Libya 2015 Reportloopsresearch.org/media/images/photoloplq8qe3b.pdf · 4. The Libyan Issue: The...

1 Libya 2015 Report Year in in Review

Libya 2015 Report

Year in Review

Monitoring and Reviewing Major Political,

Security and Economic Events


Introduction

By highlighting their causes,

implications and repercussions, this

report aims to provide a concise picture

of the most significant political,

economic and security events affecting

Libya in 2015. The report also intends

to facilitate follow-up of the most

important events that have affected the

country.

On the level of politics and security,

2015 was an eventful year. It witnessed

the escalation of the political division to

its extreme through parliamentarians,

two governments, two armies, two

central banks and two national oil

corporations. On the level of security,

the military and security map

dramatically evolved to become one of

the main aggravating factors. Also, the

clashes that began in 2014 continued

and new fields opened up, with battles

in Derna, Ajdabiya and some other

cities in the south.

At the economic level, Libya witnessed

a drastic exacerbation of the financial

crisis in 2015. The value of the Libyan

Dinar (LYD) has gone through a

decline that is unprecedented in its

history. Furthermore, the liquidity crisis

has been a burden for financial

decision-makers, and its manifestations

were apparent in the commercial banks

which experienced a significant

increase in overcrowding and long

queues.

On the international level, 2015

witnessed the transition of the Libyan

situation to the international system

with the launch of political dialogue

under the auspices of the United

Nations and with the participation of

international actors. In addition, the

intervention of regional countries in

Libyan affairs has significantly grown

and immensely worsened and further

complicated the internal situation.

In this report, we will try to objectively

and deliberately look into the

abovementioned issues, seeking to link

its inter-influential elements and come

up with a comprehensive assessment

and recommendations on the core

issues and which covers the

complications of the Libyan situation.

This will be conducted through

presenting and discussing the following

themes:

1. The Political Path and Internal

and External Interactions.

2. Security and Military Changes in

the West, East and South.

3. Political Dialogue: Stages,

Outcomes and Feedback.

4. The Libyan Issue: The

International and Regional

Position.

5. Major Deficiencies and

Weaknesses in the Libyan

Economy during 2015.

1. The Political Path and the

Internal and External

Interactions

Libya has started 2015 with more

political exacerbation. 2014 ended after

the Libyan House of Representatives

(Parliament of Libya) had announced

that it has drawn its path to be on the

side of the “Operation Dignity " which

was launched in mid-2014. It had also

announced hostility against "the Libya

Dawn Operation" for which the


supporters of the General National

Congress were gathered against the

Brigades that supports the Operation

Dignity.

As a consequence the political

polarization between the Parliament of

Libya, the Congress and their

supporters has been strongly

intensified. The polarization moved

from under one roof on one common

geographical space to clear cut

divisions after the Parliament refused to

come to Tripoli to conduct a handover

and receipt ceremony with the General

National Congress. Besides, prominent

members of this latter insisted on going

to Tobruk and continuing their

constituent work. They started taking

decisions which undoubtedly have

strongly contributed to the current

situation, and then the Constitutional

Chamber of the Supreme Court issued a

statement to dissolve the Parliament of

Libya.

The Parliament of Libya: Stations

and Directions

Libyans turned to new legislative

elections after the General National

Congress succumbed to the pressures

and the campaign of "No to the

Extension" and there was a need to fill

in the legislative vacuum, to address the

Steering Government’s apparent

weakness and inability to develop and

accelerate the convening of the

Parliament of Libya. However, these

facts did not prevent the outbreak of the

crisis at the country level and the

occurrence of a sharp division after the

return of the National Congress to

convene as a result of the issuance of

the Supreme Court decision which

called for the dissolution of the

Parliament of Libya.

Security and military mobility has

played a major role in the formation of

the official position since prominent

members of the parliament have

selected to distance away from Tripoli

as an attempt to overcome the

escalating changes on-the-ground in

Tripoli and Benghazi due to the military

confrontations which pushed Al Sawaiq

and Al Qaqa brigades (from Al Zintan),

opponents of the Congress and pro-

Parliament, out of Tripoli. Moreover,

Al Saiqa Special Forces were defeated

in Banghazi during their fight with

Ansar al Sharia in Libya backed with

some rebellions (named Shura Council

of Benghazi Revolutionaries) following

al-Saiqa Brigade’s link up to Operation

Karama (Dignity) under the leadership

of Commander Khalifa Haftar. An

overview of the Parliament of Libya

(Libyan House of Representatives) can

be presented through the following

stations:

The first meeting of the Parliament

of Libya in Tobruk was consultative.

However, an active campaign of some

members managed to convince

everybody of the majority of the

necessity of starting work from their

place in Tobruk, given the difficult

conditions the country is going through

and seeing the ongoing armed conflict

in Tripoli and Benghazi. All was

applied accordingly.


During the first meetings of the

Parliament of Libya, the prevailing

trend was to call for a cessation of the

fight, use of dialogue and formation of

a national unity government. The

Parliament was not biased in favor of

any of the parties, as stated in the

content of its statement dated on August

6, 2014:

"In the case of non-compliance with

this resolution, all the escalatory

procedures would be taken against

whoever the opposing party is," and

also in its statement dated on August 15

"fighting among brothers."

The International Community has

welcomed the Parliament’s new path

since its first days of convening. The

Egyptian delegation was the first to

come to Tobruk. Besides, right after

three weeks of his election, the first

station of the president of the

parliament, Aguila Saleh, was Cairo.

The positions of the same Parliament

following few days of launching its

work have altered towards escalation.

Proposals have been made for the

President of the General National

Congress tons and trial as well as the

resolution of all armed formations

under the legitimacy of the state,

mainly the Libya Dawn Operation,

which was under the command of the

Congress’s Chief of Staff.

One of the first Parliaments’

decisions which caused a controversy

against it and contributed to the tension

of the Libyan scene is the Resolution

No. (6) Which allows the United

Nations to immediately intervene to

protect civilians in Libya? It was issued

with the approval of 124 deputies. The

second Resolution is No. (7) of 2014

which calls for the dissolution of all

armed formations as well as irregular

Brigades and issuing some of the

provisions on them with 102 who voted

yes out of the total number of attendees

(104 deputies).

Prior to one month of the

Parliament’s convention, it has issued

the famous statement on December 24th

designating Ansar al-Sharia formation

group and the Libya Dawn Coalition as

terrorist organizations. Consequently, it

sided with one of the conflict parties

and resulted at planting the seeds of

division in the country. This decision

has pushed the Libya Dawn Coalition to

call for a second convening of the

National Congress, after being

classified as terrorists by the Parliament

of Libya.

Following deeper aggravation, on

September 17, 2014, the parliament has

approved the Law No. (3) About

fighting terrorism. The Law includes 30

articles which stipulated an

identification of the phenomenon of

terrorism, activities and actions which

go under the category of terrorism, and

their penalties. This law is issued with

the context of a Parliament’s

intensification of its positions against

the Libya Dawn Coalition and the

Shura Council of Benghazi

Revolutionaries which was classified as

terrorist groups.

The approval of the Parliament to

participate in the political dialogue the

United Nations called for, after the

envoy Bernandino Leon appointed as


the head of United Nations Support

Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), was

under the condition that he should be on

the side of Representatives Boycotters

instead of the National Congress. The

official representative of the Parliament

of Libya, Faraj Abu-Hashim, declared

that they “will not sit down with the

revolutionists” referring to the National

Congress and the Libya Dawn

Coalition.

The Parliament of Libya challenged

the judicial authority and rejected

Supreme Court's resolution to dissolve

the Parliament on the pretext that the

decision was made under threat. Also,

the Parliament has considered that its

legitimacy is immune from any kind of

judicial decision.

The Parliament of Libya issued

resolutions that dismiss the Chief of

Staff of the Libyan Army, the Central

Governor of Libya, the President of the

Audit Bureau, the Chairman of the

National Oil Corporation, and the

President of the General Intelligence

Services.

The Parliament gave permission to the

Operation Dignity to bombard the

capital of the country and Misrata.

The President of the Parliament signed

the decision of re-calling up 129 retired

officers in the military service, notably

the retired Major General Khalifa

Haftar as a further step to promote him

as the commander in chief of the

Libyan army. What is more is that he

was also given authorities that are

beyond the usual powers granted to the

leaders of armies, to an extent that

minimizes the function of the army

Chief of Staff and the Minister of

Defense.

As confirmed by more than one

representative, the Parliament has

unconstitutionally abolished the law of

political isolation issued by the General

National Congress, seeing that the

number of voters did not reach (101) as

stipulated in the Constitutional

Declaration. The House of

Representatives passed a General

Amnesty Act for all Libyans,

determining the conditions of the

amnesty and the exceptions of its

application. The number of voters was

58 members out of 99 who attended the

session, as the law stipulates the

cancellation of public jurisdiction for

all the accused.

The Parliament has promulgated a

resolution that allows the interim

government, emerged from the

government and headed by Abdullah al-

Thani, to request the Arab League to

initiate specific strikes to the country

and target the Islamic State (IS).

The House of Representatives has

amended the Constitutional Declaration

stipulating the continuation of the

House of Representatives’ mandate and

remain in effect until a legislative entity

is elected in accordance with the

permanent constitution, in addition to

the cancellation of all versions violating

this amendment.

The House of Representatives has

issued Law No. (7) of the year 2015

through amending Law No. (1) of the

year 2013 concerning the prevention of

usury transactions. The provisions of

Law No. (1) are to be applied among


legal entities, starting from the first

January 2020. Moreover, the National

Congress has already issued law

number (1) which prevents usurious

transactions in all its forms.

The Parliament has issued

resolutions which permit the

retirement of the Members of the

Council in accordance with their

current financial privileges. It also

grants them more than 100 thousand

Libyan Dinars as housing allowance

and 65 thousand Libyan Dinars for

transportation allowance.

The summary is that the Parliament,

in the beginning of its work, retreated

from the consensual process and sided

with Operation Dignity, which

receives a wide acceptance in some

cities in the East. Before a

considerably long time passes since it

was convened, the parliament has

encompassed the Operation and

classified it with its military

operations which serve under the

command of the Major General,

"Abderrazak Nadhouri." The position

of the Parliament has changed after

the promotion of the Major General

Khalifa Haftar, the commander of

Operation Dignity, to the rank of

Lieutenant, and appointing him as the

commander in chief of the Libyan

army. This was preceded by the

conviction of Libya Dawn Operation

as a terrorist group by the Parliament,

which in the opinion of many is one of

the crucial causes behind the political

division.

On the level of public and financial

affairs’ management, the resolutions

of the Parliament of Libya have raised

serious concerns inside and outside its

circle of supporters. The vast wave of

criticism which the Parliament

received has reflected the amount of

rejection to the positions and practices

of the presidency as of its members. A

considerable number of the Parliament

members and a group of its supporters

have realized that it was not the

correct substitute for the General

National Congress. The smoke of a

political fire began to fly above the

roof of the Parliament, and

battlefield’s dust was raised by the

conflict between political parties

which hovered around the Operation

Dignity. No sooner the Parliament

was established than the situation

changed into self-interest practices

which were visible to the public

opinion. Abuses, corruption and

alternatives were proposed as a

reaction to the fractions and as an exit

from the crisis of the Parliament

which became a profound one. The

main failures of the Parliament were

the following:

The split-up from public opinion

and isolation from the society as well

as its institutions through preventing

the broadcast of its meetings, in

addition to restricting its members’

communication with various media.

The issuance of serious decisions

and taking marginal positions without

any previous thorough study or

serious research that justifies the

implications of those decisions.


The Isolation of a specific group due

to the influence of the Parliaments’

orientations, which led to the

emergence of an alienation state among

several members. This was also the

reason behind their abstention from

attending the sessions of the Parliament.

The emergence of a dispute between

the parliamentarians and its two largest

formations; the National Forces

Alliance Party and Federalist

Movement. One of their main disputes

was about the position towards the team

of Khalifa Haftar and towards the

dialogue.

