Chapter 4
LIBERATION THEOLOGY AND KERALA: A POLITICAL ENQUIRY
introduction
erala is a narrow strip of land extending some 600 kms along the south
west coast of India. Situated between the Arabian sea in the west and the
Western Ghats in the east,' Kerala has an area of 38863 sq. k m ~ . ~ Its
topography is marked by three natural divisions - coastal lowlands, midland
plains and highlands. The geographical isolation of Kemla from the rest of India
gives it a distinctive socio-economic and political identity. While the mountain
range on its eastern border protected the land against incursions from
neighbouring provinces, the kingdom of the south west coast lay exposed on its
western front to foreign influences from as far back as Graceo-Roman times.
The development of this land owes not a little to centuries of maritime trade with
Arab countries and countries further west. The state gets an abundant supply of
water from its forty four rivers and several major hydro-electrkal projects have
been set up to tap this valuable resource. The land currently being utilised for
farming makes up 57% of the total land area of the state.3
Kernla's rural areas, where 81 per cent of its population live, mainly
depends on agriculture and allied occupations for their live~ihood.~ Kerala is an
agricultural state with rice5 as the staple food. Although the state is rich in
natural resources it has to depend on other states for agricultural products.
Unscientific farming methods have led to a sharp decline in production and this,
coupled with exorbitant labour and fertiliser costs, has forced farmers to turn
their attention to cash crops like rubber: tea: cashew,' coffeeg and spices.10
Kerala contributes about twenty five per cent of the total export of cash crops of
the country." There exist in Kerala so many conditions favourable to the
development of industries: raw materials, minerals, high rate of literacy, water
resources, transport and banking facilities, moderate climatic conditions etc.
Besides fishing industry, handloom, handicraft, beedi, bricks and tiles
manufacturing provides employment to thousands of people.'2 However, the
fad remains that Kerala has not yet been able to take advantage of its 600 krn.
long seaboard and exploit fully its potential for coastal and marine industries.
With 749 persons to a sq. krn. as against the all India average of 273,
Kerala ranks among the most densely populated states in the country.13 Of its
total population of 29098518'~, the rural population numbers 21418224 and the
rest constitutes its urban population. Kerala has the highest literacy rate in the
country: 90.59 per cent15 as against the 52.21 per cent of the all India average.
Kerala may be described demographically as an overpopulated state with
retarded economic growth. Power shortage continues to be the major handicap
in the development of the state.16 The situation has been made worse by
problems arising from an exclusive dependence on hydro-electric power, failure
to make any significant addition to capacity since 1977, delay in commissioning
of new projects owing to labour troubles, contract failures, defective planning,
local pressure, rehabilitation of evictees etc. Per capita consumption of electricity
in the state is 231 Kwh which is the lowest among the southern states." To tide
over the power crises, the government has been resorting to loadshedding and
power cuts. In view of severe constraints on resources for setting up new power
plants, the private sector needs to be encouraged to take up projects in power
generation. While the current demand for power is 7220 Mu, the supply is only
5820 Mu.
The Formation of Kerala - The historical and Political Background
The present Kerala State was formed by merging three admin'istrative
units - Travancore, Cochin and Malabar - of which the last mentioned had
formerly been part of the Madras Province. These three regions had their
distinctive social, economic and political features as was evident from their
markedly uneven development patterns and differences in agrarian relations.
The development of these areas was in part due to cultural divergence arising
from the distribution of the major communities among the three regions.'' Of
the three units, the largest was Travancore whose modem history begins with the
re i~n of Marthanda Varma, who annexed a part of the Cochin State, subdued
the petty chieftains of North Travancore and consolidated Travancore as a state
with Thiruvananthapuram as its capital. The history of Cochin is intertwined
with that of Travancore and Malabar. Among the rulers of Makbar, the Zamorin
of Calicut was the most powerful. The Portuguese, the Dutch and the English
had establihsed trade relations with him. The three different regions had been
knit together by a common language and thii provided a strong bond between
the princely state of Cochin and the socially backward Malabar. It must be
pointed out, however, that the Congress party had been a major political force in
Malabar; the region remained the nerve-centre of Congress activity in the 1920s
and 30s. In 1928, there were widespread demonstrations against the Simon
Commission. Other important activities included the Salt March of 1928 and the
Great Civil Disobedience campaign from 1932 to 1934.
Like people anywhere in the world, Kerala society, too, has had to
contend with divisive forces in social, cultural and economic spheres. Differences
relating to religion and caste - in particular, the caste factor which deeply
influences people's attitude and behaviour - have played a dominant role in
the Keralites' life. The two main minority communities, Muslims and Christians,
have played a vital role in Kerala's social and political history. The Muslims,
though socially, economically and educationally, a minority community,
dominates the Malabar area while the Christians, who had made themselves into
a strong well-knit social organisation through their churches are predominant in
Central Travancore and ~ o c h i i . ' ~ In the early days casteism and communal
rivalry were influential factors in the politics of Travancore. But during the days
of the "Malayali ~emorial,"" people cast aside their communal and caste
considerations for the common cause of getting out of Kerala the people who
were not Keralites, especially, the Tamils, who had grabbed the majority of the
public jobs. Malayali Memorial, a landmark event signalled the political
awakening of the people of Travancore and gave warning that no ruler of the
region should ignore the c h i of its native population. At the time of the
Malayali Memorial, the assembly seats were monopolised by the representatives
of the highest caste. The ~zhavas," Ch nsbans ' . and Muslims demanded proper
repre~entation.'~ The "abstention movementn forced the Maharaja to introduce
some reforms. Sri Narayana ~ u r u , ~ an Ezhava reformer, sought to purge
Kerala society of its evil practices and cwtoms. He campaigned against the evils
of caste system and the high-handedness of the upper caste. His advaitha
philosophy may be summarised in his famous mantra, "one caste, one religion,
and one God for man." He exhorted the Ezhavas to organise themselves in
order to acquire power. Today, a h a t all communities have their own
organisations for the protection of their interests.
In 1938, the Travancore State Congress was formed under the leadership
of Pattam Thanu Pillai who called for responsible govemment with proper
representation of all sections of the society. When the British rule ended, the
Divan wanted to set up an "Independent Travancore." The Congress was
against it and demanded the merger of Travancore with the Indian Union. On
September 4, 1947, Travancore acceded to the Indian ~ n i o n . ~ ~ The first
popular government in Travancore was formed in 1948 with Pattam Thanu Pibi
as the leader. Cochin, too, though not so politically conscious as Travancore,
desired a popular government. The Maharaja of Cochin also welcomed people's
participation in administration. As a result, a legislative council was inaugurated
in 1925 and through the Reform Act of 1938, Cochin became the first
principality to form a responsible government, though, with limited powers to the
ministersz5. In the election that followed, Cochin Congress, one of the two major
political parties won the mandate and assumed office on June 17, 1 9 3 8 . ~ ~ The
Cochin Pmja Mandal party which was established in 194lZ7 strove hard to
establish a popular govemment through constitutional means. On August 16,
1946 the Maharaja announced, in a message to the legislative council, hi
intention to transfer more power to elected representatives and enhance the
number of ministers. As a result, a popular minishy came to power on
September 9, 1946." Shortly before the country became independent, the
Maharaja transferred all powers to the ministers in deference to the wishes of the
people and Dewanship ended on September 11, 1947. The people of
Travancore and Cochin wanted the integration of the two regions. Leaders of
both states met Sardar Patel and a pact was made. Both Maharajas of
Travancore and Cochin signed it. According to the covenant, the Maharaja of
Travancore, Sri Chithii Thirunal Balarama Vanna, became the titular head of
the new state and the unification of Travancore and Cochin came into force on
1 July, 1949.'~
While the princely states of Travancore and Cochin travelled along the
path of democracy by acceding to the Indian Union, Malabar which was under
the direct rule of Britain took an altogether different course. Malabar, a district of
Madras Province, was caught up in the freedom movement and it was in
Malabar that a regional wing of the Indian National Congress started its
a~tivities.~' Socialism also won many supporters during the freedom struggle in
Malabar due to the concentration of landed property in the hands of the minority
caste Hindus. The Malabar District Congress Committee was launched under
the able leadership of Sri. K P. Kesava Menon in 1908. The year 1921 was
marked by the violent uprising of Muslims known as the "Mapilah Rebellion."
The fad that during the Quit India Movement of 1942, six hundred and fifty
people3' were arrested from this region gives some indication of the impact of
the freedom movement in Mabbar region. When India wrested freedom from
the British in 1947, Mabbar was a part of the Madras Province.
The Travancore-Cochin Assembly held its first meeting on July 11, 1949
with 178 members. The new ministry, under the leadership of T. K Narayana
Pibi resigned on Februay 24, 1951 and then C. Kesavan took over for a short
period. The Indian Constitution came into force on Januay 26, 1950 and the
designation 'Prime Minister' till then used for the head of the cabinet in
Travancore-Cochin was changed to Chief Minister. The first general election on
the basis of adult franchise was held in December 1951 and no party won
absolute majority in Tmvancore-Cochin. In order to avoid president's rule the
Indian National Congress formed an alliance with the Tmvancore Tamilnadu
Congress and, as a result, the A J. John ministry took over the admin.htion.
But the Tmvancore Tamilnadu congress withdrew its support to the ministry over
the language question and the government fell on September 23,1953.
