18
Loading of Lifeboats during Drills Guidance
Loading of Lifeboats during Drills
Guidance
1
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 2
SECTION 2: PURPOSE OF THE WORK GROUP 3
SECTION 3: REVIEW OF CURRENT LEGISLATION AND GUIDANCE 4
SECTION 4: REVIEW OF TECHNICAL INTEGRITY ISSUES AROUND 6LIFEBOATS, DAVITS AND MAINTENANCE PENNANTS
SECTION 5: DISCUSSION OF CROSS-INDUSTRY DRIVERS 7FOR LOADING LIFEBOATS
SECTION 6: RISK ASSESSMENT AND OUTCOMES 8
APPENDIX 1: SADIE ALERT 436 15
APPENDIX 2: KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 16
2
Introduction
The guidance contained in this document was producedby the combined efforts of a cross-industry working groupset up in late 2001. The group facilitated an analysis ofcurrent practices in loading lifeboats for the purposes ofdrills, reviewed current legislation & guidance, carried outa full risk assessment and concluded with the productionof this guidance on best practice.
This publication is not intended to be a mandate onindustry. It is intended to guide dutyholders in adoptingbest practice when loading lifeboats for the purpose ofdrills. Where alternative methods can, through riskassessment, or the provision of particular safety systems,be shown to offer an equally effective solution, there is noreason why they should not be adopted.
Whilst every effort has been made to ensure the accuracyof the information contained in this publication, neitherStep Change in Safety, nor any of its members will assumeliability for any use made thereof.
Acknowledgements
Step Change in Safety would like to thank severalindividuals from a wide range of companies andorganisations who gave resources and time to developingthese guidelines. Particular acknowledgement for valuablecontribution to the members of the companies andorganisations listed below:
Aker Kvaerner
Amerada Hess
Bluewater
BP
Britannia Operators Limited
Chevron Texaco
Conoco Phillips
Exxon Mobil
Halliburton
Health & Safety Executive
KCA Deutag
Maersk Contractors
Marathon
Shell
Smith Rea Energy Ltd
Sparrows Offshore Services
Statoil
Step Change OIM’s Network
Step Change Elected Safety Rep’s Network
Step Change Safety Professionals and Advisers Network
Survival Craft Inspectorate Ltd
Talisman
Transocean
Total E&P UK
UKOOA
Universal Sodexho
3
Purpose and Deliverables
The purpose of the Step Change Lifeboat Loading &Launching Work Group*, and the expected deliverables/outcomes from the group, were agreed at the outset asfollows :-
• Produce guidance / proposals on cross industry “ bestpractice “ for the loading of lifeboats during drills.
• Understand current legislation and guidancedocumentation.
• Review technical integrity issues around lifeboats, davitsand associated maintenance pennants.
• Gain understanding of current cross industry “drivers” forloading lifeboats.
• Create Risk model to demonstrate factors affectingloading lifeboats with personnel during emergency drills.
*Note: The original workgroup was set up following concerns raised by
the workforce in regard to the frequency and the risk associated with
the loading of lifeboats for the purpose of drills. In addition, to
understand the reasons behind the launching of boats for the purpose
of maintenance. After analysis of lifeboat user survey questionnaire it
was agreed the focus of the workgroup be on producing guidance on
loading lifeboats for the purpose of drills. This document makes
reference to maintenance but the guidance contained only relates to
the loading of lifeboats during drills.
Overview
This Step Change publication is the final deliverable fromthe Lifeboat Loading & Launching Work Group. Itrepresents what the Group have agreed as best practice inrelation to the loading & launching of lifeboats during drills.
The Group consisted of representatives from installationoperators, contracting companies, Step Change networks,the Regulator, UKOOA and other specialists.
This guidance commences with a review of currentlegislation and technical guidance as it relates to lifeboatdrills. It then describes the group’s review of technicalintegrity issues around lifeboats, davits and the use ofmaintenance pennants. This is then followed by adiscussion of cross-industry “drivers” for the loading oflifeboats during drills.
A key component of this guidance (and a foundation stonefor the recommendations) was a cross-industry riskassessment undertaken during September 2002. This riskassessment is summarised herein.
Finally, this guidance includes a copy of SADIE Alert 436,which was published on the SADIE database on 24th April2003.
