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Livingstone: A Minority of OneAuthor(s): Jonathan MooreSource: Fortnight, No. 257 (Dec., 1987), pp. 9-10Published by: Fortnight Publications Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25551363 .

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party." Not only is that small corner of the left in a country overwhelmed

by conservatism already very crowded, but also the WP's electoral base

of some 3 per cent is hardly an inspiring target to aim at. Morover,

whatever the parallels, the differences between 'Stickies' and 'Provies'

remain vast?and in the south, though not the north, they will redound

to the latter's disadvantage. For, leaving aside the impact of Enniskillen, what was striking

about the general tone of the motions passed by the ard fheis was their

fundamentalist character. On the key economic issue, and in particular on the crucial question of the national debt, there were three options

open to delegates?with motions respectively calling for rescheduling of payments, a moratorium upon them, and repudiation of the debt

entirely. It was the last of these, the most hardline resolution, which

the ard fheis endorsed. Quite how any Irish government would finance

that day's public expenditure on the day after the -debt was repudiated was a question delegates simply failed to address.

Nor was 'reality' evident in the document on the 'national question', A Scenario for Peace, adopted by the ard fheis. Regardless of the

apparent permanence which the Anglo-Irish Agreement has acquired, it

simply calls for Britain to declare that the Northern Ireland "statelet" is

no longer part of the UK, to withdraw its "political administration" and

military forces within the life of one parliament?the document

suggests this "could be achieved with a minimum of disorder"?and to

pay "reparations" to the new unitary state.

On a wider canvas, too, the portents are not encouraging. All over

Europe, leftist movements of the economically dispossessed and

political-military organisations of the nationally ghettoised have been

on the run?defeated by a combination of the resurgent neo-liberalism

and international anti-terrorist co-operation. The visitor from the

Basque group ETA was cheered to the echo in the Mansion House, yet

Spain and France have squeezed ETA like a nutcracker. Italy saw an

efflorescence of movements of the marginalised in the late 70s, but

they have since collapsed, as has the Red Army Faction in West

Germany. Even the more sophisticated Greens are riven by division.

Intellectually, republicanism has lost much of its 70s support,

mostly expressed via People's Democracy and the early IRSP?the

IRSP has gone and the few remaining PD members have dissolved into Sinn Fein. Solidarity from the British activists of whom the Daily Telegraph man was reminded has been weakened by the hard left's

isolation by Labour's leadership since June.

Indeed, a remark by Guardian commentator Hugo Young about

Labour could equally be applied to Sinn Fein. What Labour lacks, said

Young, is the One Big Idea which will challenge Thatcherism. Has Sinn Fein got the One Big Idea which will allow it to regain the initiative, north or south?

The answer from all the Sinn Fein leaders who talked to Fortnight was strikingly similar?there isn't one. The message is simply 'must

try harder'. Tom Hartley said: "What we are saying is that there's an

ABC of struggle?there's no short-cuts ... All you can achieve you will achieve through commitment, hard work, good planning."

Gerry Adams agreed: "I don't think there's any short-cuts. I don't

think there's any magic formula. I think there's hard work, and there's

the mundane, boring, tedious sowing of seeds. That's the way we're

going to go forward."

As he came towards the end of his presidential address, Mr Adams

reminded delegates of "the continuity and endurance of the republican

struggle" and read the roll call of recent victims. When political leaders

recall the rocky road of the past, it's usually intended as a warning of

arduous times ahead.

And so he concluded: "Next year we enter the 20th year of this stage of our struggle. There have been high points and low points but one

thing has remained constant?the British have been unable to defeat us.

We face the future secure in that certainty." It's a long way from Tiocfaidh ar la. It will be an infinitely long

haul after Enniskillen.

Livingstone: a minority of one Condemnation has show ered upon the head of the former GLC leader, Ken

Livingstone, following his remark after Enniskillen that the ERA would event

ually achieve victory. JONATHAN MOORE suggests however that, even without the cenotaph bomb, the hard left's

growing identification with Sinn Fein meant the cause

of British withdrawal from the province was entering a political cul-de-sac.

A1 I WEEK AFTER the Enniskillen

bombing, Ken Livingstone, the t 1 Labour MP most associated with support for Sinn Fein, was accused of having 'blood on his hands' at the annual conference of

the soft-left Labour Co-ordinating Committee.

At this meeting, the previous LCC policy of Irish unity in the lifetime of a Labour

government was ditched in favour of the policy of unity with consent, and Livingstone lost his

seat on the committee executive. The con

clusion that is being drawn from such events is

that the horrors of Enniskillen has dealt those who have argued for close links with Sinn

Fein a mortal blow within the Labour party.

