8142 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Materials Transportation Bureau [49 CFR Part 193] [Docket No. OPSO-46; Notice 4] LNG FACILITIES, FEDERAL SAFETY STANDARDS Development of New Standards AGENCY: Materials Transportation Bureau, DOT. ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemak- ing. SUMMARY: This notice proposes es- tablishment of a set of comprehensive safety standards governing the design (including site selection) and construc- tion of liquefied natural gas (LNG). facilities used in the transportation of natural gas by pipeline in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. Pres- ent safety standards are considered in- adequate in light of the grave conse- quence that could result from a major accident at a facility. The new stand- ards would provide safety through a combination of engineering features and sufficient area around a facility to protect the nearby population. DATE; Comments must be received by May 9, 1979. ADDRESS: Send comments to the Docket Branch, Room 6500, Materials Transportation Bureau, Trans Point Building; 2100 Second Street, S.W., 'Washington, D.C. 20590. Comments should Identify the docket and notice number and be submitted in triplicate. They will be available to the public for review at the above location. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Walt Dennis, 202-426-2082. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:, The Materials Transportation Bureau (MTB) believes that a new comprehen- sive set of safety standards is needed for LNG facilities. LNG is natural gas (mostly methane) that has been cooled to about minus 260°F, where it is a liquid. As aliquid, natural gas is 1/ 600th of its original volume, making it economically' feasible to transport by vehicle or vessel and store in large quantities. The hazards bf LNG derive from its cold temperature, flammabil- ity, and characteristics upon release. LNG can cause severe freeze burns and immediate cracking of certain metald such as carbon steel. Upon ex- posure to ground temperatures,, LNG vaporizes rapidly and returns to a gas- eous state. The vapor may remain close to the ground and travel in the form of a plume or cloud dispersed into the atmosphere. While the vapor is 'not poisonous, it can cause asphyx- iation, and It is flammable in a concen- PROPOSED RULES tration in air between 5 and 15 per- cent. The standards proposed by this notice concerns the design (including site selection) and construction of facilities, used to liquefy natural gas or to transfer, store, or vaporlze'LNG in conjunction with the pipeline trans- portation of natural gas. If adopted, they would be published in a new Part 193°of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Standards for the oper- ation, including security, and mainte- nance of LNG facilities will be the sub- ject of a notice of proposed rulemak- Ing to be issued in March 1979. These standards also would be included in Part 193. The intent of the new Part 193 would be to prescribe an acceptable level of public safety with regard to LNG facilities in consideration of the hazards of LNG and the potential causes and consequences of accidents and the steps that may be taken to safeguard against them. In most cases, Part 193 would provide for employee safety only to the extent that it is af- fected by measures required for public safety. Each of the proposed standards re- lates to a potential accident cause. For example, weak structures, faulty con- struction, installation defects, fires or spills of LNG near components, and environmental forces (high' winds, earthquakes) can cause accidents or worsen an existing hazardous condi- tion resulting from some other cause. The proposed standards would pre- scribe actions needed to minimize or prevent (1) the occurrence of accidents due to controllable causes (e.g., faulty construction) or uncontrollable causes (e.g., earthquakes) and (2) the poten- tially dan'aging effects of accidents that may occur. Some standards would require redundant or back-up meas- ures for extra protection, as in the case of manual and automatic shut-off valves. Because of the severity of po- tential consequences, even more spe- cial precautions would have to be taken to prevent accidents which could result in failure of an LNG stor- age tank. If an accident were to result in a spill of LNG, under the proposed Sub- part E a second level of protection would be provided by impounding sys- tems that are designed to hold IiNG and prveit it from endangering other components, entering neighboring property, or rapidly turning to ga. Since there is a threat of ignition once LNG is released, Part 193 also would provide a final level of safety through safe distances around a facility. (§§ 193.107 and 193.109) These dis- tances would 15rotect persons who live or work near the facility site by pro- viding enough room for flammable gas to dissipate or enough separation from the heat of burning LNG at the site, The need for comprehensive new Federal LNG facility safety standards arises because of the seriousness of po- tential hazards from LNG facilities coupled with the anticipated increase o LNG facility construction to meet the nation's energy needs, and the do- veloping variations in the design of facilities near population centers, or areas of greatest energy demand. Con- gressional committees, the General Accounting Office, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and other Federal,' State, and Local agencies; nongovernment organization; repro sentatives of industry; and the public • in general have expressed concern over 'the adequacy of present stand- ards to provide for public safety. A report Issued on July 31, 1978, by the General Accounting Office titled "'Liquefied Energy Gases" (EMD 78- 28) shows some of the safety concerns in the transportation and storage of LNG. Foremost among these are: (1) protection of persons and property near an LNG facility from thermal ra- diation (heat) caused by Ignition of a major spill of LNG, (2) protection of persons and property near an LNG fa- clity'from dispersion and delayed igni- tion of a natural gas cloud arising from a major spill of LNG, and (3) re- duction of the potential for a cata- strophic spill of LNG. The existing Federal safety stand- ards governing LNG facilities used in the I transportation of natural gas by pipeline are contained in 49 CFR Part 192. These standards were adopted by Amendment 192-10, Issued on Oceober 10, 1972 (37 FR 21638). The Amend- ment added § 192.12, adopting as the Federal LNG safety standards the Na- tional Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 59A (1971 edition), as well as the other applicable require- ments of Part 192. Subsequently, the 1972 edition of NFPA 59A was adopted (41 FR 13590). In the preamble of Amendment 192- 10, It was stated that the NFFA stand- ard was adopted only as an interim measure while permanent Federally developed regulations specifically ap. plicable to LNG facilities were being developed. MTB believes that there Is a need for Federally developed regula- tions for LNG facilities because the present referenced standards are not written in enforceable terms and do not adequately cover all safety prob- lems respecting an LNG facility. In 1974, the Department's Office of Pipeline Safety contracted for a study by Arthur D. Little, Inc. (ADL) to pro- vide safety information on LNG facili- ties (NTIS No. PB-241048). The study included a comparative analysis of na- tional, state, local, industrial, and pro- fessional society codes, standards, FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 44, NO. 28--THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1979
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8142
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATIONMaterials Transportation Bureau
[49 CFR Part 193]
[Docket No. OPSO-46; Notice 4]
LNG FACILITIES, FEDERAL SAFETY STANDARDS
Development of New Standards
AGENCY: Materials TransportationBureau, DOT.ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemak-ing.SUMMARY: This notice proposes es-tablishment of a set of comprehensivesafety standards governing the design(including site selection) and construc-tion of liquefied natural gas (LNG).facilities used in the transportation ofnatural gas by pipeline in or affectinginterstate or foreign commerce. Pres-ent safety standards are considered in-adequate in light of the grave conse-quence that could result from a majoraccident at a facility. The new stand-ards would provide safety through acombination of engineering featuresand sufficient area around a facility toprotect the nearby population.DATE; Comments must be received byMay 9, 1979.ADDRESS: Send comments to theDocket Branch, Room 6500, MaterialsTransportation Bureau, Trans PointBuilding; 2100 Second Street, S.W.,
'Washington, D.C. 20590. Commentsshould Identify the docket and noticenumber and be submitted in triplicate.They will be available to the public forreview at the above location.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATIONCONTACT:
Walt Dennis, 202-426-2082.SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:,The Materials Transportation Bureau(MTB) believes that a new comprehen-sive set of safety standards is neededfor LNG facilities. LNG is natural gas(mostly methane) that has beencooled to about minus 260°F, where itis a liquid. As aliquid, natural gas is 1/600th of its original volume, making iteconomically' feasible to transport byvehicle or vessel and store in largequantities. The hazards bf LNG derivefrom its cold temperature, flammabil-ity, and characteristics upon release.LNG can cause severe freeze burnsand immediate cracking of certainmetald such as carbon steel. Upon ex-posure to ground temperatures,, LNGvaporizes rapidly and returns to a gas-eous state. The vapor may remainclose to the ground and travel in theform of a plume or cloud dispersedinto the atmosphere. While the vaporis 'not poisonous, it can cause asphyx-iation, and It is flammable in a concen-
PROPOSED RULES
tration in air between 5 and 15 per-cent.
The standards proposed by thisnotice concerns the design (includingsite selection) and construction offacilities, used to liquefy natural gas orto transfer, store, or vaporlze'LNG inconjunction with the pipeline trans-portation of natural gas. If adopted,they would be published in a new Part193°of Title 49 of the Code of FederalRegulations. Standards for the oper-ation, including security, and mainte-nance of LNG facilities will be the sub-ject of a notice of proposed rulemak-Ing to be issued in March 1979. Thesestandards also would be included inPart 193.
The intent of the new Part 193would be to prescribe an acceptablelevel of public safety with regard toLNG facilities in consideration of thehazards of LNG and the potentialcauses and consequences of accidentsand the steps that may be taken tosafeguard against them. In most cases,Part 193 would provide for employeesafety only to the extent that it is af-fected by measures required for publicsafety.
Each of the proposed standards re-lates to a potential accident cause. Forexample, weak structures, faulty con-struction, installation defects, fires orspills of LNG near components, andenvironmental forces (high' winds,earthquakes) can cause accidents orworsen an existing hazardous condi-tion resulting from some other cause.The proposed standards would pre-scribe actions needed to minimize orprevent (1) the occurrence of accidentsdue to controllable causes (e.g., faultyconstruction) or uncontrollable causes(e.g., earthquakes) and (2) the poten-tially dan'aging effects of accidentsthat may occur. Some standards wouldrequire redundant or back-up meas-ures for extra protection, as in thecase of manual and automatic shut-offvalves. Because of the severity of po-tential consequences, even more spe-cial precautions would have to betaken to prevent accidents whichcould result in failure of an LNG stor-age tank.
If an accident were to result in aspill of LNG, under the proposed Sub-part E a second level of protectionwould be provided by impounding sys-tems that are designed to hold IiNGand prveit it from endangering othercomponents, entering neighboringproperty, or rapidly turning to ga.Since there is a threat of ignition onceLNG is released, Part 193 also wouldprovide a final level of safety throughsafe distances around a facility.(§§ 193.107 and 193.109) These dis-tances would 15rotect persons who liveor work near the facility site by pro-viding enough room for flammable gas
to dissipate or enough separation fromthe heat of burning LNG at the site,
The need for comprehensive newFederal LNG facility safety standardsarises because of the seriousness of po-tential hazards from LNG facilitiescoupled with the anticipated increaseo LNG facility construction to meetthe nation's energy needs, and the do-veloping variations in the design offacilities near population centers, orareas of greatest energy demand. Con-gressional committees, the GeneralAccounting Office, the Federal EnergyRegulatory Commission and otherFederal,' State, and Local agencies;nongovernment organization; reprosentatives of industry; and the public •in general have expressed concernover 'the adequacy of present stand-ards to provide for public safety.
A report Issued on July 31, 1978, bythe General Accounting Office titled"'Liquefied Energy Gases" (EMD 78-28) shows some of the safety concernsin the transportation and storage ofLNG. Foremost among these are: (1)protection of persons and propertynear an LNG facility from thermal ra-diation (heat) caused by Ignition of amajor spill of LNG, (2) protection ofpersons and property near an LNG fa-clity'from dispersion and delayed igni-tion of a natural gas cloud arisingfrom a major spill of LNG, and (3) re-duction of the potential for a cata-strophic spill of LNG.
The existing Federal safety stand-ards governing LNG facilities used inthe I transportation of natural gas bypipeline are contained in 49 CFR Part192. These standards were adopted byAmendment 192-10, Issued on Oceober10, 1972 (37 FR 21638). The Amend-ment added § 192.12, adopting as theFederal LNG safety standards the Na-tional Fire Protection Association(NFPA) Standard 59A (1971 edition),as well as the other applicable require-ments of Part 192. Subsequently, the1972 edition of NFPA 59A was adopted(41 FR 13590).
In the preamble of Amendment 192-10, It was stated that the NFFA stand-ard was adopted only as an interimmeasure while permanent Federallydeveloped regulations specifically ap.plicable to LNG facilities were beingdeveloped. MTB believes that there Isa need for Federally developed regula-tions for LNG facilities because thepresent referenced standards are notwritten in enforceable terms and donot adequately cover all safety prob-lems respecting an LNG facility.
In 1974, the Department's Office ofPipeline Safety contracted for a studyby Arthur D. Little, Inc. (ADL) to pro-vide safety information on LNG facili-ties (NTIS No. PB-241048). The studyincluded a comparative analysis of na-tional, state, local, industrial, and pro-fessional society codes, standards,
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 44, NO. 28--THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1979
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practices, and regulations relating toLNG facilities. The ADL report, madein December 1974, is titled "Technol-ogy and Current Practices for Process-ing, Transferring, and Storing Lique-fied Natural Gas.", Copies 'of thereport (NTIS No. PB-241048) areavailable from the National TechnicalInformation Service, U.S. Departmentof Commerce, Springfield, Virginia22151, telephone (703) 557-4650, in'paper for $7.75 and in microfiche for$3.00. A copy is also available forreview in the docket.
The ADL study provides useful in-formation in developing safety stand-ards for LNG facilities. The studyidentified and analyzed many areag ofpublic concern about-the operation ofLNG facilities. It also addressed manypractices and functions where specialprecautions are needed to protect per-sons and property. MTB believes thatthe results of the ADL study are con-sistent with current information ob-tained from other sources. Therefore,MTB has adopted the ADL report as abasis for this regulatory action.
The ADL report found that NFPA59A was the basis for practically allnational, state and local codes forLNG facilities. MTB agrees with thisconclusion and has used the 1975 edi-tion of the NFPA 59A, in part, as abasis for these proposed regulations.The following tables shows that 59Aderivation of standards proposed inthis notice:
In April 1977, MTB Issued an Ad-vance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking(ANPRM) (42 PR 20776, April 21,
-1977) inviting public participation atan early stage in the rulemaking proc-ess for adoption of new Federal safetystandards in 49 CFR Part 193. Al-though that notice was not a proposalto amend the present standards, itcontained a comprehensive set of draftregulations which were intended toserve as a basis for public commentand participation in Identification ofLNG safety problems and the develop-ment of appropriate regulatory solu-"tions to those problems, -consideringall reasonable alternatives., Subse-quently, a correctional notice was pub-lished at 42 FR 24758; and a thirdnotice (42 FR 42235, August 22, 1978)extended the comment period to De-cember 1, 1978, and set forth a bibliog-raphy of resource information.
The notice of proposed rulemaking(NPRM) is based on Subparts Athrough K of the ANPRM These sub-parts provide a broad coverage ofclosely related proposed standards forthe design and construction of newfacilities and parts of existing facilitiesthat are replaced, relocated, or signifi-cantly altered. Interested persons canmeaningfully comment on this body ofproposed Standards, since the remain-ing standards to be proposed for inclu-sion in Part 193 should not have a sig-nificant Impact on design and con-struction.
Persons interested in LNG safetywere particularly urged to submit com-ments regarding those draft regula-tions in the ANPRM which related tothe safety problems mentioned abovesince those problems involve highlytechnical fields and LNG spill charac-teristics which are still being re-searched. Comments were also solicit-ed on other safety problems and onenvironmental and economic issues;and persons were asked to supporttheir comments with rationale anddocumentation, and where appropri-ate, to propose alternative regulationsthat would provide an acceptable levelof safety.
To ensure that the new Part 193does not result In costs to the privatesector, consumers, or government
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above those necessary *to provide anacceptable level of public safety, in theANPRM, MTB also encouraged Inter-ested persons to submit informationon the annual and aggregate costs,,benefits,. and other anticipated n-pacts associated with each of the draftregulations and all alternatives whichcommenters might suggest thereto.The information received has enabledMTB to adequately consider theimpact of this rulemaking proposalearly in the developmental process. ADraft Evaluation of the Impact Is inthe docket for this proceeding in ac-cordance with the Departmental pro-cedures for improving regulations (43FR 9582, March 8, 1978). MTB has de-termined that a Regulatory-Analysis Isnot required under those procedures.
DRAFT EVALU.TION Rsvrzw
The Draft Evaluation, prepared byBooz-Allen and Hamilton, is an impactanalysis of the costs and benefits ofthe alternative potential Federal regu-lations affecting the sitting, design,and construction of new liquefied LNGfacilities. These alternatives are: .. e T4is Notice of Proposed Rulemak-ing.
e Standard 59A of the National FireProtection Association (1975 edition).
* Recommendations made in theGeneral Accounting Office ReportEMD-78-28.
* The Advance Notice of ProposedRulemaking issued by. MTB on April21, 1977.
For this impact analysis, the NFPAStandard 59A (1975 edition) was used -as the baseline regulatory standardagainst which the incremental facilitycosts, safety benefits, employment andenvironmental effects, and effects onconsumers of the other alternativeLNG regulations were measured.Standard 59A was considered to be thebaseline because it is the minimumstandard that normally would be ob-served if the MTB does not adopt adifferent one. Impacts were measuredfor five representative facilities whichincluded baseload, peakshaving, andsatellite facilities. Projections of costsand benefits were then made for twolevels of planned LNG facilities, aminimum of 6 and a maximum of 64,assumed to bebuilt from 1 979 to 1998.In addition, the actual costs of con-structing the five facilities were-inves-tigated.
The Booz-Allen report concludesthat the majority of sections of theNPRM regulatory alternative wouldnot significantly affect the costs ofnew LNG facilities. Without consider-Ing the probability of an accident oc-curing, the Booz-Allen analysis indi-cates that a wide range of potentialbenefits exist. At the lower end of thisrange, the benefit of avoiding a 10cubic meter spill of LNG at a remotely
. PROPOSED RULES
located satellite facility in terms of re-duced accident costs is estimated at$1.5 million. At the upper end thebenefit of avoiding maximum spill andIgnition at 9, large peak-shaving facili-ty in a-densely settled area is estimat-ed to be $29 billion.
Of the 130 sections of the NPRManalyzed, 95 sections would involve noincremental costs when compared tobaseline safety standards, but 21 ofthese sections would have major incre-mental benefits. Of the remaining 35sections, the Bpoz-Allen report con-cludes that 22 sections would haveminor incremental costs. Seven ofthese NPRM sections would producemajor benefits while the rest wouldhave minor benefits. Thirteen NPRMsections would create a major incre-mental cost of more than $50,000 percomponent of an LNG facility. Elevenof these sections were subjected to adetailed quantitative analysis of theircosts and benefits because they com-prise the bulk of overall cost impacts.The eleven sections are: § 193.107,.Thermal Radiation Protection;§ 193.109, Flammable Vapor Gas Dis-persion Protection; § 193.111, SeismicInvestigation and Design, § 193.113,Flooding; § 193.117, Wind Forces;§ 193.423, Gas Leak Detection;§ 193.511, Penetrations; § 193.513, In-ternal Design Pressure; § 193.535, Sup-port Systems; § 193.1027, Non-Destruc-tive Tests; and § 193.1033, StorageTank Tests.
Over the next 20 years, the incre-mental costs (in 1977 dollars, discount-ed at 10 percent) of these 11 NPRMsections range from $275 million to$502 million for the minimum andmaximum estimated level of plannedfacilities. The annualized cost over the20-year period ranges from $29 millionto $54,million per year. These cost es-timates are based on an operator'schoosing to purchase or lease land tocomply with the proposed vapor dis-persion zone under §.193.109. Buyingor leasing land under § 193.109 wouldrepresent 80 percent of the increment-al costs of these il NPRM sections. Ifthe cdmpliance alternative of plannedvapor ignition were chosen(§ 193.'109(e)) instead of land acquisi-tion, the 203year incremental costswould be ieduced to either $55 millionor $106 million, depending on thenumber of facilities, and annualizedcosts could be as low as $6 million. It isimportant to.note that the planned ig-nition alternative is intended for situa-tions where it would be impractical toprovide a vapor dispersion zone (eitherby land acquisition or zoning) and anoperator's plan would have to be ap-proved by MTB.
The aggregate incremental costs ofthe 11 costly sections shown in theDraft Evaluation are based on an esti-mated cost of compliance with each
section viewed in isolhtion from theother sections. Because of the manycomplex design options that might beused at a new facility, the Evaluationdoes not attempt to relate one sectionto another to Oetermine where esti.mated costs or benefits may overlap(although the Evaluation acknowl-edges a cost overlap with regard toland acquisition under §§193.107 and193.109). For the same reason, theEvaluation does not indicate how costsmight be minimized through design In-novations or options. Hereafter, in thediscussibn with regard to the 11 costlysections, MTB has pointed out waysthat compliance costs might be miti-gated either through available designoptions or because compliance withone section may offset the cost of an-other section. The views of interestedpersons are particularly invited withregard to the possible cost savings.
The costs and benefits providedherein are intended to provide guid-ance to what must eventually be a dif-ficult decision. LNG has the potentialto play a substantial role in meetingthe Nation's' future energy needs. Inrecognizing this, however, we mustalso recognize that there is a vitalneed to examine the risks associatedwith the movement and storage ofLNG, and to provide the full measureof protection to the public. What Issought here is to establish the mostreasonable alternative, among manydifficult ones, or new alternatives asmay appear as a result of this rule-making.
The Evaluation quantitatively esti-mated the safety benefits at each fa-cility type for the 11 costly sectionsbased on a probability assessment ofrisk. While each of these sections wasprojected to have major benefitsshould an accident occur, Booz-Allenconcludes that net benefits would notbe expected to exceed added costs be-cause its risk assessment shows verylow probability of accident occurrence.Since as the Booz-Allen report statesthe risk assessment is uncertain, MTBdoes not think it should be used as anexclusive determinant of what is nec-essary for public 'safety. Rather, be-cause of the potential catastrophywhich may result from a foreseeableaccident, MTB's decision to proposemeasures for public protection hasbeen based on what can reasonably beaccomplished without incurring ex-treme costs. Comment are specificallyrequested on this issue.
As further reason for proposingadoption of the 11 costly sections,MTB recognizes that the industry'sactual "self-imposed" safety practicesin many Instances exceed the standards in NFPA 59A. In particular, withregard to §§ 193.107, 193.109, 193.113,193.423, and 193.1-027, the bulk of com-menters' suggested changes were
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adopted, in whole or in part. Thesecomments indicate that in many in-stances "self-imposed" industry prac-
-tices exceed NFPA 59A standards.This is supported by-the Booz-Allenre-port that found the most recentlycompleted facility at Elba Island hadsafety features which exceed the re-quirements in NFPA 59A. A furtherdiscussion of the costs and benefits ofall .11 sections is covered hereafter inthe discussion related to the sections.
Over 4,000 pages of comments werereceivted on the ANPRM from 135 dif--ferent commenters. Most of the com-ments were from industry associationsor ING operators, but a few govern-ment agencies, nonindustry-related or-ganizations, and individuals also com-mented.. About 15 percent of the commentersagreed with MTB's view that thestandards in NFPA 59A are inadequateand could be improved. In support, ofthis view comments indicated' thatmost LNG facilities being designedand constructed today are designedand constructed to levels. of safety ex-ceeding the current requirements inNFPA 59A. _
While the bulk of the comments re-ceived related to specific draft regula-tions' set out in the ANPRM, therewere many. general comments that de-serve attention. About one-fourth ofthe commenters encouraged MTB tocontinue to adopt the NFPA 59Astandards. These commenters arguedthat the need for new standards hasnot been demonstrated because theLNG industry has an enviable safetyrecord, with no accidents in operatingfacilities in over 20 years. Most ofthese commenters mentioned the ex-cellent quality, experience, and exper-tise of membership in the NFPA 59ACommittee, over 50 experts in LNGtechnology.
