in LHWP catchments is in LHDA’s interests – extend the life of LHWP. Cost-effective measures to improve the standard of land-use must be identified and prioritized. These measures include inculcating the sustainability ethic and transferring the relevant skills in resource husbandry to the land-users and the local government structures (community councils)

on implementation of physical conservation interventions

• LHDA must continue to take a leading role in improving the sustainability of land-use in LHWP catchments (in a largely advising, cajoling, coordinating and facilitating capacity)

2009-10-31

• Identify, prioritize and implement measures to improve the sustainability of land-use – among these measures are the techniques of sustainable land-use, transferring the skills to the land-users, and inculcating the values of the sustainability ethic

2009-10-31

Final report on Inventory (Task 2)

• Improvements were made to the draft report to address PoE comments of 2008. The resource inventory is good but has shortcomings especially in regard to rangeland management. Rangeland

• Do not try to rectify shortcomings of the Task 2 report by amending the report. Rather move on, and treat tricky

2009-10-31



Projects Present situation Recommended action Finish date improvement measures are focused on interventions with the soil-plant-animal components to the exclusion of land-tenure/use-objective systems. These issues are best addressed by workshops involving LHDA, rangeland experts and PoE

issues (such as how to fix a rangeland) by specific and focused workshops

ICMPs draft report (Task 3)

• ICMPs have been developed for the pilot areas in liaison with the local communities who have identified their priorities. These priorities concern mostly things that are not catchment management per se. Building or upgrading an access road is an example. However, these priorities offer opportunities in developing sustainability. How must a road be built to minimize damage to the land and other resources through which it passes? To an extent the relevant considerations have been including in Task 3, but it is insufficient. This is not to say that the Task 3 report must be amended, but rather develop the specific measures conservation measures to make the road, or the water supply scheme, or other project, a showcase for sustainable land-use. This is an opportunity to transfer skills and inculcate values. There might still be funds under EAP projects to fund some priority developments in the pilot catchments.

• Proceed with the implementation of ICMPs, according to the community priorities, but identify, develop and facilitate the implementation of resource conservation measures specific to actual project to ensure a high standard of sustainability. Use this as an opportunity to transfer skills and inculcate sustainability values in the communities

2009-10-31

• Revisit the EAPs and check what if any unexpended funds might be drawn upon for implementing developments in an environmental friendly manner.

2009-11-30

ICMs with LLEs • LHDA proposes to house ICM with LLEs as part of a long term institutional arrangement. Involving LLEs in ICM seems quite justified. LHDA Counterparts in ICM fit with Income Generation & TAU.

• Retain LHDA Counterparts who must work with whomever relevant (individuals, community structures including LLEs, govt) in collaboration with Income Generation & TAU.

On-going

5. Lesotho Biodiversity Trust Progress since February 2009

• Progress has been painfully slow. LBT effectively has only two Trustees, yet no sense of urgency is apparent. None of the PoE March 2009 recommendations have been implemented. A final draft “Board

• The recommendations made by PoE in March 2009 must be implemented as an urgent priority. Barrier construction is

2009-10-31



Projects Present situation Recommended action Finish date of Trustees Discussion Paper with LHWC” dated September 2009 was given to PoE on arrival. LBT has not met with LHWC. Smallmouth Yellowfish have now invaded the Senqunyane River. The time lost has made the task of preventing the extinction of the Maloti Minnow more difficult, but not impossible. See Appendix 2 for a summary of proposed interventions over the past five years.

imperative. See Appendix 3 for a motivation for barrier construction.

6. Maloti Minnow Conservation Gillnetting in Mohale

• Intensive gillnetting at the mouth of the Senqunyane River increased catch rates of Smallmouth Yellowfish by over 400%. PoE recommendation to employ an assistant to improve efficiency was not implemented by LBT. Programme was given insufficient support during 2008/2009. Yellowfish have now penetrated the Senqunyane River. LBT Conservation Officer recommends that intensive gillnetting in Mohale be terminated. PoE strongly disagrees

• Conservation Officer should continue intensive gillnetting in suitable reaches of the Senqunyane River. This is particularly important in summer months as fish move upstream to spawn. The purpose is to maintain pressure on yellowfish. An assistant should be provided to make the gillnetting as effective as possible, or else provision be made for local communities to operate the nets and keep the catch.

2009-10-31

• 2009 monitoring of Maloti Minnow populations in Senqunyane and Bokong Rivers and the Sanctuary areas showed healthy populations.

• Ongoing monitoring of these populations must be continued diligently and the LBT Conservation Officer must be enabled to continue this important work, notwithstanding any changes in the status of the LBT.

2009-10-31

Fish monitoring repeatability

• LHDA has requested LBT Conservation Officer to implement a project to assess the repeatability of fish monitoring for the IFR programme. This is dealt with under IFR matters below.

7. IFR Communal compensation

• Payment of the first tranche communal compensation to the LLEs downstream of Mohale is due.

• Expedite calculation of the amount due to each LLE and make payment.

2010-01-31



Projects Present situation Recommended action Finish date downstream of Mohale

• LHWC and LHDA have yet to agree on the method of calculation of the compensation amount.

2006/07 and 2007/08 Final Annual Releases reports

• PoE looked over the two Reports. They have the same style repeated from section to section and from report to report. PoE marked up the first part of the 2007/2008 Report, and the principles of the comments should be applied to the remainder of the two Reports and to future report writing.

• The Reports contain most of the necessary information. However, the Reports are unduly wordy and repeat information – such as the Background to LHWP – that might be put on the website and not included in every report. The gems of information are hidden among a welter of words, and effort should be directed at presenting the key facts in tables with the text doing no more than guide the reader and highlight the main points – the Reports are nearly there.

• Recording rainfall to 0.01 mm, and releases to 0.01 MCM, is spurious accuracy.

• Under time constraints it was not possible for PoE to provide more feedback, but if LHDA requires deeper input from PoE on reporting then LHDA must provide for longer Missions.

• Do not revise the reports under review, but rather expend effort at improving future reports by making them more business-like, put the relevant facts in tables as far as possible, and confine the text to stating the purpose, leading the reader through the tables (and figures), and highlighting the main points.

On-going

2007/08 Final IFR Annual Report

• PoE looked over the Report. It is an improvement on previous IFR Reports. It contains a wealth of information, if not too much.

• Under the constraints of time it is not possible for PoE to deal with all the details in the Report, and PoE must confine attention to a few generics issues.

• The Report is very long (65 pages) to the extent that it is a mammoth task just to read. A short concise report focussed on the key issues is infinitely better than a long and ‘comprehensive’ report. The present report contains too much ‘chatter’ about how dry or wet the year was, etc, all of which adds no value after the facts have been tabulated.

• There is insufficient prioritization, and focus, on the KPIs – releases, water quality, fish stocks, riparian woody vegetation, and

• Do NOT expend more effort at improving the 2007-2008 Report, but rather work on producing an improved 2008-2009 Report.

2009-10-31



Projects Present situation Recommended action Finish date compensation payments.

• The IFR Policy and Procedures are too complicated, unrealistic and even mistaken – matters addressed below.

• The IFR annual reporting is still taking too long to be produced – because (a) there is insufficient focus on the KPIs, (b) IFR Policy and Procedures are too complicated, and (c) LHDA corporate culture is insufficiently expeditious. The apparent (LHDA perceived) purpose of IFR annual reporting is to conform to the IFR Policy, whereas the purpose must be to add value – what lessons were learnt and how does LHDA fine-tune its IFR objective and means of achieving it? The lessons learnt might be in the present IFR Annual Report, but they do not jump out at the reader.

• Improve IFR annual reporting by making the report still more business-like. Focus on the KPIs. Include the facts in tables and figures and limit the text to purpose, leading the reader through the tables and figures, and highlighting the main points. Identify the lessons learnt and propose how IFR might be improved. Aim at 20 not 65 pages.

On-going

• Aim at producing the IFR Annual Report within 3 (not 12) months of the end of the IFR year

2009-10-31

IFR policy review draft Final Report

• PoE reviewed the draft revision of the IFR Policy. • A summary of PoE’s review is provided in Appendix 4. • In short, the draft revised Policy is unrealistic and complicated to the

degree that it is not capable of implementation. • It has taken 7 years to consider a revised IFR Policy – far too long,

and not least because the IFR Policy is dauntingly complicated.

• Simplify the IFR Policy and adopt as the guiding principle ‘the simplest policy that will work’.

2010-01-31



Projects Present situation Recommended action Finish date LHDA must expedite policy simplification, and adopt a policy that can be implemented and reviewed and revised every year.

• Have a consultant undertake the revision but hold at least 2 workshops with LHDA, LHWC, PoE and consultant.

2010-03-31

C648 & C1237 IFR monitoring protocols

• PoE reviewed IFR Report 648-f-23. No additional information could be found in the reports of C1237.

• A summary of PoE’s review is given in Appendix 5. • There are several major defects with the monitoring protocols, as

bulleted below. • Strong inference cannot be drawn from the monitoring data since

much of the data has been collected using one-shot (unreplicated) sampling. Confidence limits cannot be calculated and attached to the data. Sampling variability is unknown. The trust that can be placed in the data is thus unknown and indeed unknowable.

• The monitoring involves repeatedly sampling at the same sites. This means that samples are not independent so that the conditions of use of normal statistics is invalidated. If normal statistics cannot be used to compare follow-up with baseline data then on what basis is comparison to be made? There is none.

• The fixed-site nature of monitoring means that the degree to which the sample sites reflect the conditions of the reaches that they are supposed to represent is unknown. Even if the IFR sites were well chosen at the outset (but there is not statistical assurance on this point) conditions could deviate later.

• In cases (eg riverine vegetation, aquatic invertebrates) data collection and analysis are paradigmatic. They involve special models variously called VEGRAI and SASS. The influence of chance inclusions of species (or other taxa), or other sample variation, in the one-shot samples is unknown. Some of the data are subjective. The results have

Revise the IFR monitoring protocol, adopting the following guiding principles • Design sampling studies using

probability theory • Have a consultant undertake the

revision • Find a consultant that is statistically

literate • Drop the idea of fixed sampling sites • ID appropriate KPIs • Adopt the notion of IFR reaches and

sample at random within reaches (stratify within reaches if necessary)

• Find some suitable text book to guide the design process (see Appendix 6 for an example)

2010-03-31



Projects Present situation Recommended action Finish date spurious accuracy, eg VEGRAI calculates to the 100th part while it is based on subjective ratings to the 10th part. In the ideal, monitoring should collect ‘pure’ data (eg plant density, fish caught per unit effort of sampling) which retain value regardless of shifting fashions in the paradigms of biologists.

• There is insufficient focus on KPIs. These include water releases (this involves continuous recording, not sampling), water quality, fish stocks and riverine woody vegetation.

• Undertake the monitoring protocol revision including at least 2 workshops involving LHDA, LHWC, PoE and the consultant.

2010-03-31

Fish sampling repeatability

• PoE looked over the LBT proposal to investigate the repeatability of fish sampling.

• The proposal is heading off in the right direction but the approach warrants revision. The objective is not to prove that fish sampling is reliable, or test whether repeated samples are the same. Rather the aim is to establish the variability of fish sampling. A river reach with a diversity of fish is preferred (IFR reach 3). Identify the sections along this reach with similar habitat (eg riffles). Pick 3 of these riffle stretches at random. (If 3 replicates turns out too few then extend study.) Sample the 3 sites. Calculate the sample variance for each parameter of interest. Specify the amount of difference in the parameter that is biophysically meaningful. Use the established variance and the size of the meaningful difference to determine the sample size (replicate samples) (use statistical textbook for guide).

• Revise the proposed sampling variability study and implement.

2010-01-31

• Repeat this kind of determination of sample variability for identified IFR KPIs.

2010-10-31

Water quality monitoring

• Water quality monitoring is costly partly because of the high cost of laboratory analysis of water samples and partly because of the

• Water quality sampling must be re-thought. It is essential that the sampling

2010-01-31



Projects Present situation Recommended action Finish date resources deployed to collect the water samples

• In southern Africa water quality determination is flawed because it is usually based on one-shot samples so that determination of the confidence that can be attached to the results is unknown and indeed unknowable. The power of probability theory is not applied and the worth of the results is more a matter of belief rather than demonstrable science

• While it is insisted that water samples be sent to accredited laboratories for analysis, it is not required that accredited statisticians be used to design the sampling procedure. In reality, it is possible that non-accredited laboratories (who charge half the price that the accredited labs do) could offer good value for money – the criterion is not the cost of analysis of an individual sample but the cost per unit of variability (or confidence) in results. There are two main sources of variability – sampling variability and lab analytical variability. The latter would have to be extremely high to warrant resort to the very expensive accredited laboratories.

• To conform to good practice, water quality samples must be replicated. The individual samples must be independent (have a random element) otherwise the use of normal statistics to compare follow-up with baseline data is invalidated. If normal statistics cannot be used then how are follow-up and baseline data to be evaluated?

design be based on probability theory, otherwise there is no reliable way of ever drawing secure inference from the expensive results. Replicate sampling is necessary so that confidence can be attached to the results obtained. To contain the cost. Drop the idea of specific sampling sites and adopt rather sample areas in from which samples are drawn at random. The frequency of sampling might be reduced from monthly to once every 3 or 4 months. A further cost-saving measure might be to routinely analyse for only a few KPIs, and do a full analysis only once very year or two. The KPIs should be identified on the basis of what is practically important and from analysis of the big database to hand (eg use factor analysis to identify which variables vary considerably and warrant measurement). Likely KPIs are pH electrical conductivity, phosphates, nitrates and E coli.

• Revise the water quality monitoring protocol as part of the IFR monitoring revision.

