2 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSwww.cepchile.clTIntroductionhe demise of Chiles Concertacin coalition has been predictedoften over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even thecoalitionsleadershaveissuedprematureannouncementsofitsdeath(LatinAmericaAdviser2002;ElMercurio2003a).SomeobserversofChilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertacinas both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event that is, as theproductofsomanyfactors,allworkingtowardthesameend,thatitisimpossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion thatthe Concertacin may well dissolve before Chiles next election, but not forthereasonscommonlycited.Ourargumentisbased,instead,onthestructure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricablywith Chiles unusual electoral rules.Harbingers of the Concertacins demise point out that the Chileaneconomyhasslowedsomewhatsincethecoalitionsearlyyearsingovernment during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initiallygalvanizedaroundoppositiontothePinochetregimeofthe1970sand1980s,soastimepasses,thecompellingforceofthatinitialmotivationmight naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertacin, and even its componentpartiesmostnotablytheChristianDemocratsareinternallydividedover social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birthcontrol. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertacin will have held thepresidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative houseelectedbypopularvote)for16years.Bythestandardsofmultipartycoalitionsanywhere,muchlessamongLatinAmericaspresidentialsystems, the Concertacin is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneouscorruptionchargesagainstmembers,includingthestrippingofparliamentary rights from five of the coalitions deputies in 2002, and thegeneral disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for solong. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire.Anyoftheseforces,orsomecombinationofthem,couldindeedunderminetheConcertacin,butwedonotregardthesefactorsasnecessarily devastating to the coalitions survival for a number of reasons.In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five yearsin far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, andemployment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. TheConcertacin may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for goodeconomicstewardship.Next,manyoftheissuessurroundingthenon-democraticlegacyofthePinocheteraincludingtherenownedEstudios Pblicos, 61 (verano 1996).ESTUDIOLICITACIN DE CARRETERAS EN CHILE*Eduardo Engel, Ronald Fischer yAlexander GaletovichEnlosprximostresaoselMinisteriodeObrasPblicasplanealicitar concesiones interurbanas por ms de US$ 2.400 millones. Esimportante que las concesiones funcionen adecuadamente, tanto porlamagnituddelosmontosenvueltoscomoporlaimportanciaquetiene para el pas mejorar su infraestructura vial. Un buen mecanismode licitaciones favorece a las firmas ms eficientes, mientras que unEDUARDO ENGEL. Ph. D. en Economa, MIT. Ph. D. en Estadstica, Stanford University.Ingeniero Civil Matemtico, Universidad de Chile. Profesor lnvestigador del Centro de Econo-maAplicada(CEA),DepartamentodeIngenieraIndustrialdelaUniversidaddeChile.Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).RONALDFISCHER.Ph.D.enEconoma,UniversityofPennsylvania.IngenieroCivilMatemtico,UniversidaddeChile.ProfesorInvestigadordelCentrodeEconomaAplicada(CEA), Departamento de Ingeniera Industrial de la Universidad de Chile.ALEXANDER GALETOVICH. Ph. D. en Economa, Princeton University. Ingeniero Comer-cial y Magister en Economa, Universidad Catlica de Chile. Profesor Investigador del CentrodeEconomaAplicada(CEA),DepartamentodeIngenieraIndustrialdelaUniversidaddeChile.* Agradecemos a Alvaro Gonzlez, Gerente de Concesiones, Ruta 5, la sugerencia deestudiar las propiedades de una licitacin por menor ingreso total, que corresponde al mecanis-moqueproponemosaqu,dondelatasadedescuentoescero.Asimismo,seagradecenloscomentariosdeChristopherAvery,GonzaloCortzar,CarlosCruz,JaimeFuenzalida,JaimeGibson, William Hogan, Helmut Stehr, Jean Tirole y de los asistentes a losseminarios en losque se expuso este trabajo, organizados, respectivamente, por el Ministerio de Obras Pblicas,elCentrodeEstudiosPblicos,laUniversidaddeHarvardylaconferenciaRegulacinyDesregulacinenChileyAmrica,organizadaenconjuntoporelCentrodeEconomaAplicadadelDepartamentodeIngenieraIndustrialdelaUniversidaddeChileyelBancoMundial. Todo error u omisin es de nuestra exclusiva responsabilidad.2 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSwww.cepchile.clTIntroductionhe demise of Chiles Concertacin coalition has been predictedoften over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even thecoalitionsleadershaveissuedprematureannouncementsofitsdeath(LatinAmericaAdviser2002;ElMercurio2003a).SomeobserversofChilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertacinas both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event that is, as theproductofsomanyfactors,allworkingtowardthesameend,thatitisimpossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion thatthe Concertacin may well dissolve before Chiles next election, but not forthereasonscommonlycited.Ourargumentisbased,instead,onthestructure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricablywith Chiles unusual electoral rules.Harbingers of the Concertacins demise point out that the Chileaneconomyhasslowedsomewhatsincethecoalitionsearlyyearsingovernment during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initiallygalvanizedaroundoppositiontothePinochetregimeofthe1970sand1980s,soastimepasses,thecompellingforceofthatinitialmotivationmight naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertacin, and even its componentpartiesmostnotablytheChristianDemocratsareinternallydividedover social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birthcontrol. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertacin will have held thepresidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative houseelectedbypopularvote)for16years.Bythestandardsofmultipartycoalitionsanywhere,muchlessamongLatinAmericaspresidentialsystems, the Concertacin is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneouscorruptionchargesagainstmembers,includingthestrippingofparliamentary rights from five of the coalitions deputies in 2002, and thegeneral disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for solong. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire.Anyoftheseforces,orsomecombinationofthem,couldindeedunderminetheConcertacin,butwedonotregardthesefactorsasnecessarily devastating to the coalitions survival for a number of reasons.In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five yearsin far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, andemployment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. TheConcertacin may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for goodeconomicstewardship.Next,manyoftheissuessurroundingthenon-democraticlegacyofthePinocheteraincludingtherenowned6 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSmecanismo defectuoso tender a seleccionar firmas que quebrarn orenegociarn sus contratos de concesin, ocasionando perjuicio a losusuarios.En este trabajo se presenta un marco conceptual que permite analizarlas virtudes y limitaciones de los mecanismos para licitar carreteras.Estemarcoincorporalasasimetrasdeinformacinylosriesgosinherentes delnegocio vial. Los autores lo utilizan para exponer lasdeficiencias del mecanismo actual y para argumentar que el mecanis-mo propuesto en este estudio es claramente superior. Segn estima-ciones conservadoras sealan, de adoptarse este nuevo mecanis-mo los usuarios ahorraran alrededor de US$ 800 millones en peajesen las carreteras interurbanas que sern licitadas en los prximos tresaos.I. INTRODUCCINs evidente que existe un grave dficit de infraestructura vial enel pas. Debido a la carencia de recursos para llevar a cabo las inversionesqueelpasrequiere,elGobiernohadecididoconcesionarlasprincipalescarreteras de modo que el sector privado las construya, opere y mantenga, acambiodelingresogeneradoporpeajes.ElrecininauguradotnelElMeln y la licitacin del tramo Talca-Chilln de la Ruta 5 son ejemplos deestas concesiones.El Ministerio de Obras Pblicas planea adjudicar concesiones inter-urbanaspormsdeUS$2.400millonesenunplazodetresaos.Porlamagnitud de los montos envueltos y la importancia que tiene para el desa-rrollofuturodelpasmejorarsuinfraestructuravial,esesencialqueelmecanismo de concesiones funcione adecuadamente. Esto sugiere analizarla modalidad de licitacin de las concesiones viales.Enestetrabajosepresentaun marcoconceptualqueincorporaasi-metras de informacin, las diversas fuentes de riesgo y la economa polti-cadelasposiblesrenegociaciones.Deacuerdoaesteenfoque,quenospermiteanalizarlasvirtudesylimitacionesdediversosmecanismosdelicitacindecarreteras,exponemoslasdeficienciasdelmecanismoactualyproponemos,alternativamente,unmecanismodelicitacindecarreterasms conveniente.Luegodeestaintroduccin,lasegundaseccindeltrabajoentregaun breve resumen de la situacin en que se encuentra la infraestructura vialen Chile. Posteriormente, en la tercera seccin, se desarrolla el marco con-ceptualquepermiteconsiderarlasventajasydesventajasdelosdiversosE2 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSwww.cepchile.clTIntroductionhe demise of Chiles Concertacin coalition has been predictedoften over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even thecoalitionsleadershaveissuedprematureannouncementsofitsdeath(LatinAmericaAdviser2002;ElMercurio2003a).SomeobserversofChilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertacinas both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event that is, as theproductofsomanyfactors,allworkingtowardthesameend,thatitisimpossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion thatthe Concertacin may well dissolve before Chiles next election, but not forthereasonscommonlycited.Ourargumentisbased,instead,onthestructure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricablywith Chiles unusual electoral rules.Harbingers of the Concertacins demise point out that the Chileaneconomyhasslowedsomewhatsincethecoalitionsearlyyearsingovernment during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initiallygalvanizedaroundoppositiontothePinochetregimeofthe1970sand1980s,soastimepasses,thecompellingforceofthatinitialmotivationmight naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertacin, and even its componentpartiesmostnotablytheChristianDemocratsareinternallydividedover social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birthcontrol. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertacin will have held thepresidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative houseelectedbypopularvote)for16years.Bythestandardsofmultipartycoalitionsanywhere,muchlessamongLatinAmericaspresidentialsystems, the Concertacin is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneouscorruptionchargesagainstmembers,includingthestrippingofparliamentary rights from five of the coalitions deputies in 2002, and thegeneral disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for solong. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire.Anyoftheseforces,orsomecombinationofthem,couldindeedunderminetheConcertacin,butwedonotregardthesefactorsasnecessarily devastating to the coalitions survival for a number of reasons.In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five yearsin far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, andemployment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. TheConcertacin may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for goodeconomicstewardship.Next,manyoftheissuessurroundingthenon-democraticlegacyofthePinocheteraincludingtherenownedE. ENGEL, R. FISCHER Y A. GALETOVICH 7mecanismosdelicitacin.Enlacuartaseccin,seaplicadichomarcoconceptual al mecanismo de licitacin que se usa actualmente en el pas. Laquintaseccincontienelaproposicindeunanuevamodalidaddelicita-cin. En la ltima seccin (6) se presentan algunas extensiones del mecanis-mo propuesto y las conclusiones generales del trabajo.Enloquerestadeestaintroduccinresearemoslosprincipalesargumentos y las conclusiones de poltica que se derivandel estudio.1.1. El actual mecanismo de licitacinLaprincipalcaractersticadelmecanismoqueseusaactualmenteestribaenqueellapsodelaconcesinseconoceconanticipacin.Enalgunas licitaciones, el Estado fija el tiempo que dura la concesin, y se loadjudicalafirmaqueofrececobrar el menorpeajeporconstruir,operarymantener el camino. En otros casos, el Estado fija un peaje mnimo; si msdeunafirmaofreceestepeaje,elganadorsedeterminasegnelmenorplazo de concesin solicitado. Para que el concesionario recupere su inver-sinylospeajesseanrazonables,lasconcesionessuelenotorgarseporperodoslargos(tpicamente20aos).Ambosmtodossoningeniosos,pues la competencia por obtener la concesin reduce las rentas monoplicasdel concesionario. Ante la imposibilidad de competir en la cancha, el meca-nismo induce a los licitantes a competir por la cancha.Sin embargo, las licitaciones de plazo fijo tienen varios defectos. Elprimero: es imposible confiar en una prediccin del trfico a 20 aos plazo.Adems,comoelplazodelaconcesinesfijo,esprobablequelamejoroferta la haga aquel licitante que (en forma equivocada) sea ms optimistaal estimar la demanda futura por la ruta (maldicin del ganador). Bajo elmecanismo actual de concesiones, el negocio es sumamente riesgoso; tantoas que fue necesario que el Estado redujera el riesgo otorgando garantasmnimas de trfico para que las firmas pudieran encontrar financiamientopara los proyectos. Como contrapartida, el Estado exige que el concesiona-rio comparta su rentabilidad cuando sta sea muy alta. Esto causa un nuevoproblema, ya que el Estado debe averiguar los costos del concesionario paradeterminarsurentabilidad.Esbiensabidoquecontratosquerequierenentregarinformacindecostossuelenserpococonvenientesparalapartedesinformada, en este caso el regulador y los usuarios.Ensegundolugar,bajoelmecanismoactualesdifcilmodificarelcontrato,loqueesnecesario,por ejemplo,cuandoelaumentodeltrnsitodemanda ms pistas antes del trmino dela concesin. Si el concesionario2 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSwww.cepchile.clTIntroductionhe demise of Chiles Concertacin coalition has been predictedoften over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even thecoalitionsleadershaveissuedprematureannouncementsofitsdeath(LatinAmericaAdviser2002;ElMercurio2003a).SomeobserversofChilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertacinas both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event that is, as theproductofsomanyfactors,allworkingtowardthesameend,thatitisimpossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion thatthe Concertacin may well dissolve before Chiles next election, but not forthereasonscommonlycited.Ourargumentisbased,instead,onthestructure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricablywith Chiles unusual electoral rules.Harbingers of the Concertacins demise point out that the Chileaneconomyhasslowedsomewhatsincethecoalitionsearlyyearsingovernment during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initiallygalvanizedaroundoppositiontothePinochetregimeofthe1970sand1980s,soastimepasses,thecompellingforceofthatinitialmotivationmight naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertacin, and even its componentpartiesmostnotablytheChristianDemocratsareinternallydividedover social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birthcontrol. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertacin will have held thepresidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative houseelectedbypopularvote)for16years.Bythestandardsofmultipartycoalitionsanywhere,muchlessamongLatinAmericaspresidentialsystems, the Concertacin is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneouscorruptionchargesagainstmembers,includingthestrippingofparliamentary rights from five of the coalitions deputies in 2002, and thegeneral disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for solong. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire.Anyoftheseforces,orsomecombinationofthem,couldindeedunderminetheConcertacin,butwedonotregardthesefactorsasnecessarily devastating to the coalitions survival for a number of reasons.In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five yearsin far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, andemployment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. TheConcertacin may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for goodeconomicstewardship.Next,manyoftheissuessurroundingthenon-democraticlegacyofthePinocheteraincludingtherenowned8 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSconsidera que la modificacin del contrato lo perjudica, en cunto deberacompensarlo el Estado para poner fin anticipado a la concesin? Por ltimo,una licitacin basada en el peaje mnimo dar lugar a peajes bajos en tramosde mucho trnsito (cercanos a Santiago), creando congestin. Por contraste,los peajes sern muy altos en las zonas con menor poblacin.1.2. Un nuevo mecanismoMotivadosporloanterior,proponemosunanuevaformadelicitarcaminos que, manteniendo las virtudes del mecanismo actual, reduce signi-ficativamente sus defectos. En la modalidad de licitacin que proponemosel regulador fija al concesionario el peaje mximo por cobrar y se adjudica-rlaconcesinaquellaempresaquesolicitaelmenorvalorpresentedeingresos por peajes.1Elmecanismopropuestotienevariasventajassobreelactual.Enprimer lugar, reduce el impacto negativo de una mala estimacin del trnsi-to, pues la concesin se acorta o alarga si la demanda por la ruta es mayor omenorquelapronosticada.EstoreducelanecesidaddeunagarantadelEstado.Alnosabercuntodurarlaconcesin,losusuariosasumenunpoco ms de riesgo. Sin embargo, el valor presente de los peajes que paganconestemtodoesconsiderablementemenorqueaquelquepaganbajo lamodalidad actual. Para valores tpicos de la incertidumbre respecto de flujosvehicularesydelcoeficientedeaversinalriesgodelasfirmas,elvalorpresentedelosmenorespagosdelosusuariosesalrededordel33%delcostodelainversin.TomandoencuentaqueseesperainvertiralrededordeUS$ 2.400 millones enlas carreterasinterurbanasconcesionadas enlosprximos aos, esto se traducira en un ahorro de US$ 800 millones para losusuarios.Lasegundaventaja del mecanismopropuestoesqueresultamenosprobablequesetengaquerenegociarelcontrato.Lasfirmasdispuestasaofrecer los mejores trminos en la licitacin a menudo esperan renegociar elcontrato una vez ganada la concesin. En tal caso no gana la empresa mseficiente sino aquella con mayor capacidad para renegociar en forma venta-josa en caso de un escenario adverso. Las renegociaciones son costosas paraelEstado,porqueocurrenenelmarcodeunarelacinbilateralqueno1 El valor presente delos ingresos es la suma ponderadade losingresos presentesyfuturos, en que estos ltimos son descontados adecuadamente.2 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSwww.cepchile.clTIntroductionhe demise of Chiles Concertacin coalition has been predictedoften over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even thecoalitionsleadershaveissuedprematureannouncementsofitsdeath(LatinAmericaAdviser2002;ElMercurio2003a).SomeobserversofChilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertacinas both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event that is, as theproductofsomanyfactors,allworkingtowardthesameend,thatitisimpossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion thatthe Concertacin may well dissolve before Chiles next election, but not forthereasonscommonlycited.Ourargumentisbased,instead,onthestructure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricablywith Chiles unusual electoral rules.Harbingers of the Concertacins demise point out that the Chileaneconomyhasslowedsomewhatsincethecoalitionsearlyyearsingovernment during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initiallygalvanizedaroundoppositiontothePinochetregimeofthe1970sand1980s,soastimepasses,thecompellingforceofthatinitialmotivationmight naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertacin, and even its componentpartiesmostnotablytheChristianDemocratsareinternallydividedover social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birthcontrol. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertacin will have held thepresidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative houseelectedbypopularvote)for16years.Bythestandardsofmultipartycoalitionsanywhere,muchlessamongLatinAmericaspresidentialsystems, the Concertacin is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneouscorruptionchargesagainstmembers,includingthestrippingofparliamentary rights from five of the coalitions deputies in 2002, and thegeneral disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for solong. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire.Anyoftheseforces,orsomecombinationofthem,couldindeedunderminetheConcertacin,butwedonotregardthesefactorsasnecessarily devastating to the coalitions survival for a number of reasons.In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five yearsin far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, andemployment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. TheConcertacin may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for goodeconomicstewardship.Next,manyoftheissuessurroundingthenon-democraticlegacyofthePinocheteraincludingtherenownedE. ENGEL, R. FISCHER Y A. GALETOVICH 9garantizalatransparenciadelalicitacinoriginal.Elsistemapropuestodesincentiva las ofertas que son artificialmente bajas, pues en el evento deuna renegociacin el Estado puede ofrecer pagarle al concesionario el rema-nente del valor presente del ingreso solicitado al principio.Al evitar situa-ciones que llevan a renegociar el contrato original, el mecanismo propuestono slo beneficia al Estado, sino que tambin favorece a aquellas empresasque, siendomseficientesenconstruir ygestionarcarreteras,notienenelpoder ni la habilidad o disposicin para renegociar de modo ventajoso.En tercer lugar, las licitaciones por valor presente de los ingresos sonflexibles, ya que permiten modificar los contratos en forma justa. Por ejem-plo,sielreguladordecidequeesnecesariaunaampliacindelcamino,puede compensar al concesionario con el remanente de la suma solicitada yrelicitar la concesin bajo las nuevas condiciones.Encuarto lugar,entodoslos tramosdelaRuta5sepuedencobrarlos mismos peajes, dado que el regulador los elige. En aquellos tramos conmayor trfico las concesiones terminarn antes.Una posible crtica a la modalidad de licitacin por valor presente delos ingresos es que aumenta los costos financieros, porque la duracin de laconcesinesvariable. Comose ha mencionado antes, nuestromtodo dis-minuye en forma significativa la probabilidad de quiebra, lo que hace finan-cieramente ms atractivo el proyecto. Adems, existen instrumentos finan-cieros de plazo variable en otros pases. stos no son costosos ni difciles dedisear.Una segunda crtica al mecanismo propuesto es que limita la rentabi-lidadmximaquerecibeelconcesionario,alacortarladuracindelaconcesincuandoelnegocioresultasermuybueno.Esefectivoquelasrentabilidades muyaltasson menos probables con nuestromecanismo;sinembargo,estovaacompaadodeunareduccin de losriesgosdegrandesprdidas y quiebra, puesto que cuando el negocio no es bueno, el plazo de laconcesin se alarga automticamente. Por eso, salvo que se parta de la baseque el Estado asumir las prdidas en escenarios adversos y los concesiona-rios obtendrn todas las ganancias en los casos favorables, la rentabilidad delas empresas ser la misma una vez que se corrige por el menor riesgo.II. ANTECEDENTESEn esta seccin presentamos un breve resumen de la situacin de lainfraestructura vial en Chile.El dficit de infraestructura en el pas se debe tanto al fuerte aumento2 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSwww.cepchile.clTIntroductionhe demise of Chiles Concertacin coalition has been predictedoften over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even thecoalitionsleadershaveissuedprematureannouncementsofitsdeath(LatinAmericaAdviser2002;ElMercurio2003a).SomeobserversofChilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertacinas both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event that is, as theproductofsomanyfactors,allworkingtowardthesameend,thatitisimpossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion thatthe Concertacin may well dissolve before Chiles next election, but not forthereasonscommonlycited.Ourargumentisbased,instead,onthestructure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricablywith Chiles unusual electoral rules.Harbingers of the Concertacins demise point out that the Chileaneconomyhasslowedsomewhatsincethecoalitionsearlyyearsingovernment during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initiallygalvanizedaroundoppositiontothePinochetregimeofthe1970sand1980s,soastimepasses,thecompellingforceofthatinitialmotivationmight naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertacin, and even its componentpartiesmostnotablytheChristianDemocratsareinternallydividedover social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birthcontrol. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertacin will have held thepresidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative houseelectedbypopularvote)for16years.Bythestandardsofmultipartycoalitionsanywhere,muchlessamongLatinAmericaspresidentialsystems, the Concertacin is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneouscorruptionchargesagainstmembers,includingthestrippingofparliamentary rights from five of the coalitions deputies in 2002, and thegeneral disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for solong. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire.Anyoftheseforces,orsomecombinationofthem,couldindeedunderminetheConcertacin,butwedonotregardthesefactorsasnecessarily devastating to the coalitions survival for a number of reasons.In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five yearsin far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, andemployment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. TheConcertacin may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for goodeconomicstewardship.Next,manyoftheissuessurroundingthenon-democraticlegacyofthePinocheteraincludingtherenowned10 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSen la demanda por servicios de infraestructura como a la insuficiente inver-sinenelsector.Laexperienciadepasesdesarrolladosindicaquelainversin en infraestructura debe ser entre 3 y 5% del producto, lo que paraChile corresponde a no menos de US$ 1.800 millones anuales, cifra muchomayor que la que se invirti en 1994.2Lascarenciassonespecialmenteimportantesenelsectorvial.Du-rante la dcada pasada se invirti slo el 30% de lo requerido en mantencinde caminos y no hubo aumentos considerables en la red pavimentada (van-se los Cuadros N 1 y 2). El ritmo de pavimentacin descendi desde unos350 km por ao en el perodo 1955-1970 a 150 km por ao en los 20 aosquesiguieron,almismotiempoquelademandaporinfraestructuravialaumentabaatasaselevadasdebidoalcrecimientoeconmico.3SegnlaDireccindeVialidad(VolmenesdeTrnsitoenlosCaminosdeChile,1993), durante los ltimos aos la tasa de crecimiento del trnsito ha sido de9-10% anual, lo que implica que ste se duplica cada 7 aos. En resumen, seestimaqueesnecesariocompletarlapavimentacindelaredbsica,queconsisteen26.000kmdecaminosestructurantes,ademsdemejorarlascapacidad del sistema de caminos nacionales (6.600 km).4CUADRO N 1 EL SISTEMA VIAL CHILENO (EN KILMETROS)Ao Hormign Asfalto Ripiado Tierra Total1986 3.314 6.503 33.635 35.226 78.6781987 3.473 6.847 32.718 36.184 79.2221988 3.469 6.855 32.679 36.126 79.1291989 3.525 7.237 32.391 36.329 79.4821990 3.646 7.298 32.407 35.884 79.2351991 3.663 7.338 32.426 36.166 79.5931992 3.769 8.305 32.778 34.462 79.3141993 3.834 8.517 32.709 34.233 79.293Fuente: Compendio estadstico 1991-1994, INE.Las carencias de infraestructura vial nose limitan a lainsuficienciade caminos pavimentados. Del Cuadro N 2 se desprende que el 45% de los2 Datos proporcionados por Alvaro Gonzlez.3 Datos proporcionados por Alvaro Gonzlez.4LareddecaminosdeChilecomprendealrededorde79.300km,deloscualesaproximadamenteel43%sondetierrasinningunamejorayel41%detierraestabilizados.Slo el 5% de los 12.300 km que restan corresponde a caminos con pavimento de hormign yel 11% a caminos de pavimento de asfalto (vase Cuadro N 1).2 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSwww.cepchile.clTIntroductionhe demise of Chiles Concertacin coalition has been predictedoften over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even thecoalitionsleadershaveissuedprematureannouncementsofitsdeath(LatinAmericaAdviser2002;ElMercurio2003a).SomeobserversofChilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertacinas both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event that is, as theproductofsomanyfactors,allworkingtowardthesameend,thatitisimpossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion thatthe Concertacin may well dissolve before Chiles next election, but not forthereasonscommonlycited.Ourargumentisbased,instead,onthestructure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricablywith Chiles unusual electoral rules.Harbingers of the Concertacins demise point out that the Chileaneconomyhasslowedsomewhatsincethecoalitionsearlyyearsingovernment during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initiallygalvanizedaroundoppositiontothePinochetregimeofthe1970sand1980s,soastimepasses,thecompellingforceofthatinitialmotivationmight naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertacin, and even its componentpartiesmostnotablytheChristianDemocratsareinternallydividedover social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birthcontrol. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertacin will have held thepresidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative houseelectedbypopularvote)for16years.Bythestandardsofmultipartycoalitionsanywhere,muchlessamongLatinAmericaspresidentialsystems, the Concertacin is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneouscorruptionchargesagainstmembers,includingthestrippingofparliamentary rights from five of the coalitions deputies in 2002, and thegeneral disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for solong. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire.Anyoftheseforces,orsomecombinationofthem,couldindeedunderminetheConcertacin,butwedonotregardthesefactorsasnecessarily devastating to the coalitions survival for a number of reasons.In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five yearsin far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, andemployment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. TheConcertacin may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for goodeconomicstewardship.Next,manyoftheissuessurroundingthenon-democraticlegacyofthePinocheteraincludingtherenownedE. ENGEL, R. FISCHER Y A. GALETOVICH 11caminos pavimentados se encuentra en estado regular o malo. Esto se debeengranmedidaalaumentodelnmerodevehculospesados,elquehacrecido a tasas superiores a las del parque total de vehculos.5Elrecienteaumentodelgastoeninfraestructuranoessuficiente.Parasatisfacerlasnecesidadesdemedianoplazoesnecesariopavimentar1.200 km al ao, lo que supera largamente los 500 km pavimentados en unao excepcional como 1994. Alcanzar estos niveles de inversin dentro delsistema pblico parece difcil, tanto por la magnitud de los montos envuel-toscomotambinpor los requerimientos humanosydecapacidaddeges-tin que son necesarios para planificar, disear y supervisar la construccinde las obras.CUADRO N 2 ESTADO DE LA RED VIALClasificacin Bueno Regular Malo TotalHormign 1.611 1.726 499 3.835Asfalto 5.157 2.157 1.802 9.116Ripio 4.191 15.405 17.802 34.423Total (%) 15 52 33 100Fuente: MOP.Anteesteproblema,elgobiernohadecididoconcesionarlasrutasdealtotrficoquesonprivadamenterentablesenmanosdelsectorpriva-do,dejandoqueelEstadoconcentresugastoenaquelloscaminosquenolosean.Bajoestamodalidad,sonempresasprivadas(seguramentemsinnovativas y eficientes) las que financian, construyen, mantienen y operanlascarreteras.Acambiorecibirnlosingresosporpeajesporuntiempolimitado.Laleydeconcesionesesflexibleyabiertaatodaslaspersonasnaturales o jurdicas. Permite que los privados propongan proyectos, cuyospuntajessebonificanenlalicitacinsisonaprobadosporlasinstanciastcnicas. A diferencia de lo que ocurre en otros pases, donde las concesio-nes se adjudican a travs de negociaciones bilaterales, en Chile las licitacio-nes son abiertas y competitivas. Por ltimo, la ley establece un mecanismode conciliacin para resolver las diferencias entre el Estado y los inversio-nistas.5Losestudiosindicanqueeldaoauncaminocreceaproximadamentealacuartapotencia delpesosobre cada eje. Un camin de 20toneladas conun peso por ejediez vecesmayor que el de un automvil corriente causa un dao 10.000 veces mayor.2 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSwww.cepchile.clTIntroductionhe demise of Chiles Concertacin coalition has been predictedoften over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even thecoalitionsleadershaveissuedprematureannouncementsofitsdeath(LatinAmericaAdviser2002;ElMercurio2003a).SomeobserversofChilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertacinas both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event that is, as theproductofsomanyfactors,allworkingtowardthesameend,thatitisimpossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion thatthe Concertacin may well dissolve before Chiles next election, but not forthereasonscommonlycited.Ourargumentisbased,instead,onthestructure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricablywith Chiles unusual electoral rules.Harbingers of the Concertacins demise point out that the Chileaneconomyhasslowedsomewhatsincethecoalitionsearlyyearsingovernment during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initiallygalvanizedaroundoppositiontothePinochetregimeofthe1970sand1980s,soastimepasses,thecompellingforceofthatinitialmotivationmight naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertacin, and even its componentpartiesmostnotablytheChristianDemocratsareinternallydividedover social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birthcontrol. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertacin will have held thepresidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative houseelectedbypopularvote)for16years.Bythestandardsofmultipartycoalitionsanywhere,muchlessamongLatinAmericaspresidentialsystems, the Concertacin is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneouscorruptionchargesagainstmembers,includingthestrippingofparliamentary rights from five of the coalitions deputies in 2002, and thegeneral disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for solong. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire.Anyoftheseforces,orsomecombinationofthem,couldindeedunderminetheConcertacin,butwedonotregardthesefactorsasnecessarily devastating to the coalitions survival for a number of reasons.In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five yearsin far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, andemployment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. TheConcertacin may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for goodeconomicstewardship.Next,manyoftheissuessurroundingthenon-democraticlegacyofthePinocheteraincludingtherenowned12 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSCUADRO N 3 CONCESIONES INTERURBANAS: 1993-2000Ao Nombre Proyecto Costo (MMUS$) Longitud (km)1993 Tnel El Meln 39 2,51994 Camino de la Madera 33,7 1101995 Acceso Norte Concepcin 197 100Ruta 78 Santiago-San Antonio 121,6 108Camino Puchuncav-Nogales 31,4 n. d.Camino del Ripio 0,5 0,7Talca-Chilln 130 1931996 Autopista La Dormida 250 n. d.Ruta 57 CH-Santiago-Los Andes 50 n. d.Los Vilos-Santiago 148 172La Serena-Los Vilos 235 270Santiago-Talca (1a etapa) 112 194Autopista Santiago-San Fernando 230 125Chilln-Collipulli 161 144Collipulli-Temuco 212 209Temuco-Ro Bueno 131 129Ro Bueno-Puerto Montt 128 1241997 Red Vial Cartagena-Quintay 40 n. d.Camino Corral 12 n. d.1998 Camino Los Andes-Valparaso 36 n. d.Fuente: MOP, Coordinacin General de Concesiones, 14 de septiembre 1995.Existenalternativasalasconcesiones.Porejemplo,porsubajoendeudamientoelEstadochilenoestencondicionesdeobtenercrditosexternos a tasas ms bajas que los privados y podra usarlos para financiarlas inversiones en infraestructura. Esta modalidad, que ha sido la tradicio-nal,tienevariosinconvenientes.Primero,lamagnituddelasinversionesnecesariasrequiererecursoshumanosquesobrepasanlascapacidadesdelsectorpblico.Segundo,losincentivosparareducircostosyelegirlosproyectosmsrentablessonmenoresque cuandolagestinesprivada.Eltercerinconvenienteasociadoaestaalternativa(yposiblementeelmsimportante) es que el hecho que el Estado administre los caminos har msdifcilresistirlaspresionesdegruposdeintersparareducirlospeajesaniveles que no permitirn financiar la carretera.Losproblemasobservadosenlosmecanismosdelicitacinusadosen otros pases han sido tiles para disear el sistema chileno. En particular,la experiencia mexicana permiti descartar el tipo de licitacin en que ganalafirmaqueofreceelmenorplazodeconcesin.Estemecanismollevafijar peajes tan altos, que la baja demanda por las vas forz a renegociar loscontratos. Los mecanismos de licitacin tambin se han ido perfeccionando2 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSwww.cepchile.clTIntroductionhe demise of Chiles Concertacin coalition has been predictedoften over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even thecoalitionsleadershaveissuedprematureannouncementsofitsdeath(LatinAmericaAdviser2002;ElMercurio2003a).SomeobserversofChilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertacinas both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event that is, as theproductofsomanyfactors,allworkingtowardthesameend,thatitisimpossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion thatthe Concertacin may well dissolve before Chiles next election, but not forthereasonscommonlycited.Ourargumentisbased,instead,onthestructure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricablywith Chiles unusual electoral rules.Harbingers of the Concertacins demise point out that the Chileaneconomyhasslowedsomewhatsincethecoalitionsearlyyearsingovernment during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initiallygalvanizedaroundoppositiontothePinochetregimeofthe1970sand1980s,soastimepasses,thecompellingforceofthatinitialmotivationmight naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertacin, and even its componentpartiesmostnotablytheChristianDemocratsareinternallydividedover social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birthcontrol. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertacin will have held thepresidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative houseelectedbypopularvote)for16years.Bythestandardsofmultipartycoalitionsanywhere,muchlessamongLatinAmericaspresidentialsystems, the Concertacin is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneouscorruptionchargesagainstmembers,includingthestrippingofparliamentary rights from five of the coalitions deputies in 2002, and thegeneral disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for solong. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire.Anyoftheseforces,orsomecombinationofthem,couldindeedunderminetheConcertacin,butwedonotregardthesefactorsasnecessarily devastating to the coalitions survival for a number of reasons.In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five yearsin far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, andemployment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. TheConcertacin may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for goodeconomicstewardship.Next,manyoftheissuessurroundingthenon-democraticlegacyofthePinocheteraincludingtherenownedE. ENGEL, R. FISCHER Y A. GALETOVICH 13a medida que se han licitado ms obras. Por ejemplo, en el caso del tnel ElMelnlavariabledelicitacinfueunpromedioponderadodelpeajeyelmonto de un pago anual al Estado. La firma ganadora eligi una tarifa altajunto con un pago anual alto al Estado. Es probable que el bienestar socialseamayorsitantolatarifacomoelpagoalEstadofuesenmenores.LasnuevaslicitacionesnoincluyenpagosalEstado.Msrecientemente,elprocedimiento usado en la licitacin del tramo Talca-Chilln de la Ruta 5 esel siguiente: si la menor oferta es igual a la tarifa mxima establecida en lasbases, se decide en base al menor subsidio solicitado al Estado. Si la menorofertaestentrelatarifamximaylatarifamnimaestablecidasenlasbases, es sta la que gana la licitacin. Por ltimo, si dos ofertas estn en ellmite inferior, se dirime en base al menor plazo de concesin.III. MARCO CONCEPTUALEnestaseccindesarrollamosunmarcoconceptualquepermiteevaluar y comparar distintos mecanismos de licitacin. Como se ha mencio-nado, la ley chilena exige que la licitacin de concesiones viales sea pblicaycompetitiva.Adicionalmente,elgobiernochilenodeseaqueelsectorprivado financie totalmente la construccin de caminos concesionados. Estosignifica que las concesiones deben ser lo suficientemente largas para que elconcesionarioobtengaunarentabilidadnormalcobrandopeajesrazona-bles.6Existenvariosmecanismosdelicitacinabiertaquesatisfacen,almenos en principio, ambos requisitos. Esto hace necesario desarrollar crite-riosparacompararlos.Lareglageneralesqueelmecanismodelicitacinelegido debera maximizar el bienestar agregado de la comunidad, es decir,la suma de los excedentes de usuarios y concesionarios. De este principio sesigue que el regulador debe impedir que el concesionario explote librementeelmonopoliosobrelaconcesinyqueesdeseablequelaempresamseficiente gane la licitacin.Unmecanismodelicitacindecarreterasesunconjuntodereglasque: i) especifica cmo se selecciona al ganador de la concesin; ii) estable-celaslimitacionesa lasqueestsujetala explotacindelmonopoliovialconcesionado (por ejemplo, imponiendo un peaje mximo), y iii) determina6Larentabilidadnormalesaquellaqueobtendralafirmaenunnegocioderiesgosimilar en un mercado competitivo.2 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSwww.cepchile.clTIntroductionhe demise of Chiles Concertacin coalition has been predictedoften over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even thecoalitionsleadershaveissuedprematureannouncementsofitsdeath(LatinAmericaAdviser2002;ElMercurio2003a).SomeobserversofChilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertacinas both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event that is, as theproductofsomanyfactors,allworkingtowardthesameend,thatitisimpossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion thatthe Concertacin may well dissolve before Chiles next election, but not forthereasonscommonlycited.Ourargumentisbased,instead,onthestructure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricablywith Chiles unusual electoral rules.Harbingers of the Concertacins demise point out that the Chileaneconomyhasslowedsomewhatsincethecoalitionsearlyyearsingovernment during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initiallygalvanizedaroundoppositiontothePinochetregimeofthe1970sand1980s,soastimepasses,thecompellingforceofthatinitialmotivationmight naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertacin, and even its componentpartiesmostnotablytheChristianDemocratsareinternallydividedover social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birthcontrol. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertacin will have held thepresidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative houseelectedbypopularvote)for16years.Bythestandardsofmultipartycoalitionsanywhere,muchlessamongLatinAmericaspresidentialsystems, the Concertacin is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneouscorruptionchargesagainstmembers,includingthestrippingofparliamentary rights from five of the coalitions deputies in 2002, and thegeneral disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for solong. