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Marketing techniques and political campaigns:

the limitations for the marketing of British

political parties.

Darren G Lilleker (University of Leicester) DGL4@le.ac.uk

&

Ralph Negrine (University of Leicester) RXN@le.ac.uk

This is work in progress; please contact the authors if you wish to cite this paper.

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Marketing techniques and political campaigns:the limitations for the marketing of British political parties.

AbstractThe introduction of marketing techniques to political electioneering is claimed to have

led to a dramatic shift in the way politics and politicians are presented to the

electorate. Presentation, style and delivery of the message is said to be paramount,

and winning the argument through clear, concise sentences can determine the

outcome of an election. However the concentration on designing and promoting the

party as a brand and the corporatisation of the party structure can cause tensions to

emerge between the Partys headquarters and the local organisation, individual

candidates or Members of Parliament. These tensions can often be submerged in

pursuit of electoral victory, however, when faced with strategic failures, the faade of

cohesion could develop very public fissures. Drawing on interviews with a number of

former and current Members of Parliament and parliamentary candidates, representingall the main three political parties, our research found that marketing techniques are

met with hostility and can cause conflict between the different layers of the British

political party structures. These findings lead us to conclude that British political

parties cannot be marketed as homogenous providers of the ideal product and, while

there is a necessity to professionalise certain aspects of the campaign, parties should

also reintroduce a more grass-roots approach to campaigning.

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Marketing techniques and political campaigns:the limitations for the marketing of British political parties.

Introduction the marketing of British politics

It is undeniable that politicians now campaign in a more orchestrated manner

re-stating, almost ad nauseum, the line of the day, the chosen phrases and

particular themes have a clearer idea of their target audiences and rely more

on pollsters, consultants and media advisers. (Kavanagh, 1995: 176)

[It is] vital to reinforce the impression of an innovative party shedding old

associations and image. This dimension will continue to be part of our

communications strategy a fresh party, new approach, on the move. As an

important basis for this I am looking at our overall corporate image

everything that offers a visual impression of the party. (Mandelson, quoted in

Gould, 1998a: 2)

If a shop looks cheap you expect cheap, unreliable products. Its the same with

a party. The Conservatives wanted to appear business-like and professional

that meant producing uniform literature, with uniform logos and offering

uniform commitments. You cant have one policy in Northumbria, another for

Yorkshire, something for Scotland and Wales and another for London. You

either have a coherent policy or your opponents will shoot you out of the

water. In 2001 I watched the Election from home, we [the Conservatives] were

a shambles. (Interview, 19/01/02)

If you walk into any branch of McDonalds across Britain you will find the same

products at the same price, the staff wear the same uniforms and the walls bear the

same posters. Often even the toy that comes with the Kids Club meal is the same.

Everyone knows what McDonalds sell, they know about the quality of the product

and they will probably have a good idea of the cost. The above quotes suggest that a

political party can present itself in a similar way. Every regional office can carry the

same logo, have the same letterheads, the same flyers but, are there limits to the extent

of uniformity? Can every MP provide exactly the same response to a question

concerning a local issue, should locally elected representatives disassociate

themselves from a local campaign that conflicts with an element of party policy and

can individuals divorce conscience from decision-making? These are all questionsthat can and should be posed in response to the introduction of marketing techniques

to the British political party.

Marketing techniques are employed as a response to the increased dealignment of the

British electorate, particular within the context of the post-industrial society, (Lilleker,

2002) and the growing influence of the media over public opinion. (Maarek, 1995;

Lees-Marshment, 2001a) Parties are employing market intelligence in order to

develop a product that can be adjusted to suit shifts in public opinion and promising

policy objectives that the electorate see as key to their own expectations. (Lees-

Marshment, 2001b) This all seems to fulfil Kirchheimers prophesy that the changing

nature of society would lead to the emergence of catch-all parties, who do not

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possess a loyal constituency and instead have to capture a broad consensus of the

electorate. (Kirchheimer, 1966) As Panebianco argued:

Changes in communication techniques are causing an earthquake in party

organisations: old bureaucratic roles becoming obsolete new professional

roles are gaining ground Television and interest groups become far more

important links between parties and electorates than the traditional collateralorganisations [particularly mass membership] the electorate of belonging

shrinks and party identification declines Electoral arenas become more

turbulent and unstable, forcing parties toward the electoral-professional model

through imitative and reciprocal adjustment processes. (Panebianco, 1988:

266-7)

In the modern British context political communication can appear restricted to a

discourse between the partys highest echelon and the electorate. This is epitomised

by the political debate that takes place in highly stylised, participatory arenas, all

output to the media is professionally produced by specialists and driven solely by

electoral concerns.

The major shift in recent times has been from political parties selling themselves as a

product rooted in the partys traditions and ideology to becoming increasingly

informed by public opinion. Lees-Marshment notes how, during the 1980s, British

parties employed sales or product oriented models of campaigning. These models

were unsuccessful in developing a credible image for the Labour party, dogged by the

partys failures in government 1976-9 and its subsequent leftward drift. Lees-

Marshment observes that the view was taken that:

Conviction politics would seem dead where the beliefs held are not those of

the majority of the population. [] a party that does not listen to the people

and does not meet their demands in any way at all will not succeed electorally.

(Lees-Marshment, 2001a: 132)

This presents the conclusion that unless a party follows the general will, as offered

through polling research, it can have little or no success in General Elections. Parties

must create a brand for themselves, this links them to a product that is desired by the

electorate and will be expected to reject ideological constraints in favour of electoral

dividends.

