LETTER -- Massachusetts Lawyers Thru GATA

8/6/2019 LETTER -- Massachusetts Lawyers Thru GATA

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February 21, 2011

5892 Shoreland Trail

Orlando, Florida 32807

Gold Anti-Trust Action Committee, Inc.c/o Chris Powell, Secretary/Treasurer

7 Villa Louisa Road

Manchester, CT 06043-7541

Re: I need to get the enclosed material, including this and three other cover

letters, to Reginald H. Howe indirectly, and believe I can trust GATA for that

purpose; never would I e-mail him even a hint of this at the start.

Dear Chris Powell:

This is a cover letter to explain why you should be interested in the enclosed

LETTER TO CLERK OF COURT and AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE. These related

documents are meant to serve two objectives—let me explain.

Litigation aimed at compelling a return to a constitutional monetary system

must begin with recognition of two facts as matters of law:

(1) The Congressional mandate of 4 U.S.C.A., § 72, which

provides that, “[a]ll offices attached to the seat of government

shall be exercised in the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere,except as otherwise expressly provided by law,” means that a

federal Judicial Power decision pursuant to Article III of the

Constitution for the United States of America can only be had in

D.C.—in nature, it’s a governmental action— and elsewhere is

obtained an administrative decision; it doesn’t matter that Article

III judges sit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of

Florida, for example, when they’re sitting in an Article I court—

they are functioning as officers of the court; and, this leads into

the two ways to view a complaint;

(2) As a Fourteenth Amendment or federal citizen—by

presumption of law (disregarding the verification under penalty

of perjury)—you come as a complaintant in the nature of 28

U.S.C.A., § 1746(2), which provides that, “[i]f executed

within the United States, its territories, possessions, or

commonwealths: ‘I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under





correct…,’ ” and as a state citizen in contradistinction to a

federal citizen, no attachment to government can be presumed.

There isn’t much case law to explain 28 U.S.C.A., § 1746, and what does

exist is misleading. The laws of the United States of America is the common

law found in the several united States, and the laws of the United States is

the 50 titles of statutory law together with any Federal Code of Regulations

that implement them.

In regard to (2), above, the complaintant must come as a state citizen

pursuant to Article IV, § 2, cl. 1 in contradistinction to a presumed federal

citizen pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, § 1. Case law says both

citizenships exist. But, case law also indicates that state citizenship must be

claimed as it is regarded as a choice of law decision. This doesn’t change

the fact that federal citizenship is fraudulent and deceitful; it’s a second classcitizenship in more ways than one. I’m working on the proof of fraud and

deceit so none of that is in the enclosed documents, but I’ve tried to show

how it violates my right to Due Process of Law. Several of the original state

constitutions provided that government officers—constitutional or ministerial

in nature—are the Peoples’ trustees and accountable as such in their

Declaration of Rights; three states attempted to get that language inserted

in the federal constitution:

BEGIN LEGAL CITATION

Footnote 9 is indicative of the law review article’s source for the following

contention:

“E. Popular Sovereignty and the Tenth Amendment

“At the time that [Thomas Tudor] Tucker spoke, the House was considering

adding a statement of popular sovereignty to the Preamble to the

Constitution.130 Tucker objected to this placement on the ground that the

Preamble was not actually part of the Constitution and therefore not binding

upon the government.131

Instead, Tucker wished to make the declaration apart of the official (and binding) Bill of Rights.132 Tucker’s request echoed

similar requests by a number of state conventions that had asked for the

addition of an express statement of popular sovereignty. Virginia,133 North

Carolina,134 and Rhode Island135 had each proposed adding a declaration to

the effect that ‘all power is naturally invested in, and consequently derived

from, the people; the magistrates therefore are their trustees and agents,



and at all times amenable to them.’ ” Kurt T. Lash, “THE ORIGINAL

MEANING OF AN OMISSION: THE TENTH AMENDMENT, POPULAR

SOVEREIGNTY, AND ‘EXPRESSLY DELEGATED POWER,’ ” 83 Notre

Dame L. Rev. 1889, 1922-1923 (2008)

9 “2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE

ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 362 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Phila.,

J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]. . . .”

.

.

.

116 “See James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional

Amendments (June 8, 1789), in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 437,444 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).”

.

.

.

130 “See Madison, supra note 116, at 441.”

131 “See Congressional Proceedings, DAILY ADVERTISER (New York, N.Y.),

Aug. 15, 1789, at 2, reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,

supra note 88, at 128, 128.” 132 “See id.”

133 “See 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 9, at 657.”

134 “See 4 id. at 243.”

135 “See 1 id. at 334.”

“We, the delegates of the people of the state of Rhode Island and ProvidencePlantations, duly elected and met in Convention, having maturely considered

the Constitution for the United States of America, agreed to on the

seventeenth day of September, in the year one thousand seven hundred and

eighty-seven, by the Convention then assembled at Philadelphia, in the

commonwealth of Pennsylvania, (a copy whereof precedes these presents,)



and having also seriously and deliberately considered the present situation

of this state, do declare and make known, —

“I. That there are certain natural rights of which men, when they form

a social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity, — among which

are the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring,

possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness

and safety.

“II. That all power is naturally vested in, and consequently derived

from, the people; that magistrates, therefore, are their trustees and agents,

and at all times amenable to them.

“III. That the powers of government may be reassumed by the people

whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness. That the rights of

the states respectively to nominate and appoint all state officers, and every

other power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the said Constitution

clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or to the

departments of government thereof, remain to the people of the several

states, or their respective state governments, to whom they may have

granted the same; and that those clauses in the Constitution which declare

that Congress shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not imply that

Congress is entitled to any powers not given by the said Constitution; but

such clauses are to be construed as exceptions to certain specified powers,

or as inserted merely for greater caution. . . . [335]

“And the Convention do, in the name and behalf of the people of the state of

Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, enjoin it upon their senators and

representative or representatives, which may be elected to represent this

state in Congress, to exert all their influence, and use all reasonable means,

to obtain a ratification of the following amendments to the said Constitution,

in the manner prescribed therein; and in all laws to be passed by the

Congress in the mean time, to conform to the spirit of the said amendments,

as far as the Constitution will admit.” Jonathan Elliot, THE DEBATES INTHE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL

CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, in Five Volumes, Volume

I (Second Edition), William S. Hein & Co., Inc.: Buffalo, New York,

1996, pp. 334-335.



“Mr. WYTHE reported, from the committee appointed, such amendments to

the proposed Constitution of government for the United States as were by

them deemed necessary to be recommended to the consideration of the

Congress which shall first assemble under the said Constitution, to be acted

upon according to the mode prescribed in the 5th article thereof; and heread the same in his place, and afterwards delivered them in at the clerk’s

table, where the same were again read, and are as follows: —

“ ‘That there be a declaration or bill of rights asserting, and securing from

encroachment, the essential and unalienable rights of the people, in some

such manner as the following: —

“ ‘1st. That there are certain natural rights, of which men, when they form a

social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity; among which are

the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing,and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.

“ ‘2d. That all power is naturally invested in, and consequently derived

from, the people; that magistrates therefore are their trustees and agents,

at all times amenable to them. . . .” Ibid., Volume III, p. 657.

“[A]nd the resolution of the committee of the whole house was then read,

and ordered to be entered on the Journal. The resolution was accordingly

read and entered, as follows, viz.: —

“ ‘Resolved, That a declaration of rights, asserting and securing from

encroachment the great principles of civil and religious liberty, and the

unalienable rights of the people, together with amendments to the most

ambiguous and exceptionable parts of the said Constitution of government,

ought to be laid before Congress, and the convention of the states that shall

or may be called for the purpose of amending the said Constitution, for their

consideration, previous to the ratification of the Constitution aforesaid on the

part of the state of North Carolina.

