LILLA, Salvatore R. C., The Notion of Infinitude in Ps.-dionysius Areopagita

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THE NOTION OF INFINITUDE IN Ps.-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA

Author(s): Salvatore R. C. LillaSource: The Journal of Theological Studies, NEW SERIES, Vol. 31, No. 1 (APRIL 1980), pp. 93-103Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23959150Accessed: 15-01-2016 15:27 UTC

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2/12

NOTES

AND

STUDIES

93

He

imitates the

spiritual beings by

his words while he is

making

supplication;

and

holily

he teaches

the

people

to

cry

1Holy'.

The utterance

of sanctification of the

heavenly beings

he recites to

men,

that

they may

be

crying: 'Holy, Holy, Holy,

Lord'.1

There is

good

reason for the

epiklesis

and the Sanctus to be the

only

parts

of the

anaphora

mentioned;

the reason is hinted

at

by

Edmund

Bishop

in the

Appendix

to

Connolly's

translation.

Bishop

carefully

noted that after the Sursum corda the canon seems to have been recited

silently except

for three

things:

the

concluding

words of the Preface

which

led into the

Sanctus;

at

the

signing

of

the

mysteries

when the

people

said

'Amen';

and after the

epiklesis,

when 'the

priest

makes

his

voice heard to all the

people,

and

signs

with his hand over the

mysteries,

as

before',

but now 'to

teach . . .

that

they

are

accomplished'.2

Since

Narsai

was concerned

to

describe

the

priest's theological

function

in

the

Eucharist,

he would

naturally

mention the

epiklesiseven though

it

appears

to have been recited

silentlysince

he

regarded

this as

the

moment

of consecration. This was at the centre of the

priest's

function.

But Narsai

might

be

expected

to turn back to

give

some

explanation

of

what for the

congregation

must

have been

the

most

significant

and

puzzling interruptions of the silent canon, namely the recitation of the

Sanctus.Sanctus.hat

explanation

could be

given

for this curious

interruption,

for the Sanctus

plays

no obvious

theological

role in the consecration?

What obvious

significance

could Narsai

give

for the Sanctus?

Simply

that

the

priest

raises his voice to

give

the

congregation

the cue for

reciting

it;

that

is,

'he teaches men to

cry "Holy"

with the

spiritual beings.

The

people

answer after his words:

Holy, Holy

Power,

hidden

from

all and

revealed to

all.'

The

explanation

of the so-called

anaphora

in

Homily

XXXII offered

here

is,

admittedly,

not

as

fascinating

as

that

suggested by

Ratcliff,

but

it gives some consistency to the Eucharistic material in the liturgical

homilies of

Narsai;

it also avoids the

unlikely

conclusion of drastic

liturgical

revolutions

at

Edessa and Nisibis

during

the latter

part

of

the fifth

century.

Bryan

D.

Spinks

1

Ibid.,

p. 57

2

Ibid.,

pp. 125-6;

the references in Narsai are

pp.

12, 13,

and

22.

THE

NOTION OF INFINITUDE IN

Ps.-DIONYSIUS

AREOPAGITA

The

problem

of the

relationship

between the

concept

of infinitude and

the first metaphysical

principle

does not

play

a

secondary

role in the

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3/12

94

NOTES AND STUDIES

history

of Greek

philosophy:

from the Presocratics1 to late

Neoplato

nism,

it never

ceased to draw the attention of

philosophical speculation,2

and

even some Greek and Latin

patristic

authors

paid

attention

to

it.3

In

Ps.-Dionysius' theology,

too,

the

concept

of

or )

has

some

relevance,

and it

may

therefore be worth while to

try

to

investigate

it.