The Parliament has miserably failed

in managing the areas which are under

its authority and which supports it. It

did not succeed at directing its

government to impose security and

achieve a good standard of living in the

cities of the East, especially in

Benghazi.

Testimonies about the poor

performance of the Parliament came

from its members, stated by them in

several occasions. Younis Fanoush, a

prominent MP who was one of the

official policy makers of the Parliament

during its initial first months,

mentioned that he was strongly

disappointed as he lost hope in the

Parliament. He said that recently he has

been abstaining from attending its

sessions after discovering that the top

concern for most of the MPs is not their

duty and responsibility towards their

country but rather their own privileges,

salaries, fancy positions, secret

transactions and appointments of their

relatives and friends in embassies and

institutions abroad… He said that the

extension of this Parliament for one day

is a disaster for Libya by all accounts.

Another MP from Benghazi, Ziad

Daghim, claimed that the Parliament is

the worst legislative assembly not only

in the history of Libya but also in the

history of humanity.

Parliament members prioritize their

personal interests over the public

interest. The number of attendees of the

sessions on issuing the benefits of the

members exceeded 130 members,

whereas the number of attendees from

the House of Representatives at the

discussion of the final draft resolution,

in 14 September 2015, did not exceed

30 deputies. One of the Representatives

expressed his strong indignation by

saying on his Face book page "What

happened today in the House of

Representatives is so unfortunate and

most painful... I thought that the

difficult circumstances which our

country is experiencing and which we

are going through- as the

representatives of people in the

Parliament of Libya- would impose on

us to be at the level of having a

historical responsibility towards our

country. Then, we would massively

attend the session in order to make the

decisions which our people and the

world expect us to take. However, we

were shocked by the absence of the

whole presidency of the Council...

Consequently, it was impossible to hold

an official session valid for taking

decisions. I’m sorry for this. I feel we

have to apologize to the people of our


nation for this failure, betrayal and

laziness towards our responsibility.”

The Path of the National Congress:

Strengths and Weaknesses

We have pointed out that the return of

the General National Congress as a

Legislative Council and a presidential

entity came as a response to the request

made by Leadership of Libya Dawn

Operation in August 2014. The

members’ response to the convening

was not enormous, but the situation

changed after the issuance of the

decision by the Constitutional Chamber

of the Supreme Court, where the

number of members amounted to more

than 130. Hence, the General National

Congress considered itself the

legitimate legislative authority after the

decision of dissolving the Parliament

was issued.

The Congress did not hesitate to

exercise the powers of the supreme

authority in the country at least in the

areas under its control. It has appointed

the president of the Government of

National Salvation. Also, it has issued

sensitive resolutions that concern the

security management, as the

government embarked on running

public affairs releasing the following

statements:

The National Congress initiated its big

decisions of the year 2015 with the

formation of the National Guard

strengthened by rebels from all over

Libya, as stipulated in the resolution.

One of the big decisions which related

to the country’s present and the future

is the issuance of Law No. (16) for the

year 2015. This law stipulates the

abolishment of all previous laws on the

ownership of housings and lands and

their acquisition by the state or

individuals. Instead, it nationalizes all

the properties. Moreover, laws on the

disposition of government properties

for beneficial purposes were also

abolished.

The Congress proceeded in making

resolutions related to the Directorate

General of the government institutions

such as a resolution on the powers of

the Libyan Army’s levels of leadership,

in addition to the restructuring and

changing the directors of some

important institutions such as World

Islamic Call Society.

The Congress also failed to impose

itself as a supreme authority in the

country or even in the areas where it

rules for the following reasons:

The National Congress and its

subsidiary government are unable to

manage the public money, collect the

revenues and cover the expenses. A

large deficit appeared in the coverage of

basic items like salaries, and the

exchange rate of the Libyan Dinar has

declined so dramatically when

compared with the US dollar.

The government of the National

Congress failed to manage the public

services such as electricity, facilities

and cleanliness. The energy crisis

worsened and garbage have

significantly piled up in the streets of

the capital and major cities.

The deficit in the public budget was

reflected in the continuation and


implementation of multiple vital

projects and also on the scholarships of

students studying abroad.

The General National Congress was

unable to be the political, military and

social umbrella even for its supporting

areas. The absence of vision and the

lack of communication with these

components have diminished the

Congress’ influence and control over

them.

The inability of the General National

Congress and Salvation Government to

assimilate the system of municipal

councils which became divided among

themselves. Many of these municipal

councils started working outside the

influence of the National Congress.

Furthermore, some have revolted

against this latter because of the

financial support’s absence and the

success of some international entities to

communicate with them and even direct

them away from the path of the

Congress.

The inability of the General National

Congress and the National Salvation

Government to obtain international

support or to achieve a real

breakthrough about their legitimacy and

which would enable them to enhance

their internal influence and mobilize

energies then potentials in their circle.

One of the main shortcomings and

failings of the General National

Congress is its failure to direct the

political dialogue under the auspices of

the United Nations. Despite the

capability of the negotiation team

compared to the performance of the

Parliament’s delegation, the Congress

could not employ its internal attendance

and foreign relations with some

regional and international parties in

order to achieve gains and impose the

will of the supporters of the General

National Congress.

One of the manifestations of the

General National Congress’ poor

performance was the emergence of

polarization among its members. There

was a decline in the high tension and a

sharp polarization took place under its

roof before the parliamentary elections-

due to the fact that the National Forces

Alliance Party did not join the Congress

after its convening. However, the new

challenges and disputes over the

management of the current crisis led to

a split within the Congress; emergence

of a minority led by the president of the

Congress, Nouri Bousahmein, (which

managed to agree upon some

significant decisions), and an another

majority which comprises the

Reconciliation (al Wefaq) Party along

with the Justice and Construction Party

(which are against the presidency as

they put pressure on it without any

efficient results).

The final stage of the dialogue under

the auspices of the United Nations was

one of the most prominent reasons that

created division within the congress.

The presidency of the Congress stated

that the signature of Salih Makhzoum,

the second deputy of the Congress, on

Skhirat agreement with Mohamed

Shuaib, the first deputy of the

Parliament, does not represent the

National Congress. Adding that it has

limited the powers of signing the


agreement to the first Deputy Awad

Abdessadeq.

Divisions, weakness, lack of vision

and poor communication have opened

the door for huge breakthroughs in the

front of Tripoli. These breaches were

not limited to the position of the

municipal councils which responded to

the invitation of the former United

Nations envoy by calling them to play a

political and administrative role away

from the General National Congress.

The division has even reached the

military front which, under the

leadership of big battalions that belong

to the forces of Libya Dawn Operation,

shifted away from consensus and

entered into an agreement with the

opposition individually. Big battalions

that belong to the city of Misrata have

entered in a truce and agreement with

the social and military groups from

"Wreshfana" and received strong

rejection and indignation from the

presidency of the Congress as well as

leaders from the Libya Dawn

Operation.

Regardless of the wave of rejection,

meetings and statements, which

included military, social, civil and

political forces in some coastal cities in

the west and east of the capital, the

circle of supporters of the truce and

reconciliation grew wider. It was a

result of the sincere desire of large

sectors within Tripoli’s front and Libya

Dawn Operation supporters to stop the

bloodshed and put more focus on

overcoming the new challenges of

security. Moreover, it paved the way for

political and security transitions,

including a division within the National

Congress aiming to form a new security

component to protect and support the

new government which was adopted in

Skhirat agreement.

The conclusion is that the General

National Congress lost the broad

support which it had received after the

success of Libya Dawn Operation in

controlling the Capital city and the

nearby areas. Nevertheless, it formed an

umbrella for some political actors

which are strict in their attitude towards

the political dialogue, the document of

political agreement and the draft

presented by UN envoy. These parties

have relatively managed to obstruct the

path of dialogue. Still, these actors

might be exposed to international

pressures and sanctions, if it continued

opposing the Government of National

Accord.

2. Security and Military

Changes in the West, East and

South

The security file had known significant

changes during 2015, especially in the

East and South with the intensification

of the political division and the

formation of two governments. On the

one hand, the western region has

witnessed a cessation of hostilities for

reasons such as armistice or

disagreements within the army of the

tribes and its supporting cities. On the

other hand, clashes in Benghazi have

increased during the year 2015, making

the conditions worse in the most

important cities of the south every now

and then resulting in deaths, wounded,


more division and conflicts. The

condition of the real situation of

security in 2015 can be monitored

through reviewing the condition of the

armed forces in all areas and their role

in shaping the security scene.

First: Security Policy and the

Ministry of Interior

The Ministry of Interior was

reconfigured after the formation of the

Government of National Salvation due

to the decision of the Congress

stipulating to reduce the number of the

Ministries of the government to 12. A

resolution to dismiss Mr. Mohammed

Shaitar, Minister of Interior, was also

issued. Nevertheless, an appeal against

this resolution was submitted to the

Attorney General and, therefore,

prevented the newly assigned Minister

from taking his position.

The Ministry of Interior of the

Government of National Salvation has

continued its main traditional tasks

after the political division. The

Ministry in Tripoli and the cities of

western Libya did not go through any

major changes, especially in the vital

services provided through its systems,

departments and administrations such

as the Civil Status Authority, Passports

Department, Control Authority of

Illegal Immigration and Traffic

Management. The available data

indicate that the parallel Ministry in El

Beida has experienced disorders and

severe limitations due to the following

reasons:

- Instability after pressures was put on

Mr. Omar Alsenki Minister of the

Interior leading to his resignation.

- Lack of financial resources, staff

members and headquarters …

On the training and qualification level,

the two Ministries have competed on

the graduation of officers and non-

commissioned officers. Consecutive

batches of police officers have

suddenly graduated in Tripoli and some

other cities in West and East. It has

been noticed that the level of training is

weak due to the distractive competition

between the two governments of

Tripoli and El Beida, noting that the

training abroad was halted owing to

financial reasons, if not the abstention

of the outside world from cooperating

with the Government of National

Salvation.

The exception which the observers

confirm as a major change is the

remarkable activity of the security

services in some cities in the eastern

region, especially Benghazi, Marj and

El Beida. Numerous indicators confirm

the return of many internal security

elements of the former regime to

function again. The interim government

has issued a resolution calling back

elements of the previous ill-reputed

system; a system which has a dark

record full of human rights violations.

What is more is that all its former

branches started working inside all the

municipalities within its authority,

including the Internal Security

Department. Human rights

organizations and activists accuse those


systems of being involved in human

rights violations, yet most of these

systems’ units do not receive orders

from the government, but rather from

outside sources.

It is recorded that the Ministry of

Interior has failed in the West and East

at facing the increasing crime rate with

all its types, most notably kidnapping,

robbery and drug trafficking. Despite

the fact that the institutions of the

Ministry of Interior have announced

several successful operations in

addressing drug trafficking crimes, the

role of the Ministry of Interior remained

limited to addressing the cases of

kidnapping and armed robbery. These

two cases constitute a serious concern

in many cities for the following

reasons:

- Low financial resources.

- Lack of security elements due to

the large number of citizens who refrain

from joining the Ministry of Interior.

- Lack of necessary equipment that are

required to counter the criminal armed

groups.

- Control of "Salafi" movement and

tribal militias over some institutions of

the Ministry while imposing its gunmen

on the security and functional

framework of the Ministry.

Second: Operations and Security and

Military Groups

1. In 2015 the security situation was

relatively stable in the areas controlled

by Libya Dawn Operation in the West

of Libya. Nevertheless, the military

operations have declined and the main

reason behind this was the inability of

Libya Dawn Operation’s various

elements to agree upon a clear cut

vision. One group requested to keep on

fighting until eliminating the second

party and if necessary occupy Al

Zintan city. The other group refused

this approach and saw that their

mission has finished after getting Al

Zintan Brigades out of Tripoli. This

difference in the vision has evolved

into a dispute and then a split which

became apparent after the

abovementioned ceasefire and

reconciliation agreement was

concluded by the military brigades. The

split has even made the two parties

exchange accusations of treason.

The dispute and division had a huge

impact on Libya Dawn Operation. The

First impact was that the

aforementioned agreement has

weakened its efforts after the

withdrawal of “Al Mahjoob” and

“Halbous” Misrata brigades which

possesses a big military armory for their

being specialized in heavy weapons.