“ [243] ‘DECLARATION OF RIGHTS.

“ ‘1. That there are certain natural rights, of which men, when they form a

social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among which are

the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing,

and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.



“ ‘2. That all power is naturally vested in, and consequently derived from,

the people; that magistrates, therefore, are their trustees and agents, and

at all times amenable to them.’ ” Ibid., Volume IV, p. 242-243.

END OF LEGAL CITATION

It’s hornbook law that a contract incorporates as reference existing law at

the time of its inception, and the original state constitutions as well as the

federal constitution are regarded as contracts; they are special contracts as

compacts.

BEGIN LEGAL CITATION

The federal and each of the original thirteen state constitutions were social

compacts as they were adopted; and, social compacts are third party

beneficiary contracts; the beneficiaries of these social compacts were state

citizens pursuant to Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution for the United States

of America. ABDI HOSH ASHKIR v. UNITED STATES, 46 Fed.Cl. 438,

441 (2000) ( “The holding in REID v. COVERT, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) was

based, in part, on viewing the Constitution as a social compact, embodying

the consent of the governed to be governed and viewing those governed as

the beneficiaries of that compact. 4 Id . at 5-7, 77 S.Ct. 1222. Under this ‘contractarian’ view, the benefits of the compact flow to citizens wherever

they are located. See UNITED STATES v. CURTISS-WRIGHT EXPORT CORP.,

299 U.S. 304, 318, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936) (‘[n]either the

Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign

territory unless in respect of our own citizens’).5 Moreover, as illustrated by

cases such as MATTHEWS v. DIAZ, 426 U.S. 67, 77, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48

L.Ed.2d 478 (1976) and KWONG HAI CHEW v. COLDING, 344 U.S. 590, 596-

97, 73 S.Ct. 472, 97 L.Ed. 576 (1953), the benefits of the compact also

redound to aliens residing within the territory of the United States, who aredeemed to owe temporary allegiance to the United States and thereby are

entitled to the reciprocal protections of the Constitution. See UNITED

STATES v. BARONA, 56 F.3d 1087, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied ,

516 U.S. 1092, 116 S.Ct. 813, 814, 133 L.Ed.2d 759 (1996).6 ” )



(n. 4: “As Chief Justice Jay explained in 1793, ‘[e]very state constitution is

a compact made by and between the citizens of a state to govern

themselves in a certain manner; and the constitution of the United States is

likewise a compact made by the people of the United States to govern

themselves as to general objects in a certain manner.’ CHISHOLM v.GEORGIA, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793) (JAY, C.J., seriatim

opinion). See generally , Anita L. Allen, ‘Social Contract Theory in American

Case Law ,’ 51 Fla. L. Rev. 1 (1999).” )

(n. 5: “See also WONG WING v. UNITED STATES, 163 U.S. 228, 238, 16

S.Ct. 977, 41 L.Ed. 140 (1896); TRANSPORTES AEROS MERCANTILES

PANAMERICANOS, S.A. v. BOYATT, 562 F. Supp. 707, 709 (S.D.Fla. 1983).” )

(n. 6: “Highlighting the importance of residency as a substantial

connection, the Supreme Court has long drawn a distinction between theconstitutional footing of aliens who are beyond the territorial limits of the

United States and those residing either permanently or temporarily within

our borders. For instance, while the Supreme Court has held that the Fifth

Amendment protections, including that of due process, apply to a resident

alien, KWONG HAI CHEW, 344 U.S. at 596, 73 S.Ct. 472, it has denied the

same rights to an alien who has not entered the country’s borders,

NISHIMURA EKIU v. UNITED STATES, 142 U.S. 651, 660, 12 S.Ct. 336, 35

L.Ed. 1146 (1892). See UNITED STATES v. VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ, 856 F.2d

1214, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting), rev’d , 494 U.S. 259,

110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990). Summarizing cases like these, the

Supreme Court, in JOHNSON v. EISENTRAGER, 339 U.S. 763, 771, 70 S.Ct.

936, 94 L.Ed. 1255 (1950), commented that ‘in extending constitutional

protections beyond citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out that it

was the alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the

Judiciary the power to act.’ See also PLYLER v. DOE, 457 U.S. 202, 212,

102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982); KWONG HAI CHEW, 344 U.S. at

596-97 n.5, 73 S.Ct. 472; CARLISLE v. UNITED STATES, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)

147, 154-55, 21 L.Ed. 426 (1872). Similar sentiments date back at least to

1798, as a constant theme in the vigorous debates between the

Jeffersonians and the Federalists over the Alien Act of 1798. See 8 Annals of

Cong. 2012, 2019 (1798). See also Stephen J. DiGianfilippo, “The Reach of

the Constitution Beyond the Territory and ‘People’ of the United States,” 16

Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 117, 123-32 (1992).” ).

END LEGAL CITATION



This brings us to two more essential facts of law to recognize:

(3) Federal citizenship is the property of the federal government

since it’s a creature thereof; state citizenship is derived fromEnglish subjectship and was regarded by the original states as

trust property; with government officials regarded as trustees,

there had to be trust property to administer, and legal interest

lies in the state while beneficial interest lies in the individual that

qualifies and claims state citizenship; and, all fundamental rights

to be managed as trust property require state citizenship.

WADSWORTH v. STATE of MONTANA, 275 Mont. 287, 911

P.2d 1165, 1171-1172 (Mont., 1996) ( “[W]e have held a

right may be ‘fundamental’ under Montana’s constitution if theright is either found in the Declaration of Rights or is a right

‘without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would

have little meaning.’ BUTTE COMMUNITY UNION v. LEWIS

(1986), 219 Mont. 426, 430, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311-13. . . .

(Emphasis mine)

“See GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT for

NORFOLK COUNTY (1982), 457 U.S. 596, 604, 102 S.Ct. 2613,

2618-19, 73 L.Ed.2d 248, 255 (First Amendment encompasses

those rights that, while not specifically enumerated in the very

terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to

enjoyment of other First Amendment rights.).” ); thus, state

citizenship is itself a fundamental right with beneficial interest

therein unavailable. UNITED STATES v. UNITED MINE

WORKERS of AMERICA, 330 U.S. 258, 376, 67 S.Ct. 677,

91 L.Ed. 884 (1947) (Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE, dissenting.)

( “When the assertion and securing of all other rights depends

upon one, that one is the core of all. Here the right ‘to know

that it was a charge, and not a suit’ comprehended all otherprocedural rights in the trial and appellate courts. Without this,

none could be asserted or maintained. The denial of that right,

deferring it until the decision here is handed down, is in my

opinion not only a denial of all. It is a violation both of the

Constitution and of Rule 42(b).” ); natural born American citizens

are unaware of their vested right to claim state citizenship.



(4) A federal citizen owes allegiance to government in his/her

personal and political capacities, but a state citizen owes

allegiance only in his/her personal capacity.

What kind of compact was a constitution of one of the original 13 states?

Every state of the several united States of America was brought into the

Union on the same footing as those of the original thirteen, ILLINOIS

CENTRAL RAILROAD v. ILLINOIS, 146 U.S. 387, 434, 13 S.Ct. 110, 36

L.Ed. 1018 (1892) ( “The State of Illinois was admitted into the union in

1818 on an equal footing with the original states in all respects. Such was

one of the conditions of the cession from Virginia of the territory northwest

of the Ohio River, out of which the state was formed. But the equality

prescribed would have existed if it had not been thus stipulated. There canbe no distinction between the several states of the union in the character of

the jurisdiction, sovereignty, and dominion which they may possess and

exercise over persons and subjects within their respective limits.” ); BAKER

v. CARR, 369 U.S. 186, 226 n. 53, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)

( “On the other hand, the implication of the Guaranty Clause in a case

concerning congressional action does not always preclude judicial action. It

has been held that the clause gives Congress no power to impose

restrictions upon a State’s admission which would undercut the

constitutional mandate that the States be on an equal footing. COYLE v.