4
Introduction
The present situation on lifeboat legislation is complicatedby the interaction between offshore installation legislation(under the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974) andmaritime legislation (under IMO and SOLAS), since someoffshore installations can be subject to both regimesdepending on what they are doing at any given time.However, as far as possible, the Regulators try to avoid asituation where duty holders have to comply with twodifferent sets of parallel requirements.
Also new legislation has appeared in recent years whichhas a bearing, such as the Lifting Operations and LiftingEquipment Regulations 1998 (LOLER), and the need for averification scheme under the Offshore Installations andWells (Design and Construction etc) Regulations 1996(DCR), since duty holders normally designate the lifeboatsystem as a safety critical element. As well as maritimelegislation, further health and safety legislation which has abearing on lifeboats includes the Provision and Use ofWork Equipment Regulations (PUWER).
This guide concentrates mainly on legislation as it appliesto offshore installations but, as some installations are alsoclassed as ships under certain circumstances, a briefmention is made of this, in particular requirements underIMO SOLAS (The International Convention for the Safety ofLife at Sea).
Lifeboat legislation (offshore installations)
Equipment and its use on UK offshore installations issubject to the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974(HSWA), and, where an installation is also classed as aship, to IMO and Merchant Shipping requirements.
Sources of specific legislation and guidance applying tothe lifeboat system (lifeboat and davit) on an offshoreinstallation include:
• The Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire andExplosion and Emergency Response) Regulations 1995(PFEER) and the associated ACoP (Approved Code ofPractice) and guidance (HSE Books L65 1997).
• The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations1992 (SCR) and its associated guidance (HSE BooksL30 1998).
• The Management of Health & Safety at Work Regulations1999 (MHSWR) and its associated ACoP and guidance(HSE Books L21 2000).
The above legislation applies to fixed installations, and tomobile installations on station.
PFEER and the associated ACoP include the followingrequirements:
• A “PFEER” assessment has to be carried out.
• The assessment should include the selection ofappropriate means of evacuation [eg lifeboat system]including type, capacity and location.
• There has to be a sufficient number of people on theinstallation competent to undertake emergency dutiesand operate relevant equipment.
• Everyone on the installation has to be provided withadequate instruction and training in the appropriateaction to take in an emergency.
• There has to be an emergency response plan. Eachperson on the installation has to be given suchnotification of its contents as are sufficient for them.
• Arrangements have to be made to ensure, so far as isreasonably practicable, the safe evacuation of allpersons.
• The lifeboat and associated plant has to be soconstructed as to be suitable for the purpose for which itis provided.
• The lifeboat and associated plant has to be maintained inan efficient state, in efficient working order and in goodrepair.
• A suitable written scheme has to be prepared andoperated to ensure that relevant plant on the installation[eg the lifeboat system] is subject to systematicexamination by a competent and independent person.Work done to comply with this requirement maycontribute to the SCR verification scheme.
The lifeboat system is normally classified as a safetycritical element. SCR requires a verification scheme toensure that a safety critical element is suitable and remainsin good repair and condition. The verification scheme willcontribute to ensuring compliance with PFEER.
5
MHSWR includes a requirement that employers undertakerisk assessments for work activities [such as a lifeboat drill]for the purpose of identifying the measures which need tobe put in place to prevent accidents and to protect peopleagainst accidents.
Lifeboat legislation (offshore installationsoperating as a ship)
This Step Change guide is not intended to cover maritimelegislation in detail. However, as some floating installationswill also, at times, be classed as ships, a brief overview ofSOLAS requirements will be provided, in so far as theyrelate to lifeboats.
The main objective of regulations made under the SOLASConvention is to specify minimum standards for theconstruction, equipment and operation of ships,compatible with their safety. Flag States are responsible forensuring that ships under their flag comply with itsrequirements, and a number of certificates are prescribedin the Convention as proof that this has been done.
The current SOLAS Convention includes Articles settingout general obligations, amendment procedure and so on,followed by an Annex divided into 12 Chapters. “LifeSaving Appliances and Arrangements” are covered underChapter III.
Under the 1996 revision of SOLAS, specific technicalrequirements were moved to a new International Life-Saving Appliance (LSA) Code, made mandatory underRegulation 34, which states that all life-saving appliancesand arrangements shall comply with the applicablerequirements of the LSA Code. These are implemented inmaritime law by the International Maritime Organisation(IMO).