Additionally, they played a major role

in the liberation of the capital city from

the brigades of Al Zintan in the fights

which broke out in July 2014. Hence,

their withdrawal from the Libya Dawn

Operation had a strong impact on the

process of this latter and resulted in its

significant military decline and made it

surrounded by the pressure of the other

party.

The second impact was political.

The ceasefire agreement was

accompanied by the transmission of the

aforesaid brigades and the adoption of a

new political trend in the western

region and from inside Misrata. This

trend called for a truce and supported


the political dialogue, even with low

demands, unlike the requests of the

General National Congress. Those who

have adopted this approach have been

internally and externally active as they

kept contacting the international envoy

without consulting the General National

Congress. What is more is that some of

them even consider the Congress

terminated, and worked on the

outcomes of the national dialogue away

from the National Congress and Libya

Dawn Operation.

Concerning those who support this

agreement, they claim that their

interpretation of reality is correct and

that their vision is based on political

and social perspectives. In their point of

view, this two address a complicated

reality that surrounds the city of Misrata

and its brigades. The fighters of Misrata

were deployed in most parts of the

country and performed military

missions fighting in the south (where

they constituted the majority of the

most powerful Third Force that belongs

to the Libyan Army), and in the center

during sporadic but bloody clashes

against the Islamic State. They have

also strongly participated with Al

Shorouk Operation during their

confrontations against a militia led by

Ibrahim Jadhran who took over the oil

ports in June 2013. Besides, they

composed the striking force within

Libya Dawn Operation in Tripoli and

its southwest.

Seeing that the Battlefronts started

fighting against regional and zonal

sides, burden, pressure and tension have

increased within the city, resulting in a

dispute among social components in the

east, west and south. Consequently, the

undertakers of this agreement see that

Misrata city should play a different role

and avoid being involved in more

animosities. They insist that Misrata

should be more active in the direction

of pacification and reconciliation.

Those refusing the truce have

protested saying that Misrata brigades

ignore peace with Tawergha in order to

come to terms with some parties that

pose a threat to the cities in the west of

Libya. They insist that the Tribes Army

or fighters of Wershfana did not respect

the agreement, and their goal is to

control Tripoli and eliminate Libya

Dawn Operation. This was confirmed

by several security breaches of parties

of Wershfana as well as the army and

the Tribes Army.

Changes in the Security Condition

after the Truce

- This controversy has significantly

impacted the conduct of military

operations in the Western Front, and

was reflected adversely on the progress

of Libya Dawn Operations towards al

Wattayah military base. This base is

considered as the most important

military center of the Tribes Army as it

constitutes a strategic location for Al

Zintan Brigades. This after it was

besieged by the Libya Dawn troops

from four sides and was about to enter

the area in the second half of 2015. - After the ceasefire, most of the groups

withdrew from al Wattayah protesting

against what happened. In the

meanwhile, other groups hesitated to

progress and enter the base under the

influence of the announcement of the

ceasefire agreement, whereas the rest

took defensive positions.

- The agreement has paved the way

for the opposing military groups, which


belong to the Tribal Army, to infiltrate

and venture in some areas controlled by

Libya Dawn Operation. The forces of

this latter, which are spread in

Wershfana and nearby areas, became in

a state of defense instead of attack.

- The two sides within Libya Dawn

Operation have disagreed over the

interpretation of the military changes

which occurred after the agreement. In

consequence of this agreement

subdivisions of Tribes Army have

emerged. The two parties have also

disagreed over the occupation of some

military camps and points in some

regions of Wershfana, over occupying

the coastal road near the gate of the

"27" located between Tripoli and

Zawiyya, and over endeavoring to

control Rass Ajdir border crossing. The

opponents of the agreement saw that the

disagreements are tricks made by the

leaders of the Tribes Army using the

agreement as an instrument to divide

Libya Dawn Operation in order to

achieve military victories and progress

towards Tripoli. Some supporters of the

agreement interpret the aforesaid acts as

attempts by their opponents to foil the

agreement because it does not serve

their goals. What weakens the position

of the pro-agreement regarding the

violations of Tribes Army is their

neglect of these violations, which goes

against what has been agreed upon.

Consequently, some leaders of Libya

Dawn Operation declared that there is a

deliberate betrayal as well as a

collusion of some military commanders

in the Alhalboss battalion.

- The biggest challenges that were

faced by the supporters of the ceasefire

took place before the so called the

forum of "Attwila" where sheikhs and

dignitaries gathered from several tribes

near Sabratha, under the leadership of

the Field Commander Omar Tentoush,

one of the most prominent leaders of

the Tribes Army. This latter declared

their intention of sweeping the cities of

the west then Tripoli that in the

conference green flags were raised and

pennants glorifying Colonel Gaddafi

and his regime were raised.

2. In the security camp that was under

the leadership of the Parliament, the

strategy of Khalifa Haftar’s group

during 2015 has faced major challenges

internally and externally. However, the

parliamentary majority have been

strongly supporting Haftar in its

internal and external positions.

- The year 2015 has witnessed the

success of Haftar in attracting the

attention of regional parties which have

an interest in the achievement and

implementation of his political and

military project. It seems that he has

been receiving a considerable political

support which can be easily deduced

from the official reception he had

received in many Arabic capital cities.

Still, the decline of this support have

increased, probably, owing to his

inability to achieve any crucial progress

on the ground, or perhaps due to the

regional changes which kept the

supportive parties busy from Libya.

- The military plans of Haftar of the

year 2015 have faced failures caused by

the steadfastness of the Shura Council

of Benghazi Revolutionaries who

managed to foil Haftar plans which

aimed to control Benghazi.


- The year 2510 has witnessed the loss

of Dignity Operation Army of masses

of lives and gears, and left many injured

citizens. Moreover, the war of this army

in Benghazi caused great damage and

disruption of life; after schools,

universities and most of the hospitals

have closed, in addition to the

worsening of living crisis due to the

continuous power blackouts and lack of

fuel and bread supplies.

- In 5510, the emergence of points of

dispute with Haftar has emerged

between two basic groups. One of them

has a regional tribal dimension in which

the Colonel "Faraj Al Barasi" was

active as one of the previous most

prominent field commanders of Dignity

Operation. He was sacked by Khalifa

Haftar for failing to achieve victory in

the hubs of al Sabri in the city of

Benghazi, being involved in the

destruction of some neighborhoods and

inciting to demolish and burn the

houses of the Shura Council of

Benghazi Revolutionaries’ supporters

(as Haftar realized that these acts may

get him into a criminal involvement).

- The regional and tribal front which

expressed reservations about Dignity

Operation was mentioned by the leader

of "al Abidat" tribe; one of the largest

tribes of the eastern region. It was when

he called for a division of the eastern

region to two military squares. The

Eastern one governed by Faraj Al

Barasi which includes the cities of

Tobruk, Derna and El Beida. The

Western square would be under the

command of Khalifa Haftar and of

which the center is Benghazi-based.

- There is also tension between the

personnel and officers of some military

groups, particularly the leaders of the

three military Brigades; the Special

Forces, Battalion 204 and Battalion 21,

in addition to some of the elements that

affect the security situation in

Benghazi. Many reports of the changes

that occurred in 2015 reveal that Haftar

is not capable of achieving victory.

Some have accused him of preventing

supplies of weapons and ammunition

from many areas of fighting because of

his personal ambition to take over the

capital city while focusing on

supporting the Tribes Army in the

western region instead of the one in

Benghazi’s front.

- Both the opposition of Dignity

Operation camp of Khalifa Haftar and

the loss of many lives could be the

reasons that pushed Haftar to search for

alternatives in order to maintain the

glow of the military operation and to

achieve the victory which he promised

long time ago and which cost him a lot.

Local and external sources have

confirmed that Haftar hired mercenaries

from "Tubu" who are not Libyans,

some others who belong to the Justice

and Equality Movement and also some

of the Sudanese movement, "Minni

Arko Minnawi." This information was

confirmed by the official spokesperson

of the Sudanese armed forces after

calling the military attaché of the

Libyan Embassy in Khartoum and

making a formal protest against it.

- The main highlight of what has been

said about the crisis of Dignity

Operation is the talk of the parliament

member from Benghazi, Ziad Daghim,

in a one of his statements in the media.


He said that the army has received

about 800 million Libyan Dinars, and

that 51 million is being paid as salaries

to about 54 thousand soldiers. Besides,

150 million was given to the

commander in chief after he confirmed

the liberation of Benghazi in two

weeks; which actually did not happen.

Not to mention that no one knows

where the supplies provided to the army

go. What is more is that the commander

in chief refused to subject their

accounts to the Audit Bureau.

- It seems that the Tribes Army got

divided after supporting Haftar, where

many of its members quitted the camp

of the Dignity Operation after having

fought under its name. Other elements

did not leave; some of which are well

known leaders for their association with

the former regime. These leaders have a

short-term project which is to drain out

the power of the pro-revolution and

destroy it so- in the case of Libya

Dawn’s failure in the capital city- they

would be the one imposing security.

This division has been clearly

undisclosed by the statement of Al

Zintan’s Military Council which was

issued on December 20, 2015.

- In the last quarter of 2015 Haftar

announced the operation entitled "the

last death" to eliminate the Shura

Council of Benghazi within weeks. This

step was considered by the United

Nations as a clear attempt to undermine

the ongoing efforts to end the conflict at

a time when the negotiations reached

the final and critical stage. However,

unfortunately, Like the previous ones,

this operation failed.

- In December 2015, Haftar went

through a new war in the city of

Ajdabiya. Various interpretations

revolved around the quest of Haftar to

put pressure and to encircle Shura

Council of Benghazi from the West, in

addition to the preparation to control

the oil fields and ports from the tough

opponent Ibrahim Aljzeran.

3. The Shura Councils of

revolutionaries were formed after

Dignity Operation was launched in an

effort to unify the military of the

revolutionaries against Haftar. In the

launch of Dignity Operation rebel

groups were multiple and even different

among themselves. Still, they

cooperated while fighting Haftar in

order to thwart his plan of controlling

Benghazi and on all parts of the eastern

region as expressed by many of their

leaders.

- The first Council that was formed

was Shura Council of Benghazi

Revolutionaries, which included rebels

belonging to Brigades and several

armed groups notably; February 17th

Martyrs Brigade, Faruq Brigade, Ansar

al-Sharia Brigade, Free Libya Brigade,

Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade; in addition

to independent revolutionaries and

otherBrigades which did not announce

its participation in the Council, such as

Omar Mukhtar Brigade.

- The leadership of the Council was

composed of representatives from the

abovementioned Brigades, yet Ansar al-

Sharia were the luckiest for their large

number of combatants against Haftar.

The situation changed after a huge


number were killed, then some of the

members joined the Islamic State,

which does not participate in the

Council's composition. However, IS

became a major force among the groups

that are fighting against Khalifa Haftar.

- The Council has gone through ups

and downs during 2015. It has faced

excessive challenges that led to its

defeat as a regulatory body and failed to

be an umbrella for all the militant

groups, after receiving strong support

from them since its inception. The

current composition of the Council

reflects a remarkable weakness resulted

from the occurring intellectual conflicts

between the constituent groups of the

Council. These conflicts emerged as a

reaction to the practices of the Islamic

State in Sirte and Derna which both

declared war on Libya Dawn Operation

and got involved in clashes that have

negatively impacted even the public

opinion that is against Dignity

Operation. This has embarrassed the

Command Council in Misratah and

brought it in front of big challenges

with regard to the logistical support of

the Council’s forces in Benghazi.

- During the last three months of

2015, the political or media action of

Shura Council has declined. Data on

military groups under the umbrella of

the Council was issued; it contains

publications of Ansar al-Sharia

movement, as well as information

named Free Libya Brigade headed by

field commander Wissam Bin Hamid.