SMITH, 221 U.S. 559, 31 S.Ct. 688, 55 L.Ed. 853 [(1911)]. And in TEXAS

v. WHITE, 7 Wall. 700, 19 L.Ed. 227, although Congress had determined

that the State’s government was not republican in form, the State’s standing

to bring an original action in this Court was sustained.” ), and so it would

seem that a description of the Massachusetts compact would do for any and

all: MUNN v. ILLINOIS, 94 U.S. 113, 124, 24 L.Ed. 77 (1876)

( “[T]hrough their State constitutions, or other forms of social compact, [the

original states] undertook to give practical effect to such as they deemed

necessary for the common good and the security of life and property. . . .

“ ‘A body politic,’ as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution of

Massachusetts, ‘is a social compact by which the whole people

covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people,

that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.’

(Emphasis mine)” ). This mutual promise sets up the state’s Sovereignty in

the citizenry in their collective capacity in their common law jurisdiction with



their elected and appointed government officials exercising sovereignty in

their representative capacity from within their political jurisdiction governed

by their statutory jurisdiction and the common law as trustees of the people.

William Franklin Fratcher, ed., SCOTT ON TRUSTS, 4th Edition, Little,

Brown and Company, 1987, Volume I, § 17: METHODS OF CREATINGA TRUST: § 17.3: Promise in trust ( “A trust can be created not only

where the owner of property declares himself trustee of it or where he

transfers it to another in trust, but also where a promisee is made by one

person to another as trustee. In such a case the promise holds in trust his

rights as promise. . . . Where the promise is binding, however, because

consideration is given for the promise . . . the promisee becomes trustee of

his right to enforce the promise if the parties so intended. (Citations

omitted)” ); and, the promise of allegiance in the citizen’s personal capacity

is consideration for the promise of protection from the citizenry in their

collective capacity, and vice versa. A prospective state citizen must offer to

pledge his/her allegiance in covenant to demand that the State, in its

representative capacity, pledge the protection of the state citizens

collectively in covenant, in return. Catherine M. A. McCauliff, CORBIN

ON CONTRACTS, Volume 8: Conditions, § 30.12: Promise and

Condition Distinguished, p. 26 ( “The word ‘covenant’ has come to be

not much more than a synonym of ‘promise,’ although once its only proper

meaning may have been a formal promise under seal. Whether a covenant

is a formal promise, or an informal promise, or both, it is not itself a

‘condition’ of the duty of the covenantee to keep his return promise or

‘covenant.’ But the performance of a covenant, or other promise, may be

such a condition, either express or constructive.” ); Ibid., p. 27, n. 48

omitted ( “The first step, therefore, in interpreting an expression in a

contract, with respect to condition as opposed to promise, is to ask oneself

the question:

Was this expression intended to be an assurance by one party to the

other that some performance by the first would be rendered in the

future and that the other could rely upon it?

If the answer is yes, we have found the expression to be a promise that the

specified performance will take place. The alternative question to be asked

is:





in the Constitution of the United States against the passage of *266* laws

impairing the obligation of contracts applies to the Constitution, as well as

the laws, of each State.’ NEW ORLEANS GAS-LIGHT CO. v. LOUISIANA

LIGHT CO., 115 U.S. 650, headnote 4, 6 S.Ct. 252, 29 L.Ed. 516. See also

12 C.J. 988. See FORCHEIMER v. HOLLY, 14 Fla. 239; CANOVA v. STATE ex rel. BRADFORD COUNTY COM’RS, 18 Fla. 512.” ); and the covenant set up

by the compact clause of the FLORIDA CONSTITUTION of 1838,

Declaration of Rights, § 1, where the state citizen pledges his/her

allegiance in their individual capacity as consideration for the citizens’

protection pledged in their collective capacity and vice versa which involves

the mutual promise of a covenant, is impaired within the meaning of

UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY of NEW YORK v. NEW JERSEY, 431

U.S. 1, 15, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977), rehearing denied,

431 U.S. 975, 97 S.Ct. 2942 (1977) (“HOME BUILDING & LOAN ASSN. v.

BLAISDELL, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), is regarded as the leading case in the

modern era of Contract Clause interpretation.” ), and HOME BLDG. &

LOAN ASS'N v. BLAISDELL, 290 U.S. 398, 429-430, 54 S.Ct. 231, 78

L.Ed. 413 (1934) ( “The obligation of a contract is the law which binds the

parties to perform their agreement. STURGES v. CROWNINSHIELD, 4

Wheat. 122, 197; STORY, op. cit., 1378. This Court has said that ‘the laws

which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract, and where it

[290 U.S. 398, 430] is to be performed, enter into and form a part of it,

as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms. This

principle embraces alike those which affect its validity, construction,

discharge, and enforcement. . . . Nothing can be more material to the

obligation than the means of enforcement. . . . The ideas of validity and

remedy are inseparable, and both are parts of the obligation, which is

guaranteed by the Constitution against invasion.’ Von HOFFMAN v. CITY of

QUINCY, 4 Wall. 535, 550, 552. See, also, WALKER v. WHITEHEAD, 16

Wall. 314, 317. But this broad language cannot be taken without

qualification. Chief Justice Marshall pointed out the distinction between

obligation and remedy. STURGES v. CROWNINSHIELD, supra, 4 Wheat.

200. Said he: ‘The distinction between the obligation of a contract, and the

remedy given by the legislature to enforce that obligation, has been taken at

the bar, and exists in the nature of things. Without impairing the obligation

of the contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the

nation shall direct.’ And in Von HOFFMAN v. CITY of QUINCY, supra, 4 Wall.

553, 554, the general statement above quoted was limited by the further



observation that ‘it is competent for the States to change the form of the

remedy, or to modify it otherwise, as they may see fit, provided no

substantial right secured by the contract is thereby impaired. . . .” ), and

“[t]he obligations of a contract are impaired by a law which renders them

invalid, or releases or extinguishes them

9

(STURGES v . CROWNINSHIELD,supra, 4 Wheat. 197, 198) and impairment, as above noted, has been

predicated of laws which without destroying contracts derogate from

substantial contractual rights. 10 (nn. 9 & 10 omitted)” Ibid., 290 U.S.

398, 431, in that without this compact as a covenant the sovereignty of

Florida citizens in their collective capacity is not setup and the subsequent

political jurisdiction of the State of Florida is not brought into existence to

exercise said sovereignty in its representative capacity with respect to

Florida citizens in their collective capacity; a contract is impaired, in the

context of Article I, § 10 of the Florida Constitution, when a contract is made

worse or is diminished in . . . excellence or strength. LAWNWOOD

MEDICAL CENTER, INC. v. SEEGER, 959 So.2d 1222, 1224 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2007) ( “The right to contract is one of the most sacrosanct rights

guaranteed by our fundamental law. CHILES v. UNITED FACULTY of

FLORIDA, 615 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1993). In Florida, this right is protected

through article I, section 10 of our state constitution: ‘No bill of attainder,

ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be

passed.’ An impairment occurs, in the context of this provision, when a

contract is made worse or is diminished in quantity, value, excellence or

strength. POMPONIO v. CLARIDGE of POMPANO CONDOMINIUM, INC., 378

So.2d 774 (Fla. 1979).” ); the construction of § 19 of the FLORIDA

CONSTITUTION of 1838, Declaration of Rights should be substantially

the same.

As Judge D. Arthur Kelsey makes clear, STONEY v. FRANKLIN, 54 Va.Cir.