Certainly Enniskillen has focused the left's

mind on the consequences of uncritical support for the republican movement. Most of the

Labour left's support for Sinn Fein is

The image the Labour leader would prefer to convey ?

meeting Molins workers in Derry during their struggle against closure

relatively new, dating from 1981. Prior to that

there was a 'troops out' movement active in the

party, but it tended to focus far more on the

evils of partition and the brutality of British rule?there was precious little positive support

within the Labour left for the republican movement itself. However, this all changed in

the wake of the 1981 hunger strike?the

argument in favour of 'self-determination'

became closely associated with support for

Sinn Fein.

Central to this turnaround in thinking was

a radical change in the British left's perception of Irish republicanism. As Sinn Fein became

more involved in electoral politics, and as the

language of the republicans became more

overtly socialistic, so the Labour left began to

perceive them as 'freedom-fighters' in the same

mould as the ANC and the PLO.

Following the visit of Mr Livingstone to Belfast in 1983, during which he met Gerry Adams, direct contacts between the Labour left

and Sinn Fein blossomed. Mr Adams seemed

convinced that the arguments of the pro-Sinn Fein Labour Committee on Ireland could win

the party. Such a possibility was never likely. Labour's policy is not made by constituency

parties: it is made by the block vote, and none

of the larger unions who dictate conference

policy has shown any willingness to break

with the leadership. Neil Kinnock has always viewed the Irish

issue with some foreboding. For him, support for Sinn Fein is seen in the same context as

support for gays, lesbians and black sections

?precisely the kind of policies which he

perceives as major vote-losers.

Within the party, there is no real danger to

Fortnight December 9

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the existing policy. Since 1981, this policy has been of supporting Irish unity through consent, but given that there is no perception as to how this consent can be won?surely the

crucial question?unity must be seen far more

as an aspiration than as a serious policy. However, given the fact that the Irish are the

biggest single ethnic minority in Britain, the association of Labour with unity has clear

electoral benefits. In the course of the 1983 and

1987 elections, the highly influential Irish Post, the paper of the Irish in Britain, con

tained a great many articles and letters calling on the Irish to vote Labour, on the grounds that Labour was more sympathetic to Irish

nationalism.

In the context of the last 18 years, such a

claim is desperately difficult to substantiate.

Whereas the three most significant defeats for

unionism in this period occurred at the hands

of Conservative governments?the suspension of Stormont in 1972, Sunningdale in the

following year and the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985?a very different picture emerges when

one looks at Labour in power. There was the

capitulation of Wilson and Rees in 1974 in the face of the UWC strike; there was the granting of extra seats to Northern Ireland in 1979, not

For Mr Kinnock,

support for Sinn Fein is seen in the same context as

support for gays, lesbians and black sections...

to mention the totality of policy between

1976 and 1979 under Roy Mason. As one senior unionist remarked at the time of 'teapot

diplomacy' in the early 1980s, "unionists are

safer with a Labour government". In essence, Labour's policy towards Ireland

has been one of pragmatism and damage limitation. Under Mr Kinnock, despite the 1981 resolution on unity, bipartisanship has

been maintained on all constitutional quest ions. In the 1985 debate on the Anglo-Irish

Agreement, Mr Kinnock was totally support ive of the government's strategy.

His desire for the Irish issue to be kept as

low-key as possible was epitomised by his

first choice of shadow spokesperson, Peter

Archer. Here was a lawyer who could con

centrate on civil liberties issues?plastic

bullets, the Prevention of Terrorism Act and

strip-searches?issues on which everyone in

the party is united. On constitutional matters

he appeared as a total agnostic. This generally worked well, but in the run

up to the last election problems arose when

one of his lieutenants, Stuart Bell, appeared to

suggest the next Labour government would

listen more sympathetically to the complaints that unionists had made about the Anglo-Irish

Agreement?in particular the 'provocative'

meetings of the secretariat at Maryfield. The

impact of the speech in Britain was not great, but in constitutional nationalist circles real

damage was done to Labour's image. In the aftermath of the 1987 elections, the

party mood has been more introspective and

defeatist than at any time since the war. One

result has been a growing belief that Labour

can no longer afford the luxury of debate, since this will only focus on its real

divisions. An example of this has been the

recent closing of the party's newspaper, Labour Weekly, and its replacement by

something reminiscent of a glossy mail order

catalogue, Labour Party News.

The result of the policy review announced

at this year's conference will be the ditching of

any policies perceived as vote-losers. The

atmosphere at Brighton in September was

such that Mr Kinnock will be given a

relatively free hand in this process. The hard

left is fragmented and in decline and there is a lack of clear alternatives to Mr Kinnock's

proposals. Central to his success has been his ability

to take substantial sections of the left along his road of modernisation. The Labour Co

ordinating Committee, previously an inde

pendent think-tank on the left, now acts as a

support body for the leader committed to

isolating the hard left. Its vote in support of

party policy on Ireland should be understood in the context of the soft left gradually dropping all policies which are in conflict with the leadership. It would almost certainly have gone through regardless of Enniskillen.