In the mid term election that followed, no party won the majority required
to form a government. Again, to avoid presidential ~ l e and a coalition headed
by communists,32 the Congress supported Sri. Pattam Thanu Pillai, the P. S. P.
leader, to form the ministry but the ministry collapsed on February 8, 1955 when
the Congress withdrew its support to the government. Panambilly Govinda
Menon, the Congress leader, took over in March 1955 but had to step down the
following year due to dissension within the party. Presidential rule was imposed
on March 23,1956.
Another significant development in Kerala politics was the "Aikya Kerala"
33 movement. The Tamil speaking areas of Southern Travancore wanted to
merge with Tamil Nadu while the Malayalam speaking areas of Malabar
preferred a merger with Travancore-Cochin. On the recommendation of the
State Re-organization Commission, the State of Kemla was formed by uniting the
three provinces of Travancore-Cochin and Malabar on November 1, 19.55.~~
Kerala - An Analysis of Major Trends in Its Political History
Tbe first communist minlstry
A striking feature of Kerala politics throughout its histoly has been the
absence of single party dominance and the administrative instability that resulted
from it. At the time of the formation of United Kerala there was no elected
government in Travancore-Cochin and the President of Indii appointed
P. S. Rao as adviser to the Rajapramukh. The fmt election after the formation of
the State of Kerala, on the basiis of adult franchise, was held along with the
second general election of 1957. The election results attracted the attention of
political analysts within and outside the counby. In this election, the people
chose a Communist Government to govern them - an electoml feat with few
precedents in the history of free elections. The communists got s i ~ 3 r ~ ~ out of one
hundred seats they contested.36 The table below sets out the details of the
results.
Assembly elections 1957 - ~ e s u l t s ~ ~
Total seats Uedomte Votes polled Percentage of votes
Political parties Seats contested Seats won Percentage
Congress 124 43 37.84
Communist 100 60 35.28
RSP 28 Nil 3.22
Muslim League 75 13 12.87 and independents
One independent candidate, Umeshwara Rao. from Manjeshwar, was elected
uncontested.
A major reason for the remarkable victory of the communists was the
inclusion of Malabar in the State where the commun'& had gained decisive
influence and the exclusion of South Travancore where the Congress was
Communal rivalry also contributed to the victory of the commun'kts.
Christians supported the Congress while the majority of lower class Hindus were
attracted to the Communist programme. The Commun'kt ministry was sworn in
on April 5, 1957 under the leadership of E. M. Sankaran ~ a m b o o d i r i ~ a d . ~ ~ But,
as a result of the so-called "liberation struggle", the E. M. S. ministry was
dismissed on July 31, 1959. The President's rule that ensued lasted up to
February 1960. In the subsequent election, Congress made an alliance with
Muslim League and PSP who had turned against the Communists and won 94
seats while the Communists got only 29 seats4' But in percentage of votes,
communists got a better deal, from 35.28 of 1957 to 39.14 in 1960. This means
that the Communists were able to broaden their base though they lost the
election
Results of Assembly Elections, 1960~'
Total seats Electorate Votes polled Percentage of votes
126 9601601 6919312 85.08
Political parties Seats contested Seats won Percentage
Congress 80 63 34.42
PSP 33 20 14.14
Muslim League 12 11 4. %
Communist 108 29 39.14
Jan Sangh 3 Nil 0.07
Independents 76 3 7.27
Congress supported PSP and its leader Pattam Thanu Pilhi f o m d the
ministry on February 22, 1960. The Pattam ministy marked the beginning of
coalition government in Kerala. Relations between the coalition partners
suffered a set-back with the death of Seethi Sahib. C. H. Muhammad Koya was
elected Speaker. Congress was not vey happy about the choice of the Speaker.
The impending parliamentary elections and the Congress's reluctance to
coaperate with the Muslim League resulted in the exit of Muslim League from
the coalition.42 The two party (Congress-PSP) coalition continued. But the
leadership question created problems. Congressmen like P. T. Chacko and R
Sankar were reluctant to serve under the minority party (PSP) leader. To mend
fences and save the m i n i i , the then Home Minister of India, Lal Bahdur Sastri,
visited Kerak and talked to various parties and leaders. A compromise was
reached by which Pattam Thanu Pillai was offered the Governorship of Punjab
which he accepted on September 25, 1%2 without consulting hi supporters. A
new ministry was formed on September 26, 1962 with R. Sankar as Chief
Minister. PSP did not join the Government. Thus the co-alition experiment
ended in single party rule.
Soon, casteism and communalism asserted themselves. The Nairs and
Christians were not ready to serve under an Ezhava Chief Minister - R. Shankar. The untimely and unexpected death of P. T. Chacko on August 1,
1964 became a rallying point for the rebel groups within the ruling Congress.
There followed the defection from the party of fifteen MLA's loyal to
P. T. Chacko. As a result of the passing of a noconfidence on
September 8, 1964, presidential rule was imposed on the state once again which
lasted till February 1965.
The year 1964 is important in the politics of Kerala. This year saw two
major splits in two major political parties. The Communist Party broke into two:
Communist Party of Indii (CPI) and Communist Party of Indii-Mamist (CPI-M).
1964 also witnessed the birth of Kemla Congress as a result of the split in the
Congress party. In the 1965 elections, therefore, there were more political
parties in the arena than in any previous elections. There was no attempt made
at governing coalitions, probably because of recent failures in the experiment.
Resub of AssembIy Elections, 1%5~
Total seats Electorate Votes polled Peroentage of votes
133 8557716 6428937 75.12
Political parties Seats contested Seats won percent&
INC 133 36 33.58
SSP 29 13 8.13
Muslim League 16 6 3.83
CPI 78 3 8.10
Kerab. Congress 54 23 12.58
Independents 175 12 13.90
No party got absolute majority. No party was ready to co-operate with
any other to form a coalition government. As a last resort the Resident
d i i Ived the assembly on March 24, 1965 and again Kerak came under
Resident's rule.
FormatJon of an alliance
After the abortive election of 1965, the political parties had to accept the
fact, howewr unpleasant, that no party could rule the state single-handedly.
During the 1%7 elections, seven political parties formed an alliance named "The
United Front" under the leadenhip of CPI(M). The United Front was obviously
anti-Congress. The year 1%7 marked the end of Congress hegemony in many
states. In the elections the United Front bagged 117 seats and a CPI(M) led
m i n i i took charge on March 6, 1%7 under the leadership of E. M. S.
Results of Assembly Elections, 1967~~
Total seats Electorate Votes polled Percentage of votes
133 8613658 6318272 72.92
Political parties Seats contested Seats won Percentage
CPI (M) 59 52 23.50
CPI 22 19 8.57
Muslim League 15 14 6.40
RSP 16 6 2.71
SSP 21 19 1.10
KTP 3 2 6.52
KSP 1 1 35.43
INC 133 9 7.56
KC 62 5 0.21
Swathanha Party 6 Nil 0.88
Jana Sangh 24 Nil 0.22
PSP 7 Nil 4.13
Independents 55 6
Before long, the adminiition got bogged down in a spate of akgations
and counter-allegations. The Chief Minister having gone abroad for medical
treatment, there was little hope of resolving the crisii. The situation got steadily
worse until, on hi return from abroad, Nampoothiripad found it virtually
impossible to cany on. He handed in hi res ignat i~n~~ on November 1, 1969.
The Achutha Menon ministry came into force but the defection of three MIA's to
PSP wrecked hi m i n i i . Achutha Menon resigned on August 4, 1970 and
Kernla came under President's rule. After the resignation of Achutha Menon, the
parties set to work to form alliances. As a result, there appeared three groupirigs
among the political parties: (i) The CPI-led "mini alliance" consisting of CPI,
UML, RSP, PSP supported by Congress (R). (By this time the Congress had
split to form Congress (R) led by Prime Minister lndira Gandhi and Congress (0)
kd by those opposing her leadership). (ii) Marxist coalition, consising of
CPI (MI, KSP, KTP, SSP with the tacit support of ISP. (iii) Kerala Congress,
Congress (0) alliance supported by the Swatantra and Jan Sangh. In the mid-
term election held on September 17, 1970, the CPI "mini alliance" emerged
victorious and won the rnaprity of seats.
Results of Assembly Elections of 1970~'
Total seats Electorate Votes polled Percentage of votes
133 10169467 7634451 75.07
Political parties Seats mntested Seats won Percentage of votes polled
CPI 29 16 8.97
RlML 20 11 7.55
RSP 14 6 4.39
PSP 7 3 2.43
Congress (R) 52 30 17.63
CPI (M) 73 29 23.83
KSP
m SSP
ISP
Kemh Congress
Congress (0)
Swatantra
Jan Sangh
DMK
suc
1
1
6
3
12
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Independents 205 15 17.40
The second Achutha Menon ministry, comprising nominees of the CPI,
IUML, RSP, PSP came to power on Odober 4, 1970. The Congress, which
supported the government from outside, also joined the ministry on September
25, 1971. Though the joining of the Congress strengthened the min-khy, six
IUML rebel MLA's withdrew their support to the government due to inner party
conflids. On May 8, 1975, the IUML speaker resigned and joined the All India
Muslim League (AIML) formed by the rebel MLA's. The government had by
now completed its term and fresh elections were expected in September 1975;
but because of the unusual political situation prevailing in the country, the
governments' life was extended to six months.