Even though many commenters pro-posed that MTB continue to referenceNFPA 59A, about one-fourth of thesecommenters recognized the need forimproved standards. Many suggestedthat MTB add to -the NFPA 59A stand-ards where necessary, while adoptingas much of NFPA 59"A as possible.
Over half of the commenters saidthat the draft Part 193 in the ANPRMwould be an excessive or overly bur-densome body of regulations, or thatthe draft needed major modification.Many commenters proposed two setsof standards-one for "peak-shaving"facilities (used by gas distributioncompanies to supplement gas suppliesduring periods of high demand) andone for major import terminals. Manypersons commented that the draft reg-ulations were too specific and wouldnot permit alternative approaches orimplementation of new technologicaldevelopment, and they argued'thatperformance language should be used.
Also, several commenters proposedthat regulations should be developedin closer cooperation with nongovern-ment organizations such as the Ameri-can Gas Association.
MTB does not agree that there Is-not any need for the development ofnew, more stringent Federal standardsfor LNG facilities. The hazard from acatastrophic spill of LNG Is very sig-nificant. The spill of LNG from a rup-ture of two ILG storage tanks inCleveland on October 20. 1944, that-killed 130 persons and Injured 225more, very clearly represents theextent of potential hazards and subse-quent consequences if a large amountof LNG escapes. Although there havenot been iny 'major incidents sincethen in the operation of LNG facilitiesin the United States, research con-ducted by various government agen-cies and industry groups on thermalradiation and Vapor cloud dispersionhas further indicated the significantpotential hazards that would occur ifLNG escapes. Also, as indicated in theANPRM and the study by ADL men-tioned above, MTB has Identifiedmany deficiencies in the presentstandards which should be correctedto mitigate the potential for a majorspill of LNG and provide an acceptablelevel of public safety. Some of the de-
-ficlencles can be corrected by clarify-ing or restating in enforceable termsprovisions of NFPA 59A. However, themore significant ones (such as thoserelating to seismic design and thedesign of storage tanks and impound-ing systems) require the developmentof entirely new standards.
NFPA continues to express the fearthat the new Federal regulations willeliminate the need for the NFPA 59ACommittee and result In disbandmentof a valuable group of LNG experts.Alternatively, NFPA suggests thatMTB work within the NFPA stand-ards-setting process to bring about theneeded changes in*LNG safety regula-tions. While MTB fully recognizes thequality, experience, and expertiseemobodied in the NFPA 59A Commit-tee, MTB does not agree that such avital function as setting the level ofsafety for LNG facilities should be leftto a nongovernment organization.Even though the NFPA process forstandards development may be fairand open to everyone, It still does notprovide a forum equivalent to the Fed-eral rulemaking process where deci-sions are made on the broadest possi-ble base of Information, the decisionmakers are subject to public scrutiny,and independent judgment Is appliedto develop standards that serve thepublic interest. As a consensus stand-ards developing body, by Its nature,the NFPA 59A Committee generallyreflects a perspective common to thegroup. Moreover, because of the var-
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ious ties, most Committee membersowe allegiance to the Industries affect-ed by the standards. Therefore, whileuse of the NFPA 59A standards as abasis for Federal safety regulationsmay be reasonable, the standards stillmust be evaluated with care In light ofpublic safety and welfare Interests-afunction Inherent in the Federal rule-making process.
It Is clear the the NFPA 59A Com-mittee Is important to MTB's regula-tory program for LNG facilities, butthe functions of each organizationdiffer. The NFPA should devise andrecommend means of meeting the gov-ernmentally prescribed safety leveland Investigate new areas where regu-lations may be needed or existing reg-ulations should be changed. To thatend, MTB wants the NFPA 59A Com-mittee to continue to participate inthe rulemaking process on the devel-opment of the new Part 193 and ex-pects that a signficant public benefitwill be achieved.
MTB essentially agrees with thecommenters that proposed that MTBadopt NFPA 59A to the extent possi-ble. However, because of the difficul-ties In adapting the format of NFPA
.59A to Federal regulation format andthe need for appropriate regulatorylanguage to facilitate enforcement ofthe LNG regulations, only a few sec-tions of NFPA 59A are being proposedfor incorporation by reference in Part193. Other 59A sections are used as abasis for, and restated as, Part 193 sec-tions.
MTB has reviewed the comments tothe ANPRM and has adopted thosecomments which it deems appropriate.Those draft regulations in theANPRM which comments indicatedwere particularly burdensome or un-needed have been revised where ap-propriate as discussed hereafter. How-ever, the proposal for two separatesets of standards-one for "peak-shav-Ing" facilities and one for large importterminals-as suggested by "severalcommenters, has not been adopted. In-stead, as set forth in the draft regula-tions in the ANPRM. those compo-nents that because of size should meetdifferent standards have been desig-nated In the text of the proposed regu-lations. Commenters to these proposedregulations should further point out-those particular; areas where differentstandards might be appropriate be-cause of size of component or the.extent of the operation of an LNG fa-cility and its associated risk.
MTB has tried not to be overly rigidand to permit alternative approachesfor specific safety concerns. Where ap-propriate, draft regulations in theANPRM have been revised to allowthis flexibility. In this regard, MTBrecognizes the technological develop-ment occurring in the ILNG field.
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MTB has generally stated the pro-posed requirements in performanceterms, using specific requirementswhere deemed necessary for, safety,and also referencing several industryconsensus standards. The use of per-formance language rather than speci-fication (how-to-do-it) language is con-sistent with the longstanding Depart-mental policy in prescribing Federalpipeline safety standards. Perform-ance standards prescribe what level ofsafety must be achieved, leaving theregulated industry free to develop anduse improved technological means ofmeeting the required level. Where nec-essary, the performance standardsmay include tests and analytical proce-dures to check that the level of per-formance if achieved.
MTB does not concur with thosecommenters who suggested that thenew LNG regulations should be devel-oped, in 'cooperation with privategroups outside the government. Thegroups recommended generally reflectthe limited view of the-regulated in-dustry. With regard to the commentsthat MTB develop these regulations incoordination with the U.S. CoastGuard, MTB agrees, and this NPRMhas been so developed. Also, the subse-quent development of final rules willbe in coordination with USCG. •
The proposed Part 193 would beadopted. under the Natural Gas Pipe-line Safety Act of 1968 (49 USC 1671et seq.). The jurlsdiction'of that Act islimited to LNG faciljties which areused In connection with a system forpipeline transportation of natural gasto consumers. Thus, the contemplatedPart 193 would not apply to facilitiesused exclusively in the transportationof natural-gas or LNG by modes otherthan pipeline. For example, the tand-ards would not apply to an LNG stor-age and transfer facility at a marineterminal used to transfer LNG be-tween ships or barges and rail ormotor' carriers unless the facility wasalso connected with a system for pipe-line transportation. Also, Part 193would not apply to LNG facilities usedby ultimate consumers of LNG or nat-ural gas or facilities used in the courseof natural gas treatment or hydrocar-bon extraction which do not storeLNG. With regard to the proposed de-
'velopment of offshore LNG facilities,while the standards would apply, it isproposed that an offshore LNG facili-ty need not comply with any require-ment of Part 193 which the Secretaryof Transportation finds impractical orunnecessary because of the offshorelocation (Section 193.2).
While almost all existing andplanned facilities involve the supply ordelivery of natural gas by pipeline, asLNG facilities become more wide-spread, it may be necessary to enlargethe scope of the Federal regulations to
PROPOSED RULES
cover facilities which are not relatedto the pipeline transportation of natu-ral gas. Any future action that may betaken with regard to these LNG facili-ties would, under -current law, be byauthority of the Hazardous MaterialsTransportation Act (49 U.S.C. 1801 etseq.).*
Effective,February 7, 1978, the U.S.Coast Guard (USCG) and thd Materi-"als Transportation Bureau executed aMemorandum: of Understanding(MOU) with respect to a division ofregulatory responsibilities for water-front LNG facillties, or those facilitieswhich are on, or immediately adjacentto, the navigable waters of the UnitedStates. This MOU was published inthe FEDERAL REGasTm on July 14, 1978(43.FR 30381).
The division of responsibilitiesagreed to by the MOU was considerednecessary due to the overlapping regu-latory authority of the USCG and theMTB affecting the siting, design, con-struction, operation, and maintenanceof waterfront LNG facilities.
The text of the Memorandum of Un-derstanding follows:
* ME JoN. xrm OF UNDERSTANDING BErwEENTHE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD AND THEMATERIALS TRANSPORTATION BUREAU FORREGULATION OF WATERFRONT LIQUIFIEDNATURAL GAS FACILIIES
L INTRODUCTION
Within the Department of Transportation(DOT),- the United States Coast Guard(USCG) and the Materials TransportationBureau (MTB) exercisd separate and over-lapping safety regulatory authority affect-ing the siting, design, construction, mainte-nance, and operation of waterfront liquiflednatural gas (LNG) facilities adjoining thenavigable waters of the United States. TheUSCG aerives Its authority over such facili-ties from the Ports and Waterways SafetyAct of 1972 (Pub, 1.. 92-340, 33 U.S.C. 1221-1227) and the Magnuson Act (50 U.S.C. 191).The regulatory authority of the MTh overthese same facilities (as well as non-water-front LNG facilities) is derived from theNatural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968'(Pub. IL 90-481, 49 U.S.C. 1671 et seq.) andthe Hazardous Materials TransportationAct (Pub. L 93-633; 49 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).
In recognition of each of the. parties' re-spective regulatory responsibilities, theUSCG and the MTB agree that a memoran-dum of understanding Is needed to avoid du-plication of regulatory efforts regarding wa-"terfront LNG facilities and to maximize theexchange of relevant information.
II. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PARTIESFor the foregoing reasons, the USCG and
the MTB agree to the following division of-regulatory responsibilities with respect towaterfront LNG facilities and cooperationin carrying out those xesponsibilities:
USCG RESPONSIBILITIESThe USCG is responsible for establishing
regulatory requirements for-(1) Facility site selection as it relates to
management of vessel traffic in and aroundthe facility;
. (2) Fire prevention and fire protectionequipment, systems, and methods for use ata facility;
(3) Security of a facility; and(4) All other matters pertaining to the fa-
cility between the vessel and the last mani-fold (or valve) immediately before the re.celving tank(s)
IT RESPONSIBILITIES
The MTB Is responsible for establishingregulatory requirements for-
(1) Facility site selection except as pro-vided by paragraph (1) of the "USCO Re-sponsibilities -set forth In this Memoran-dum; and
(2) All other matters pertaining to the fa-cility beyond (and including) the last mani-fold (or valve) immediately before the re-ceiving tank(s) except as provided by paragraphs (2) and (3) of the "USCO Responsi-bilities" set forth In this Memorandum.
JOINT RESPONSIBILITIES(1) The USCG and the MTB will cooper-
ate and assist each other In carrying outtheir respective waterfront LNG facilityregulatory enforcement activities; and
(2) The USCG and the MTB, in an effortto avoid inconsistent regulation of similarsafety matters (including as between water-front and non-waterfront LNG facilities)will consult with each other before issuingeach Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, andfinal regulation affecting waterfront LNG.facilities.
Dated: February 7, 1978.For the United States Coast Guard.
ADM OwEN W. Sm,Commandant.
Dated. February 1, 1978.For the Materials Transportation.Bureau.
I. D. SAS rnAN,.Acting Director.
Concurrent with this proceeding, theUSCG is developing regulations forthe storage and handling of hazardousmaterials, including LNG, at ports. OnAugust 3, 1978, the USCG issued anAdvance Notice of Proposed Rulemak-ing in the FEDERAL REGISTM (43 FR"34362) inviting public participation atthe earliest stages in the developmentof regulations to provide standards forsafety, security, and' environmentalprotection in the transportation,transfer, handling, and storage of liq-uefied natural gas at water front facil-ities. The USCG intends for these reg-ulations to become an integral part ofIts revised general waterfront faciltyregulations. The USCG published anAdvance Notice of Proposed Rulemak-ing as General Waterfront FacilitiesRequirements (43 FR 15107) on April10, 1978. MTB and USCG are coordi-nating their regulatory activities Inthis area to preclude problems involv-ing overlapping jurisdiction in conso-nance with the MOU.
The ANPRM issued by MTB Includ.ed draft regulations relating to (1) fireprevention and fire protection equip-ment, systems and methods for use at
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 44, NO. 28--THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1979
a facility-, and (2) security of a facility.At a waterfront LNG facility, in ac-cordance with the MOU between MTBand the USCG, these safety matterswill be subject to USCG regulatory re-sponsibility. Accordingly, this NPRM,covering only design and construction,does not include standards for thesetwo areas. Although both fire protec-tion and security for nonwaterfrontfacilities will be covered in MTB's nextNPRM in this proceeding, which willcover operation and inaintenancetopics, appropriate delineation of thelimits of MTB's responsibilities underthe MOU over fire protection and se-curity will be set forth in that notice.There are standards in this noticewhich could be applied to that part ofa waterfront facility between thevessel and-the last manifold (or valve)immediately before the receivingtank(s), but in accordance with theMOU, an operator would refer toUSCG requirements for applicabledesign and construction regulationsfor this portion of a waterfront LNGfacility (See § 193.1(b)(3)).
MTB and USCG have coordinated indeveloping a format that would beused by both agencies in the develop-ment of regulations for all waterfrontfacilities, including LNG facilities.Using a similar Iormat for all of theDOT waterfront facility regulations inPart 193 will make 'it easier for theregulated industry- to use these regula-tions. The proposed format to be 'used
-by MTB, as well as by the USCG, inthe issuance of the final regulationsfor LNG facilities will be the follow-ing:
The notice of proposed rulemaking,however, does not follow this format.The NPRM follows the same format,section by section, as published in theANPR)L In this way commenters tothe ANPRM are able to more easily
-follow any revisions made by MTB tothe draft proposed regulations issuedin the ANPRM.
The following portion of the pream-ble discusses the comments made toeach particular section in the draftregulations in the ANPRM as well asany revisions to those -draft regula-tions used in developing the standardsproposed in this notice.
SUBPART A-GENERAL
This subpart would explain the ap-plicablity of Part 193 to new and exist-
PROPOSED RULES
Ing facilities and define several terms.If a term used in the proposed Part Isnot defined, It is used In its ordinarysense or the sense commonly under-stood in the LNG industry. Subpart Awould also set forth rules for inter-preting certain regulatory terms, ex-plain how documents are incorporatedby reference in Part 193. and make Itclear that leaks and spills of ING areto be reported to the Secretary as re-quired by Part 191 of title 49 of theCode of Federal Regulations.
Applicability. In response to numer-ous requests that § 193.1 indicate moreprecisely which LNG facilities wouldbe covered by Part 193, this sectionhas been rewritten to refer to facilitiesused In the transportation of gas bypipeline that are subject to the Natu-ral Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968and, the Federal Gas pipeline safetystandards in 49 CFR. Part 192.
There were many recommendationsthat LNG facilities not covered byPart 193 should be described in § 193.1.As a result, § 193.1(b) now sets forththree types of facilities not covered bythe proposed Part 193. Consistent withthe present regulation of LNG facili-ties in 49 CFR Part 192, the first typeis an LNG facility used by an ultimateconsumer of the product. The secondapplies to the large number of refin-ery-type plants which use low ten-perature processes. One commenterexpressed great concern about the ad-verse economic effect that could resultif these plants were regulated by Part193. = believes that since LNGfacilities of this type do not receive,store, or transport LNG. they do notpresent a level of hazard comparableto a typical LNG facility and, there-fore, are not proposed to be covered. Athird exemption applies to those as-pects of a waterfront LNG facility re-ceving or sending out LNG by marinevessel which are to be regulated in ac-cordance with the MOU between MTand the USCG.
A new § 193.2 has been added cover-ing "offshore LNG facilities." As men-tioned in the ANPRM preamble, MTBbelieves that if facilities of this typeare built, they should comply with theproposed standards to the largestextent practicable. Two commentersto the ANPRUI mentioned that iuchfacilities would not be appropriatelycovered by the draft regulations. 1=agrees, and will study this aspect fur-ther to determine what more appropri-ate standards would be needed forfacilities in the offshbre envirbnment.However, in the interim, it Is proposedunder § 193.2 that any questions in-volving the appropriateness of a stand-ard for an. offshore facility be resolvedby MTB on a case by case basis. Also,
T recognizes that the USCO aswell as other agencies have Jurisdic-tional responsibilities over the safety
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of offshore facilities. As in the case ofwaterfront LNG facilities, MTB andthe USCG intend to reach an under-standing as to how their respective ju-risdictional responsibilities will be ex-ercised to preclude any overlaps frombecoming an unnecessary regulatoryburden. Final rules regarding offshoreLNG facilities that are developed as aresult of this notice would reflect thisunderstanding.
Under the Natural Gas PipelineSafety Act of 1968, general safetystandards affecting the design andconstruction of "pipeline facilities"may not apply to facilities in existancewhen the standards are adopted (49U.S.C. 1672(b)). Section 193.3 in in-tended to apply this statutory require-ment with respect to LNG facilitiesthat would be subject to Part 193.
The majority of commenters ad-dressing §193.3 in the ANPRM feltthat to apply the design and construc-tion requirements of Part 193 to facili-ties "substantially under develop-ment" when the new rules are adopt-ed, even if such application were prac-tical, would be much too indefiniteand could lead to enforcement difficul-ties as well as adverse economic ef-fects. A wide vaiety of recommenda-tions were given for establishing anappropriate cutoff point whereby anexisting facility would not be subjectto the design and construction stand-ards Intended for nei facilities. Manycommenters recommended the begin--ning of construction as an appropriatecutoff point. This view was adopted as-most reasonable and easy to apply. Asrestated, § 193.3(b) now provides thatany component of an LNG facilityupon which construction, installation,relocation, replacement, or significantalteration is begun after Part 193 isIssued would have to meet the require-ments of Part 193 related to designand construction, including siting andinitial testing and inspection. Ofcourse, as stated in § 193.3(a), all facili-ties would have to comply with the re-quirements of Part 193 which affectoperation and maintenance.
Considerable concern was expressedalso that the suggested scopes of var-ious subparts in 'the ANPRM1 wouldmake design and construction require-ments apply retroactively to all com-ponents of an existifig facility if anyone component were changed. Sincethis result was not intended, MTB hasmodified the scope of individual sub-parts in this notice (Subpart B and K)to more clearly define each subpartsintended applicability to new or exist-ng facilities, consistent with § 193.3.(See §§ 193.101, 193.201, 193.301,193.401, 193.501, 193.601. 193.701,193.801, 193.901, 103.1001). n thisregard, MTB believes that It is in thepublic Interest to require that existingLNG facilities meet the design and
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 44, NO. 28--THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1979
8148
construction requirements applicableto new facilities to the exent an exist-ing facility is replaced, reldcated, orsignificantly altered. In applying thestandards in this way, it is not intend-ed to unnecessarily 'restrict the im-provement or expansion of existingfacilities, but to enchance their levelof safety.
Definitions, Many commenters sug-gested changes to various "definitionsIn § 193.5. Appropriate editorial andclarifying revisions were made to thesuggested definitions of certain termsin response to comments. The terms"bunkering," "gasification," and "gasi-fier" are deleted because changes tothe proposed standards and the divi-sion of responsibility with the USCGmade these definitions unnecessary.The suggested definitions of "LNG"and "LNG facility" are combined.Also, the term "storage tank" ischanged to include underground cav-erns to assure that if caverns are usedto store LNG they meet the applicablesafety requirements of Part 193. Thefollowing definitions have been signifi-cantly changed as a result of com-ments to the ANPRM:
"Cargo transfer. system" is mademore concise and revised to apply tothe transfer of hazardous "fluids"rather than hazardous "liquids" be-tween piping and'a tank car or tanktruck.
"Controllable ' emergency" and"emergency" are revised to mean situ-ations where prudent action can pre-vent "harm" rather than prevent a"hazard," since some form of hazard isimplicit in.either term.
"Determine" is revised to mean an"appropriate" investigation using sci-entific methods rather than a "thor-ough" investigation.
"Exclusion zone" is revised to permitgovernmental control as well as con-trol by an operator of activities withinthe zone in accordance with the pro-posed §193.107 and §193.109. Thischange would allow means others thanownership by an operator to provide.the required restrictions on land devel-opment around an LNG facility.
"Piping system" is revised to deletethe reference, to "ingulation" and tomake-the term applicable to the con-tainment of hazardous fluids..
Regulatory Terms. In § 193.7, subpar-agraph (b)(3) has been deleted becausethe gender of. sex is not used in theproposed Part 193.
Inspection and Maintenance Plans.As an Improvement in format, § 193.9In the ANPRM, "Filing inspection andmaintenance plans," has been trans-ferred to Subpart M, Maintenance,and will be incorporated in the NPRMon that subject to be issued in March,1979.
Reporting. Operators of gas distribu-tion systems and transmission systems
PROPOSED RULES
.which include -LNG facilities are re-quired to report leaks and spills of gasor LNG at LNG facilities under the re-porting- requirements of 49 CFR Part191. A new §19310 is added in thisnotice to assure that there is no mis-understanding regarding this report-ing requirement. The MTB recognizes.that LNG facilities are not effectivelycovered by the present reportingforms under Part 191.- Until theseforms are changed, however, informa-tion applicable to leaks or spills of gasor LNG at LNG facilities must be re-ported to the maximum extent possi-ble on the existing forms prescribed byPart 191.
SUBPART B-SITE RELATED DESIGNREQUIREPM S
This subpart would establish designcriteria pertaining to the site of a newLNG facility or the site of an existingcritical component which is replaced,relocated, or significantly altered. Asite would have to provide safe separa-tion distances needed for public pro-tection in the event of a spill andwould have to be designed to with-stand the effects of natural and man-made hazards which may occur at thesite.
Site Acceptability. A small numberof comments were made about§193.103 in the ANPRM, which sug-gested" that a site not be used for anING facility unless it is investigatedand designed in accordance with Sub-part B. The most significant com-ments proposed that Section 20 ofNFPA 59A be adopted Instead, or that§193.103 be deleted because it dupli-cates Federal, State, or local authorityin establishing an acceptable LNG fa-cility site. The proposal to use themore general NFPA wording was notalopted because MTB feels that thepresent requirements in NFPA 59A arenot sufficient to ensure the adequateinvestigation of a site for. an LNG fa-cility. The proposed Subpart B hasconsiderably broader and more appro-priate requirements. With regard tothe comments suggesting possible doplication of other governmental au-thority, MTB acknowledges the au-thority of other agencies over the non-safety related aspects of siting an NGfacility, but DOT authority is primarywith regard to the safety aspects ofsiting. Therefore, § 193.103 is neces-sary and does not duplicate any otherFederal, State, or local jurisdiction.