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire.Anyoftheseforces,orsomecombinationofthem,couldindeedunderminetheConcertacin,butwedonotregardthesefactorsasnecessarily devastating to the coalitions survival for a number of reasons.In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five yearsin far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, andemployment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. TheConcertacin may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for goodeconomicstewardship.Next,manyoftheissuessurroundingthenon-democraticlegacyofthePinocheteraincludingtherenowned14 ESTUDIOS PBLICOScmo se distribuyen los riesgos y las utilidades o prdidas del negocio entreel concesionario, los usuarios y el Estado.Elmecanismodelicitacinafectalosincentivosdelastrespartesinvolucradasenelnegocio,locualtieneconsecuenciassobreelbienestaragregadodelacomunidad.Enestaseccindescribimoslasprincipalescaractersticas que deben ser consideradas al disear y evaluar un mecanis-mo de licitacin.3.1.Requerimientos de informacin y complejidad del mecanismoUna licitacin da origen a un contrato en que el ganador se compro-meteaentregardeterminadosservicios.Paraverificarsielconcesionarioestcumpliendoconloacordadoelreguladorrequiereinformacin.Afinde evitar el comportamiento oportunista del concesionario,7 la discreciona-lidad administrativa del regulador y costosas disputas judiciales, es conve-niente que el contrato especifique condiciones cuyo cumplimiento sea fcil-mente verificable por terceros. En particular, se debe evitar que el reguladordependa de informacin que slo es conocida por el concesionario.8Unaaplicacindeesteprincipiosugierequenoeseficientefijartopesalasutilidadesdelconcesionario,porqueestorequiereconocerloscostosefectivos deconstrucciny operacindel caminoconcesionado. Essabido queresultadifcilparaelreguladoraveriguarculessonloscostosde una empresa. Al concesionario le conviene mostrar costos altos, porqueas disminuye su rentabilidad contable. En particular, esto es simple cuandoelconcesionarioestintegradoverticalmenteconotrasempresasqueleprestan servicios ya que puede manipular los precios de transferencia. Por elcontrario, el principio anterior es consistente con contratos de concesin queespecifican los estndares de calidad que debe cumplir el camino, pues stossepuedendefinirconobjetividadyexistenequiposespecializadosquepermiten monitorearlos.Una segunda propiedad deseable es que el mecanismo de licitacinsea simple. El problema de los mecanismos complejos es que dependen demuchasvariables,loqueloshacedifcilesdeanalizar.Amenudoestoredunda en sorpresas que no fueron anticipadas por las partes, aumentandoas laincertidumbre.Ms an,losmecanismoscomplejosnoson transpa-7 Utilizamos el concepto de comportamiento oportunista en el sentido que tiene en laliteratura de contratos incompletos. Vase, por ejemplo, Williamson (1985).8 En la literatura esto se conoce por informacin asimtrica.2 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSwww.cepchile.clTIntroductionhe demise of Chiles Concertacin coalition has been predictedoften over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even thecoalitionsleadershaveissuedprematureannouncementsofitsdeath(LatinAmericaAdviser2002;ElMercurio2003a).SomeobserversofChilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertacinas both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event that is, as theproductofsomanyfactors,allworkingtowardthesameend,thatitisimpossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion thatthe Concertacin may well dissolve before Chiles next election, but not forthereasonscommonlycited.Ourargumentisbased,instead,onthestructure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricablywith Chiles unusual electoral rules.Harbingers of the Concertacins demise point out that the Chileaneconomyhasslowedsomewhatsincethecoalitionsearlyyearsingovernment during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initiallygalvanizedaroundoppositiontothePinochetregimeofthe1970sand1980s,soastimepasses,thecompellingforceofthatinitialmotivationmight naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertacin, and even its componentpartiesmostnotablytheChristianDemocratsareinternallydividedover social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birthcontrol. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertacin will have held thepresidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative houseelectedbypopularvote)for16years.Bythestandardsofmultipartycoalitionsanywhere,muchlessamongLatinAmericaspresidentialsystems, the Concertacin is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneouscorruptionchargesagainstmembers,includingthestrippingofparliamentary rights from five of the coalitions deputies in 2002, and thegeneral disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for solong. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire.Anyoftheseforces,orsomecombinationofthem,couldindeedunderminetheConcertacin,butwedonotregardthesefactorsasnecessarily devastating to the coalitions survival for a number of reasons.In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five yearsin far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, andemployment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. TheConcertacin may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for goodeconomicstewardship.Next,manyoftheissuessurroundingthenon-democraticlegacyofthePinocheteraincludingtherenownedE. ENGEL, R. FISCHER Y A. GALETOVICH 15rentes, lo cual facilita la discrecionalidad del regulador y el comportamientooportunista del concesionario.Una consecuencia de lo anterior es que las reglas mediante las cualesseeligeelganadordelalicitacindebensersencillas.Enparticular,laeleccindelganadordeberadependerdeunasolavariable,yaquedelocontrariodebenestablecerseponderacionesparalasdistintasvariables,locual hace el proceso menos transparente y da pie para la discrecionalidad.3.2. Rentas monoplicasEn muchos casos la carretera concesionada no tiene sustitutos impor-tantes, por lo que la licitacin adjudica un monopolio.9 Hay tres razones porlas cuales no es conveniente que el concesionario explote ese poder mono-plico. Primero, como ya se mencion ms arriba, un monopolio no maxi-miza el bienestar social agregado. Segundo, las rentas monoplicas redistri-buyen riqueza desde los usuarios al concesionario y no compensan el riesgodelnegocio.Porltimo,seestaranadjudicandorentasmonoplicasaunparticular, lo que vulnera elprincipio de que la accin del Estado debe serimpersonal.10 Por estos motivos, elmecanismodelicitacindeberaelimi-nar las rentas monoplicas, de manera que los usuarios no paguen ms de lonecesarioparaquelaconcesinseaprivadamenteatractiva.LaLeydeConcesiones es consistente con estas tres consideraciones, ya que, como semencion ms arriba, obliga a licitaciones pblicas y competitivas y proh-be al Estado negociar con el potencial concesionario.En elcaso de las concesiones viales es posible evitar la mayora delos problemas del monopolio asignando la concesin en licitacin abierta ycompetitiva.ElrazonamientopopularizadoporDemsetz(1968)esquelacompetenciaporobtenerlaconcesineliminarlasrentaseconmicasdelganador.11 Ms an, bajo ciertas condiciones, la asignacin competitiva delmonopolio evita sus ineficiencias.12Existen varios mecanismos de licitacin del tipo Demsetz: por ejem-plo,laconcesinpodraadjudicarseallicitantequeofrezcaelpeajems9 La Ruta 5 es un buen ejemplo.10 Estamos conscientes que en otras reas como los derechos de agua, uso detierrasfiscales, asignacin de frecuencias electromagnticas (v.g., radio, televisin, telfonos celula-res y PCS), el Estado entrega rentas a particulares, pero creemos que no es la manera justa deasignar estos recursos escasos.11 Vase tambin a Posner (1972).12 Sin embargo, para una crtica a Demsetz vase a Williamson (1985, pp. 326 - 364).2 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSwww.cepchile.clTIntroductionhe demise of Chiles Concertacin coalition has been predictedoften over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even thecoalitionsleadershaveissuedprematureannouncementsofitsdeath(LatinAmericaAdviser2002;ElMercurio2003a).SomeobserversofChilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertacinas both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event that is, as theproductofsomanyfactors,allworkingtowardthesameend,thatitisimpossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion thatthe Concertacin may well dissolve before Chiles next election, but not forthereasonscommonlycited.Ourargumentisbased,instead,onthestructure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricablywith Chiles unusual electoral rules.Harbingers of the Concertacins demise point out that the Chileaneconomyhasslowedsomewhatsincethecoalitionsearlyyearsingovernment during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initiallygalvanizedaroundoppositiontothePinochetregimeofthe1970sand1980s,soastimepasses,thecompellingforceofthatinitialmotivationmight naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertacin, and even its componentpartiesmostnotablytheChristianDemocratsareinternallydividedover social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birthcontrol. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertacin will have held thepresidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative houseelectedbypopularvote)for16years.Bythestandardsofmultipartycoalitionsanywhere,muchlessamongLatinAmericaspresidentialsystems, the Concertacin is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneouscorruptionchargesagainstmembers,includingthestrippingofparliamentary rights from five of the coalitions deputies in 2002, and thegeneral disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for solong. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire.Anyoftheseforces,orsomecombinationofthem,couldindeedunderminetheConcertacin,butwedonotregardthesefactorsasnecessarily devastating to the coalitions survival for a number of reasons.In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five yearsin far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, andemployment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. TheConcertacin may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for goodeconomicstewardship.Next,manyoftheissuessurroundingthenon-democraticlegacyofthePinocheteraincludingtherenowned16 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSbajo, el menor plazo de concesin, la menor rentabilidad, o el menor valorpresentedeingresosporpeajes.Enunasituacindecompetenciaysinohay incertidumbre ni externalidades, los cuatro mecanismos son equivalen-tes desde el punto de vista del usuario, en el sentido que el valor presente delos peajes pagados durante el perodo de concesin es el mnimo compatibleconqueelconcesionario notengarentasniprdidas econmicas.Esms,loscuatromecanismospermitentarificarptimamente.13 Sin embargo, noson equivalentes cuando hay riesgo o externalidades. En particular, la renta-bilidadexpostdelafirmapuedesersuperioroinferioralarentabilidadnormal; la variabilidad de la rentabilidad depender del mecanismo elegido.3.3.Distribucin del riesgoElmecanismodelicitacinseleccionadodistribuyelosmltiplesriesgos delnegociode concesionesvialesentre elconcesionario,losusua-rios y elEstado. La teora financiera sugiere que el riesgo debe ser traspa-sadoyasumidoporquienpuedediversificarlo.Sinembargo,estoignoraque frecuentemente el concesionario tiene mayores incentivos para ser efi-ciente cuando debe asumir parte del riesgo. Por ejemplo, si el Estado otor-gaalconcesionariounsegurodesobrecostosgeneroso,stenotendraincentivosparasereficientealcontrolarsuscostos.As,enocasionesesconvenientequeciertosriesgosseanasumidosporquienestmejorcapa-citado para controlarlos. Todo riesgo que no se puede controlar debera serdiversificado.La rentabilidad promedio exigida por unconcesionario crece con elriesgo