Meanwhile, the Kerala Congress which had fought the elections against
the CPI alliance expressed its desire to join the government. After hectic
deliberations, the Kerala Congress nominees, K M. Mani and R Bakkriihna
Pillai joined the ministry on October 26, 1975." The Achutha Menon minisby
proved a welcome relief from the instability that plagued the State since its
inception in 1956. It also showed that able and impartial administrators like
Achutha Menon can give political stability to the State.
After the "emergency", general elections were held on March 19, 1977.~'
There were only two powerful alliances (UDF and LDF) in the fray as against the
three competing alliances in the 1970 elections. The United Democratic Front
(UDF) consisting of Congress, CPI, Kerak Congress, IUML, RSP, National
Democratic Party (NDP) and PSP were ranged against the Left Democratic Front
(LDF) consisting of the CPI (M). Janatha, AlML, Kerak Congress (Pillai) on the
other side. The UDF had a massive victory over the LDF and won one hundred
and eleven seats while the LDF got only twenty nine seats.
Results of Assembly Elections of 1 9 7 7 ~
Total seats Electorate Votes polled Percentage of votes
Political parties Seats contested Seats won Percentage of votes poUed
INC 54 38 19.3
CPI 27 23 9.6
Kerak Congress
ML RSP
NDP PSP
CPM
BLD (Janata)
N O )
KC ( m i ) 15 2 4.3
Independents (U.F) 11 1 3.18
Congress (Radicals) 2 Nil 0.52
KSP Ind. 1 Nil 0.36
NRSP 1 Nil 0.26
Independents 288 Nil 3.78
The UDF under the leadership of K ffimnakaran came to power on
March 25,1977.~' Only C. H. Muhammad Ibya of lUML joined the ministry on
that day. Thirteen others joined the minishy only on April 10, 1977.~' It points
to the fact that the formation of the minii was not an easy task internal and
inter party rivalries held up the expansion of the minis-. The ffimnakaran
ministry had to resign on April 25, 1 9 7 7 ~ ~ due to the infamous "Rajan casen. On
April 27, 1977~~ . A. K Antony was sworn in as Chief Minister. Meanwhile, the
Indian National Congress underwent another split, this time into Congress (1) led
by Mrs. India Gandhi and Congress (S) opposing her. This split had its impad
on Kemk politics also. K Karunakaran and others who supported Mrs. Gandhi
were suspended from the KPCC and thrown out of the UDF. Prof. K M.Chandy
was elected President of the KPCC which supported Mrs. Gandhi. The split in
the Congress weakened the UDF. On February 4, 197€i5', NDP, a partner of
the UDF withdrew from the UDF and decided to sit as an independent bloc in
the state legislature.
The Chief Minister, Mr. A. K Antony, resigned on October 26, 1 9 7 p , in
protest against the decision of the Indian National Congress Central
Parliamentary Board to support Indim Gandhi, in the bye-eledion to the Lok
Sabha from Chikmangalore constituency in Kamataka. Consequently, the
leadership of the coalition passed to the CPI. P. K. Vasudevan Nair, the CPI
leader was swom in Chief Minister on Odober 29, 1978.'~ The UDF lost all four
byeelections (May 18, 1979) to the assembly. It pointed to the gradual erosion
of popular support to the UDF.
The UDF was further weakened by a split in the Kerala Congress, into
Kemla Congres (M) led by K M. Mani and Kernla Congress (J) led by
P. J. Jmeph. K M. Mani resigned from the government on July 26, 1979.~'
Owing to his party's stand on the "Gift Deed" (land reforms) Bill,
P. K Vasudevan Nair resigned on October 7, 1979.~' After hectic parleys
between coalition partners, C. H. Mohammad Koya of the IUML was elected as
a compromise candidate to lead the UDF and the m i n w under his leadership
was sworn in on Odober 12, 1 9 7 9 ~ . The Congress and Kerak Congress were
keen to ensure the passage of the Land Reforms Bill and supported the
government. When the Bill had been passed, the co-alition parties, especially
Congress and Kerala Congress, showed little interest in bringing the ministry
through to the end of its term. Kerab Congress (M) on November 14, 1979, left
the coalition and joined the opposition.61 Congress withdrew its support on
November 27, 1979. The Chief Miniier advised the Governor to di i lve the
assembly and the Governor did so on November 30, 1979.~' The following day
Muhammad Koya, the Chief Min'ier, resigned and once again the state passed
under President's rule on December 5. 1979.
Preparations were made to conduct a fresh election. Two equally strong
and well-knit political alliances were in the fray - one led by the CPI (M),
namely the Left Democratic Front (LDF) consisting of Congress (A), CPI, AIML,
RSP, KC (M) and KC (Pihi) and the other the United Democratic Front (UDF),
consisting of Congress (I) , IUML, KC (Joseph), PSP and NDP. The elections
were held on Januay 21, 1980. The LDF won ninety three seats while the UDF
got only forty six seats.
Results of the 1980 AssembIy ~ l ec t ions~~
Total seats Uedomte Votes polled Percentage of votes
140 13266064 %I1455 75.74
Political palties Seats mntested Seats won Percentage of votes polled
MC (1) 51 17 17.34
IUML 20 14 7.17
Kc (J) 15 6 4.94
PSP 4 1 0.11
NDP 11 3 3.65
SRP 6 Nil 0.33
CPI (M) 50 35 7.79
CPI 22 1 7 10.94
INC (S) 30 21 3.02
RSP 8 6 3.51
AIML 11 5 5.24
KC (MI 17 8 0.80
KC (PG) 2 1 0.80
Janata 29 5 7.57
Independents (UDF) 4 Nil 2.24
Independent elected 1 1 0.29
The LDF government led by E. K Nayanar of CPI (M) assumed office on
January 25, 1980. Withii a year of the LDF coming to power, the political
situation in the state became unstable. There were frequent alegations of the
breakdown of law and order: the excesses of ClTU activism, and clashes
between CPI (M) and RSS activists etc. created an explosive situation. Serious
differences of opinion emerged among the coalition partners and on Odober 16,
1981, Congress (S) led by Sri. A. K Antony withdrew its support to the
g~vernment .~~ On Oaober 20, 1981, the Kerab Congress (M) atio withdrew its
support and E. K Nayanar tendered his resignation on the same day. Thus on
October 21,1981, Kerala came under President's rule and the assembly was kept
under suspended animation. The Congress (S) leader made intensive
negotiations with the UDF to form a government but the central leadership of
Congress (S) asked its Kerala unit to stop all consultations with the UDF. But the
Kerab leader, Sri. A K Antony, defied the orders of Congress (S) centml
leadership and this brought about a split in the Congress (S) in Kerala. The
breakaway gmup was known as Congress (A) led by Sri. A. K Antony. With
the tacit support of Congress (A), K Karunakaran, the leader of the UDF and of
the Congress (I) was sworn in as Chief Minister on December 28, 1 9 8 1 . ~ ~ Both
the UDF and the LDF started political manoeuvring aimed at discrediting each
other. With the defection to LDF of a KC (M) M. L A, Mr. Lonappan
Nambadan, the UDF lost its majority, and this forced the resignation of
Ka~nakaran's minkby on March 17, 1 9 8 2 . ~ ~ On the same day, the President of
India took over the administration of the state.
Both alliances set to work to fight the elections. In the elections held on
May 19, 1982, there was, in addition to the UDF and the LDF, a new entrant,
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The election results awarded the victory to the
UDF which won seventy seven seats. K brunakaran, the leader of the UDF
from the Congress (I) , was sworn in Chief Minister on May 24, 1982.~'
Results of the 1982 Assembly ~ l e d i o n s ~ ~
Total seats Uedorate Votes polled Percentage of votes
140 13117012 9649083 73.56
Political parties Seats contested Seats won Percentage of votes polled
Congress (1) 35 20 11.88
Congress (A) 28 15 9.62
IUML 18 14 6.17
Kc (MI 17 6 5.85
KC (J) 12 8 4.55
Janata (G) 8 4 2.75
NDP 8 4 2.67
SRP 6 2 2.14
RISP (S) 4 1 1.20
PSP 1 1 0.30
DLP 1 1 0.37
Independent (UDF) 1 1 0.38
NRSP 1 Nil 0.36
CPI (M) 51 26 18.77
CPI (M) Inde. 9 3 2.65
CPI
CPI Inde.
Congess (S) RSP
AlML Janata
KC (S)
DSP
Independent Lok Dal
BJP
Other Inde.
13
Nil
7
4
4 4
1
1
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
The Karunakaran minishy enjoyed enough legislative support but was
driven by interparty and intraparty feuds. Personal rivalries occupied the
attention of the m i n i i in place of good Qovemance. It was alleged that
K Karunakamn, the Chief Minister, gave undue importance to the Muslims and
the Christians at the expense of the State as a whole. Sri. Karunakaran himself
precipitated the political crisii in the State by hii frequent talk of reshuffling of the
ministry which every body understood as a tactic for ousting the powerful home
miniir , Vayalar Ravi, of Karunakaran's own party. Karunakaran was forced to
call new elections to the Assembly in March 1987, two months before the
completion of its five year term.
1982 and the following years witnessed the merger and split of more than
two political parties. In December 1982, Congress (A) merged with Congress (I).
1985 saw the merging of the Kerab Congress factions, but the re-union was
short lived; two years later, they split again. AlML merged with IUML in 1986.