There is little reference in the political marketing literature to how the component

parts of political parties adjust to party branding. The marketing approach views

parties as homogenous; like a retail outlet. The micro level is seen as unimportant and,

where it is given a degree of attention, its only role is to mobilise the electorate.Political scientists often reaffirm this perspective, though Denver and Hands note that

there is a requirement for local campaigns to include an element of persuasion which

does have a marginal effect on voting behaviour. (Denver & Hands, 1997) However

the perception that the local campaign lacks significance is reinforced in a recent

special edition of the Journal for Marketing Management.1 None of the eight

contributions on differing aspects of the 2001 General Election devote any attention to

the micro party structure. These studies focus on the branding of parties as centrally

organised, top-down structures, whose image is determined by the leadership. This

indicates that the application of marketing techniques has created parties that are not

only centralised, but that the character of the leader and the national campaign is one

that dominates all levels of the party structure. The literature assumes that the power

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of the leadership remains unchallenged and that all party political activity is initiated

and directed from the headquarters of each British party.

However autonomous political activity still takes place at the local level. There may

not be the same level of public meetings as there were, but the local constituency is

seen, by the vast majority of prospective parliamentary candidates [PPCs] in the 2001General Election, as the hub of campaign activity.2 Those who engage in this activity

have varying levels of contact with the central party office, and often have views that

conflict with party policy. Candidates often find the prescribed methods inappropriate

and are hostile to the corporatisation of the party. This evidence conflicts with the

thesis presented by the political marketing literature. This paper explores the

relationship between the central party campaign and activity and opinion at the local

level. Through a study of the application of marketing techniques within each of the

major British political parties, and the way in which the market-oriented campaigning

methods are viewed, we can gain some insights into where the limits of marketing lie.

Examining the limitations will allow us to draw some conclusions regarding how

British political parties can a strategy that involves some aspects of marketing, butthat their strategies must not appear too slick, too centrally co-ordinated or remove all

vestiges of individuality from the election campaign.

The introduction of marketing techniques: the hostilities begin

The historians of political communications suggest that the introduction of any

practices that implied media manipulation, conducting public relations exercises or

the selling of parties and candidates were met with at best antipathy. Conservative

Prime Minister 1924-9 Stanley Baldwin did encourage the use of radio, cinema and

the printed photograph as tools of the campaign and became quite the star of the

newsreel in his own right. (A Seldon & P Snowdon, 2001: 33; Ramsden, 1982) In

1936 both Downing Street and Whitehall were employing the skills of public relations

specialists that researched the economic effects of policies and their impact in terms

of governmental support. These consultants were also required to suggest ways in

which a policy could be sold to the governments core supporters. (Middlemas, 1979:

356) However, despite the warm relationship between Churchill and the media during

the Second World War there is little to suggest that politicians were becoming attuned

to the requirements of the media. Political leaders in Britain were largely distrustful of

the media, even when those journalists were elected members of their own party,

(Interviews, 19/10/01; 09/12/01) and politicians expected deferential treatment.

Labour Prime Minister 1964-70 and 1974-6 Harold Wilson liked to believe he couldcontrol his media image and became infuriated when criticised by journalists, though

his frustration was argued to be a reaction to the anti-Labour stance adopted by the

majority of newspaper editors. (Williams, 1975: 179) Edward Heath, Conservative

prime Minister 1970-4, in contrast, preferred to maintain a distance between himself

and the corps of journalist that pursued him on his campaigning tours of Britain.

(Alexander & Watkins, 1995: 175)

The party machines, particularly at the local level, exhibited extreme forms of

hostility to operating within pre-determined, media-friendly parameters. This is

particularly the case with Labour. Hugh Gaitskell made several attempts at

modernisation following the partys third consecutive electoral defeat in 1959.(Kavanagh, 1995: 175) While all attempts to reform the party through the left leaning

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National Executive and Party Conference were doomed to fail, his attempts to address

the partys image problem through a public relations initiative at the grassroots was

met with equal disdain. Despite the support of local MP and Party Chairman Ted

Short, the London Borough of Islington Labour Party were obstructive of every

measure. As the Local Government Officer 1964-6 explained, Islington was a typical

Labour group; scared to death of any suggestion that they were involved in PRmanipulation... (Interview, 13/12/01) This phenomena has not been eroded despite

the reforms to the party since 1994. As the same party worker recalled There is a

distrust of gloss, even among the party workers in Romford, where I was working [in

2001], I felt they were a bit sniffy about all of this. (Interview, 13/12/01)

The tensions between the media and the party leaderships, and between the reformers

and traditionalists still exist. Kavanagh reported that consultants employed by each of

the political parties between the 1960s and 1992 recalled that politicians often

believed they knew best and would counter the advice of the specialists they had hired

to get them elected. (Kavanagh, 1995: 164-71) However considering the quotes at the

top of this article, and the wealth of literature which talks of the professionalisation ofpolitical communication, (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995; Blumler, & Kavanagh, 1999;

Farrell, Kolodny & Medvic, 2001; Gibson & Rommele, 2001; Mancini, 1999; Watts,

1997) one would assume that such conflicts have been resolved. Indeed, in the case of

the Labour party, detractors appear to have acquiesced in the cause of electoral

success. However the case of the sniffy party workers at Romford, whose

antagonism to all things marketing related were argued to have contributed to Labour

mounting an ineffective campaign, highlights the reverse.

The anti-marketing Labour activists in Romford are not alone, as we shall see there is

a core of antagonism to the trend of marketing politics within each of the major

electoral contenders in Britain. The following three sections of this paper explore the

tensions between, on the one hand the party members, campaigners and candidates

the micro political level - and on the other the central party machinery or macro level.