In

his

longest

treatise,

the De divinis

Nominibus,

Dionysius

represents

God

sometimes as

being

above

and as its

source,

and

sometimes as

being

identical with

it; moreover,

in the latter

case,

he

uses

the terms

in different contexts and seems to

attach at least three different meanings to them. This short paper sets

itself the task

of

establishing

(a)

the

philosophical

sources on which

Dionysius

depends

when

he

places

God above

; (b)

the

three different

meanings

which

the

concept

of

assumes

when

it is

applied directly

to

God,

as well as their

philosophical

and

patristic

sources;

(c)

the real reason

why

Dionysius

sometimes dis

tinguishes

God from

,

nd sometimes identifies him

with

it.

(a)

The

passages

in which

Ps.-Dionysius places

his first

principle

above

and

and

considers

it as their

cause are

the

following:

I.I.

De

div. Notn.

IV,

X,

705

C

...

.

. .

,

.

2. De

div.

Nom.

IX, ,

909

c

.

*

I wish to thank here Father P.

Grech, O.S.A.,

rector of the

Institutum

Patristicum

Augustinianum,

Rome,

for

revising my

English.

1

To the

evidence about Anaximander

collected

by

H.

Diels,

Die

Fragm.

der

Vorsokr.Vorsokr.

(Berlin, 1951), pp.

81-90,

it is

possible

to add Clement of

Alex.,

Protr.Protr.6, I (I 50, 1416) , .

6

(Diels quotes

the imme

diately

following

lines of

this

passage

of

Clement

as

fragment

11 of

Archelaus,

op.

cit.

II

47, 15).

On

Anaximander,

the

philosopher

to whom the

identification

of

with God

ultimately goes

back, see,

for

instance,

W.

Jaeger,

Die

TheologieTheologieerfriihen griechischen

Denker

(Stuttgart, 1964), pp. 35-49

and

229-42,

and

G. S.

Kirk-J.

E.

Raven,

The

Presocratic

Philosophers (Cambridge, 1957),

pp. 99-142

1

Three

inquiries

on the

significance

of this

concept

in Greek

philosophy

can

be found in R.

Mondolfo,

L'infinite

nel

pensiero

dei

Greci

(Firenze,

1934),

in

C.

J.

De

Vogel,

'La thiorie

de

1'

chez Platon et la tradition

platonicienne',

Revueevue

philos.

de

la France et

de

I'etranger,

149 (1959), pp. 21-39,

and in the

important

book

by

E.

Muhlenberg,

Die Unendlichkeit

Gottes bei

Gregor

von

NyssaNyssaForsch. zur Kirchen und Dogmengesch. 16, Gottingen, 1966).

3

Besides

Gregory

of

Nyssa, Muhlenberg, op.

cit.,

draws attention

to

Irenaeus

(p. 69), Tertullian,

Minucius

Felix,

Hilary

of Poitiers

(pp. 70-2),

and the

Alexandrine

theologians,

viz.

Clement

and

Origen (pp.

73-82).



4/12

NOTES

AND

STUDIES

95

3De div. Norn. XIII, I, 977 .

4

De div. Nom.

XIII, III,

980

C

,

.

. .

.

The

view

according

to

which

and

,

though

being

the two constitutive

principles

of all

things,

are nevertheless

subordinated

to the

first,

divine

principle,

goes ultimately

back

to

Presocratic

philosophy,

and

is

adopted

and

developed especially

by

Neopythagoreanism

and

Neoplatonism.

As

Clement of

Alexandria,

Protr.Protr.

6,

1

(I 50,

16-17

=

Archelaus,

fr.

11

Diels,

II

47, 15)

tells

us,

both

Anaxagoras

and his

pupil

Archelaus

placed

divine

intelligence

above

infinitude,

.

In the Platonic

Philebus

Socrates,

after

maintaining

that all

things

are

composed

of limit

and

infinitude

(16 c),

makes

it

clear

that there is

a

cause above

these two

principles

(30

C

. . .

,,

,

'

. . .

,

cf.

23

D

.

.

.

). According

to

Syrianus,

In

Metaphys. 165,

35-166,

2,

Philolaus

(under

whose name is

probably

adumbrated

a

Neopythagorean

philosopher,

just

as in the

case of

Archaenetus

and

Brotinus,

mentioned a few lines

below, p.