Persons commenting on the' generalsiting criteria suggested by § 193.105,suggested editorial changes whichthey felt would clarify, the intent ofthis provision. A few commenters feltthat general siting requirementsshould, be limited to a land-based siteso as not to preclude use of offshorelocations that could not comply with
'the suggested requirement for ease of
access to the site. This suggestion wasnot adopted since the proposed stand-ards in Part 193 are intended to applyto offshore facilities to the maximum,,extent practical and MTB feels thanoffshore LNG facilities could comply,with a proposed requirement for "easeof access." Several suggestions tomodify the term "ease-of access" werenot adopted. MTB feels that thisphrase adequately describes the spaceneeded for access by offslte emergencyresponse personnel and as one com-menter suggested, evacuation of per-sonnel. Similarly, MTB feels that theterm "jeopardize" adequately de-scribes the intent of the proposed re-quirement that an operator investigateall site characteristics which have po-tential for harm to the facility. MTBdid not adopt the comments that Sec-tions 200 and 925 of NFPA 59A beadopted as a general requirement be-cause It was felt that § 193.105 betterstates the broad intent of this propos-al rather than the narrower wordingof NFPA 59A. The suggested rule Ismodified, however, to adopt those,comments that argued that as a gener-al standard, a site should enable a fa-cility to be "designed to minimize haz-ards."
.ghermal radiation protection. Under§193.107 each space provided for Im-pounding, or holding, a spill of LNGwould have to be located a sufficientdistance away from certain structuresor, areas of public assembly (as set(forth in § 193.107(d)) outside the LNG"facility so that persons would haveprotection from the heat of any firewhich may occur at the Impoundingspace. Added protection is necessarybecause even a small spill of LNG intoan impounding system can result in afire just as hot as that from a largespill. For a new facility, the proposeddistances could range from about 50 to500 meters.
The current Federal standard forprotection against the heat, or ther-mal radiation, .from a fire (49 CIFR192.12) as well as'the 1975 edition ofINFPA 59A prescribe a safe distancebased on a fixed level of heat flow atthe plant boundary (measured as unitsof thermal flux equal roughly to10,000 BTV/ft2hr.). A formula Is pro-vided for computing a safe distance de-pending on the area of impoundment(d=.8A' 5). However, evidence showsthat at the prescribed distance, per-sons would not be adequately protect-ed if they are openly exposed to suchheat levels or In buildings that do notprovide adequate shielding from theheat.
In the ANPRM, MTB suggested that-safety be provided by safe distances to,,
structures, with distances varying ac-,,cording to the effect of heat on the,.structure, and br distance to openareas based on the time people would
'FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 44, NO. 28-THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1979 -
need to walk away or seek shelter. Byusing a diagram to precisely define amethod for measurement of the dis-tance, the ANPRM approach took intoaccount site topography and the effect01 wind on a fire that might be expect-ed during the early stages' of ignition.OSome commenters appeared to favor
retention of the NFPA method, butmany commenters supported the useof allowable thermal flux levels as thebasis for determining a safe zonerather than prescribing the distances.In consideration , of these views,§ 193.107 has been modified. Under§ 193.107(d), maximum allowable ther-mal'flux levels are proposed for differ-ent structures and open areas, andunder §193.107(b) and (c), a methodfor measuring and determining dis-tance is proposed.
Section 193.107(a) of the ANPRMhas been changed to clearly show thata "thermal exclusion zone" is definedby the computed safe distances. Anumber of comnenters objected to useof the word "target" to refer to astructure or open area, stating that ithas an unfavorable meaning. However,
\ in view of the general acceptance ofthe definition of target and becausethe term is used extensively in techni-cal literature on thermal flux from anLNG fire, adoption of this commentdoes not appear justified. Some com-menters to § 193.107(a) in ANPRMalso objected to use of the term "flam-mable liquid," preferring instead•%NG." Considering the relative quan-tities of flammable liquids other thanLNG at a facility, exclusion zones forother liquids should fall within theboundaries of exclusion zones for thelarger LNG volumes. Therefore,
-§ 193.107(a) is changed to apply onlyto LNG impounding systems.
A large number of commentersstated that local wehther conditionsshould be considered in defining safedistances. Neither NFPA 59A nor theANPRM, which each rely on assumedfixed conditions, provide for local vari-ations. However, in view of the com-ments and the wide range in ambientweather conditions that may exlit atproposed sites, and the effect vari-ations may have in defining appropri-ate thermal exclusion zones,# provi-sions for site specific conditionsappear justified.
Among the commenters who pro-posed procedures for determining thethermal exclusibn zone, only one pro-posed a precise ,method of measure-ment. This proposal essentially wasbased on the diagram in § 193.107(b) ofthe ANPRM, but added modificationsfor flame angle and length related toflame base dimensions and local windcondition. Although the ANPRM-method did not intend to specificallyaccount for flame angle and height be-cause of the uncertainities involved in
PROPOSED RULES
I.TG fire characteristics, in this noticethe measurement diagram is changedin § 193.107(b) to provide for site spe-cific determination of flame angle andlength of the flame. The flame angleand length of flame would affect theamount of thermal radiation In thethermal exclusion zone.
One commenter presented a com-parison showing the differences thatcan be expected in flame angle de-pending 6n the method of computa-tion used. Others indicated that a spe-cific method should not be mandateddue to the lack of verification by cur-rent technology. These commentsserve to illustrate the uncertainties In-volved and emphasize the need for adefinitive procedure to assure uniformsafety levels at all facilities. Most corn-menters who specifically addressedthe flame angle aspect recommendeduse of the American Gas Association(AGA) report. MT proposes that theAGA Interim Report, IS-3-1 (July 1,1974) be used for determining flameangle and length under § 193.107(b).
Commenters said that using theANPRM method for measuring dis-tance would not reflect flame lengthwhen impoundment dimensions arelong and narrow, as the case might bewith transfer piping. Consequently, arequirement -to account for this situa-tion has been included as a note under§.193.107(c). The note provides thatthe thermal flux on a target must bedetermined on the basis of multiplefire sources when impounding systemswith base dimensions in a ratio ofmore than 2 are involved.
In accordance with the suggestion ofone commenter, the term "innermost"has been added to the definition ofpoint (D) under § 193.107(b) to betterdescribe the way a safe distance ismeasured. This change is needed inorder to make clear which dike is ref-erenced in a multiple diking system.
Most commenters who suggestedmethods to determine safe distancesproposed that AGA report IS-3-1, or"a method at least as accurate" beused. Others did not reference a datasource but specified factors to be con-sidered in determining distances andsome suggested that determinationsshould be made by an engineering con-sultant. Two prepared comparativedata showing the diversity of resultsthat might be expected depending onthe method employed.
While the AGA report does not pro-vide a unique model for distance deter-mination, two commenters proposed aunique model for distance determina-tion based on that report (see Colum-bia LNG Corp. Consolidated SystemsLNG Co. cdmments). The model sug-gested appears to be appropriatelyconservative. Accordingly, with somemodification, this model is proposed Inthis Notice under §193.107(c)(2). The
8149
model provides for site specific param-eters suggested by niany other com-menters and thermal flux levels dis-cu.ied under §193.107(d). Althoughthe commenters' model Is based on athermal flux of 31,500 BTU/ft. hr, atthe fire, the MTB proposes that 45,000BTU/fL2 hr. be used In view of the un-certainties regarding this value. Forexample, the AGA IS-3-1 report sug-gests a value of 56,000 BTU/ft.2 hr. foruse In one instance. Also. large verifi- -cation testing has not yet been per-formed to determine maximum fluxfrom a large fire, which some expertsbelieve may exceed 50,000 BTU/ft.2 hr.-In addition, preliminary results fromresearch performed for the Depart-ment at China Lake, California, haveshown that there are still uncertaincharacteristics about LNG fires.
These same commenters also pro-posed that a mathematical formula onthermal flux be permitted as an alter-nate method for determining distance.MAB has incorporated this proposalunder § 193.107(cl(1), since It willpermit LNG facilities, particularlythose of smaller size, to establish-ther-mal exclusion zones with less data ac-cumulation and computation.
Several commenters to §193.107(c),In the ANPRM felt that thermal ex-cluslon distances derived as suggestedwould be much too short. Many othersargued that the ANPRM distanceswould be excessive and proposed re-tention of the 10,000 BTU/ft.2 hr.thermal flux level set by NFPA 59A.With regard to open areas (category(1) under §193.107(d)) most coni-menters recomxpended that the fluxlevel be 1,600 BTU/ft.1 hr., since it isthe level for human exposure recom-mended In recent technical reports.This level was said to be conservativebecause clothing could afford someprotection and there would be suffi-cient time (20 seconds) for a person toeither find shelter or move away. Also,the commenters asserted that if awind factor is used in conjunction withthe measurement diagram It wouldafford some safety when the windspeed is low, or, for remotely locatedareas, provide some cooling effect. Inaddition, altering position to changethe area of the body exposed to the ra-diant heat would allow additionalescape time.
At the same time, the Departmentof Housing and Urban Development(HUD), who s develoiping Its ownstandards for locating HUD sponsoredoutdoor recreational projects nearLNG or other highly volatile liquidfacilities, has expressed a yew in aletter dated November 28, 1978, that1600 BTU/ft2 hr. would provide littletime for people to take protectivemeasures. In HUD's view a 20-secondreaction time to find refuge before ex-periencing pain would be unrealistic,
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 44, NO. 28--THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1979
PROPOSED RULES
since it is doubtful that people at acrowded beach, swimming pool, 'orother exposed recreational area wo ldbe able to find shelter within thattime. HUD also asserts that special at-tention should be given to the limitedmobility of the elderly, small children,and the handicapped. Accordingly,HUD recommends, that a more realis-tic reaction time be provided such as 2minutes which corresponds to a ther-mal flux of 500 BTU/ft 2 hr. HUD fur-ther recommends making this thermalflux level.applicable to yfird areas as-sociated with residential dwellingssince the levels recommended* by theANPRM would not allow sufficienttime for persons outside their homesto escape radiant heat in the event ofan LNG fire. On this latter point MTBdoes not agree because setting a lowlevel for yards would have the con-comitant effct of requiring unneces-sarily long separation distances forhouses, and unlike outdoor recreation-al areas, houses are readily availableas shelter for persons in yards. Be-,cause of questions raised by HUD an&the differing views stated by com-menters, MTB is proposing that alevel between 500 and 1600 BTU/ft?hr. be adopted for open areas undercategory (1). of §193.107(d). To avoidconfusion, the 1600 BTU/ft 2 hr. levelis shown in the text of the rule, butthis level may be reduced in the finalrule depending ofi the views expressedby commenters.
With regard to certin cellulose(wood or wood fiber) or metal struc-tures, (category (2) under § 193.107(b)),c.ommenters recommenlded that 4,000BTU/ft 2 hr. be adopted, since at thislevel structural properties available toshield persons or materials will not beitnpaired. This recommended fluxlevel is adopted for this Notice.
In response to recommendationsthat safe distances for transportationfacilities be specifically addressed, anew category (3) is included in thisNotice. For reasons given above, andsince either shelter or a more rapidmeans of escape would be expected,the flux level for category (2) appliesto this new category also.
A flux level of 10,000 BTU/ft 2 hr. formasonry structures (category (3) inthe ANPRM) was generally acceptedand is retained in this Notice as cate-gory (4).
With regard to the proposed flux of6,700 BTU/ft 2 hr. for other cellulose,metal or masonry structures (category(4)' in the ANPRM) one commenterthought it could be too restrictive insome situations and not, restrictiveenough in others. Two who proposeddetailed procedures did not object tothe category and flux level. This cate-gory and flux is retained in this Noticeas category (5) to provide protectionfor less critical structures. Some safety
factor is included for the integrity ofmetal structures and ignition of cellu-lose materials in view of the many un-certainties that remain with respect tothermal radiation levels.
Some of the commenters suggestedvarying acceptable flux levels, withstructures identified by local zoningdescriptions. MTB, however, believesthe concept of zoning would not beuseful since, for example, in an indus-trial zone, a high-concentration ofhumans could be exposed to highlevels of thermal flux."
A variety of methods to mitigateheat radiating from' a fire, such ashigh expansion foam and waterscreens, have been considered for in-clusion in the Notice. Many com-menters, including one who preparedan extensive report covering this andother factors, felt that a reduced ex-clusion zone should be permitted whena facility has foam systems. Based onavailable data, it appears, that high ex-pinsion foam can reduce the magni-tude of heat radiation. However, MTBis not proposing that exclusion dis-tance determinations be modified toaccount for any potential mitigatingeffects of foam or other systems sincethere is insufficient data to assure pre-dictable results particularly for largescale events.
The Draft Evaluation for this Noticeshows that- the proposed § 193.107would have a major cost impact onconstruction of a new ING facility ascompared to NFPA 59A because of theadditional land area that would haveto be acquired. MTB believes thatthere are factors which may lessen thecost impact of the proposed § 193.107:,
(1) Selection of a site which mini-mizes the need for construction of ad-ditional pipelines so that the com-bined cost of land and piping is riothigh.
(2) Choosing a site where, because ofthe nature of the surrounding area,the thermal flux permitted under theproposed § 193.107 would equal or ap-.proach that allowed by NFPA 59A.
(3) Locating a facility where localmeteorological conditions would resultin lower exclusion distances.
(4) Utilizing government land con-trols to provide the necessary dis-tances -rather than purchasing theland.
(5) Utilization of alternative plantdesigns to reduce the exclusion dis-tances. For example, the use of eitherClass I impounding system (§ 193.407),cavern storage, or a .larger number ofsmall tanks would minimize the neces-sary distances. Such designs could alsoprovide savings in cbmpliance withother proposed standards. ' ,
Protection Against Gas Dispersion.While the thermal exclusion zone re-quirements in § 193.107 would provide-protection from thermal radiation of 'a
potential fire on a facility, § 193.109would protect against the, hazards of avapor plume traveling downwind froma large spill of LNG. Section § 193.109would require that each LNG impounding space be surrounded by a"vapor dispersion exclusion zonebcomputed on the basis of separatildistances within which places of out-door assembly and certain structures(as set forth in § 193.109(a)) would beprohibited and LNG vapor would dissi-pate. Alternatively, safety would beprovided by Igniting LNG vapors atthe plant site. Depending on the siteof a facility, as stated In the DraftEvaluation, an exclusion zone couldrange from about 500 to 5,000 meters,
The Draft Evaluation for this Noticeshows that § 193.109 would have amajor cost impact if the "exclusionzone" alternative Is chosen in designrather than planned Ignition ofvapors. Since the bulk of this costwould be due to land acquisition, mostof the factors discussed under§ 193.107 on how land costs might bemitigated are equally applicable to.§109.109. Even assuming a low prob-ability of accident event that wouldcause flammable vapors to leave aplant site, MTB believes the addedcosts involved are justified by the po-tentially disastrous effects that couldresult from Ignition of a vapor plumein a populated area.
Several commenters expressed conucern that § 193.109(a), which suggesteifthat new LNG facilities be surroundedby a dispersion exclusion zone, wouldprohibit any structure, even controlrooms, within LNG plant boundaries.Obviously, each structure or compo-nent in an LNG facility must be locat-ed within ,the facility's exclusion zoneand, therefore, § 193.109(a) is changedin this Notice to make It clear thatitems prohibited within the zone arenot those associated with the LNG fa-cility. ,
With respect, to §.193.109(b) in theANPRM, a number of commenters ob-jected to an exclusion zone being re-quired for impounded liquids otherthan LNG, because of the differencesin physical characteristics and possibleconflict with acceptable practices. Ob-jections 'were also expressed to thesuggestion that an additional safe dis-tance to. protect against thermal radi-ation be added to the dispersion dis-tance' on the grounds that continuousburning of dispersed gas, as with apool fire, would be unlikely. Regardingthese comments, MTB agrees that be-cause of the larger dispersion distanceneeded for LNG, a safe distance forLNG is likely to extend well beyondthat needed for other liquids, MThalso agrees that it appears unlike..that Ignition would occur at the pr&Pcise instant of maximum dispersionConsequently, § 193.109(b) is changed
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in this Notice to eliminate reference tocommodities other- than LNG and toany added distance.
A mathematical model in the AGAreport, IS-3-1, was suggested in§193.109(c) of the ANPRM for use indetermining a safe dispersion distancefor LNG spills. Many c6mmentersagreed with the use of IS-3-1. Similar-ly, the NFPA: 59A, 1975 ed., recom-mends IS-3-1 for determining vapordispersion distances. However, manycommenters objected to the proposedmodel on the basis that it is applicableto instantaneous spills only, and isnow outdated. They suggested thatother models should be adopted orthat the selection of a model should bedelayed pending further research.Upon further evaluation, it appearsthat some error in test data may haveexisted and that an alternative to theIS-3-1 model should now be proposed.
MTB believes a specific model givingconservative results should be adoptedas a standard th assure that adequatesafety levels are uniformly estab-lished. The model being proposed (Ap-pendix B of "Evaluation of LNGVapor Control Methods" AmericanGas Association) was recommended bymany of the commenters and current-ly is believed to have a sound basis andbackground development.
The ANPRM suggested that compu-tation of dispersion distance be basedon gas concentrations of 2.0 percent.This value is changed in this notice to2.5 percent, a more appropriate level.- Instead of fixed weather conditions
suggested in the ANPRM, site specificvariables are proposed for use in themodel This change was proposed bymany commenters and is justified forthe same reasons discussed abovb re-garding the use of site specific varia-bles in determining safe distance forthermal radiatioh.
MTB is not proposing that less dis-tance be permitted if higher dikes areused since current evidence to supportthis change appears insufficient.
Most commenters to §193.109(d) inthe ANPRM regarding vaporizationrates indicated that to determine dis-persion distances based on an assumedsudden instantaneous spill would notbe creditable. Other commenters pro-posed use of the 10-minute design spillrate set forth in NPFA 59A, but MTBbelieves that use of an arbitrarydesign spill could result in an excessivedispersion distance in some cases andnot enough in others.
Both the ANPRM and this Noticebase the proposed protection againstthe threat of gas dispersion under§193.109 on the premise that morestringent design requirements for com-ponents would make a catastrophicilure unlikely as long as accident
causes are predictable and can be ac-commodated by engineering design.
Under this condition projected spillrates into an impounding system cansafely be based on the discharge froma failed transfer line, and vapor gen-eration rates limited to the spill rateItself plus flash vaporizations. Wheretransfer piping runs over a dike andautomatic shutdown is available, asproposed by this Notice, the entire im-pounding and retention space can beassumed to be available for vapor re-tention. Additional dispersion distanceto protect against failure of the com-ponent served by Impoundment wouldbe necessary only where accidentcauses are unpredictable or cannot beaccommodated by design. Accordingly,the essential features of § 193.109(d) inthe ANPRM are retained in thisNotice, with some modifications fordetail and clarity as proposed by com-ments. The seismic acceleration sug-gested in the ANPRM as a designstandard for unpredictable seismicmotion has been increased from .3G toAG to reflect areas where earthquakeactivity is high but can be accommo-dated be design. Also. In paragraph(d)(3), a new equation for determininga more realistic time of spillage Is pro-posed based on a comment by Colum-bia LNG Corporation and Consoli-dated Systems LNG Company.
As recommended-by most commentson the subject, the ANPRM's suggest-ed specifications describing heat trans-fer properties and insulation design inan impounding system have beenchanged Ji this Notice to permit great-er flexibility and use of future techno-logical improvements.
The planned Ignition suggested in§ 193.109(e) -was opposed by most com-menters. Some felt that requiring Igni-tion of LNG vapor could increase thehazard of a small spill and argued thatinsurance on facility equipment wouldbe unobtainable. Still others advocat-ed planned Ignition as an alternativeto a dispersion exclusion zone as longas It would not have to operate auto-matically. Several opposed only thesuggested requirement for redundancyin hardware.
MTB believes that planned Ignitionwould provide a needed safety alterna-tive to the vapor dispersion distancethat would otherwise be required by
.§ 193.109(a) to (1) allow for future de-velopment at existing LNG facilitieswith limited or unsuitable land tomeet the distance requirement, and (2)permit new facilities to be sited on thebasis if criteria that may be more rele-vant than population density, such asseismic or land use considerations.However, because there Is not enoughinformation about Ignition systems onwhich to base an adequate perform-ance standard, an acceptable level ofsafety would be assured under§193.109(e) by requiring operatorswho choose the planned Ignition alter-
native to obtain Secretarial approvalof the plan.
The suggested requirement for auto-matic Ignition has been deleted from§ 193.109(e) in this Notice to allow per-sonnel responsible for responding toemergencies greater latitude in actionunder an Ignition plan.
Earthquake Design. Section 193.111would establish site investigation re-quirements and design criteria for re-sponse spectra (ground motion) causedby earthquakes to protect against thecatastrophic failure of certain criticalcomponents. Storage tanks and im-pounding systems at facilities locatedwhere there has been a relatively highincident of seismic activity, wouldhave to be designed to withstand re-sponse spectra that has a 99.5 percentprobability of not bLMng exceeded in 50years. Alternativ'ely, an operatorwould have to base seismic design onthe effect of recorded earthquakes atthe site if there would be a higherdamaging effect.
Under NIFA 59A seismic study is re-quired for a facility of any size whenlocated in Zones 2 and 3 of Seismicrisk Map, of the Uniform Buildingcode, 1973. However, specific seismicdesign provisions apply only to storagetanks, and no consideration is mandat-ed for potential vertical seismicmotion. In addition, only seismic accel-eration rather than critical "responsespectra" must be addressed, and nomethod of prescribing the level ofmotion intensity is included so that auniform level of safety among facii-ties would be unlikely. Factores whichshould be considered, such as surfacefaulting, motion amplification, soil lq-uefaction. land slide, foundation anddike design in areas of high seismhc ac-tivity, and reaction of contained liquidare also omitted in 59A. Consideringthe failure to address these criticalfeatures, particularly vertical seismicmotion, and the lack of uniformity inseismic safety design, current stand-ards do not appear to provide an ade-quate level of safety.
The proposed rule addresses all ofthe factors discussed above. Considera-tion of seismic loading would be re-quired for all flammable fluid contain-ers, shutdown control, transfer piping -and impounding systems as well as thestorage tanks. Most significantly, itproposes to require design accommo-dation of vertical seismic motion and.establish a uniform level of seismicsafety at all facilities with more strin-gent requirements for storage tanksand their impounding systems, themost critical components from asafety viewpoint in an LNG facility.
Several commenters to § 193.111 inthe ANPRM advocated that the seis-mic design requirements of the Nucle-ar Regulatory commission (NRC) beadopted. Others felt the NRC require-
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ments should be strengthened, makingspecific suggestions. In contrast, mostcommenters declared that the suggest-ed design earthquake for a storagetank and dikes (based on a 10,000-yearrecurrence interval) would be exces-sive (see §193.111(d) of the ANPRM),and they argued that the UniformBuilding Code (UBC) design methodshould -be used since it has beenproven by experience to be adequate.
Obviously, the probability of a natu-ral disaster occurring at an LNG facili-ty may be similar to that of a nuclearfacility, and this in Subpart B theANPRM addressed the same range ofnatural occurrence risks as the NRCregulations. However, MTB believesthe release of LNG in an accidentwould not have the long term Implica-tions presented by escaping, radioac-tive materials and this difference inconsequences should be reflected inany design standard intended to pro-tect against the potentially cata-strophic effects of natural occur-rences. For example, in § 193.111(c),the return period for the proposeddesign seismic motion is either 475 or9',975 years, while the period for a nu-clear plant may be from 10 thousandto 10 million years. thus, even thoughthe most critical components of anLNG facility would have a level ofseismic safety closely approximate tosome components in nuclear plants,the overall level of design would notbe as high.