The discussion will start with the Labour party, the party categorised as the classic

market-oriented party (Lees-Marshment, 2001a: 181), we will then move on to the

Conservatives, the party who have failed to add an effective marketing dimension to

their campaigning, and conclude with a study of the Liberal Democrats who have so

far resisted employing marketing techniques. This study will allow us some insights

into what limitations exist for political parties in Britain becoming fully market-

oriented.

New Labour control freaks and corporate identities?

Literature on political marketing, and the professionalisation of parties and political

communication rely heavily on New Labour as the epitome of the post-modern party.

(Norris, 2002) New Labour emerged from of a variety of theoretical responses to new

times, these converged with Mandelsonian strategic thinking to give rise to a strategic

response to the Electoral defeats of 1979 and 1983. Following the fourth defeat in

1992 the party transformed its campaigning and communications strategy. (Gould,

1998a; Shaw, 1994) Philip Gould, Labours strategy consultant 1986-97, tells the

reader:

The Labour victory in 1997 was the end of a journey that started in the 1950swith the first failed attempt at modernisation, which culminated in Gaitskells

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failure to change Clause IV [and] condemned Labour to a 30-year struggle

before it was able to gain final, ascendant victory. (Gould, 1998b: 4)

While this created a formidable electoral machine, what had also been created was a

party that feared disunity, a party that could not allow the media to be able to

characterise them as having conflicting perspectives or differing opinions. The LabourParty's obsession with distancing itself from anything which the right wing media

could pick up and exploit as 'extremist' is well described by Hilary Wainright in her

account of a Labour Party election rally. The Labour Family Fun Day in Islington,

London was a well-policed event. To test the atmosphere, Wainwright purposely

bought a copy ofSocialist Worker. 'Slipping it under my arm', she writes,I returned to the hall. When I came to be searched, an earnest young man

asked me: 'Please could you leave the paper on one side and pick it up

afterwards.' 'Don't be ridiculous,' I replied laughing. 'Why should I do that?'

'Please,' he pleaded, 'it will embarrass Neil Kinnock. (Negrine, ?????)

The paranoia is often treated with amusement tinged with derision, but equally thereis a feeling that the members should toe the party line unquestioningly in order to

secure victory. Even after two years, a time when many former left-wing activists felt

the party was failing the working people, support for the project remained. One

Labour party worker with left leanings made the point well:

Well we dont want to scare the horses, if we mention socialism now the

merchant banker types will switch to the Tories and their papers will switch

with them. Weve got to give Tony the chance, thats a full second term, then

well see what colour he is. (Interview, 11/03/00)

However New Labours leaders and policy makers largely ignore the opinion of the

membership. It is the electorates opinion that informs Labours political agenda.

New Labour's 1997 Election Manifesto has market intelligence as the starting point,

in 1996 Labour conducted a series of opinion polls asking what were the most

important issues to the electorate. Six months later, when Labours ten points were

launched, it led on those highlighted as most important with the top three being

reiterated in the same order. (Lees-Marshment & Lilleker, 2001) Furthermore Labour

continued to monitor opinion polls and conducted focus groups to measure the effect

of campaign posters, broadcasts and the wording of party campaign literature on the

electorate. While it can be argued that the issues that were important to the electorate;

health care, education and unemployment, were also key aspects of Labours

traditional ethos, the party had become increasingly led by public opinion and wasseen to have lost its ideological foundation.

In the period prior to the 1997 General Election Labour developed a strategy

designed to project images and receive media reports that would depict the party as

being harmonious with the demands of the electorate. (Lees-Marshment & Lilleker,

2001: 211) Philip Gould provides some interesting accounts of how the Millbank

machine worked, he tells us that the central element was that dialogue with the

electorate was constant. From top to bottom, voter feedback was built into the

system. (Gould, 1998b: 7) Labour recognised there was no real need to promise the

earth to get elected, the Conservatives were seen as a spent force and the zeitgeist of

the election was time for a change. Labour's pledges and key messages were keptsimple to the point of vagueness and reinforced through repetition. One Labour

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candidate recalled that they worked according to the Mandelson edict: "repeat-remind,

repeat-remind, repeat-remind." He recalled;

If I couldnt do something everyday of the week that mentioned one of

Labours five key pledges once, adhering to the principle and it was said to

us quite often during 1995, and certainly during 1996 as the election got closer

when you are absolutely sick to death of repeating the same line over andover again, that is the point at which it is beginning to penetrate the publics

consciousness. (Interview, 17/12/01)

It is argued that this tactic was successful. As one study found, Labour benefited from

an electorate that subconsciously weights the utility of a given policy by the

probability of its being implemented and sums this across the different policies.

(Heath, Jowell & Curtis, 2001: 159) Labour's modest promises to do;

just a bit more here, a bit better for hospitals, schools, youth crime, all

reinforced by D:Reams Things can only get better, were accepted on face

value as a reaction to what some described as eighteen years of Tory misrule.

(Toynbee & Walker, 2001: 2)

At the 1997 and 2001 General Elections Labour candidates, particularly those

standing in key marginal constituencies, were expected to act as advocates for the

party line. This was not simply a case of repeating identical messages, on the same

day as the leaders. No candidate was allowed to back a cause that would conflict with

party policy; this highlights the fear of potential embarrassment that plagues the

Labour leadership. One MP found that his campaign literature, produced for him by

the regional office, had been censored; sections supporting local organic farms had

been removed. (Interview, 08/01/02) Three candidates who sent a letter to The Times

criticising Robin Cook and Menzies Campbell's chapter on Europe in The Progressive

Century (Lawson & Sherlock, 2001) came under attack from the regional and national

offices. We all got phone calls they said we dont need this, theres a General

Election coming, dont wash our dirty laundry in public. (Interview, 04/01/02)

More damagingly the regional office ordered that David Locke could not offer to

support the reinstatement of emergency treatment at Kidderminster Hospital3 as it

was not party policy to single out any particular case or reverse the policy of a

government department. (Interview, 04/01/02) This lost Locke his Wyre Forest seat

to the independent Dr Richard Taylor. The conclusion we can reach is that it was

more important for Labour to present a united image than to win one seat. This

practice has received criticism from some candidates4 and there is evidence of

discomfort among some constituency parties.