166,

4-5)1

considered

and

as

the

two

supreme

realities deriv

ing

directly

from the first

principle,

.

Plotinus,

Enn.

II,

IV,

15 (II

69,

19-20

Brehier),

regards

infinitude

as

being produced by

the

one,

(i.e.

in the

one)

,2

and

brings

it

into

connection

with the

inexhaustible

power

of

intelligible being

(which

for him

is one and

the same

thing

with the

,

the

first

product

of the

one):3

(i.e.

the

intelligible)

act

,,

,

. . .

Enn.

VI, V,

II

(VI1 211, 23-5);

. .

.

,

1

.

R. Dodds

also,

Proclus,

The Elements

of Theology (Oxford, 1933), p.

247,

regards

this

passage

of

Syrianus

as

reflecting Neopythagorean

tradition.

2

To

this

passage

of Plotinus

attention

has been drawn

by

E. R.

Dodds,

op.

cit.

245

n.

3,

and

by

L.

Sweeney,

Gregorianum, 38 (1957), p. 718

n.

85.

The

words

immediately

preceding,

eV

rijs

eVos

del,

point

to the

doctrine

of the infinite

generative

power

of the

'one', which,

in

Plotinus'

opinion,

represents

the

only possible interpretation

of the infinitude

of the

'one':

see

p.

100 below.

For further

details on the

doctrine of infinitude

in

Plotinus

see

Dodds,

op.

cit.

245

and

246-7,

C.

J.

De

Vogel,

art. cit.

33-4,

and

especially

L.

Sweeney,

'Infinity

in

Plotinus',

Gregorianum, 38 (1957). 515

35

and

713-32

Cf. for

instance

Enn.

V, III, 5 (V 54, 26-7)

lv

.

8822C78



5/12

96

NOTES AND

STUDIES

,

.

VI, V,

12

(VI1

211,

5~9) Porphyry

takes

up

the view of his

teacher.1

In Proclus the

doctrine

of

an, together

with

that

of

,

assumes a

very precise

connotation

and

becomes a

fundamental element

of

his

strongly

hierarchical

system.

In

keeping

with

Neopythagoreism,

he maintains

that,

according

to

the

view set

forth

by

Socrates

in the

Philebus,Philebus,

he first

principle begets

both

and

:

iviv

,

Theol.Theol.lat.

Ill,

8

(III

30,

19-20

Saffrey-Westerink);

the

and the are for him the two supreme principles of beings,

subordinated

only

to the first 'one'

{El.

Theol.

90-2,

p.

82

Dodds).

More

exactly,

whereas the

must be

regarded

as the second

'one' which

originates being,

the

represents

the

infinite

generative power

of

this second

'one',

and is situated between

being

and the first

'one':

Theol.Theol.lat.

Ill,

8

(III

31, 18-20)

'

(i.e.

the second

'one',

the

)

,

.

Theol.Theol.

lat.

Ill,

8

(III 32, 2-5)

i.e.

the

first

one')

,,

,.

El.El.

heol.

92 (82, 34)

(

,

)

,

'

),

.

Although

the

generative

power {)

is

represented,

in the

passages

of the

Theologia

Platonica

quoted

above,

as

belonging

to the

and

as

originating

after

t

(

),

it

goes

nevertheless

ultimately

back,

in Proclus'

thought,

to the first one': in El. Theol.

56

(54, 8-11)

Proclus

clearly

maintains

that the

generative power

charac

teristic of the

inferior

beings

derives

from

the

beings

of the

upper

rank,

. .

.

.

In

identifying

with the

infinite

generative

power

belonging

to the second

'one' and

originating

from

the first

'one',

Proclus

does not seem to be

far

removed from

the Plotinian

conception,

as

it

appears

in the

passages

of the Enneads

quoted

above.

Damascius,

in Dub.

et

Sol.

45 (I 91,

1

Ruelle), places

the first 'one'

1

The first

part

of

Sent.

40 depends

on

Plotinus,

Enn.

