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LLNLThis work was partially performed under the auspices of the US Department of Energy by the University of
California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, under contract No. W-7405-Eng-48.
Safeguards and Cooperative Monitoring of Reactors With
Antineutrino Detectors
Adam Bernstein, (P.I.)
Jan Batteux
Dennis Carr
Celeste Winant
Chris Hagmann
Norm Madden
John Estrada (P.I.)
Nathaniel Bowden
Jim Lund
C. Michael Greaves
N. Mascarhenas
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Sandia National LaboratoriesCalifornia
Stanford University Giorgio Gratta, Yifang Wang
University of AlabamaAndreas Piepke
Oak Ridge National Laboratory Ron Ellis
Collaborators
LLNL
Project Timeline
1999-2000Late 2000
Research into 1 kT explosion detectionRecognize futility of this effort – publish paper
2000/2001 Research into reactor monitoring
2002 Begin installation at San Onofre
Oct. 2003 First data taking
Dec. 2003 IAEA interest / experts meeting
Now Operational for 100 days, 70 events/day
Feb 9th 2004 Refueling shutdown
Summer 2004
800-1000 events per day
LLNL
Properties of Antineutrinos and Antineutrino Detectors
• Rates near reactors are high 1 ton detector, 24 m from reactor core Not untypical core thermal power = 3.46 GW 3925 events/day/ton (100% efficient detector)
• Rate and spectrum are sensitive to the isotopic composition of the core
• Cost and complexity can be made comparable to that of a few high-end Germanium detectors
LLNL
Monitoring Reactors with Antineutrino Detectors
A. ~1 cubic meter antineutrino detectors placed a few tens of meters from the reactor core
B. Compare measured and predicted total daily or weekly antineutrino rates (or spectrum) to search for anomalous changes in the total fission rate
C. Identify changes in fissile content based on changes in antineutrino rate (“the burnup effect”)
A. Measured in previous experimentsB. Rovno quotes 540 kg +- 1% fissile content from shape analysis
LLNL
What Good Is That ?
1. Detecting unauthorized production of plutonium outside of declarations
2. Measuring enrichment of freshly loaded fuel and burn-up or plutonium content of spent fuel destined for reprocessing or storage shipper-receiver difference
3. Checking progress of plutonium disposition, and ensuring burnup is appropriate to core type
4. Monitoring core conversion
• An integral, continuous, high statistics, non-intrusive, unattended measurement
LLNL
Fission Rates Vary with Time and Isotope
U-238
Pu-241
Input fuel enrichment can be changed in PWRs increased plutonium production even at constant power
Easy to alter for CANDU (online refueling)
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Detected Antineutrino Rates Vary With Isotope
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The Antineutrino Rate Tracks Inventory Changes
• The total antineutrino rate changes with the relative U/Pu content of the core About 250 kg of Pu is generated during the cycle
• Rate calculation based on a detailed reactor simulation shows an antineutrino rate change of about 10% through a 500 day equilibrium reactor cycle This “burnup effect” seen and corrected for in
past experiments Modern detectors reach 3% precision
The change in antineutrino rate directly tracks the fissile inventory even at constant power
LLNL
A 1 Cubic Meter Detector, 10 Meters From PWR Core
• fuel rods with 20 kg Pu replaced with fresh rods (0 kg Pu)
• assumed 3% systematic error
• 50% detection efficiency
• A standard statistical test can identify the switch with
> 90% confidence with one month’s data
The systematic shift in inventory is reflected by the antineutrino count rate over time
Days
Counts per day
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Inputs Needed to Predict/Extract an Absolute Antineutrino Measurement
1. Core model with the input parameters: Secondary calorimetric power Pressure Flow rates Boron concentration Inlet temperature total model error 1% (power
dominates) *
2. Antineutrino energy density error = 3 % 3. Null result from near-reactor oscillation
experiments4. Well understood antineutrino detector