2010-01-31

8. Residual resettlement Land redistribution & residual resettlement See Appendix 1

• PoE was asked to assess progress on the land re-distribution exercise and advise on the need to implement the Residual Resettlement Policy. The 64 households in the residual resettlement category who lost 50%

• The Residual Resettlement Policy should be accepted after taking into account residual resettlement household

2010-03-31



Projects Present situation Recommended action Finish date or more of their land have all been allocated land in the two areas in Mohale: Nthakane and Kolotshane. The Residual Resettlement Policy should be accepted once some outstanding issues are resolved. For example, consideration needs to be given to how to handle those residual resettlement households that would like to opt for resettlement outside of the Mohale Basin. Efforts should also be made to address the concerns of those households that established fields in one or both of the two areas but who were removed because they had not been given permission to plough there originally.

requests for resettlement.

9. LHWP Zonation – LHDA Contract 1255 Final report • The second Draft Final Report dated August 2009 was reviewed by

PoE. This ponderous, verbose and poorly written document of 115 pages contains some useful suggestions but they are extremely difficult to extract from the report. The document is carelessly written. In the important Chapter 4, not one of the seven sources quoted appears in the Reference list. The “Secondary Zones Descriptions” contain such nonsense as Cruise Liners and Submarines not being permitted in certain zones, while the “Model Rules and Regulations of the Zones” inform the reader that “Where existing, a natural woodland buffer shall be maintained within one hundred fifty 50 meters of the reference line.”

• Further engagement with this consultant will not improve the document and will further delay the clarification of LHDA’s role in zonation. The few good recommendations need to be taken on board and developed in-house. Further suggestions are made in Appendix 7.

2010-03-31

• Pages 44 to 72 appear to have been cut and pasted from sources relevant to the United States of America, and they are not properly acknowledged as such. The zoning recommendations on pages 92 to 99 are taken directly from the Bloemhof Dam Management Plan (Northwest Province, RSA) but acknowledgement of the source is made.

• LHDA may wish to consider its options in the light of such unprofessional work.

2010-03-31

10. Public Health Public Health & HIV/AIDS Policies

• Final review of the public health and HIV/AIDS policy documents have been completed.

• Merge the two policies into a single public health policy document immediately.

2010-03-31



Projects Present situation Recommended action Finish date • Arrangements for mainstreaming of the policies into the LHDA

administrative and management instruments are being made. • The decision for implementation is

through a staff training workshop where the CEO and Divisional and Branch Managers will be challenged to apply the policies in their daily work and help to educate their staff on the implications of the policies.

2010-03-31

• The Human Resources Branch is currently responsible for the implementation of the policies and has suggested the incorporation of the policy documents into the LHDA Staff Manual and Instruments. The Branch will be assisted by the M&E in monitoring the implementation process by developing appropriate monitoring indices.

• The Human Resources Branch incorporate the policies into the LHDA staff Manual and initiate the motivation for the workshop to launch the main-streaming of the public health policy in LHDA administrative and legislative instrument.

2010-03-10

• The CEO will ensure that all Divisional Managers are accountable for the successful implementation of the policies at the operational and administrative levels, including the training and orientation of staff and communities that come under them.

• The CEO should establish a committee that will oversee the implementation of the public health policy at every level of LHDA activities and functions.

2010-03-31

• There are no mechanisms to assess implementation of the public health policy and how this affects organizational performance.

• Identify and monitor KPIs for corporate public health

2009-10-31

KLM WATSAN • KLM WATSAN is currently at a stand-still as construction was suspended in March 2009 when the PoE recommendation to discontinue construction under the LHWP was accepted.

• Restart construction immediately as the community still with no facilities are disgruntled.

2009-10-31

• There are some administrative hiccups as the full financial accounting for the funds used has not been submitted for audit. Reportedly M8.3million was used for constructing 65 VIPs and 3 water systems with some incomplete VIPs and water systems.

• Audit the project expenditure to enable the determination of the balance of money that will be the basis for resource mobilization to enable completion of the project.

2009-10-31

• There are remaining resources including funds cement blocks, block making equipment and other building materials the total amount of which has not been estimated.

• Prepare an inventory of funds equipment.

2009-10-31



Projects Present situation Recommended action Finish date • There is a balance of VIPS and water systems still to be built. • Determine the VIPs and water systems

still to be developed and estimate the finances required to complete the project.

2009-10-31

• LHWP has given an order to auction the project vehicles even when a decision to hand over the construction to LHDA special projects was made.

• Rescind the order to auction the project vehicles since the vehicles will be needed to complete the rest of the construction.

2009-10-31

• There is a lot of rubble and left-over building sand and ballast stones at the block making site.

• Rehabilitate he block making site according to the policies and standards applied to the rest of the dam construction in LHWP areas.

2009-11-30

• There is currently no security provided for the equipment and stocks at the block making sites and there is a risk of loosing the machinery and stocks through theft. Current security arrangements are inadequate as the single guard placed there is never around to guard the materials and equipment.

• Provide proper security for the remaining materials and assets at the storage and block making site.

2009-10-31

• Should construction be initiated under LHDA, there is a risk of wastage and shrinkage.

• Establish a project management oversight team to regularly monitor procurement of both labour and materials.

2009-10-31

• Not dates are set for completion of KLM WATSAN • Define a budget and timeline for completion of KLM WATSAN.

2009-11-30

11. Community infrastructure The Community Infrastructure and Development Policy

• The Community Infrastructure and Development Policy was again reviewed along with plans for its implementation. As noted in POE 51, this Policy addresses infrastructure development in the 44 highlands, foothills, and lowlands villages hosting the Phase 1B relocated and resettled households. The Community Infrastructure and Development Policy overall is sound. The POE feels strongly that communal compensation funds should go to the LLEs owed this

• LHDA should intensify its efforts to work with government ministries, district administration, traditional authorities, and community councils in working out arrangements for the fair use of communal compensation funds.

2010-01-01



Projects Present situation Recommended action Finish date compensation and their host communities and community councils and not to government, something that has been recommended in some quarters. Instead, work should be done with all stakeholders, including the communities, government, local institutions, and traditional authorities, to come up with a way to handle the communal compensation issues.

12. KFF pilot trout production KFF reports & way forward

• KFF monthly reports are not being received by NES. This is a condition of the RoD. PoE met with KFF and advised the situation.

• KFF is sampling water quality which so far is not different from Katse water quality generally. But KFF is not sampling the sediment (beneath trout cages and control) as required by the RoD. PoE advised KFF of this shortcoming.

• LHDA is not collaborating with KFF in respect of water quality monitoring, by comparing and discussing results. KFF’s monthly report includes a response sheet that is not completed and returned.

• The RoD expires on 2010-08-03, and application for renewal was required 12 months in advance but has not yet been applied for. PoE advised KFF of this.

• KFF has not yet reached its RoD permitted upper limit of production for the pilot project (300 tons per year).

• LHDA is the Lessor, KFF the Lessee. LHDA is not pursuing the progress and possible impacts of the production project (ie not checking on conformance to the RoD conditions and MoU).

• LHDA must facilitate the conformance to RoD conditions, and keep under review water quality & sediment monitoring, plus other relevant issues, since these inform on the performance of the pilot project.

2010-03-31

MOU & community involvement

• The MOU requires that KFF make a twice-annual payment, as a percentage of gross sales value of fish produced, to Katse Fish Farms Steering Committee. Two payments have reportedly been made.

• LHDA is not monitoring the MOU and lease agreement

• LHDA must monitor the MOU and the lease entered into with KFF, and play an active role as a party to the MOU and as the Lessor.

2010-03-31

Large-scale fish production, regulatory framework, and

• LHDA has approved go-ahead of EIAs by KFF and Advance Africa (another proponent in trout production) for big trout production operations in LHWP dams. This has been done without defining a

• LHDA immediately withdraw the EIA go-ahead it gave to trout production industry players.

2010-03-31



Projects Present situation Recommended action Finish date monitoring of projects regulatory system, without calling for tenders, and without awarding

tenders (identifying preferred bidders). It is best practice for (a) the regulatory framework to be set up as the first step (cf Botswana Dept of Wildlife & National Parks, and South African National Parks), (b) the EIA to be required only of the preferred bidder, with the tender awarded subject to a favourable RoD. EIAs for big projects are expensive to undertake (order of magnitude M106). It is not feasible to undertake a proper EIA without knowing the rules (the regulatory framework). Developing a regulatory framework in parallel will waste not save time. This does not mean that the potential bidders should not be consulted in developing the regulatory framework – quite the reverse.

• LHDA undertook in writing to review the estimates on the carrying capacity of the reservoirs to ensure that projects licensed for operations are within limits. This is a false promise. The carrying capacity has been extensively reviewed already. No amount of further paperwork alone is going to help. Only practical testing will further contribute. That is why a conservative pilot study was instituted. The pilot study is still under way. The carrying capacity can be established only over time and with practical testing and monitoring of trout production operations and water quality.

• Trout production in Mohale is a non-starter because the measures to protect the Maloti Minnow are incomplete – specifically a barrier on the Senqunyane has not been constructed. Risk of extinction of the endangered Maloti Minnow was aggravated by LHWP, and LHDA has already committed itself to the protection of this fish. The protection amounts to the mitigation of an externality, just as protecting affected communities from impoverishment. The high cost of the barrier is not a bucket-load of cash down the drain – the money will circulate through the Lesotho economy, creating jobs and demands for goods and services. A sincere and costly effort to protect



Projects Present situation Recommended action Finish date the Minnow might be cheaper inflated interest on loans for Phase 2 because Lesotho is environmentally reckless.

• A regulatory framework would typically include at least the following • The rules of the tendering process. This would include the basis of

how tenders will be scored and awarded (pre-qualification criteria, then for qualified bidders: project description, sources of finance, capital investment, projected cash flow, concession fee offer, employment and empowerment, other benefits, outline environmental risk management). The preferred bidder would be given the right to proceed subject to an EIA and favourable RoD.

• Concession contract – the rights to produce trout in time, location, amount, containment of environmental impacts whether or not covered in EIA or EMP, conformance to the project as outlined in the bid unless modified with the approval of NES and LHDA, comply with the laws of the land (this is a lawful business), project monitoring and independent auditing (appointment of auditor subject to regulator’s approval) be undertaken by the concessionaire (at his cost) to proactively demonstrate compliance, typically contract up for review every 5 years when others might bid but the incumbent would have first right of refusal.

• The regulator would typically appoint his own project manager to oversee the proper (conforms to concession contract) development and operation of the concession

• LHDA would hire the services of a professional to develop the regulation, and this would be done in part by consulting the prospective and then later the pre-qualified bidders. The bidders must be assured that the playing field is level.

• LHDA must withdraw its undertaking to review and establish the trout production carrying capacity of the reservoirs, and make clear that this is figure that can be approximated only gradually over time, by practical testing.

2010-03-31

• LHDA must construct the fish barrier on the Senqunyane River and secure protection for the Maloti Minnow before it offers Mohale Reservoir for

2010-06-30



Projects Present situation Recommended action Finish date commercial trout production.

• LHDA must engage a consultant to develop the regulatory framework for the commercial trout production operations. LHDA must do this in part by workshops with the consultant, LHWC, LHDA and PoE.

2010-06-30

• In preparing a regulatory framework, LHDA must take into account the there are several users of the fish stocks in the reservoirs – the caged trout producers who produce their own stocks, and then the users of the wild fishery (that is liable to be stimulated by the fish food and nutrient inputs of the fish production operations) including artisanal fishermen who might use boats and nets, casual fishermen using handlines or other gear from the shore, and recreational fisherman (tourists) mostly from outside Lesotho. To avoid conditions of an open access fishery that gets overfished, regulation is warranted – the level of exploitation must be controlled in the knowledge of how the fishery is performing (monitor fish and fishing pressure). A consultant experienced in fishing regulation is required.

• LHDA must engage a consultant to develop the regulatory framework for the wild fishery, and do this in part by workshops with the consultant, LHWC, LHDA and PoE.

2010-10-31

• Monitor fish stocks and fishing pressure in the reservoirs

Start now, on-going

• LHDA consultation with players in the commercial fish production industry involves sensitive information about the individual players, and this must be respected and not divulged.

2010-03-31

13. Other issues Light pollution in project areas

• PoE noted that floodlights are apparently to be installed along the crest of the Mohale Dam. This is not for security purposes but for cosmetic reasons. Light pollution is becoming an issue around the world. It results in the waste of electricity, interferes with astronomy,

• LHDA and LHWC must review all deployment of lights in the project area and require full justification and projection of energy consumption costs.

2010-03-31


2009 – Critical projects Page 29 of 73


Present situation Recommended action Finish date

PoE Report 52, October

Projects and has far-reaching impacts on biodiversity. In particular, lights attract and kill insects in large numbers. This in turn may affect pollination of plants, disruption of ecosystems and impacts on insectivorous animals like bats. The deployment of excessive lighting by LHDA is wasteful and unnecessary in the Lesotho Highlands.

PoE has provided an introduction to the global problems of light pollution in Appendix 8.

Improving performance

• Performance on projects undertaken by LHDA in-house or by contractors or consultants has improved over the years but it still falls short, and there is in any case the unending quest to improve. A more expeditious LHDA is desired – to complete projects within budget, on time and to a high standard. How do we do this?

The following are proposed • For each project identify a project

champion and appoint a task team drawn from wherever in LHDA and even outside LHDA.

• Bring in critical expertise as needed. • Have short iterations of plan-

implement. • Within the iterations have formal

consultation through planning and implementation, involving, LHDA, LHWC, consultant/contractor, PoE.

• Exercise close supervision over contractors and consultants.

On-going

PoE Report 52, October 2009 – Resettlement, relocation & LLEs Page 30 of 73

Appendix 1 Resettlement, relocation and LLEs RESETTLEMENT, RELOCATION, AND LOCAL LEGAL ENTITY (LLE) FORMATION IN THE LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER PROJECT PHASE 1 The implementation of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (Phase 1) included social and environmental impact assessments, baseline studies of people and natural resources likely to be affected by the project, the payment of compensation to project-affected people, and the resettlement and relocation of 71 households in Phase 1A and 321 households in Phase 1B.