VI,

v,

12: see the

apparatuspparatus

fontium

in E.

Lamberz, Porphyrii

sententiae ad

intellegibilia

ducentes

(Leipzig, 1975), p.

47.



6/12

NOTES

AND STUDIES

97

above

limit and

infinitude,

;

and

in his

commentary

on

the Philebus

(62,

3

Westerink)

he

repeats

the

same

view

referring

to

Proclus,

Se

,

(i.e.

Proclus).1

Dionysius'

doctrine of the subordination

of

to God

and of

its

origin

from him shows

therefore a

complete

agreement

with

the

previous Neopythagorean

and

Neoplatonic

tradition,

and

particularly

with Proclus

and Damascius:

passage

1 must be

compared

with

Syri

anus,

In

Metaphys. 165, 35-166,

2,

with

Plotinus,

Enn.

II,

iv,

15 (II

69, 19-20), and with Proclus, Theol. Plat. Ill, 8 (III 30, 19-20);

passage

2,

stressing

God's transcendence

with

respect

to

,

must

be understood in the

light

of

El.

Theol.

92 (82,

31-4); passage 3,

in

which God is

represented

in the act of

imparting

a limit

upon

,

finds also its

counterpart

in El. Theol.

92,

,

;

and

passage

4,

in which

the first one' is

repre

sented

as

being

prior

to

any

limit and

infinitude,

agrees

almost verbatim

with

Damascius,

Dub.

et Sol.

45 (I 91, 1).

(b)

It could not

escape Dionysius

that

Parmenides,

in

the first

hypo

thesis of

the

homonymous

Platonic

dialogue

which so much

influenced

the

theology

of

Neoplatonism,2

calls

the

'one'

also

(Parm.

137 d);

and

that,

in the second

hypothesis,

he

brings

the

'one' into

close

connection

with

the

infinite multitude of

beings

{Parm.

144 a-b).

And

since

Dionysius, adapting

the

Neoplatonic

interpretation

of

the

Parme

nidesnideso his own

theology,

identifies

his first

principle

with

the

'one' of

the

first two

hypotheses

of this

dialogue,3

he is inclined

to call

God

himself

and

.4

1

Another

passage

of the

commentary

on the Philebus

(98, 1-6)

is

also worth

noticing:

rives

al

;

. . .

. . .

2

On the

theological

interpretation

of

the

Parmenides in

Neopythagoreism

and

Neoplatonism

see

particularly

E. R.

Dodds,

'The Parmenides of

Plato and

the

Origin

of the

Neoplatonic

"One"',

Class.

Quarterly,

22

(1928),

pp.

129-42;

E.

Corsini,

II trattato De

divinis

nominibus dello

pseudo-Dionigi

e i

commenti

neoplatonicineoplatonici

l Parmenide

(Torino, 1962),

pp.

115-20;

H. D.

Saffrey-L.

G.

Westerink, Proclus, Theologie platonicienne,

i

(Paris, 1968), pp.

lxxxv-lxxxix.

3

This has been

rightly

seen

by

E.

von

Ivanka,

'Der

Aufbau der

Schrift

"De divinis nominibus"

des Ps.

Dionysios',

Scholastik,

15

(1940), pp.

392-3

(=lato(=lato(=

lato

Christianus, Einsiedeln,

1964, pp. 234-5)

and

by

E.

Corsini,

op.

cit.,

pp.

43

and 120-1. On

the

dependence

of the De

divinis

nominibus on

the

Parmenidesarmenides

see

particularly chapter

III

of Corsini's

book,

II De divinis

nominibus

ee l

Parmenide,

pp.

77-111.

4 It may be worth noticing that Clement of Alexandria also calls his God

-,,

n

Strom.

V

81,

5-82,

(II 380,20-5)

he is

no

doubt under the influence

of

a

Neopythagorean

speculation

on

the first

hypothesis

of the Parmenides .

(

.

.

.