Engineering literature shows thatthe UBC basis for design earthquakesis not universally considered adequateand is not suitable for critical compo-nents, particularly those componentsin areas of high seismic activity. MTBbelieves that more stringent design cri-teria are needed, and the concept of99.5 percent probability of seismic re-sponse spectra not being exceeded in50 years would providea uniform levelof risk fo all facilities. Some com-menters also supported this view.
A number of commenters to§193.111(a) in. the NPRM proposedthat the need for a detailed geotechni-cal investigation should be basedsolely on the potential -for earth-quakes at the site, as shown by theUBC Seismic Risk Map, and not onstorage capacity. Since an investiga-tion is probably not warranted evenfor a large facility where seismic activ-ity is low, this Section has been re-vised to propose detailed investigationof all sizes of facility in zones 2, 3, and4 of the UBC map. However, even inthese higher risk areas, sites for smallstorage tanks such as "bullets" shouldnott have to be investigated unlessthere is evidence indicating a potentialfor surface faulting.
Section 193.111(b) in the ANPRMspecified information (patterned after'the NRC regulations) that would have
PROPOSED RULES
to be determined from a -detailed in-vestigation to assure a sound basis fordesign. In this Notice, performancelanguage in § 193.111(a) is intended tocover the important aspects of the in-vestigation.
In accordance with comments to§ 193.111(f) in the ANPRM requestingthat a minimum distance be prescribedfor proximity of surface faulting tocritical components, considering otherfactors of the investigation, one milehas- been proposed as a reasonableminimum..
In response to several comments to§ 193.111(g) in the ANPRM, the, maxi-mum seismic acceleration above whichadditional design requirements wofildbe imposed on certain critical compo-nents has been increased from.30 to 40percent of gravity under § 193.111(e) inrecognition of arguments that seismicforces up to this level can be accom-modated without the added designmeasures. .
The suggestion that a large dikewidth be one of the added design fea-tures was strongly opposed by anumber of commenters. This provisionis not changed, however. MTB believesthat added dike width is the bestmeans of preventing impounding capa-bility from being breached by. fissurescaused by earth movement.
The Draft Evaluation for this Noticeshows that the proposed § 193.111would have a major cost impact onconstruction of a new LNG facility ascompared to NFPA 59 A because ofthe more detailed seismic investigationproposed for high risk areas, morestringent seismic design requirements,and the added cost of structural steel,concrete and earthwork. A large pro-porti6on of this impact can be attribut-ed to the proposal that facility designaccount for a vertical component ofmotion even in areas of relatively lowseismic (See § 193.111(b)(2)), since lowrisk zones predominate over theUnited States. MTB believes that theimpact of seismic design (not includingthe cost of investigation) should beminimal because of one or more of thefollowing conditions:
(1) Overstressing of foundations andmaterials by as much' as 3 abovedesign operating stress would be per-mitted under the proposed Part 193for the accommodation of seismicloading.(2) Design for wind loads (§ 193.117)may be adequate to accommodatesome or all of the seismic loading onouter shells.
(3) Additional design features above59A requirements necessary, to ac-count for the proposed hydraulic test-ing of storage tanks may be adequateto accommodate some or all of theseismic design loads on hydraulicallyloaded tanks (assuming an earthquakedoes not occur during testing.)
(4) Using an underground cavern forstorage would offset added seismicdesign costs since there would be noneed to design for vertical or horizon-tal seismic motion. it
Protection Against Other Natural)Occurrences. Sections 193.113, 193.1156i193.117, and 193.119 would require,that a facility be designed to protectagainst natural occurrences otherthan earthquakes. These sections havebeen included In this Notice becauseMTB believes the comparable NFPA59A provision would not require adesign adequate for safety and wouldnot provide a uniform level of safety.NFIA 59A would require only that anoperator consider the "degree towhich a plant can, within the limits ofpracticality, be protected againstforces of nature," without mentioningthe type or magnitude of occurrenceto be ibonsidered or the componentsthat are to be protected.
Protection Against Other NaturalOccurrences. Sections 193.113, 193.115,193.1L7, and 193.119 dealing with natu-ral occurrences were in the ANPRMandhave been included in this Noticebecause MTB believes the presentstandards in- NFPA 59A do not ade-quately address the requirements toprotect an LNG facility against theseevents.
With regard to § 193.113, Flooding,most commenters felt that the design,frequency of flooding specified by theANPRM would be an excessively stria.,gent standard. Most of these com-rmenters suggested that the designflood be based on that worst flood pre-dictable in a 100-year period, which isgenerally accepted as a very conserva-tive design basis. One commenterpointed out the 100-year flood levelfor a coastal area is based on a combi-nation of worst possible conditions ofstorms, wind, tides, and surface drain-age which makes this design basis suf-ficiently- conservative. Some com-menters suggested that the designflood be the worst anticipated floodingconditions. MTB has revised the flood-ing design proposed In this Notice torequire that operators use a 100-yearflood. In addition, MTB has madesome editorial changes to clarify thisSection.
The Draft Evaluation also identifies§ 193.113 as a niaJor cost item due tothe ,cost of; additional concrete andearthwork needed to protect a facilityagainst the dynamic and flotationforces of flooding. MTB believes thatexcept for marine terminals, carefulsite selection would minimize theimpact on new facilities. Even wherecosts are high, MTB believes and the-Evaluation shows that should a deslgnlflood occur, major benefits wouldf!accrue through prevention of catavstrophic failure of critical components,
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PROPOSED RULES
Some commenters to- § 193.115, SoilCharacteristics, felt that a soil loadbearing capacity safety factor of 1.3would not be appropriate for all equip-ment located at ill sites. They feltthat such a safety factor should varyaccording to the site condition and thehazard associated with the component.A -few commenters pointed out that insome cases, a higher safety factor maybe appropriate. This' provision hasbeen revised to permit operators to use"appropriate" safety factors in deter--mining load bearing capacities of soils.'MTB has made editorial and drafting-changes in § 193.115(b) by consolidat-ing the list of loads.
Most commenters to § 193.117, WindForces, felt that critical componentsshould be designed to withstand thewind loadings specified by the UBCrather than the comparatively highloading suggested by the 'ANPRM(wind with probability of being ex-ceeded 0.5 percent in 50 years). Theypointed out that the UBC had beendeveloped utilizing many years of his-torical data. They further argued thatthe wind loading designs in the UBChad historically been proven to. pro-vide an adequate design basis since theprocedures in that code include provi-sions for shape of structure, location,elevation, and horizontal and upliftwind pressures. Section 193.117(a) is-changed in accordance with thesecomments.-Most commenters to § 193.117(b)
took issue with the suggested tornadodesign loads (250 mph, if probabilityof occurrence is at least 0.5 percent in50 years) for storage tanks and dikes.Many pointed out that a requirementto evaluate the effect of tornadoes andother severe weather conditions wouldbe covered in § 193.117. Many othersfelt that the suggested probability ofoccurrence would be too stringent, andthe design wind loads of 250 mph tooexcessive. A few made the observation-that it would be unreasonable to re-quire design based on a probability ofoccurrence of tornadoes where such anoccurrence cannot be accurately deter-mined. MTB believes that tornadowind loads are go excessive that theyshould be specifically set forth in Part193 as suggested in the ANPRMrather than cover these loadingsunder a general design requirementfor other severe weather conditions in§ 193.119. While the probability of oc-currence of -a tornado specified in§193.117(b) may seem low for designpurposes, the magnitude of wind loadsin tornadoes of this frequency of oc-currence is not very different from thewind loads in tornadoes which occurmuch more frequently. With regard tothe comments that a 250 mph windload from a tornado is excessive, MTBbelieves that-.many large tornadoeshave had winds in excess of 250 mph.
MTB acknowledges, however, that ap-plying the suggested design require-ment may be too stringent where theprobability, of tornadoes occurringcannot be quantitatively predicted. Aspointed out by some commenters, theprobability of tornadoes occurring.cannot be predicted in some regions ofthe country because the occurrence oftornadoes in these regions is so infre-quent that valid statistics have notbeen recorded. Under §193.117(b) Inthis Notice, if the probability of occur-rence cannot be determined, only theUBC design criteria would have to bemet.
The Draft Evaluation identifies§ 193.117 as a proposal with major costimpacts primarily because of the hightornado design wind load and the lowthreshold probabil~ty of occurrence oftornadoes. MTB believes that cost sav-ings can be obtained by selecting a sitewith low probability of tornadoes oc-curring or by using a below or partlybelow ground tank design. Also, designof foundations to meet the proposedtest requirements for storage tanks(§ 193.1033) or seismic design require-ments (§193.111) might be used tooffset design for toe load due to wind,with a partial reduction in the cost ofthis Section. Considering these fac-tors, together with the 33 percdnt al-lowable overstressing of materials andfoundations, MTB believes that thecosts would not be as high as project-ed.
The provision for wind load design isanother proposal which MTB believesnecessary to mitigate the likelihood ofcatastrophic failure of an LNG storagetank.'If a dispersion exclusion zone isprovided under §193.109(a), the pro-posed wind load design would alsoassure that vapor dispersion can, inmost cases, reliably be based on trans-fer line failure alone.
While most commenters did not sug-gest changes to §193.119 regardingother severe wheather and naturalconditions a few commenters felt thatit would be unreasonable to expect a"worst combination of other weatherand natural conditions" at the facilitysite in addition to those conditionsspecifically covered by §§ 193.111,193.113, 193.115, and 193.117. This Sec-tion has been revised to permit opera-tors to determine the worst "effect,"rather than the worst "combination,"of other wheather and natural condi-tions which may predictably occur atthe facility.
Adjacent Activities. The need fortaking into consideration man-madeactivities adjacent to an LNG facilityas suggested in § 193.121 was addressedin the G.A.O. report on LiquefiedEnergy Gas Safety. This Importantsubject is not specifically covered inthe present NFPA standards. Mostcommenters to this Section felt that it
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was impossible for an operator to accu-rately predict the adjacent activitieswhich will occur during the operatinglife of an LNG facility. These corn-menters pointed out that a site chosenin a remote location could Initiate de-velopment and result in activitieswhich were not predictable and wouldnot be under the control of the LNGplant operator. Many of these corn-menters felt that an operator should,however, take reasonable precautionsbased on estimates of the areas devel-opment potential, this Section hasbeen changed to permit the operatorthe flexibility of determining the "rea-sonably foreseeable." rather than the"predictable," activities adjacent to afacility.
Separation of Component& Under§ 193.123 adequate. clearance wouldhave to be provided between criticalcomponents and between componentsand the site boundary to provide forthe movement of personnel and equip-ment during normal operations and inan emergency and to minimize hazardsto persons and property on and off thefacility site.
A large number of commenters to§ 193.123 suggested revising the Sec-tion to require operators to providedistances between critical componentsand specified in NFPA 59A. Thesecommenters argued that the NFPA59A requirements establish certainspecific distances that through experi-ence have proven adequate to mini-mize hazards from these componentsas well as permit movement of person-nel and equipment around these com-ponents. In Ionsideration of theseviews and until MTB develops a morecomplete performance- standard onthis subject, MTB believes that thepublic interest is better served by re-quiring operators to comply with Sec-tions 213 through 216 of Chapter 2 ofNFFA 59A.
SUBPART C-MATERITALS
This subpart would establish criteriafor the use of materials for compo-nents at an LNG facility. The main ob-jective of the proposed criteria is toensure that materials are used whichenable components to function overthe expected range of high and lowtemperatures.
Most conmenters to § 193.201,Scope, pointed out that operators donot "design"r material. Thus, thephrase, "selection and qualification" isnow proposed.
With regard to § 193.203, General, amajority of commenters agreed withthe wording of the ANPRM. However,several commenters suggested replac-ing the word "predictable" with theword "design"* in paragraph (a) to de-scribe those loadings that materialmust withstand. This change wasadapted to keep the material require-
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ments consistent with' the design re-quired for components.
Temperature Ranges. Revisions werenot made to the suggested language of§ 193.205 rega'ding normal, extremetemperatures since there were-no sub-stantive objections to the wordingused in the ANPRIV.
In response to several commentsabout the lack of need to protect allcomponents against the effects of un-expected contact with LNG or fire, ifi193.207, the term "critical" is insertedbefore the word ."components" inparagraphs (a), (b), and (c). However,it is not considered appropriate to solimit the scope of paragraph (d) whichis intended to preclude an uncontrolla-ble emergency In the event of a smallfire around a flammable fluid compo-nent. Paragraph (d) was revised in re-sponse to several comments pointingout that some fluid release may not behazardous or detrimentally affectsafety.
Insulation. In Section 193.209, a newparagraph (a) is added to propose thatinsulation have thermal and mechani-,cal load bearing capabilities duringnormal operation. This provision wasrecommended 'by commenters. Toeliminate redundancy, the .suggestedprovision of §.193.209 regarding out-side insulation is combined with thatof § 193.525(b), and the latter section Isdeleted. A further change also elimi-nates the problem several commenterspointed out that there are no insulat-Ing materials that would provide ade-quate Insulating properties and also"not 'support combustiost" In thisnotice, the term "self extinguishing" isused to describe materials with neededthermal properties that provide theneeded safety as well.
Cold Boxes. Most comments --to§ 193.211 agreed with the suggestion inthe ANPRM that cold boxes should bemade of noncombustible materials.There were some commenters whopointed out that requirements for in-sulation should be covered in § 193.209and need not be duplicated for,"coldboxes" under §193.211. However, thiscomment was* not adopted because ofthe need for special treatment of coldbox insulation.
Piping. Most commenters,/ were inagreement with the suggested prohibi-tion in § 193.213 against use of cast,malleable, or ductile iron piping at lowtemperatures. However, a few com-ments pointed out that some otherpiping materials also develop undesira-ble -characteristics at low tempera-tures. Other commenters were in favorof totally prohibiting the use of cast,malleable'and ductile iron pipe, as inSection 6113 of NFPA 59A. In re-sppnse to these issues,' MTB has re-vised the wording of § 193.213 to pro-pose that- cast, malleable or ductileiron piping not be used to carry cold"
PROPOSED RULES
refrigerants and flammable fluids andthat materials intended to operate atless than -28.9C (-20 F) be qualifiedby testing to determine that the mate-rials meet the general requirements of§ 193.203(b).
Concrete. With regard to § 193.215,one commenter pointed out that thereare other refrigerants than LNG inLNG facilities that could cause ther-mal shock to concrete and adverselyaffect the integrity of a structure. Forthat reason, the term "LNG" Ischanged to "'cryogenic". Other com-menters pointed out that concrete canhave minor spalling occur that will notbe detrimental to safety. Thus, Inparagraph (a) the word "detrimental"is Inserted before "spalling".
It is MTB's feeling that the perform-ance language of § 193.215 would pro-vide an acceptable concrete materialsstandard, which permits innovation,and that the specifications listed in4230 of NFPA 59A should not beadopted as some commenters recom-mended. Meeting the NFPA specifica-tions should *suffice, however, tocomply with the proposed § 193.215. Inthis regard, interested persons shouldnote that, in contrast to this section,'the more detailed concrete specifica-tions of Section 42 of NFPA 59A areproposed in § 193.527 for concrete stor--age tanks and containers because ofthe greater need for specificity in astandard regarding storage tanks andthe associated hazards involved.
Use of Combustible Materials. Under§193.217 an operator could not usecombustible materials for buildings orequipment where ignition wouldworsen an emergency. Several com-ments emphasized that the class ofmaterials that has "limited combusti-ble" characteristics should be an al-lowable alternative to non~ombusti-bles when the latter is not available.MTB concurs since the recommenda-tion is consistent with the intent ofthe suggested rule, and §193.219 ischanged accordingly.
Records. The- great majority of thecommenters to §193.219 indicated thatrecords should be limited to "critical"components, to avoid unessentialpaper work. MTB believes that thecompliance objective of this proposedrequirement can be satisfied by limit-ing the required records to "criticalcomponents."
SUBPART D-DESIGN OF COMPONENTS ANDBUILDINGS .
The purpose -of this subpart is toensure that those parts of an LG fa-cility that are related to safety are de-signed to withstand 'anticipated load-ings and to properly contain or controlhazardous fluids. In addition, build-ings would have, to be designed ,tominimize the effects of explosion andbe ventilated if used to handle flam-mable fluids.
General. With regard to § 193.303(a)..several commenters suggested that theword "design" should replace "predict-able" to describe the loadings that acomponent must withstand. MTB docAnot agree, however, because the puriipose of § 193.303 is to set the standarq'for design loadings. Paragraph (b) inthe ANPRM has been deleted as re-dundant with § 193.207, and paragraph(c) has been redesignated as para-graph (b).
Personnel. In response to a numberof comments, to § 193303(c)i the sug-gested qualifications for persons whodesign and fabricate components in anLNG facility are changed to permitqualification by either training or ex-perience on LNG or other cryogenicfacilities. Also, the proposed qualifications would only apply to persons in.volved with critical components. Al-though for clarity § 193.303(c) In theANPRM Is restated as § 193.304, it Isanticipated that in the final rules thissection would be transferred to thenew subpart on personnel qualifica-tions and training.
Valve. In § i93.305 of the ANPRMparagraph (a) is deleted as redundantwith §193.307a), paragraph (b) is re-designated as paragraph (a), pnd para-graph (c) is redesignated as paragraph(b). In response to several comments,paragraph (b) has been changed torecognize that there are extende4bonnet valves available that-operatqsatisfactorily in cryogenic service withthe valve stems in any position relative to horizontal. Paragraph (d) inthe ANPRM which related to reliefvalves is Incorporated In § 193.905,which covers this topic.
Piping. In response to comments to§193.307. MTB changed the word"process" to "cryogenic" in paragraph(b) since the need for purge connec-tions is important for piping carryingcryogenic or flammable fluids and theword "process" Is more Indefinite. Thesuggestion that each piping system beIdentified by color coding, painting, orlabeling Is now limited to abovegroundcryogenic or flammable fluid piping toapply the requirement only to areas ofgreatest benefit. Paragraph (d) is re-vised to permit the use of pipe with alongitudinal seam that has a Joint effi-ciency rating of 1.0 under ANSI B31.3for handling LNG and other hazard-ous liquids rather than requiring thatonly seamless pipe be used. Severalcommenters pointed out that longitu-dinal weld seam pipe Is more uniformin wall thickness than seamless pipeand, thus, often of a higher quality.MTB adopted this revision for thisreason and because the 100 percent ra-diograph requirement of B31.3 assuresthe integrity of the longitudinal seam,,In paragraph (e) the -referenced para.'graph number has been corrected toread 323.2.3 of ANSI B31.3. The sug-
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gestion in paragraph (e) that threadedpipe be at least Schedule 80 waschanged in response to several com-menters who pointed out that suchheavy wall pipe is only justified onc~yogenic or flammable fluid service.Paragraph (g) is deleted as redundantbecause the difficulties with using fur-nace lap welded or butt welded pipeare covered by the revision of para-graph (d) of this section. Becauseparagraph (h) concerned pipe materi-al, it is more appropriately covered by§ 193.213.
Pipe Supports and Attachments. Sec-tion 193.309(a), in the ANPRM ischanged to refer to §193.207, whichmore appropriately covers the prob-lem of pipe stability in the event of anLNG spill or fire. In paragraph (b) theword "supports" is replaced by "pipeattachments and supports" to clarifythe intent of this proposal regardingthe effects of heat transfer. In re-sponse to one commenter who pointedout that "unintentional" piping re-straint is a safety problem with Ice for-mation, the words "piping restraints"are replaced by "unintentional re-straint of piping."
Buildings. Several commenters to§ 193.311 argued that small quantitiesof flammable fluids in a buildingwould not constitute a potentialhazard justifying special design andconstruction to protect against the ef--fects of explosion, as might be the casefir shops, warehouses,, and offices.MTB agrees that the suggested designr~quirement probably would -not bereasonable for every building in-whichany amount of flammable fluid is han--died. Thus, in this notice, only those"buildings with "potentially hazardousquantities of" flammable fluids wouldhave -to meet the proposed require-ments. Th6 proposed rule also wouldrequire design and constriction to
" minimize "potential fire hazards" inresponse to one commenter who point-ed out that fire is more often themajor hazard rather than explosion.
Coinmentdrs to § 193.313 alsostressed that the suggested ventilationrequirements of paragraph (a) wouldbe inappropriate for buildings wheresmall quantities of flammable fluidsare handled because ventilation is in-tended to minimize the possibility of ahazardous accumulation of gas in air.MTB agrees, and the ventilation re-quirements are proposed for buildingswith potentially hazardous quantitiesof hazardoug fluids. With regard tothe suggested gas concentration limitof 5 percent of the lower flammable
- limit (LFL), virtually all commenters-argued the lack of instrument accura-cy at such low levels. Thus, MTB hasrtvised the limit for activation of theventilation system to 15 percent LFL,a'level lower-than that which is pro-posed under §193.605 for, automatic
PROPOSED RULES
shutdown of transfer piping. In para-graph (b), the second sentence Is re-vised to propose that a proportionalamount of air reach each level ofbuildings with two or more levelswhere vapors heavier than air can bepresent. This change Is made in re-sponse to commenters who pointedout that the suggested requirementthat one-half of the ventilation befrom the lower level could lead to asituation of more ventilation than nec-essary in one area and Insufficientventilation in other areas.-
Low Temperature Effects and Load-ings. Paragraph (a) and (b) of§ 193.315 In the ANPRM were deletedsince they are duplicative of § 193.205(a) and (b) regarding the effects ofcryogenic temperatures on compo-nents. Paragraph (c) of this sectionconcerning the separation of valvesunder Icy conditions Is moved to§ 193.321(c).
- There were no unfavorable com-ments regarding the substance of§ 193.317 and it is unchanged In thisnotice.
Section 193.319 concerns the prob-lem of frost heave, or ground uplift,due to freezing soil. In §193.319 onlyminor changes are made Pn the word-ing used in the "temperatures of thecomponent" that may cause frostheave. Paragraph (b) Is changed In re-sponse to several comments that rell-ability, accuracy,- and durability ofsensing devices for detecting frostheave are questionable In some appli-cations and- that visual inspection Ismuch more reliable when based on ref-erence monuments. Upon further con-sideration of this issue, an alternativeto instruments and alarms is added toparagraph (b) to allow monthly in-spections using reference monumentsand surveying instruments to detectchanges in elevation of the facility.
Section 193.321, regarding protectionfrom ice and snow loads contains aclarifying change in paragraph (a). Anew paragraph (c) is transferred tothis section from § 193.315(c).
Electrical Systems. Regarding§ 193.323, two commenters pointed outthat the suggested requirements ofparagraph (a)(1) regarding areaswhere electrical Ignition could occur Iscovered equally as well in IFPA 70which is referenced in paragraph(a)(2). As'a result, paragraph (a)(1) isdeleted, and paragraph (a)(2) is re-vised for clarity. In response to severalcommenters who convincingly arguedthat more definitive requirements areneeded for electrical grounding andbonding, paragraph (b) in the ANPRMis revised by referencing Sections 760and 761 of NFPFA 59A. Paragraph c)has been revised for the same reasonby referencing Section 762 of NFPA59A. Paragraph d) was deleted In re-sponse to several commenters Indicat-
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'ing that paragraph (aX2) of theANPRM would require design and in-stallation in accordance with NFPA 70which covers the suggested subject ofparagraph (d), ground fault detectiondevices.