- In Derna, Al Shura Council of

Mujahideen was formed in the end of

2014. It was formed because of the

same motivations and circumstances

that resulted in Shura Council of

Benghazi Revolutionaries. Though the

foundation of Al Shura was late, being

established in November 2014, it

included Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade

that was known for its strong fights

against Gaddafi. The leader of this

Council “Salim Derby” had a role in

supporting the revolution, Ansar al-

Sharia Brigade and a group of young

people associated with the thought of

Jihadism.

The number of the Council shrunk

leading its formation to change after the

escalation of the controversy over the

"doctrine" of Abu Salim Brigade by

reopening the previously raised

controversy about its protection to the

President of the Transitional Council,

Mustafa Abdul Jalil, besides the

involvement of its members in the

Supreme Security Committee of the

Ministry of the Interior. At that time,

the legitimate judge associated with the

IS in Derna a judgment that considers

the process of protecting, securing the

movement of Mustafa Abdul Jalil and

signing the Supreme Security

Committee contracts as acts of

"apostasy and infidelity". Hence, Ansar

Al Sharia found themselves obliged to

exit the Shura Council of Mujahideen in

Derna under the pressure of its

members who were convinced with the

Fatwa (advisory opinion) issued by IS

judge.

According to the statement of Abu

Salim Brigade of Ansar Al Sharia

which was published and circulated on

Facebook page, Ansar has confirmed


the Apostasy of Abu Salim Brigade and

therefore, accepted the judgment of IS.

They have also imposed on all the

supporters of Ansar Al Sharia to leave

Al Shura Council of Mujahideen.

The crisis which Derna Council has

experienced changed into a new

condition, after the predominance of IS

on the city and on several institutions

imposing another political reality. The

incident of “Harir” family which IS

members broke into its house and killed

even women, in addition to the

executions carried out by IS are huge

violations signaling danger. The

execution of prominent leaders of Al

Shura Council of Mujahideen of Derna

blew up the situation, and pushed Abu

Salim Martyrs Brigade to react and

wage war against members of IS in

their locations. Then, a short battle took

place, in which many youths of Derna

participated, and IS was defeated,

dozens of its members were arrested

and the rest who remained were

expelled from every neighborhood of

the city. Some of IS members run to "al

Fattaih" area, which is about 20 km

away from Derna, in order to launch

another small war from afar with

indiscriminate shelling, sniper shooting

and sporadic suicide attacks.

After expelling IS from the city a

military operation occurred for a longer

time after being targeted by Abu Salim

Martyrs Brigade and their supporters

who are citizens from the city in the

Fattaih hill. In this area, several battles

erupted and IS members were besieged

and obliged to fight in some nearby

neighborhoods. Consequently, the

influence and weight of IS in the city

has significantly lessened, for its being

completely trapped. Sources related to

Al Shura Council of Mujahideen state

that the reason behind the delay of

eliminating the remains of IS is this

latter’s continuous use of suicide

attacks.

Al Shura Council of Mujahideen of

Derna became the most powerful in

Derna. The Council earned a

widespread sympathy from the

population after expelling IS. It has

pursued a unique policy that

distinguished it from Shura Council of

Benghazi Revolutionaries due to its

openness to the elites and the Senates of

the city while sharing with them the

steps to be taken to assure stability.

Besides, it has allowed the police and

other official elements to function and

do their job.

Another Council was added to the

list; Shura Council of Ajdabiya Rebels

which includes several Islamic

revolutionaries. Dignity Operation has

been targeting this Council through

sporadic battles with frequent raids

supported by the Parliament.

4- In 2015, two squares of battlefields

emerged in the scene of fighting in the

south; Tebou and Tuareg in one front

against other Tebou people and fighters

of Kufra city in the opposing front.

They were fighting for reasons that

have to do with influence. What is

more is that they were moved by

outside orders. Some internal official

sources confirm that Tebou fighters

coordinate with the French in their

movements and they are the ones

behind the battles in Sebha, Ubari and

Kufra. Besdies, Tebou supports the

Parliament of Tobruq while Tuareg and

Kufra revolutionaries-the majority of

which belong to the Zuwayya tribe-


stand with the General National

Congress and Libya Dawn Operation.

- There is no doubt about the nature

of Tuareg’s power and the resilience of

Kufra revolutionaries. However, the

debate is about Tebou- whom some

people consider as not Libyans, but

rather Mercenaries coming from Chad.

Big portions of south cities population,

especially Sebha, call the Tebou forces

“Chad invaders” in the outside areas

that belong to Tebou, as they also

control the surrounding areas. It has

been proved that Tebou supported Haftr

during his fights in the southwest

Tripoli, and even in Benghazi as

already stated in the report.

- It should be noted that Tuareg are

fighting to protect themselves and their

interests against the invasion of Tebou

and this latter’s attempt to impose their

authority all over the south. They don’t

have any political project or purpose,

unlike the leaders of Tebou plan to have

their own and special authority in wide

areas in the south and even to take over

a channel or line that leads to the beach.

5. The other power which constitutes a

significant circle among others of the

security scene in Libya is the Islamic

State. The prevalence of IS in Libya

constitute a strong factor in

complicating the current situation. IS

has been taking advantage from the

political vacuum and security chaos to

get more active and promote its

existence to become a riot force in a

prominent manners since 2015.

The prominent spread of IS was

limited to three cities: Derna, Benghazi

and Sirte. However, its strong presence

has significantly declined in Derna after

the confrontations with Abu Salim

Martyrs Brigade and its supporters from

Derna. Many security sources indicate

that IS has a limited presence in

Benghazi and does not constitute more

than 10 % of the fighters compared to

the significant growth in Sirte and the

complete domination they have over the

city.

Since the beginning of 2015, the

presence of IS in Benghazi has grown.

This occurred after a number of Ansar

al Sharia members joined IS, in

addition to many independent people

affected by the independent Jihadist

movements. Their presence became

more noticeable in the battlegrounds,

especially in the districts of El Sabri

and Lithi. However, it hasn’t gained

elements of a comprehensive military

work yet due to its large reliance on the

logistical support provided by Al Shura

Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries

which IS refuses to join. Still, no one

can deny the existence of supply

channels through Sirte, though limited.

According to reliable sources, the

strength of IS has declined during the

second half of 2015 for two reasons:

• The death of several of its elements.

• The cleavage of many of those who

joined it.

Some observers have attributed the

success of IS, at the beginning of its

establishment and its attraction of many

fighters to join it, to the clarity of its

intellectual approach and the rapid

expansion achieved in Iraq and Syria.

However, in return, their violent

practices inside and outside constitute

the reason behind people’s later

rejection of IS.

The largest presence of IS is located

in Sirte; a presence that was reinforced


by its distance from the strong opposing

locations in the West and East, in

addition to its being able to extend the

network of its logistical contact from

the country’s North to the South, and

across its southern border into

neighboring countries. For this reason

IS in Sirte keeps receiving supply

cadres (many of which are foreigners),

financial support and supply of arms

and ammunition.

IS group has managed to dominate

Sirte and stretched eastward;

controlling the nearby villages and

cities. It also conducts intermittent

military operations crawling towards

the West and near Misrata to prevent

any military power from approaching

Sirte. Ambiguity hovers around the

number of IS fighters in Sirte and some

other cities. External and local sources

have provided different estimations of

IS members raging from 200 to 1000.

Other sources confirm that currently

their number does not exceed 2000. The

continuousness of the current situation

increases the number of the joining

members from within the country and

abroad making the latter estimation, if

not more, an existing number.

IS is in a serious motion and

unceasing expansion, and its opposing

force in Tripoli, and Misrata did not

launch the war against its strongholds in

Sirte as it has repeatedly announced.

This means that the equation will be

more difficult if the status quo

sustained. Moreover, it seems that

everyone is waiting for the unity

government to receive the power in

order to strike the “Islamic State” with

the help of international support.

Records and reports confirm that the

strategy of IS in Sirte is based on the

following plan:

- Launching sudden and violent attacks

to terrify the strong enemy Misrata so

as to remove this latter from their areas

of influence.

- Securing a wide area of the coast and

in the deep desert to be an independent

outlet.

- Planning to dominate the areas near

Sirte, especially oil rich areas.

3. Political Dialogue: Stages,

Outcomes and Feedbacks

2015 was a year of political dialogue

par excellence. Late in 2014, the Libyan

political scene was mostly marked by

high tension and the escalation of

hostility to the extent that talks about

dialogue were limited and had no

echoes. What reinforced the failure of

conciliation and dialogue was the fact

that the Libyan parties to the conflict

did not pay attention to dialogue,

especially at the beginning of its

establishment by the United Nations.

Furthermore, it seems that the parties to

the conflict adopted or relied on

military strategies to achieve their

objectives. The bias of both sides

towards alternatives other than dialogue

was reflected in their interaction with

the outputs of the dialogue, making the

intransigence the master of the

situation. However, several factors,

including the inability of the parties to

the conflict to provide successful

alternatives to public opinion, pushed

them to change their position.

The Stages of the Political Dialogue

during 2015

Given the outcomes of the meetings, it

can be said that the agenda of the


political dialogue between the parties to

the conflict, at the end of the first

quarter of 2015, did not clearly focus on

the third version of the draft. More

precisely, the draft agenda of Leon has

focused on two main points:

Agreeing to form a national unity

government,

Agreeing on a set of security

arrangements.

Nevertheless, the dialogue moved to

another level and new content due to

the intransigence of the General

National Congress, which demanded a

comprehensive agenda that comprises a

consensus on an executive authority

monitored by a legislative one. Another

more intransigent position was of the

Parliament which required remaining

intact considering it as the legitimate

representative of the Libyan people.

These two sides have probably pushed

Leon and the international parties to re-

consider the previous approach, and

therefore resulted in a fourth draft.

The ideas which Leon distributed to the

two negotiation delegations in his

fourth draft were close to the approach

of a comprehensive agenda. It dealt

with the compatibility of the

institutional system which includes:

Government of National Accord,

Legislative Council,

Libya's Presidential Council,

The new agenda’s proposal included the

possibility of negotiation about the

National Security Council and the

Municipal Councils including Mayors

of Municipalities elected during the last

year.

The Fourth draft did not address precise

details about the authorities, leaving it

for negotiation between the parties to

the conflict. Nonetheless, the general

framework revolves around assigning

the power of legislation as well as

monitoring to the Parliament in its new

form. This would take place with the

condition that the General National

Congress is offered, in the form of the

Presidential Council, the power of veto

over regulations and decisions on

specific crucial issues that concern the

vital controversy between the two sides.

Controversy about the Fifth Draft

The controversy about the fifth draft

was caused by the reservation of the

General National Congress and its

supporters on the fourth draft, which

they considered as a setback, and the

radical change made in favor of the

other party. Supporters of the Congress

see that the fifth draft enables their

opponents to exclusivity manage the

new transitional phase, giving them the

authority to withdraw position of the

head of the consensual government and

appoint his successor, to assign the

Commander in Chief of the Army,

approve the manner in which the army

was constituted in the eastern region

and to consider the formation of the

Congress a militia. This has happened

after having the fourth draft that

stipulates the reformation of the army

instead of supporting it, as

recommended in the fifth draft. Hence,

the ‘support’ in the amended draft can

be attributed to the army of the

Parliament and not the Chief of Staff of

the General National Congress.

While supporters of the National

Congress requested to exclude Haftar

and the second party insisted on

preserving him, the pro-Congress say

that the draft enables Haftar to remain

the commander in chief of the army.


This occurs due to the draft’s approval

of the Parliament’s resolutions, and the

approval of the necessity of unanimity

in the Council of Ministers’ resolutions

which was granted the authority of

dismissing and appointing the

commander of the army. The supporters

of the Congress confirm that it will be

difficult to reach consensus to dismiss

Haftar, and if it ever happened, it would

be more difficult to agree by consensus

on an unbiased alternative.