The main regulations which are of interest to operators offloating offshore installations (in so far as the scope of thisguide is concerned) are Regulations 19 and 20 in ChapterIII. These may also be applied as good practice on fixedinstallations, since much of the equipment is common.
Regulation 19 covers “Emergency training and drills”. Thisincludes the requirements for; familiarity with safetyinstallations, practice musters, drills, abandon ship drill,fire drills, on-board training and instructions and record-keeping.
Regulation 20 covers “Operational readiness, maintenanceand inspections”. This includes the requirements for;operational readiness; maintenance; maintenance of falls;spares and repair; weekly inspections; monthlyinspections; servicing of inflatable liferafts, inflatablelifejackets, marine evacuation systems and inflated rescueboats; periodic servicing of hydrostatic release units,marking of stowage locations and; periodic servicing oflaunching appliances and on-load release gear.
6
Strategy adopted by Work Group
The strategy which was adopted by the Step Change WorkGroup was to; identify all European manufacturers oflifeboats and obtain information from them and; to reviewliterature pertinent to lifeboat operations (in particularlifeboat drills).
Lifeboat OEM Study
The lifeboat OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturers)study was undertaken by members of the Work Group andit achieved the following:-
• All European manufacturers of lifeboats were identifiedand an approach made to ask for information.
• Information was sought in writing and technicalclarification achieved through discussions.
• Responses were collated and the findings fed back tothe Work Group.
The following manufacturers participated in this study:-
• Schat Harding
• Survival Craft Inspectorate
• Safety Systems International
• Verhoef Aluminium Scheepsbouw
It was identified that there was a wide variety of types oflifeboat in use in the industry, although they could bebroadly classified by launch category as either davitlaunched of freefall (eg Verhoef specialise in freefall boatswhilst Schat Harding manufacture both types). Differentmaterials are used for construction (GRP is typical butsome freefall boats are constructed in aluminium).
General findings from this study were as follows:-
• The load path of the suspended boat is designed to takethe full load of the boat plus the POB complement.
• Drills should be regularly undertaken to familiarisepersonnel with mustering and loading the boat.
• On davit launched boats one manufacturerrecommended not fitting maintenance pennants duringdrills because they felt that there was a danger of thembeing left in place in error, or of becoming stuck if theboat lowered.
• On GRP hulls, ultra violet from sunlight can degrade thestructure but this typically would be in excess of 10 yearsfrom new and could be as much as 35 years.
The Work Group debated these points and they areconsidered further in the Risk Assessment (Section 6) andthe SADIE Alert (Appendix 1).
Literature Review
Relevant literature, which was reviewed and discussed bythe Work Group, was as follows:-
• Safety Alerts from SADIE (102, 254, 274, 357), HSE(1/96), IMCA (05/02), IADC (02-31).
• “Structural design basis determination of TEMPSClifeboats”, Smedley, PAFA Consulting.
• OCIMF “Results of a survey into lifeboat safety” July1994.
• IMO “Measures to prevent accidents with lifeboats” 3January 2002.
• MAIB Safety Study 1/2001 “Review of Lifeboat andlaunching systems accidents”.
• OCIMF “Lifeboat Incident Survey - 2000”.
7
Strategy adopted by Work Group
The strategy which was adopted by the Step Change WorkGroup was to use a questionnaire based approach,involving as many offshore installations as possible, to elicitinformation on current practices for loading lifeboats for thepurposes of drills.
Lifeboat User Study
The lifeboat user study was undertaken by members of theWork Group and it achieved the following:-
• 120 questionnaires were issued.
• 29 responses were received of which 22 were usable.
• Lifeboat types covered in the 22 responses were;Watercraft (ie Schat Harding) (18), Verhoef freefall (1),Norsafe (1), Balmoral (1) and Welin Lambie (1).
The key questions asked were as follows:-
• Should lifeboats be fully loaded for the purposes of drills?
• When loading lifeboats for drills, should the maintenancepennants be fitted?
• How do you inspect/maintain the load path?
• What is the Safe Working Load (SWL) of yourmaintenance pennants?