Paul Marsden, who left Labour to join the Liberal Democrats in December 2001,

delivered the first public condemnation of New Labour's obsession with discipline. In

a press statement he declared:

I have lost confidence in the Labour Government, I've had enough of their

obsession with control freakery and spin I have experienced enough Labour

intolerance in recent weeks to last a lifetime. I want to belong to a party which

encourages debate and practices genuine internal democracy.

He went on to blame Blair for much of the intolerance. Tony Blair is behaving in an

increasingly arrogant and presidential manner. His party believes in threats and

intimidation to crush internal dissent.5 Marsden is not alone in voicing disquiet about

the Blair measures for maintaining discipline.

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In the prelude to the 1997 General Election candidates recognised the necessity for

exorcising the ghost of 1983, however once Labour's landslide was realised many

expected discipline to be relaxed and for Labour to adopt more traditionally socialist

spending policies. Minor rebellions over cuts to single parent benefit and the ending

of student grants ensued. Candidates interviewed stressed being dissatisfied with the

lack of democracy and argued that they found from doorstep campaigning that this,more than any other factor, was turning the voters off. (Interview, 18/02/02) One

candidate argued he had to be extremely careful when deciding how to run his

campaign.

I saw my job as being quite loyal to the line, but the Labour party has this

image of control and toeing the party line and candidates not having their own

mind, and the public are getting sick of that. There is a need, a fine art, of

being loyal, but to appearing that you have an independent mind. (interview,

04/02/02)

Others found it very difficult to run an effective campaign.

The modern campaign, as highlighted by Denver and Hands, depends upon resourcessupplied by party headquarters. If these are not given, either due to hostility to a

particular candidate or because the seat is deemed unwinnable, the candidate is

reasonably free to say and do what they like. One candidate campaigning in a safe

Conservative seat testified: we were asked to keep our regional press officer

informed of what we were doing but there was no direct interference. (Interviews,

27/11/01; 11/03/02) Only if the candidate received national attention that embarrassed

Labour would the party attempt to kerb the activities of that candidate. However if

the candidate was fighting a target seat, so requiring greater resources, that meant

allowing the 'party machine' to interfere in campaign activities. One candidate

described Labour techniques in glowing terms:

The Labour party machine is phenomenal, being able to put so many bits of

glossy paper through an individuals door, all tailor-made mailshots so that the

person is addressed and they focus on a number of issues that you know the

voter identifies with. Making sure there is personal phone calls from the

candidate so on and so forth it doesnt go like clockwork, but it is bloody

professional. (Interview, 06/01/02)

However the same candidate argued that the party was ill-equipped to fight a local

campaign; the regional and national structures were detached from the local issues

and context.

You've got to know what is happening locally, so youve got to break up the

party machine and return it back down to the local level. Say heres yourresources, well give you the support, the training, the media management

techniques, but then let go. They wont! (Interview, 06/01/02)

This was a theme running through the arguments of a number of candidates: the

importance of local control and local issues. However does this mean that a party can

only market itself at the local level, that the national or overarching persona actually

hinders the party from campaigning where many assume that it matters; in the

constituency?

Many of the former MPs interviewed in the course of this research stressed that

constituency campaigning was of very high importance; a belief voiced by MPs

representing all parties. An MP who ignored the local issues was 'committing politicalsuicide' as an opponent could fill this gap; a tactic used to great effect by the Liberal

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Democrats in recent years. Therefore there is much criticism of the New Labour style

among many former Labour MPs, none of whom can be called 'Old Labour left-

wingers'. They see that careerism within the party means adhering to party dictates.

One former MP, who retired in 2001, argued they dont have the balls that our

generation had. We would stand up and be counted on any unpopular subject.

(Interview, 19/09/01) Another claimed that discipline was impossible and that dissentis part of the normal, free, democratic process of the party. (Interview, 23/10/01) A

former moderniser criticised the lick spittles toadies [and] self obsessed yuppies

who populated the Blair leadership recalling that one [sh]ould go along with the

Labour programme unless you feel something is wrong. (Interview, 31/10/01) The

former MPs see that the loci of control has shifted, as one Labour loyalist noted: The

route to [becoming a candidate] now is to win approbation of the centre first In the

1970s if you kept the confidence of your constituency that was recognised as making

you safe. (Interview, 19/10/01) Central control is seen, almost universally, as counter

productive; both in terms of campaigning and maintaining a role as a constituency

representative. This is exemplified by the case of Wyre Forest; this was a disaster for

Labour's strategy, however, it was an affordable loss and must have been calculated asmore acceptable than acting diffidently over policy. However some argue that this

strategy is doomed to fail. One current MP noted that, currently Labours market-

orientation is successful, but with an effective opposition and a dissatisfied electorate

the next General Election will determine whether such techniques have any realistic

chances for longevity.

1997 was very successful. 2001 not as much, but reasonably successful. 2004

or 5 no. Theyll fall flat on their face because the voters have wised up now.

I've seen this on the doorsteps Oh god, bloody New Labour again If

they use the same glossy techniques again it will fail [the voters] dont like

the style now, they want the barebones of honest politics trying to get it

down to the local level is the key It was understandable in the run up to

1997 to have some strong discipline but they should have eased off, but they

cant. They dont know how to. (Interview, 08/01/02)

Evidence suggests that New Labour is not unaware of the hostilities within the party.