,



7/12

98

NOTES AND

STUDIES

The identification of God with

and

gives origin,

in

Dionysius' thought,

to

three different

ideas. God is

infinitude

or infi

nite since

(1)

he

comprehends

all

things

in

himself;

(2)

he is endowed

with a

generative

power

which knows no

end;

(3)

he is

completely

in

comprehensible

to the

human

mind.

Infinitude

becomes

thus

practically

identical

(1)

with God's

property

of

enclosing everything

in

himself;

(2)

with his infinite

generative

power; (3)

with his total

unknowability.

(1)

That for

Dionysius

God is infinitude because he

comprehends

everything

in

himself is

clearly

shown

by

the

following

evidence:

5.

De div. Norn.

Ill,

I 680

.

6. De div. Notn.

V, ,

825

.

..

e

div.

Nom.

V, X,

825

>

[]

..

. .

.

.1

8.

De div. N0ttl.

IX,

III,

912

.

.

.

. .

.

.

It is one of

the

main features

of the

theology

both

of

Dionysius

and of

Neoplatonism

to

consider

all

beings

as

proceeding

from

the 'one'

by

means

of a

process

of

emanation:

the

'one'

is the source of all

beings

in

so far

as

they

pre-exist

already

in some

wayi.e.

without

being

distinct

from one

anotherin

the

'one',

which contains

all of them and

brings

them

forth.2

This

is the

underlying

idea of a

passage

of

Plotinus,

Enn.

,

Sc

,

oil

,

,

.

All

these

concepts

go

back

to the first

hypothesis

of

the

Parmenides.

On this

passage

see also

Muhlenberg, op.

cit., pp. 75-6;

I

very

much

regret

not to

have drawn atten

tion

to

this

important

point

in

my

book on Clement

(see particularly p.

219).

1

is

my

own

restoration;

I

also

thought

it

proper

to

cut out

the

which

immediately

follows. E.

R.

Dodds,

Proclus.

The Elements

of

Theology,

p.

248,

in

quoting

this

passage,

puts

after

in,

without

making

it clear

that the

word

represents

a

restoration,

since it occurs

neither

in

the

Migne

edition nor

in

the

manuscripts.

I,

however,

prefer

to

write

,

which

I

regard

as

dependent

on

.

*

It

must be

remembered

that

in

passages

58

of

Dionysius,

as well as in

analogous

passages

of

Plotinus,

Proclus,

and

Damascius,

the 'one'

comprehends

all

things

in itself

potentially,

i.e. before

bringing

them forth

by

means of its

emanation.

This

concept

must not

be

confused

with the

other

idea

according

to

which

the divine

principle,

thanks

to its

power,

embraces

()

and holds

together () the whole sensible universe. This idea, which goes ultimately

back

to

Presocratic

philosophy,

occurs

in Plato's

conception

of the

world-soul,

becomes

fundamental

in the

Porch,

and

is inherited

by

Philo,

Clement of

Alex.,

Gregory

of

Nyssa,

Middle

Platonism,

Neoplatonism,

and

Dionysius

himself:



8/12

NOTES

AND STUDIES

99

V,

III,

15 (V 70, 29-3 )

7

.

. . '

.

In his

commentary

on

the Parmenides

Proclus,

prob

ably

having

Aristotle in

mind,

brings

the

infinitude

of

the first 'one'

into

close

connection

with

its

property

of

possessing

everything

in advance:

Inn

Farm. VI

(73,

11-12

Cousin)

...

el

,

7

,

.1

Inn

Parm.

VI

(7316-17)

.

Damascius also

maintains that the 'one'

comprehends

everything:

Dub.Dub.t Sol. I

(I 3, 1-2)

'

.

Dub.Dub.

t

Sol. 2

(I 5, 2-3)

.

. .

'

. . .

.

Dub.Dub.

t

Sol.

25 (I

42, 27)

.

Ps.-Dionysius'

dependence

on

Neoplatonism

even

in

terminology

is

therefore

evident:

the

of

passages

5

and 8

is

already

used

by

Proclus and

Damascius;

and the

of

passage

7

must be com

pared

with the

expression

which occurs

in

Plotinus,

Enn.