Conclusions from User Study
The Working Group collated the results from thequestionnaires received and the following conclusionswere drawn:-
• A survey response of 22 out of 140 represented a lowresponse rate hence caution needed to be exercisedabout the validity of the results.
• One manufacturer dominated the responses.
• Only 18% of those who responded (4 responses)admitted to fully loading the lifeboats for the purposes ofdrills and all of these stated that they used maintenancepennants during these drills.
• The rationale for the load rating of maintenance pennantswas unclear across the survey population, with a numberof inconsistencies being evident.
• A number of other inconsistencies were evident from theresponses. These included; the use and configuration ofmaintenance pennants, the policy for load testing, theprocedures for load path inspections, the load ratings ofthe davits etc.
The Work Group debated these responses and theybecame a core focus for discussions at subsequentWorking Group meetings. The key issues were thendebated and evaluated at the cross-industry riskassessment, the outcomes of which are presented inSection 6 of this guide and in the SADIE Alert (Appendix 1).
8
Background to Risk Assessment
Once the Work Group had gathered the data on currentsystems and operational practices, it was agreed that arisk assessment should be undertaken to evaluate risksassociated with loading lifeboats for the purposes of drills,and to weigh these against the benefits offered by thedrills.
The process which was recommended by the group was toarrange a professionally facilitated one-day workshop withas wide a representation as possible present. This wouldinclude operators of fixed and mobile installations,designers, OIM’s, Safety Representatives, Coxswains, theRegulator, manufacturers etc.
Overview of Workshop
The Risk Assessment workshop was held at Aker-Kvaerneroffices on Thursday September 26th 2002. A wide cross-section of people was present with over 30 participating(list can be found on Step Change website). The RiskAssessment was facilitated by Pat McIntosh of Smith ReaEnergy Ltd who was also responsible for producing a clearanalysis of the outcomes. The Work Group are grateful forhis help.
The deliverable from the risk assessment workshop wasstated to be “Create a risk model to demonstrate factorsaffecting loading lifeboats with personnel duringemergency drills”.
It was agreed that the scope of the risk assessment shouldcover “The risks involved with the loading and launching oflifeboats for the purposes of drills and maintenance. Thisshould include both davit launched lifeboats (with andwithout maintenance pennants in place) and freefalllifeboats”.
Structure to Risk Assessment
The structure of the day was as follows:-
• Introductions
• Background and objectives
• Overview on current Lifeboat issues
• Process description (ie how would the Risk Assessmentbe conducted)
• Risk brainstorm (in groups)
• Risk classification
• Risk review
• Risk comparison
• Brainstorm alternative solutions (pair-wise comparison)
• Rank alternative solutions
• Discussion and close
Outcomes from Risk AssessmentWorkshop
1. Risk Brainstorming/classification
The risk classification exercise involved the allocation ofrisks identified by all workshop participants to appropriatecategories on a 5 x 5 risk matrix (probability vsconsequence). Three themes were assessed:-
• Risks in an emergency evacuation where no lifeboat drillshave been undertaken by the crew.
• Risks in an emergency evacuation where fully loadedlifeboat drills have been undertaken by the crew.
• Risks associated with full crew loading of lifeboats duringdrill exercises.
These are shown in Diagrams 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
Diagram 1 represents the risk position where asset crewsare involved in an emergency evacuation without havingpreviously been involved in any form of drill or lifeboatloading training.
Diagram 2 represents the impact of current lifeboat drillson the base case (no drills) scenario.
Diagram 3 summarises risks associated with carrying outfully loaded lifeboat drills offshore.