Party Chairman Charles Clarke is considering reforming the policy making procedure

to re-empower the membership in order to stimulate the levels of local support back to

their pre-1997 levels.6 Furthermore, during the 2001 General Election Peter

Mandelson called for reductions to the emphasis on presentation. (Moloney &

Colmer, 2002: 964) There were also moves to return party spin doctors to a role of

invisible press officers, though this was to lessen criticism rather than to reduceattempts at media manipulation. (Moloney & Colmer, 2002: 966) The revelations that

civil servant and press officer Jo Moore had advised her Minister to bury bad news

beneath the events of 9 September 2001, and similar allegations at the time of the

death of Princess Margaret, proved that Labour were still manipulating news cynically

and the media continued to focus attention on the party spin-doctors.

Clearly the focus upon internal discipline is driven by a fear of appearing divided.

This is a corollary of the dark days of the 1980s. The left versus centre dichotomy

fatally damaged Labours electoral credibility and led to dramatic policy reforms

which allowed the leadership control over the party line. Despite two election

victories this practice remains unchanged. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw highlighted

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the problems faced when discussing allegations that the leadership was divided on the

issue of European integration.

As members of the government, on the one hand we are always accused of

operating from a single script. But if we use different syntax, different

grammar, to explain a particular point of view, the next thing is there are

headlines about government splits. (The Guardian, 07/01/02)This may be overstating the point, surely neither syntax nor grammar can lead to a

perception of division? Michael White, Guardian correspondent, disagrees. He

happily admits that journalists are indeed seeking to trip up the government by

revealing any inconsistencies:

that is precisely the legacy of New Labours on-message centralising

discipline since 1994. They were never quite as good as they told each other

now they are reaping the whirlwind. (The Guardian, 07/01/02)

The Conservatives failed marketers?

The Conservative party ethos offers few tensions with notions of marketing. The lateConservative MP Alan Clark described the first rule of the partys politics as that the

pursuit of power is the criterion against which all policy decisions should in the last

resort be judged. (Clark, 1998: 396) The conflicts during the 1970s were not with

using techniques for selling the party; disputes surrounded the packaging. Edward

Heath, party leader 1965-75 and Prime Minister 1970-74, saw himself as the better

judge of what to say, how to phrase it, what the policies were and how to offer them

to the people. (Kavanagh, 1995: 165) Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister 1979-90,

had similar strong opinions and reservations, however was more than willing to

introduce marketing techniques to political campaigning.

The Conservative campaign was given a more professional look, and many of these

techniques were employed within constituencies, (Thomas, 1989) however local

electioneering continued in the same form as it had for decades. Though corporate

imagery was introduced, uniformity of message could only be achieved by promise of

favours. A Derbyshire Conservative MP opposed Thatcher's legislation designed to

kerb Trade Union power and actively supported local miners in his campaign

literature. While this earned him little respect from the party leader, at no time was

there a hint of attempting to make him adhere to the party line. (Interview, 03/10/01)

This is the continuing picture of the Conservative party campaign. The divisions over

policy towards the European Union, and in particular European Monetary Union, wascapitalised on by the media to provide the party with an image of being divided and

having an incoherent policy. The media created the perception that the Conservatives

refused to define policy messages or that the party members were doing the job

incompetently. (Wring, 2001: 920) Conservative academics and commentators seem

to lean towards the latter perspective of the party, and there are indications that the

party mounted attempts to provide a unified core message. The 2001 General Election

focused on 'Keep the Pound' and numerous rallies were organised. On Keep the

Pound Day all Conservative candidates were expected to have stalls in their

constituencies, handing out leaflets and stickers and informing people about

Conservative policy. The material was all produced by central office and distributed

by the Regional Campaign Manager, therefore every candidate had identical publicitypresenting an identical message. However candidates did not have to take part. Those

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who supported European integration could remain inactive or, alternatively, organise

their own event.

The area where the Conservatives receive most criticism is their lack of market

research. Because the party lacks a wealth of ideological baggage they could have

presented a policy derived from populist concerns. Instead the Conservativesinstituted a process of intra-party democratisation; thus it was the party members who

were to determine the agenda for the 2001 General Election. This led the party to

adopt a stance that pandered to sentimental attachments for the British pound and an

opposition to the increasing number of foreign nationals seeking asylum in the UK.

These did not gain support because; firstly 2001 was not the last chance to save the

pound, a referendum had been promised; (Interview, 16/01/02) secondly the party

itself had an image problem. The Conservatives image as being out-of-touch seems

proven by the policies which the empowerment of members offered following the

1997 party conference. The members views were at odds with those of the voters,

and as Lees-Marshment and Quayle suggest:

Electoral imperatives dictate (and political marketing advises) that the partyshould formulate a policy programme on the basis of input from the wider

electorate, not just the membership, and that the leadership should have a firm

grip on policy-making. (Lees-Marshment & Quayle, 2001: 208)

The lack of reference to the provision of welfare, and the stress upon dealing swiftly

with bogus asylum seekers, presented the Conservatives as uncaring. These failings

were compounded by the media image of leader William Hague, who was unable to

expunge his appearance at a Conservative Conference as a sixteen-year-old. These

problems lead Anthony Seldon to argue that the Conservatives needed to learn some

lessons from the Labour party. Seldon observed that the Conservatives had emulated

key aspects of the Millbank model, though with mixed results, but that the key

problem was that the leadership had failed to accept why they had been defeated in

1997 or how to reverse the situation in which they found themselves. (Seldon &

Snowdon, 2001: 10; Kavanagh, 2001) Seldon and Snowdons prescription is

Reconnecting with [and] articulating the concerns that [are] most important to the

middle class and to a large share of the working class. (Seldon & Snowdon, 2001:

44) More importantly, however, is organisational renewal on four levels: strong

and effective leadership find[ing] new ways to appeal to the young devis[ing] a

successful media strategy [and] reviv[ing] at a local level (Seldon & Snowdon,

2001: 48-9)

In contrast to the Labour party, these notions are not met with hostility from MPs or

candidates, the main problem for the Conservatives is the party membership. If the

party does follow the advise of Seldon, or that of marketing literature will this cause a

gulf between the parliamentary party and the foot soldiers in the constituency parties.