591, 2001 Va.Cir.LEXIS 84, 44 U.C.C.Rep.Serv.2d (Callaghan) 1211

(2001) ( “The debate draws us back to first principles. The economic loss

rule exists, in large part, to guard ‘one of the last hilltops on the boundary

between tort and contract.’ John L. Costello, Virginia Remedies § 21-5(f), at862 (2d ed. 1999). Tort law involves public policy concerns over safety,

both to persons and property, that carry with them the non-consensual

imposition of duties. A manufacturer may choose to build a product and sell

it. But whether the manufacturer agrees to or not, he must use reasonable

care or be held responsible if his product injures either persons or property.

Tort law imposes duties upon the otherwise unwilling. That is, no consent-



of-the-governed concepts apply to tortfeasors. On the other hand, contract

law involves an entirely different set of principles. Contract law itself

imposes few, if any, duties in the first instance. As a general rule,

contractual duties stem only from the consensual dealings of the parties.

Based upon the expressed (or, in the case of implied warranties, thepresumed) intention of the parties, contract law merely recognizes—rather

than imposes—legal duties and permits the parties wide latitude to limit their

liability and to disclaim implied warranties when the protected interests are

purely economic.” ), when the State of Florida omits our compact clause

from the first provision of our Declaration of Rights, we are deprived of the

fundamental right to give our consent to be governed—“the consent of the

governed”—first found in the Declaration of Independence; this may explain

why STONEY v. FRANKLIN failed to be reported in S.E.2d (2001).

Nowhere in the first Florida Constitution—nor any state constitution in effectat the adoption of the Constitution for the United States of America—is it

stipulated that a citizen must proffer proof of anything to obtain the

opportunity to create constitutional government by compact as a covenant

which is the consent of the governed. HEPBURN and DUNDAS v. AULD, 1

Cranch (5 U.S.) 321, 331, 2 L.Ed. 122, 125 (1803) ( “The only question

in this case is, whether Hepburn and Dundas had a right to insist on this

previous condition; and it is admitted that this question depends entirely on

the agreement of the 27th of September, 1799.

“That an acquittance should be signed, sealed and delivered before the act

itself was performed, which entitled the party to such acquittance, is a mode

of proceeding very unusual, and which certainly could only be rendered

indispensable by express stipulation.

“There is in this case no such express stipulation. . . .

“If we inspect those covenants which relate to the deed of assignment of

Graham’s contract, we find no stipulation respecting a release of any sort.” ).

When an individual is subject to the political jurisdiction, FISHER v.

MASTERS, 83 P.2d 212, 217, 59 Idaho 366 (1938) ( “In KNIGHT v.

TRIGG, 16 Idaho 256, 100 P. 1060, this court said [page 1062]: ‘The

holding of elections is peculiarly and wholly a matter within the management

and control of the political department of government.’ The word ‘political’,

as used in this connection, has no reference to partisanship or political



parties but rather to the control, management and operation of

government….” ); LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORP. v. SUPERIOR COURT of

L. A. COUNTY, 171 P.2d 21, 24, 28 Cal.2d 481, 166 A.L.R. 701 (1946)

( “[T]he interference proscribed by the statute is interference with ‘political

activities or affiliations,’ and the test is not membership in or activitiesconnected with any particular group or organization, but whether those

activities are related to or connected with the orderly conduct of government

and the peaceful organization, regulation and administration of the

government.” ); AKIO KUWAHARA v. ACHESON, 96 F.Supp. 38, 41

(S.D.Cal. 1951) ( “In Webster’s New International Dictionary

(Unabridged), second edition, 1949, . . . the word ‘political’ is defined as

follows: ‘Of or pertaining to polity, or politics, or the conduct of government,

referring in the widest application to the judicial, executive, and legislative

branches; of or pertaining to, or incidental to, the exercise of the functions

vested in those charged with the conduct of government; relating to the

management of affairs of state. . . .’ ” ); DE-ANNEXATION of CERTAIN

REAL PROPERTY, 102 P.3d 120, 127-128, 2004 OK 60 (Okla. 2004),

rehearing denied, ( “In sum, for governmental action *128* to be political

there must be (a) an issue of ‘governing’ coupled with (b) a

mandatory and final resolution by nonjudicial means. (Emphasis in

original )” ), the individual has waived his/her rights secured by the

Constitution for the United States of America in return for rights granted by

the Constitution of the United States; this individual is internal to

government which acts in the nature of a charitable corporation where the

administration of government is of primary concern. Where the Florida

Supreme Court has decided that “ ‘A charity, in the legal sense, may be

more fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for

the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, . . . lessening the burdens

of government. It is immaterial whether the purpose is called charitable in

the gift itself, if it is so described as to show that it is charitable in its

nature.’ JACKSON v. PHILLIPS, 14 Allen (Mass.) 539, 556. (Emphasis

mine)” JORDAN v. LANDIS, Attorney General on Behalf of State, 128

Fla. 604, 175 So. 241, 246 (1937), it would seem to me that the Court

could see the State of Florida as acting in the nature of a charitable

corporation for the purpose of administering the fundamental rights of

individuals.



When the United States Supreme Court reviews the constitutional rights of a

member of our military, it demonstrates that matters of government

administration come first. PARKER v. LEVY, 417 U.S. 733, 750-752, 94

S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) ( “[W]hile legal proceedings actually

brought before a court-martial are prosecuted in the name of theGovernment, and the accused has the right to demand that he be proceeded

against in this manner before any sanctions may be imposed upon him, a

range of minor sanctions for lesser infractions are often imposed

administratively. Forfeiture of pay, reduction in rank, and even dismissal

from the service bring to mind the law of labor-management relations as

much as the civilian criminal law.

“In short, the Uniform Code of Military Justice regulates a far broader range

of the conduct of military personnel than a typical state criminal code

regulates of the conduct of civilians; but at the same time the enforcementof that Code in the area of minor offenses [417 U.S. 733, 751] is often

by sanctions which are more akin to administrative or civil sanctions than tocivilian criminal ones.

“The availability of these lesser sanctions is not surprising in view of the

different relationship of the Government to members of the military. It isnot only that of lawgiver to citizen, but also that of employer to employee.

Indeed, unlike the civilian situation, the Government is often employer,landlord, provisioner, and lawgiver rolled into one. That relationship also

reflects the different purposes of the two communities. As we observed inIn re GRIMLEY, 137 U.S., at 153, the military ‘is the executive arm’ whose

‘law is that of obedience.’ While members of the military community enjoy

many of the same rights and bear many of the same burdens as domembers of the civilian community, within the military community there is

simply not the same autonomy as there is in the larger civilian community.The military establishment is subject to the control of the civilian

Commander in Chief and the civilian departmental heads under him, and its

function is to carry out the policies made by those civilian superiors.

“Perhaps because of the broader sweep of the Uniform Code, the military

makes an effort to advise its personnel of the contents of the Uniform Code,

rather than depending on the ancient doctrine that everyone is presumed to

know the law. Article 137 of the Uniform Code, 10 U.S.C. 937, requires that

the provisions of the Code be ‘carefully explained to each enlisted member

at the time of his entrance on active duty, or within six days thereafter’ and

that they be ‘explained again after he has completed six months of active



duty. . . . ’ Thus the numerically largest component of the services, the

enlisted personnel, who might be expected to be a good deal less familiar

with the Uniform Code than commissioned officers, are required by its terms

[417 U.S. 733, 752] to receive instructions in its provisions. Article 137

further provides that a complete text of the Code and of the regulationsprescribed by the President ‘shall be made available to any person on active

duty, upon his request, for his personal examination.’

“With these very significant differences between military law and civilian law

and between the military community and the civilian community in mind, we

turn to appellee’s challenges to the constitutionality of Arts. 133 and 134.” ),

yet, in military court-martials you are “guilty until proven innocent,” with

the burden on you doing so, while a private citizen is “innocent until proven

guilty,” with the burden on the government to show guilt.

The parties to the compact as a covenant contract within the common law

jurisdiction, and the presumption must be that all their activity is within that

jurisdiction unless it can be proved that they have done something to attach

themselves to government. As long as the individual has no attachments,

the common law is supreme to legislative enactment—federal and state.