DIAGRAM 3 - FULLY LOADED DRILLS RISKS
9
LIFEBOAT LOADING RISK ASSESSMENT MATRICES
DIAGRAM 1 - EVACUATION RISKS - NO DRILLS UNDERTAKEN
DIAGRAM 2 - EVACUATION RISKS - FULLY LOADED DRILLS UNDERTAKEN
5ExtremelySignificant
4Major
3Moderate
2Minor
1Insignificant
1Rare
10-6 - 10-3Possible, but
extremely doubtful
Individuals unable to launchlifeboat without coxwain in anemergency
2Unlikely
10-3 - 10-2 (1%)Could be true,
but probably not
Inappropriate loading (F/F)Inadvertently launch lifeboat(Davit)
Inadvertently launch lifeboat(F/F)
Muster list - loadingnumbers not controlled
3Moderate1% - 10%
Reasonable chance
Unfamiliarity with specificboat - unable to operate airsystem, deluge, start engine.Failure to Release oncelowered
Communication – commandand control weaknesses
4Likely
10% - 25%Probably true,
chances are good
Inappropriate loading andimbalance of TEMPSCInexperience with securingpersonnel harnessesDelay completing loading
Longer time to boarduntrained crew
Injury to personnel enteringboat under pressure (Davit)
5Almost certain25% - 100%
Highly probable, strongargument
Crowding at access hatchesreducing seating
Uncontrolled panicPanic attack by passenger (s)
Multiple personnel fatalities
Single fatality
Serious injury to personnel
Minor injury to personnel
Discomfort to personnel
5ExtremelySignificant
4Major
3Moderate
2Minor
1Insignificant
1Rare
10-6 - 10-3Possible, but
extremely doubtfu
Individuals unable to launchlifeboat without coxwain in anemergency
2Unlikely
10-3 - 10-2 (1%)Could be true,
but probably not
Inappropriate loading (F/F)Inadvertently launch lifeboat(Davit)
Inadvertently launch lifeboat(F/F)
Muster list - loadingnumbers not controlled
3Moderate1% - 10%
Reasonablechance
Communication - commandand control weaknessesInjury to personnel enteringboat (davit)
4Likely
10% - 25%Probably true,
chances are good
Inappropriate loading andimbalance of TEMPSCInexperience with securingpersonnel harnessesDelay completing loading
5Almost certain25% - 100%
Highly probable,strongargument
Panic attack by passenger (s)
Multiple personnel fatalities
Single fatality
Serious injury to personnel
Minor injury to personnel
Discomfort to personnel
5ExtremelySignificant
4Major
3Moderate
2Minor
1Insignificant
1Rare
10-6 - 10-3Possible, but
extremely doubtfu
2Unlikely
10-3 - 10-2 (1%)Could be true,
but probably not
Inadvertent release of hookFailure of boat hull at interface with hook (Davit)Failure of winch/wireElectrical short-circuit onwinch controls Too manydrills
Person falling over side whenfitting pennantsPerson falling between boat& side when loadingHeart attack by crewmember during drill
Serious fall while boardingF/F lifeboatBatteries left on – notavailable on demandLifeboat left ‘out of service’after drill - pennant
Boat lowering to sea Hazards of connecting safetypennants during drillsNipped fingers & generaldifficulty in fitting pennants
3Moderate1% - 10%
Reasonablechance
Wear and tear on boatduring drills
Over-winching into davit afterexerciseOver loading maintenancepennants
Trips and fallsWet, slippery surfacesSudden movement of lifeboat
4Likely
10% - 25%Probably true,
chances are good
‘Lift up’ hatches fall on crewduring loadingRestricted headroomCrew panic due toclaustrophobia
People wearinginappropriate clothing
5Almost certain25% - 100%
Highly probable,strongargument
Inhalation of exhaust fumeson start up.