The Conservatives may not find this as greater problem as was the case of Labour in

the 1980s, as one study observed

The stress placed upon loyalty is an instinct as old as politics itself. The

Conservative stress on pragmatism, compromise and the tempering of policy

has its roots in the fear that confrontation between factions within the

privileged groups could of itself undermine the whole structure of the political

organisation of society. (Norton & Aughey, 1981: 50-1)

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However this view contrasts with the intra-party fighting that has taken place between

the pro and anti-Europe factions over the last ten years. The leadership election of

2001 was coloured by the issue of Europe, the fact that the anti-Europe lobby appear

to have been successful could mean that the notion will be submerged but,

alternatively, could indicate dissent is only in abeyance. These are all imponderables

at present, what is clear though is that there is widespread demand for change.

Many Conservative candidates are happy to blame William Hague for the defeat of

the party in 2001. In an interview the day after the 2001 Election Nick Weston,

Conservative candidate for Leicestershire North, argued that Hague was unpopular

with the electorate: That was the impression we got on the doorstep We live in a

media age, and Portillo does seem best set for changing the image of the party.

(Atkinson, 2001: 17) One candidate extended his criticism further. The average

Conservative candidate lacked a media strategy and so was incapable of marketing

themselves were his inferences:

If you are an old duffer wearing tweed you wouldnt get a press release

published they tend to come across as condescending upper-class old gitswho are very boring All this media stuff is common sense. Unfortunately

most of the Conservative candidates lack common sense but that is a selection

issue. (Interview, 08/10/01)

That particular candidate attempted to be more modern, more with it, different to

what people expected you to be. You try to break the mould, individualise

yourself. (Interview, 08/10/01) Candidates were also critical of the organisation of

the campaign, the dissemination of literature and, as one candidate put it, the lack of

a structure to it they said jokingly that I was the legal necessity, well run the

campaign but I found myself having to take charge of most it (Interview,

16/01/02) Equally, they were absolutely incapable, almost Victorian in what they

did, if I ran a business a tenth as badly as they ran a campaign I would be bankrupt

and sweeping the streets and half of those so-called election agents should be doing

that anyway. (Interview, 19/01/02)

The problem for the Conservatives is finding a platform that wins them elections

while appeasing the membership of the party. One candidate highlighted the problem

faced by a political realist surrounded by traditional Conservative activists.

You are in a position where you not only think what is the national view but

also what is the local view; if they are not the same it can be a problem. I cant

make up party policy I have to take on the line taken by the party nationally

[but] I will take the local view on local issues The problem is that I knowthe party activists would be happier if I was calling for Britain to withdraw

from the EU [and] if I took a tough line against gypsies and travellers but

I know that wouldnt do me any good as a prospective MP. (Interview,

08/04/01)

This highlight the problems faced by a party that wants to brand itself under a single

image with broad appeal while parts of that party have highly diverse views of what

the party stands for.

The Liberal Democrats an anti-market party?

To describe the Liberal Democrats as an anti-marketing party may be something of anover-exaggeration. However, due to a combination of tradition, current opinion and

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lack of resources, the party has not added a marketing dimension to its campaigning

in any significant sense. That said the party has been transformed itself into a much

tighter electoral machine than it was during the 1970s and 80s, and there are

indications that the Liberal Democrats are in the process of centralising key features

of the campaign as well as homogenising the messages of the candidates. In the light

of this, and drawing from evidence based on studies of Labour and the Conservatives,we can evaluate whether reforming the campaign will lead to tensions within the party

between the new practices and its core values and, of greater importance, we can

assess if structuring the party from the centre would be counter-productive in electoral

terms.

Liberal MPs were often elected as radical individuals with a large personal following,

to use marketing terminology they sold themselves as the product rather than their

role within the party. Personal appeal provided very limited gains and between 1974

and 1983 they were unable to gain more than thirteen seats and in 1979 284 Liberal

candidates lost their deposits. The creation of the Social Democratic Party [SDP] by a

centre-right group of Labour MPs perhaps, with hindsight, marked the resurgence ofthe party. The SDP were seen as a media-oriented party and had a clear strategy for

campaigning. (Crewe & King, 1995: 254-71) Though the Liberal-SDP Alliance

fared badly in 1983 in terms of seats, winning only 23, it was able to attract 25.4% of

the vote. Clearly therefore the media strategy was successful.