During the course of implementation of Phase 1B of the project, LHDA's consultants (Hunting/Consult 4 Joint Venture) worked closely with local communities in the Mohale Basin. They assessed preferred destinations, found out about whether people wished to relocate in the basin or resettle outside of the mountains, and they and LHDA provided familiarization tours for people to potential destinations. On the basis of the these tours, combined with information on the kinds of housing people would receive and on the compensation package available, individuals began to make decisions as to whether they wished to relocate or resettle and where they wanted to go.

The consultants made careful measurements of the assets of the households that

were affected by the infrastructure of the project (access roads, tunnels, the dam area, gravel pits, and construction camps) and of those that would later be affected by the filling of the reservoir. Forms were filled out on each household that became part of the Compensation Management Register. The consultants measured all arable fields below what was estimated to be Full Supply Level (FSL) of the Mohale Reservoir. It was more difficult to determine the amount of land left to each household after inundation, so it was not until 2003-2004 that a cadastral survey determined these land areas, allowing for an accurate assessment of the total amounts of arable land possessed by each household. Once the preferred options of the various project-affected households were determined, the planning for the actual movement of the households began. LHDA agreed to cover the cost of hiring drovers to drive the herds of livestock to new grazing areas in the highlands or in the foothills. Given the fact that most of the households were living in areas without roads, arrangements had to be made for animal transport to carry the household goods to points where they could be loaded on trucks and moved. The LHWP Phase 1B resettlement and relocation was divided into three stages, which were as follows. In Stage 1, the Pre-construction Stage, a total of 99 households were moved, many of which had been affected by the construction of roads and other project works. In line with the preferences expressed by the various households, 37 Stage 1 households were relocated within the Mohale Basin, 38 households moved to the foothills, and 24 households went to Maseru. The bulk of Stage 1 resettlement took place from 1996 to 1998. Two households opted for self-resettlement, accepting cash compensation and building their own houses and other facilities (e.g. kraals for their livestock) and undertaking the move themselves.



In Stage 2, The pre-inundation Stage, 222 households were relocated or resettled. LHDA offered to construct gardens either in the yards of resettler households or nearby. Stage 2 resettlement took place in the period from 2002 and 2006. In this period, 27 households chose to relocate while the rest (N=195) moved either to the foothills or the lowlands. In some cases, entire villages resettled, but in the process they dispersed to different destinations. In Stage 3, Post Inundation, households situated dangerously close to the reservoir and whose access to their fields was cut off, relocated or were moved to the foothills. they were in their new homes by 2006. Four people had died, leaving their property to households that were resettled. In summary, the affected households were divided in to three stages (see Table 1). Stage 1 and Stage 2 household moves were completed in the Table 1. Households Relocated or Resettled by Destination and Stage in Phase 1B of the LHWP Destination Stage Basin Foothills Maseru Total____ Stage 1 37 38 24 99 Stage 2 27 190 5 222 Stage 3 103 103 Total 167 228 29 424 _________________________________________________________________ Note: Data obtained from the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority period between 1996 and 2006. 321 households either relocated in the Mohale Basin or resettled outside of the basin in the foothills or lowlands. Although individual families and communities had been able to choose their resettlement destinations, the choice of a specific site for the new house was subject to limitations, often imposed by local authorities and host communities with whom the resettlers had to negotiate.

Some of the resettler households moved as groups to places in the foothills or lowlands that they felt would be receptive to their presence. Thirty six households from two of the reservoir-affected communities moved to Ha Makotoko in the foothills. Twenty two households moved to a housing project at Makhoakhoeng in Maseru. Another set of 22 households moved to Ha Matala in Maseru. Resettlers moved to 3 other locations in Maseru and 10 other locations in the lowlands. All told, in Stage 2, households resettled in 16 locations in the foothills, 10 in the lowlands, and 5 in Maseru. Twenty seven households in Stage 2 relocated to 4 communities in the Mohale Basin. The overall result was dispersal of the previously stable and socially integrated mountain communities. Small groups of relatives and neighbours nevertheless remained together, or at least close to one another, in their new locations.

For many of the households in the Phase 1B area physical resettlement and relocation was followed by a difficult period of adaptation and uncertainty. On the one hand they had to reconstruct their sources of household income and on the other they had to work out relationships with their new neighbours, settle their children into new



schools, adapt to new climatic and environmental conditions, and learn to manage their new financial arrangements, which involved handling lump sum or annual cash compensation.

For the most part, the resettlers integrated reasonably well with their hosts, entering into sharecropping and land rental agreements with them and intermarrying. Host villagers sometimes saw the resettlers as resources since they were coming in with cash from their compensation payments. A worry of some of the host villages was that having additional people in their midst would place greater strains upon their grazing, firewood, and water resources. There was particular concern about the addition of substantial numbers of livestock on the range. As it turned out, many people who moved out of the highlands left their cattle, sheep, goats, and donkeys behind in the highlands in the care of relatives or herders hired to manage them.

Initially, Phase 1B resettlers moving to the foothills had difficulties getting access to land for crops, in part because host populations asked high prices for the land or were reluctant to allow the incomers to rent or sharecrop. As familiarity and mutual trust developed the situation began to change and within a few years nearly all of the resettled households that wanted to engage in agriculture had land of their own, or rented land or share-cropped. Some of the resettlers who started off renting or share-cropping were able to buy land as they settled in to their new surroundings.

The households that moved to the capital Maseru found new opportunities as well as difficulties. On the positive side, some people were able to take advantage of the urban economic opportunities, investing in malaene, rental property located close to the industrial area where there were garment factories. These were flourishing at the time, but by 2005 the massive influx of Chinese-made garments on to the world, as well as Lesotho's, markets and China's admission to the World Trade Organization, led to a crisis in Lesotho's garment industry. Most of the factories closed down, leaving large numbers of workers unemployed. This resulted in a decline in the demand for rental accommodation. Some individuals took their lump sum compensation payments and invested in taxis, a highly competitive field. These people were also affected by the economic downturn in the textile industry. At the same time the settlers found that living costs in the city were far higher than in the mountains.

The transition from an agricultural and pastoral life to urban life was fraught with uncertainty. One group who had moved to Makhoakhoeng in Maseru, for example, found that their hosts refused to allow them to bury one of their members who had died there. While this problem was eventually resolved, it was not before there were calls from the hosts for the settlers to be relocated by LHDA to another area. These kinds of host-resettler issues continue to be important ones in the implementation of the LHWP. Interviews by the POE with people who had resettled in the foothills and lowlands or who had relocated in the highlands (38 people in 14 communities) revealed a variety of views on whether they felt themselves to be better or worse off as a result of the Highlands Water Project. Half of the households who had moved to the foothills said that their agricultural yields and commercial sales of agricultural products were now



higher. At the same time, they said that their cash expenditures for agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertilizers were far greater. Nearly all of the people resettled in the foothills and lowlands said that they now had greater access to social services and markets, but that their costs of living had increased.

Of the 321 households that have had to move as a result of the Mohale Reservoir, dam and other infrastructure development, 61 opted to relocate locally, in the Mohale Basin. Some of them felt that they then had to contend with greater competition for grazing, arable land, and natural resources such as firewood. People from several communities in the Mohale basin relocated to a nearby village, Ha Koporale, above the water line, in part because of the good grazing there. On these steep slopes there was hardly any land suitable for arable and gardening purposes, a fact obvious to the residents but not, apparently, to the incomers. When the new settlers arrived in Ha Koporale, they began trying to acquire land to cultivate, which led to friction with their hosts, and since their efforts were largely unrewarded their livelihoods were also affected. Households headed by women or by elderly people were usually short of labour and often found themselves worse off after the LHWP than they were before, in spite of the Minimum Threshold Payments. The relatives, friends and neighbours who had previously helped out in the fields and with herding had moved away. Many households split up, with younger members moving to town or starting new homesteads, leaving behind the elderly people. Information from social workers in the Mohale Field Operations Branch in October, 2009 indicated that many of the elderly people both in the highlands and in the resettled households in the foothills lowlands were having a difficult time. Some of the elderly were classified as especially vulnerable by the LHDA FOB and were receiving assistance in the form of funds and food, a substantial portion of these goods provided by individual LHDA officers at their own expense.

The various surveys and reports on the affected families1 show that the LHWP had widely differing affects on the households, families and individuals who were affected by the project.2 Some households increased their incomes by working on the dam, tunnels, feeder roads, or the water and sanitation projects carried out in the Mohale area. These were by their nature temporary jobs. There was some dissatisfaction expressed by local people as to the opportunities they had to get work as opposed to people brought in by the contractors.

Over time, some households were able to capitalize on development opportunities provided by the Project or to invest their compensation funds in enterprises such as

1 See the files and reports of LHDA (e.g. Maema et al 1997; Tshabalala and Kisubi 2003) and the Field Operations Branches, and the reports by SW and B&A Consult (Contract 669), and Human Sciences Research Council (Contract 1204) as well as reports by academic researchers and non-government organisations. 2 Households in Lesotho generally consist of one or more extended families who are tied together through marriage, kinship, or friendship; they often share a compound and may cook and eat together at least some of the time. Nuclear families usually consist of a husband, wife, and children and sometimes elderly parents or relatives. Basotho generally are patrilineal and patrilocal, although there is significant variation in residence and descent (Murray 1981; Casalis 1997). As Braun (2005: 35) notes, “Despite the residence pattern chosen, the strength of patrilineal kin groups remains strong.”



poultry production or rental property. But there were also households whose income levels fell substantially, especially immediately after resettlement.

LHDA, under its development programme, has supported a range of institutions and activities including co-operatives, range management associations, and agricultural extension services for the benefit of both the resettlers and their hosts. Co-operatives and LLEs are the organizations that were established by the project. Under the 1997 Compensation Policy (as amended) these entities receive communal compensation. Co-operatives are found upstream of the dams, while local legal entities (LLEs) are found downstream of Katse and Mohale. LLEs receive communal compensation as a function of the impacts of the project on their grazing and other natural resources. In order to access this compensation, the LLEs have to be registered and they have to have a memorandum of understanding with the LHDA and the Department of Co-operatives. As of October, 2009, there were 23 cooperatives upstream in Katse and 22 Local Legal Entities downstream for a total of 45 LLEs. In Mohale there were 54 co-operatives upstream, some of which have been registered and provided their first tranche of compensation. There are 32 LLEs downstream of Mohale. The total number of Phase 1B LLEs is currently 86. In the 1A project area all such organizations have been formed and provided with their first tranche of compensation under the Compensation Policy. There are 23 registered co-operatives upstream in the Katse, Lejone, and ‘Muela (“KLM”) area, which have so far been paid a total of approximately M 11 million. As of October, 2009, the LLEs in the KLM area (Phase 1A) and Mohale (Phase 1B) had begun 20 businesses and income generation, while 15 more were in preparation. Downstream of the Katse Dam on the Malibamatso River, 22 LLEs have been formed, which have so far received M 27 million in compensation.

While some of the LLEs have clearly flourished, others are harder to assess. Co-operatives in general have a record of being complicated to implement in Lesotho, and people tend to be wary of committing their own resources to them. Individuals may enrol as members on a tentative basis, to see if the cooperative brings any tangible benefits, and if not they leave after a year or two. The number of cooperatives established therefore gives no assurance that they will survive or thrive. A number of project-affected people in the highlands and resettlement areas are diversifying by raising chickens for consumption, sale, and egg production. One farmer was producing a wide variety of vegetables (onions, cabbage, and many others) along with apples and peaches that he was selling to neighbours and to teachers and health workers at the local mission hospital at Ha Mahau in the Lejone area. Some co-operative members produce and sell tree seedlings, flowers, vegetables, and fruits.

As LHDA's Phase 1 resettlement and compensation programmes draw to a close, and funding for its various components, including the Rural Development Program (RDP) terminates, the question of co-operative and LLE sustainability becomes paramount. Without detailed socioeconomic investigations and case studies of the co-



operatives and LLEs it is difficult to say how effective they are. It is, however, possible to say that (1) many of the cooperatives are engaging in entrepreneurial enterprises, (2) there is wide variation in the capacity of the LLEs to manage their finances, (3) LHDA FOB personnel, the Technical Assistance Unit, and the Department of Co-operatives are working closely together to assist the LLEs. There are at least 16 different kinds of business and income generating activities in which co-operatives and LLEs are engaged. The returns on the investment vary considerably, but some of the activities are proving to generate income and enhance livelihoods in other ways (e.g. reducing labour of women through the availability of hammer mills to grind maize, sorghum and other goods). The co-operatives and LLEs in Katse and Mohale currently are engaged in a variety of economic activities, including managing a boat on the Katse Reservoir, running a petrol station, and running shops that sell agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and poultry feed. Craft production continues among some households but finding markets for the crafts and sewing and knitted products continues to be an issue.