Multiple personnel fatalities
Single fatality
Serious injury to personnel
Minor injury to personnel
Discomfort to personnel
10
2. Alternative drill exercises
An evaluation of alternatives to current drill practices wasalso undertaken in the workshop. This adopted atechnique of paired preferences, high scoring alternativesoffering the most attractive option. Two themes wereassessed (see Diagrams 4 and 5):-
• Davit lifeboats training preferences
• Freefall lifeboats training preferences
The baseline scenario for the paired preference exercisewas “fully loaded drills offshore”. This was then comparedwith the following scenarios -
• Fully loaded drills onshore
• Partial loaded drills (x% of lifeboat capacity)
• Partial loaded drills (fixed number eg 5)
• Fully loaded simulation on deck/cradle offshore
• Current BOSIET
• Training small groups - familiarisation with rafts, lifeboatsetc
• Re-introduce boats into FOET
• Offshore installation induction
11
AN EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO DRILL PRACTICES
DIAGRAM 4 - DAVIT LAUNCHED LIFEBOATS - PAIRED PREFERENCE EXERCISE
Alternatives
Fully loaded drills offshore
Fully loaded drills onshore
Partial loaded drills
(x% of boat capacity) offshore
Partial loaded drills -
fixed number (eg. 5)
Fully loaded simulation on
deck/cradle offshore
Current BOSIET
Training small groups -
familiarisation with rafts lifeboats etc
Re-introduce boats into FOET
Offshore installation induction
Legend
Much Stronger (MS) Evidence is available to indicate that the column ‘A’ value measure is strongly dominant over the row ‘1’ value measure
Stronger (S) Experience and judgement favour the column ‘A’ value measure over the row ‘1’ value measure
Neutral (N) Both value measures contribute equally to the project
Weaker (W) Experience and judgement favour row ‘1’ value measure over the column ‘A’ value measure
Much Weaker (MW) Evidence is available to indicate that the row ‘1’ value measure is strongly dominant over the column ‘A’ value measure
Fully loadeddrills offshore
Fully loadeddrills onshore
N
MS
S
S
MS
N
S
S
S
MW
N
MW
MW
N
MW
MW
W
MW
W
MS
N
N
MS
MW
N
N
W
W
MS
N
N
MS
MW
N
N
W
MW
N
MW
MW
N
MW
MW
W
MW
N
MS
MS
MS
MS
N
MS
S
S
W
MS
N
N
MS
MW
N
N
W
W
S
N
N
S
W
N
N
N
W
MS
S
S
MS
W
S
N
N
1.4%
27.0%
10.3%
10.3%
27.0%
1.3%
10.3%
6.87%
5.7%
Partial loadeddrills (x% of
boat capacity)offshore
Partial loadeddrills - fixed
number (eg. 5)
Fully loadedsimulation ondeck/cradle
offshore
Current BOSIET
Training smallgroups -
familiarisationwith rafts
lifeboats etc
Re-introduceboats into
FOET
Offshoreinstallationinduction
★
★
★ Strong preferences
12
Alternatives
Fully loaded drills offshore
Fully loaded drills onshore
Partial loaded drills
(x% of boat capacity) offshore
Partial loaded drills -
fixed number (eg. 5)
Fully loaded simulation on
deck/cradle offshore
Current BOSIET
Training small groups -
familiarisation with rafts lifeboats etc
Re-introduce boats into FOET
Offshore installation induction
Legend
Much Stronger (MS) Evidence is available to indicate that the column ‘A’ value measure is strongly dominant over the row ‘1’ value measure
Stronger (S) Experience and judgement favour the column ‘A’ value measure over the row ‘1’ value measure
Neutral (N) Both value measures contribute equally to the project
Weaker (W) Experience and judgement favour row ‘1’ value measure over the column ‘A’ value measure
Much Weaker (MW) Evidence is available to indicate that the row ‘1’ value measure is strongly dominant over the column ‘A’ value measure
Fully loadeddrills offshore
Fully loadeddrills onshore
N
MS
S
N
S
MS
N
MS
S
MW
N
W
W
N
S
W
N
W
W
S
N
N
S
S
N
S
S
N
S
N
N
S
MS
N
MS
S
W
N
W
W
N
N
W
N
W
MW
W
W
MW
N
N
W
N
W
MW
N
W
MW
N
N
W
N
W
N
S
N
N
S
S
N
S
S
W
S
W
W
S
S
W
S
N
2.1%
17.5%
4.9%
2.6%
15.8%
22.3%
2.7%
20.1%
11.9%
Partial loadeddrills (x% of
boat capacity)offshore
Partial loadeddrills - fixed
number (eg. 5)
Fully loadedsimulation ondeck/cradle
offshore
Current BOSIET
Training smallgroups -
familiarisationwith rafts
lifeboats etc
Re-introduceboats into
FOET
Offshoreinstallationinduction
★
★
★
★ Strong preferences
AN EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO DRILL PRACTICES
DIAGRAM 5 - FREEFALL LIFEBOATS - PAIRED PREFERENCE EXERCISE
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3. Analysis of Results - The Benefit of Drills
The safety risk associated with each of the drill strategieswas calculated using the impact and likelihood rangesdefined on the risk matrices. An industry accepted formulafor assessing the aversion to multiple fatalities was thenused to combine the consequence impacts onto aconsistent scaling. Using this scale the safety risk for eachdrill strategy was evaluated and compared. Whilst it wasnot possible to confidently predict the exact evacuationrisk level associated with each strategy (ie those who haveexperienced loading in drills and those who have not), itwas possible to produce a comparison against a range ofpossible outcomes.