While Paddy Ashdown, leader 1988-98, deserves much of the credit for reforming the

party's campaigning methods and political agenda; their most successful tactic, the

ruthless targeting of seats was an idea that was put forward by Rosie Barnes, a

member of David Owen's breakaway 'independent fourth force' SDP. After

humiliating defeats in municipal elections in March 1989, Barnes conceded that if all

their resources were targeted on ten seats at the 1992 General Election the party could

build a basis for greater electoral gains. (Cook, 1998: 205) Barnes plan was routed at

the 1990 Bootle by-election, where their candidate was beaten into last place by

Screaming Lord Sutch, of the Monster Raving Loony Party, a party that prides itself

on not having credible policies. Despite this setback, targeting was to be the way

forward for the Liberal Democrats. Countering financial disadvantages, having a

weak support base and lacking a large presence in national politics, the Liberal

Democrats ran highly effective campaigns in 1997 and 2001. They increased their

share of the vote by only 1% over a nine-year period, from 17.8% in 1992 to 18.8% in

2001, but the party was able to increase their number of MPs from 20 to 52. This is

argued to be a consequence of the Liberal Democrats producing: "a good performancein specific seats where there is a reasonable chance of winning rather than an

across-the-board improvement that might pay few dividends." (Denver, 2001: 638)

The party has adopted a seat-by-seat approach to electioneering and seeks greater

representation using similar tactics at the next General Election. (Denver, Hands &

Henig, 1998; Russell & Fieldhouse, 2002)

However there remain concerns that the party will face greater scrutiny from the

media as it increases its share of parliamentary seats and so must begin to develop a

more corporate image.

Because were a larger party we are taken more seriously by the media, which

in turn has forced us to raise our game I think that the majority of our MPs,if they put their hands on their hearts, would acknowledge that they are only in

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parliament because they are Liberal Democrats Of course theyve made

their own contributions themselves, but there is a much greater sense of

cohesion and more of a sense of loyalty to the party, and adopting common

practices and common policies and using the organisation of the party to do

what they have to do in parliament and outside. I think its a much more

cohesive and professional organisation than it was. (Interview, 08/01/02)This has led to the candidate selection procedure stressing the importance of knowing

party policy and being able to link that with issues specific to the constituency.

People should know what the message is We dont want to be a party that

muzzles individuality but having said that I think there is more of a party

line on a lot of things than there used to be. (Interview, 08/01/02)

However the party candidates who stood at recent elections stress the importance of

individuality arguing that they have as important a role in achieving victory as does

the fact that they represent the Liberal Democrats. Could this lead the party to become

involved in battles to keep their candidates on message or will candidates acquiesce in

the name of electoral victory?

Certainly a sense of individuality, and freedom for independent thought, was stressed

by many of the candidates. They were critical of Labour candidates who reproduced

party messages like a speak your weight machine (Interview, 11/10/01) and saw

themselves as able to have a personal view. One candidate reported I think the most

important thing about standing as a Liberal Democrat candidate was being able to say

what I think on policies. (Interview, 18/10/01) Liberal Democrat candidates did

reproduce the party message on tactical voting and the need to pay for essential

services through taxation, but largely saw this as advantageous to their campaign. The

general feeling among candidates was:

We werent forcing the public to think about this or that it was going with

flow. It was not exactly imposed from the top, it was: these are our campaign

themes, it would be a good idea if you majored on those. It was never: you

will! (Interview, 11/10/01)

The importance of the individual was also stressed; one candidate argued they vote

for a particular person dealing with particular issues. (Interview, 07/04/01)

What was also clear throughout the interviews with Liberal Democrat candidates was

that they saw grassroots issues as of fundamental importance and often felt more

attuned to how a constituency could be won than the central party a factor due to the

majority of the candidates having a background as a local councillor within the region

where they are standing - however they also argued that through extensive doorstepcanvassing they became aware of the concerns of the constituents. Collecting these

concerns and turning them into the foundation for a campaign, many Liberal

Democrat candidates and MPs argued, was the route towards electoral success.

This highlights a tension between the local, or micro level, politics and the macro

campaign. Candidates from both the Conservative and Labour parties found their

Liberal Democrat opponents infuriating. One Labour candidate argued: they try to be

all things to all men to win votes, you cant run a party like that. (Interview,

17/12/01) A Conservative was more critical reporting that:

they say anything on the doorstep to win someones vote. Their policy is not

only different for different parts of the country but for different parts of aconstituency and even from one house to the next. (Interview, 16/01/02)

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Criticisms such as these are of concern to the party leadership who wish to see the

campaign become more homogenous. They claim some successes, observing that: A

lot of Liberal Democrat literature will look the same though with local factors

added in and there is a certain look to a Liberal Democrat campaign. (Interview,

08/01/02) However foresee problems should the media start to scrutinise the party:

we are more vulnerable to the criticism that we say different things in differentparts of the country, Id much rather that we kept repeating the same message.

(Interview, 08/01/02)

The press have largely been very sympathetic to the Liberal Democrats. Studies of the

coverage of the 2001 General Election found that the party received a reasonably high

level of media attention and, more importantly that this was almost universally

positive. The overt use of spin by Labour and the failed populism of the

Conservatives both allowed the Liberal Democrats to bask in their position as an

honest party with a lot of energy. (Wring, 2001) At the end of the 2001 campaign

Kennedy lagged behind Blair by only 0.5% in the British Election Study

commissioned poll on the ratings of the party leaders. While the Daily Telegraph andBBCs Newsnight criticised the partys policy to shift the television watershed to

11pm rather than the present 9pm, core Liberal Democrat policies were often used as

a benchmark against which other parties could be criticised. This was particularly the

case in relation to the partys honesty in talking about raising income tax, rather than

using stealth taxation to fund public services. (Denver, 2001: 645)

The interviews with Liberal Democrat candidates and those working on the party

campaign strategies indicate that they are a party at the crossroads. They could pursue

the marketing model and centralise the electioneering process or they could provide

the tools to their candidates for running an autonomous campaign. It was the latter

that was described by one Liberal Democrat MP as the favoured choice of the

candidates. (Interview, 08/01/02) But this may not necessarily be what the central

office see as necessary to make an impact in terms of improving their share of

parliamentary seats. Moves towards centralisation, however, may undermine the

partys current popularity. Denvers observation that their focus on popular issues

such as public services, coupled with making a virtue of giving straight answers, of

being honest and of shunning negative campaigning (Denver, 2001: 646) is

reminiscent of Kavanaghs description of the party in 1995. Where the differences lie

is that Kavanagh identified that many Liberal MPs were independent local

personalities in their own right [which] limits their incentives to respond positively

to campaign instructions from the national leadership. (Kavanagh, 1995: 153) Thishas changed, but it is difficult to measure the extent of that shift. Some Liberal

Democrat MPs still evoke the image of individuality and the Scottish MPs are

particularly buoyed by the fact that they can offer different policies because they have

influence within the Scottish parliament. The questions remain can they evade

divisive media attention and continue to gain victories offering localised, popular

election campaigning or must they organise and centralise the campaign process. And,

if they do, will this result in the tensions between the macro and micro level becoming

a bigger story than their potential to win a number of constituencies.