AIML had been a CPI(M) ally since its inception. It had four MLA's and the
merger was a blessing to the UDF. In 1987, a section of Congress (S) merged
with the congress (I). Around thii time, the M)P and SRP too divided into
smaller factions, while the Janata (G) with its four MIA's dippeared from the
political scene.69 Even the much disciplined CPI (M) was not free from internal
dissension. Differences arose in the party over its "political linen. M. V.
Raghavan, the then Secretary of its legislative party advocated that in order to
defeat Congress (I), the party should align itself with any party other than BJP.
Three more MIA's supported his political line. AU of them were expelled from
the party and later they formed the Communist Marxist Party (CMP).
In 1987, the LDF d i i i a t e d itself for the first time from communal
political parties. The emergence of Hindu Munnani with WP links was a new
feature of the political scenario and provided a third front on the election scene.
The CPI (M) was prepared to alienate the Muslim votes and in so doing they
hoped to cash in on the Hindu votes and thereby reduce the strength of the BJP.
The Congress, fearing a Hindu backlash, tried to make up for it with concessions
to Muslim fundamentalist^.'^ In the 1982 election, the UDF had only managed
to gain a majority of less than one kkh votes and the margin of victory in many
constituencies had been meagre. In thirty four out of one hundred and forty
constituencies, the victory margin happened to be just less than two thousand
votes. The UDF had won forty two of its seventy-six seats by a mere majority of
less than five hundred votes. Kerak presented 28 kkhs of new voters in the
1987 elections. The new voters which would have numbered 20,000 on an
average in each constituency, was the decisive factor in the p o ~ ; ~ ' going by past
experience, the voters could not have been vey optimistic about the outcome.
They had by now tried both fronts. Their experience with either front hand not
been satisfactoy. Besides the two fronts, the presence of the Hindu Munnani
and an anay of independent candidates - 1254 - in the fray compounded the
situation for the electorate. The rebel Communist Marxist Party (CMP) of
M. V. Raghavan added to the confusion of the already complex party political
alignments. The two front leaders - the Congress (I) and the CPI (M) - played
'big broither' to their partners by contesting seventy-six and seventy-nine seats
respectively. Even the threat of a walkout by CPI from the LDF didn't help to
change CPI (M)'s attitude. In the UDF, the Congress (I) rejected outright the
exaggerated c b i of the Kerab Congress and SRP.
The LDF approached the people as a truly secular outfit without any
communal allegiances." It presented itself as a caste-free alliance. By thii they
hoped to entice the new voters and a part of the Hindu votes of the UDF who
were dissatisfied with the pressure tactic of the communal partners of the UDF.
The LDF strategy focused on the Ezhavas who constituted the traditional vote
bank of the LDF. The CPI (M) put up twenty-five fresh candidates and dropped
seven sitting ML4's from their list. They also tried to field intellectuals like
M. K Sanu where they couldn't hope to win on their own. The LDF never
made known the name of the leader who would lead the combmation if it won
the contest. However, the name of Mrs. K R Gowri, 68 year old veteran, an
Ezhava, who had successfully contested eight assembly elections, was widely
touted, with the party's tacit support, as a tactic for enticing U a v a votes.
The Congress also dropped seven sitting MLA's but failed to infuse young
blood into the array of the old guards. The State Executive of the Youth
Congress resigned en rnasse in protest against being sidelined but was later
pacified by the leadership.n The UDF was considerably weakened by factional
infighting between two of its partners. The fight between the Kerala Congress
(M) and Kerak Congress (J) caused much headache to other coalition partners
of the UDF. Even withii the Congress (I), the intraparty rivalry between the hvo
groups owing allegiance to A K Antony and K Kamnakaran seriously
compromised the party's electoral fortunes.
CPI (M) General Secretary E. M. S. Namboodiripad drew a parallel
between the 1957 and 1987 elections. According to him, as in 1957 the
comrnun'kls were putting up a fight on a matter of principle-a fight against
communal and casteist forces.74 He was confident that the people would
appreciate the basic distinction between his front and the UDF; he described the
latter as ". . . a shameless produd of opportunistic flirtation of the Congress with
communal forces"." On the other hand, the AlCC General Secretay, Mr. A. K.
Antony was sure, though he was not quite happy with the UDF style of
functioning, that the people ". . . cannot and will not afford the luxuy of another
experiment with the ~ a r x i s t s " . ~ ~ The presence of the CMP and the near total
alienation of the Muslim voters adversely affected the LDF. Ps a matter of fad,
the LDF, despite its loud secularist protestations, had taken care to field
candidates belonging to the dominant communities in evey con~tituency.~ The
caste'& and communal card played astutely though secretly by the LDF brought
in rich dividends. Neither the LDF nor the UDF seemed confident of victoly.
And so, they spoke in guarded terms of their plans for the govemment to be
formed.78
There were 1241 candidates for a total of 138 seats.79 The three political
fronts and the CMP together had only 480 candidates. The remaining
candidates, independents and rebels, had entered the election fray to express
various grievances against the prevailing regimes. In Ranni, in Pathanamthitta
d i d , 12 independents joined forces to form a people's front. In Kottayam
district, several independents got together and organised a convention. Many
retired government officials, too came fonuard to contest the elections. AU
Kerah S e ~ c e Pensioners Association put up some candidates because they felt
that their representatives alone would be able to redress their grievances.
Autorikshaw driven, lottey vendors, sanyasins like Swami Gangadham Thirtha
( b b p a r a ) , Swami Pethambarachalya (Kaduthuruthy) were in the fray. The
inmates of Keezhmadu school where the police had reportedly beaten up the
blind students, were in Mak to campaign against Chief Minister, K Karunakamn,
along with a team of women, representing the outraged womanhood of
Thankamani village in ldukki district. In Chertala, Sebastian, a traditional
fisherman, put himself up as an independent where former Home Minister
Vayakr Ravi was seeking r e e l e ~ t i o n . ~
The election results favoured the LDF. The SRP, which claimed the
support of the Ezhavas, lost all of its four candidates. The Ezhavas expe&d
K R Gouri, an Ezhava, to be the next Chief Minister and voted for the LDF.
The NDP which chimed the support of the Naii' and had bargained for and
obtained nine seats from the UDF list, was able to win only one seat. A large
number of its votes went to the BJP-Hindu combine which won more than ten
thousand votes in nineteen constituencies. The Kerala Congress factions
suffered heavily and won only nine seats though they had fifteen seats in the
outgoing assembly. The infighting of the Kerala Congress factions had split the
Christian votes. The "policy of annihiitionn pursued by either of the Kerala
Congress factions resulted in their own annihilation. The CMP had fielded
eighty eight candidates; not many of them were able to secure more than a
thousand votes.
Though the BJP-Hindu Front won no seats, they were able to evoke a
response from the voters.*' Th.s indicated the widespread resentment among
Hindus against the UDF policy of communal appeasement. In nearly sixty
constituencies it bagged more than five thousand votes each and emerged
second in three constituencies; it polled more than ten thousand votes in
nineteen constituencies. The BJP-Hindu Front cut mainly into the UDF vote
banks, and did not make any gains at the expense of CPI (M) votes. The secular
.mge of the IDF was appealing to the people, particularly to the urban elite and
the middle class. The LDF won in most of the urban centres. However, it must
be conceded that though the LDF emerged victorious, the difference of votes
between the LDF and the UDF was just below one per cent of the total votes.
Results of the 1987 Assembly ~~ections*
Total seats Electorate Votes polled Percentage of votes
140 15948137 12846620 80.58
Political parties Seats contested Seats won Percentage of votes polled
INC 76 33 24.81
RIML 23 15 7.72
Kc (J) 13 5 3.53
KC (MI 10 4 3.33
NDP 9 1 2.23
SRP 4 Nil 1.21
=IJ (s) 1 Nil 0.23
Independents (UDF) 2 2 0.58
CPI (M) CPI (M) Independent
CPI
CPI Independent
IC (S) Janata
Lok Dal
RSP
WP-Hindu Munnani
Independents
CMP
Other Independents
38
4
16
1
6
7
1
5
Nil
Nil 1
1
On January 29, 1991n, the LDF held the first ever district council
elections. The Congress (I)-led front's defeat in these elections was grievous and
humiliating. The LDF won decisive majority in 12 of the 14 councils. On the
strength of thii massive victory, the LDF decided to go in for fresh assembly
elections ewn though they had one more year to complete their term. The
Chief Minister, E. K Nayanar, declared that they planned to hold simultaneous
elections to the k m b l y and Parliament in order to avoid unnecessary expense
to the state. The LDF accepted KC (J) as its partner, though E. M. S. had once
dubbed it as a Christian communal party. He justified the induction of KC (J)
into the LDF by saying that it ". . . had disowned its ecclesiastical leadership and
was secular in The newly formed Samvamna Samudaya
Munnani (SSM), (an organisation of communities eligible for reservations) bied
its pressure tactics to influence both fronts. The SSM - the protagonist of
caste-based reservation - carried littie weight with the people. The two fronts,
the LDF and the UDF, didn't pay much attention to them. But both fronts were
careful to take account of caste and religious equations in choosing the
candidates for each constituency.