DIAGRAM 6 - EVACUATION RISK BETWEENCREWS WHO HAVE EXPERIENCED LIFEBOATLOADING AND THOSE WHO HAVE NOT
Diagram 6 shows that there is a significant improvement inthe risk profile when drills are undertaken.
4. Analysis of Results - The Risks vs the Benefits of Drills
The final stage of the risk assessment was to evaluate thebenefits of undertaking drills (in terms of yielding areduction in evacuation risks) against the risks in actuallycarrying out the drills. In particular this exercise focused onthe risks of partially loading vs fully loading boats duringdrills.
Diagram 7 shows the risk benefit which can be achievedby partially loading boats during drills.
DIAGRAM 7 - OVERALL RISK PROFILE (RISK vsBENEFIT) WHEN PARTIALLY LOADINGLIFEBOATS FOR DRILLS
5. Analysis of Results - Paired PreferenceExercise
The paired preference exercise (Diagram 4) demonstrateda strong preference for the following options in relation todavit launched lifeboats :-
• Undertaking fully loaded drills onshore.
• Undertaking fully loaded drills on deck or on a solidlysupported cradle from which it cannot fall.
These preferences recognised the benefit of undertakingfully loaded drills, but removed the risks evident when theboat is hanging in the davits (even with maintenancepennants fitted). The paired preference exercise (Diagram5) demonstrated a strong preference for the followingoptions in relation to freefall lifeboats :-
• Undertaking fully loaded drills onshore.
• Undertaking fully loaded drills during BOSIET.
• Re-introduce lifeboats into the FOET.
These preferences recognised the benefit of undertakingfully loaded drills, but removed the risks evident when theboat is suspended on the maintenance ram. They alsorecognise the benefit of formal training under the BOSIETand FOET.
Note: A copy of the Lifeboat Loading Workgroup Workshop Risk
Assessment can be found on the Step Change website
(www.stepchangeinsafety.net)
Evacuation Risk
Total Risk -Evacuation
Total Risk -ReducedEvacuation RiskP
rob
abili
ty
14
6. Conclusions from the Risk Assessment
The outcomes of the risk assessment workshop werediscussed at length in a Working Group meeting on 31stOctober 2002. The conclusions were summarised asfollows:-
• Lifeboat loading drills provide a significant reduction inevacuation risk
• Training exercises carried out offshore on installationsurvival craft expose crew members to risk
• The evacuation risk reduction achieved by offshore drillsis greater than the risk experienced due to offshore drills
• Alternative methods for achieving crew training arepreferred to the offshore drills option
• Further risk reduction can be achieved by optimisingcrew training methods
The Work Group discussed the key points in theseconclusions. It was agreed that the key improvement lay inoptimising crew training methods to achieve further riskreduction. The group discussed whether or not lifeboatsshould be fully loaded during drills and, if not, what shouldbe the maximum allowable number in the boat? It wasagreed that the practice recommended in the final SADIEAlert (5 POB maximum) should be formally endorsed.
The subject of ad-hoc workers was also considered, notingthat current practice tended to miss them out, particularlyif they were only on site for a day or two. The key would beto capture them during installation inductions. The WorkGroup endorsed a 3-stage approach to the issue, asfollows:-
1) Offshore Induction to include familiarisation with lifeboatloading for all persons coming on to the installation(subject to maximum POB of 5 at any one time with boatsuspended on falls, maintenance pennants optional).
2) Offshore drills (boat suspended on falls, maintenancepennants optional) to include familiarisation with lifeboatloading subject to maximum POB of 5 at any one time.
3) Fully loaded drills to be carried out only in anunsuspended state ie not over water and with boatsolidly supported either on the deck or in other suitablehard landing area (or onshore).
7. SADIE Alert
The final outcome of the Group’s work, and in particular therisk assessment, was the issue of a SADIE Alert on 24thApril 2003. This is shown in Appendix 1 of this guide.
15
Loading of Lifeboats during Drills (revised)
Publication Date: 24/04/2003
Abstract: This notice updates a previous SADIE alert (254)and it makes recommendations for the loading of lifeboatswith personnel and for the use of maintenance pennantsduring drills.