HeinONLINE, 1 James Kent COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW

419-420, (1826)HeinONLINE, 1 James Kent COMMENTARIES ON

AMERICAN LAW 419-420, (1826) ( “MUNICIPAL law is a rule of civil

conduct, prescribed by the supreme power in a state. It is composed of

written and unwritten, or statute and common law. Statute law is the

express written will of the legislature, rendered authentic by certain

prescribed forms and solemnities.

“It is a principle in the English law, that an act of parliament, delivered in

clear and intelligible terms, cannot be questioned, or its authority controlled

in any court of justice. ‘It is,’ says Sir William Blackstone, ‘the exercise of

the highest authority that the kingdom acknowledges upon earth.’ When it

is said in the books, that a statute contrary to natural equity and reason, or

repugnant, or impossible to be performed, is void, the cases are understoodto mean, that the courts are to give the statute a reasonable construction.

They will not readily presume, out of respect and duty to the lawgiver, that

any very unjust or absurd consequence was within the contemplation of the

law. But if it should happen to be too direct and palpable in its direction to

admit of but one construction, there is no doubt in the English law, as to the



binding efficacy of the statute. The will of the legislature is the supreme law

of the land, and demands irresistible obedience.a

“But while we admit this conclusion of the English law, we cannot but,

admire the intrepidity and powerful sense of justice which led Lord Coke,

when chief justice of the K. B., to declare, as he did in Doctor Bonham’s

Case,b that the common law doth control acts of parliament, and adjudges

them void when against common right and reason. The same sense of

justice and freedom of opinion, led Lord Chief Justice Hobart, in Day v.

Savagec to insist that an act of parliament made against natural equity, as

to make a man judge in his own case, was void; and induced Lord Chief

Justice Holt to say, in the case of the City of London v. Wood ,d that the

observation of Lord Coke was not extravagant, but was a very reasonable

and true saying. Perhaps what Lord Coke said in his reports, on this point,

may have been one of the many things that King James alluded to, when hesaid, that in Coke’s Reports there were many dangerous conceits of his own

uttered for law, to the prejudice of the crown, parliament, and subjects.e

“The principle in the English government, that the parliament is omnipotent,

does not prevail in the United States.” )

(a: “1 Blacks. Com. 91, 160, 185. Christian’s note to 1 Blacks. Com, 41.” )

(b: “8 Co. 118.” ) (c: “Hob. 87.” ) (d: “12. Mod. 687.” )

(e: “Bacon’s Works, vol. 6. p. 128.” ).

When the private state citizen enters into conduct that attaches him/her to

government, statutes are supreme. CULLEN v. SEABOARD AIR LINE R.

CO., 63 Fla. 122, 58 So. 182, 183 (1912) ( “ ‘A statute will not be

construed as taking away a common-law right existing at the date of its

enactment, unless that result is imperatively required – that is to say, unless

it be found that the pre-existing right is so repugnant to the statute that the

survival of such right would in effect deprive the subsequent statute of its

efficacy; in other words, render its provisions nugatory.’ TEXAS & PAC. RY.v. ABILENE COTTON OIL CO., 204 U.S. 426, 27 Sup.Ct. 350, 51 L.Ed. 553, 9

Ann.Cas. 1075.” ), rehearing denied; In re LEVY’S ESTATE, 141 So.2d

803, 805 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1962) ( “A statute will not be held to have

changed well settled common law principles by implication, unless the

implication of change is clear or necessary to give full force to express

provisions of the statute and the public policy thus established. DUDLEY v.



HARRISON, McCREADY & CO., 1937, 127 Fla. 687, 173 So. 820, reh. den.,

128 Fla. 338, 174 So. 729. A statute will not be construed as taking away

common law rights unless the pre-existing right is repugnant to the statute.

CULLEN v. SEABOARD AIRLINE RY. CO., 1912, 63 Fla. 122, 58 So. 182.” ),

rehearing denied; MUNN v. ILLINOIS, 94 U.S. 113, 134, 24 L.Ed. 77(1876) ( “A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the

common law. That is only one of the forms of municipal law, and is no more

sacred than any other. Rights of property which have been created by the

common law cannot be taken away without due process; but the law itself,

as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will, or even at the whim, of the

legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations. Indeed, the great

office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are

developed, and to adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances.” ).

In other words, a federal citizen which must be subject to the political jurisdiction of the United States, finds himself/herself restrained in the use of

fundamental rights, the Court says there must be a compelling state interest

to justify it. COASTAL FLORIDA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION,

INC. v. WILLIAMS, 838 So. 2d 543, 550-551 (Fla. 2003) ( “There is

also no assertion here that the State has a compelling interest in depriving

deputy sheriffs of the right to collective bargaining. Indeed, as noted above,

all police officers and many deputy sheriffs have been exercising such rights

throughout Florida for some time. The most recent case in which this Court

has reviewed a statutory restriction on a public employee’s right to collectivebargaining was in CHILES v. STATE EMPLOYEES ATTORNEYS GUILD, 734

So.2d 1030, 1033 (Fla. 1999), wherein we struck down a statutory attempt

to deny collective bargaining rights to lawyers employed by government.” );

NORTH FLORIDA WOMEN’S HEALTH AND COUNSELING SERVICES,

INC. v. STATE, 866 So.2d 612, 625 n. 16 (Fla. 2003) ( “Under ‘strict’

scrutiny, which applies inter alia to certain classifications and fundamental

rights, a court must review the legislation to ensure that it furthers a

compelling State interest through the least intrusive means. The legislation

is presumptively unconstitutional. The standard of proof is as follows: theState must prove that the legislation furthers a compelling State interest

through the least intrusive means. See generally In re T.W., 551 So.2d

1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989).” ); Ibid., 866 So.2d 612, 635 & n. 50 ( “[I]t is

settled in Florida that each of the personal liberties enumerated in the

Declaration of Rights is a fundamental right. See generally TRAYLOR v.

STATE, 596 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1992).” ), and for private state citizens with no





consequently derived from the people; therefore, all officers of government,

whether legislative or executive, are their trustees and servants, and at all

times, in a legal way, accountable to them;” and, the Constitution of

Maryland, November 11, 1776, A Declaration of Rights, &C, § 4

provides, in part, “[t]hat all persons invested with the legislative orexecutive powers of government are the trustees of the public, and, as such,

accountable for their conduct;” and, the Constitution of the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1780), Part the First: A

Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts, Article V provides that, “[a]ll power residing originally in

the people, and being derived from them, the several magistrates and

officers of government, vested with authority, whether legislative, executive,

or judicial, are their substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable

to them;” and the jurisdictional predicate for this request for relief, at a

minimum, is found within the meaning of UNITED STATES v. STANDARD

OIL CO., 332 U.S. 301, 307, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1608 (1947) (arguing that

federal common law covered matters “vitally affecting interests, powers and

relations of the Federal Government [that] require uniform national

disposition rather than diversified state rulings” and that ERIE was not

intended to have the “purpose or effect for broadening state power over

matters essentially of federal character or for determining whether issues

are of that nature” ); BIVENS v. SIX UNKNOWN FED. NARC. AGENTS,

403 U.S. 388, 407, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed. 2d 619 (1971) ( “[I]t must

also be recognized that the Bill of Rights is particularly intended to vindicate

the interests of the individual in the face of the popular will as expressed in

legislative majorities; at the very least, it strikes me as no more appropriate

to await express congressional authorization of traditional judicial relief with

regard to these legal interests than with respect to interests protected by

federal statutes.” ) (HARLAN, J., concurring); PRIEBE & SONS, INC. v.