The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1 9 9 1 ~ changed the whole
political scene. The LDF had to concede that there was a sympathy wave. In
order to counter the sympathy wave, the LDF tried to create an anti-sympathy
wave. They marched through the towns holding up tom and disfigured banners
which they claimed had been vandalised by UDF workers. But even in such
demonstrations, the left front instructed the poll campaigners not to utter slogans
maligning Rajiv Gandhi. The LDF withdrew anti-Rajiv cassettes and the LDF
leaders had to garland the urn canying Rajiv's ashes and attended condolence
meetings;% they had to shower praise on the late Indian leader. In the elections
on June 12, 1991, the UDF got a massive victory
Results of the 1991 Assembly €ledionss6 -
Total seats Electorate Votes polled Percentage of votes 139* 19512248 14333377 73.46
Political parties Seats contested Seats won Percentage
INC (I) 90 53 32.27
ML
KC (MI CMF' BJP
BSP
CPI
CPM
lcss JP
19
9
1
Nil
Nil
12
29
2
Nil
KC 10 1 3.03
NDP 3 2 0.93
RSP 6 2 2.15
JD 12 3 3.80
SJP 1
DPI 2
UCPl 3 0.03 Lok Dal 4 Nil
Social Action Party 1 Nil
MGR MMK 1 Nil "1 Independents 115 4 5.79
* Election to a constituency was countermanded due to the death of a candidate.
K Ka~nakarn of Congress was sworn in as Chief Minister on June 24,
1991.'' But due to conflicts within the Congress and between Congress and its
allies, he was forced to resign on March 16, 1995 and A. K Antony was sworn in
as Chief Minister on March 22, 1995." The UDF, under the leadership of A. K
Antony, decided to ban the sale of anack from April 19% and to hike the exc'ke
duty on Indian made foreign liquors from twenty rupees to two hundred rupees
per proof litre. Prohibition had been an item in the UDF manifesto. Antony
said he had made thii decision "to wipe out the tears of suffering
Opposition leaders were not quite prepared for this daring initiative. They didn't
know how to react to this policy. The UDF and the LDF were racing neck and
neck in the 19% elections. The elections were scheduled to be held on April 27,
19%. A. K Antony's leadership and the liquor ban raised the morale of the
UDF. There were internal party problems in the LDF. Kerala Congress (J),
Janata Dal, and to some extent, the CPI, were all plagued by internal problems.
In the UDF, the Karunakaran and Antony groups were out to scuttle the chances
of their opponents. The LDF had a slight edge on the UDF on communal lines
as the Nair service Society (NSS) had vowed to defeat the UDF. The NDP was
not happy with Antony over his declared stance on the question of job
reservation and had parted ways with the UDF.
In order to attract Ezhava votes, the UDF formed an alliance with
Janathipathya Samrakshana Samithi (JSS) of K. R. Gouriamma who had been
expelled from CPI (M) and had bunched her own party in 1994. The UDF also
reached an understanding with Sree Narayana Dharrna Paripalana Sangham
(SNDP) which openIy declared its support to the UDF. The UDF took steps to
soften up the People's Democratic Party (PDP) of Madhani which posed a
serious threat to IUML vote-banks. On the other hand, the LDF went in for an
understanding with the Indian National League (INL) of Ibrahim Sulaiman Sait
who floated hi party in 1994.''
There were two other fronts besides the UDF and the LDF, one led by
PDP and other by W. The people voted the LDF to power. Neither the clean
image of Antony nor the liquor ban appears to have made much impact on the
people in their eledoral options. The election was mainly a vote against the
UDF. In the Kollam and Thiruvananthapuram districts, the NSS contributed to
the defeat of the UDF. In some constituencies the INL tilted the balance in
favour of the LDF. The difference of votes between the two fronts was only 1.32
per cent of the total votes.
Results of the 19% Assembly Elections9'
Total seats Electomte Votes polled Percentage of votes 140 20667409 14706806 71.16
Political parties Seats contested Seats won Percentage
AlCC (T) 8 Nil 0.06
J3JP 127 Nil 5.48
CPI 22 18 7.62 CPM 62 40 21.59
INC 94 37 30.43 JD 13 4 4.12
JP 21 Nil 0.06
SAP 9 Nil 0.01
ICS 9 3 2.49
KEC 10 5 3.18
MUL 22 13 7.19
BLP 1 Nil 0.03
BSP 12 Nil 0.13
CMP KSC 3 Nil 0.49
FBL 6 Nil 0.02
ILC 1 Nil 0.00
INL 15 1 0.45
JPSS 4 6 1.28
KEC 10 1 3.10
Kt32 (B) 2 2 0.64
KEc (J) 4 Nil 1.14
PDP 50 5 0.72
RSP 6 Nil 2.07
SHS 16 Nil 0.03
SLAP 1 Nil 0.00
SWJP 1 Nil 0.00
Ind . 672 5 7.68
Communalism in Kerala Politics
The Ezhavas, Christians, Muslims and Nairs constitute twenty-six,
twentyane, nineteen and sixteen percentage respectively of the Kerab
population.g2 As may be seen from a cursory view of electoral vicissitudes,
communalism has proved itself a major force in Kerah society and politics.
Inequalities, both economic and social, exist between different communities.
Each community has its own interests to protect and promote. According to
Paulose Mar Paulose, communalism comprises three elements: the identity, the
ethos and the shield.% Of these, communal ethos has a predominance among
the four communities competing for an upper hand in Kerak politics.
Communal rivalry and hostiIity is bound to have an impact on the social, political
and economic life of Kerala.
The Hindus are mainly divided into "Savarna" and "Avama" castes and
numerous subczdes. The avamas are generally deprived of the privileges
enjoyed by the savamas and are characterised by social and economic
backwardness. Each community has its organisation set up to protect its
interests. The communal equations could be shuffled if, by doing so, a
community's interest could be better served. The tendency to form communally
based parties has led to a proliferation of political parties in Kerala.
Muslims and Politics
The Indiin Union Muslim League (IUML) was set up in Malabar in 1937
as a branch of AN I n d i Muslim League which had been bunched in Dacca three
decades earlier, in 1906. The IUML may claim the dubious distinction of being
the fust communal political party in Kerala. The Muslims are considered as a
backward community both socially and economically. The Muslim League
stands for the overall development of the Muslim community. Already in 1957,
the League proved itself a wellarganised political party in Kerab and played a
vital role in the "liberation struggle" aimed at ousting the communists from
power. After the diimissal of the E M. S. Ministry, the Congress, P. S. P. and
the Muslim League formed an alliance. 94 From then onwards, except during
1987-1991, one faction or other of the Muslim League has managed to stay in
power through calculated moves in the political game. It is second only to CPI
(M) and Congress (I) in strength and size. But splits and personality clashes
have considerably weakened its bargaining power. Of late, the Indian National
League and PDP haw made inroads into its stronghokis. But IUML, INC and
PDP all have the Muslim community's interests at heart and aim at promoting
them.
Christians and Politics
Christians are next only to Ezhavas in strength in Kerala. They are
powerful, both sacialty and economically and are generally thought to be
anticommunist. Before the formation of Kerala Congress, Christians had given
their whole-hearted support to the Indian National Congress.95 They had the
feeling all along that Congress was neglecting their interests.% But they had no
choice but to support the Congress. It was against thii background of growing
discontent among the Christians that the Kerala Congress was formed on
October 9, 1%4 under the leadership of K M. George. Right from the start, the
Kerala Congress has been considered as a kontal organisation of the Christians
enpying the tacit support of the Church. It is true that the Church, especially,
the Syrian Christians, have exerted considerable power on the government,
through one faction or the other of the Kerala Congress. Today, it has four
factions originating from personality clashes within the party.97 The Kerala
Congress (Mani) pined the CPI(M)-kd Left Democratic Front on November 14,
1979.~ In the 1980 assembly elections, KC (M) went to the polk in alliance with
the leftist parties. Till then, the Church had considered the Commun'Lsts as their
arch-enemy. The "Mani Factorn in the Left Front mollified the Church's stand
towards the Communists. Some Bishops, though reluctantly, lent heir support
to the LDF. Mani's argument that hi party had joined the D F with a view to
influencing the leftists with their positive approach found favour with many
Christians. In that election many Christians voted for "Sickle and Hammer."
Since then, one faction or the other of Kerala Congress has allied i&lf with the
LDF. The Church no longer considers it anathema to work with the leftists. For
their part, the Leftists also have shed their prejudices against religion. In Calcutta,
the CPI (M) volunteered to build a temple for the people." Religion, which they
once saw as the "opiumn of the people, is now seen as a useful instrument for
widening their power base.
Nairs and Politics
The enormous gains made by IUML and Kerak Congress inspired the
Naii to form their own political party. When the N a m b d i i Brahmins
dwindled in number in positions of power, the Nairs took their place and became
the privileged caste in Kerak's power structure. However, over the years, with
the number of job reservations for various communities steadily increasing, the
Naii found they had to give up many of their traditional privileges. Nor were
they versed in the arts of agriculture and business so as to compete with a
powerful community like the Christians. The Naiirs decided to organ.& their
people. Thus, the NSS was founded on October 31, 1914 under the leadenhip
of Mannathu Padmanabha PiUai.'* The aim was to promote the community's
social and educational interests. Eventually, they realised that in order to exert
political influence, they needed a party of their own and so they formed the
National Democratic Party (NDP) in 1973 as NSS's political wing.lO' Since then,
the community has thrown its weight behind the NDP to wrest its share of power
in government. However, much of its vitality has been drained by corruption
and inner party feuds. The NDP is indulging in evey kind of political
manoeuvring to protect the interests of its community. They find little difficulty
in lining up with either front to protect their interests. The party has consistently
advocated the policy of reservation on economic basii.