There are also 5 main kinds of ‘development’ activities which some LLEs are doing: (1) water systems, (2) road-building, (3) hammer mills, (4) houses to be used for tourists, and (5) electrification. The success of these efforts varies, in part because of the complexity of the projects, especially electrification, which requires getting assistance from TAU and FOB income generation and compensation officers who may or may not know much about electrification projects. The Katse FOB is already planning a meeting with the Lincoln Electric Company to get information on materials and unit costs of electricity-related activities. Co-operative members will have to purchase various kinds of wire, electrical fixtures, as well as items that use electricity (e.g. teapots, stoves, televisions) and they will have to negotiate with the Lesotho Electricity Company and nearby communities to get on the electricity grid. An open question remains as to how effective a strategy electrification will be. Clearly, local communities, both resettlers and their hosts, would like to have electricity. They would also like to improve their roads, water and sanitation systems, and enhance other physical and social infrastructure. Table 2 Milestones in the Planning and Implementation of the LHWP Phase 1 Year(s) Milestones 1985 Feasibility Study for the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) begins 1986 Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (LHDA) established with the

signing of the LHWP Treaty and Order 1987-1996

Implementation of advanced infrastructure (roads, electricity) and construction of dams and tunnels in Katse and ‘Muela areas (Phase 1A of the LHWP)

1995-1996

Feasibility studies and resettlement planning for Phase 1B of the LHWP begin

1996 Completion of Katse Dam, the largest dam in Phase 1A of the LHWP 1997 Reservoir-Induced Seismicity (RIS) sees earthquakes having impacts on 7

villages in the Katse catchment; in one village, Mapaleng, 11 houses were destroyed, resulting in displacement of a dozen families (January, 1997)

1997 Adoption of revised compensation and rehabilitation policy based on the



LHWP Phase 1A experience 1998 Construction of Mohale Dam (Phase 1B) begins 1996-1998

Phase 1B Stage 1 resettlement and relocation implemented

2002- 2006

Phase 1B Stage 2 resettlement and relocation implemented

2003 Completion of Mohale Dam construction 2004 Official inauguration of Phase 1 of LHWP (16 March, 2004)

2006 Completion of relocation of households affected by the Mohale reservoir 2007 LHWP Implementation completion report (ICR) by the World Bank 2008 Decisions reached by LHDA and LHWC on Stage 3 (residual) resettlement 2009 Announcement by Lesotho and South Africa of plans for LHWP Phase 2 References Braun, Yvonne (2005) Feminist Political Ecology in South Africa: The Social Impacts of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Irvine, California. Bureau of Statistics (2004) LHDA Compensation Policy Minimum Threshold Assessment Study. Maseru, Lesotho: Agriculture and Environment Statistics Division, Bureau of Statistics, Government of Lesotho. Casalis, Eugene (1997) The Basutos. (Originally published 1861). Morija, Lesotho: Morija Museum and Archives. Human Sciences Research Council (2009) Volume 1. Main Report: Findings of a Study Conducted in the Upstream Areas of Phase 1 of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Contract 1204, Lesotho Highlands Development Authority. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council and Maseru: Lesotho Highlands Development Authority. Maema, M., T. Putsoane, K. Sefeane, P. Bertilsson, M. Molaoa, and T. Gwintsa (1997) Making Resettlement a Community Development Project: Case Study of Katse Dam Resettlement in Lesotho. Manuscript on file at the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, Maseru, Lesotho. Murray, Colin (1981) Families Divided: The Impact of Migrant Labour in Lesotho. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. SW-B&A Joint Venture (2002a) Contract LHDA 669 (VO2): A Socio-economic Monitoring Program for Phases 1A and 1B Affected Households. Volume One: Main Report. Maseru, Lesotho: Lesotho Highlands Development Authority. SW-B&A Joint Venture (2002b) Contract LHDA 669 (VO2) A Socio-economic Monitoring Program for Phases 1A and 1B Affected Households. Volume Three:



Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation. Maseru, Lesotho: Lesotho Highlands Development Authority. Tshabalala, Mavuso and Wilson Kisubi (2003) Socioeconomic Monitoring of Households Affected by Phase 1 of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project: A Synthesis of 2000/01 Results. Maseru, Lesotho: Monitoring and Information Branch, Environment and Social Services Group, Division, Lesotho Highlands Development Authority.


PoE Report 52, October 2009 – Maloti Minnow Page 38 of 73

Appendix 2 Five years of Maloti Minnow conservation Extracts from PoE Reports since 2004 May 2004 Appendix 3 Maloti Minnow conservation.

With the establishment of the Lesotho Biodiversity Trust (LBT), the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) has moved some of the responsibility for conservation action on the Critically Endangered Maloti Minnow to the LBT. The Trust is addressing this challenge by establishing a Maloti Minnow Project Steering Committee under Professor Maitland Seaman of the University of the Free State. The acknowledged expert on the minnow, Dr Johann Rall, made a presentation on what needs to be done to the second meeting of the Trustees of the LBT on 28 May 2004. There is an urgent need to make progress and fast-track the program. Mohale reservoir is filling, and yet nothing is known about the biology of the lake. An immediate priority is to ascertain whether any exotic fish are already in Mohale, as they constitute a threat to the Maloti Minnows in all three rivers flowing into Mohale, the Jordane, Senqunyane and Bokong. The most effective way to get a fish monitoring program going in Mohale is to redeploy the fisheries team from Katse to Mohale, and Dr Rall and Professor Seaman have written this into their proposal. However, both scientists and the PoE were shocked to hear, for the first time, that the fisheries project is to be abandoned and the personnel paid off. This is a serious blow to the Maloti Minnow project, and the LHDA Board and the Lesotho Highlands Water Commission (LHWC) are requested to review this decision as a matter of urgency. The LBT still has no funds in its account, since the Deed of Trust has yet to be registered. The priority for funding the Maloti Minnow project is to appoint a LBT Conservation Officer to oversee the work. The LBT needs the support of LHDA in several ways to make a significant intervention that will prevent the extinction of the Maloti Minnow. These include support in monitoring fish populations in Mohale reservoir, and in the provision of facilities in the Mohale area for the Maloti Minnow conservation project. While the conservation of the minnow may seem to have been placed at something of an arm’s-length from LHDA by the establishment of the LBT, it must be remembered that this is but one part of the Maloti Minnow Policy and Action Plan, which is reproduced below as a reminder that LHDA, as an agent of the Government of Lesotho and which has acceded to the Convention on Biological Diversity, carries the ultimate responsibility for the survival of the species. September 2005 The LBT was established by the Project Authorities with seed money of M9.2 million. Its primary task is to implement the Maloti Minnow policy and Conservation Action Plan. There is sufficient background knowledge and professional guidance



available for the LBT to get to work on the minnow project. During the PoE mission in April 2005, it was stressed that the Maloti Minnow is a high priority for the whole LHWP. Failure to make appropriate interventions to prevent the minnow from moving closer to extinction will not simply be seen as a failure of the Lesotho Biodiversity Trust, but of the LHDA and the LHWC as well. PoE is extremely concerned to find during its September 2005 mission that there has been limited progress towards establishing the Maloti Minnow conservation programme. Although the LBT has appointed a suitable person as the project Scientific Officer, he has been unable to do any work in the field because of the failure of the project authorities to achieve the apparently simple transaction of transferring the equipment from the fisheries project at Ha Lejone to the LBT, and of finding a suitable base for the project executant. Equipment from Ha Lejone In a letter dated 18 July 2005 from the Chief Executive of the LHDA to the Commission Secretary of the LHWC, a list of equipment from Ha Lejone was provided, with a request that it be donated for use in the Maloti Minnow project. When PoE visited Ha Lejone on 9 September, we found the former offices and laboratories of the former fisheries project unlocked and all the equipment, apart from some fishing nets, missing. Earlier the same day the PoE had visited Katse FOB where we were told that the Ha Lejone equipment had been moved to Katse for safekeeping. We asked for a list of the material, and were given an inventory of household and office furniture and equipment, which had no mention of the technical and scientific equipment formerly housed at the fisheries project. The following items are among those now unaccounted for: SMS MZ-50 camera Black & Decker drill Ryobi angle grinder Battery charger Lowrance fish finder Microfiche reader Kern electronic scale PH meter 9025 Conductivity meter 9033 Dissolved O2 meter 9143

Logging DO meter Nikon microscope Presica balance Hanna conductivity meter Water sampler Electroshocker Fishing rods Insect net Seine net Life jackets

PoE urges LHDA and the project authorities to locate this equipment as a matter of urgency, and to place it in the custodianship of the LBT so that it may be cleaned, serviced and repaired if necessary. PoE also noticed that the boats at Ha Lejone are deteriorating due to lack of maintenance, and some of the small fibre-glass boats are in need of repair. The LBT Scientific Officer has been trained in boat maintenance and repair, and should be entrusted with the task of restoring the equipment from Ha Lejone.



[Note in October 2009: this equipment was never located, and no charges of theft were ever laid] April 2006 Implications of Mohale fish monitoring for Maloti Minnow conservation The warning bells are now sounding for the progressive increase of Smallmouth Yellowfish in the Mohale reservoir, and the colonisation of all the tributaries flowing into the dam, ie the Jordane, Bokong and Senqunyane rivers. This is the ‘amber light’ that must trigger an immediate and emphatic response from the LBT, the LHDA and the Project Authorities. Suggested actions follow below. Rainbow Trout are regularly netted by artisanal fishermen in Katse, and are likely to move through the Mohale-Katse transfer tunnel. When this happens, the ‘red light’ will start flashing to indicate that the Maloti Minnow is in grave danger of extinction unless appropriate interventions are made. Recommended interventions • Continue regular and thorough monitoring of fish populations in Mohale by gill-

netting with appropriate mesh size at all ten existing sites, and preferably at more sites.

• Institute an artisanal fishery in Mohale using gillnets of a mesh size that will catch

all yellowfish up to a fork length of 300 mm in order to put pressure on the new population and to prevent as many fish as possible from reaching sexual maturity.

• Institute intensive gillnetting in the Jordane, Bokong and Senqunyane rivers

upstream of the full supply level of Mohale dam. Train local people in the use of these nets, and monitor their activities on a regular basis.

• Launch appropriate action to revisit the issue of fish barriers on the Senqunyane

and Bokong rivers, using local labour and hand construction methods instead of civil engineering technology.

Fish barriers revisited Dr Johann Rall, the acknowledged authority on Maloti Minnow, strongly promoted the view that the only lasting solution to protect Maloti Minnow populations in the upstream rivers from the inevitable invasion of Mohale Dam by predatory fish like Rainbow Trout and Smallmouth Yellowfish was the construction of barriers on the Senqunyane and Bokong rivers. The Jordane already has a natural barrier in the form of the Pampiri waterfall. The artificial barriers would prevent the upstream movement of predators, and would serve as sanctuaries for the conservation of the last important populations of Maloti Minnow. Rall (2005) provides details of the specification of such barriers: they must have a drop of a least 3 and preferably 4 metres and the substrate below must not allow fish to congregate or attain the necessary high acceleration speeds for leaping vertically.



Africon Consulting Engineers produced designs and costings, with indicative amounts of around M10 million for each of two proposed barriers. The cost of these barriers was based on the notion that they would be designed to endure for 100 years without maintenance. The PoE and others argued against the barriers at that stage, because of excessive cost (in the context of Lesotho) and their fallibility to human perversity. Instead, funds were invested in the establishment of the Lesotho Biodiversity Trust, the rationale being that a dedicated NGO would provide the necessary long-term momentum for Maloti Minnow conservation, which would include raising off-shore funds for the construction of artificial barriers as the ultimate solution to protecting the remaining populations of minnows. That inevitable stage has now been reached. Serious consideration must be given to initiating a project that will result in barrier construction to protect, first, the Senqunyane river and, second, the Bokong river, from invading predatory fish. This project requires two main thrusts: • Fundraising, in Lesotho, South Africa, and internationally. • Barrier design, with serious consideration given to the possibility of construction by

local artisans using mainly manual construction methods. Barrier construction The PoE has noted with considerable admiration the capacity in Lesotho to undertake medium-scale civil construction work using mainly manual labour and minimal equipment. We have observed and documented the construction of a road bridge across the Malibamatso River where the only mechanical equipment used was a motorised concrete mixer and a small motorised compacting machine to consolidate the bridge approaches. All other construction work, including production of concrete aggregate, steel reinforcing, shutter fixing, slab throwing and stone facing was done by hand, almost exclusively by women. The bridge construction involved diverting sequential parts of the river with sand bags so that foundations could be set on bed-rock. All this work was done to extremely high standards – as a visit to this bridge will confirm. The Panel believes that construction of an artificial waterfall on the Senqunyane River with a drop of 4 metres is both feasible and achievable by using local construction skills at a fraction of the cost quoted by civil engineering consultants. Use of local labour has further advantages in that job creation and poverty alleviation funding sources can be tapped. Ongoing maintenance can be provided as and when required by local workers, and it will not be a requirement to design structures that will last 100 years. October 2006 The inevitability of barrier construction PoE’s current view is that the original conclusion of LHDA 1041 that barriers to alien fish are the only long term solution to the conservation of the Maloti Minnow in its original habitat is correct. Since the project executant has removed the need for a



barrier on the Bokong, the requirement is now only for one structure on the Senqunyane. The construction of an artificial waterfall is an innovative and environmentally acceptable solution. PoE has previously suggested that the use of local labour working under the supervision of an engineer would probably result in a cost considerably lower than the M10 million previously estimated by Africon Consultants. Whatever the cost of the barrier, it is clear that the LBT will not be able to raise this money. Why LBT is unable to raise donor money for a barrier • Any new NGO, without a track record, no administrative staff, and no affiliation

to an international organization like IUCN (World Conservation Union) will struggle during its early years to establish the contacts and credibility to tap into donor funds

• The appointment of a professional, full-time fund-raiser involves an investment of at least two years before the first returns from donors can be expected. This is a reality of the highly competitive nature of the fundraising industry

• While the LBT has a good case for donors to support its species conservation work, educational initiatives, and general impact on biodiversity awareness in Lesotho, there is major donor resistance to funding capital expenses which are regarded as a project cost to the LHWP

The risks of not taking reasonable steps to protect the Maloti Minnow from extinction While the establishment of replicate populations of minnows outside the project area is a precaution, it is not a lasting solution which could be considered as ‘reasonable’ by the biodiversity conservation world. The leading authority on the Maloti Minnow has argued for the construction of a barrier on the Senqunyane as the minimum requirement for protecting part of the remaining population in its natural habitat. Even if malicious introduction of predatory fish should take place above the barrier, it is possible to remediate the situation and destroy the introduced fish. Without a barrier, no remedial action will be possible. The risks of not constructing a barrier on the Senqunyane are the following: • Negative criticism of the LHWP by the world conservation community and anti-

dam activists such as International Rivers Organization (IRN) • Insistence by the world conservation community and others that the Maloti