What can be deduced from the appointment of Kevin McNamara as Labour's new shadow

spokesperson? This has been interpreted as

Labour hardening its attitude towards unity? Mr McNamara is ideologically closer to the SDLP than any other Labour MP. In marked

contrast to Mr Archer, he is absolutely com

mitted to Irish unity. The Labour Committee on Ireland welcomed his appointment as a step in its direction.

In reality it has little to do with that. For Mr Kinnock, Mr McNamara fulfils a useful

double function. With Mr McNamara con

stantly stressing the commitment to a united

Ireland, Mr Kinnock hopes that republican dissent in the party will be kept relatively quiet. It will also have the effect of mending

bridges with constitutional nationalism in

Ireland.

It is, however, at Ken Livingstone that

attention is now directed. He has taken over

the mantle of the most hated man on the left

in Britain?previous award-winners included

Tony Benn, Arthur Scargill and Derek Hatton. Mr Livingstone's behaviour is genuinely

difficult to explain. To suggest, only a few

days after Enniskillen, that the IRA was going to win was bound to lead to predictable condemnation. Ken Livingstone is an extreme

ly complex political figure, and it is difficult to ascertain whether he made the comments

simply because he believed them to be true or

whether he wished to increase his own support in the hard-left constituencies. Either way, he

has become the most isolated MP in the Labour party, and there are some who are

calling for the removal of the whip. This, however, is a fate that has not fallen on a

Labour MP since Michael Foot in 1956, and it is highly unlikely that it will occur now.

The real problem that Livingstone and the Labour Committee on Ireland face is that,

having tied their colours?and those of the

withdrawal movement?so firmly to the Sinn

Fein mast, the efficacy of their arguments is

greatly affected by events such as Enniskillen.

Rather than being associated with any set of

principles, sections of the Labour left have

wedded themselves to Provisional republi canism. Tactically, this may prove to be the

critical mistake on the part of those

advocating British withdrawal from Northern

Ireland.

Two fingers to Tom

The victory of Sinn Fein in the two Falls by-elections consolidated its west Belfast citadel, from where MAIRTIN 0 MUILLEOIR sends this defiant message. IN ONE OF its many colonial shindigs the

British once faced an adversary who

declared he enjoyed a "holiday in his heart'

every time he heard a British soldier had been shot. For republicans throughout Ireland, for the prisoners, and for the much

maligned and misrepresented people of the Falls, the election of two Sinn Fein

members to Belfast City Council afforded them a 'holiday in their hearts'.

Sinn Fein, maintained Tom King (with eyes averted from the hulk of the Belgrano) couldn't be allowed to sit in counci

chambers because they believed in jaw-jaw and war-war. With God's blessing he

would prevent Sinn Fein reps from taking

up the positions to which they were

elected by introducing an oath abjuring violence?not all violence, of course, bu

nasty violence. And to implement the new

legislation he could always call on his

30,000 armed men. One man, one vote

would remain the catchword?provided, of

course, that you voted for the right sort of

candidate.

The message from the Falls on October 22

was that if Tom King could sign the

pledge and sleep easy then Sinn Fein reps could sign the paper blindfold. Sure, at the

end of the day, aren't the IRA just novices

and amateurs when placed alongside the

men who brought us Dresden and

Hiroshima?

The people of the Falls should have learnt by now. Vote Sinn Fein and you wave

goodbye to your ACE grants; vote Sinn Fein and you say sldn to the prospects of

any industrial development; vote Sinn

Fein and you've only yourself to blame

when the boys in bottle-green fail to

tackle your vandalism and hooliganism

problem; and vote Sinn Fein and you won't get any readies for your daily Irish

newspaper or your Irish schools.

The problem with blackguardism, however,

is that it seldom works when used against a people who can differentiate between

wrong and right, possess their own

identity and even go so far as to reject the

Queen's own English for some

unintelligible lingo. Those damnable people of the Falls are

Irish?worse, are proud of being Irish?and don't want to be ruled by

Britain. So what if another shamrock is

added to the RUC's badge, or the High Court receives another coat of paint?

No doubt the men of violence in the dugouts, mess halls and Stormont offices are

pulling on their mailed gloves. 'Who cares

about their hearts and minds when you've

got them by the privates?' will no doubt

become the British government's guiding

philosophy once again, when it finally sinks through that the Uncle Toms can't

1 bring home the republican bacon._

10 December Fortnight

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