UNITED STATES, 332 U.S. 407, 411, 68 S.Ct. 123, 92 L.Ed. 32 (1947)

(applying federal common law to the construction of a federal government

contract and stating that it “is customary, where Congress has not adopted

a different standard, to apply to the construction of government contracts

the principles of general contract law. UNITED STATES v. STANDARD RICE

CO., 323 U.S. 106, 111, 147, 147, and cases cited.” ).

When the covenants on either side form the entire consideration for each

other, neither party can sue without alleging that he has or is ready and

willing to perform it. Halsbury, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Third



Edition), Volume 11, Deeds and Other Instruments, BUTTERWORTH

& CO. (PUBLISHERS) LTD., London, England, 1955, § 729: Rules

regarding nature of contract & footnote (e) ( “1. If the covenants on

either side form the entire consideration for each other, they are mutually

dependent; each is a condition precedent, and neither party can sue withoutalleging that he has performed his covenant, or that he is ready and willing

to perform it (e).” )

(footnote (e): “This is the fourth rule in the notes to PORDAGE v. COLE

(1669), 1 Wms. Saund. 319 l, at p. 320 e; ‘4. Where the mutual covenants

go to the whole consideration on both sides, they are mutual conditions and

performance must be averred’ (see OXFORD v. PROVAND (1868), L. R. 2 P.

C. 135, at p. 156). Accordingly, where a vendor had so changed the

property by cutting down timber that he could not properly perform his

covenant, he could not sue for the purchase-money (DUKE of St. ALBANS v.SHORE (1789), 1 Hy. Bl. 270). . . .” ); the first thing we need do to setup our

damage suit is file petitions for Florida state citizenship which simultaneously

repudiates the federal nature of citizenship and any attachment to political

jurisdiction with the Florida attorney general using the same general form

we used to file Michael L. Hodge’s NOTICE OF LIABILITY in the Orange

County Recorder—the details of which are alluded to in Louis Farrakhan’s

letter.

Declarations of Domicile and Allegiance must be incorporated as referencesin these petitions for state citizenship. SMITH and ARMISTEAD v.CROOM[2], 7 Fla. 180, 185-186 (1857) (“[T]he law of citizenship,

as it is known in America [ ] is found in American decisions. This

citizenship I understand as equivalent to domicil, when applied to an American born or a foreigner naturalized. To be a citizen of a State,

says Judge Story, a man must have his domicil in the State.

“If a man has his domicil in a State, to which he has removed from anotherState, he is a citizen of the former.

“In CASE v. CLARK, 5 Mason C. C. Rep. 70, Story, J., says: ‘It appears tome clear that there is no sufficient proof that the plaintiff is a citizen of Massachusetts. To effect that purpose, it should be established that there as

a bona fide change of domicil; there must be a bona fide intention of removal, and a real change of domicil.



“In the same case he shows that a removal for business or pleasure, asojoun, does not make a citizen. This was a question of forensic character—

a question as to the right to sue in the Federal Court; and in this case, as inquestion of the right to sue as a citizen of a State has been put upon the

question of whether the person was or was not domiciled in the State for all

purposes, and the rules as to domicil laid down in the same way as insuccession cases, and the cases as to succession referred to.

“In Story’s COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, Vol. 3, pp. 564, 565, in

treating of that clause of the Constitution which gives jurisdiction to theFederal Court, between citizens of one State and citizens of another State,

he explains the meaning of the word ‘citizen’ as there used. He says: ‘Areall persons born within a State to be always deemed citizens of that State,

notwithstanding any change of domicil, or does their citizenship change withtheir change of domicil? The answer to this enquiry is equally plain and

satisfactory. The Constitution having declar- *186* ed that citizens

of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, every person who is a citizen of one

State and removes into another, with the intention of taking uphis residence and inhabitancy there, becomes ipso facto a citizen

of the State where he resides , and he then ceases to be a citizen of the

State from which he has removed his residence. In general it may be saidthat a removal from one State into another, animo manendi, or with a

design of becoming an inhabitant, constitutes a change of domicil, and of course a change of citizenship.’

“Here we have emphatically declared, that as to the right to sue inthe Federal Court, ‘domicil’ and ‘citizenship’ are synonymous.

(Emphasis mine)” ).

Long before the Fourteenth Amendment came into existence, a

preponderance of our courts considered American citizens to be attached to

the political jurisdiction of government as owing allegiance to it; the older of

only two U.S. Supreme Court cases that define the meaning of “subject to

the jurisdiction of the United States” cites an 1805 Massachusetts case for

the proposition that a citizen must be born in the common law jurisdiction of

the country wherein he/she is born to be a citizen thereof, and then, his/her

allegiance is due the political jurisdiction. UNITED STATES v. WONG KIM

ARK, 169 U.S. 649, 663-664, 18 S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890 (1898) ( “The

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, speaking by Mr. Justice

(afterwards Chief Justice) Sewall, early held that the determination of the

question whether a man was a citizen or an alien was ‘to be governed



altogether by the principles of the common law,’ and that it was

established, with few exceptions, ‘that a man, born within the jurisdiction of

the common law, is a citizen of the country wherein he is born. By this

circumstance of his birth, he is subjected to the duty of allegiance which is

claimed and enforced by the sovereign of his native land; and becomesreciprocally entitled to the protection of that sovereign, and to the other

rights and advantages which are included in the term ‘citizenship.’ ’

GARDNER v. WARD, (1805) 2 Mass. 244, note. And again: ‘The doctrine of

the common law is, that every man born within its jurisdiction is a subject of

the sovereign of the country where he is born; and allegiance is not

personal to the sovereign in the extent that has been contended for;

it is due to him in his political capacity of sovereign of the territory

where the person owing the allegiance was born.’ KILHAM v. WARD, (1806)

2 Mass. 236, 265. It may here be observed that in a recent English case

Lord Coleridge expressed the opinion of the Queen’s Bench Division that the

statutes of 4 Geo. II, (1731) c. 21, and 13 Geo. III, (1773) c. 21,

(hereinafter referred to,) ‘clearly recognize that to the King in his

politic, and not in his personal capacity, is the allegiance of his

subjects due.’ ISAACSON v. DURANT, 17 Q.B.D. 54, 65.

“The Supreme Court of North Carolina, speaking by Mr. Justice Gaston, said:

‘Before our Revolution, all free persons born within the dominions of the

King of Great Britain, whatever their color or complexion, were native-born

British subjects; those born out of his allegiance were aliens.’ ‘Upon the

Revolution, no other change took place in the law of North Carolina, than

was consequent upon the transition from a colony dependent on an

European King to a free and sovereign State;’ ‘British subjects in North

Carolina became North Carolina freemen;’ ‘and all free persons born within

the State are born citizens of the State.’ ‘The term ‘citizen,’ as understood

in our law, is precisely analogous to the term ‘subject’ in the common law,

and the change of phrase has entirely resulted from the change of

government. The sovereignty has been transferred from one man to

the collective body of the people; and he who before was a ‘subject

of the king’ is now ‘a citizen of the State.’ ’ STATE v. MANUEL,

(1838) 4 Dev. & Bat. 20, 24-26. (Emphasis mine)” ), yet it does

observe that the King’s prerogative—sovereignty—has been transferred to

the collective body of the people. BIGNELL v. CUMMINS, 69 Mont. 294,

222 P. 797, 799 (1923) ( “The word prerogative implies sovereign right.



ATTORNEY GENERAL v. CITY of EAU CLAIRE, 37 Wis. 400, 443. The

expressions are synonymous. With respect to the governmental problems of

a free people either expression is apt only when it is used to mean the

inherent and paramount power of the people. Expressive of this is section 1

of article 3 of the Constitution: ‘All political power is vested in and derived from the people; all government of right

originates with the people; is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for

the good of the whole.’