Minnow be safeguarded before any fisheries (artisanal yellowfish, or cage trout operations) are allowed in Mohale reservoir

• The ‘conservation community’ would most likely include international organizations such as the World Conservation Union, Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), Conservation International and Fauna & Flora International, while regional bodies such as the Endangered Wildlife Trust, WWF-South Africa and the Wildlife and Environmental Society of South Africa would add their voices to the protest

• Lesotho is a signatory to the International Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and could find itself in breach of the Convention because of failure to



implement reasonable steps to safeguard the Maloti Minnow from extinction. MTEC as the government agency responsible for applying the CBD in Lesotho could well be drawn into the debate that LHDA is responsible for building the barrier to protect the main population of the minnow in its natural habitat in the upper reaches of the Senqunyane River

• An embargo on development could result in financial and nutritional disadvantages to communities around Mohale, by being denied access to benefits of fishery activities

• The freezing of tourism activities around Mohale reservoir because of embargo on recreational fishing opportunities is another negative outcome, together with:

• Loss of opportunity to improve the lives of project-affected people • Negative perceptions from financiers about proceeding with Phase 2 of the LHWP • Waste of manpower and resources in dealing with complaints about lack of

reasonable interventions to prevent the Maloti Minnow from becoming extinct Conclusion The PoE urges the Project Authorities to accept that the construction of a barrier on the Senqunyane River is an inevitable project cost, and that work be initiated immediately to design the barrier and devise the most cost-effective manner in which it may be constructed, making the best use of local labour and skills. There is no time to delay this critical decision. PoE further proposes that the Project Authorities avoid a fruitless debate about the role and responsibilities of the Lesotho Biodiversity Trust in raising funds for the barriers, a task which is clearly beyond the capacity of the LBT. The construction of the barrier is a project cost, while the LBT has an important role to play in the long term monitoring of the Maloti Minnow, and taking remedial action to address any future threats. The LBT should be given until the end of June 2007 to demonstrate a significant improvement in performance, otherwise consideration should be given to dissolving the Trust. However, as established in terms of the Lesotho law, the donated funds cannot simply be taken back by the donor. May 2007 • Since PoE’s last visit in Oct 06, monitoring was conducted by both Conservation

Officer (CO) & Dr J. Rall. PoE had sight of the CO’s second report (Dec 06) & Quarterly Report (Jan-Mar 2007). Results of monitoring for success of transplanted populations reveal 3 of 4 populations are reproducing & transplantation appears successful. Monitoring of minnows in Senqunyane and Bokong rivers indicate strong populations. Minnows have not been found in inundated parts of both rivers. Monitoring for Smallmouth Yellowfish in Mohale Dam reveals a stable population which is now breeding. No yellowfish have been recorded in rivers, or in the gill nets set at the mouths of rivers. Fishing intensity has been increased from setting 12 nets once a month to setting 6 nets every day. No trout have yet been recorded in Mohale Dam. See Appendix 6.



• Monitoring for predators of Maloti Minnow (yellowfish and trout) to be continued diligently in Mohale Dam. It is critically important that the high intensity of netting is continued. As the population of yellowfish increases & nutrient levels in the dam decrease, there will be pressure on the yellowfish to invade the river systems.

• No aquaculture initiatives to be allowed on Mohale Dam until a barrier is in place.

• Construction of a barrier on the Senqunyane River to be pursued as a high priority.

September 2008 Maluti Minnow conservation programme The LBT has conducted very good work on monitoring the Maluti Minnow in its natural and historic distribution range in the Senqunyane, Bokong and Jorodane Rivers, and in the three areas where transplanted populations were introduced into new sanctuary rivers. The LBT has also monitored the colonisation of the Mohale Dam by fish that were kept out of the Senqunyane River system for millions of years by the Semonkoaneng waterfall, a natural barrier now rendered ineffective by the construction of the dam. Transplanted populations in the Maletsunyane, Quthing and Makhaleng Rivers are all doing well. Ongoing monitoring over the next 5-10 years is required to verify that these new populations remain viable. Although the Jordane River is part of the original habitat of the minnow, numbers were very low at the start of the project and some 365 fish were transplanted into the reaches above the Pampiri falls. This transplanted population is also doing well. The Panel warns against any optimistic perceptions that these four transplanted populations could offer hope for the long-term survival of the Maluti Minnow. Three are in rivers that apparently did not historically host viable populations, and the transplanted populations were relatively small, which could result in future limits to their viability through restricted genetic variability. These transplanted populations of minnows are of significant interest to evolutionary biologists, and constitute a unique experiment in conservation management that is of international importance. It is highly recommended by the Panel that ongoing monitoring of these populations and data collection be pursued. Now, at the end of September 2008, the Panel finds that there has been no progress on the design and building of the barrier, and the draft Terms of Reference for the EIA have only now been put before the Panel for its comments.

Intensive gillnetting to prevent yellowfish from entering the Senqunyane River from Mohale Dam was carried out from September 2007 to May 2008. The operation was successful in that 1,549 Smallmouth Yellowfish were removed from this site.

On 18 September 2008 the Panel met with the LBT Management Committee in Maseru and stressed the importance of repeating the intensive gillnetting during the summer months of 2008-2009, as another (desperate) measure to reduce the chances of yellowfish penetrating the upper reaches of the Senqunyane.



It has subsequently transpired that the Conservation Officer cannot implement intensive gillnetting at Mohale in September 2008 because his vehicle requires new tyres that were requested in July but have not yet been bought because of the administrative inefficiencies in the LHDA system.

The LBT is apparently seen as a low-priority activity within the LHDA, causing inefficiencies and delays that seriously compromise the work of the LBT, and place in jeopardy the reputation of the LHDA, the LHWC, and the Government of Lesotho.

This is simply not acceptable, and the Panel recommends that the project authorities make an immediate intervention to address this crisis. We provide more detail later in this document.

Conclusions The Lesotho Biodiversity Trust was founded as an innovative response to the challenge faced by major developments that place endangered species at risk. As such the LBT is a unique initiative – everyone associated with this pioneering endeavour should be proud of their efforts, from the past and present Trustees to the current workers. However, our best efforts are sometimes just not enough to get us over the hurdles, and when faced with overwhelming challenges there is a time and place to ask for help. Indeed, the inability to ask for help has resulted in the failure of numerous worthy endeavours, and the brave efforts of many people have been wasted as a result. The only realistic hope for the long-term survival of the Maluti Minnow is to protect and manage the populations in their original ancestral habitats of the Senqunyane, Bokong and Jordane Rivers. The primary and critical intervention is the construction of a barrier on the Senqunyane River to prevent access by invasive fish species to the upstream areas where they will destroy the minnows. Securing a viable, natural population of the Maluti Minnow in the Senqunyane catchment is the only acceptable outcome if Lesotho is to comply with its obligations as a signatory to the Convention on Biological Diversity. The only way this will be achieved is though the construction of a barrier on the Senqunyane River to prevent yellowfish and trout from penetrating the upper reaches of the river. If time and money allow, a second barrier on the Bokong River would provide additional insurance. Without barrier construction, the development of either artisanal or commercial fisheries in the Mohale reservoir cannot proceed. Without barrier construction, Phase 2 of the LHWP could be compromised. Without barrier construction, the reputation of the LHWP as an award-winning engineering project could be tarnished. Recommendations The Panel recommends that the barrier issue must immediately rise to the top of the agenda for both the project authorities and the LBT. There are some important and hard decisions to be made, but they have to be made, and soon.



• LBT Trustees should get together as soon as possible for an emergency meeting. • The debate is about whether LBT is out of its depth and needs help. • The Panel has little doubt that the LBT is out of its depth and needs help. • The LBT is constituted as an independent Trust and this is fully respected by the

project authorities and the Panel. The LBT’s future is in its own hands. • If the Trustees agree that they need help, this must conveyed at once to the

LHWC. • The Lesotho Highlands Water Commission must be requested to intervene in the

interests of the project, and on behalf of the governments of Lesotho and South Africa.

• The LHWC should assemble a Task Team to attend to the design and location of the barrier and to supervise the rewriting of the Terms of Reference for the EIA.

• The funds of the LBT must be placed at the disposal of the project authorities for the EIA, design and construction of an approved barrier on the Senqunyane River. This must be carried out by the LHDA and LHWC acting jointly in the best interests of maintaining the reputation of the LHWP and the Government of Lesotho.

• The fate of the LBT is secondary to the construction of the barrier, but the Panel hopes that its long-term future as a viable and legitimate national biodiversity NGO would be a matter of importance to all concerned.

March 2009 A Way Forward – Four Steps

1. The LBT Chairman and Trustees must meet with the LHWC as soon as possible to discuss the way forward. Matters on the agenda should include the provision of a budget for the LBT Conservation Officer and an assistant to be employed for two years to assist in activities around EIA supervision, barrier construction, Maloti Minnow monitoring, and intensive gillnetting in Mohale reservoir. The balance of the LBT funds should be transferred to a Barrier Construction Fund and a Task Team appointed to drive the process forward.

2. Before appointing an EIA consultant, a ‘Conceptual Design’ study should be

completed. This will involve the LHDA Special Projects Unit, and a blasting expert. PoE has contacted Mr John Cruise of John Cruise Mining (Pty) Ltd, a leading specialist in directional blasting. He has expressed his willingness to become involved as an advisor to the Task Team. One field visit to the site would be required, at which time other information such as the possible loss of arable land and the other impacts of construction would be gathered.

3. The EIA is then to be put out to tender and the necessary permission obtained

from NES to proceed with the construction. The NES should be asked to fast-track the application in view of the urgency of the matter.

4. When the full financial implications are known, the project authorities must

seek the additional funding that might be required to bring the project to fruition, mobilise the construction team and build the barrier.



POSTSCRIPT October 2009 No progress has been made on implementing the four steps proposed in March. By September the Trustees of the LBT had agreed to meet with the LHWC, but no date had been set for that meeting at the time of writing. The past five years have seen opportunities wasted and the chances of the extinction of the Maluti Minnow increase steadily. The World Conservation Union (IUCN) has established 2010 as the “International Year of Biodiversity”. Will this be the year when the fate of the Maluti Minnow is decided? 5 October 2009


PoE Report 52, October 2009 – Barrier construction Page 48 of 73

Appendix 3 Barrier construction on Senqunyane River Motivation for the Construction of a Barrier on the Senqunyane River to Protect the Maloti Minnow Introduction The LHDA Maloti Minnow Policy and Action Plan was made public in 2002. A full copy is appended, and extracts follow. 1. Policy Statement The Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, as the implementing agent of the LHWP, will make such reasonable interventions as are necessary to conserve the relict population of the Maloti Minnow (Pseudobarbus quathlambae) in the Mohale catchment. 2. Policy Objective 2.1. The overall objective is to conserve a viable in situ population of the Maloti Minnow

in the Mohale catchment, coupled with the establishment of several ex situ populations as an additional safeguard for the survival of the species.

2.2. The specific objectives shall be: • Establishment of an in situ sanctuary in the Senqunyane river, and possibly another in the

Bokong river, that shall be protected from invasive fish species, and gazetted as “protected natural environments” (Lesotho Environment Act 2001, section 73(1)).

• Establishment of an ex situ sanctuary in the Jordane river above the Pampiri waterfall. • Establishment of ex situ populations in the Makhaleng, Quthing and Maletsunyane rivers. • Monitoring of in situ and ex situ populations. • Building local capacity for long-term conservation of the species. 4. Maloti Minnow Action Plan 4.1. Provide funding for ongoing work on the Maloti Minnow, including translocation, monitoring and conservation planning through LHDA Project 1041, and ensure continuity and overlap with new initiatives described below. 4.2. Establish the Lesotho Biodiversity Trust that shall as its first priority investigate the feasibility of an in situ sanctuary in the Senqunyane river, with the possibility of a second sanctuary in the Bokong river. These sanctuaries will require protection from invasive fish species, by whatever means are best applied. 4.3. Establish an ex situ sanctuary in the Jordane river above the Pampiri waterfall. 4.4. Establish ex situ populations in the Makhaleng, Quthing and Maletsunyane rivers. 4.5. Monitor in situ and ex situ populations. 4.6. Build local capacity for long-term conservation of the species.



This is an exemplary policy and the implementation of the Action Plan has seen both success and failure. Success • Provided funding for excellent ongoing work on the Maloti Minnow. • Successfully established ex situ populations in the Makhaleng, Quthing and

Maletsunyane Rivers. • Successfully established an ex situ sanctuary area in the Jordane River.