Lightning Protection. Section193.325 Is changed to state that thepurpose of rods, arrestors and groundsIn protecting against lightning Is to"minimize the hazard." This change ismade in response to several corn-menters who argued it would be im-possible for the devices to "protect"everything from lightning. Magrees that installation of lightningprotection devices cannot provide acomplete guarantee agsinst damage.
Boilers. Commenters to § 193.327 re-quested that Section IV of the ASMEBoiler and Pressure Vessel Code be es-tablished as a design standard for boil-ers, as well as Section L MT concurswith this change since It permits theuse of hot water boilers as well assteam boilers.
Combustion Engines. Section193.329 Is unchanged from theANPRM in requiring that combustionengines and gas turbines meet the re-quirements of NFPA 37.
SUBPART E-MPOUNDM'NT DESIGN ANDCAPACITY
The purpose of this subpart is to re-quire the construction of a structural-ly sound, leak free impounding system(composed of dikes and floors) tocatch and hold spills of LNG fromstorage tanks and other critical com-ponents. For large spills impoundingsystems also serve to retard the rate ofvaporization of LNG and any subse-quent downwind vapor traveL
Components Requiring Impound-ment The ANPRM would have madeit mandatory to provide impoundmentfor each of the components and areaslisted In § 193.403 to contain a poten-tial spill of LNG or other hazardousliquid. Many commenters recommend-ed deletion of various individual itemsIn the list. Others suggested that eachcomponent or area be protected, butnot necessarily by impoundment, argu-ing that less potentially hazardousleaks or spills could be handled more _cost effectively by proper grading anddrainage, or that impoundment 1s un-necessary because of rapid vaporiza-tion. MTB concedes that grading anddrainage can be substituted for im-poundment where the same degree ofprotection from a potential spill canbe reasonably assured.
Under § 193.403(a) impoundmentwould be -required for three items:storage tanks, transfer piping above 4inches in diameter, and tank car ortank truck loading or unloading areas.MTB believes that large diametertransfer lines should have impound-ment because of the large volume that
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could be spilled in the case of a linebreak. Using this guideline, piping ineicess of 4 inches in diameter is pro:posed to require impoundment. An op-erator would have the option underparagraph (b) for smaller piping andthe other Items listed to provide safetyby grading and drainage or impound-ment. MTB welcomes comments on (1)the proposed diameter breakpoint fortransfer piping with suitable backupfor ny differing views, and (2) wheth-er some other criterion, such as pres-sure, should be used as a breakpoifit.Because MTB believes it is more ap-propriate to apply the proposed newImpounding design rules solely to thecontainment of LNG, a'new paragraph(c) has.been added to require that im-pounding systems for other hazardousliquids be built in accordance withNFPA 30, the standird followed by in-dustry for these facilities.
General Features of Impoundment.The phrase "to the maximum extentpossible" has been added to § 193.405to modify the level of spill contain-ment which an impounding 'systemmust provide, recognizing that abso-lute protection may not be possible.Many commenters objected to the pro-vision that trajectory and splash ofspilled liquid be contained. MTB be-lieves, however that these are reason-ably predictable ways by which LNGcould escape impoundnient and thatdikes should be designed with suffi-cient shape and size.to handle thesefactors. The trajectory issue is furtherdiscussed under § 193.419 in .this pre-amble. Also, under § 193.405, interest-led persons should note that if an un-derground cavern is used for LNGstorage (see definition of "storagetank"), the cavern would be an "im-pounding system" and Would have tobe sealedagain~t leakage.
The majority of the commenters rec-ommended deletion of the suggestedImpounding system classificationsunder § 193.407 as they did not see anyneed for them. Classification of im-pounding systems is useful in §193.439for example, as well as in other sec-tions of Subpart E and Subpart B sothat requirements may 'vary, accordingto system design. The Section hasbeen simplified, however, by eliminat-ing the types In each classification.MTB does not believd that the argu-ments. that this Section would stand inthe way of technological developmentor would not permit an operator tochoose a systemi to achieve the designrequirements are valid because of thegeneral language used in the classifica-tion descriptions..Structural Integrity. Many com-
menters were concerned that§ 193.409(a) in the ANPRM would re-quire that all materials in an impound-ing system, including insulation be de-signed to meet structural require-
PROPOSED RULES
ments. The intent of this Section hasbeen clarified by specifically referringto the design of structural parts. Insu-lation would be covered to the extentit serves some structural purpose."Also, in the lead-in to paragraph (a),the suggested requirement that sur-faces of an impounded componentwhich could be contacted by spilledliquid be. designed to the same require-ments as the impounding system hasbeen deleted because design require-'ments for specific components are cov-ered by other Sections.
Regarding protection against high-way or rail traffic,, there were com-ments that "adjacent ' traffic in para-graph (a)(5)(ii) of, the ANPRM wouldbe ambiguous and the term-has beenchanged to "adjoining" in this Notice.Commenters claimed highways or rail-ways would not be permitted in the ex-clusion zone but such WSvas not suggest-ed under either § 193.107 or § 193.109.There are existing LNG facilitieswhere tank car or tank truck cargotransfer systems are adjacent to, oradjoin, impounding systems. Many,commenters also objected to the sug-gested requirement that dikes with-stand impact loadings from aircraftwhen they are near an airport. MTBhas quantified this proposal by usingthe distance of 20,000 feet, establishedby Phe Federal Aviation Regulations(14 CFR Part '77) to' define a criticalarea surrounding a large airport.Under §193.409(c), a Class I dikewould have- to 'be designed to with-stand the impact of the heaviest air-craft which can operate to or from theairport.. MTB concurs 'with the majority of.
commenters that "a sudden total re-lease," from a storage tank, as used In§ 193.409(b), is not a credible design ac-cident. Nevertheless, it is being re-tained in.this Notice to provoke thedevelopment of a realistic, definablespill condition. Comments submitted'on this point to the ANPRM do notfulfill this objective. Further commentin this regard is solicited. Absent anyacceptable definitive alternative, MTBwill develop its -own design spill oradopt the proposed spill condition.
In § 193.409(c)(1) the term "self-ex-tinguishing" is being used instead of"must not support combustion."
As suggested, § 193.409(d) in theANPRM regarding insulation, sealantsand other coatings, has been combinedwith the suggested,§ 193409(c) and re-stated in a new § 193.410.
.Section 193.411 in the ANPRM re-garding system surfaces has been de-leted, as recommended by the major-ity of the commenters. Paragraph (a)duplicated § 193.405 with regard toleakage, paragraph (b) is consideredimpractical, and the problem of seep-age is handled by § 193.431.
Floors. There were varying objec-tions to the suggested slope require-ments in §193.413 regarding thedesign of Impounding system floors:that they were too specific, such as re-,quiring a two percent slope, or unrea-,sonable to meet. After reviewing sugd!
gested wording, MTB is proposingmore performance oriented require-ments consistent with the purpose of asloped floor, which is to drain spilledLNG to a.safe area and prevent Waterfrom collecting on the floor. Underthis section, channels would be re-quired to minimize the wetted floorarea in the event of a spill.
Dikes. The majority of the coin-menters felt , that bompacted earthdikes would not be permitted under§ 193.415(a) in the ANPRM which sug-'gested that dikes be "reinforced andcontiguously Interlocked."' MTB is notproposing that such dikes be prohibit-ed, and since the structural standardsfor dikes would be covered by§ 193.409, paragraph (a) of § 193.415 inthe ANPRM is deleted in this Notice,
Many commenters to § 193.415(b) inthe ANPRM felt that properly de-signed penetrations should-be permit-ted in dikes to accommodate piping orother purposes. MTB still feels it is Inthe interest of safety to prohibit them,Water drains from sumps would beparticularly vulnerable. There are ex-isting local ordinances that now pro-hibit such penetrations. Commenterdalso stated that dike penetrationgiwould greatly simplify LNG pump in--stallations. This could be true ifbottom tank penetrations were permit-ted, but is not Important with the pro-posed top penetrations ' under§ 193.511.• Section § 193.415(c) in the ANPRMhas been modified to permit a compo-nent wall to serve as a dike In a Class 1impounding system that is designed tomeet the requirements of § 193.409(c),which applies to facilities near air-ports. MTB requests comments as tohow this provision might be furthermodified to allow sufficiently strongwalls of components to serve as dikesin the 'case of facilities not near air-ports. What should be the designstandard for such walls? How should amodified standard apply to under-ground caverns?
A large number of commenters to§193.417 questioned the need for"vapor barriers" if a dispersion exclu-sion' zone, as calculated under§ 193.109, would eliminate the possibil.ity of a flammable vapor cloud extend-Ing beyond the exclusion zone. Erectedon top of dikes, vapor barriers canretard the rate at which vapor leavesan impounding system. Section 193.417,would not require the use of vapor:barriers, but If they are used in con-junction with dikes as a means of re-"ducing the extent of the exclusion
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PROPOSED RULES
zone, such barriers would have to bedesigned in accordance with Part 193is as a critical component and be caba-ble of entraining cold vapor.2The Draft Evaluation shows that
§193.417 would have a major costimpact if an operator chooses to in-stall vapor barriers. However, costs at-tributed to the design of barriersshould be offset somewhat by a reduc-tion in land cost under §193.109. Inany event, M .believes the costswould be justified by the added assur-ance that a vapor dispersion zone de-signed on the basis of vapor barrierswould not be exceeded in the event ofa design spill
The majority of comments to§ 193.419 recommended that para-graph 2115 of NFPA 59A be used todetermine dike dimensions and statedthat some of the suggested require-mentst were not feasible, particularlywith regard to interception of jets ofliquids from transfer lines. Notwith-standing the transfer line issue,has determined that the formulaX;0.6Y 4used in Figure .2-1 of NFPA59A results in'dike dimension whichwill not intercept all credible trajec-tories of discharged liquids. MTB be-lieves, however, that increasing theconstant factor from 0.6 to 1.0 wouldprovide the needed protection in mostcases, although operators would stillhave to make appropriate calculationsto determine the dike dimensions andconfiguration necessary to prevent theepcape of liqued by splash and othermechanisms described under § 193.405,and to provide the necessary impound-ment capacity.
Covered Impounding Systems. Mostcommenters recommended that§ 193.421 concerning covered systemsbe deleted. Objections were not to thesuggested requirements as much as tothe implication of the suggested stand-ard that covered impounding systemsare practicable to design. They wouldbe prohibitively expensive accordingto many commenters.' It was alsostated that such systems could be dan-gerous and detrimental to a safe LNGfacility. Granting these arguments,MTB believes. that by definition thereare existing facilities that could fallinto this category, and advances intechnology could make- such systemsmore feasible in the future. According-ly, this Section, with clarifying revi-sions, is being retained.
Gas Detection. Section 193.423 pro-'poses that impounding systems be con-tinuously monitored for the presenceof gas in order to assure that an LNGor gas leak will be detected quickly.Current standards are indefinith withrespect to this safety feature. Section92 of NFPA 59A states that, becauseof the wide differences in LNG facili-ties, fire and leak control measuresshall be coordinated with the authoii-
ty having Jurisdiction, and logal emer-gency agencies. This is not appropriatefor a Federal safety standard sinceneither performance criteria nor con-trol measures are stated.
There were a number of varied com-ments in regard to § 193.423 pertainingto detection of gas concentrations.that the number of sensors would beexcessive; that they would be ineffec-tive in some of the specified locations,such as the low point of an impound-ing space where a low temperaturealarm would be more appropriate todetect presence of LNG; and that thealarm set point for gas concentrationsshould be 25 percent. T recognizesthe validity of these arguments ,andhas revised this Section to propose amore performance oriented require-ment. There were some commenterswho felt that mandatory gas detectionsystems were unwarranted, that theydid not contribute to safety, and wouldcreate serious maintenance problems.MTB and the majority of the corn-menters do not agree with this reason-ing. Leak'detectors and alarm systemsare needed to permit an operator timeto correct a problem and prevent itfrom becoming an uncontrollableemergency. -
The Draft Evaluation shows thatthis Section would have a major costimpact because of the Instrumentationthat would have to be provided todetect leaks. MTB believes that an op-erator could minimize this cost byusing a design which reduces theamount of impounding space floorarea and thus the amount of instru-mentation. The added costs are justi-fied by the early warning that wouldbe provided should a leak occur. Evenwith a minor leak, the extreme cold ofLNG could produce high thermal gra-dients and potentially excessive local-ized thermal stress in surfaces contact-ed. Resulting cracks could damage thestructural integrity of a componentmaking it, susceptible to failure possi-bly of a catastrophic nature, from nat-
- ural or other forces which it was Ini-tially designed to accommodate. Withcurrent designs of high dikes locatedclosely adjacent to a component, asmall leak of 'either LNG or cold gascould result in a combustible mixtureforming between a component and itsdiking. If ignited, high overpressuremight result either from deflagrationor detonation depending on the mix-ture and degree of confinement. Manyuncertainties remain regarding thishazard, but the potential for simulta-neous failure of both the componentand Its diking is of such serious con-cern that it should not be overlooked.
Inerting Systems. All commenters in-dicated that the installation of acarbon dioxide nertng system as sug-gested by § 193.425 in the ANPRMshould not be required. Most felt the
suggested system could decrease safetyand would be impractical to maintain-MTB concurs that charges generatedby the system could Ignite a gas-airmixture. The National Fire Councilhas warned against the use of carbondioxide systems because of such staticIgnition. It was pointed out that suchsystems had been examined in thepast and found of questionable benefitin open air conditions. For these rea-sons, this Section has been deleted.
Sump Basin. Many of the corn-menters objected to the suggested re-quirement under § 193.427 for sumpsto collect small spills of LNG ongrounds that pumping out such liquidas suggested by § 193.429 would be im-practical. While MTB Is proposingthat a sump be required, its purposewould be for collection of rain waterand small spills of LNG, rather thanto provide for pumping out LNG. MTBbelieves that sumps provide an addedsafety benefit of preventing unneces-sary spreading of small spills.
Removal of LNG spills from sumpbashis was suggested in the ANPRMby § 193.429. The majority of -com-menters argued the impracticability ofsuch removaL They pointed out that aslow cooldown of all components in-volved would be required and an ade-quat liquid pressure would be re-quired to establish a suction. Sparestorage capacity would be required toreceive the pumped liquid, whichwould probably be contaminated andunusable. It Is also questionable ifpumping equipment and piping couldbe considered in a fall-safe mode, as§ 193.429 would have required, sincepower is required for the pumps. MTBbelieves the many problems involvedoverride the potential benefits and hasdeleted this Section.- The purpose of § 193.431 is to keep
an Impounding space as free of wateras possible in order to maintain thespace available for impounding LNG.Some commenters objected to the sug-gested requirement in § 193.431(a) thatpiping for removal- of water fromsumps be installed 'over the dike.MTB's position on dike penetrationsfor piping is stated under §193.415(b)and it does not appear that an over-the-dike arrangement for water drainpiping would be onerous, and, in fact,It could be more economical. Com-menters also argued that the suggest-ed requirement in paragraph (c)(2) forredundant shutdown capabilities whenLNG Is present in the sump wouldonly add to the cost, without a com-mensurate safety benefit. MTB doesnot concur with this assessment andhas retained the redundancy require-ment.
Shared Impounding Systems. TheANPRM would have prohibited theuse of a single Impounding system toserve more than one component
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(except when small capacities were in-volved)' in order to minimize thechance that an emergency at one com-ponent might endanger another. Sucha prohibition would require construc-tion of more systems at each facilityand would not allow operators to usedesign concepts or topography to miti-gate the hazards involved.
MTB has therefore rewritten§ 193.433 in performance language. Al-though it was suggested that Section211 of NFPA 59A be used to govefnshared impoundment, MTB does notagree with paragraph 2110(c) thatwould allow other components to beexposed to low temperature or heat ifImpoundment were provided for thecontents of all of the containers.
Piping. Section 193.435 has beenchanged to remove the duplication of§ 193.207 with respect to critical com-ponents inside an impounding system.Also, protection of piping would be re-quired where failure would "worsen"an emergency in recognition of thefact that an emergency may alreadyexist at the time of failure.
Impoundment Capacity.- MTB hasretained the basic concept suggestedin the ANPRM under § 193.437 forgeneral capacity requirements that al-lowance must be made for displace-ment by objects within an finpounding\system. A minor change is made in rec-ognition of the fact that. water wouldnot be used to fight an LNG fire.
, With respect to § 193.439, the major-ity of the commenters felt that 100percent of a storage tank's maximumliquid capacity would be adequate forimpoundment capacity. This capacitywould be consistent with the presentNFPA 59A requirements. However,there were also many commenters whoacknowledged that provision for addi-tional capacity should be included tohold foaming or boiling LNG. MTB ac-cepts this latter concept for Class 1and covered impoundment systemsserving a single tank, and accordinglyis proposing a 110 percent requirementfor such systems.
However, there are many more fac-tors that must be considered in estab-lishing capacity for Class 2 and Class 3systems, such as jetting, splash, waveaction and others. Additional capacitywould also assist in the containment ofthe initial rapid generation of vaporinherent with spills into such systems.It is significant that all States whichnow have existing or proposed LNGregulations as well as local ordinances(such New York City) have a 150 per-cent requirement. MTB is proposingthat this capacity be adopted for Class2 and Class 3 systems which serve asingle storagetank. The requirementshould lot be unduly onerous, consid-ering the advantages derived.
In regard to §193441, most com-menters felt that a capacity equal to
PROPOSED RULES
150 percent impoundment of thevolume 6f liquid in equipment andtransfer systems "and" the liquidwhich would be discharged duringtwice the time period necessary forspill detection, instrument response,and sequenced shutdown by the auto-matic shutdown system would be toolarge. It was suggested that "or" besubstituted for "andi" but MTB doesn6t agree becaiise these two volumesare additive. However, it is proposedthat the sum of 100 percent of thevolume of liquid in the componentserved, plus that liquid which could bedischarged before shutdown, wouldprovide adequate impoundment capac-ity for equipment and transfer facili-ties.
Section 193.443, concerning parkingareas and portable vessels, has beenrevised to be consistent with § 193.403,as impoundment would not be manda-tory if grading and drainage are usedto insure- that critical components oradjoining property are not endan-gered.
Section 193.445, concerning flow ca-pacity to remote systems, has alsobeen revised to be consistent withother changes made in this Subpart.
Many commenters argued that, if§ 193.429 Pertaining to LNG spill re-moval from sumps were -deleted,§ 193.447 covering sump capacitywould no longer be relevant. MTBdoes not agree, however, because ofthe importance of a sump in prevent-ing the spreading of a small spillacross an impoundment system floorand thus reducing the time beforeVapor begins'to overflow the dikes.MTB is proposing, therefore, that thesuggested requirements of § 193.447 beadopted to govern sump basin capac-ity. While some commenters to theANPRM argued that basins of the sizesuggested in the ANPRM wopld be toolarge, unnecessary, or difficult tomanage in design, these commentersdid not say what size basin would beappropriate. MTB invites commentson this 'point with the view that§ 193.447 would be changed in the finalrule, if comments show that sumpbasins of a different size than pro-posed would be more appropriate.
SUBPART F-LNG STORAGE
A storage tank is the most criticalcomponent of an LNG facility becauseof the large quantity of stored energyand the threat of catastrophy in thevent of a failure. This subpart would
establish additional design consider-ations to assure, structural integrityand preclude accident causes such asoverpressure or underpressure.
Scope. In regard to § 193.501, a dom-ment was made that the suggested re--quirements of Subpart F were essen-tially applicable only to LNG storagetanks. As this was the intent,, the- title
of this Subpart and the scope havebeen changed accordingly,
Membrane Liners. Containers usedto.hold LNG in a storage tank must bestrong enough to support operationaland environmental loads. Thus, undor§ 193.503(b) In the ANPRM, MTB suglgested that a membrane liner, becausdof its doubtful reliability, not be per-mitted in a storage tank as an Innercontainer. There were a number ofvarying comments to this Section.Commenters generally argued thatsuch a prohibition would limit futuretechnological development, that theprovision should only be applicable topermanent 'land based LNG storagetanks, and that bnly nonmetallic linersor flammable liners should be ban-nerd. One commenter submitted areport to support the view that disal-lowing membrane liners would be toogeneral and not reflect the, presentstate of the art. Another commenterstated that although membrane linersmay not be economically attractive atthis time, their prohibition is not real-istic. Based on these views, MTB hasrevised paragraph (b) to prohibit onlyflammable nonmetallic liners.
Design Loads. As recommended bymany commenters, the word "maxi-mum" has been deleted in § 193.505(a)and "minimum" § 193.505(b) as Well asthroughout this part, to be consistentwith the terminology used in industrypractice and standards regarding,"design pressure." There were somcomments thpt the suggested list oljdesign forces for storage tanks be de-leted and replaced by general lan-guage. Others stated the list did notinclude all possible forces or combina-tions of forces. While the latter com-ment is true, the list was not intendedto be exhaustive, but only illustrative,Because of the significance of tankdesign, MTB feels it is necessary tosupplement the general language usedto refer to possible loadings in thelead-in to § 193.505 with examples.Also, at the suggestion of one com-menter, the word "predictable" hasbeen added to paragraph (f) (formerlyparagraph (e)), as it was pointed outthat some settlement may be unpre-dictable. A new paragraph (e) Identi-fies the loads that would be caused bypressure testing under § 193.1033.
Stratification. If IG in a storagetank is allowed to-stratify, or developlayers of different density, hazardous"rollover" and overpressure couldresult. The hazard occurs when thebottom layer rises to the top (rollover)and releases excess heat through rapidvaporization. The majority of com-ments to § 193.507 felt that suggesteddesign requirements for protectionagainst the effects of stratificatio-would be too specific and should be'written in performance languageThey also stated that any one of the
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methods listed would alone provideadequate protection and that requir-ing all of them would be unnecessary.A number thought the term "mixing,edevces" should be defined. One com-%nenter thought that both top andbpttom connections would ,be neededto comply, although the latter would
-be prohibited by § 193.511. MTB's re-visedSection is more performance ori-ented. A choice of mitigating methodswould be allowed, and reference tomixing. A choice of mitigating meth-ods would be allowed, and reference tomixing devices has been deleted. Itshould be noted that the bottom of atank can be reached through top con-nections.
-Tank Movement A safe tank designmust consider the predictable move-ment of parts after construction. Sec-tion 193.509, Movement and Stress, isunchanged in this Notice.
Penetrations. To preclude the possi-bility that any failuie of piping thatenters a tank would also cause a majorspill from the tank, MTB believes thatall piping should enter, or. penetrate,the tank at the top. This design fea-ture would place connections abovethe top liquid level in a tank and pre-
*vent- gravity discharge of the liquid inthe event of a piping failure. In addi-tion, the integrity of the walls andbottom of a tank would be increasedby the elimination of indeterminateAtresses caused by connected piping.iTFPA 59A does not contain any simi-l r provision.