V, III,

15 (V

70,

29-30).

(2)

God's infinitude

is

also connected with his

generative

power,

which is infinite in so

far

as it never ceases to

produce

an infinite

number of

powers

and never

runs short.

This idea occurs in

the

two

following

passages:

9.

De div. Nom.

VIII,

11,

889

D

. .

.

157j57,

2

.

see,

for

instance,

Anaximenes 2

(Diels I,

95)

and W.

Jaeger's

important

remarks

on the use of the term

on the

part

of some

Presocratic

philo

sophers, op.

cit.

42

and n.

39,

pp.

232-3;

Plato,

Tim.

36 e;

SVF

I

530,

II

439,

440, 441, 447;

Philo, De

Fuga

et Inv. 112, De

Conf. Ling.

137,

De Post. C.

7,

DeDe

Migr.

Abr.

182,

De Sobr.

63,

De

Somn.

I

63

and

185;

Clement of Alex.

Strom.Strom.

I, 5, 4,

II, 6, 2, V,

73, 3,

V, 81,

3; Gregory

of

Nyssa,

De

Profess.

Christ.

139,39, 3-4

Jaeger;

Plutarch,

De An. Procr. in Tim.

1023 a;

Atticus,

fr. VIII

Baudry;

Alcinous,

Did.

170,

3-5

(on

the

right spelling

of the name of

the author

of the

Didaskalikos,

who must

be

distinguished

from

Albinus,

the

pupil

of

Gaius,

see now

J.

Whittaker, Phoenix,

28

(1974), pp. 450-6);

Plotinus,

Enn.

IV,

3, 9

(IV 76,

36-7)

and

V, 1,

2

(V 17,

29-30); Ps.-Dionysius,

De div. Nom.

IV,

iv

697

c, 700

a-b,

VIII,

11

892 a,

XI,

949 a, XI,

11

949

c.

1

Proclus' words

eVo's

may

have

been influenced

by

Aristotle's

definition

of

,

ot 8e

17780

,

Phys.

Ill

207a8-9-

As to

the

idea

according

to which infinitude

comprehends

everything

in

itself,

cf.

Aristotle,

Phys.

Ill

207a1821, ye 1, nepicgfiv

1,

'

.

2

The

expression ?

is Procline: see for instance

El.

Theol.

(2,

10-11),

Theol. Plat.

II,

1

(II

4,

22-3),

In Parm. VI

(75,

16 and

19).



9/12

100

NOTES AND

STUDIES

10. De

div. Norn.

VIII, 11,

889

D-892

A

in'

.

Plotinus also had

interpreted

the

infinitude of the

'one'

in

this

way:

the

'one' is unlimited

(Enn.

IV

ill, 8,

pp. 74, 38

6

,,

f.

Enn.

V, V, II,

p. 103, 34

"'

^

and

Enn.

VI, V,

4>

202,

13-14

,

),

but its

infinitude must be

under

stood as

referring

not to its

physical

dimensions

(from

this

point

of

view the 'one' is neither limited nor unlimited, Enn. V, v, 10,

p. 103,

18-20 '

. . .

'

'

)

but

only

to its

inexhaustible

power:1

Enn.Enn.Enn.

I,

4,

15

(II

69,

19)

Enn.Enn.

V,

III,

8

(IV 74> 3^~7) V

TV

,

..

Enn.Enn.

, V,

(V 103,

212)

'

..

Enn.Enn.

I, V,

\ (VI1

202,

1314)

"

,

'

,

;

Enn.Enn.

I, ,

6

(VI2

11210

)

eivai

)

and

is

severely

condemned

by

Justinian

for this

reason: cf. the references

produced

by

P. Koetschau in the

apparatus

fontium, p.

164.

For

a

discussion

of

this

passage

cf.

Muhlenberg,

op.

cit.,

pp. 78-82,



10/12

NOTES AND STUDIES

101

The same view is shared

by

Damacius,

who

in

Dub. et Sol.