Failure • The Lesotho Biodiversity Trust has been a failure. • The establishment of an in situ sanctuary in the Senqunyane River has failed to

date. Present Situation (October 2009) The successful establishment of ex situ populations must be treated with caution. The time scale since introduction is short. The rivers into which the minnows were introduced did not historically host this species. The genetic variability of the ex situ populations is restricted because they are from small founder populations. The key to the long term survival of the Maloti Minnow is the establishment of an in situ sanctuary in the Senqunyane River. This has been emphasised over the years by the global expert on the species, Dr Johann Rall, and others. The Maloti Minnow is considered to be Critically Endangered according to the criteria of the IUCN (World Conservation Union). The experiment to found the Lesotho Biodiversity Trust which would raise funds and build the barrier to establish the in situ sanctuary has failed. The LHDA and the two participating governments, represented by the LHWC, have full responsibility for the survival of the species which has been impacted by Phase 1B of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Both Governments are signatories to the International Convention on Biological Diversity. Failure to take all necessary measures to prevent the extinction of the Maloti Minnow places both governments in breach of the Convention. The Maloti Minnow has been flagged by the World Bank (and others) as one of the few blemishes on this otherwise exemplary project. Should the project authorities fail to act decisively at this time when the minnow is under the greatest threat, it can be expected that a strong negative reaction from the global biodiversity community and anti-dam activists will result. Arguments for and against the construction of a barrier on the Senqunyane to establish an in situ sanctuary. 1. Smallmouth Yellowfish have already penetrated the Senqunyane River and have been seen as far up as the point where the barrier has been proposed. As these fish



are omnivorous they will feed on Maloti Minnow and so the latter is doomed anyway. And even if a barrier is built, mischievous people will introduce alien fish upstream. RESPONSE. This situation is the result of delaying the implementation of the barrier, despite all expert advice that it is required. Notwithstanding the presence of Smallmouth Yellowfish, the Maloti Minnow can still be protected, provided the barrier is built as soon as possible. There are many examples of similar situations when barriers have been installed, the endangered fish species temporarily removed in as large numbers as possible, the alien predatory fish removed through application of a fish-specific organic compound (rotenone) and the endangered fish returned afterwards. There is no reason why this technique should not work in the present case. The greater danger is in delaying the project further, when Rainbow Trout will inevitably invade the Senqunyane River. These fish are considerably more invasive than yellowfish and will be more difficult to remove. The main point is that without the barrier, the above options and possibilities are closed. 2. The Maloti Minnows in the sanctuary areas are doing well and represent an adequately protected resource for the future RESPONSE. The genetic variability of the introduced minnows is small and this may cause problems in the future. The sanctuary rivers did not historically hold minnows, and there may be reasons for why this was so. The time that the ex situ populations have been in their new sanctuaries is much too short to deduce whether they will thrive in the longer term. The main point is that we cannot rely on these ex situ populations for the long term survival of the species. 3. The barrier in the Senqunyane River is too expensive RESPONSE. Nobody has provided recent detailed costings for the various options available. In January 2002 Africon Consulting Engineers produced designs and costings, with indicative amounts of around M10 million for each of two proposed barriers (one on the Senqunyane and one on the Bokong). These costs were based on the notion that the barriers would be designed to endure for 100 years without maintenance. In its report of April 2006, the PoE suggested that construction of a suitable barrier on the Senqunyane River is both feasible and achievable by using local construction skills at a fraction of the cost quoted by civil engineering consultants. Use of local labour has further advantages in that job creation and poverty alleviation funding sources can be tapped. Ongoing maintenance can be provided as and when required by local workers, and it will not be a requirement to design structures that will last 100 years. The main point is that nobody has yet considered the options available to construct the barrier, and no proper costings are available for the different options. [Note that the PoE’s position was informed by the fact that a bridge on the Malibamatso River, constructed almost entirely by hand (and by women) using local materials, easily withstood a recent one in twenty-year flood.] 4. Nobody wants to pay for the barrier



RESPONSE. The quick answer is that the plight of the Maloti Minnow is a direct result of Phase 1B of the LHWP and it is quite clearly a cost of the project. The LHDA acknowledged this by diverting money that would have been used for barrier construction to the Lesotho Biodiversity Trust. With the failure of the LBT, the balance of the money must be recovered and put towards the cost of building the barrier. The significant economic value in aquaculture and fishing in the Mohale Dam cannot be realised until the Maloti Minnow is safeguarded. The cost of the barrier should therefore be seen as a way to unlock other economic benefits to Lesotho. Furthermore, the money to build the barrier will go to local communities if they are involved in construction activities. Alternative sources of funds for the barrier There is significant economic value in aquaculture and fishing in the Mohale Dam. As a condition of being allowed to conduct operations in the dam, all commercial aquaculture and fishing enterprises should be required to pay a percentage of gross annual turnover into a biodiversity protection fund. This money will be used to recover any shortfall on the costs of barrier construction, as well as for ongoing scientific and monitoring services of fish in the reservoir and the catchment. In this way those who profit from being able to utilise Mohale Dam help to pay for the long-term protected on the Maloti Minnow, whose existence was threatened by the construction of the dam in the first place. 4 October 2009

Lesotho Highlands Development Authority

Maloti Minnow Policy & Action Plan (V4)

3. Introduction 3.1. The Maloti Minnow (Pseudobarbus quathlambae) is endemic to Lesotho, and

is regarded as being critically endangered. The decline of this species began over 70 years ago, when trout were introduced into Lesotho’s rivers to provide sport angling. The predatory trout have subsequently eradicated the minnow as they spread into more of its habitat, and it is estimated that the species has lost 90% of its original numbers.

3.2. Genetic studies have revealed two distinct groups within the Maloti Minnow population, known as ESUs (Evolutionary Significant Units). One comprises the “Mohale ESU” from the Senqunyane, Bokong and Jordane rivers, while the rest fall into the “Eastern ESU”. The Mohale ESU comprises 77% of the total extent of occurrence of the Maloti Minnow.

3.3. The Mohale Dam development of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) will affect 97% of the Mohale ESU (if there is no mitigation), mainly resulting from the inevitable introduction of trout and yellowfish into the system.



3.4. The dam will inundate approximately 58 km river length of minnow habitat in the Senqunyane catchment, possibly containing 7000 fish. Without intervention, it has been estimated that more than 80% of the Mohale ESU could be lost within the next ten years.

3.5. The LHDA has already invested significant funds on studies to determine the distribution, status and conservation measures required to prevent the extinction of the minnow.

3.6. The Government of Lesotho is a signatory to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and is mindful of the international concerns of the biodiversity community regarding the extinction of species.

3.7. As an agency of the Government of Lesotho, the LHDA is expected to take reasonable steps to conserve the relict Maloti Minnow population in the Mohale project area.

4. Policy Statement The Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, as the implementing agent of the LHWP, will make such reasonable interventions as are necessary to conserve the relict population of the Maloti Minnow (Pseudobarbus quathlambae) in the Mohale catchment. 5. Policy Objective 5.1. The overall objective is to conserve a viable in situ population of the Maloti

Minnow in the Mohale catchment, coupled with the establishment of several ex situ populations as an additional safeguard for the survival of the species.

5.2. The specific objectives shall be: • Establishment of an in situ sanctuary in the Senqunyane river, and possibly

another in the Bokong river, that shall be protected from invasive fish species, and gazetted as “protected natural environments” (Lesotho Environment Act 2001, section 73(1)).

• Establishment of an ex situ sanctuary in the Jordane river above the Pampiri waterfall.

• Establishment of ex situ populations in the Makhaleng, Quthing and Maletsunyane rivers.

• Monitoring of in situ and ex situ populations. • Building local capacity for long-term conservation of the species. 4. Maloti Minnow Action Plan 4.1. Provide funding for ongoing work on the Maloti Minnow, including translocation, monitoring and conservation planning through LHDA Project 1041, and ensure continuity and overlap with new initiatives described below. Project 1041 has established an extremely sound basis for decision-making on the conservation of the Maloti Minnow. It is vitally important that this work be continued, and that the services of the Maloti Minnow Specialist, Dr Johan Rall, are available to



LHDA to provide guidance and direction to the future conservation action plan to manage the species as the Mohale reservoir is impounded. 4.2. Establish the Lesotho Biodiversity Trust that shall as its first priority investigate the feasibility of an in situ sanctuary in the Senqunyane river, with the possibility of a second sanctuary in the Bokong river. These sanctuaries will require protection from invasive fish species, by whatever means are best applied. An amount of approximately 8 million Maloti will be contributed by LHDA to provide the seed money for the establishment of the Lesotho Biodiversity Trust (Appendix 2). Specialist studies have recommended that the core population of the minnow in the Senqunyane and Bokong rivers be conserved in sanctuaries, protected from the introduction of predatory fish through the construction of suitable barriers. A number of engineering studies have been carried out, and the feasibility established of constructing barriers such as a dam on the Bokong, and an artificial waterfall on the Senqunyane river. Such drastic interventions in the rivers for the protection of a single species cannot be taken lightly. Many other species may be adversely affected by the construction of artificial barriers. Adopting the precautionary principle, it will in any case be mandatory to conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment before contemplating the construction of barriers on the rivers. There may be alternatives to barriers to keep predatory fish out of the Senqunyane and Bokong rivers. An analytical decision-making procedure, such as the Population and Habitat Viability Analysis (PHVA), developed by the Conservation Breeding Specialist Group (CBSG) of the IUCN (World Conservation Union), would be a useful exercise to perform before embarking on major engineering works in the rivers to conserve the Maloti Minnow. The proposed Lesotho Biodiversity Trust will be the best vehicle to drive such activities. The Lesotho Biodiversity Trust will also negotiate with the Lesotho Environment Authority to have designated reaches of the Senqunyane and Bokong rivers gazetted as a “protected natural environments”, with specific legislation put in place to make the malicious introduction of predatory fish into the river a criminal offence. 4.3. Establish an ex situ sanctuary in the Jordane river above the Pampiri waterfall. As part of a translocation exercise that has already commenced, 300 fish have been captured in the Jordane river, and transferred to the reaches above the Pampiri waterfall, which constitutes a natural barrier to predatory fish. 4.4. Establish ex situ populations in the Makhaleng, Quthing and Maletsunyane rivers. As part of a translocation exercise that has already begun, 1,300 fish had been moved into the above rivers by August 2002. 4.5. Monitor in situ and ex situ populations.



As part of the ongoing project LHDA 1041, monitoring of all the populations will continue on a regular and standardised basis. Depending on the outcome of monitoring, additional fish may be moved to ex situ sanctuaries. 4.6. Build local capacity for long-term conservation of the species. LHDA will, by formal resolution (Appendix 3), establish the Lesotho Biodiversity Trust (Appendix 2) by registering a Deed of Trust (Appendix 4), to provide ongoing funding for conservation, research and monitoring programmes on the Maloti Minnow, for the training of Basotho biodiversity scientists, and for developing public education and awareness programmes and materials. The Trust will also actively seek income from foundations and other donors to enhance its effectiveness.


PoE Report 52, October 2009 – IFR Policy Page 55 of 73

Appendix 4 IFR Policy 1. The Policy document is back-to-front. Recommendation Put the most important

thing first, that is the objective. Explain the achievement of this objective on the subsequent pages.

2. The Policy is verbose, confusing and complicated. Recommendation Rewrite the

whole Policy, simplifying and shortening it. The IFR Policy should be limited to a few pages – the bulleted points under para 3 below, the bulk IFR releases and the targeted river conditions. The remainder of the IFR detail should be in the IFR Procedures, and the compensation issues transferred to the Compensation Policy.

3. Page 1 Purpose and objectives. There are some 14 ‘aims’ stated on page 1. They

are poorly prioritized, if at all. As the linear programmer’s say ‘it is improbable that two or more objective functions can be maximized simultaneously’. If it is not possible to achieve this mathematically you can be sure that it cannot be done any other way. Multiple objectives are liable to conflict, and they confuse the main thing that it is intended to achieve with conditions that need to be met in the goal achievement. Recommendations Rewrite the objective and conditions along the following lines.

• The objective of the IFR policy is to maintain specified minimum river

conditions on the river reaches of concern. • In achieving this objective several conditions shall have to be met, as bulleted

below. • The IFR Policy will be supplemented by IFR Procedures that detail the chief

management measures that must be updatable. • A flow release system must be defined for achieving the required river

conditions. • While a reduction in total flow is inevitable, the timing and variation of high

and low flows should mimic natural circumstances as far as possible. • The actual flow releases must be recorded. • An appropriate system of river condition classification must be developed and

applied. • Key performance indicators (KPIs) to measure river condition must be

identified. • KPIs must be monitored to permit determination of river condition. • The KPI monitoring must be designed and executed so that strong inference

can be drawn. • Wherever KPI monitoring involves sampling the survey design must be based

on probability theory involving replicate sampling so that confidence can be attached to the results.

• Compensation for loss of riverine resources arising from river regulation shall be paid to the affected parties.

• Compensation issues will be dealt with in terms of the Compensation Policy. (Move all compensation issues out of IFR into Compensation.)



• Subject the IFR Policy and its implementation to annual independent audit. • Review and revise the IFR Policy annually. (This is implicitly an adaptive

management approach whereby we learn to manage and manage to learn simultaneously.)

• An annual report summarizing IFR releases and river conditions shall be prepared and made public.

4. Table 4.1 pages 6-7 River condition classes. The classification is inappropriate. It

might suit the case for a protected area. But it is unsuitable for Lesotho. The rivers are not in protected areas. The presence of trout is not necessarily bad. The region needs to be zoned – class A might be wilderness and for preservation of pristine condition (eg upper Senqunyane), class B might be high value productive water (riparian woody vegetation, commercially valuable trout, etc) (impoundments where caged trout production is possible, proximal reaches in which water quality is high and trout thrive), class C lower value turbid waters, etc. The river condition needs to be scored against the ideal for its zone. For example, we would not use the same environmental condition rating system for farmland in the Mooi River Highlands as we would use in Kruger National Park – in the one case the land-use objective is sustained agricultural production, and in the other case the land-use objective is to allow natural processes to proceed with minimal intervention. With river regulation the river IS going to get smaller. It is inappropriate to score the river simply on departure from the unregulated condition. It is better to score river condition on what it might be given the reduced river flows – we need to ‘maximize’ given the constraints of reduced flows. It warrants emphasizing that the present paradigm of pristine is best is poppycock – the logical extension of ‘pristine is best’ is that in interests of man the whole world should be returned to its pristine condition. In other words city, cultivated fields, roads, power stations, etc must be done away with and we all will be better off. Recommendation Revise the river condition classification system.