(* from “Estimation of Expected Neutrino Signal at Palo Verde”, Lester Miller, Stanford University,unpublished note)
LLNL
• 3.46 GWt reactor
• Antineutrino detector in “tendon gallery” with 1017 / s per m2
• Installation/testing begun May 2002
The Site, Detector, Signal, Backgrounds
data taking began in late September 2003
LLNL
The Underground Experimental Site
20 meter concrete/rock overburden
24 meters from core
LLNL
Cutaway Diagram of the LLNL/Sandia Antineutrino Detector
Gd-doped
Currently operational:
2 cells instrumented with
4 pmts;
0.32 tonnes of Gd-scintillator;
quasi-hermetic muon veto
hermetic water shield
LLNL
• The antineutrino interacts with a proton producing…
– A 1-7 MeV positron
– A few keV neutron
– mean time interval 28 sec
• Both final state particles deposit energy in a scintillating detector over 10s or 100s of microsecond time intervals (depending on the medium)
• Both energy depositions and the time interval are measured
Detection of Antineutrinos
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Backgrounds
1. Muon generated neutrons create “correlated” events
fast neutron proton knock-on thermalization and capture within time window
energies and time correlation can mimic the antineutrino
2. Neutron and gamma “singles” can fall within the time coincidence window defining the antineutrino event
gammas from surroundings neutrons from S.F., activated nuclei from surroundings muon-induced neutrons Background rate ~ a few dozen per day
LLNL
Four Variables Define the Antineutrino Signal
Variable Eff.
T > 100
(sec)
95% the time between a muon veto and a cube signal
10 < Tcube < 100
(sec)
70% the time between the two energy depositions mean = 28 sec
3 < Eprompt < 10
(MeV)
62% (analytic formula)
The prompt, positron-like signal (including annihilation gammas)1.022 < E1 < 7 MeV, peak at ~3 MeV
4 < Edel < 12
MeV
68% (MC) the delayed, neutron-like signal from Gd gamma cascade
“geometry cut” ~80% Events with large asymmetries in PMT energy distribution within a cell
1280 events per day 68 events per day (now) over 800 (with simple upgrades)
100% efficiency 5% efficiency 30% efficiency and 2x volume
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Event Candidates Since the Last Muon
antineutrino-like backgrounds(spallation and capture) more likely to occur near a muon
T > 100 sec
Cut on time since last muon:
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2. Interevent time
Interevent time distribution well fit by e-t/ 28 sec
(Capture time set by 0.1% Gdconcentration in scintillator)
10 < Tcube < 100 sec
Cut on interevent time:
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Conclusions
1) That antineutrinos can track burnup and plutonium inventory is firmly established by prior experiments and shortly confirmed by us
2) Detector deployment essential for demonstrating practical utility and potential
3) Main challenges: • Controlling detector systematic effects (spectrum
error, fiducial error, event containment…)• Shrinking footprint (coherent scatter, better IVB
detector)• Transforming a delicate physics instrument into a
robust cooperative monitoring deviceMust compare to existing safeguards methods and demonstrate that the benefit is worth the cost of deployment
LLNL
Literature on Applied Antineutrino Physics
Reactor Monitoring Bernstein, A., Wang, Y., Gratta, G., West, T.,
Nuclear Reactor Safeguards and Monitoring with Antineutrino Detectors, J. Of Appl. Phys V.91, Num. 7, p 4672, April 2002
Klimov, Yu. et al. The remote measurement of power and energy release using a neutrino method, Inst. Obshch. Yad. Fiz, Russia, At. Energ., (1994) 76(2) 130-5, CODEN:AENGAB; ISSN: 0004-7163
Detection of Antineutrinos for Non-Proliferation M.M. Nieto, A. C. Hayes, C. M. Teeter, W. B. Wilson,W. D. Stanbro, arXiv:nucl-th/0309018 v1 9 Sep 2003
Conclusion: power and isotopic measurement at 10-100 m is feasible
Explosion DetectionA. Bernstein, T. West V. Gupta, An Assessment of Antineutrino Detection as a Tool for
Monitoring Nuclear Explosions, Science & Global Security, Volume 9 pp 235, April 2001
Conclusion: 1 kT remote detection is not feasible