178

(II 55,

22)

uses

the term

which occurs in

passage 9

of Ps.

Dionysius:

.1

(3)

In two

passages

Dionysius brings

nto close

connection

with the total

unknowability

of the first

principle.

God is

and,

is therefore too

superior

to

the limited

faculties

of

the human

mind,

which is not

capable

of

comprehending

him:

II.II. De div. Norn.

I,

I

588

. . .

2

. . .

.

12. De div. Nom.

I, 11,

588

C

.3

The doctrine of

the

absolute

unknowability

of

the first

principle

is

fundamental in

Neoplatonism:

as E.

R. Dodds has

shown,

it derives

from

the

theological

interpretation

of the 'one' of the

first

hypothesis

of

Plato's Parmenides.4

And since Parmenides calls this

'one'

(Parm.(Parm.37 d)

and

comes

to

the

conclusion that it

cannot be the

object

of any speech, scientific knowledge, or opinion (Parm. 142 a), it must

not have been difficult

for

Dionysius

to

bring

these two

negative

properties

of

the

first

one'

(that

of

being

infinite and

that of

being

completely unknown)

into connection

with

each other and

to define

consequently

his God

as an

which lies

far

beyond

the reach

of

the human mind.

But

Dionysius

did not find

this close

connection

between

and

God's

unknowability

in

the Parmenides itself or in

Neoplatonism:

the

'one'

of

the first

hypothesis

of

the Parmenides

is

represented

as

being

completely

unknown not because

it

is

,

but because

it

partakes

in no way of being (Parm. 141 e ), and

1

In

the

Elements

of Theology

Proclus

applies

the

term

not to

the first

principle,

but to

the

intelligible beings

deriving

from

and

:

see El. Theol.

84 (78, 5),

86

(80, 12), 89 (82, 2), 92 (82,

31).

In the

Commentary

onn the

Timaeus

also

(see

Diehl, Index,

vol.

iii,

397)

the

term

is not

applied

to the first

principle.

The

expression

en'

in

passage

10 of

Dionysius

should be

compared

with

Damascius,

Dub. et Sol.

178

(II 55,

18)

en'

.

22

In

my opinion,

the

varia

lectio

,

which occurs in some

manuscripts,

is better than

, accepted

in the

Migne

edition.

3

The term

which occurs in De cael. Hier.

II,

iii,

140

D

is also con

nected with

God's

incomprehensibility:

..

4

Cf. Class.

Quarterly,

22

(1928).

133i

and

especially

the

Appendix

I,

'The

unknown God in

Neoplatonism',

in his

Proclus,

The

Elements

of Theology

(Oxford

1933), 310-13.



11/12

102 NOTES

AND

STUDIES

in

spite

of the

strong emphasis

laid on

the

doctrine of

the

unknowability

of

the first

'one',

Neoplatonism

does not seem to

regard

this

unknow

ability

as

a

result

of

.

As we

have

seen

(pp. 95-7

above),

for

Plotinus, Proclus,

and

Damascius

is the

product

of the first

,one',

but

not identical

with

it;

and when

they

call this 'one'

infinite,

they

think either of its

property

of

containing

all

beings

in itself

potentially,

or

of

its

generative

power

which

knows no

end.1

The

con

ception

of

God's

unknowability

as

a

direct result of

has come

to

Dionysius

not

from

Neoplatonism

but from a Patristic

source,

namely

Gregoiy of Nyssa, and goes ultimately back to the Aristotelian doctrine

of

71/)>.

.

Muhlenberg

has

devoted

a

detailed

inquiry

to the notion of

both

in

Gregory

of

Nyssa

and in

previous

Greek

thought,2

and has

also hinted

at the

way

in which

Dionysius interprets

this doctrine of the

Cappadocian

father.3

We shall here limit

ourselves to

drawing

attention

to some

passages

of

Gregory

and of

Aristotle which

may

be of

some

importance

for our

point.