Ezhavas and Politica
The Ezhavas, though a majority community, was reeling under such
diminat ions as untouchability, unapproachability etc. In order to uplift them,
the Sree Narayana Dharma Paripalana Sangham (SNDP) was formed. Before
the founding of SNDP, the Ezhavas had contented themselves with signing
memoranda for redressal of their grievances. The "Malayali Memorial" of 1891
and "Ezhava Memorialn of 1896 are examples of this. But they received no
positive response. They too realised from experience that "unity is strength" and
that only pressure tactics would pay good dividends. Thii recognition had led to
the formation of the SNDP, the first communally based organisation to be set up
by a backward community in the state. But the SNDP took almost seven
decades to start its political wingSocialist Republican Party (SRP, 1974). The
Ezhavas had at last learnt a valuable lesson from the experience of other
communities like Muslims, Christians and Nairs. Now no political party can
ignore SRP. It has been pursuing vehemently the interests of the Ezhavas. Both
fronts are eager to appease the Ezhavas through concessions to the SRP.
The Caste Factor In Kerala Politics
To a great extent, Kerala politics has been guided by the caste affiliations
of the people. In the rise and fall of each ministry might be d i i m e d the unseen
hand of caste politics of different leaders. The Sankar ministry of 1%2 collapsed
due to caste clashes within the mini*. Sankar, an Ezhava, was not ahwed to
discharge hi duties effectively by high caste Nairs. Communal parties like
Muslim League and Kerab Congress supported the CPI-led Achutha Menon
ministry of 1971-77. The Church was not averse to the CPI which had drifted
from CPI (M) and allied itself with the Congress. However, the Education Bill of
1972 aroused communal feelings among the Nain, Christians and ~zhavas.'"
Due to mass agitation led by the leaders of different communities, the
government had to concede several demands.lm The policy of resenmtion in
govemment jobs for the backward classes has also inflamed caste and communal
feelings. The Nairs, in 1971, demanded reservation on economic basis. The
SNDP and SRP also held mammoth demonstrations to put pressure on the
govemment so as to forestal changes in the current reservation policy. The
Supreme Court accepted the Nettoor Commission ~ e p o r t ' ~ which
recommended reservation on economic and communal basis. The reservation
policy has proved to be a contentious issue calling for unequivocal commitment
to communal or anticommunal policies and programmes.
During the 1977 elections the ruling front made an alliance with SRP and
NDP. They supported Antony ~ovemment in 1977 in the hope of securing
certain demands on''' the reservation i ~ s u e . ' ~ On the basii of the assurance of
"Front" leaders, SRP and NDP urged their community to vote for the ruling
front. Thus communalism has been politicised and has retained its unhealthy
influence in the social and political spheres to thii day.
The political parties are not averse to forming alliances with communal
parties in order to keep their opponents away from power. In 1980, CPI (M)
made an alliance with Muslim Lague and Kerala Congress to keep the Congress
out of power. But, in 1982, almost all communal parties rallied to the camp of
the UDF under the leadership of the Congress. The communal parties secured
thii-four seats out of the seventy-seven seats won by the UDF camp.lo7 But
Congress was not so happy with the communal parties. G. Karthikeyan
expressed the sentiment of the party when he said that Congress was bullied by
communal parties and that the party had tarnished its image on thii count.'''
E. M. S. Namboodiripad, too, admitted that the LDF also was no different from
the UDF in appeasing the communal parties.1w In the 1987 elections, though
the LDF proclaimed itself to be a purely secular front, it projected an Ezhava,
K. R. Gouri, as its Chief Minister-to-be, with a view to attracting Ezhava votes. In
the 1991 and 19% elections, the LDF resorted to the same tactics of projecting
certain Ezhavas as its prospective leader, in order to woo the Ezhava voters. For
their part, the UDF made an open alliance with communal and caste forces.
Communal Election Politica
The political behaviour of the people in Kerala is influenced more by
caste and communal considerations than political ideologies. Every political
party selects its candidate on a communal basii. The geographical diibution of
the major communities is a crucial fador in the choice of candidates. The four
major communities are more or less concentrated in four different regions of the
state: the Muslims in Mabppuram, Kozhikode d i ic t s ; the Christians in
Kottayarn, Idukki, Pathanarnthitta and Emakuhrn diicts; Nain in
Thi~vananthapuram, Kollam d i ic t s ; and Ezhavas in Pabkkad, Alappuzha
districts. This makes it easy for parties to choose their candidates with an eye on
communal wte banks. The fobwing tablel10 shows the number of seak won by
communal candidates in various elections in the state, a state which boask the
highest literacy rate in the country!
Number of Communal Parties in each Assembly Elections in eral la^^' No. of o o m n a l pa* Seats won by mmrrmnal
Year of election which contested in parties in the elections elections
1957 1 8
1960 1 11
1965 2 29
1967 2 19
1970 2 23
1977 5 43
1980 6 37
1982 7 39
1987 6 25
1991 6 31
19% 9 28
Usually people are asked to vote on the basis of caste and community
affiliations. AU parties haw members from almost all castes and communities.
So, it is not diff i l t to find suitable candidates belonging to the predominant
caste in each constituency. During elections, ideology takes a back-seat and a
s'kable section of the people vote on the basis of communal and caste feelings.
The leaden miss no chance of inciting caste and communal feelings among the
people to win the elections.
Though some political parties may proclaim secularism as their hall-mark
and may declare that they have no relations with any communal parties, their
actual practice gives the lie to this anticommunal rhetoric. In actual fad, evey
political party is seen to cash in on communal issues and strike a secret deal with
the communal parties. During the 1987 elections, the LDF, despite their open
n 111 professions of secularism, sought the secret assistance of the "radical priests .
They expkied it away by saying that any priest as an individual has the
freedom to support any political party of hi choice. In the 19% elections, the
LDF had reached a secret understanding with the NSS.llZ The NDP, the political
wing of the NSS, had been a partner in the UDF. But before the elections, the
NDP left the UDF. According to the NSS leaders, the LDF approached the NDP
and promised them eight corporations instead of five promised by the UDF. The
public stance of the NDP was that they had offered their support to the LDF
without pre-conditions. This means that even the LDF which prides itself on its
ideological purity is not averse to sacrificing principles to political expediency in
its drive for political power.
lhlrd Force
Kerala's political scene has mainly been dominated by caste politics,
communal rivalry and competition between different communities. The smaller
communities, too, following the example of the major ones, have formed their
own groups to protect their interests. The recently organised WP-Hindu
Munnani represent caste Hiidu~."~ Till the 1984 elections, the LDF and the
UDF dominated the political scene of Kerak. &It the eve of the 1984 elections
saw the birth of a new political force - the BJP-Hindu Munnani - in the
political arena. The Muslims and Christians had already entrenched themselves
in Kerab politics, but the Hindus as such were not organ'ked except in certain of
their sections such as Nairs and Ezhavas. The Hindu-Muslim clashes of 1982 in
~hiruvanantha~uram"~ and the "Nilakkel issuen115 of March 1983 between
Christians and Hindus helped intensify the "Hindutwa" sentiment and polarise
the communal elements to form the Hindu ~ u n n a n i . " ~ Today, the WP-Hindu
Munnani rope in supporters by inciting religious feeling and, is hying to pride
over militant Hinduism. Though it is not able to win a single seat, its strength has
been on the increase and both fronts are not too happy about this. It can tilt the
balance between the LDF and the UDF in many constituencies since the margin
between the two is often very slight.
Liberation Theology and Kerala Politlcs
Until the 1980 elections, the Christians had given their support either to
Congress or to Kernla Congress. The Communist-regimes' repressive policies in
East European countries had instilled fear in the Church in Keraia and they
wanted to prevent Communists from coming to power. The Communists, too,
had taken a hard anti-religious line but a change occurred during the 1980s.
Many Christians, even against the instructions of their Bishops, supported the
Communist Party. Many radical priests found nothing wrong in joining hands
with the Marxists. They even questioned the authority of the Bishops who
aligned themselves with the Congress which they considered as cormpt,
anti-poor and unjust. The Kerala Congress (Mani), considered by many to be an
extension of the Christian community, was an ally of the UDF in 1980. That
means many Christians voted for "sickle and hammern and many leftists voted
for Kerala Congress. In 1982, Christian radicals openly supported the LDF. The
"Priests Forumn, a liberation theology activist's movement, instructed people to
vote for the LDF. Their attempt in 1982 did have little effect on the bi, but it
was a new approach, all the same. In the 1987 elections, the political scenario
was more favourable to radical thought than in previous years. In 1982, the
radical priests were considered as revolutionaries and the people rejected them.
But by 1987, the situation had changed in their favour. Because of their active
support to the fishermen's agitation of 1984, and because of the many hardships
they willingly endured for thii cause, they came to be seen as 'victims' rather
than as violent agitators. The laity, especially those in the coastal areas, saw the
radicals as more dedicated, approachable, dependable than the official Church.
The Church, on the other hand, had tried to suppress the pro-poor movement
and punish the people involved in it. People's sympathy was with the radicals.
In 1987, the Church supported the UDF, but the radicals and the laity opted for
the LDF. The leftists also stood by the fishermen's agitators and worked for the
success of their cause. So the poor saw hope in a government led by the leftist
and voted for them. Thus, liberation theology may be said to have brought
about certain changes, though in a minimal way, in the outlook of both the
Communists and a section of the Christian community. Under the influence of
the liberation movement, Christians were abk to co-operate with the leftists
without feeling guilty about it. The Communists supported the liberation
activities in the hope that, by doing so, they would be able to close the gap that
is felt to exist between Orthodox Christians and communists.