The members of the General National

Congress insisted on not signing the

penultimate draft unless adjustments,

creating a balance between them and

the Parliament, are made. Through its

firm position, the General National

Congress, with the support of its

popular, political and military base,

managed to push Leon and international

and western ambassadors to pay

attention to their position. Hereafter, a

meeting was held in Istanbul in early

September as a step that gave the floor

to the demands of the Congress and

promised to reconsider the draft. This

act angered the Parliament which

strongly protested against what he

viewed as acquiescence to the pressure

made by the General National

Congress. Consequently, the Parliament

issued an objecting statement that

rejected the amendment to the draft,

declares abstention from allowing the

representative delegation to sign the

draft and called for the need to give the

Parliament the right of appointing the

head of consensus government and its

deputy, in addition to deciding on a

temporary headquarters of consensus

government (such as Tobruk or El

Beida) until all security arrangements

are implemented, which includes the

evacuation of the capital city from the

armed formations.

Another issue is related to the Council

of State which the draft proposes that

the members of the General National

Congress should occupy about 75% of

its total seats. The statement demanded

that the decisions of the Congress

should not be non-binding, its

headquarters should be in Sabha, and

the parliament should have the right of

selecting its members and ratifying the

other half. With regard to the issue of

the resolutions of the two legislative

bodies, the statement asks for a

cancellation of the General National

Congress’s resolutions and, instead,

commit to the laws, decisions and

appointments made by the Council of

Tobruk.

Referring to the statement of the Head

of the Parliament’s Delegation,

Mohammad Shuaib to the Libyan

channel HD- broadcasted from

Amman- on Thursday the 10th

of

December2015, he said that the House

of Representatives has reviewed all the

details of the dialogue and its drafts. He

added that at the beginning, a

committee of 17 members was formed

to study the details and at a later stage a

committee of 40 members was formed

for the same purpose and they

expressed their remarks. In both

committees, the results were presented

to the House of Representatives for a

vote and approval.

A General Assessment of the

Dialogue’s Path under the Auspices

of Leon

Many observers believe that the source

of the constant controversy and


disagreement about the output’s

dialogue is mainly due to the style of

the former envoy Leon and his

approach to the dialogue. It was plainly

evident that Leon got confused when

dealing with the parties to the conflict,

and his confusion was reflected in his

drafts’ formulas. The parties were

surprised in each round by a draft that is

radically different from what has been

agreed upon, which can be attributed to

the absence of objectivity, wisdom and

control.

On the one hand, some of those who

criticized Leon confirm that the

confusion in the content of the drafts

was resulted from the lack of vision and

the absence of a compass by UN and its

former representative in Libya. What

proves the absence of a vision is the

surprisingly big changes made in every

version he provided to the Parties. It

made this latter feel that the UN

mediator is not neutral, but rather

subject to other agendas coming from

outside the negotiating room as

frequently demonstrated in his drafts.

On the other hand, the two parties

reserved on the behavior of Leon in

what concerns the paragraph of security

arrangements. The UN envoy has

communicated with military groups

within the two fronts of Tobruk and

Tripoli without coordinating with their

military leaders. The two sides have

repeatedly mentioned their doubt

towards Leon’s vision of the security

arrangements and this latter’s

implementation.

Another point was about the leaks

which revealed that Leon was open in

an unacceptable manner to one of the

parties to the conflict which made his

impartiality as an international mediator

suspicious. It is vital to note that what

minimized the impact of the scandal of

the leaks is its occurrence in his last

days of his mission as a UN envoy in to

Libya.

The Period between Leon and Kobler

Before Kobler embarks on his mission

as a UN envoy, succeeding Leon, the

national movement was somehow

active. The most prominent

manifestation of this movement was the

progress of representatives of the South

in the Parliament with an initiative

known as the "Fezzan initiative." This

initiative accepts the proposed

government by the former UN envoy,

with few modifications such as the

addition of a Deputy for the eastern

region, a Deputy Commissioner and a

Minister of the southern region. The

other amendment was made rejecting

the UN Mission’s proposal of

nominating an adviser to the Council of

Defense and National Security as well

as the Supreme Council of the State.

Furthermore, the Fezzan initiative

insisted on basing the decision-making

of sovereign positions on a mechanism

characterized by unanimity. The

initiative has obtained the support of 92

deputies in the Parliament. However,

the presidency of the Parliament did not

provide the choice of voting and

making a formal confirmation or not.

Besides, the initiative was in favor of

keeping Haftar while emphasizing that

the military establishment is an

independent institution which should

not be subject to any bargains in any

political agreement.

The Trends of Kobler


It was crystal clear that the new envoy,

Martin Kobler, started from the last step

of his predecessor in respect of the draft

agreement and the proposal of the

Government of National Reconciliation.

This is what Mr. Kobler transmitted to

all the delegations which he met,

especially those interested in dialogue,

such as the Parliament, the General

National Congress and the political

parties involved in a way or another in

the dialogue. These two parties are; the

National Forces Alliance and Justice

and Construction Party. Also, the UN

envoy, Kobler, emphasized in several

occasions on the following:

- Not to modify the final draft

announced by his predecessor,

Bernardino Leon.

- Not to change the presidency and the

membership of the government

proposed by Leon.

- Accept the addition of two or three

deputies to the Council of the

Government.

- Accept the signature of the members

who acknowledged the agreement of

the Parliament and the Congress.

Kobler has previously said he will

focus on overcoming the groups

rejecting the draft proposed by the

former UN envoy. Likewise, making

decisions on a consensual basis will be

adopted by members of the National

Congress and the Parliament will sign

the agreement. The upcoming Council

of state and the House of

Representatives will be formed by

those who signed, while those whom

he described as "obstructionists" of the

agreement will be excluded.

Charter of Principles and its

Implications on Dialogue

The sudden agreement entitled the

"Charter of Principles", which was

signed by some members of the

Parliament and the Congress in Tunisia

in mid-December 2015, had a wide

strong echo that resulted in positive and

negative repercussions. However, the

agreement has raised the severity of the

rejection to dialogue sponsored by the

United Nations that the opponents

sought an alternative to rely on and

which is the Libyan-Libyan dialogue

without external mediation. Yet, the

Libyan dialogue demonstrates one of

the current complexities of the

aggravation:

- The agreement is a general

framework, and launching it will

prolong the crisis and maybe face tough

challenges.

- The agreement goes against the

international management and most of

Libyan activist/ actors ignore it.

It seems that the big reservation on

Tunisia Agreement comes from the

Parliament or the majority of its

members; some of which have even

signed on the Fezzan initiative. After

investigating some samples of the

individual positions in the parliament,

the official spokesman of the

Parliament, Faraj Hashim, considered

that Tunisia Agreement was intended to

disrupt the political process as well as

the dialogue under the auspices of

United Nations. Hashim believes that

those who rejected Skhirat dialogue

want to hinder it through this initiative.

This opinion was also shared by others

from the Parliament and even from the

General National Congress and its


supporters. According to consultant of

the General National Congress’

delegation in Skhirat dialogue, Ashraf

al-Shah, during an interview on Libya

Al Ahrar Channel on the 6th

of

December 2015, he mentioned that

those who signed Tunisia Agreement

are the hinderers of the Skhirat dialogue

from both sides.

The most obvious comment that

explains the reservation of many

members of the Parliament was given

by the first deputy speaker of the House

of Representatives, Mohamed Shuaib.

He said that it is impossible to ignore

Skhirat dialogue and its outputs because

it has covered many details related to all

Libyans as the document of the

dialogue represented everyone. He

added that Libya cannot afford more

than the Skhirat attempt because it

almost arrived to an end. Besides, he

considered the statement made in

Tunisia as unacceptable seeing that it

violates the rules of procedure of the

House of Representatives and the

Conciliation Committee has the aim of

dialogue thus cannot sign the

agreement. When he elaborated on the

issue, he said that the Libyan crisis

should not be reduced to one page as

happened in Tunisia’s initiative. The

national issues must be based on a

consensus in the Parliament and not

only the majority.

Concerning the National Congress, the

position of the second deputy was

similar to the reservations of Mr.

Shoaib. Mr. Saleh Al-Makhzoum

believes that excluding the United

Nations would be harmful to the Libyan

situation because it will deprive the

country from an international

consensus. He also says that relying on

what happened in Tunis may push the

country into the arms of some

countries’ negative influence and make

it sink in the ocean of international

conflicts.

Tunis Meeting under the Sponsorship

of Martin Kobler

Only few days after the announcement

of the agreement of Tunis, another new

agreement was announced in the second

week of December. It was proclaimed

under the sponsorship of Kobler and

with the presence of a group of

politicians; the majority of which have

participated in the political dialogue of

Skhirat. A close date was announced to

sign Leon’s proposal draft and the

presidential council, whose members

now account for nine after the addition

of some members without changing

those proposed by Leon. The agreement

of Tunisia under the auspices of UN’s

envoy has important significations that

can be summarized in the following:

- Kobler fulfilled his promise to go to

the agreement with those who agreed to

attend while ignoring the other

objecting parties regardless of their

status or position.

- The agreement of Tunis under the

sponsorship of Kobler is taking place in

spite of strong opposition and wide

favorable reaction towards the first

meeting of Tunisia.

The International Conference of

Rome

The meeting of Rome was attended by

high level representatives of 19

European and Arab countries, in

addition to the participation of

representatives of the main international


parties concerned with the Libyan issue.

The aim of the meeting as declared by

the concerned participating parties aims

at showing international support and

accord in order to take measures to stop

the danger of IS through forming a

National Unity Government supporting

it locally and internationally.

The meeting of Rome was a turning

point in the Libyan issue. On the one

hand, it came after the meeting of Tunis

under the sponsorship of Kobler. On the

other hand, it was marked by the

speeches of the foreign ministers of

Italy and the US, Paolo Gentiloni and

John Kerry. The first said that society

needs to prove that reaching an

agreement and forming institutions in

Libya can be quicker than the

expansion of IS while Kerry said that it

is impossible to allow the expansion of

IS threat Libya as the continuous

hampering of the efforts of the

agreement should be stopped1.

The Signing and the Decision of the

Security Council

Members of the parliament and the

General National Congress signed the

agreement and many representatives of

developed countries and others were

present. All the parties declared their

support to the agreement and to the new

government. The signing was followed

by a resolution unanimously adopted by

the members of the Security Council

and which included full support to the

agreement and the new government,

warning the parties that rejected the

agreement of sanctions from

obstructing the proposed government.

The following are the main points of

1 Al Hayat magazine : 14 December 2015

the international community regarding

the current Libyan crisis:

Admission of a pressing need for a

government of national accord whose

headquarter shall be in Tripoli and to

which full support should be provided

by the international community for it is

the sole legal government in Libya.

A strong commitment to protect

Libya’s sovereignty, its territory’s

security as well as its social cohesion

and to disapprove any foreign

intervention in Libya.

The commitment to provide full

support to implement the resolution of

the UN Security Council number 2213

and other related resolutions to confront

threats against peace, security and

stability in Libya.

The commitment to subject officials

responsible for violence or for

hampering democratic transition to

meticulous accountability.

Full recognition and support for the

Libyan political agreement and the

institutions emanating from it.

Preventing official channels of

communication with individuals who

claim to be part of institutions which

are not approved by the Libyan political

agreement.

Full support to the efforts of the UN’s

envoy, Martin Kobler, to facilitate the

process of the Libyan dialogue.

The State of Affairs and Reality

Scenarios

Many sources indicate that the

majority of Libyans are in favor of a

consensus; whether under the UN

auspices or through the meeting of

Tunis. For this reason they were


considerably content with the outcome

of Tunis meeting. However, they would

definitely support the road map of the

International Community for they

believe that the latter is capable of

solving the critically complicated

situation of the country.

Yet, it is important to note that the road

map of Tunis, where the presidents of

the Parliament and the General National

Congress met in Malta, took the

political process away from the UN’s

efforts. Subsequently, it was adopted by

a powerful group in Tripoli who is

armed enough to resist Leon’s initiative

and later Kobler’s. Consequently, the

situation is facing the problematic of

multitude in the road maps of political

settlement.

The Challenges facing the Agreement

and the Success of the Proposed

Government

Despite the important changes

considered by many as very positive

since it led to the signing of the draft

and towards forming a government,

there are huge challenges related to the

influence of the parties (influential

political parties especially in the West

of Libya).These parties question the

credibility of those represented by

Kobler and the international

community. In other words, the main

challenges that face the new envoy can

be summarized as follows:

- Disputes between armed groups

about the government and disapproval

of a minority group which could not be

overcome in Skhirat agreement. Thus,

making it difficult for the government

to enter by force and in case that

happened, the situation is expected to

worsen.