“The sovereignty of the people is expressed by the Constitution, by statute,

or by law expressly recognized by statute. Of course it is carried out under

the Constitution by the three departments of the government. Article 4, §

1.” ). The fact that the courts have recognized that each state constitution

and the federal constitution is a compact, ABDI HOSH ASHKIR v.

UNITED STATES, 46 Fed.Cl. 438, 441 (2000), supra; PEAVY-WILSON

LUMBER CO. v. BREVARD COUNTY, 159 Fla. 311, 31 So.2d 483, 487

(1947) ( “[C]onstitutional law [ ] was promulgated as a compact, by all

in the first instance, to shield minorities from majorities.” ), and that a

constitution may be construed two ways: (1) in light of legislative

enactments, and (2) as a contract, OGDEN v. SAUNDERS, 25 U.S. (12

Wheat.) 213, 277, 6 L.Ed. 606, 628 (1827) ( “If ever contemporaneous

exposition, and the clear understanding of the contracting parties, or of the

legislating power (it is no matter in which light it be considered), could be

resorted to as the means of expounding an instrument, the continuing andunimpaired existence of this power in the states ought never to have been

controverted.” ), is incompatible with the idea that the people of the political

jurisdiction are one of the contracting parties. If the contracting parties

were as they presume—the citizens in their individual capacity and the

citizens in their collective capacity of the political jurisdiction—there would

not be two ways to construe because “in light of legislative enactment” is

from the point of view of the political jurisdiction. If everyone is attached to

the political jurisdiction, who are they representing? If government can be

seen as acting in the nature of a charitable corporation in the administrationof its business—particularly in the administration of fundamental rights (civil

liberties), it could never be a trustee to anyone internal to its

administration.

It would seem that the U.S. Supreme Court is waiting for an American

citizen to claim the right to state citizenship. WHEELER v. SMITH, 50 U.S.



(9 How.) 55, 78, 13 L.Ed. 44 (1850) ( “When this country achieved its

independence, the prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the people of

the States. And this power still remains with them, except so far as they

have delegated a portion of it to the Federal government. The sovereign will

is made known to us by legislative enactment. And to this we must look inour judicial action, instead of the prerogatives of the crown. The State, as a

sovereign, is the parens patriae.” ).

It should be eye-opening with respect to the foregoing to contrast Florida’s

view that a state constitution is a limitation on governmental powers in

contradistinction to a grant a power, SAVAGE v. BOARD of PUBLIC

INSTRUCTION of HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, 101 Fla. 1362, 133 So.

341, 344 (1931) ( “The Constitution of this state is not a grant of power to

the Legislature, but a limitation only upon legislative power, and unless

legislation be clearly contrary to some express or necessarily impliedprohibition found in the Constitution, the courts are without authority to

declare legislative acts invalid. The Legislature may exercise any lawmaking

power that is not forbidden by organic law. STATE v. BRYAN, 50 Fla. 293,

39 So. 929; JORDAN v. DUVAL COUNTY, 68 Fla. 48, 66 So. 298; STONE v.

STATE, 71 Fla. 514, 71 So. 634.” ), and that this is a generally accepted

doctrine, BOARD of PUBLIC INSTRUCTION for POLK COUNTY,

FLORIDA v. GILLESPIE, 81 F.2d 586, 589 (CA5, Fla. 1936) ( “It is the

generally accepted doctrine of constitutional law that the powers of state

Legislatures are not conferred by, or to be found in, their constitutions; theyare inherent. That Legislatures look to constitutions not as the source of,

but for limitations upon, their powers. It is the generally accepted doctrine

that exerted legislative powers may not be stricken down upon general ideas

of propriety or justice, or of the force and effect of natural law, but only by

pointing to a constitutional limitation upon the power. LYTLE v. HALFF, 75

Tex. 128, 132, 12 S.W. 610; HARRIS COUNTY v. STEWART, 91 Tex. 143, 41

S.W. 650; BROWN v. CITY of GALVESTON, 97 Tex. 1, 75 S.W. 488. The

Florida courts have announced the same doctrine in COTTON v. COUNTY

COMMISSIONERS, 6 Fla. 610 [(1856)]; SAVAGE v. BOARD of PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, 101 Fla. 1362, 133 So. 341; STATE ex rel. MOODIE v.

BRYAN, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929; HARRY E. PRETTYMAN v. FLORIDA REAL

ESTATE COMM., 92 Fla. 515, 109 So. 442; JORDAN v. DUVAL COUNTY, 68

Fla. 48, 66 So. 298.” ); In re APPORTIONMENT LAW SENATE JOINT

RESOLUTION NO. 1305, 1972 REGULAR SESSION, 263 So.2d 797,

805 (1972) ( “It is well settled that the state Constitution is not a grant of



power but a limitation upon power. Unless legislation duly passed be clearly

contrary to some express or implied prohibition contained in the

Constitution, the courts have no authority to pronounce it invalid HARRY E.

PRETTYMAN, INC. v. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 92 Fla. 515, 109

So. 442 (1926); STATE ex rel. JONES v. WISEHEART, 245 So.2d 849 (Fla.1971).” ), supplemented, 279 So.2d 14, supplemented, 281 So.2d 484.

Compare this to the most satisfying case I have found explaining the true

nature of state constitutional governmental purpose, WHITTINGTON v.

POLK, 1 H. & J. 236, 1802 WL 349 (Md.Gen.). “After the Revolutionary

War, the Maryland General Court succeeded the Provincial Court, and the

Court of Appeals succeeded the Colonial Court of Appeals and was given

authority to hear appeals from the General Court, the Court of Chancery and

the Court of Admiralty. See Md. Const. of 1776, § 56.6 ” (n. 6: “The

General Court was abolished by constitutional amendment in 1805.”)), soWHITTINGTON v. POLK was heard in a lower court.

“The bill of rights and form of government compose the constitution of

Maryland, and is a compact made by the people of Maryland among

themselves, through the agency of a convention selected and appointed for

that important purpose.

“This compact is founded on the principle that the people being the source of

power, all government of right originates from them.

“In this compact the people have distributed the powers of government in

such manner as they thought would best conduce to the promotion of the

general happiness; and for the attainment of that all important object have,

among other provisions, judiciously deposited the legislative, judicial and

executive, in separate and distinct hands, subjecting the functionaries of

these powers to such limitations and restrictions as they thought fit to

prescribe.

“The legislature, being the creature of the constitution, and acting

within a circumscribed sphere , is not omnipotent, and cannot rightfully

exercise any power, but that which is derived from that instrument.

“The constitution having set certain limits or land marks to the power of the

legislature, whenever they exceed them they act without authority, and such

acts are mere nullities, not being done in pursuance of power delegated

to them: Hence the necessity of *243* some power under the



constitution to restrict the acts of the legislature within the limits defined by

the constitution.

“The power of determining finally on the validity of the acts of the legislature

cannot reside with the legislature, because such power would defeat and

render nugatory, all the limitations and restrictions on the authority of the

legislature, contained in the bill of rights and form of government, and they

would establish a despotism, and subvert that great principle of the

constitution, which declares that the powers of making, judging, and

executing the law, shall be separate and distinct from each other.

“This power cannot be exercised by the people at large, or in their

collective capacity, because they cannot interfere according to their

own compact, unless by elections, and in such manner as the

constitution has prescribed, and because there is no other modeascertained by which they can express their will. (Emphasis mine)”

WHITTINGTON v. POLK, 1 H. & J. 236, 242-243 (1802); the court

asserts that the state constitution is like the federal constitution in that the

powers of government are delegated and the compact clause of the state

constitution’s bill of rights involves the citizens individually and the citizens

collectively as parties setting up the citizens collectively as the sovereignty

and bringing into existence the political jurisdiction where sovereignty is

exercised in a representative capacity—unhindered.