In the eighties, liberation theology activists in Kerala were working on the
principle that there was a real and valid diindion to be made between the
"official Church" and "people's Churchn. Sr. Alice, the 'liberation fire-brand',
openly opted for socialism and saw nothing wrong in using violence for attaining
socialist aims. It probably did not occur to her that even before the birth of
liberation theology cornmunists had come to power in Kerak through the bah t
box and many communist chief ministers had ruled the state without resorting to
armed revolt."' Fr. Thomas Kocheny, the unquestioned leader of the liberation
activists, does not look up to the cornmunists as saviours of the poor. In hi
view, they, too, are not fully committed to the cause of the poor. However, he
admits that, on balance, the leftists are much more sympathetic than the UDF to
the cause of serving the poor. But he expects the u)F"* to take a more radical
line in the service of the depressed classes. For their part, the communists
consider religion as an instrument of revolution. Beyond that, they are not
prepared to accept liberation theology either as a science or as a discipline.
According to the leftists, the dialogue in liberation theology is between
god-oriented theologies.11g Thii taught the leftists the valuable lesson that they
can no longer claim to be the sole saviours of the poor, that anyone with
genuine interest in the uplift of the poor will have the support of the people and
that one need not be an atheist to be able to work for the poor. They also
realised that ideological jargon and mere lip-service will not go down with the
poor. Leftist and liberation activists are action oriented and both try to learn
from real life situations. They - liberation theologists and communists - give
prime importance to human beings. The communists in Kerab, especially in
coastal areas, like to have a healthy relation with liberation movements, in order
to widen their power base.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the political upheavals in the M
European countries came as a bolt from the blue and communists all over the
world have since been reconsidering the validity of their own ideology. It is
bound to have its repercussions in the practice and theoy of the Kerala
communists a h . Nowadays they are not too keen on carrying their ideological
baggage with them; more pragmatic than before, they are silent about their
athe'htic and materialistic stance. Now the communists in Kerak, like their
counterparts in other parts of the world, are not averse to relegionlZ0 and
consider it as a requirement of social life.
Moreover, no liberation activists today like to be bracketed with leftist
parties. Clccoding to Fr. Thomas Kocheny, the leader of the fishermen's
agitation of 1984, the liberationist prefers to keep equal d i i nce fromo both the
LDF and the UDF. They are prepared to co-operate with any political party
which may extend its help to solve the fishermen's problems. According to Fr.
Kocherry, the KSMF only believes in issue-based politics. In the 1987 election,
they supported the LDF and soon came to the realisation that even the LDF is
less interested in helping the fisherflock than in securing their votes. So, during
elections, the liberation activists bargain with the candidates and political parties
and support only those who promise to work for them. In Kocheny's opinion,
the liberationists cannot profess unquestioning loyalty to the communists.
Sometimes, too, they might line up with Congress if circumstances wananted
it.
According to Sr. Patrisha Kuruvinakunnel who had undertaken a
twenty-three day fast in front of the Secretariate during the fisherman's agitation,
the liberation activists no longer enjoy the patronage of the communists. In her
view, the leftist approach to the problems of the poor and the fisherfolk is just
"eye-washn calculated to win votes. They may make loud professions of
solidarity with the poor, but that is just about all. There is a lot of difference
between the preaching and praxis of the communists. But the sister is reluctant
to put the blame on the party entirely. In her opinion, the party may be under
pressure to accommodate various interests. She feels that under the guidance of
the liberation theologians, the fisherfolk are now able to operate as a pressure
group. Today, no one can ignore them. The liberation activists, inspired by
Christ's championship of the cause of the poor, would like to make a defmite
option for the poor and support those who support their cause.'= Today,
neither front can take for granted the support of the f~herfolk Social activists
drawing inspiration from liberation theology have made the fisherfolk fully
conscious of their rights and have enabled them to work on their own without
the patronage of any political party. Consequently, they are now able to stake a
claim for their share of power in regions where they constitute a sizeable
majority.
Kerala is a politically conscious state. People do take an active part in
political activities. According to Prof. Aravindakshan, famous psephologist,
Kerala politics is mainly guided by caste and communal fadors.lP Caste and
communal feelings are deep-rooted in the Keralite's psyche. The dawn to dusk
bandh organised by the backward classes' Liberation Front in protest against the
move to introduce creamy layer in job reservation was a general strike carried
out to preserve caste and communal privileges.'24 Long before the Mandal
Commission Report became an issue in the county, Kerab had sanctioned
substantial reservation on the basii of social as well as economic backwardness
of lower caste Hindus and the bandh indicated the strong resolve of these
sections to preserve the concessions they have been enjoying.
Even the so-called secular parties are secular in name only. The
communists as well as Congress have from time to time sought alliances with
communal forces. At a recent meeting, the CPM asked its followers to intervene
effectively in religious activities to prevent BJP and the Muslim League from
making serious inroads into the segment of the religious minded people of the
state. The central committee resolution asked the CPM followers to befriend and
rope in the religious minded people to widen the party's power base. Thii shows
that the party has deviated from its declared anti-religious stance and that it no
longer wants to alienate believers. The Central Committee Report also admits
that "casteconsciousness is a growing tendency among party followers of
n 125 different levek . It is alleged that the CPM leadership has always been in the
hands of high caste Hindus.
Against this background of communal and caste consciousness, liberation
theology could not make much headway. In Kerala, as elsewhere in the world,
the new theology was favourably disposed to the left parties; however, long
before the advent of thii theology, Kerala had given the reins of power to the
communists in a fair and free democratic election.
In Kerak, the liberationists' political activities were a h a t wholly confined
to their championship of fiherman's rights and the leadership they gave to their
agitation. In the 1987 election to the state assembly, although the new theology
had by now become fairly popular, the results showed little evidence of a change
from established voting patterns.
Undoubtedly liberation theology has been responsible for educating the
fishermen in their democratic rights and empowering them in political terms.
The libemtionists were able to eliminate the power broken who were misguiding
and cheating these people with insincere promises. They showed these deluded
people that neither the CPM nor Congress will save them, that they should
m o b i i their own men to fight for their rights. As a result, they haw been
enabled to bargain from a position of strength. The political leadership can no
longer take their support for granted. They are obliged to strike a deal in real
terms with the fisherfolk if they want their support in the election. Having been
made fully conscious of their right, the feherfolk can now operate as a close-knit
pressure group. They can play the polifical game with skill and competence and
this much may be pbced fo the credit of the liberation activists.
Notes
1 Government of Kerak, Economic Review 1995 (Thirumnanthapuram:
State Planning Board, 19%) 32.
h o r n Year Book (Kottayam: Makyala Manorarna Publications.
19%) 182.
/bid 31.
Government of Kerala, f i r& Sfate Gazetteer, Vol. I1 (Trivandrum:
Kerak Gazetteers Department, 1989) 728.
The area under rice cultivation is declining. In 1992-93, it was 537608
hectres; in 1993-94, 507832 hectres; in 1994-95 it dropped again to 503290
hectres. Government of Kerala, Economic Review 1995- 35.
The area under rubber cultivation is increasing. In 1992-93, it was
428864 hectres; it rose to 437138 hectres in 1993-94 and 443300 hectres in
1994-95. Government of Kerala, Economic Review 1995- 35.
7 Indii is a major producer and consumer of tea. /bid 124.
Kerala accounts for 37 per cent of the total production of cashew in
India. /bid 1222.
Coffee is cukvated in eighty countries. Of these, 25 countries produce
more than 5000 MT of coffee and India is one of them. 85 percent of the
country's production comes from Kamataka. Kerala and Tamil Nadu are other
major coffee producing states in Indii.
10 Pepper, cardamom, ginger and turmeric are the major varieties of
species produced in Kemla. Kerak accounts for 97 per cent of the total
production of pepper in the country, for 67 per cent of the total production of
cardamom, for 26 per cent of ginger. Alleppey ginger turmeric is rated highly by
international traders. /bid 121-122.
l1 Robert L Hardgrave (Jr.), h y s in the Political k i o k of South
India (New Delhi: Usha Publications, 1979) 37.
* See, for detaik, Government of Kerak, Economic Review 1995
91-101.
l3 Manonma Year Book 1996 (Kottayam: Malayala Manorama
Publications) 336.
14 Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Census of lndia 1991
Ser. /(New Delhi, 1995) 16.
l5 Literacy, life expectancy and income are the three indicators used in
measuring human development index. In these, Kerala's achievement is unique
among other Indian states. According to the 1991 census, Kerala's literacy rate is
89.81 whereas the all lndii level is 52.21 per cent. Female literacy rate is 86.17
per cent in Kerak as against 39.20 per cent at the national level. The literacy
rate among the scheduled cates is 79.66; scheduled caste female literacy is 74.31
per cent and scheduled tribes literacy is 51.09 per cent in Kerak. Government of
Kerak, Eoonomic Review I995 128.
l6 The pattern of energy consumption in the state shows that the industrial
sedor is the largest consumer (36.97%); the domestic sedor comes second with
32.74% during 1994-95; the commercial sedor consumes 13.57%. See, for
details, Government of Kerak, b n o m i c Review 1995 73.