The majority of comments to§ 193.511 objected to the suggested re-quirement that all tank penetrationsbe symmetrically located on top of thetank as close as possible to the center.They stated that locating penetrationsat-the center could cause structural,safety, and financial problems. It wasargued that penetrations near theedge would be easier to support (struc-turally), and surveillance, protection,or fire control would be a greaterproblem with center penetrations. TheNotice eliminates the suggested re-quirement in the ANPRM that pene-trations be located as close as possibleto the center, but retains the proposalthat all tank penetrations be locatedon -the top of the tank. A number ofcommenters agreed with MTB's viewthat top penetrations are inherentlysafer than those at the side or bottombecause the potential for more hazard-ous side or bottom rupture would beremoved in the event of a line breakduring severe environmental condi-tions. While the probability of such anevent is reduced-for lines designed asproposed by this Notice, M feelsthat the possible disadvantages andad:ded costs of top connections are jus-tified by the additional safety thatwould be provided.
PROPOSED RULES
The Draft Evaluation for this Noticeassigns a major cost impact to the pro-posal to require top penetrations.Many existing facilities have pipingconnections of this type, and top pene-trations would normally be selected Ifnew storage tanks are designed withberms or high close-in dikes to satisfyother safety objectives. Since these de-signs may be the most reasonablechoice for new facilities in mitigatingsuch problems as thermal radiation,vapor dispersion, wind loading, andleak detection, the impact of this Sec-tion-may not be as high as projected.
Design Pressure, Section 193.513 pro-poses. that a storage tank's internaldesign pressure be no lower than thevapor pressure resulting from filling,rollover, atmospheric pressure change,heat input from Insulation loss, orflash vaporization from pumping. Ex-cessive internal pressure could resultin catastrophic tank failure or a spillwhich could cause vapor dispersions tosurpass design limits. The purpose ofthe proposal Is to assure that factorsparticularly relating to low pressurestorage of a cryogenic flammable fluidare included in design in order to rea-sonably assure that design pressurewill not be exceeded during operationand to mitigate the possibility of a re-lease of excessive volumes of LNGvapors. Existing standards do not spe-cifically address these aspects ofdesign.
Most of the comments In regard to§ 193.513, concerning storage tankdesign pressure, pertained to theANPRM's use of terminology that Isnot generally accepted. MTB has re-vised the title of this Section as well asthe wording In paragraphs (a) and (b)to be consistent with accepted termin-olgy with regard to design pressure.Paragraph (c) regarding redundantrelief devices, has been deleted fromthis Section and incorporated in§ 193.905.
The same general comments weremade in respect to § 193.515 which alsoconcerns design pressure and similarchanges in the terminology have beenmade here. Paragraph (c) which sug-gested the use of redundant vacuumrelief devices is deleted and incorpo-rated in § 193.905. Many commentersargued that the suggested 2 psi mini-mum design pressure in paragraph (b)would be contrary to accepted practiceand would impose an unnecessary costburden. In view of these comments,this suggested requirement has beendeleted Inasmuch as the remainder ofparagraph (b) should provide an ade-quate design standard.
The Draft Evaluation states that§ 193.513 would result in a major costimpact. The impact derives from theadditional hoop strength that wouldbe needed in the commonly used lowpressure storage tanks-but the Impact
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would not be as significant for highpressure tanks. While the impact ofthis Section alone may be high, sinceadded tank strength would be neededas well to meet proposed wind andseismic load requirements, the com-bined impact of these proposals isprobably not as high as projected.
Temperatures. Section 193.517, con-cerning the effects of ING spills onstorage tanks. is deleted as redundantwith §§ 193.205 and 193.107.
In § 193.519, by restricting the re-quirements of this Subpart to LNGstorage tanks, MTB believes that theapparent misunderstanding by manyof the commenters as to the wordingIn the ANPRM has been removed.Under this Section, a tank would haveto withstand the lowest temperatureof LNG which could occur underdesign conditions.
Foundation. Practically all com-menters to § 193.521 objected to para-graph (d), which would have prohibit-ed the use of piles to provide founda-tion support for a storage tank. Themajor argument advanced was thatpiling is an accepted structural engi-neering practice and as reliable as anyother form of foundation. Test pilesare used to verify load capacity andfactor of safety. Commenters alsostated that excluding piles would con-siderably reduce available sites forLNG facilities. Although one cpm-menter felt that possibly this prohibi-tion should be applied to areas of hishseismic loads, another commenter, theCalifornia Public Utilities Commis-sion, stated that use of batter pilescould provide acceptable lateral resis-tance to seismic design loads. In viewof the weight of these comments,MTB has deleted paragraph (d).
The wide majority of commentersdid not object to §193.523, whichwould require an alarm to warn of anymalfunction In the heating systemused to protect a foundation againstfrost heave. It is retained in thisNotice, but modified consistent withthe change to § 193.319.
Insulation. Many commenters feltthat § 193.525(a) contradicted para-graph (b). Paragraph (a) has beenreworded to clarify the intent thatoutside Insulation may not be used onstorage tanks for operational pur-poses. Also, paragraph (b) is deleted,as commenters suggested, and incorpo-rated in § 193.209. The provision inparagraph (c), suggesting a prohibi-tion against flammable insulation hasbeen changed to propose that insula-tion be "self extinguishing", since anonflammability requirement wouldpreclude the use of many insulatingmaterials
Instrumentation. Concerning§ 193.527, commenters. suggested var-ions deletions of the instrumentationsuggested by the ANPRM for monitor-
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Ig certain conditions to provide forthe safe operation of storage tanks. Byfar, the largest number recommendedthat items (5), (6). (7), andr (8) be de-leted because of the high maintenancecosts involved and disagreement overthe need for such extensive monitor-ing. MTB has determined that sincesome of the instrumentation suggestedis of the laboratory type, it would notbe readily' adaptable to continuousfield use, making it unreliable and re-quiring extensive maintenance. Ac-cordingly, items (5), (7), and (8) of theANPRM have deleted in this Notice.Item (6) concerning excessive stress isrestated to apply to thermal stress,and a new item (7) is added dealingwith excessive relative movement de-termined under § 193.509.
Metal and Concrete Tanks. Under9§ 193.529 and 193.531 both .the innercontainer and outer shell of a metal orconcrete storage tank would have tobe designed and constructed accordingto applicable industry, codes. A double-wall tank with different materials(concrete shell, metal container)would have to meet the applicable por-tions of the codes. Most of the com-menters felt that §193.531 in respectto a concrete storage tank was notcomprehensive, enough, and recom-mended that Section 42, of NFPA
- 59A-1975 be adopted. MTB, after areview of Section 42, finds that it morecomprehensively covers the neededsafety measures and provides detailed-references. Consequently, Section 42 isproposed to be used instead of the xe-quirements suggested by §193.531 inthe ANPRM. One commenter statedthat there was no adequate standardavailable for concrete tanks in cryo-genic service, and that considerationbe given to incorporating ASME Sec-tion III, Division 2, to strengthen therequirements for concrete tanks. MATBwill welcome any comments or elabo-ration in this regard.
Tank SupporL All commenters rec-ommended deletion of §193.535(d) inthe ANPRM which suggested that in-stallation of tank bottoms above grade(or ground) level be prohibited. Com-menters argued that requiring thebottom of a storage tank to be atgrade level would eliminate the use offoundations installed on top of elevat-ed piles. With this type of foundationnatural convection under the tankmay be used rather than ground heat-ers to prevent frost heave. Other corn-menters misunderstood the intendedmeaning of' "grade leveL" In a recentstudy, the General Accounting Officepoints to the potential hazardkof igni-tion of an LNG spill which runs undera tank or enters the open space pro-vided by an elevated, or. above grade,foundation. If such a spill and ignitionwere to occur, a tank could fail cata-strophically by overpressure or ther-
PROPOSED RULES
mal stress due to heating the bottomof the tank or by the force of any ex-plosion which might occur. WhileMTB has 'determined that the level ofthis potential hazard is uncertain,paragraph (d) was intended to pre-clude such eventualities for large'tanks, and the provision is retained inthis Notic6. It is modified, however,for clarity.
While the Draft Evaluation shows amajor cost impact for this Section,MTB believes the impact could bemitigated by selecting sites wherepiling is not needed for support or byusing special fill material underneatha tank to minimize the use of groundheaters.
Piping. Most commenters questioned,the suggested- requirement for excessflow valves under § 193.537(b). Somestated that such valves did not existfor cryogenic service; others statedthat large sizes were not available.Two commenters stated that the expe-rience in the liquefied petroleum gasindustry with such valves was decided-ly mixed, and the current trend is touse other devices such as internalvalves. As a pressure differential is re-quired for the proper functioning'ofexcess .flow valves, it was suggestedthey only be used where pressures ex-ceeds 15 psL MTB has adopted thisrecommendation.
Tank Marking. All comments to§193.539 pointed out that the refer-enced codes under §193.529 and§ 193.531 for design of metal and con-crete tanks specify name plate data. Itwas said that all of the additionalitems listed in the ANPRM are riotpertinent, serve no useful purpose, donot add to safety, and would be availa-ble in an operator's design file- if itshould be needed. MTB agrees thatthe items listed in the design codesprovide sufficient name plate data andhas so changed § 193.539.
SUBPART G-DESIGN OF TRANSFERSYSTEMS -
This subpart would prescribe addi-tional design requirements for pipingused to-transfer hazardous fluids be-tween containers or between contain-ers and a tank car or tank truck. Thesubpart would assure structural integ-rity of the piping when It expands andcontracts and require the use of oper-ational devices to minimize the effectsof line breaks or piping malfunctions.
Expansion and Contraction. Withrespect to § 193.603(b), in the ANPRM,the majority of commenters objectedto the suggested prohibition of the useof bellows-type expansion joints unlessa transfer system is maintained at atemperature near its operating tem-peratures. The requirement was sug-gested because bellows could fail dueto icing or fatigue cracking. Com-menters pointed-out that maintaining
a piping system in a cooled-down con-dition would not be a practical alterna-tive because of increased operatingcosts, and that it would not be possibleor practical to use expansion loops asan alternative means of protection iflall cases. In view of these problemdiand MTB's belief that bellows Jointslcan be used safely If they are properlydesigned (taking into account the fre-quency of thermal cycling so as foavoid fatigue) and maintained free ofIce. MTB has revised paragraph (b) tobe more performance oriented and de-leted reference to expansion and bel-lows joints. However, slip-type expan-sion joints would be prohibited be-cause they are susceptible to failure,and packing-type joints would not bepermitted under cryogenic tempera-tures because the packing materialscould leak.
Shutdown. For the following rea-sons, many commenters objected tothe suggested requirement in § 193.605that redundant shutdown control sys-tems be installed on transfer systems.Because of operational problems com-menters said the suggested redundantmechanism would need an elaboratecomputer; It would not contribute sub-stantially to reliability; it would not beeconomically justifiable; or It wouldcause problems in safe operation.After reviewing these considerations,MTB has deleted the redundancy re-quirement. However, a backup means'for operation of the shutdown system(would be required by § 193.921. Thdc-
gas concentration set forth in para-graph (e) has been changed to 25 per-cent. As many commenters pointedout, this level Is more consistent withaccepted practice. Editorial changeshave also been made in paragraphs (a)and (b). Paragraphs (c) and (d) havebeen transferred to § 193.617.
-Backflow from a container in theevent of a line break could increasethe severity of a spill. Therefore,§ 193.607(b) has been added based onSection 812 of NFPA 59A, to proposethat the means installed for protec-tion against backflow be located nearthe receiving container, thus minimiz-ing the volume of backflow.
C6mmenters to § 193.609(a) regard-ing the possible overfilling of a con-tainer pointed out that manual shut-down is a more desirable method thanrelying on automatic shutdown to pre-vent overfilling. Commenters also saidthat prevention of overfilling bypumping predetermined amounts of.
-liquid would be dependent on meter-ing facilities, and It was stated suchmetering technology for large volumecryogenic installations Is in its infancy.In the ANPRM, MTB did not intendthat manual shutdown should be pre-3eluded, but that safe alternative'should be available. MTB believes this'ralternative would be provided by the'
FEDERAL REGISTER; VOL 44, NO. 28-THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1979
PROPOSED RULES
- automatic shutdown proposed under§ 193.605 and has rewritten § 193.609 topropose means for manual control.'As some commenters recornmended,
the term "design maximum liquid-level" is proposed in §§ 193.605(b) and193.609 as more appropriate than"design load limit" to define the dan-gerous overfill level.
Design of Cargo Transfer Systems.The major comment in regard to§193.611 was that the same design re-quirement should not apply to arms aswell-as hoses (devices-used to transferliquid between piping and tank cars ortank trucks). MTB concurs that adesign burst pressure of not less thanfive times thd operating pressure isonly applicable to hoses. Similarchanges are -made- to other provisionsos § 193.611(b), based on Section 870 ofNFPA 59A. It was" further suggestedthat paragraph (a) be clarified to re-quire venting of each cargo transfersystem, such as a hose from a mani-fold -valve to a tank truck valve. Asthis was the intent, wording has been-changed accordingly for clarificationunder §'193.611(a)(1). Paragraph(a)(3), concerning protection barriers,which is similar to Section 843 ofNFPA 59A, has been added, at it is feltthis provision contributes to the safetyat cargo , transfer areas. Section§ 193.613, pertaining to marine trans-fer systems, has been deleted becauseof the memorandum of understanding
'between the U.S: Coast Guard andMTB, effective February 8, 1978 (43FR 30381), which assigns regulatoryresponsibilities involving waterfrontLNG facilities to the Coast Guard.
MTB agrees with the many com-menters who stated that §193.615(a)and (c) in the ANPRM were moreproperly operational procedures. thandesign consideratins. Both of thesetopics will be incorporated in the up-,coming Notice of proposed rulemakingon Subpart L of the ANPRM.
Shutoff Valves. Section193.617 hasbeen retitled to cover all shutoffvalves on transfer systems and com-bined with the suggested § 193.605(c)and (d) to prescribe valve locationsand design stress. Wording has alsobeen changed to clarify, consistentwith Section 845 of NFPA 59A, thatvalves would be required in transferpiping supplying- cargo transfer sys-tems where they can be readily operat-ed in an emergency.
SUBPART H-VAPORIZATION EQUIPMENTThis subpart is intended to provide
design and installation requirementsneeded to assure the safe operation ofvaporization'equipment. At LNG facil-ities vaporization equipment is used toconvert LNG to natural gas to satisfysudden or long term demands for gas.,The process occurs when LNG isheated either directly by burning .gas
(fired) indirectly by steam, or bytransferring heat from large quanti-ties of air or water (ambient vaporiz-ers).
Based on the views of the majorityof the commentrs, the terms "gasi-fier" and "gasification" have beenchanged throughout this subpart to"vaporizer" 'and "vaporization" respec-tively, because these terms axe morecommonly used in the LNG industry.
Design. Some commenters men-tioned that "ambient vaporizers"should also be subject to the design re-quirements in § 193.705 suggested for"fired vaporizers." MTB believes thatall vaporizers should be designed in ac-,cordance 'with the applicable provi-sions of Section VIII, Division 1 of theASME Boiler and Pressure VesselCode; and § 193.705 has been changedaccordingly. Based on the recommen-dation of one commenter, paragraph(b) has been added to require a designfor pressure based on the pump orcontainer pressure supplying the va-porizer.
Overpressure and Temperature- Sec-tion 193.707 in the ANPRM concern-ing overpressure in vaporizers ordownstream piping, has been deletedas redundant with §§193.913, 193.917,and 193.1107. Similarly, §193.709 inthe ANPRM concerning temperatureis redundant with §§193.203 and193.913, and It has been deleted.
Controls for Operatiom Monitoringdevices, valves, and relief devices areneeded for safe control of the vapori-zation process. In regard to §193.711,MTB agrees with the commenters whopointed out that paragraphs (b) and(c) in the ANPRM related to oper-ational procedures, and, therefore,they will be Incorporated in Subpart I.Paragraph (d) has been deleted as re-dundant with §193.605. As suggested,§ 193.711(a) Is changed to require mon-itoring of "heating medium fluids". Itis agreed, as suggested by commenters,that monitoring of the Inlet and outlettemperatures and pressures is moremeaningful than monitoring the tem-perature dnd pressures in the vaporiz-er as suggested in the ANPRM.
It was suggested that manifoldedambient vaporizers with Inlets 2 inchesor less in size be excepted from thetwo inlet valve proposal under§193.711(e) in the ANPRM (now§ 193.711(b) to be consistent with para-graph 5220 of INFPA 59A-1975. MTBbelieves this is not an onerous propos-al and can see no valid justification forsuch an exception.
In regard to the design of shut offvalves under §193.713, a number ofcommenters suggested that the mini-mum separation distances in para-graphs 524, 5240, and 525 of NFPA59A-1975, would provide less chance ofdamage to valves by explosion or fire.MTB feels the performance type Ian-
guage in paragraph (a), as revised, ismore appropriate. The ANPRM sug-gested that a valve be located near an"emergency exit". This provision, hasbeen deleted from §193.713(a)(2) be-cause as a number of commentersstated, a building could have a numberof exits, none of which would be desig-nated as an emergency exit. Secti6in193.713(a)(3) in the ANPEM regardingemergency shutdown has been deleted,as MTB believes these suggested re-quirements would be redundant withother provisions.
MTB concurs with the majority ofthe commenters on §193.715 whopointed out that setting relief devicesso that the pressure does not riseabove the vaporizer's maximum allow-able operating pressure (MAOP)would be impractical. If a vaporizerwere operating at MAOP, the reliefdevice would continuously chatter andwould rapidly deteriorate. The revisedSection is consistent with Section 53of NFPA 59A-1975 and with theASME Boiler and Pressure VesselCode in permitting a 10 percent in-crease in pressure above the MAOP.
SectIon 193.717 has been deleted asredundant with § 193.911, which wouldrequire warning devices to warn of po-tential or existing hazardous condi-tions detected by all sensing devicesproposed by this Notice.
Combustion Air Intakes. In regard to§193.719, MTB agrees with the largenumber, of cornmenters stating thatcombustion air intakes in themselvescannot prevent the induction of aflammable mixture. This Notice pro-poses a device to detect induction of aflammable vapor. However, MTB be-lieves the device should detect thepresence of any flammable vapors (orgases) rather than of a gas mixturewhich is in a flammable concentration.
SUBPARS I-IQUEFACTI ON EQUIWM
Liquefaction equipment is used tocool natural gas to the point it be-comes a liquid. Some mportant safetyfeatures in the liquefaction area of anLNG facility are covered elsewhere inthis notice (e.g., - spill collection(§193.403), leak detectors and alarms(§§193.909 and 193.911), and fire resis-tant materials (§193.207). This sub-part covers additional design require-ments specifically applicable to lique-faction equipment.
Shutoff Valve. An operator should-beable to shut off gas entering a lique-faction process in the event of anemergency. In response to many com-ments, §193.805 has been revised topropose that a shut-off valve be re-quired for piping leading to each "liq-uefaction system" rather than "lique-'faction equipment." This change is in-tended to clarify that a shut-off valvewould not be required for each pieceof equipment used in the liquefaction
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process. Subparagraph (a) in theANPRM has been changed to proposethat shutdown begin when gas concen-trations reach 40 percent of the lowerflammable limit "in the area of lique-faction equipment" rather than "nearliquefaction equipment." The suggest-ed. requirement for sutomatic shut-down at 30 percent of the lpwer flam-mable limit has been increased to 40percent because MTB considers 30 per-cent to be unrealistic for mandatoryshutdown in the case of liquefactionequipment. Several commenters alsopointed out that automatic shutdownsystems could not detect when a fire isuncontrollable, as would be necessaryif Subparagraph (b) were proposed assuggested in the ANPRI. Therefore,the suggested requirements of subpar-agraph (b) have been changed to pro-pose that shutdown be required whenhigh or low temperature in the area ofliquefaction equipment exceeds thelimits determined under § 193.205.
Contaminants. Commenters to§193.807 pointed out that subpara-graph (b), on monitoring the buildupof Ice or other contaminants withinliquefaction equipment, would not beneeded for safety. It was argued thatsuch buildup would be detected by,normal pressure and temperature indi-cators long before it becomes danger-ous. Since these plant operating char-acteristics are normally monitored toachieve efficient operation and suchmonitoring was suggested as a safetymeasure under § 193.1107 in . theANPRM, Subparagraph (b) is deleted.
Backflow.'Section 193.809 has beenrevised to be consistent with the word-ing used elsewhere in the proposedPart 193, by replacing the term "re-verse flow" with "backflow" both inthe title and the text. In addition, thetext in § 193.809 has been revised toclarify the level of protection requiredagainst backflow in a multiple parallelpiping system.
Coldboxes. Section 193.811 has beenrevised for clarity and to respond tocomments indicating that the insula-tion space surrounding liquefactionequipment may contain an atmos-phere of air, natural gas, or inert gas.The Intent of the proposed rule is toavoid explosions and fires by restrict-ing the concentration of gas In air toranges that are not flammable. Theflammable range of natural gas in airvaries slightly but is about 5 to 15 per-cent by volume. Commenters pointedout that the lack of instrument accu-racy at low concentrations such as 5percent of the lower flammable limit.Because of this and to be consistent-with other revisions to this proposal,the lower limit for introduction ofpurge gas was raised to 25 percentlower flammable limit, which corre-sponds to 1.25 percent by volume.
PROPOSED RULES
There has been no established limitfor avoiding the upper flammablelimit of gas in air. Therefore, MTB hasselected 30 percent by volume as theconcentration for introduction ofpurge gas. Discussion of this upperlimit is specifically requested fromcommenterM to this Notice. I
Air In Gas. No changes are proposed-to § 193.813, regarding the preventionof a flammable mixture in incominggas, because many commenters agreedwith the concept stated in theANPRM ..
Equipment Supports. Section 193.815has been changed to clarify thatequipment supports must comply withthe material requirements of § 193.207regarding high and low temperatures.
SUBPART 3--CONTROL SYSTEMS
This subpart concerns significantdesign features such as backup powersupplies, redundant relief capacity forLNG storage tanks falsafe design andcentral control for components usedmanually or automatically to controlthe operation of other components.
General. Section 193.903(c) was re-vised to recognize the fact that itwould not be reasonable -to requirethat all control systems be accessible,as pointed out by some commenters.However, they should be maintained,and the design and installation shouldaccommodate future inspection ortesting. Separate routing, of controllines -is being proposed under§ 193.903(d) to avoid simultaneousdamage in the event of an accident.
Relief Devices. Sections 193.905(a)and (b) in the ANPRM, relating tofelief valve capacity, are combined in'Paragraph (a) in this Notice. Changesmake this paragraph Consistent withother changes to the proposed part,that relief devices should release fluidso as to prevent pressures from ex-ceeding 110 percent of the maximumallowable operating pressure. The sug-gested redundancy of relief devices,suggested by Paragraph (b) in theANPRM, has been deleted except forLNG storage tanks, but MTB is pro-posing under Paragraph (b) in thisNotice that a separate manual meansbe provided to relieve pressure in anemergency. Over design of relief ca-pacity in the case of LNG storagetanks would provide an added safe-guard against unexpected events with-out much extra cost. The term "over-ride" has been deleted with regard tomanual controls to avoid the misun-derstanding that they could be used toavert automatic pressure release.