“The interference of the people by elections cannot be considered as the

proper and only check and a suitable remedy, because in the interval of

time, between the elections of the members who compose the different

legislatures, the law may have had its full operation, and the evil arising

from it become irremediable; nor is it probable that the elections will be

made with the view to afford redress in such particular *244* case, and if

they were, and the law should be repealed, it would not be an adequate

remedy.” Ibid., 1 H. & J. 236, 243-244.

“It is the office and province of the court to decide all questions of law whichare judicially brought before them, according to the established mode of

proceeding, and to determine whether an act of the legislature, which

assumes the appearance of a law, and is clothed with the garb of authority,

is made pursuant to the power vested by the constitution in the legislature;

for if it is not the result or emanation of authority derived from the



constitution, it is not law, and cannot influence the judgment of the court in

the decision of the question before them.

“The oath of a judge is ‘that he will do equal right and justice according to

the law of this state, in every case in which he shall act as judge.’

“To do right and justice according to the law, the judge must determine what

the law is, which necessarily involves in it the right of examining the

constitution, (which is the supreme or paramount law, and under which

the legislature derive the only authority they are invested with, of

making laws,) and considering whether the act passed is made pursuant

to the constitution, and that trust and authority which is delegated

thereby to the legislative body. . . .

“The legislature are the trustees of the people, and, as such, can

only move within those lines which the constitution has defined as

the boundaries of their authority , and if they should incautiously, or

unadvisedly transcend those limits, the constitution has placed the judiciary

as the barrier or safeguard to resist the oppression, and redress the injuries

which might accrue from such inadvertent, or unintentional infringements of

the constitution.” Ibid., 1 H. & J. 236, 244-245.

“It is also observable, that the courts cannot take judicial cognizance of any

act repugnant to the constitution, unless the question is judicially brought

before them, and then it is fully discussed by counsel learned in the law, andthe court decide on mature consideration.” Ibid., 1 H. & J. 236, 245.

Thus, within the meaning of WHITTINGTON v. POLK, 1 H. & J. 236

(1802), the constitutional purpose of Florida government has been

misconstrued.

Add to the above the fact that the English common law doctrine of a

subject’s perpetual allegiance did not conform to the States’ entitlement to

remodel their form of government according to the necessities or policy of

the people, so the American common law doctrine of contracting allegiancecame into being. INGLIS v. TRUSTEES of the SAILOR’S SNUG

HARBOUR in the CITY of NEW YORK, 28 U.S. 99, 157-161 & n. (a), 7

L. Ed. 617 (1830) ( “The case of the separation of the United States from

Great Britain, is perhaps not strictly brought within any of the descriptions

already referred to; and it has been treated on many occasions, both at the

bar and on the bench, as a case sui generis. Before the revolution, all the





allegiance to the British crown. When, therefore, the declaration of

independence absolved all the states *159* from allegiance to the British

crown, it was an act of one party only. It did not bind the British

government, which was still at liberty to insist, and did insist upon the

absolute nullity of the act, and claimed the allegiance of all the colonists asperpetual and obligatory. From this perplexing state of affairs, the

necessary accompaniment of a civil war, it could not escape the notice of the

eminent men of that day, that most distressing questions must arise; who

were to be considered as constituting the American states, on one side, and

‘the state of Great Britain’ on the other? The common law furnished no

perfect guide, or rather admitted of different interpretations. If, on the one

side, it was said, that all persons born within a colony owed a perpetual

allegiance to that colony, whoever might be the sovereign, the answer was,

that the common law admitted no right in any part of the subjects to change

their allegiance without the consent of their sovereign, and that the

usurpation of such authority was itself rebellion; for ‘nemo potest exuere

patriam,’ was the language of the common law. In respect to persons who

were not natives, but inhabitants only, in a colony, at the time of the

assertion of its independence, there was still less reason to claim their

allegiance. If they were aliens, there was no pretence to say that they could

be bound to permanent allegiance against their will. If they were born in

England, or elsewhere in the British dominions, out of the colony, they were

as little bound to permanent allegiance; because they inhabited, not as

colonists, but as British subjects. In respect to both these cases, (i.e.

foreigners and British subjects,) no colony, upon assuming to be an

independent state, could, against their will, make them members of the

state. It would be an exercise of authority not flowing from its rights as an

independent state, and at war with the admitted rights of other nations, by

the law of nations, to hold the allegiance of their own subjects. In order,

therefore, to make such persons members of the state, there must be some

overt act or consent on their own part, to assume a character; and then, and

then only, could they be deemed, in respect to such colony, to determine

their right of election.

“Under the peculiar circumstances of the revolution, the *160* general, I

do not say the universal, principle adopted, was to consider all persons,

whether natives or inhabitants, upon the occurrence of the revolution,

entitled to make their choice, either to remain subjects of the British crown,



or to become members of the United States. This choice was necessarily to

be made within a reasonable time. In some cases that time was pointed out

by express acts of the legislature; and the fact of abiding within the state

after it assumed independence, or after some other specific period, was

declared to be an election to become a citizen. That was the course inMassachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. In other states,

no special laws were passed; but each case was left to be decided upon its

own circumstances, according to the voluntary acts and conduct of the

party. That the general principle of such a right of electing to remain under

the old, or to contract a new allegiance, was recognised, is apparent from

the cases of the COMMONWEALTH vs. CHAPMAN, 1 Dall.Rep. 53; CAIGNET

vs. PETTIT, 2 Dall.Rep. 234; MARTIN vs. THE COMMONWEALTH, 1 Mass.Rep.

347, 397; PALMER vs. DOWNER, 2 Mass.Rep. 179, note. S. C. Dane’s

Abridg. Ch. 131, art. 7, sec. 4; KILHAM vs. WARD, 2 Mass.Rep. 236, and

GARDNER vs. WARD, 2 Mass.Rep. 244, note; as explained and adopted in

INHABITANTS of CUMMINGTON vs. INHABITANTS of SPRINFIELD, 2

Pick.Rep. 394, and note; INHABITANTS of MANCHESTER vs. INHABITANTS

of BOSTON, 16 Mass.Rep. 230, and M’ILVAINE vs. COXE’S LESSEE, 4

Cranch, 209, 211 (a). But what is more directly in point: it is expressly

declared and acted upon, by the supreme court of New York, in the case of

JACKSON vs. WHITE, 20 Johns.Rep. 313. It appears to me that there is

sound sense and public policy in this doctrine; and there is no pretence to

say, that it is incompatible with the known law or general usages of nations.

The case of AINSLIE vs. MARTIN, 9 Mass.Rep. 454, proceeds upon the

opposite doctrine; but that case stands alone, and is incompatible with prior

as well as subsequent decisions of the same court; and so it has been

*161* treated by chancellor Kent, in his learned commentaries. 2 Kent’s

Comm. 35, 52.” )

(n. (a): “See also CHASE, J., in WARE vs. HYLTON, 3 Dall. 225, 1 Peters’s

Condens. Rep. 199; HEBRON vs. COLCHESTER, 5 Day’s Rep. 169.” )

(STORY, J., dissenting).

I’m sure I have read somewhere that you and Landis are certified to practice

in the United States Supreme Court. Though, Congressional mandates

dictate that we file in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia

(after we’ve given Florida’s Attorney General a chance to remedy things), I

don’t believe it will remain there long; I expect the Supreme Court to be the

trial court operating under the Fed.R.Civ.Proc after the lower courts examine



the issues and certify the case as having questions of great public

importance.

We can discuss the possible advantage of coming pro se with you as

advisors, but whether you sign on as the attorney of record or not, we would

enter into the agreement you use representing clients for purposes of

securing your remuneration and whatever other reasons you can think of.

Let’s talk about it. We look forward to hearing from you. And, thank you for

your time and efforts in our behalf.

Very Truly Yours,

J. Patrick Simpson

321-299-5773 (SU, MO, & TU are days off; otherwise my 12-hour

driving shift precludes me from talking on my cell phone)

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