Conclusion the future of marketing in British politics

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In the USA, where the Presidential elections focus upon the credibility of one

individual, marketing has proved highly successful. (Jamieson, 1996; McGinniss,

1998; Newman, 1994) In the British context, however, the complex nature of the

political parties means that there are structural and ideational obstacles when

attempting to establish the market-oriented model of campaigning. As David Denver

rightly points out:It is not the case that there are 'generals' at party headquarters who issue

instructions to the troops' in the field. Quite apart from the constitutional

independence of Conservative constituency associations, the fact that each

party has over 630 local campaigns to oversee means that, on the whole, local

parties have to be left to run their own campaigns (Denver & Hands, 1997:

145)

There are practices for "coaxing, prodding, cajoling and bribing" the constituencies to

"follow advice from the centre." And their use has increased, particularly in the case

of the Labour party. The fact that other parties are beginning to recognise the benefits

of disciplined campaigning hints that such techniques could become a standard

feature of election campaigning in Britain. However it is debatable whether the effectsof this will all be positive.

The research on the three parties suggest that each one is at a different stage of

implementing some form of market orientation. In terms of electoral success it would

seem that Labour's conversion to a market-led political programme would seem a

model worthy of emulation. However, we should enquire whether Labour could have

lost in either 1997 or 2001. Certainly the Liberal Democrats were not a significant

threat on a national level, and made most of their gains from the Conservatives. The

Hague-led Conservatives 1997-2001 could offer no more potent an opposition than

the party led by John Major: the majority of British national newspapers saw them as

divided and out of touch. (Wring, 2002) We should therefore ask is Labours strict

control necessary and, moreover, is it more damaging to the party than allowing

members to vote 'according to their conscience'.

Clearly both the media and a proportion of Labour party members are hostile to the

use of spin and the control freakery that have become synonymous with the Blairite

model of leadership. If the Conservatives can mount a serious challenge, and Labour

begin to lose its lead in the ratings, the party's control mechanisms could begin to

unravel. However, if the Conservatives adopt a more centralised model and enforce

party messages this could cause dissent that will render the party ineffectual. These

questions, together with the recognition that marketing is perhaps antithetical to theLiberal Democrat ethos, raise doubts as to how far marketing can be applied to

political parties. We should also consider the effect upon the electorate. Douglas

Alexander, Labours General Election Campaign Co-ordinator in 2001, argued that

reports about control and spin contributed to a sense that the actions of both

political reporters and political candidates were somehow very remote from their day-

to-day concerns. (Alexander, 2001: 73)

Dissent and disunity has long been a feature of British politics, a tradition many wish

to uphold, can it be expunged in the name of electoral success and will the electorate

accept monolithic entities, expounding identical arguments as the only form of

representation available? The low turnout and overall antipathy to the current politicalclimate was evident throughout the protracted 2001 campaign, the overt use of

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marketing techniques is argued to be one cause of this and its application needs to be

questioned before we accept that a market-orientation is the way forward. Clearly

marketing techniques have some application for political parties, advertising, product

identification, image manipulation have all been tools utilised by Prime Ministers and

party leaders. However can a party present a manifesto that is informed only by public

opinion; in other words is adopting a market-oriented model a step too far? Equallycan the use of spin convince the electorate that pledges are being followed despite

contrary evidence. More importantly can cohesion be enforced, using a combination

of the promise of elevation within the ranks, electoral success and bullying tactics,

upon individuals who often enter politics on the grounds of their own personal

convictions? The answers provided in this paper are by no means finite but tend

towards offering a negative conclusion.

While we can argue that Labour did, and perhaps the Conservatives do, need to

rebrand themselves: redefine their product and regain a sense of political realities,

political parties within the British electoral system must also act as a composite of

their members and retain a sense of their history and traditions. It is here where themarket-oriented model faces its greatest obstacles. All three party's traditions of

internal democracy and local autonomy conflict with the centralised, disciplined,

corporate model of party organisation. Therefore students of political marketing need

to re-investigate whether the limitations on implementing a market orientation

indicate that the use of techniques currently associated more with MacDonalds are not

practical for the organisations who dwell in and around the palace of Westminster.

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1The Journal of Marketing Management, Vol 17. No. 9-10, November 2001.

2 This is evidenced by a number of interviews carried out with PPCs from all parties but is a

reinforcement of the argument put forward by D Denver and G Hands, Modern Constituency Elections,1997.3

A service that had been taken away during a rationalisation of the Health Service in 1998 and whichhad been an issue of serious contention throughout Lockes period as MP.4

Criticism was expressed by the majority of those interviewed, however as this was a small sample it isnot representative of all members. However the arguments presented indicate there are internaldifferences on strategy that could become pronounced.5 Statement to the press, 10 December 2001 posted on to the official Liberal Democrat website

www.LibDems.org.uk6

Interviewed for BBC TV, On The Record, 27 January 2002.