Paragraph (c) (paragraph (d) in theANPRM) is changed to eliminate thesuggested -requirements for vents onpressure relief devices to preventharmful discharges of fluids. The pro-posed paragraph (c) is, performanceoriented and would permit any means
of minimizing a discharge hazard,Paragraph (d) (paragraph (e) In theANPRM), concerning the relief ofvacuum conditions has also been modi-fied to be more in keeping with Para-graph 335 of NFPA 59A. '
As commenters noted, the means foradjusting the setpoint pressure ofrelief devices rather than the pressure,itself, should be sealed, and§ 193.905(e) in this Notice Is changedaccordingly. Section 193.905(f) hasbeen modified to prohibit the use ofrelief-devices installed to limit maxi-mum or minimum pressures.to handleboiloff and flash gases. This changedis consistent with NIPA 59A, Para-graph 334. Section 193.905(h) in theANPRM, regarding operating tem-peratures of relief devices has been de-leted as redundant with § 193,205.
Fluid D'ischarge. Section 193,907(a)has been modified to propose that dis-charge of fluids be prohibited In con-dined spaces as well as In buildings.Paragraph (b) has been changed toapply only to boiloff vents, which Isconsistent with Paragraph 33, NFPA59A.
Sensing and Warning Devices. Assuggdsted by a number of commenters,tow changes were made in § 193,909.The -word "critical" was insertedbefore "component" in paragraph(a)(1) to limit the number of compo-nents that are monitored for malfunc-tions to those where berious hazardscould result. To be consistent with ac-cepted practices, "5 percent" waschanged to "25 percent" In paragraph(b) as the warning level for hazardousgas concentrations.
Many commenters objected to thesuggesed'requirements that warningdevices be installed at all locations fre-quently by personnel as proposed by§ 193.911 in the AMPRM. MTB con-curs that such a requirement would beunreasonable and Is proposing thatsuch devices be installed in the controlcenter. However, under § 193.921(e), ameans would have to be available forcommunicating hazardous conditionswarnings from the control center to lo-cations frequented by personnel.
The words "potential" or "existing"are not used to describe the hazard forwhich an alarm is sounded, because, asIt was pointed out, a warning indicatesan actual hazardous condition. MTBalso agrees that .sensing devices canonly detect the nature of a hazard, notthe cause as suggested in the ANPRM,
Section 193.913 has been deleted, asdischarged pressure and temperaturesare adequately covered by §§ 193.917,193.205, 193.207, and 193.709.
Pump Cbntrols. As suggested bysome commenters, the word "Idle" in§ 193.915(a)(2) has changed to "off" toclarify the intended meaning that a'light show when a pump or compres-sor in service Is not In operation. Para-
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 44, NO.28-THURSDAY,-FEBRUARY 8, 1979
graph (3) in the ANPRM has beenbroken down to paragraph (a)(3) and
* (4) for clarify. Also, paragraph 820 ofNFPA 59A has been used as basis for a
--new paragraph (b) to establish the lo--cation of controls for pumps or com-
pressors used in loading or unloading- operations.
Shutdown. As pointed out by manycommenters, in §193.917, the term"shutoff valves" is adopted as moreappropriate than "control valves" forthe purpose of requirements related tosafe falve closure. Also, Paragraph (a)in the ANPRM is deleted as duplica-tive of other proposed requirements inPart 193 regarding the control of fluid -flow.
Section 193.919 has been-redraftedfor clarity and to propose in Para-graph (a) that all critical componentshave control systems to automaticallyshutdown the component in certainevents. However, a provision for a rea-sonable delay between warning andthe- actuation of shutdown at amanned facility permits an operator totqke appropriate action which couldremove the hazard and consequentlyeliminate the need for a shutdown.This delay would not apply to unat-tended facilities, where no personnelwould be available to take such action.In addition to automatic shutdownsystem for critical components, it isproposed that each LNG facility havea manual shutdown control systemwhich can be actuated to shutdown alloperations of the whole facility.
Control Center. As pointed out bysome commenters, an LNG facility
- may have more than one centralizedlocation for operating control systems,with specialists in attendance at eachcenter. This is recognized inthe Noticein the redrafted version of §193.921.Personnel would have to be in attend-ance at any center when critical com-ponents under its control are oper-ational. Under paragraphs (b) and (c)requirements would be established forredundant means of communicationbetween centers, and for means ofcommunicating hazardous conditionwarnings from the control centers toother locations frequented by person-nel at the- LNG facility, only whencritical coihponents under its controlare in operation. Under paragraphs (b)and (c) requirements would be estab-lished for redundant means of commu-nication between centers, and formeans of communicating hazardouscondition warnings from the controlcenters to other locations frequentedby personnel at the LNG facility.
Auxiliary Controls. Section 193.923,which would have required auxiliarycontrol' devices in addition to those re-quired by other Sections -of Part 193,has been deleted. Some of the suggest-ed requirements in this Section of theANPRM were redundant with other
PROPOSED RULES
sections (e.g., § 193.915(a)(1) and MTBbelieves that a requirement for addi-tional controls is not economically jus-tified.
Failsafe Design. In §193.925, In re-sponse to some commenters, the words"liquefaction equipment, storagetanks, and gasification equipment"have been replaced by "critical compo-nents." Under this proposal and§ 193.917(a), each control system for acritical component and each shutoffvalve would have to be designed toprovide a safe condition.in the eventof a malfunction or.faiure of eitherthe power supply, the valve on thesystem, or the component being con--trolled.
Power Supply. Many conmuenters ob-jected to the suggested requirement in§193.927 for separate and redundantsources of electrical power, and point-ed out that other types. of power thanelectrical could be utilized, such asdiesel or gas driven systems, as asecond power source. Upon considera-tion of the comments, MTB believesthat a requirement for backup powersources should be applied broadly andnot just to electrical power. Wording Isalso changed to clarify the proposalregarding the intended separate andredundant power sources.
An additional proposed requirementwould provide for the protection ofauxiliary generators which may be In-stalled to furnish a second source ofelectricity, and for the protection ofthe fuel supply to such units.
SUBPART ---CNSTRU'TIO1
Under this subpart MTB is propos-ing new requirements for reliable con-struction procedures. inspection ofconstruction activities, personnelqualifications, and for field testingcomponents. The 'obJective of the sub-part is to assure that componentscomply with design plans and materialspecifications and have sufficientstructural Integrity to operate safelywhen placed in service.
General. The text of § 193.1021 inthe ANPRM titled "Testing accept-ance" has been restate In §193.1002 inthis Notice and named "Constructionacceptance." Section 193.1002 proposesa general requirement that a compo-nent must pass all applicable Inspec-tions and tests before It is placed Inservice. While most commentersagreed with the wording of this Sec-tion in. the ANPRM, a few felt Itshould apply only to critical compo-nents and not to incidental parts of anLNG facility. The proposed definitionof "component" In § 193.5 should alle-viate this problem since the definitionwould only refer to parts of a facilitythat are related to safety.
Section 193.1003 In the ANPRM hasbeen deleted, since It was essentiallyredundant with other suggested re-
8163
quirements iind personnel qualifica-tions are now addressed more effec-tively in § 193.1009.
Construction Procedures. With re-spect to §193.1005, most commenterssaid that the suggested requirementsthat operators prepare and follow con-struction procedures for each compq-nent should apply only to critical com-ponents so as to limit the impact ofthe requirements to componentswhose failure could cause or worsen ahazard. The proposed definition of"component" should help alleviatethis issue. Also. § 193.1005 is changedto apply only to "critical processes," orthose processes of construction, instal-lation, Inspection or testing that arenecessary to ensure the performancereliability or structural integrity of acomponent. The change to §193-1005also incorporates the views of a largenumber of commenters that construc-tion be In accordance with writtenspecifications and drawings. Two com-menters pointed out that field chandesare made In construction processes,and recommended that changes bepromptly reflected In the records. Onthis point, §193.1005 would requirethat comprehensive written proce-dures be followed for all critical proc-esses, whether they are processeschanged in the field or original ones.The last sentence of §193.1005(a) asstated In the ANPRM requiring testsfor joining procedures, has been re-stated and set forth as §193.1005(b)for greater clarity. The language hasbeen revised to be consistent with§193.1005(a) and broadened to pro-pose that all procedures be substanti-ated by testing or experience.
Section 193.1007, in the ANPRMconcerning the Identification of con-struction processes that are critical tothe safety of a facility has been de-leted 'In this Notice. Instead, the term"critical process" is defined in §19&5.This term forms the basis for sereralproposed requirements in Subpart K.The suggested -requirement under§193.1007, In the ANPR1M whichwould have allowed each operator todetermine critical processes at an LNGfacility, would not provide an ade-quate standard because of the poten-tial variations in interpretation of theword "critical."
Personnel Qualifications. In order toeliminate redundent language andthereby simplify this Subpart, the sug-gested inspector qualifications in§ 193.1013 of the ANPRM have beenincluded in §193.1009 regarding thequalification of personnel in general.Accordingly, § 193.1009 proposes quali-fications for personnel used in all criti-cal processes of construction, includ-ing inspection and testing.
The principal position of most com-menters was that the suggested re-qulrementi of both § 193.1009 and
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§ 193.1013 in the ANPRM would be toorigorous. Generally, commenters ob-Jected to the suggestion that person-nel be qualified by both training (orexperience) and testing and recom-mended that either one should satisfythe need for'a qualification standard.This viewpoint has not been adoptedsince MTB believes that qualificationeither by testing and training or bytesting and experience is necessary incritical processes for the safety and re-liability of an LNG facility. MTB feelsthat testing is necessary to assure thata worker's prior training or experiencecan be applied in practice. :
A number of commenters said thatthe 'suggested personnel qualificationsrequirements would conflict with"right to work" laws in certain States;Notwithstanding such conflict' if any,MTB believes it is empowered to es-tablish reasonable qualifications forconstruction personnel working on anLNG facility.x
Other commenters felt that itshould not be the obligation of the op-erator to test and evaluate the compe-tence of personnel involved in.criticalprocesses. Some commenters said thatreliance on a third party's decision intesting would be desirable. MTBagrees that an operator need not bethe one to give performance qualifica-tion tests; an appropriate test given byothers should suffice. However, wherea new employee, for example, has notyet demonstrated competency by test-ing, under § 193.1009 it would.be theoperator's obligation to see that suchtesting is performed. The language of§ 193.1009(a)(2) has therefore beenmodified to make clear that an opera-tor must verify that qualification testsrelevant to the assigned function arepassed.
In the final rules,, the provisions of§193.1009"will be relocated to a sepa-rate Subpart on personnel trainingand qualifications. I
Inspection. Section 193.1011, relat-Ing to inspection of construction activ-ities, is changed by incorporating thesuggested material inspection require-ments of § 193.1035. Although manycommenters agreed with the wordingof § 193.1011(a), regarding inspectionto assure compliance with Subpart K,some " commented that inspectionshould be to verify compliance withspecifications, • industry codes, anddrawings but not Federal regulations.While the language has been modifiedto clearly point out that inspection re-quirements apply to all constructionactivities required by Subpart K,. in-cluding testing, MTB believes that inaddition, an essential purpose of in-spection .should be to assure compli-ance with'the other al~picable Federalsafety standards in Part-193. This con-cept has therefore been retained inthe revision.
PROPOSED RULES
Provisions of other Sections (E.g.,§§ 193.1023(0) and 193.1035) concern-ing the type and scope of insepctionsand tests are restated in a new§ 193.1014, called "Inspection and test-ing methods". This new Section wouldestablish a general requirement thateach operator determine the nature
-and scope of testsand inspections per-formed under Subpart K (that are nototherwise sPlecified) and the extent ofinspection and testing procedures pre-pared under § 193.1005.'
Cleanup. Most commenters on§ 193.1015 agreed with the conceptthat components -should be cleanedafter donstruction to remove potential-ly damaging contaminants. Therefore,this Section is retained in this Notice;and it Is combined with Aeveral provi-sions from § 193.1417, which also dealtwith cleanup. Several commenters sug-gested that the clause "which couldcause a hazard" be deleted, statingthat all detrimental contaminantsshould be removed. MTB agrees thatremoval of all contaminants is goodpractice, but the purpose of this pro-posed requirement is to 'prevent haz-ards resulting from contaminants.
Pipe, Welding. There were severalminor modifications suggested by corn-menters for § 193.1017 which proposesstandards for welding pipe. The fol-lowing modifications have been madein accordance with applicable com-ments: In § 193.1017(a)(1) a revisionhas" been made to permit weldingqualification under either ASME Sec-tion IX or API 1104 as applicable. Sub-section 193.1017(a)(2) has been modi-fied slightly, only to clarify intent.Two commenters stated that in§ 192.1017(d), prohibition of dyestamping should be based on wallthickness and temperature of piperather than nternal pressure. Sincematerial must be selected to have ade-quate toughness at predictable operat-ing temperature, MTB has not includ-ed temperature as a factor to considerin'deciding whether to field dye stampthe pipe. Otherwise, MTB agrees thatthickness should be the, controllingfactor and has revised § 193.1017(d) ac-cordingly. Also, a suggested weldingprovision regarding alloy welded jointsis transferred to this section from§ 193.1417(d) in the ANPRM.
Pipe Connections. A large number ofcommenters recommended that thesuggested piping connection require-'ments of § 193.1019 be limited to LNGand hazardous Iluid piping, and theproposed definition of "piping" shouldsatisfy this concern. A number of ttom-menters to § 193.1019(a) felt that non-welded connections should be permit-ted for unusual situations where weld-ing would not be practical. MTBagrees and a change has been made topropose that threaded or flanged con-nections be allowed for "special con-
nections" such as those needed toattach Instruments to pipe. Many corn-menters advocated the use of NFPA59A as a basis for this Section. MTBhas essentially followed this recom-mendation, expanding the Section toinclude most of the provisions ofNFPA 59A, Paragraphs 6210 and*6211,Based on the views of one commenterthat clearances in socket fittings mustbe assured, MTB has added a newparagraph (b) covering this topic,
Retesting. Section 193.1023(c) n theANPRM has been revised in responseto a majority of commenters' whoargued that a component should nothave to be retested In every 'case thatwelding is performed on the compo-nent after initial testing. MTB has re-examined potential harm that couldbe caused by welding after a c0mpo.nent Is tested and the need for suchwelding. Section 193.1023 now providesthat retesting would be required onlyin the event of penetration welding(other than tie-in welds). In addition,MTB Is proposing that retesting be re-quired if the components structural in-tegrity is disturbed in any way afteran initial test.
Strength Tests. Many commentersobjected to the suggestion under§ 193.1025(a) in the ANPRM that ehchcomponent be tested for strength be-cause as the term "component" wasdefined in the ANPRM, many needesstests would be run. MTB agrees andunder this Notice only "piping systemsand containers" would have to betested. Components which dd not con.tain a hazardous fluid, such as a con-trol 'system, need not be strengthtested' to prove their design capabili-ties; and it would not be practical tostrength test other components, suchas dikes. Some commenters questionedhow loading from Ice or snow could beconsidered in tests as suggested In§ 193,1025. This may be accomplishedby calculating deflection, settling, andmovement due to thermal contractionand comparing the value with fieldmeasurements taken during testing.As another example, calculated toeloads due to wind or seismic motionmight be correlated with settlementmeasurements during hydrostatic testto determine the effects of the pro-jected loading.
A number of commenters on§ 193.1025(b) said that the suggested1.5°C temperature limitation on pres.sure testing low alloy and carbon steelpiping would not be practical since am-bient 'temperatures could be lower andmany steels retain adequate toughnessat that temperature. Once commentersaid there should be no low tempera-ture limit, since testing at a low tem.perature would be more rigorous. Ac-cordihgly, the low temperature limitfor testing has been deleted. A newclause proposing that test pressures
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 44, NO. 28-THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1979
PROPOSED RULES
include a uniform safety factor, con-sistent with test requirements for ordi-nary gas piping and hydrostatic testsunder B31.3, has been included forcritical components.
Testing Welds. A wide range of view-points was expressed in comments to§193.1027(a) concerning- the nonde-structive testing of circumferential
- welds on piping to check for weldingdefects. Some felt that a requirementfor testing all welds would be exces-sive; 59A requires that only 30 percentof the welds on piping be tested. Onthe other hand, many commenters in-dicated that a 100 percent testing re-quirement would be appropriate, orappropriate for certain temperatureranges or fluids. After further consid-eration, MTB believes that a higherlevel of testing should be required forcritical piping, or piping whose failurecould cause an emergency, in order toadequately assure weld acceptability.Assurance is most important in thecase of cryogenic piping because of theunusual problems in welding the mate-rials involved. Therefore, this Sectionhas been revised to proposed that 100percent of welds be nondestructivelytested on critical piping and 30 percenton noncritical piping.
Most commenters agreed with thesuggested requirement of§193.1027(a)(3) in the ANPRM for 100percent testing of longitudinal seamsin transfer piping. MTB believes thisrequirement would be -.appropriate,and it is proposed under § 193.1027(c)along with' 100 -percent testing ofspiral welds;
With respect to§ 193.1027(d)(§ 193.1027(b) in theANPRM) commenters opposed adopt-ing a requirement for testing 100 per-cent of the welds in metal storagetanks with curved surfaces because ofthe low stress levels in some areas ofmost tanks and because pressure tests§ (193.1033) assure quality of construc-tion. A number of these commenterscontended that testing should be nomore stringent than currently re-quired by the industry standard, API620, since it has not been shown to beinadequate. However, other com-,menters indicated that a 100 percentrequirement would be appropriate forLNG tanks or those operating at tem-peratures below -20°F. MTB has notadopted these comments because the59A standard (and reference to API620) appears ambiguous and does notimpose any appreciably higher stand-ard for LNG storage tanks than tanksholding any other fluid. Also, pressuretesting may not be adequate.to assurethat joints meet the proposed designrequirements for loading becauseunder § 193.1033 some joints might notbe tested to the stress level that wouldresult from wind. or seismic loads.MTB has revised this suggested re-
quirement to make clear that It ap-plies only to butt welds In hydraulicload bearing shells of tanks withcurved surfaces that are to operate atcryogenic temperatures. In view of thepotential for disaster in case a storagetank containing a flammable fluidfails and the level of difficulty associ-ated with welding the curved surfacesand cryogenic metals involved, MTBbelieves that testing 100 percent of thewelds is approplate. In addition, test-ing to this degree Is necessary toassure structural integrity so that avapor dispersion distance under§193.109 for ap LNG tank justifiablybe based, in most cases, on a pipingfailure and not on a total sudden re-lease of the tank contents.
The Daft Evaluation has Identified§ 193.1027 as a provison with high costimpact. The additional testing thatwould be required would obviouslyhave some adifUtional -cost. MTB be-lieves this impact would not be harshbecause the added testing could bedone by personnel already at a job siteto comply withany less stringent test-
-'ing standard that might b6 adoptedand during the same time period.
Leak Tests. Most commenters ad-dressing § 193.1029(a) on testing com-ponents for leaks after construction,objected to the suggested testing of all"components." The Section Is modi-fied to apply to containers and pipingsystems, those components which willcontain hazardous fluids and wouldpose a hazard if a leak occurs.
In § 193.1029(b) (paragraph (c) in theANPRM) the words "design maximumpressure" have been revised to "designpressure."
Testing Control System. Section193.1031, concerning the testing ofcontrol systems to assure their per-formance, is unchanged from theANPRM.
Pressure Tests for Storage Tanks.Many commenters strongly opposedthe full hydrostatic test suggested by§ 193.1033(a) for storage tanks (fillingthe tank with water to Its maximumliquid level) and recommended thatthe API 620, Appendix Q, test proce-dure be adopted without exceptions.In connection with the hydrostaticloading, most of these comnenters ob-jected particularly to paragraph (Dwhich would have prohibited overload-ing of the tank foundation during test-ing. Only one commenter advocatedthat the full hydrostatic test require-ment be retained as suggested in theANPRM, stating the API 620, Appen-dix Q, procedure is ambiguous. API620, Appendix Q, provides that a tankbe filled with water to the designliquid level, but then permits filling toa lower level if excessive overstressingor foundation overloading wouldresult. As a consequence, load bearingsurfaces of an LNG tank are usually
not tested for even the static loadsthat wUll result when the tank isplaced in service.
MTB believes, first, that a full hy-drostatic test would be consistent withoverpressure tests proposed or now re-quired as a safety factor for less criti-cal components. The test would assurethat a tank is liquid and gas tight atall Its level and that foundation bear-ing is adequate. In addition. MTB be-lieves this more stringent test isneeded as a safeguard against cata-strophic failure of a tank by dynamicor other loads that, as allowed bydesign procedures would cause staticloads to be exceeded. It also wouldprovide justification for basing thevapor dispersion distance computedunder §193.109, in most cases, onpiping failure rather than on a suddentotal release 6f the tank contents. Ac-cordingly,, the suggested requirementfor a full hydrostatic test has been re-tained in this Notice. However, subpar-agraph (D in the ANPRM has been de-leted in order to permit overloading ofthe foundation during testing (as per-mitted by API 620, Appendix Q), rec-ognizing that lower profile tanks maybe necessary for compliance in some-cases. This deletion, together with theallowable overstressing of materialsand design provisions for certain dy-namc loading, should mitigate theonerous aspects of this test.
The Draft Evaluation shows thatthis provision would have a major costImpact mostly because of the extracost of concrete and earthwork to sup-port the added fondation loading formost tanks. MTB believes that thisImpact could be lessened by taking fulladvantages of the allowable overstress-ing of .material and foundation, bycareful site selection, and by using al-ternate tank designs. Also, any costsfor added strength would, to someextent, be included in the costs associ-ated with compliance with proposedSections related to seismic design,wind load, and internal pressure.
A large number of commenters alsoopposed the relatively high pneumatictest pressure (1.5 times the designpressure) suggested by § 193.1033(b) inthe ANPRM. In view of the commentsand other factors, the test pressureproposed in this Notice is reduced to1.25 times the design pressure, thepressure provided by API 620, Appen-dix Q.
In accordance with the number ofcomments .on §193.1033(c), statingthat thermal stabilization cannot beachieved, the wording "after thermalstabilization' has been deleted.
The majority of commenters recom-mended that §193.1033(d) in theANPRM be deleted, stating that un--sealed concrete shells should be testedIn the same manner as other tankparts. Although the suggested require-
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PROPOSED RULES
ment for an additional test on tsealed surfaces was not intendedsupplant other requirements, it dcnot appear to add to-safety and 1been deleted.
Based on the views of many co:menters, § 193.1033(e) in the ANPRhas been changed using more perforance type language, and incori~oratin § 193.1033(c) along wi§ 193.1033(g) of the ANPRM.
The majority of comments§ 193.1033(g) in the ANPRM agrewith the need to use reference misurements to detect tank motiduring testing. 1MTB believes this stgested requirement is- appropriate Jsafety, and it is, therefore, retainunder § 193.1033(c).
Records. Although a number of co:menters to § 193.103 7 agreed with. tneed to keep construction recorsome felt that retention of a recordeach personnel test and each comlnent inspection would be excessilCommenters argued that only thesuits of such tests and inspeetioshould be kept. MTB agrees and hrevised § 193.1037 accordingly.. In consideration of the foregoMTB proposes to amend Title 49-the Code of Federal Regulations bytablishing Subparts A-K of a new P,,193 as set forth below.