que enfrenta.14Esta rentabilidad adicional se conoce como premioporriesgo.Silalicitacinescompetitiva,larentabilidadexantedelconcesionario, una vez corregida por riesgo, debera ser normal. Sin embar-go,larentabilidadbrutarequerida(sinajustarporriesgo)esmayor.Estosignificaquelos usuariospagarnms.Porlotanto, sebeneficiaran si elconcesionariopudiesetraspasarlosriesgosqueno controlaa quienpuedadiversificarlos.En casos extremos es posible que el riesgo que enfrenta el concesio-nario sea tan grande que no haya interesados en participar en el negocio, a13Esdecir,permitenpeajesquesatisfacenlascondicionesdeRamsey-Boiteux,losque son ptimos sujetos a la restriccin de autofinanciamiento.14 Estamos suponiendo que las firmas le tienen aversin al riesgo en el sentido de lateora de decisiones bajo incertidumbre.2 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSwww.cepchile.clTIntroductionhe demise of Chiles Concertacin coalition has been predictedoften over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even thecoalitionsleadershaveissuedprematureannouncementsofitsdeath(LatinAmericaAdviser2002;ElMercurio2003a).SomeobserversofChilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertacinas both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event that is, as theproductofsomanyfactors,allworkingtowardthesameend,thatitisimpossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion thatthe Concertacin may well dissolve before Chiles next election, but not forthereasonscommonlycited.Ourargumentisbased,instead,onthestructure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricablywith Chiles unusual electoral rules.Harbingers of the Concertacins demise point out that the Chileaneconomyhasslowedsomewhatsincethecoalitionsearlyyearsingovernment during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initiallygalvanizedaroundoppositiontothePinochetregimeofthe1970sand1980s,soastimepasses,thecompellingforceofthatinitialmotivationmight naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertacin, and even its componentpartiesmostnotablytheChristianDemocratsareinternallydividedover social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birthcontrol. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertacin will have held thepresidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative houseelectedbypopularvote)for16years.Bythestandardsofmultipartycoalitionsanywhere,muchlessamongLatinAmericaspresidentialsystems, the Concertacin is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneouscorruptionchargesagainstmembers,includingthestrippingofparliamentary rights from five of the coalitions deputies in 2002, and thegeneral disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for solong. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire.Anyoftheseforces,orsomecombinationofthem,couldindeedunderminetheConcertacin,butwedonotregardthesefactorsasnecessarily devastating to the coalitions survival for a number of reasons.In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five yearsin far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, andemployment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. TheConcertacin may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for goodeconomicstewardship.Next,manyoftheissuessurroundingthenon-democraticlegacyofthePinocheteraincludingtherenownedE. ENGEL, R. FISCHER Y A. GALETOVICH 17menosqueelEstadoasegureuningresomnimo,locualenlaprcticaequivaleaqueeselEstadoquiendebeevaluarsiunproyectovialesrentable.Nonosparecequestaseaunabuenasolucin,porquecreemosimprobable que el Estado est mejor capacitado que el sector privado paraevaluaryadministrarriesgos,tantoporlafaltadeincentivossuficientescomo por las restricciones econmicas y polticas que enfrenta. Ahora bien,el gasto en peajes es una fraccin pequea del ingreso total de la mayora delosusuariosde una carretera. Porlotanto,losusuariosestarn interesadosprimordialmente en el precio promedio que pagan y no en las fluctuacionesentornoaestepromedio.15Porlotanto,unaposibilidadinteresanteestraspasaralosusuarioslosriesgosquenielEstadonielconcesionariopueden controlar.16 Los riesgos controlables debieran ser asumidos, segnsea elcaso,porelconcesionarioo elEstado.Acontinuacinsedescribenlos riesgos a los que est sujeto el negocio vial y se indica en cada caso elagente econmico que est en mejores condiciones para asumirlo.3.3.1 Riesgo en las proyecciones de demandaElingresoporperododependedelflujodetrficoporlacarretera.Predecir con exactitud razonable el flujo de corto plazo (uno o dos aos) noes fcil; hacerlo con el flujo de mediano y largo plazo (cinco o ms aos) esprcticamente imposible.17Es posible clasificar los problemas de prediccin de demanda en:15 En estricto rigor, lo que interesa a los usuarios es el valor presente de los peajes quepagan.Loanterioresconsecuenciadelresultadoclsicodelateoradedecisionesbajoincertidumbre,segnelcualsepuedesuponersinprdidade generalidadquelosindividuossonneutrosalriesgocuandolosmontossujetosaincertidumbresonpequeosrelativosalgasto. Vase Arrow y Lind (1970) para una demostracin formal de que cuando un riesgo nocorrelacionado con la riqueza es compartido por un nmero suficientemente grande de perso-nas, el premio por riesgo agregado tambin tiende a cero.16 En principio podra parecer que este argumento es menos vlido para el transportedecarga.Sinembargo,hayquenotarquelospeajessereflejanenelcostodelosbienestransportados; si el costo de transporte es pequeo en relacin con el valor total de los bienestransportados, el argumento aqu expuesto sigue siendo vlido (una vez completado el ajuste deprecios de los bienes transportados). Podra argumentarse que los accionistas de las empresasconcesionariasysusacreedorestambinpuedendiversificarestosriesgosamuybajocosto.Sin embargo, esto no es consistente con que en Chile los financistas hayan aceptado financiarconcesionesslosielEstadoofrecegarantasmnimasdetrficoequivalenteal70%deloscostos estimados de construccin, y las empresas hayan presionado fuertemente por garantasms generosas an.17 En lenguaje ms tcnico, las desviaciones estndar de los errores de prediccin sonenormes.2 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSwww.cepchile.clTIntroductionhe demise of Chiles Concertacin coalition has been predictedoften over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even thecoalitionsleadershaveissuedprematureannouncementsofitsdeath(LatinAmericaAdviser2002;ElMercurio2003a).SomeobserversofChilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertacinas both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event that is, as theproductofsomanyfactors,allworkingtowardthesameend,thatitisimpossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion thatthe Concertacin may well dissolve before Chiles next election, but not forthereasonscommonlycited.Ourargumentisbased,instead,onthestructure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricablywith Chiles unusual electoral rules.Harbingers of the Concertacins demise point out that the Chileaneconomyhasslowedsomewhatsincethecoalitionsearlyyearsingovernment during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initiallygalvanizedaroundoppositiontothePinochetregimeofthe1970sand1980s,soastimepasses,thecompellingforceofthatinitialmotivationmight naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertacin, and even its componentpartiesmostnotablytheChristianDemocratsareinternallydividedover social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birthcontrol. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertacin will have held thepresidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative houseelectedbypopularvote)for16years.Bythestandardsofmultipartycoalitionsanywhere,muchlessamongLatinAmericaspresidentialsystems, the Concertacin is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneouscorruptionchargesagainstmembers,includingthestrippingofparliamentary rights from five of the coalitions deputies in 2002, and thegeneral disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for solong. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire.Anyoftheseforces,orsomecombinationofthem,couldindeedunderminetheConcertacin,butwedonotregardthesefactorsasnecessarily devastating to the coalitions survival for a number of reasons.In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five yearsin far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, andemployment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. TheConcertacin may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for goodeconomicstewardship.Next,manyoftheissuessurroundingthenon-democraticlegacyofthePinocheteraincludingtherenowned18 ESTUDIOS PBLICOS1. Riesgodetrfico.Nosesabeconcertezacuntosvehculosvanapasarporeltramoconcesionadoenunperododeterminado.Esteriesgotiene dos fuentes: Existeincertidumbrerespectodecuntocrecernlaeconomayelparque automotor en el perodo de la concesin. Esto es as tanto enel corto plazo (pues nadie sabe cundo vendr la prximarecesin)comoenellargoplazo.Esteriesgoafectaporigualatodoslostramos concesionados, por lo que lo llamaremos riesgo macroeco-nmico. No se sabe con certeza cul ser la distribucin del trfico entre lasdistintas carreteras concesionadas. La diferencia entre el cambio eneltrficoporunarutaconcesionadaylavariacinpromediodetrfico por todas las carreteras puede definirse como el riesgo espe-cficoomicroeconmicodeesacarretera.Entrelosfactoresqueinciden sobre este riesgo cabe destacar los siguientes: Tasas de crecimiento heterogneas en distintas zonas geogrfi-cas. Modelos de transporte que entregan predicciones poco precisaspara los flujos vehiculares que resultan luego de agregar un arcoa la red. Construccindevascomplementariasosustitutas;calidaddelos accesos a la ruta concesionada.18 Modificaciones del transporte pblico (v. g., planes de desarro-llo de ferrocarriles).CUADRO N 4 TASA DE CRECIMIENTO (%): VEHCULOS QUE CANCELAN PEAJE1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995Angostura 8,8 15,0 11,7 4,5 8,7 12,4 6,7 7,8 9,4Zapata 21,5 14,4 13,1 8,1 7,2 5,2 2,9 3,9 4,9Lampa 3,8 13,4 15,9 8,9 6,8 18,0 8,8 16,2 12,5Fuente: MOP.18 En el caso del tnel El Meln, se esperaba que los camiones usaran la cuesta. Sinembargo, la mayora ha utilizado el tnel.2 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSwww.cepchile.clTIntroductionhe demise of Chiles Concertacin coalition has been predictedoften over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even thecoalitionsleadershaveissuedprematureannouncementsofitsdeath(LatinAmericaAdviser2002;ElMercurio2003a).SomeobserversofChilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertacinas both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event that is, as theproductofsomanyfactors,allworkingtowardthesameend,thatitisimpossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion thatthe Concertacin may well dissolve before Chiles next election, but not forthereasonscommonlycited.Ourargumentisbased,instead,onthestructure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricablywith Chiles unusual electoral rules.Harbingers of the Concertacins demise point out that the Chileaneconomyhasslowedsomewhatsincethecoalitionsearlyyearsingovernment during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initiallygalvanizedaroundoppositiontothePinochetregimeofthe1970sand1980s,soastimepasses,thecompellingforceofthatinitialmotivationmight naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertacin, and even its componentpartiesmostnotablytheChristianDemocratsareinternallydividedover social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birthcontrol. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertacin will have held thepresidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative houseelectedbypopularvote)for16years.Bythestandardsofmultipartycoalitionsanywhere,muchlessamongLatinAmericaspresidentialsystems, the Concertacin is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneouscorruptionchargesagainstmembers,includingthestrippingofparliamentary rights from five of the coalitions deputies in 2002, and thegeneral disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for solong. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire.Anyoftheseforces,orsomecombinationofthem,couldindeedunderminetheConcertacin,butwedonotregardthesefactorsasnecessarily devastating to the coalitions survival for a number of reasons.In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five yearsin far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, andemployment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. TheConcertacin may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for goodeconomicstewardship.Next,manyoftheissuessurroundingthenon-democraticlegacyofthePinocheteraincludingtherenownedE. ENGEL, R. FISCHER Y A. GALETOVICH 19ElCuadro4ilustralaimportanciatantodelriesgomicrocomomacroeconmico durante la ltima dcada en Chile.19 Este cuadro presentalas tasas de crecimiento del nmero de automviles que cancelaron peaje entres de las principales plazas de peajes en el pas.20 El riesgo macroecon-mico se refieja, por ejemplo, en el hecho que los flujos vehiculares en los 3tramosconsideradoscrecieronmuchomsentre1988y1989queelaosiguiente. El riego microeconmico es aparente en la mayorade los aos:la tasa de crecimiento del flujo vehicular flucta bastante en torno al prome-dio anual al pasar de un peaje a otro.212. Congestin.Esdifcilpredecirelefectodelacongestinsobrelademanda,yaquelacomposicindeltrficoesheterognea.Dadoqueelvalordeltiempodelosusuariosestrelacionadoconsuingreso,seranecesario conocer la composicin futura del trfico.Enprincipio,losriesgosanterioresdeberancompartirlosel conce-sionarioylosusuarios,yaque,comosesealamsarriba,elEstadonotiene ventajas comparativas para asumirlos. Es conveniente que el concesio-narioasumapartedelosriesgosdedemanda,demodoquenoleseaindiferenteconstruirunelefanteblanco.Estosincentivossonmenorescuando el Estado otorga garantas de ingreso mnimo.3.3.2 Riesgo de costos de construccin y mantencinEsteriesgoexisteporqueloscostosdeconstruccinymantencinsuelendiferirdelosproyectados.LoscostosefectivosyladiligenciadelconcesionarionopuedenserconocidosdirectamenteporelEstadoolosusuarios.Dadoqueloscostosestncasitotalmentebajoelcontroldelconcesionario, concluimos que ste debe asumirlos.19 Los riesgos fueron mayores en dcadas anteriores.20 Las tasas corresponden al crecimiento del flujo de automviles de un ao a otro. Porejemplo,elflujovehicularporlaplazadepeajedeAngosturadurante1987fueun8,8%superior a aquel de 1986. Presentar la tasa a la cual creci el nmero total de automviles quecancelaron peaje en Chile no es informativo, pues tanto el nmero de plazas de peaje como elsentido de cobro de algunas de stas (una vs. ambas direcciones) cambian de un ao a otro. Lasplazas consideradas en el Cuadro N 4 no presentan estas variaciones.21 Cabe notar que la interpretacin anterior de ambas fuentes de riesgo lleva implcitael supuesto que los flujos vehiculares siguen un camino aleatorio, lo cual es consistente con losdatos.2 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSwww.cepchile.clTIntroductionhe demise of Chiles Concertacin coalition has been predictedoften over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even thecoalitionsleadershaveissuedprematureannouncementsofitsdeath(LatinAmericaAdviser2002;ElMercurio2003a).SomeobserversofChilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertacinas both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event that is, as theproductofsomanyfactors,allworkingtowardthesameend,thatitisimpossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion thatthe Concertacin may well dissolve before Chiles next election, but not forthereasonscommonlycited.Ourargumentisbased,instead,onthestructure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricablywith Chiles unusual electoral rules.Harbingers of the Concertacins demise point out that the Chileaneconomyhasslowedsomewhatsincethecoalitionsearlyyearsingovernment during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initiallygalvanizedaroundoppositiontothePinochetregimeofthe1970sand1980s,soastimepasses,thecompellingforceofthatinitialmotivationmight naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertacin, and even its componentpartiesmostnotablytheChristianDemocratsareinternallydividedover social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birthcontrol. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertacin will have held thepresidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative houseelectedbypopularvote)for16years.Bythestandardsofmultipartycoalitionsanywhere,muchlessamongLatinAmericaspresidentialsystems, the Concertacin is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneouscorruptionchargesagainstmembers,includingthestrippingofparliamentary rights from five of the coalitions deputies in 2002, and thegeneral disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for solong. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire.Anyoftheseforces,orsomecombinationofthem,couldindeedunderminetheConcertacin,butwedonotregardthesefactorsasnecessarily devastating to the coalitions survival for a number of reasons.In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five yearsin far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, andemployment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. TheConcertacin may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for goodeconomicstewardship.Next,manyoftheissuessurroundingthenon-democraticlegacyofthePinocheteraincludingtherenowned20 ESTUDIOS PBLICOS3.3.3 Riesgos de cambios en las reglas del juegoEs posible que el Estado cambie las condiciones originalmente pac-tadas.Comoelconcesionarionopuedecontrolaresteriesgo,debesercompartido por el Estado y los usuarios.3.4. Susceptibilidad a la maldicin del ganadorElfenmenodelamaldicindelganadorocurrecuandolafirmaqueganalaconcesinnoeslamseficiente,sinoaquellaquerealizalaproyeccin ms optimista de alguna variable incierta (v. g., el flujo vehicu-laroelcostodeconstruccin).22 Al preparar su oferta, cada licitante pro-yectalademandadetrnsitoysuscostosdeconstruccin,operacinymantencin,loscualesdependendeparmetrosquedebenserestimados.De no estar consciente de la maldicin, aquel licitante que estima los par-metros que llevan a la proyeccin ms optimista har la mejor oferta, sin serel licitante ms eficiente. As, en casos extremos, la maldicin del ganadorpuede llevar a la quiebra del concesionario o a dificultades financieras quelo harn presionar por una renegociacin del contrato. Tanto la teora comolaprcticaindicanqueestasrenegociacionessonpococonvenientesparalosusuarios yel Estado,pudiendo llevaracostosasdisputas judiciales. Lamaldicindelganadoresmenosrelevantecuandoelriesgoesmenor,yaque los errores de prediccin tambin son menores.Si los licitantes se dan cuenta de la maldicin, deberan corregir susposturascastigandosusestimacionesdeacuerdoacuninciertasseansuspredicciones de demanda y costos.23 Aunque esto hace menos probable queel concesionario quiebre, la tasa de retorno sin corregir por riesgo ser msalta,es decir, losusuariospagarn ms.Alreducirel riesgode prediccinque enfrentan los concesionarios, se reduce tanto el premio por riesgo usualcomo el premio necesario para compensar por la maldicin del ganador.2422LamaldicindelganadorfueconceptualizadaporCappen,ClappyCampbell(1971),quieneslaobservaronenlasconcesionesdeexploracionespetrolerasenelGolfodeMxico. Para buenas introducciones, vanse Thaler (1988) y Milgrom (1989).23 EI licitante exigir una rentabilidad determinada condicional, en que su oferta es lamejor,esdecir,condicional enquesusestimacionesdelosparmetrosinciertossonlasmsoptimistas.24 Es conveniente notar que en licitaciones de sobre cerrado y primer precio (las quese usan en Chile para adjudicar concesiones) el premio exigido para compensar por la posibili-dad de ser vctima de la maldicin del ganador es positivo an si los licitantes son neutrales alriesgo; vase McAfee y McMillan (1987), p. 721.2 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSwww.cepchile.clTIntroductionhe demise of Chiles Concertacin coalition has been predictedoften over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even thecoalitionsleadershaveissuedprematureannouncementsofitsdeath(LatinAmericaAdviser2002;ElMercurio2003a).SomeobserversofChilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertacinas both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event that is, as theproductofsomanyfactors,allworkingtowardthesameend,thatitisimpossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion thatthe Concertacin may well dissolve before Chiles next election, but not forthereasonscommonlycited.Ourargumentisbased,instead,onthestructure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricablywith Chiles unusual electoral rules.Harbingers of the Concertacins demise point out that the Chileaneconomyhasslowedsomewhatsincethecoalitionsearlyyearsingovernment during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initiallygalvanizedaroundoppositiontothePinochetregimeofthe1970sand1980s,soastimepasses,thecompellingforceofthatinitialmotivationmight naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertacin, and even its componentpartiesmostnotablytheChristianDemocratsareinternallydividedover social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birthcontrol. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertacin will have held thepresidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative houseelectedbypopularvote)for16years.Bythestandardsofmultipartycoalitionsanywhere,muchlessamongLatinAmericaspresidentialsystems, the Concertacin is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneouscorruptionchargesagainstmembers,includingthestrippingofparliamentary rights from five of the coalitions deputies in 2002, and thegeneral disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for solong. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire.Anyoftheseforces,orsomecombinationofthem,couldindeedunderminetheConcertacin,butwedonotregardthesefactorsasnecessarily devastating to the coalitions survival for a number of reasons.In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five yearsin far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, andemployment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. TheConcertacin may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for goodeconomicstewardship.Next,manyoftheissuessurroundingthenon-democraticlegacyofthePinocheteraincludingtherenownedE. ENGEL, R. FISCHER Y A. GALETOVICH 21En cualquier caso, la experiencia sugiere que los licitantes que participan ennuevos negocios suelen no considerar que pueden ser vctimas de la maldi-cindelganador;posturasmsprudentesson consecuenciadeunlargoycostoso aprendizaje.3.5. Renegociaciones y discrecionalidadLaexperienciadeotrospasesindicaquelarenegociacindeloscontratosdeconcesinesfrecuentecuandolasempresasqueganaronlalicitacinhace unmalnegocio, encuyo caso lasprdidasterminansiendoasumidas por el Estado o los usuarios. Esto es inconveniente no slo por lastransferencias de riqueza envueltas, sino tambin porque las firmas dispues-tas a ofrecer los mejores trminos en la licitacin no son las ms eficientes,sinoaquellasqueesperanrenegociarelcontratofavorablementeunavezganadalaconcesin.25Porlotanto,elmecanismodelicitacinelegidodeberahacermenosprobablesaquellosescenariosenqueelcontratoserenegocia. Esto no slo beneficia al Estado y a los usuarios, tambin favore-ceaaquellasempresasque,siendomseficientesenlaconstruccinygestindecarreteras,notienenelpoder,loscontactos,lahabilidadoladisposicinpararenegociarelcontrato.Porltimo,lasrenegociacionestambin pueden ser perjudiciales para el sector privado si ellas dan pie paraque el regulador se comporte discrecionalmente.3.6.Modificaciones al contratoAuncuandoesdeseableevitarrenegociaciones,sedancircunstan-ciasenqueelbiencomnaconsejacambiarlostrminosdelcontratodeconcesin. Porejemplo, puede ser conveniente ampliar una carretera antesque finalice la concesin. En tal caso, el Estado debe compensar al conce-sionario sin alterar su rentabilidad.25 Podra argumentarse quepara evitar estos efectos indeseablesbastaque el Estadodeje quebrar al concesionario; pero eso supone que el Estado es inmune a presiones de gruposinteresados o lobbies. Si aceptamos que el Estado es malo para asumir riesgos, no hay motivospara suponer que sea mejor para resistir presiones.2 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSwww.cepchile.clTIntroductionhe demise of Chiles Concertacin coalition has been predictedoften over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even thecoalitionsleadershaveissuedprematureannouncementsofitsdeath(LatinAmericaAdviser2002;ElMercurio2003a).SomeobserversofChilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertacinas both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event that is, as theproductofsomanyfactors,allworkingtowardthesameend,thatitisimpossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion thatthe Concertacin may well dissolve before Chiles next election, but not forthereasonscommonlycited.Ourargumentisbased,instead,onthestructure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricablywith Chiles unusual electoral rules.Harbingers of the Concertacins demise point out that the Chileaneconomyhasslowedsomewhatsincethecoalitionsearlyyearsingovernment during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initiallygalvanizedaroundoppositiontothePinochetregimeofthe1970sand1980s,soastimepasses,thecompellingforceofthatinitialmotivationmight naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertacin, and even its componentpartiesmostnotablytheChristianDemocratsareinternallydividedover social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birthcontrol. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertacin will have held thepresidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative houseelectedbypopularvote)for16years.Bythestandardsofmultipartycoalitionsanywhere,muchlessamongLatinAmericaspresidentialsystems, the Concertacin is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneouscorruptionchargesagainstmembers,includingthestrippingofparliamentary rights from five of the coalitions deputies in 2002, and thegeneral disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for solong. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire.Anyoftheseforces,orsomecombinationofthem,couldindeedunderminetheConcertacin,butwedonotregardthesefactorsasnecessarily devastating to the coalitions survival for a number of reasons.In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five yearsin far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, andemployment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. TheConcertacin may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for goodeconomicstewardship.Next,manyoftheissuessurroundingthenon-democraticlegacyofthePinocheteraincludingtherenowned22 ESTUDIOS PBLICOS3.7.Incentivos para explotacin eficienteElganadordeunalicitacinpuederealizardiversasaccionesparaaumentarlademandaporesecamino,lascuales,sinembargo,involucrangastos.Entreestasvariablesdecomercializacinestn:i)larapidezdeatencinenlospeajes,ii)laceleridadconqueseretirandelacarreteraautomviles chocados o en panne, y iii) los esfuerzos que realiza el conce-sionarioparaintroducircambiostecnolgicosenelmecanismodecobro(v. g., peajes electrnicos).3.8.Flexibilidad de la tarificacinElmecanismodelicitacindeberapermitirfijarlospeajessegncriterios de eficiencia de modo que se puedan resolver los problemas causa-dos por las externalidades. Por ejemplo, las tarifas debieran ser ms altas encaminos ms congestionados. Tambin es deseable que stas puedan modi-ficarse si prueban ser totalmente inadecuadas.Porotraparte,puedeserconvenientequelaconcesinconsidereelementos de economa poltica. Un ejemplo es la promocin de la regiona-lizacin del pas. En este caso, sera deseable que los peajes no dependierande la demanda del camino, sino que las tarifas fueran similares para distan-cias similares. Por lo dems, la economa poltica indica que las concesionesse legitimarn ms fcilmente y los usuarios estarn ms dispuestos a pagarpor el uso de las vas si los peajes son simples y uniformes.3.9.Supervisin del reguladorEs importante dar incentivos para que el concesionario mantenga elcaminoenbuenascondiciones.Estoesposibleenelcasodeconcesionesviales, ya que se pueden definir estndares de calidad objetivos ndices derugosidad,grietasporkilmetro,deflecciones,etc.quesonfcilesdemonitorear con equipos especializados. No es necesario supervisar directa-mentela mantencin delcaminoconcesionado, sino slolosresultados delamantencin.Estofacilitamuchoeltrabajodelregulador.Elreguladordebe exigir boletas de garanta al concesionario como una forma de resguar-darelintersdelosusuariosencasodequenosecumplanlasnormasdecalidad establecidas.Los problemas de la mantencin de caminos se agudizan cuando se2 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSwww.cepchile.clTIntroductionhe demise of Chiles Concertacin coalition has been predictedoften over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even thecoalitionsleadershaveissuedprematureannouncementsofitsdeath(LatinAmericaAdviser2002;ElMercurio2003a).SomeobserversofChilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertacinas both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event that is, as theproductofsomanyfactors,allworkingtowardthesameend,thatitisimpossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion thatthe Concertacin may well dissolve before Chiles next election, but not forthereasonscommonlycited.Ourargumentisbased,instead,onthestructure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricablywith Chiles unusual electoral rules.Harbingers of the Concertacins demise point out that the Chileaneconomyhasslowedsomewhatsincethecoalitionsearlyyearsingovernment during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initiallygalvanizedaroundoppositiontothePinochetregimeofthe1970sand1980s,soastimepasses,thecompellingforceofthatinitialmotivationmight naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertacin, and even its componentpartiesmostnotablytheChristianDemocratsareinternallydividedover social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birthcontrol. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertacin will have held thepresidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative houseelectedbypopularvote)for16years.Bythestandardsofmultipartycoalitionsanywhere,muchlessamongLatinAmericaspresidentialsystems, the Concertacin is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneouscorruptionchargesagainstmembers,includingthestrippingofparliamentary rights from five of the coalitions deputies in 2002, and thegeneral disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for solong. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire.Anyoftheseforces,orsomecombinationofthem,couldindeedunderminetheConcertacin,butwedonotregardthesefactorsasnecessarily devastating to the coalitions survival for a number of reasons.In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five yearsin far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, andemployment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. TheConcertacin may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for goodeconomicstewardship.Next,manyoftheissuessurroundingthenon-democraticlegacyofthePinocheteraincludingtherenownedE. ENGEL, R. FISCHER Y A. GALETOVICH 23acercaeltrminodelaconcesin,yaqueelconcesionariotienemenosincentivosparamantenerelcamino.Enestaetapaelreguladordeberverificarestrictamentelamantencinycalidaddelcamino.Asimismo,lasboletasdegarantaquecorrespondenaestaetapadeberanserpormontosmayores.Adicionalmente, se deberan especificar condiciones mnimas de ser-vicio regulando el tiempo mximo de espera en los peajes, el tiempo mediode retiro de vehculos averiados, etc.3.10. ColusinUnodelosprincipalestropiezosqueenfrentanlosmecanismosdelicitacin es la posibilidad de que los licitantes se coludan.26Cuandovarioslicitantesdesarrollanunaestrategiaconjuntaparapresentarse a una licitacin, aumentan sus rentas en caso de ganar exce-dentequesereparteentrequienessecoluden,loqueperjudicaalosusuarios yalEstadoydisminuyelaeficienciaeconmica.Unmecanismode licitacin dificulta la colusin si incentiva que los miembros de un cartelno cumplan con el acuerdo colusivo. Por ejemplo,la colusin es ms fcilcuando las mismas empresas participan en licitaciones consecutivas, pues sepuedenturnarenganarlasconcesiones.Encambio,siselicitanvariostramos simultneamente, los incentivos para desviarse de un acuerdo colusi-vo sern mayores.27IV. MECANISMOS DE LICITACIN CON PLAZO FIJOCasi todos los mecanismos de licitacin que se han usado en Chile yen el resto del mundo fijan el plazo de la concesin. Por ejemplo, segn elmecanismo ms usado en Chile el regulador fija el plazo de la concesin yganaaquellafirmaquesolicitaelmenorpeaje.Elplazodelaconcesin(tpicamente 20 aos) debe durar lo suficiente como para que el concesiona-rio recupere su inversin inicial cobrando peajes razonables. Bajo el meca-26 Robinson (1985) compara varios mecanismos de licitacin segn cunto faciliten lacolusin. Vasetambin Hendricks y Porter (1989). Para un estudio emprico sobre colusinen licitaciones de obras pblicas en los Estados Unidos, vase Porter y Zona (1993).27Asimismo,esconvenientequeseadifcilquelosconcesionariossecoludanpararenegociar.2 ESTUDIOS PBLICOSwww.cepchile.clTIntroductionhe demise of Chiles Concertacin coalition has been predictedoften over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even thecoalitionsleadershaveissuedprematureannouncementsofitsdeath(LatinAmericaAdviser2002;ElMercurio2003a).SomeobserversofChilean politics, t