- The security situation is very

complicated particularly in what

concerns how the conflict parties

consider the confrontations; the pro-

Parliament consider it as a war against

terrorism while the supporters of the

General National Congress classify it as

an agenda against the February 17

Revolution.

- The future of the Commander Haftar

in the Libyan political scene is one of

the main problems to reach an

agreement. Parliamentary actors insist

that his position should not be

amended, whereas the supporters of the

General National Congress keep

emphasizing on excluding him from the

new political and security equation.

- The agreement won’t have positive

effects if not accompanied with parallel

security measures. However, balance

may be difficult to reach under the

continuous war in Benghazi and

security conditions in places south west

of Tripoli- where forces of the General

National Congress and the tribes army

clashes.

The parties which disapprove of the

UN supported agreement and the

proposed government are:

The presidency of the General

National Congress and some of its

members supported by groups of

political activists and armed groups

who believe in the conspiracy

hypothesis and aims at taking control of

the country’s future with a vision that

exclude the rebels and the revolution.

A bloc within the Parliament,

Dignity Operation and others; all of

whom regard the agreement as

marginalizing Cyrenaica, ignoring

Benghazi and not giving the pro-house


of representatives’ army and its leader

Khalifa Haftar the right position they

deserve according to their point of

view.

The Consequences in Case the

Agreement and the Government

Failed

We may not be able to expect that

Skhirat agreement to fail. The

international community or at least the

concerned international parties may not

allow a scenario of failure to take place.

Therefore, the efforts will focus on the

tactic of embracing supporters and

excluding those who disapprove. This

tactic is not an easy method as it may

take a long time. Yet, it remains

possible under the increase of

divergence between Libyans. However,

once again, it cannot be as quick as the

signing of the agreement. Generally, if

the agreement fails, or if the

government could not address the fiery

political and security situation, all the

dreadful options and scenarios would

be possible.

The following are some potential

scenarios:

- The state of division will be

perpetuated, legalized and will become

an acceptable reality for Libyans to live

in.

- More security chaos and crime rates

will increase under the continuous

political vacuum.

- More deterioration on the economic

level and hard living conditions for the

citizens.

- Battlefronts will intensify and engulf

all the regions of Libya; West, East and

South .

- Increase the possibility of a military

intervention pursuant to an international

resolution or even through a small

Arab-Western coalition.

4. The Libyan Issue;

International and Regional

Position

The initiation of the process of Libyan

political dialogue took place

concurrently with coordination between

the positions of the main European

capitals and the United States. The said

countries issued many joint statements

starting from the end of 2014 until

November, 2015. Yet, there is a

contradiction in the west’s position

regarding the Libyan crisis and its

current changes. This contradiction of

statements makes it hard to predict the

real position of those parties.

No one can deny that 2015 has

witnessed considerable development of

the role and influence of external

factors on the situation in Libya. The

position of the countries regarding the

Libyan crisis differs in terms of the

extent of their involvement. Some

countries played a major role in the

unfolding events and were the parties

who directly framed the political and

security scene. Other countries, which

are supposed to be major players, had a

very limited and confused role.

As for the Arab world, the Arab League

was following the situation and tried in

its own way to contain it. Some Arab

parties, who fear the dominance of

Operation Libya Dawn and the Rebel

Council, are encouraging the

involvement of external powers. This is

mainly because they see that it is


impossible to confront them with the

forces serving under the internationally

recognized Parliament. The parties

unhappy with Operation Libya Dawn

and the Rebel Council argue that Libya

is still under the seventh clause. Some

of them even claim that the danger of

the rebels was equal to that of

Muammar Gaddafi and thus there is no

harm in asking for international

intervention similar to the scenario of

2011 when fighting Gaddafi2. This

paved the way for Parliament to seek

international help to protect civilians

and consider the factions which

constituted Operation Libya Dawn as

terrorist groups.

The Arab League, in regards to the

worsening crisis during 2015, has

chosen to support the Parliament, its

government and Operation Dignity. The

League urged the Arab parties and

international community to support

Parliament, the government and the

Libyan army through lifting the ban on

arms importation. The last time the

League expressed its support was

during the urgent meeting in August

held by the Foreign Minister of the

Interim Government.

It is likely that the Arab League will

pave the way for any international

decision to launch a military operation

in Libya against IS and even against

factions which are opposing the

international role in the Libyan issue.

This may happen only after the signing

2 Snoussi, Libya in its third transitional phase:

wills conflicts and struggle of legitimacies, Aljazeera Center for Studies, August 11, 2014. http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2014/8/11/201481112413793734libyan%20parliament.pdf.

the political agreement and the adoption

of the government of Sarraj. Such a

decision will not prevent Arab parties,

mainly Egypt, from intervening directly

in the confused situation of the Arab

world because of the discord regarding

what is happening in Syria and Iraq, in

addition to the disagreement about the

military operation led by the Gulf

countries against the Houthis in Yemen.

The African Union (AU)

The role of the AU in the Libyan crisis

was very limited after the revolution,

especially in 2015 as it was totally

absent from the scene. The only thing it

did during 2015 was interact positively

with international efforts to contain the

crisis through dialogue and issue many

statements calling for the ending of the

conflict, launching a dialogue for an

agreement and forming a unified

government.

The initiative of the AU was not able to

reconcile between the two parties

through the communication group

formed by the AU Security and Peace

Council, including neighboring

countries like Algeria, Chad, Egypt,

Niger, Sudan, Tunisia, the Arab

League, the European Union and the

UN in 2014. Therefore, the AU opened

the door to the UN to contain the crisis.

The AU remains unable to play an

efficient role in creating stability in the

country as it did in many African

countries in crisis. Nevertheless, there

is a possibility for it to take part in the

solution to help maintain stability if the

international intervention required

forces on the ground.


The European Union (EU)

The European concern regarding the

Libyan crisis escalated after the

political division. The EU became more

interested in the situation with the

appearance of IS in the country, which

threatens to target European capitals. In

fact, Libya’s Mediterranean coast

constitutes easy access to the EU and is

used by smugglers to transport boats

full of people and drugs from southern

Mediterranean countries to EU

countries. Thus, the countries most

affected by illegal immigration in the

EU, particularly Italy and France, are

very concerned with the issue of

stability and security in the South of the

Mediterranean.

The number of immigrants leaving

Libyan shores heading towards Europe

has considerably increased during 2015,

and the crisis became very dangerous

during the year. This issue, in addition

to the increasing presence of IS, is one

of the main concerns that put pressure

on Brussels and main European

capitals.

Brussels and the other main European

countries see that confronting illegal

immigration necessitates political

stability and a unified government.

Thus, they classified this issue as a

priority. However, the current situation

has unveiled, more than ever, the

considerable gap and divergence

between those countries’ views,

policies and interests and lastly their

positions in dealing with the Libyan

crisis. On the one hand, some countries,

like France, are pushing for a military

operation whereas other countries, like

Germany, are against such military

involvement. Italy, on the other hand,

limits its role to giving statements

supporting regional efforts to create

stability and protect oil refineries and

ports – the majority of which are

managed by Italian companies. In

general, the EU’s view is compatible

with that of the UN; to adopt dialogue

as a solution for the crisis. However,

until now, the European position has

been limited to political support

promising to ensure the requisites for

the success of the agreement and the

Government of Accord. It is also likely

that some EU countries will take part in

any international or regional military

action to impose the political solution

supervised by the UN.

Some western reports indicate that

some European countries are about to

propose military action against IS and

other armed groups affiliated to it after

the settlement of the government of

Sarraj. Until now, there are no details

about the expected operation, but it

might be limited to airstrikes and a few

Special Forces troops to help manage

the battle against IS. Some observers

point out that the US and the EU hold

different viewpoints on the solution of

the crisis.

The Position of the United States

(US)

Many observers agree that the US

presence in the Libyan struggle was

weak during 2015. The reason behind

this feeble presence is due to the decline

of the American role internationally

during Obama’s mandate and the

appearance of other bigger issues which

dominate US attention, such as the

Iranian, Syrian and Iraqi issues. The

American role was limited to the

participation in international parties


supporting political dialogue and

forming a National Unity Government.

Some observers see a mystery in the

American policy towards the situation

in Libya. Some claim that it encourages

the Egyptian and Emirati policy in

supporting Haftar and his forces3.

Others believe that the White House is

closer to the Tripoli camp and the

troops in the capital as well as in the

cities of the west (which the US

believes are an important power able to

fight terrorism and confront the

extremist parties in the country).

Therefore, some sympathize with the

US policy and claim a negative position

towards their rivals in the eastern

region, mainly Haftar.

What confirms the obscurity of the

American role in Libya are the

suspicions surrounding the residence of

Commander Haftar in the US, his

relations there and Libya’s regional

partners that are also close to America;

such as Egypt. What also reinforces this

claim are the frequent meetings recently

taking place between Libyan officials

and their American counterparts, which

led the president of the Interim

Government, Abdullah al-Thani, to ask

the US to exercise pressure on all the

fighting parties in Libya to bring back

stability4.

3 Washington Post, ‘Egyptian fighter jets strike

the positions of Libyan militias, according to official reports’ (The Washington Post, October 15, 2014), available at: http://is.gd/fAPmT8 4 Rai Alyoum, quoting the Anadolu Agency,

‘Abdullah al-Thani asks the US to exercise pressure on the parties fighting in Libya’ (Rai Alyoum, August 4, 2014). Available at: http://www.raialyoum.com/?p=131753.

The US is trying to avoid any

individual action in dealing with the

Libyan crisis without the involvement

of its European partners. Statements on

the Libyan crisis are usually issued by a

group of principal countries which are:

US, Germany, France, Italy and the

UK.5

The American-European coordination

corroborates the absence of an

independent American viewpoint

towards Libya. The agreement between

the five influential countries proves that

the US cannot act without Europe in

confronting common dangers,

particularly the growth of terrorism and

illegal immigration. Therefore, America

supports any action in Libya in return

for the participation of its European

allies in the war against IS and in any

decision targeting extremist groups

anywhere in the world. There is,

therefore, a mutual defensive

dependency that cannot be ignored

according to pragmatic and current

French political aspirations. This

explains France’s continuous denial of

the statements of its Defense Minister

about the possibility of France’s

individual military intervention to

resolve the recent Libyan crisis. Instead,

now, it is calling for dialogue between

the different factions and adopts the

policy of joint statements, as previously

explained.

5 See, for example, the joint statement issued

by these countries to condemn the fighting and all violence taking place in Tripoli and Benghazi. ‘Joint Statement on Libya by the Governments of France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States’ (US Department of

State, August 25, 2014). Available at: :http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/230863.htm

http://www.raialyoum.com/?p=131753

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/230863.htm




Some parties consider the decisions of

the UN, particularly decision No: 2174,

issued by the Security Council on

August 27, 2014, as an excuse to invade

Libyan territory under the pretext of

fighting terrorism and armed groups6.

This decision can also be a cover for

individual American operations, as has

already happened over the last two

years. Furthermore, any government

which depends on international support

can provide legitimacy to the potential

intervention by international powers.

Supporters of the Conflict Parties

In 2015 a significant interference by

regional parties has taken place on

Libyan territory. Some observers, inside

and outside, consider Egypt, the UAE

and Jordan as the supportive military

camp of Parliament and Haftar, whereas

Turkey and Qatar support the General

National Congress and Operation Libya

Dawn. Yet, there is a huge gap between

the support provided by the two

military camps. Abu Dhabi and Egypt

are providing considerable amounts of

money, weapons, and ammunition,

aiming to ensure as much as possible

6 El Hadi Shallouf, an objective and concise

analysis of the decision of the international security council No: 2174, (Al Watan, September 13, 2014). Available at: http://www.alwatanlibya.com/more-32073-22-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A9%20%20%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B6%D9%88%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9%20%D9%88%20%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9%20%20%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%20%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%20%20%D8%B1%D9%82%D9%85%20%202174%20%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85%2027%20%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%B3%D8%B7%D8%B3%202014

Haftar’s victory, while Qatar and

Turkey are providing limited financial

and technical support.