5. Table 4.1 pages 6-7 River condition criteria and KPIs. Some of the condition

criteria are unsuitable for monitoring. VEGRAI and SASS are highly derived as opposed to simple ‘pure’ data such as water pH, turbidity, P concentration, E. coli count, density of riparian tree species A, etc. The trouble with derived indices is that they and the data on which they are built lose value and meaning as soon as the ecological fad moves on, whereas the pure data retain value irrespective of shifting scientific paradigms. Also, the likes of VEGRAI and SASS are not built on probability theory. They are usually applied on a one-shot sample basis with no knowing the extent to which they reflect the river reach that they are supposed to represent. It is uncertain how chance in sampling (chance inclusion or exclusion of this taxon or that one) might affect the SASS score. VEGRAI calculates to the 100th part. Given that the calculation derives from subjective assessments of plant species abundance, this thing has spurious accuracy. Some of the water quality key variables are questionable. Were these derived on the basis of multivariate analysis of the extensive existing database (eg using factor analysis to identify which variables vary most)? PoE questions inclusion of Manganese as a key water quality variable. Manganese is insoluble except under very acid conditions. PoE understand Highlands waters are neutral to slightly alkaline. Recommendation Discard techniques that deal in derived data, and for



monitoring stick to pure data. If it is necessary to assess aquatic invertebrates, identify a few KPIs and use probability theory to design a sampling procedure to yield measures of abundance from which strong inference can be drawn. Adopt the same approach with riparian plants. Identify one or a few KPIs. Monitor their density. Drop the notion of IFR sampling sites, and rather adopt the idea of IFR reaches within which monitoring samples are located at random so as to permit the use of normal statistics in comparing follow-up with baseline data. For survey and monitoring studies do not hire consultants that are statistically illiterate.

6. Table 5.1 page 9 target IFR releases. The spirit of the proposed simplified

releases was to release a constant proportion of inflow. For example, if the Project Authorities agreed that the bulk release from Katse is 12.1% of MAR then the release strategy is to release 12.1% of inflow. If this is done, then during dry years (below average rainfall) the actual release will be less than 12.1% of MAR, and during wet years the actual release will exceed 12.1%. In the long run the average release should approximate to 12.1% of MAR. However, the presently proposed Table 5.1 gives different percentages for each month. This is very complex and is likely to deviate far from 12.1% of MAR in most years. Recommendation Keep the release strategy to the simplest possible that has a chance of working – release the agreed percentage each month (eg for Katse release 12.1% every month).

7. Further recommendations

• Have the Consultant revise the IFR Policy, taking into account the above, and workshop the revised policy with LHDA, LHWC, Consultant and PoE.

• Guiding principles are ‘adopt the simplest approach that will work’, ‘specialists must not be required for IFR implementation and monitoring’, ‘the emerging IFR Policy must be readily capable of annual review and revision’.

• When the IFR Policy is revised to the satisfaction of the Project Authorities then revise the IFR Procedures.


PoE Report 52, October 2009 – IFR monitoring Page 58 of 73

Appendix 5 IFR Monitoring 1. The initial objective of the monitoring was to test the efficacy of IFR (Section 1,

page 1, Task 6). What was the objective of the IFR? It was – to paraphrase – to limit departure from the pristine or pre-regulation river condition. What was the pristine condition? It was a variable condition, as is the post-construction condition. Remember that even 2500 years ago it was commonly enough appreciated that rivers changed for the Ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus to tell his listeners that ‘you cannot step into the same river twice’ – an analogy to persuade simple folk that the world is ever changing. It is suggested that the objective of IFR is to maintain river condition above R where R is defined as follows.

[Insert specifications.]

2. Section 1 scopes the monitoring. It is too ambitious. There are too many

disciplines and too many specialists. Understanding the natural fluctuations of all the things mentioned is not a realistic proposition. It would be expected that only the gross or crude properties would have predictable variation. Remember, data = pattern + noise. Phenomena such as plan growth and ecosystem behaviour can potentially be described almost perfectly by polynomial equations, but the better the description of any given instance the worse the prediction for growth of the next plant or behaviour of the ecosystem next year. This is because the polynomials account for idiosyncrasies of individual plants and ecosystems in individual years. For the next plant, or the ecosystem in the next year, the idiosyncrasies are different and the descriptor then fails to predict. Better prediction is yielded by simpler equations that do not go beyond general issues. All this is described by, among others, Hunt R 1982 Plant Growth Curves: The Functional Approach to Plant Growth Analysis Arnold, London.

3. Section 1 page 4 says It is envisaged that, at that time, details of the number of replicates collected

and the statistical analyses used will also be determined. Was this done in Contract C1237? It seems not.

4. Section 2. The adoption of fixed monitoring sites has shortcomings.

• We do not know how representative these fixed sites are of the river reaches that they a supposed to represent.

• Samples are not independent (random) so resort to normal statistics for significance testing is invalidated. If normal statistics cannot be used to compare follow-up with baseline data, what is the basis of comparison? For the same reason it is not possible to attach confidence limits.

• Because of these flaws in macro-design the capacity to draw strong inference from the monitoring data is compromised.

5. Section 3. Again, much too grandiose (see para 2 above). The priority is to master

monitoring of KPIs of river condition. A team of dedicated specialists is not feasible.



6. Section 4.1 Hydrology. It is necessary to measure and record stream flow and

dam releases. These can and should be continuously recorded. No sampling is involved, and the complete picture is to be recorded.

7. Section 4.2 Hydraulics. If the river profile (cross section) is to be monitored then

(stratified) random sampling within reaches is warranted. Otherwise strong inference cannot be drawn from the data since the representativeness of the river cannot be reflected by repeated measurement at one or a few fixed sites.

8. Section 4.3 Sedimentation & Geomorphology. Proposed sediment sampling is

from fixed sites. The degree to which conditions at these sites represent the respective river reach is unknown. The proposed use of ANOVA is invalid because he samples are not independent.

9. Section 4.4 Water quality. The degree to which the water samples represent the

respective river reaches is unknown. The use of normal statistics is invalidated because the samples are not independent. On page 31 the answer to the question about how to indicate significant change is proposed to be to use multivariate techniques to search for trends in the water quality data. This is mistaken. Only man can decide on how much change is meaningful, and he can then design surveys and analyses, and tests with the right amount of power, to detect that amount of change as significant. Also, why were the existing data not subject to exploratory multivariate analysis to determine which parameters are the most variable, and therefore probably the most important to monitor?

10. Section 4.4 Microbiology and parasitology. Again, the degree to which the

samples represent the respective river reaches is not known. 11. Section 4.5 Riparian vegetation. The sample plots are fixed. The degree to which

they represent the respective river reaches is unknown. Trying to exclude livestock is not feasible and if it were would render the sample plots unrepresentative. Again, multivariate techniques are proposed to detect significant change. Statistical techniques do not have an ethical or moral sense. The amount of riparian vegetation change that is meaningful must be decided by man, and then the techniques designed to be able to detect such change.

12. Section 4.6 Aquatic invertebrates. Sampling again is too site specific and the

condition of sample independence is not satisfied. Most certainly the degree to which the samples reflect the respective river reaches is unknown. Again, the amount of meaningful change is not pre-identified so that the power of monitoring and testing can be designed around this. Rather, significant change is to be determined after the data are collected. Erecting post hoc hypotheses (ie collecting data, analyzing for pattern and constructing the hypotheses from the patterns identified) and then testing these hypotheses with the same data amounts to circular logic. There is no knowing the extent to which the identified pattern is made up of ‘real’ pattern and just ‘noise’. The human is famous for being able to invent explanations (hypotheses) for almost any situation. There is the story of the psychologist who had a sample of women rate 12 brands of nylon stocking. He



then had them give reasons for their ratings. They obliged with qualities like texture, feel, stretch and colour. The 12 brands of stocking were in fact identical.

13. Section 4.7 Fish. As for other parameters, sampling sites are fixed without it

being known the extent to which the sample might represent the conditions of the respective river reaches. As for the aquatic invertebrates, hypotheses and significance are to be determined post hoc.

14. Section 4.8 Avifauna, mammals and herpetofauna. In this case the survey sites are

less localized than is the case for the other parameters. But otherwise the same criticisms apply.

15. Section 5 Socio-economic monitoring. A community-run monitoring system is

hopelessly flawed because the data are not collected by independent observers. This applies also to the activity-based recordings if they are undertaken by community members. Questionnaire surveys are also not valid in this case because the degree is not known to which subjects might give answers to benefit themselves. Again, there is confusion between what might be socio-economically meaningful and what can be demonstrated to be statistically significant. Statistical significance is a function of sample variability and sample size. If the sample is big enough, statistical significance can be demonstrated for many small differences that might be of no socio-economic importance. Standard of living and public health monitoring would need to be comparative – project-impacted and non-impacted study groups. Some of the report is out of date. For example in the area of animal disease, the transmission of horse-sickness is caused by vectors that live in dung not water.

16. Section 6 Essential monitoring. The proposed monitoring is excessive and

unrealistic. What is essential? How is this decided? A KPI approach needs to be adopted.

17. The report is defective in the respect that it does not pre-identify how much is

meaningful. In several places it is stated in words to effect that the purpose is to ‘verify’ IFR predictions. It is logically not possible to verify anything.


PoE Report 52, October 2009 – IFR monitoring design Page 61 of 73

Appendix 6 IFR monitoring design (Ten principles from Green RH 1979 Sampling Design and Statistical Methods for Environmental Biologists Wiley, New York)

1. Be able to state concisely to someone else what question you are asking. Your results will be as coherent and as comprehensible as your initial conception of the problem.

2. Take replicate samples within each combination of time, location, and any other controlled variable. Differences among can only be demonstrated by comparison to differences within.

3. Take an equal number of randomly allocated replicate samples for each combination of controlled variables. Putting samples in "representative" or "typical" places is not random sampling.

4. To test whether a condition has an effect, collect samples both where the condition is present and where the condition is absent but all else is the same. An effect can only be demonstrated by comparison with a control.

5. Carry out some preliminary sampling to provide a basis for evaluation of sampling design and statistical analysis options. Those who skip this step because they do not have enough time usually end up losing time.

6. Verify that your sampling device or method is sampling the population you think you are sampling, and with equal and adequate efficiency over the entire range of sampling conditions to be encountered. Variation in efficiency of sampling from area to area biases among-area comparisons.

7. If the area to be sampled has a large-scale environmental pattern, break the area up into relatively homogeneous subareas and allocate samples to each in proportion to the size of the subarea. If it is an estimate of total abundance over the entire area that is desired, make the allocation proportional to the number of organisms in the subarea.

8. Verify that your sample unit size is appropriate to the size, densities, and spatial distributions of the organisms you are sampling. Then estimate the number of replicate samples required to obtain the precision you want.

9. Test your data to determine whether the error variation is homogeneous, normally distributed, and independent of the mean. If it is not, as will be the case for most field data, then (a) appropriately transform the data, (b) use a distribution-free (nonparametric) procedure, (c) use an appropriate sequential sampling design, or (d) test against simulated Ho data.

10. Having chosen the best statistical method to test your hypothesis, stick with the result. An unexpected or undesired result is not a valid reason for rejecting the method and hunting for a "better" one.


PoE Report 52, October 2009 - Reservoir zoning Page 62 of 73

Appendix 7 Katse & Mohale zoning management Introduction LHDA Contract 1225 is titled Review of Katse and Mohale Reservoir Zoning Plans. It was commissioned to update Contract 674 of 2002, which has been overtaken by changes at local government level in Lesotho. The PoE urges the LHDA not to disregard Contract 674 as a source of reference and ideas. It has excellent suggestions on where development around the reservoirs would best be located. The final report for Contract 1225 (August 2009) is badly written and presented, and contains a large amount of irrelevant information, much of it simply cut and pasted from overseas sources. The PoE does not believe that any further value can be extracted by continuing to engage the Consultant. Chapter 5, Zoning Application Guidelines and Standards, draws heavily on the 2001 Management Plan for the Bloemhof Dam on the Vaal River in South Africa’s Northwest Province. This reservoir is set in an environment and topography that is completely different to the Lesotho dams, and zoning is mainly to accommodate anglers (see map below). Furthermore, it provides no information about zoning on the Free State shore of the dam.