That

Gregory

of

Nyssa regards

as a

negative

attribute

of God

and

as the

main cause of his

unknowability

appears

clearly

from the

following evidence:

Contraontra Eunom. II

(I 246,

16-22

Jaeger)

i.e.

)

. .

. .

,

'

,,

'

.*

Contraontra

Eunom.

Ill

(II 58,

268

Jaeger)

55

,

.

Quoduod

non sint tres dii

(52, 1520 Miiller)

,

.

,

.6

1

As to the

interpretation

given by

E.

Muhlenberg

of the

passage

of

Enn.

VI, IX,

6

quoted

above

(p. 100)

see the

footnote

p.

100 n.

3

above.

2

Cf.

p. 94

n. 2 above.

Op.

cit.

142-3:

'. .

. dad er

[Gregor

of

Nyssa]

nicht einfach

sagt,

das

MaB

Gottes

sei seine

Unbegreiflichkeit.

So haben die

mystischen

Theologen, ange

fangen

bei

Dionysius Areopagita, Gregor

von

Nyssa

verstanden.'

4

This

passage

is discussed at some

length

by

Muhlenberg, op.

cit.,

p. 142.

5

The same verb SioJ s used by Dionysius in passage 2 quoted above

(P- 94)

6

Another

passage

of

Gregory

of

Nyssa

about divine

infinitude,

De An. et

Res.

(P.G.

46. 97

a

3-8),

is also worth

noticing, although

there is no

mention in



12/12

NOTES AND STUDIES 103

The last sentence

of this

passage,

which

traces the

unknowability

of

divine

nature

back to

the

impossibility

of

giving

any

definition

of

pov,pov,

s based

on the Aristotelian

doctrine

according

to

which

is

completely

unknown:

Phys.Phys.Phys.

187b 7

el

fj

.

Phys.Phys.

ll

207"

25-6

fj

.

Rhet.Rhet.ll I048b 27-8

(c)

It is now

necessary

to

point

out that there is

no real contradiction

between

Dionysius'

view

which

places

the

first

principle

above

and considers the latter

as a

product

of the former and his

tendency

to

identify

with God himself.

If we take into account

a funda

mental law

of

Dionysius' systemnamely

the

law

of

and

,

the two distinct

stages

of

God's

existenceand

are aware of

the

philo

sophical background

of both

views about

,

we

are able to

under

stand

what

Ps.-Dionysius really

meant and to

appreciate

the intimate

coherence of his

thought.

For

Dionysius

there can be no confusion between

the

which

is

produced by

God and is inferior to him and

the

which

is

identical

with

him:

whereas the former is the

expression

of divine

emanation or

,

and is

only

one of the

two

constitutive

prin

ciples

of

beings

which Plato

places

under the first

cause and which

both Plotinus

and

Proclus

regard

as an

emanation

of the first ,one'

(cf.

pp. 95-6

above),

the latter

must be referred to

God's

,

viz. to that

stage

of God's existence in which he has not

yet

come out of

himself,

and

becomes then one of his main

negative

attributes. As we

have seen

(pp. 97

and 101

above),

it was the

Neoplatonic interpretation

of

the

first

two

hypotheses

of Plato's Parmenides that led

Dionysius

to

identify

with

God;

and the three different

ways

in which he

interpreted

it were

suggested

to him

by

Neoplatonism

and

by Gregory

of

Nyssa.

Salvatore R. C. Lilla

it of God's

unknowability:

'

.

.

.

)

-

,

.

1

On

the notion of

in

Aristotle

see also

Muhlenberg, op.

cit.,

pp. 43

if.

who, however,

does not draw

enough

attention to the

unknowability

of the

Aristotelian

.

In the

passage

of Clement of

Alexandria,

Strom. V

81,

6

quoted above (footnote 4, p. 97 above) there also seems to be a closer connection

between

the

infinitude of the 'one' and its

unknowability:

. .

.

.

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LILLA, Salvatore R. C., The Notion of Infinitude in Ps.-dionysius Areopagita

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