Changes in the Russian position on the

international scene and in the Middle

East have paved the way for some to

think that Moscow may support Haftar.

In such a case, it will have a noticeable

effect. Still, Russia’s involvement in the

Syrian crisis may weaken its influence

in the Libyan crisis. By the end of 2015,

the Prime Minister of the Government

of National Salvation and his Foreign

Minister, accompanied by a

government delegation, made a visit to

Moscow where they met Sergey

Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister.

The visit took place when the

Government of Salvation, with the

mediation of the president of Chechnya,

released the crew of a Russian ship that

had been arrested in Libya and charged

with smuggling Libyan fuel.

5. Changes in the Economic

Issue During 2015

It is obvious that the economic situation

is affected by political and security

issues in the country. Indeed, the

negative effects of the political and

security changes have deeply

influenced the economic situation and

led the country to a severe financial

crisis threatening of bankruptcy- as

stated by some international

institutions.

The year 2015 represented the peak of

the economic and financial crisis that

hit the country after the revolution in

February 2011 due to accumulations

that almost destroyed the economy.


Revenues dangerously decreased,

wasting public money continued and

austerity measures increased which

badly affected the living conditions of

citizens who suffered greatly from the

effects of the economic crisis in this

year.

First: Major Economic and

Influential Events and Decisions

which influenced Libya in 2015

In 5510, a number of economic events,

laws and decisions related to influential

economic institutions have taken place.

Libya, during this year, has also seen a

state of instability because of the

critical events it has been through

mainly the continued closure of oil

ports and fields, multiplicity of

governments, frequent protests, armed

incursions into the state headquarters

and a military and political division that

led to violent conflicts and multiplicity

of authorities:

The General National Congress in

Libya approved the public budget law

for 2015 which is estimated to be 43

billion LYD. The new budget was

calculated on the basis of Libyan oil

production average; half a million

barrels a day with 50 dollars per barrel

crude. On the hand, in Tobruq, the

Parliament adopted a budget without

considering the status of public

revenues.

The Libyan General National

Congress decided to change subsidies

of basic goods and hydrocarbons with

monthly direct monetary support to

each citizen (50 Dinars). The aim of

this change is to enable Libyan citizens

to directly benefit from subsidies. At a

first stage, citizens will first receive

monetary subsidy and then basic goods

and hydrocarbons subsidies will be

removed in line with its real cost. This

idea was refused by the Parliament who

claimed that it is not yet time for such

procedures.

The Ministry of Economy in the

Government of National Salvation has

issued a resolution that bans the

importation of 32 products for 6 months

starting from the date of issuance as

attempt to adjust spending and

implement austerity measures. A month

later, the ministry revoked its decision

arguing that the Central Bank and

commercial banks do not cooperate.

The Ministry of Economy in the

Interim Government endured the crisis

of flour for many months. The policy of

the ministry did not issue any decisions

that could influence commercial policy;

instead it had merely the role of a

managing entity.

Effective implementation of the

national number system started and

decisions banning the exchange of any

item or any element of the budget,

unless it conforms to the national

number system, were issued.

The Libyan Audit Bureau issued

the report of 2014 which demonstrated

for the first time works about evaluating

the implemented public policies and

diagnosed flaws and defects in the

manner of managing the state’s money.

Such initiative is intended to improve

the government and its institutions’

performance and help them construct a

balanced institutional system.

The Parliament has amended the

law of 2013 banning usury and

approved the postponing of the

implementation of the law till 2020,

according to law number 7 issued in

2015.


The two parties in Tripoli and

Tobruq, the Parliament and the

government, had to take various

austerity measures because of the

decline in foreign exchange reserves,

the decline in oil production, the falling

of oil prices and the increase of public

deficit. However, this did not

discourage the issuance of measures

about austerity or the critical situation

such as the decision rewarding all the

people working in education sector with

300 dinars to improve their financial

situation.

Decline of monetary reserves and

the drop of oil prices worldwide have

negatively affected oil sector which

represents 95 % of the country’s

revenues. International reports have

warned that Libya approaches

bankruptcy and that foreign exchange

reserve will run out in four years time if

political and security turmoil persisted.

Forming a Government of National

Accord between the different parties in

Libya and ending political struggle

between the House of Representatives

and the General National Congress

brought some hope for political and

economic stability in a country that lost

its position as a major oil exporter and

was destroyed by internal conflicts that

lasted for almost five years.

Experts from the IMF and World

Bank participated in a workshop held in

the Jordanian capital Oman in the

beginning of December 2015 with

experts from the Central Bank of Libya

represented by its two administrations

of Tripoli and El Beida in order to

discuss the budget of 2016.

The Central Bank of Libya in

Tripoli confirmed in its last statement

that the economic conditions undergone

by the country, where oil production,

exportation declined and its prices have

dropped in the global market,

necessitates decisive measures. These

measures should help to reach a

consensus able to save the unity and

integrity of the country, reproduction

and exportation of oil and maintain the

value of the dinar so as to reduce the

negative effects on citizens.

Second: Assessing Indicators of the

Overall Economic Performance

during 2015

1) Economic Growth

The rate of economic growth became

negative during 2015 because of the

bad security situation and the decline in

oil production and prices. According to

IMF estimations, the growth this year

reached about -6.1%

2) The State Budget

During 2015, the Government of

National Salvation in Tripoli approved

a budget of about 42.9 billion LYD

while the Interim Government in El

Beida approved another budget of 43

billion LYD. The government of

Tripoli’s spending amounted to 23.8

billion dinars compared to 5 billion

dinars spent by the government in El

Beida during the same period.

It is important to mention that more

than half of the state budget is spent on

the staff of public sector wages and on

government subsidies of many goods

including supply commodities, fuel,

free hospitalization and treatment

abroad. The Government of National

Salvation in Tripoli resorted to the

central bank’s reserves while the rival

government in El Beida resorted to

borrowing to manage its spending

costs.


3) The Overall Investments

Security turmoil and armed conflicts

disrupted the majority of investments

in Libya. 65 % of the overall

investment projects were blocked

because most of investors left the

country following their countries’ urge

to leave due to the bad security

situation in the country. Huge

investments in cement industry planned

for this year were aborted. Their total

productive capacity is about 10.65

million tons per year divided on five

factories located in different parts in

Libya. The cost of aborted industrial,

touristic and estate projects is estimated

to be 4.6 billion LYD.

4) Monetary and Banking Changes

Liquidity crisis in Libyan banks

Libyan banks in Tripoli and other

regions suffered from a crisis of cash

flow because the customers withdrew

their deposits from banks due to the

severe decline in the state‘s revenues.

The Central Bank had to print money

to pay local commitments. Official data

indicates that cash flow outside banks

exceeded 22 billion dinars as of the end

of January, 2015 compared to its

normal average which did not exceed

three billion LYD.

Printing a New Currency without a

Monetary Ceiling

The increase of currency withdrawal

from banks led the Central Bank of

Libya to print new currency and pump

it in the market to address the crisis.

The banking system in Libya is

suffering a shortage of cash flow

because citizens keep and retain the

currency instead of bank deposits. The

crisis as a whole is due to the fact that

people seem to be distrusting the

banking system.

Continuous Decline of Foreign

Exchange Reserve

The crisis in Libya pushed the Central

Bank to increase withdrawing money

from its reserve of foreign exchange.

This reserve declined due to the

decrease of oil production and the drop

of its prices worldwide. The central

bank withdraws money from reserves

of foreign exchange which decreased

from 120 billion dollars in 2011 to

around 70 billion dollars, as of the end

of 2015.

The Crisis of Libyan Dinar

The Libyan dinar lost more than 120 %

of its value compared with the dollar

during 2015. The reason was the

decline of oil production and prices, the

fact that the government is forced to

withdraw from cash reserves, the

existence of international sanctions

banning the exportation of dollar

currency to Libya since 2013 and the

act of freezing the opening of

documentary credits for goods

importation. Furthermore, withdrawal

transactions are more than deposits. On

the one hand, the exchange rate in the

black market reached 3.70 in relation

with the dollar for the first time during

the last quarter of 2015. On the other

hand, the dinar is sold in commercial

banks, for limited purposes such as

treatment and drugs, for 1.39 a dollar.


5) Labor Market and Unemployment

Unemployment rate during 2015

according to official statistics by the

Ministry of Labor reached about 17%;

17 % of males and 22.4 of females

representing about 400 thousands

citizens able to work. About 37.3% of

the unemployed have university and

academic degrees.

Unemployment Rates According to Gender and Area

The Area Males Females Both sexes Tobruk 13.2 32.8 21.0

Derna 7.0 9.8 8.3 Jabal Al akhdar 8.8 10.2 9.4

Al Marj 17.1 35.7 25.0 Benghazi 14.3 24.4 17.4

Al Wahat 9.6 45.7 21.3 El Kafra 11.4 12.2 11.7

Serte 18.0 20.9 19.0 Al Jufra 12.0 9.4 10.7

Misrata 15.2 25.4 18.0

Murqub 18.7 31.7 22.5

Tripoli 15.2 28.1 19.3 Al Gefara 20.5 18.3 19.7

Zawiya 9.6 19.9 13.7 Zuwarah 9.6 10.3 9.9

Al Djabal Al Gharbi 17.5 21.4 19.1 Nalut 5.9 13.7 9.4 Sebha 11.3 22.7 15.5

Wadi al Sahtii 7.8 13.4 10.3

Murzuq 12.8 24.9 18.3

Wadi Al Hayaa 14.5 27.2 20.1

Ghat 14.9 28.7 20.6

Ajdabiya 16.3 30.0 21.9

Total 14.5 22.4 17.4

Libya heavily relies on immigrant

workers to do many activities that

require hard efforts or professional and

technical skills. Yet, the initial problem

which lies in managing the entrance of

workers and giving them work permits

remains a big issue for business owners

who are sometimes pushed to violate

the laws and use workers without

permits. Furthermore, more than 60%

of immigrant workers in Libya work

illegally. This causes many problems

and negative effects on the Libyan

economy as well as the employees

themselves who work under bad

conditions.


6) Inflation

High prices, especially those of

commodities became the daily concern

for the Libyan families who suffer from

collapse of the purchasing power of the

Libyan dinar, low salary levels and

increase in unemployment rates among

the working force because of the critical

security situation in the country.

Libyans are also complaining about

delay in disbursal of paychecks as well

as about the fixed wages in the majority

of economic sectors be it private or

public despite the increase of inflation

levels five times more since the

overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, in

addition to the absence of bodies that

can control and monitor the increase in

prices.

Third: the Situation of Oil Sector

The National Oil Corporation in Tripoli

estimated its production average in

2015 for 500 thousand barrels per day

and the total revenues are estimated to

be 9.5 billion dollars with an average of

50 dollars for one barrel. The actual

exported oil is about 450 thousand

barrels a day, which represents only

less than the third of the quantity used

to be exported in normal old times (1.5

billion barrels per day as of 2013). On

the local level, 150 thousand barrels are

consumed every day.

The government is forced to sell oil for

a price which is 5 cents less than the

international average for each barrel in

an attempt to attract clients lost during

two years after closing oil ports. Oil

selling contracts became monthly rather

than annual because the National Oil

Corporations have lost many clients

who turned towards other countries.

The re-adoption of annual contracts

necessitates security stability. It is also

expected that production will not reach

its normal rate in the near future

because of technical and electrical

problems.

Fourth: the Situation of Productive

Sectors

Even though agriculture uses three

quarters of the consumed waters, its

contribution to the gross domestic

product reached only 3%, while its

contribution in providing food for local

consumption decreased. This reality is

caused by the fact that private holdings

are small, dominating most of the

cultivated area and relying on

traditional methods during their

production process.