However, there are some useful recommendations in the report which are summarized below. Zoning classification (Chapter 3.3) Four zones are recognized: Reservoir Zone The entire water body to the full mean supply level. [PoE comment: this zone is controlled by LHDA.] Protected shoreline zone Designated areas all around the reservoirs where public access is restricted for safety or protection reasons. [PoE comment: this zone is controlled by LHDA.] Limited development zone Concession areas, public recreation areas and the like; access to and control of these areas would be by a suite of agencies. [PoE comment: the LHDA would act as the Referee in respect of activities that could affect water quality. Every proposed activity in this zone to be subject to a full Environmental Impact Assessment through the National Environmental Secretariat.] Periphery zone A full development zone with normal statutory development requirements. [PoE comment: LHDA would be involved if there are water quality issues affecting the reservoirs.] Priority Objectives (Chapter 6) Legal framework Since Contract 674 was published, the Tourism Act (2002), the Environment Act (2001) and the Local Government Act (1997) have passed into law. The Environment Act (2001) has been reviewed and will appear as the Environment Bill (2007) which is being processed in law. LHDA is mandated by the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty to ensure the quality of the water delivered by the project. The LHDA may thus be regarded as the main “Referee” which has the final say in all developments in the catchments that might affect water quality. Administrative framework



The Consultant recommends the establishment of a high level, inter-ministerial coordinating mechanism that would manage and avoid potential conflict, institutional rivalries and institutional duplication. This body is envisaged to comprise representatives of all ministries with a role in natural resource management and economic development of Lesotho. [PoE comment: such a body would be extremely unwieldy, and a simpler form of administrative framework should be implemented.] Public investment The National Tourism Plan (2000) identifies local communities as key stakeholders, participants and beneficiaries of tourism investments in Lesotho. It is true to say that LHDA shares this vision. The acquisition of land for specific tourism activities is a thorny issue. Contract 674 suggested that LHDA actually acquire sites on which future lodges, camping and picnic sites, sports centres, golf courses etc could be developed. These areas would be proclaimed as Special Development Areas (SDAs). The Consultant points out the disadvantages of doing so: the cost of land acquisition, and the resettlement of some communities. [PoE comment: LHDA should restrict its activities to that of Referee in respect of development that could affect water quality.] Private investment The Consultant talks about ‘Business Plans’ and the need to provide bulk infrastructure at approved development and concession sites. [PoE comment: this is not the business of LHDA.] Monitoring plan for protected areas The Consultant offers some guidelines from Latin America which are unduly complicated and not appropriate for Lesotho. Partnering, communications and marketing The Consultant talks about structures that would be “responsible for undertaking intensive advertising of business plans, locally and internationally.” Such a structure already exists in the form of the Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC), although to date its activities have been more directed at industry than tourism, where a specific body in the form of the Lesotho Tourism Development Corporation (LTDC) has been brought into existence. Again the role of LHDA is that of Referee. Implementation Matrix (Chapter 7) The Consultant provides a detailed Matrix of envisioned activities to be conducted in order to implement the Zoning Management Plan. In most cases the LHDA is listed as the Lead Agency to initiate the numerous activities. Given the limited capacity within



LHDA, and the number of other priorities it has to deal with, this proposal is ‘Pie in the Sky” that simply cannot be implemented. DISCUSSION The PoE is astonished that the words “Environmental Impact Assessment” and “National Environmental Secretariat” apparently do not appear anywhere in the report (or at least the PoE could not find them anywhere!). The EIA process is a key component of any zoning plan. Once it has been decided that a particular development or activity may take place at a particular site, it is a legal requirement in Lesotho for the proponent to undertake, at his/her cost, an Environmental Impact Assessment and to prepare and Environmental Management Plan. The EIA will identify all the potential impacts and how they are to be mitigated, while the EMP is the operational guideline for the developer to implement during construction and operation. The Record of Decision issued by the National Environmental Secretariat lays down all the conditions that the developer must comply with, and construction/activities may only commence on receipt of the ROD. The lack of any reference by the Consultant to the EIA process is considered by the PoE to be a serious omission. Way forward Is LHDA any closer to being able to implement Zoning Plans for Katse and Mohale as a result of Contract 1225? The PoE is not convinced that this is the case, but perhaps the two studies together provide sufficient material and ideas for LHDA to consider proposals for developments and deal with them in an objective and orderly way. The sensitive zones and the limited development zones have been identified by the two studies, and LHDA can accept or refuse applications on those grounds. LHDA has good communications with the communities around the reservoirs as well as with local councils and LLEs. PoE would be interested to learn the process whereby two tourist boating enterprises were introduced at Mohale and Katse. PoE understands that the boat at Mohale is owned and operated by MTEC, while the one at Katse is owned and operated by a LLE and Katse FOB Income Generation division assisted in setting up the business. • Was an EIA deemed necessary for each of these two operations? • If not, how were the environmental risks assessed and mitigated? • Did LHDA conduct a risk analysis for the Katse operation? • Did MTEC conduct a risk analysis of the Mohale operation, to the satisfaction of

LHDA? PoE is interested in these questions because the zone in which both operations takes place is the core of the LHDA operation, and the precautions that were taken before allowing both activities should have been stringent, especially in respect of safety, littering and pollution. Boat-based operations such as these that are open to the public carry considerable risks if things go wrong. Injuries sustained while boarding or leaving a craft may



result in litigation, and in the worst case of loss of life, extremely damaging litigation. Public liability insurance would thus seem to be prudent, but is this affordable to the LLE, for example? PoE also notes that asking paying passengers to sign indemnity forms is no defence in the case of gross negligence. The control of litter from the boat is non-negotiable, but the PoE is concerned about toilet facilities, especially as the operators both offer four hour trips. Perhaps these two small operations could be used as a pilot case to guide LHDA as to what to look for in allowing operations within the zones that it controls. The PoE suggests that during its next mission it could carry out a risk assessment of one or both of the tourism boating operations.




PoE Report 52, October 2009 – Light pollution Page 68 of 73

Appendix 8 Light pollution Light Pollution – A New Threat to the Environment Introduction During the PoE’s field visit to the LHDA project areas, the Panel members stopped on the Mohale Dam wall to see progress with the repair of “the crack”. The workmen showed us a large floodlight that they had been asked to install on the parapet facing the water. This was for evaluation for the suitability of eventually lighting up the crest of the wall with some 42 such floodlights. The Dam Engineer was present and told the PoE that the lights were not required for security, but rather “for show”, so that the triumph of constructing this (admittedly outstanding) piece of engineering could be appreciated by all who observed it by night! Among the many suggestions for income generation in the Mohale area are a high altitude training centre, sports facilities, and an observatory. The latter would take advantage of the very high altitude and clear skies, unsurpassed in the region. The roadway on the crest of the Katse Dam wall has been illuminated for some time, and there are increasing artificial light sources in the LHDA project areas, which were once some of the darkest parts of the planet, lit only by the stars and the waxing and waning of the moon. The PoE would like to introduce the Management and Staff of the LHDA, LHDA Board members, and the members of the Lesotho Highlands Water Commission, to the concept of “light pollution”. Lighting our streets, cities, bridges and dam walls carries both global and local costs and risks that we were unaware of a few decades ago. Today we live in an energy constrained world, and the “frivolous and unnecessary” wastage of energy is unacceptable. Southern Africa faces increasing energy shortages and rising energy costs. For example, South Africa’s new coal-fired power station under construction at Medupi is expected to cost no less than 120 billion Rand, and probably more. The second (Kusile) power station of similar size (4 800 Megawatts) is next in line, and Eskom intends to build a third one to meet anticipated future demand for electricity. Lesotho cannot rely on electricity from South Africa in the medium term, and so is considering hydropower generation from Phase 2 of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project that will cost the Kingdom huge amounts of money. All consumption of electricity, including outdoor lighting, must therefore be carefully considered and evaluated before simply being installed and switched on.



The Panel requests the project authorities (LHDA/LHWC) to revisit the idea of installing 42 floodlights on the crest of the Mohale Dam. We offer as a discussion document an edited version of an article that was recently published in the journal of the Endangered Wildlife Trust (Vision 12, 2009). Discussion document In 2004 National Geographic magazine published an amazing new perspective of our planet: “This intriguing map reveals in stunning detail the pulsating lights of the Earth at night. The rare view is a composite image made by three satellites on cloud-free nights over a one-year period. In addition to showing lighted areas of the Earth, this map also features where fires rage and natural gas burns off and night fishing locations.” We now know that the proliferation of artificial light (which has been going on for about 100 years) has been a very bad thing for the environment generally. This is because of the direct negative impacts of light on a wide variety of nocturnal creatures, from insects to bats to birds, as well as the indirect impacts of burning coal to generate electricity for lighting. From a biodiversity point of view, the last thing we should actually do is install outdoor lights in previously unspoilt areas. The truly revealing feature of the National Geographic map is not just the intensity of the white light from the vast cities of Europe, North America and parts of Asia, but the fact that much of this light is directed towards space, rather than onto the ground where it is actually needed. This is an enormous waste of electricity, the generation of which has serious consequences for the health of the planet resulting from global climate change. Scientists have been rather slow to make the connection between artificial light and its impact on living creatures. Some time ago it was discovered that turtle hatchlings in Florida moved inland towards the street lights along their nesting beaches, instead of towards the sea, with fatal consequences. In 2002 the Endangered Wildlife Trust organised a conference on The State of South Africa’s Species. The perceived threats to the diversity of terrestrial invertebrates were as follows (not in order of importance): • Habitat fragmentation and destruction through agriculture and urbanization; • Pesticide pollution; • Possible effects of climate change; • Introduction of alien species; • Poor land management; • The proliferation of artificial light, which has probably interfered with the

migration and habits of many nocturnal species, and possible extinction of some of them



Today there is enormous concern in the developed world about the unintended consequences of light pollution. In a submission (17 January 2008) to the ‘Royal commission study on artificial light in the environment’, the Royal Entomological Society expressed its concern about the impact on insects: “The ways that light pollution impacts on insects are varied but the effects are likely to be important for insect populations in general. From a conservation perspective rare species with isolated population near urban areas may be particularly vulnerable. However, it has recently been shown that the total population of a very biodiverse group of nocturnal insects, the moths, have declined in the UK by a third since 1968, with declines being particularly severe in the south east of Britain where light pollution is particularly intense, so light pollution may be partially implicated in a very widespread decline of some of our most abundant and widespread species as well.” What is Light Pollution? The International Dark Sky Association defines light pollution as Any adverse effect of artificial light including sky glow, glare, light trespass, light clutter, decreased visibility at night, and energy waste. Different types of light pollution are recognized: Urban Sky Glow: is the reflection of city lights from clouds that can sometimes be seen from more than 100 km away, destroying the view of the night sky and our view of the universe. Amateur astronomers have been leading members of the ‘dark sky’ movement which began in the 1980s and has been gathering momentum since then. The urban sky glow is the result of over-illumination. Over-illumination: is the excessive use of light. In the United States of America, over-illumination is responsible for approximately two million barrels of oil per day in energy wasted. Direct Glare: is defined as the visual discomfort resulting from insufficiently shielded light sources in the field of view. One should see the effect rather than the light source itself, Light Trespass: simply means that someone else’s light is adversely affecting you, whether it is a street light or a neighbour's backyard light shining into your bedroom at night. Light clutter: refers to excessive groupings of lights which may generate confusion, distract from obstacles (including those that they may be intended to illuminate), and potentially cause accidents. Clutter is particularly noticeable on roads where the street lights are badly designed, or where brightly lit advertising surrounds the roadways. Source: www.njaa.org


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accidents

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Road


Following World War II the cities of Europe and America were increasingly lit up at night. In part this was the result of the evolution of electricity generation as a business with a commodity to sell, but another important factor in Europe was that city lights represented a triumphal response to the years of war and blackouts, with all the accompanying misery, fear and danger of those dark days. For many, the joy and freedom of being able to walk through a lighted city at night was highly symbolic. South Africa is the most brightly lit country on the continent, although big North African cities like Cairo are highly visible from space. To date no popular movement for dark skies has been launched in South Africa, but government has introduced measures to regulate light pollution in parts of the country that are important for the development of international astronomy initiatives. New law gives Square Kilometer Array bid a boost President Thabo Mbeki has signed the Astronomy Geographic Advantage Bill into law, giving the Science and Technology Minister the power to declare astronomy advantage areas, in order to ensure that large-scale and globally important astronomy facilities are protected from developments that might interfere with their research activities. In addition, the bill defines a framework for the establishment of a national system of astronomy advantage areas to ensure that geographic areas highly suitable for astronomy and related scientific work - owing, for example, to their high atmospheric transparency, low levels of light pollution, low population density or minimal radio frequency interference - are protected, preserved and properly maintained. Lastly, it enhances South Africa's geographic advantages by restricting activities that cause or could cause light pollution or radio frequency interference, or might interfere in any other way with astronomy and related scientific work on designated areas. Source: SouthAfrica.info 29.01.2008. Note: This Bill will have an important (though unintended!) benefit for biodiversity in these designated areas because the proliferation of artificial light will be curtailed. Southern Africa’s history of cheap, abundant electricity from coal-fired power stations resulted in our wasteful habits spilling over into lighting. With the power stations running at optimal loads to meet the daily demand, why not take up the spare capacity at night with extensive lighting of streets and highways to enhance security, safety, or just to make buildings look pretty at night? At one stage even Table Mountain was being floodlit to create spectacular nocturnal scenery, without a thought about the effects on birds, insects and other invertebrates. No work has been done on the amount of energy used for artificial lighting in South Africa. But recent studies in the USA estimate that nationally more than 30% of the electricity generated for outdoor illumination is simply squandered by being misdirected into the sky, costing $4.5 billion annually. South Africa’s bill for lighting



our cities and highways must be significant, and it is high time that somebody quantified it. Much of our outdoor lighting is installed to prevent crime, but does it work? Our efforts to eliminate the dark of the night makes the public immune to security lighting and, some would say, makes the work of criminals easier. It is much better to have a bright light switch on only when an intruder enters the premises and triggers a motion sensor, say others. Reducing light pollution includes reducing sky glow, glare, light trespass, and clutter. Possible solutions include: • Using lights of the minimum intensity necessary to accomplish their purpose. • Turning off lights with a timer or occupancy sensor when they are not needed. • Improving lighting fixtures, so that they direct their light more accurately towards

where it is needed. • Adjusting the type of light used, so that the light waves emitted are those that are

less likely to cause pollution problems. • Evaluating lighting plans for all new developments and making sound decisions. • In improving street lighting, the ‘flat-lens luminaire’, a ‘full cut-off fixture’,

ensures that light is only directed below the horizontal, which means less light is wasted. By contrast, a ‘drop-lens luminaire’ allows light to escape sideways and upwards.

Our national parks and protected area authorities now have a new responsibility: to evaluate the impact of artificial lighting in the areas under their control. They should be the role models for South Africa’s dark sky movement. Will the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism please take note? Relevance to Lesotho Like every country of the world, whether developed or developing, Lesotho needs to introduce policies and practices that result in the careful and efficient use of electricity. LHDA should be a role model in its careful and efficient use of electricity. LHDA is entrusted with the stewardship of the highlands areas in which it operates. The introduction of artificial lighting can have serious consequences for natural processes and biodiversity conservation. Lights inevitably attract and kill insects of various kinds. These in turn may be keystone ecosystem species that pollinate specific plants, for example. Lights in formerly unspoilt areas are an intrusion and a form of pollution. Lesotho’s hopes to build an observatory near Mohale will come to nothing if light pollution spoils the view for astronomers. Conclusions



The PoE suggests that a policy for outdoor lighting by the Authority be considered and implemented, to position the LHDA in the forefront of best practice in this field. The Panel offers its expertise and services to assist LHDA in this initiative. Ends 4 October 2009.


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