Activity Location: Lifeboats (davit launched, freefall).
Activity Type: Emergency exercises/drills.
Keywords: Lifeboat, exercise, loading personnel,maintenance pennants.
Background: Lifeboats have been involved in a number ofserious/fatal incidents during maintenance operationsand drills (eg see SADIE 102) when the boat hasinadvertently fallen into the sea. The followingrecommendations for loading lifeboats with personnel,and for the use of maintenance pennants during drills,have been made for the continued practice of lifeboatdrills among crews. These recommendations reflect theoutcomes of a risk assessment. These outcomes will bepublished, along with others from the work of the StepChange Lifeboat Loading & Launching Work Group, in aStep Change Guidance document during 2003.
Recommendations:
1. Individuals should be offered the opportunity tobecome familiar with lifeboats during offshore inductionand by means of regular drills, however:-
2. The launching of lifeboats with any personnel on boardshould not be carried out for the purpose of drills.
3. The maximum number of persons in an in-situ lifeboatat any given time be restricted to an absolute maximumof 5 (five) persons, on condition that this is within theSafe Working Load of the maintenance ram for free-falllifeboats, or maintenance pennants for davit launchedlife-boats, should this option be selected (see 7 below).
4. Fully loaded drills are only to be carried out when alifeboat cannot fall eg with the lifeboat in anunsuspended state, not over water and with the boatsolidly supported either on the deck or in other suitablehard landing area (or onshore).
5. Notwithstanding (3) and (4) above, when a Duty Holderhas decided to permit lifeboats to be loaded to their fullcapacity then a full written risk assessment must becarried out and justification should be provided by wayof outlining the benefits to be achieved, identifying thesafety measures in place and confirming that these aresuitable to ensure the safety of the personnel involved.All personnel must be in agreement with this.
6. When carrying out the above assessment it isincumbent on the Duty Holder to take account of thenumber, type and integrity of the various securingdevices and measures which may be put in place.These differ in extent and effectiveness dependant onthe type of launching appliance and the specificdevices available on each installation.
7. For davit launched life-boats, maintenance pennantsmay be fitted at times when persons are in the lifeboatbut this is at the discretion of the Company on whoseInstallation the lifeboat is located and it is dependenton the activity being undertaken.
Note: for maintenance activity such as the testing ofrelease gear the fitment of maintenance pennants wouldbe mandatory.
Contact: Robert Hirst, Total E&P UK, 01224 297891, E-mail: [email protected]
Or Step Change in Safety: 01224 881272, e-mail:[email protected]
ACoP Approved Code of Practice
BOSIET The Basic Offshore Safety Induction andEmergency Training
DCR The Offshore Installations and Wells(Design and Construction) Regulations1996
Drill(s) An event to practice and train for anemergency response also known as an‘exercise’
Duty Holder The company responsible for the operatingof the installation
FOET Further Offshore Emergency Training
F/F Freefall lifeboat
GRP Glass Reinforced Plastic
HSE Health and Safety Executive
HSWA Health and Safety at Work Act 1974
IADC International Association of DrillingContractors
IMCA International Maritime ContractorsAssociation
IMO International Maritime Orgainsation
LOLER Lifting Operations and Lifting EquipmentRegulations 1998
LSA Code Merchant Shipping Life Saving AppliancesRegulations
MCA Maritime and Coastguard Agency
MHSWR Management of Health and Safety at WorkRegulations 1999
MAIB Marine Accident Investigation Branch
OCIMF Oil Companies International Marine Forum
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
OIM Offshore Installation Manager
PFEER The Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fireand Explosion and Emergency Response)Regulations 1995
POB Personnel On Board
PUWER Provision and Use of Work EquipmentRegulations 1998
Regulator The Health and Safety Executive OffshoreSafety Division
Risk A system used for the identification of theAssessment hazards associated with a particular
activity, assessing the risks and identifyingthe controls / precautions required tomitigate the risk
SADIE Safety Alert Database InformationExchange
SCR The Offshore Installations Safety CaseRegulations 1992
SOLAS International Convention for the Safety Of Life at Sea
SWL Safe Working Load
TEMPSC Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled SurvivalCraft
UKOOA United Kingdom Offshore Operator’sAssociation
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