As for the industrial sector, it did not

realize any improvements during

2015. Instead, it was badly affected;

many companies and productive units

stopped working after reaching

bankruptcy and being subject to

robberies. The Ministry of Industry in

the Government of National Salvation

in Tripoli affirmed that companies and

industrial units in Libya suffer from

cash flow and that they are not able to

carry out the intended development

programs. Moreover, there is an

absence of marketing mechanisms due

to the high cost of its products on the

one hand and its inability to compete

with other goods in the local market on

the other hand.

A report produced by the Ministry of

Industry in Libya indicates that 33

companies and productive units stopped


operating due to security conditions

which made the Ministry unable to

follow-up closed factories, especially

the ones located in conflict areas.

Concerning services sector, it was also

subject to considerable deterioration

during 2015 in all over Libya. Health,

education and living problems have

worsened while the majority of Libyans

were deprived from government

services for many reasons, mainly

security turmoil, austerity measures

declared by the central bank in 2015

and rampant corruption in many

sectors. The losses of services sector,

including transport and commercial

activities, exceeded 5 billion LYD

during 2015. Other problems include

reluctance of tourists and investors

from coming to the country in addition

to displacement problems. According to

official statistics, the sector of services

contributes with 40% to the non-oil

GDP and it is one of the sectors which

were severely damaged after security

turmoil.

The sector of services is ranked second

in terms of importance after oil sector

and natural gas extraction.

Sixth: Major Deficiencies and

Weaknesses in the Libyan

Economy during 2015

1) Political Division [

The state of duplication of authorities is

the hardest fact which most affects the

country’s economy. It resulted in the

deterioration of the state’s institutions

and public administrations, weakness of

performance, waste of money as well as

capacities and the spread of corruption7.

2) Obscurity about Smuggled Money

Although the successive governments

in Libya have assigned many parties to

follow up the money smuggled abroad,

the country could not retrieve any Dinar

back to its public treasury. The chief of

investigation department at the office of

the Attorney General, Assiddig Assour,

explains that his office was ignored and

did not receive any notice from the

successive governments concerning the

procedures related to smuggled money.

He adds that it is hard to give

estimations about the amount of that

money since the governments did not

determine specific strategies according

to transparency and international

standards to return the money back to

the state.

Muhsin Drija, The General Director of

Libya Africa Investment Portfolio,

mentioned that the assets of the

Portfolio have amounted to 5 billion

dollars before the revolution, whereas

now it has reached only 3.5 billion

dollars resulting in 1.5 billion dollars

loss during four years due to the

mismanagement and financial

corruption.8

Libya’s investments abroad also did not

achieve any financial returns. Instead, it

suffered heavy losses caused by

mismanagement and lack of control

7 The Annual Report of the Audit Bureau for

2014. 8 Libya is amongst the most corrupted

countries in the world, Ahmed Lkhmissi, Al Arabi Aljadid news paper, September 5, 2015, available at:

http://www.alaraby.co.uk/economy/2015/9/5/.

http://www.alaraby.co.uk/economy/2015/9/5/%d9%84%d9%8a%d8%a8%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d8%b6%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d9%83%d8%ab%d8%b1-%d9%81%d8%b3%d8%a7%d8%af%d8%a7-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85#sthash.Ft86ImPT.dpuf


over sovereign funds. According to

investigatory reports, this situation is

the result of disagreement between the

powers. Libyan Investment Authority

(LIA), whose capital is 65 billion

dollars, invested about 23 billion dollars

of its assets in low-risky investments

with low financial revenues such as the

deferred deposits and investments in

bonds.

3) Corruption and Financial

Irregularities

Libya was ranked amongst the most ten

corrupted countries in the world

according to corruption index of

International Transparency

Organization for 2015. The successive

Libyan governments adopted

uncontrolled financial policies during

the last four years which wasted billions

of dollars, leaving the country without

development. The Libyan Audit Bureau

mentions that governmental spending,

which is marked by extravagance and

waste during the last three years,

reached about 158 billion Dinars.

In this regard, the Libyan Audit Bureau

blocked all the bank accounts of the 99

major importers of food and medical

goods who are accused of financial

corruption for importing inexistent

goods, for trading with backed-dollar in

the black market and to fraud and

evading payment of customs duties.

The Audit Bureau also blocked bank

accounts of 26 companies because of

their involvement in smuggling foreign

exchange and for falsifying official

documents. Twenty other companies

had also their bank accounts frozen for

evading payment of customs duties.

Furthermore, the accounts of five

people were blocked for opening

documentary credits and for providing

banks with documents related to goods

importing without supporting it with

other documents delivered by the

customs to prove the transactions. As

for the customs, the Audit Bureau

prohibited dealing with eight customs

brokers whose cases were brought

before the public prosecutor for forgery

of customs declarations.

4) Administration weakness

The Libyan administration suffers from

structural weakness which results in a

shortage of information and statistical

data. This latter results in more tax

evasions in addition to corruption and

bribery; all these hinder economic

reformation projects. Consequently,

Libya’s rank regarding taxpaying is

embarrassing. According to DOING

BUSINESS 2015 report, Libya ranked

186 out of 189 countries, a fact which

reflects the serious problems

encountered by the administration that

led to the increase of taxpaying hours to

reach 889 hours compared with the

average in North Africa (220 hours)9.

5) Serious Gaps in the System of

Managing Public Investments

These gaps are reflected by the absence

of sectoral policies that are useful in

guiding decision making regarding

investment. What is more is that there is

an inefficacity of investment

procedures, weakness of law

enforcement, absence of coordination

during the execution of many

9 DOING BUSINESS 2015 report, Economy

Profile Libya


investment projects which led to an

important increase in the number of

contracts, arbitrary allotment of many

huge investments and budget

duplication (the decisions of investment

projects and the capital budget are taken

in isolation from the decisions of

management budget).

6) Banking System [[ Despite the accumulation of deposits,

the banking system is disrupted and

both, public and private commercial

banks continue to fail in revitalizing

national economy.

Recommendations:

1) Addressing the repercussions of the

two agreements of Tunis and Skhirat

and promoting consensus along a single

well-defined track at one negotiating

table. It is also important to convince

the conservative and reluctant parties

that this consensus is the only option to

escape the actual crisis and avoid

unsafe scenarios.

2) Avoiding destabilization of the

current situation and limiting the

channels to one to carry out the

consensus. International support is also

needed while observing the sovereignty

and decisions of the state.

3) Rebuilding confidence in dialogue

through anticipating objective

approaches to overcoming obstacles

and realizing the need for equilibrium

to solve the main issues. This latter is

security and other related issues such as

armed groups, arms and the situation of

the army, police, etc.

4) Varying dialogue scenarios will not

be effective in solving the problems;

instead it will extend the crisis and may

cause convergence and consensus to

fail. Therefore it should be prevented

and efforts should be exerted to

combine the approach of the Libyan-

Libyan dialogue and the approach of

the UN under the auspices of Martin

Kobler.

5) Imposing a fait accompli policy and

using force to invoke any agreement

being argued about may complicate the

situation and fail to realize the intended

goals.

6) The security measures according to

the UN approach are full of flaws, are

not effective enough to address the

critical situation of the country and

need to be reevaluated and agreed upon

in a way that guarantees the conformity

of security and political tracks.

7) Founding an established stability

that is based on the state’s institutions

and sovereignty through security

measures, in addition to ending the

militia or groups formula forever.

8) Guaranteeing a transition to state

institutions and sovereignty of security

means the containment of the groups

representing the rebels and integrating

them in a dialogue of transition. Rebels

should also avoid confrontation with

the army and the police.


9) Protecting Tripoli, which is going

through a state of transformation. The

city is at risk of a sudden explosion in

instability. Thus, the priorities of all the

concerned parties should be to prevent

fighting between the different fronts in

Tripoli because it symbolizes the

country’s stability. Any confrontations

in Tripoli could destroy any chance for

the stability of Libya.

10) Saving Benghazi represents the

heart of tension in the country. The

situation became very complicated,

necessitating wisdom and seriousness to

deal with it. The approach should begin

by stopping the fighting by all possible

means and then initiating a dialogue

about the city protected by the

government; a dialogue which

welcomes all parties except those who

refuse and promote division.

11) Liberating Sirte is a national

priority that must be done according to

a military, security, national and

effective strategy.

12) Prioritizing of the aim of reaching a

common ground that is unbreakable or

that cannot be breached which gathers

security forces, dignitaries and civil

society to prevent attacks on sovereign

resources; mainly oilfields and ports.

13) Supporting the role of the Price

Stability Fund, responsible for

subsidizing commodities through

consumer associations, is crucial to

maintain actual prices and preventing

monopoly.

14) Studying the issue of support by

the government through revaluating the

decisions taken and immediate tackling

of the matters in order to prevent the

waste of public money and provide

people with decent indemnities

whenever the subsidy is removed.

15) Supporting and encouraging means

of production that participate in

diversifying sectors and avoid relying

on just one sector that is subject to price

fluctuations and international markets.

It is also important to establish a legal

and business-friendly administrative

environment which encourages

individual initiatives and seizes

available investment opportunities. To

enable the Libyan economy to move

from its primitive stage, based on the

extraction of oil and the distribution of

royalties, to a developed economy

(where production and competition are

the norm). Plus, Libya has several

qualifications that can develop many

sectors in various fields, especially

tourism.

16) Fighting administrative corruption

through the strict application of the

principles of good governance and

making a good use of new anti-

corruption mechanisms with the

participation of both; the government

and civil society. Admission to public

services should also be subject to new

mechanisms that foster transparency

and merit in addition to enforcing laws

against corruption and bribery.


17) Establishing a new system for

managing public investments in way

that suits good governance, changes at

the national level and international

standards for good practice. For that,

continuous effort should be exerted to

build institutional, regulatory, technical

and human capacities while observing

similar international experiences,

particularly in countries living in a post-

conflict stage.

18) Respecting each financial decision

and spending policy taken by any party

or official government on all levels is

essential. All concerned parties should

be informed and such information must

be available to the public.

19) Promoting participation by various

means, mainly through hearings carried

out by local and central public

institutions, to understand public

opinion concerning the policies

adopted, whether either old or new.

Audio-visual, written or print media

should be used to expose the public to

policies that are to be adopted. The

opinions of citizens and different

parties should be taken into

consideration in adapting those policies

their implementation.

20) Characterizing accountability by

three features: immediate response,

transparency and non-discrimination.


LOOPS Recent Publications:

1. Priorities of National Reconciliation Government.

2. The Draft of Political Agreement. Review of the Content.

3. 2014 Audit Bureau Report and Rationalization of Public Spending.

4. Social Impacts of the Political Division in Libya.

5. The Political and Security Scene in Libya, an Analytical and Forward Looking

Vision.

6. The Economic Impacts of the Political Division in Libya.

7. Is it Possible to Bring Peace to Libya?

8. Policies of Commodities Subsidy.


About the Libyan Organization Of Public Policies & Strategies

The Libyan Organization Of Public Policies & Strategies (LOOPS) is an

independent, nonprofit and nongovernmental institution founded in December 2014 in

Tripoli, Libya. A representative branch was founded in Istanbul in January 2015.

The organization carries out research and studies related to emerging policy and

strategy issues with the aim of generating effective and successful policies and

providing support to decision-makers. The organization devotes its efforts to

improving the performance of Libyan institutions and advancing the economic and

social welfare of the Libyan people. It seeks to spread the notions and concepts of

quality, good governance, strategic planning and a culture of excellence so as to

improve the performance of Libyan institutions.

LOOPS aspires to promote and spread knowledge about public policies and strategies

to the state through the dissemination of statistics, studies and periodic reports. It also

organizes conferences, workshops and forums as platforms for discussion, the

exchange of opinions and spreading knowledge.

Tripoli Office

Zawiyat Al Dahmani, Tripoli, Libya

Mailbox: 4133

Telephone: 00218 21 340 75 86

Fax: 00218 21 340 75 87

Istanbul Office

Yenibosna Merkez MAH.29

Istanbul vizyon park

Ofis Plaz.A3 BLK

K:3/D28

Bahçelievler - Istanbul – Turkey

Telephone: 0090 212 603 25 92

Fax: 0090 212 603 27 48

Date post:	26-Aug-2020
Category:	Documents
Upload:	others
View:	2 times
Download:	0 times