17 Government of Kerala, Kkrah: Yesfeday and Today (Trivandtum:
Department of Public Relations: 1981) 1.
l8 George Wookcock, &I&: a Porbzv't of the Mlabar Coast (L~ndon:
Faber and Faber, 1%7) 243.
19 R Ramakrishnan Naii, Social Sbucture and Poltical Lkwbpment in
&I& (Trivandtum: The Kerak Academy of Political Science, 1976) 10.
20 In 1891, the people of thii region belonging to various castes and
religious groups signed a memorandum in which they requested the Maharaja
Moolam Tirunal to give public jobs only to Kerallites. The petition came to be
known as "Malayali Memorial." See, k Sreedhara Menon, Adunika &rahm
(A Concise P o b h l H&y of W e m &I& h m 18t51957) (Kottayam:
NBS, 1988) 5.
21 The Ezhavas submitted to the Maharaja a rnemorndum signed by
13176 pemns under the leadenhip of Dr. Palpu, the frst medical graduate from
that community on September 3, 18%. A. Sreedhara Menon, Adhunika
&mhm (Ibttayam: NBS, 1988) 22.
" In 1933, the three communities - Ezhavas, Christians and Muslims -
passed a resolution seeking proper representation in government and threatened
to boycott the assembly if thii was not granted. The Maharaja of Travancore
accepted some of their demands. The boycott resolution is known as "The
Abstention Movementn.
T. K Ravindran, Asan and Social Revo/utio~s in &rah (Trivandrum:
Kerala Hiirical Society, 1972) 30.
24 K S. Nayar, Con- and && Politics (Trivandtum: College Book
House, 1984) 54.
25 R. Rarnalqishnan Nair, Constitutions/ Wn'imenG in fir&
(Trivandrum: St Joseph's Press, 1%4) 29.
26 K S. Nayar, Congress and f i r a h Politics (Trivandrum: Cokge Book
House, 1984) 35.
27 K. G. Krishna Moorthy and Lekshrnana Rao, Poltical Pehmnces in
fimb-An .Ekclvral AnaIjsis of the Kerala Elections 1957,1960,1%5and 14167
(New Delhi: Radhakriihna Ptakashan, 1968) 181.
hid 181.
29 Government of Kerala, Glimpses of %tab (Trivandrum: Department of
Public Relations, 1988) 37.
30 K N. Nair Perunna, kkrahthik Con- hasthanam (Cochin:
Ptathibha Publications, 1985) 14.
31 V. S. Keraleeyan, firalathik Veeraputhmn (Calicut: K R Brothers,
1959) 330.
32 T. J. Nossiter, "Communism in Kerak: A Study in Political
Adaptation," Journal of Kernla Studies (Trivandmm: Department of H i i r y ,
1977): 115.
33 The Political Conference held at Ottapakm in 1921 signalled the start
of the 'United Kerak' movement. See, K V. Krishna Iyer, A Short Hiszby of
kkmb (Ernahlam: Pai and Co., 1966) 184.
34 A. Sreedhara Menon, Sow'al and Cuhial Histry of Ilerab (New
Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1979) 3.
35 The communists contested in 100 seak and won 60 of them and
communist-backed independents got five seak.
36 T. J. M i t e r T. J., YCommuni~m in Kemla: A study in Political
Adaptation," Journal of &mb Studies 116.
37 Government. of Kemla, Backgrounder to 1987 Assembly Uections
Part/, (Trivandrum: Deparh-nent of Public Relations, 1987) 13.
3 S ~ . J. Nossiter , "Communism in Kemla: A Study in Political Adaptation,"
Joumal of Kkmh PoJtics 123.
39 /bid 123.
40 Government of Kemla, Assembly Ekction Reportage 1987
(Trivandrum: Department of Public Relations, 1987) 3.
41 Government of Kemb, Backgrounder to 1987 Assembly Uections
Part/, 14.
42 The Hindu (Madras, November 11, 1%1).
The No-Confidence Motion was passed with a majority of 73 votes
against 50.
44 Government of Kerala, Backgrounder to 1987AEsembly Hection
Part 1 16.
45 Ibid 1 7.
46 Manorama Year Book (Kottayam: Malayala Manomma Publications,
1996) 165.
47 Government of Kerala, Backgrounder to 1987Assembly Election
Part/ 19.
48 Deepika (Kottayam, Odober 27,1975).
49 Lkepika (Kottayam, March 18, 1977).
50 Government of Kerala, Backgrounder to 1987Assembly Uection
Part J 20.
Deepika (Kottayam, March 26,1977).
52 Ikepika (Kottayam, April 11, 1977).
53 Deepika (Kottayam, April 26,1977).
50 Deepika (Kottayam, April 28,1977).
55 Deepika (Kottayam, Febmaly 5,1978).
55 Deepika (Kottayam, October 27,1978).
" Deepika (Kottayam, October 30,1978).
58 Deepika (Kottayam, July 27,1979).
59 Deepika (Kottayam, Odober 8,1979).
Deepika (Kottayam, October 13,1979).
61 Deepika (Kottayam, November 15,1979).
62 Deepika (Kottayam, December 1,1979).
63 Government of Kerala, Badgrounder fu 1987Assembb Election
Part? 22.
64 Bepika (Kottayam, Odober 21,1981).
65 Deepika (Kottayam, December 29,1981).
66 Dzepika (Kottayarn, March 17,1982).
67 Deepika (Kottayam, May 25,1982).
Government of Kerala, Backgrounder to 1987Asrernbly .%don
h r t / 24.
69 Two of its members joined Kerala Congress and the others merged with
Congress (I). (M. Karnalam formed Democratic Janata Party (DJP) and later
joined the Congress (I).
70 The Week 6,13 (March 1987) 14.
71 ?bid 14.
" bid 18.
bid 20.
74 lbjd 20.
75 bid 20.
76 bid 20.
7he Week 6.14 (March 1987) 15.
78bid 16.
79 Elections for two seats had been countermanded foUowing the death of
two independent candidates.
80 The Week (March 29-April 4 , 1987) 45.
The Week (April 5-11, 1987) 16.
Government of Kerala, Assembly Wection Reporhge 1987 7 .
93 n e Week (April 7,1991) 36.
84 Deepika (May 22,1991).
85 The Week (June 16,1991) 21.
86 Based on the information provided by the Election Department,
Thiruvananthapuram.
87 hepika (June 25, 1991).
88 Deepih (March 23,1995).
The Week (April 7,1996) 48.
b id 41.
91 Based on the information provided by the Election Department,
Thiruvananthapuram.
9~ N. Jose Chander, "Political Culture" Dynamics of State Poltia in
Kernla, Ed. Jose Chander N. (New Delhi: Sterling Publications, 1986) 16-17.
43 ECORomjC and Political Wee& (May 5,1984) 752.
94~ournal of krala Studies (Trivandrum: Deparbent of Histoy, June-
September 1977) 479.
95 Deepika (Kottayam. February 9.1957).
% Deepika (Kottayam, January 29,1957).
97 Deepika (Kottayam, August 17,1976).
98 Deepika (Kottayam, November 15,1979).
99 The Indian Expres (Cochi, May 20,1997) 4.
100 Deepika (Kottayam, December 1, 1914).
101 Deepika (Kottayam, August 18, 1973).
im Deepika (Kottayam, June 27,1972).
lm The formation of the Calicut University in 1969, by the E. M. S.
Namboodiripad ministry was meant to appease the Muslim community, and was
sanctioned under pressure from its leader C. H. Mohammed Koya - the then
educational minister.
I W The Nettoor Commission was constituted in 1967 by the E. M. S.
ministry to examine the reservation problem. Kerala humudi (Trivandrum,
September 5, 1990). See also, T. Ramakrishnan and E. M. S.
Namboodiripad, Nettoor Commission Reporturn Supreme Kodathi hidhiym
(Trivandmm: CPI(M) Publication, 1976) 20.
105 The NDP demanded the non-implementation of the Nettoor
Commission Report and implementation of reservation on the basis of economic
backwardness. SRP on the other hand, wanted the continuation of reservation
on communal basis.
'm The Indian .&press (September 30. 1977).
lo' India Today (June 1, 1982) 26.
lo' The Indian Express (Cochin, April 23, 1984).
lW hid. 110 The Hindu (January 6, 1980); Uedion Guide, Socialirt &dam
Magazine (Kochi, 1996). 111 Information provided by the Uection Department,
Thiruvananthapuram.
'I2 Mathmbhumi (September 25, 1996).
"3 Deepika (August 18, 1984).
"4 See, for the details of the Hindu-Muslim clashes in Chala,
Thiruvananthapuram on December 30, 1982 Mathrubhumi (December 31,
1982); Malayala Manorama (December 31, 1982); Chandrika (December 31,
1982). 115 The Week (August 6 , 1983).
The Hindu Front was formed on the initiative of the Vihal Hindu
Sammelan on November 26. 1984 at Ernakulam. See, Mathrubhumi
(November 27, 19841. 117 Matter collected through personal interview.
'I8 Matte) collected through personal interview.
' I9 Sachithanandan. "Class War in the Christian Church" a marxist
approach, a paper presented in a seminar held at Thrissur in December 1985. 120 Malayala Manorama (Kottayam, January 4, 1991).
121 Matter collected through personal interview.
Matter collected through personal interview. 122 Matter collected through personal interview. 124 The Indian fipres.s (Cochin, Februay 22, 1997). 125 The lndian Express (Cochin, February 22, 1997).