Issued in Washington, D.C. on Fruary 5, 1979.
CEsAR DE LEON,Associate Director for Pipelini
Safety Regulation, Materia,Transportation Bureauw
PART 193-LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS
FACILITIES: FEDERAL SAFETY STANDARDS
Subpart A--General
Sec.193.1 Scope of part.193.2 Offshore facilities.193.3 Applicability.193.5 Definitions.193.7 -Rules of regulatory construction.193.10 Reporting.193.11 Incorporation by reference.
protection.. - .193.111 Seismic investigation and design193.113 Flooding.193.115 Soil characteristics,193.117 Wind forces.193.119. Other severe weather and natuconditions.
193.121 Adjacent activities.193.123 Separation of components.
Scope.General.Loading forces.Stratification.Movement and stress.Penetrations.Internal design pressure.External design pressure.Internal temperature.Foundation.Frost heave.Insulation.Instrumentation for LN G storage
Scope.General.Shutdown control system.Backflow.Overfilling.Cargo transfer systems.Cargo transfer area.Shutoff valves.
,Subpart H-Gasification Equipment
193.701193.703193.705193.711193.713193.715193.719
Scope.General.Vaporizer design.Operational control.Shutoff valves.Relief devices.Combustion air intakes.
Subpart I-Liquefaction Equipment
193.801193.803193.805
"193.807193.809193.811193.813193.815
Scope of part.General.Control of incoming gas.Contaminants.Back flow.Cold boxes.Air in gas.Equipment supports,
Subpart J-Control Systems
193.901 Scope.193.903 General.193.905 Relief devices.193.907 Vents.193.909 Sensing devices.193.911 Warning devices.193.915 Pump and compressor control.193.917 Shutoff valves.193.919 Shutdown control systems.193.921 Control center,193.925 Failsafe control.193.927 Sources of power.
Subpart K-Construction
193.1001 'Scope.193.1002 Construction acceptance.193.1005 Procedures,193.1009 Qualification of personnel,193.1011 Inspection.193.101, Inspection and testing methods.193.1015 Cleanup.193.1017 Pipe welding.193.1019 Piping connections.193.1023 Retesting.193.1025 Strength tests.193.1027 Nondestructive tests.193.1029 Leak tests.193.1031 Testing control systems.193.1033 Storage tank tests.193.1037 Construction records.
Appendix A-incorporation by Reference
AuTonRTry: See. 3. Pub. L. 90-481, 82 Stat.721 (49 USC 1672); 49 CFR 1.53, Appendix Aof Part 1, and Appendix A of Part 106,
Subpart A-General
§ 193.1 Scope of part.
(a) This part prescribes safety stand-ards for LNG facilities used In thetransportation, of gas by pipeline thatis subject to the Natural Gas PipelineSafety Act of 1968 and Part 192 of thischapter.
(b) This part does not apply to-
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PROPOSED RULES
(1) LNG facilities used by ultimateconsumers of LNG or natural gas.
(2) LNG facilities used in the courseof natural gas treatment or hydrocar-bon extraction which do not storeLNG.
(3) In the case of a waterfront LNGfacility engaged in marine transfer,any matter pertaining to the facilitybetween the marine vessel and the lastmanifold (or in the absence of a mani-fold, the last valve) on transfer pipinglocated immediately before a storagetank.
§ 193.2 Offshore facilities.An offshore LNG facility need not.
comply with any requirement of thispart which the Secretary finds Imprac-tical 'or unnecessary because of theoffshore location. In making such afinding, the Secretary may impose ap-propriate alternative safety condi-tions.
§ 193.3 Applicability.(a) No person may operate an LNG
facility that does not meet the applica-ble requirements of this part govern-ing operation, maintenance, personnelqualifications and training, fire protec-tion, and security.
(b) No person may operate any com-ponent of an LNG facility upon whichconstruction, installation, replace-ment, relocation, or significant alter-ation-was begun after (date Part 193-Design and Construction is issued)unless that component meets the ap-plicable requirements of this part gov-erning siting, design, installation, andconstruction.
§ 193.5 Definitions.As used in this part--"Ambient vaporizer" means a vapor-
izer which derives heat from naturallyoccurring heat sources, such as the at-mosphere, sea water, surface waters,or geothermal waters:
"Cargo tkansfer system" means acomponent or system of tomponentsfor transferring hazardous fluids inbulk between the closest inline valveon transfer piping and a tank car, ortank truck, including, connections,arms, hoses, and associated area.
"Component" means any part orsystem of parts functioning as a unitthat is used in an LNG facility for con-trolling, processing, or confining haz-ardous fluids or to provide safety.
"Container.' means a componentother than piping which confines ahazardous fluid.
"Control system" means a compo-nent or system of components func-tioning as a unit, including controlvalves, and sensing, warning, relief,shutdown and failsafe devices, whichis activated either manually or auto-matically to establish or mafitain theperformance of another component.
"Controllable emergency" means anemergency where reasonable and pru-dent action can prevent harm to per-sons or property.
"Critical component" means a com-ponent which may cause, fail to pre-vent, or increase an emergency if oper-ational capability is impaired or mau-function occurs.
* "Critical process" means a process ofconstruction, Installation, inspection,or testing that is necessary to ensurethe performance reliability and struc-tural integrity of a component.
"Cubic metre" means a volumetricunit which is 6.2898 barrels, 35.3147feet 3
, or 264.1720 U.S. gallons, eachvolume being considered as equal tothe other.
"Determine" neans make an appro-priate investigation using scientificmethods, reach a decision based onsound engineering judgment, andrecord the decision and Its basis.
"Dike" means a structural arrange-ment, which may be of natural geo-logical formation, compacted earth,concrete, or other material, formingan impermeable barrier to preventliquid from flowing in an unintendeddirection.
"Emergency" means a deviationfrom normal operation, a structuralfailure, or severe environmental condi-tions that probably would cause harmto persons or property. -
"Exclusion zone" means an area sur-rounding an LNG facility in which anoperator or government agency legallycontrols all activities in accordancewith §§ 193.107 and 193.109 for as longas the facility is in operation.
'Failsafe" means a design featurewhich will maintain or result in a safecondition in the event of malfunctionor failure of a power supply, compo-nent, or component part.
"G" or "g" means the standard ac-celeration of 4ravity of 9.806 metre persecond (32.17 feet per second ).
"Gas," except when designated asinert, means natural gas, flammablegas, or gas which is toxic or corrosive.
"Hazardous fluid" means gas or anyliquid that is subject to Parts 172 and173 of this Chapter.
"Heated vaporizer" means a vaporiz-er which derives heat from other thannaturally occurring heat sources.
"Impounding space" means a volumeof space formed by dikes and floorswhich is designed to hold a spill ofLNG or other hazardous liquid.
"Impounding system" includes animpounding space and dikes andfloors, including those for conductingthe flow of spilled hazardous liquids toan impounding space.
"Liquefied natural gas" or "LNG"means natural or.synthetic gas havingmethane (CIL) as Its major cdnstitu-ent which has been changed to aliquid by reduction in temperature.
"LNG facility" means a facility forliquefying natural gas or transferring,storing, or vaporizing liquefied naturalgas, including rights-of-way, buildings,equipment, piping, and assbciatedfacilities, but not including tank cars,tank trucks, marine vessels, fuel sys-tems for motor vehicles, or portabledewar vessels.
"Maximum allowable operating pres-sure" means the maximum pressure atwhich a component may be operatedunder this part.
"Normal operation" means function-ing within design ranges of pressure,temperature, flow, or other operatingcriteria withour malfunction or per-4onnel error which results in the acti-vation of any safety control system.
"Operator" means a person -whoowns or operates an LNG facility.
"Person" means any individual, firmjoint venture, partnership, corpora-tion, association, state, municipality,cooperative association, or joint stockassociation and includes any trustee,receiver, assignee, or personal repre-sentative thereof.
"Piping" or "piping system" meansall pipe, tubing hoses, fittings, valves,pumps, connections, safety devices orrelated components for containing theflow of hazardous fluids.
"Secretary" means the Secretary ofTransportation or any person to whomauthority In the matter concerned hasbeen delegated.
"Storage tank" means a container.for storing a hazardous fluid, includ-ing an underground cavern.
"Transfer piping!" means all perma-nent and temporary piping, supports,and associated area used for transfer-ring hazardous fluids between contain-ers, and between a container and acargo transfer system.
"Transfer system" includes transferpiping and cargo transfer system.
"Vaporization" means an addition ofthermal energy changing a liquidmedium to a vapor or gaseous state.
"Vaporizer" means a heat transferfacility designed to introduce thermalenergy in a controlled manner forchanging a liquid medium to a vaporor gaseous state.
"Waterfront LNG facility" means anING facility located on or immediate-ly adjacent to a navigable waterway ofthe United States.
§ 193.7 Rules ofregulatory construction.(a) As used in this part-(1) "Includes" means including but
not limited to;(2) "May" means is permitted to or
is authorized to;(3) "May not" means is not permit-
- ted to or is not authorized to; and(4) "Shall" or "must"'is used in the
- mandatory and Imperative sense.(b) In this part-
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PROPOSED RULES
(1) Words importing the singular in-clude the plural; and
(2) Words. importing the plural in-clude the singular.
§ 193.10 Reporting.Leaks and spills of LNG must be re-
ported in accordance with the require-ments of Part 191 of this chapter.
§ 193.11 Incorporation by reference.(a) Any documents or parts thereof
incorporated .by reference in this partare a part of this regulation as thoughset out in full.
(b) All incorporated documents areavailable' for inspection in DocketRoom 6500, Trans Point Building, 2100Second Street, SW., Washington, D.C.20590. In addition, the documents areavailable at the addresses provided inAppendix Ato this part.(c) The titles pnd applicable editions
for the publications incorporated byreference in this part are provided inAppendix A to this part.
Subpart B-Site Related Design Requirements
§ 193.101 Scope.This subpart prescribes site related
requirements for the design of a newLNG facility or an existing criticalcomponent which is replaced, reIo-cated, or significantly altered.
§ 193.103 Acceptable site.A site may not be used for an-LNG
facility or critical component'unless itis investigated in accordance with therequirements of this subpart.
§ 193.105 General.
An LNG facility must be located at asite of suitable size, topography, andconfiguration so that the facility canbe designed to minimize the hazards topersons and property resulting from
leaks and spills of LNG and other haz-ardous liquids at the site. In selectinga site, each operator shall determineall site related characteristics whichcould jeopardize the integrity and se-curity of the facility. A site must pro-vide ease of access so that personnel,equipment, and materials from offsltelocations can reach the site for firefighting or controlling spill associatedhazards or to evacuate personnel.
§ 193.107 Thermal radiation protection.(aY Thermal exclusion zone. Each
LNG facility must have a thermal ex-clusion zone. Within the thermal ex-clusion zone an impounding system forLING may not be located closer to tar-gets listed in paragraph (d) of this sec-tion than the exclusion distance "d"determined according to this sectionunless the target is part of an LNG fa-cility. If grading aatd drainage are usedunder § 193.403(b), operators mustcomply with the requirements -of thissection by assuming the space neededfor drainage and collection of spilledliquid is an impounding system.
(b) Measurement The exclusion dis-tance "d" is measured as shown in thefollowing diagram along the line (PT)in a vertical plane defined by thepoints (T) and (D) where-
(T) is a point at the top of the target;(DI Is a point blosest to (T) on the top
inside edge of the innermost dike;C ) is the flame tilt angle measured from
the vertical as calculated from Equation G-4 of AGA IS-3-1, using the maximum windspeed that is exceeded less than 5 percent ofthe time based on recorded data for thearea.
(L)'Is the flame length as calculated fromEquation G-7 or G-8 of AGA IS-3-1;
(PD) Is a line In the vertical plane whichintersects (D) at an angle with the verti-cal;-(P) s -located where (PT) and (PD) inter-
sect at an angle of 90' or more, or where(PD) equals (L), whichever results in the.shortest length of (PD).
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 44, NO. 28-THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1979
PROPOSED RULES
CL
oZ
CLJ
6.
K
8169
8170(c) Exclusion distance length. The
length of an exclusion distance in feetfor each Impounding space may not beless than the distance "d" determinedin-accordance with one of the follow-Ing:
(1) d=(qA/47rq")Y2
(1) Where-A=Area measured acrdss the top of the im-
pounding space in square feet.q"=Radiation flux level for the target pre-
scribed by paragraph (d) of this section.q=Emissive power of LNG fire equals 45,000
Btu/ft.2hr.(2) Determine "d" from a detailed
analysis of the radiation from LNGfires, using the model beginning onPage G-40 of AGA IS-3-1,.making cer-tain the analysis accounts for:
(I) Transmissivity of the atmoslherebased on the minimubi daily relativehumidity that is exceeded at least 95percent of the time based on recordeddata for the area;
(ii) Emissivity of the flame;(iii) Geometric view factor between
the flame and the target;(iv) Emissive -power of LNG fire
equals 45,000 Btu/ft.2 hr.; and(v) Radiation flux level for the
target is as prescribed by paragraph(d) of this section.
NoTE.-In the case of an Impoundingspace with base dimensions in a ratio ofmore than 2, the distance "d" must be calcu-lated by assuming simultaneous radiation
.from a series of impounding spaces eachwith base dimensions in a ratio of 2 or lessand taking into account the combination ofradiation flux.
(d) Permissible thermal flux on tar-gets. Thermal radiation from an Im-pounding space may not result in morethan the following thermal flux at atarget:
(2) Structures made of cellulose or metalwhich-=l) Are frequently occupied byhumans; (it) Contain flammable ortoxic materials; (ii1) Have exceptionalvalue or contain objects of exceptionalvalue, or (iv) Could result in additionalhazard If damaged by thermal radi-ation ............................. ... ....................... 4,000
(3) Public streets, highways, and mainlines of railroads ....................................... 4,000
(4) Structures made of brick, stone, orother masonry materials, which arefire resistant and have not more than10 percent window area .......................... 10,000
(5) Other structures made of cellulose,metal or rmsonry materials .................... 6,700
(a) Dispersion exclusion zoneExcept as provided by paragraph (e)of this section, each LNG facility must
-° PROPOSED RULES
have a dispersion exclusion zone witha boundary described by the minimumdispersion distance computed in ac-cordance with this section. The follow-ing are prohibited in a dispersion ex-clusion zone unless 'it is part of anLNG facility.
(1) Places of outdoor assembly; and(2) Structures which-
,(i) Area frequently occupied by'humans;
(ii) Contain flammable' or toxic ma-terials;
(iII) Have exceptional value or con-tain objects of exceptional value; or
(iv) Could result in additional hazardif damaged by concussion or fire.
(b) Measuring dispersion distance.The dispersion distance is measuredradially from the inside edge of an im-pounding system along the groundcontour to the exclusion zone bound-ary.
(c) Computing Dispersion distance.A minimum dispersion distance mustbe computed for each impoundingsystem which serves components con-taining LNG. Computing dispersiondistance in accordance with applicableparts of the mathematical model inAppendix B in the report, "Evaluationof LNG Vapor Control Methods" pre-pared for the American Gas Associ-ation by A. D. Little, Inc. If gradingand drainage are used under§193.403(b), operators must complywith the requirements of this sectionby assuming the space needed-fordrainage and collection of spilledliquid is an impounding system. Com-putation of dispersion, distance is sub-ject to the following aid paragraph(d) of this section:
(1) Average gas concentration in air= 2.5 percent.
(2) Weather conditions are thosewhich result in longer.predicted down-wind dispersion distances than 95 per-cent of other weather conditions oc-curring at the site based on U.S. Gov-ernment weather data.
(3) Dispersion parameters y, z, andH=O.
(d) Vaporization design rate. In com-puting dispersion distance under para-graph (c) of this section, the followingapplies:
(1) For sites not subject to para-graph (d)(2) of this section, dispersiondistance is based on the following c6n-ditions:
(4) Vaporization equals the maxi-mum constant rate of ischarge byfailed transfer piping which has thegreatest overall flow capacity durngthe time necessary to wet 100 percentof the impounding floor area as deter-mined by equation C-9 in the report,"Evaluation of LNG Vapor ControlMethods, prepared for the AmericanGas Association by A. D. Little, Inc.,plus the -flash vaporization from theassumed piping failure.
(ii) After the time required to wetthe impounding floor has been exceed-ed, the vaporization rate Is a decreas-ing function of time and spill surfaceproperties.
(l) Vapor detention space Is allspace provided for liquid impound-ment and vapor detention outside thecomponent served, less the valume oc-cupied by the spilled liquid at the timethe vapor escapes the vapor detentionspace.
(2) For sites located in active seismicareas having a potential for groundrupture or seismic accelerations Inexcess of 0.4G as determined under§ 193.111, or where other surroundingconditions exist such that structuralintegrity of the vessel served cannotbe assured with a high degree of cer-tainty (e.g., high density commercialor military air traffic, and militarytest sites for aircraft and missiles), andfor areas under § 193.403(b)(4) and (5),dispersion distance is based on the fol-lowing conditions, as applicable:
(i) For Class 2 and Class 3 impound-ing systems-
(A) Vaporization results from a re-lease of the maximum contents of thelargest vessel Impounded, timed in ac-cordance with paragraph (d)(3) of this 4section, which contacts all exposedsurfaces of the impounding systemand outer vessel surfaces, plus flashvaporization from the contents of thevessel served; and
(B) Vapor detention space is allspace provided for liquid impound-ment and vapor detention outside thevessel served less the volume occupiedby the spilled liquid at the time thevapor escapes the 'vapor detentionspace.
(ii) For Class 1 impounding systems,vaporliztion results from a volume dis-charged from transfer piping equal tothe impoundment capacity required by§ 193.441 for transfer piping, whichcontacts all exposed surfaces of theimpounding system, heat transfer tothe liquid from any collapsed compo-nent roof, plus flash vaporization fromthe maximum contents of the compo-nent served or from the liquid dis-charged by transfer piping, whicheveris greater.- (3) For sites subject to paragraph(d)(2) of this section, the assumedmaximum time (t) required for the re-lease of liquid from a vessel served Isdetermined in.accordance with the fol-lowing equation:
2 A (01'-(h.) 1,
,c a (2g) 0
where:
A = cross-sectional area of vessel in feet.a = area of credible spill opening in feet butt
not less than 5 percent of the nonhor-?zontal wetted surface of the vessel.
c = coefficient of discharge = 0,75.
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 44, NO. 28-THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1979
. PROPOSED RULES
hi = original height of contained liquid infeet.
h, = equilibrium height of impoundedliquid in feett
(4) Unless the requirements of para-graph (d)(5) of this section are met.the boiling rate of LNG on which dis-persion distance is based is determinedusing the weighted average value ofthe thermal properties of the soil, sea-lant, and other contact surfaces in theimpounding space determined fromeight -representative experimentaltests on the materials involved.
(5) If impounidng surfaces are insu-lated and the insulation is designed,installed and maintained so that it willretain its performance characteristicsunder spill conditions, the boiling rateof LNG is determined in accordacnewith paragraph (d)(4) of this sectionboth with and without the insulationsystem in place, using a value of notless than the average of the weightedaverage value without insulation andthe weighted average value with insu-lation.
(e) Planned'ignition. An LNG facili-ty need not have a dispersion exclu-sion zone if the Secretary finds thatcompliance with paragraph (a) of thissection would be impractical and theoperator prepares and follows a planfor igniting ILNG that is found accept-able by the Secretary. The plan mustincldde circumstances under whichLNG vapor is ignited to preclude thedispersion of a flammable mixturefrom the LNG facility under all pre-dictable environmental conditions thatcould adversely affect ignition. The re-liability of the method of ignitionmust be demonstrated by testing orexperience with LNG spills.
§ 193.111 Seismic investigation and design.(a) At the site of each of the follow-
ing LNG facilities each operator shallconduct a detailed geotechnical inves-tigation and determine liroximity tofaults, the sei:niic response spectra,potential for motion: amplification, po-tential for soil liquefaction, and poten-tial for surface rupture:
(1) A facility which is located inZone 2, 3, or Zone 4 of the "SeismicRisk M p of the United States," UBC,or in, Puerto Rico, not including a fa-cility with total LNG storage capacityprovided by one or more horizontal cy-lindrical double wall metal storagetanks of less than 100,000 gallon ca-pacity each, mounted within 2 feet ofthe ground.
(2) A facility located where there isevidence indicating a potential for sur-face faulting.
(b) In the case of LNG facilities notlisted in paragraph (a) of this section,the critical components listed in para-graph (c) of this section must be de-signed and built to withstand-
(1) The horizontal seismic accelera-tion and other applicable factors setforth in the UBC, Volume 1. corre-sponding to the zone of the "SeismicRisk Map of the United States" inwhich the facility Is located. and
(2) A vertical seismic accelerationequal to the horizontal accelerationand the associated applicable factors.
(c) In the case of LNG facilitieslisted in paragraph (a) of § 193.111. thecritical components set forth belowmust be designed and built to with-stand the most critical maximum hori-zontal and vertical response spectra(with respect to the natural period ofthe structure) determined to have oc-curred at the site as a result of anearthquake or determined to have thefollowing probability of not being ex-ceeded at the site in 50 years, which-ever is larger, considering motion am-plicatlon and symmetric and asymmet-ric reaction forces resulting from hy-drodynamic pressure and motion ofcontained liquid in Interaction withthe component structure:
Probability ofCritical Component response spectra not
being exceeded
Storage tanks and theirImpounding systems - 99.5%
Transfer piping. shutdowncontrol system% otherflammable fluid contalners-, 90.0,0
(d) An LNG facility Is prohibited inthe following locations:
(1) A location where surface faultingwithin one mile of a critical compo-nent is determined by the seismic in-vestigation under paragraph (a) of thissectiQn to have more than a 0.5 per-cent probability of occurring within 50years.
(2) A location where the maximumhorizontal or vertical seismic accelera-tion, or any combined vector thereof,at the foundation of the followingcritical components Is determined tohave more than the indicated percentprobability of exceedildg 80 percent (g)in 50 years:
Component Probability
Storage tanks and theirImpounding systems - 0.5%
Transfer piping, shutdowncontrol system, otherflammable fluid containers. 10.0%
(3) A location where soil liquefactionor landslide has more than 0.5 percentprobability of occurring In 50 years.
(e) If the maximum horizontal orvertical seismic acceleration at a site Isdetermined to have more than a 0.5percent probability of' exceeding 40percent (g) in 50 years, the followingapplies: "
(1) Foundations of LNG storagetanks must be a monolithic structureon bedrock.
(2) Impounding systems must be de-signed and installed so that surround-ing dike elevation is not below thelevel of stored liquid for a distancefrom the Inner edge of the dike equalto 4(A)", where A is the inside areaacross the top of the impoundingspace.
(f) Each container which does nothave a structurally sound, liquid-ti ght'cover, must have sufficient freeboardwith an appropriate configuration toprevent the escape of liquid due tosloshing, wave action, and verticalliquid displacement caused by seismicmotion.
§ 193.113 Flooding.(a) Each operator shall determine
th1e effects of flooding on an LNG fa-cility site based on the worst occur-rence in a 100-year period. The deter-mination must take into account:
(1) Volume and velocity of the flood-water,
(2) Tsunamis,(3) Potential failure of dams-(4) Predictable land developments
which would affect runoff accumula-tion of water; and
(5) Tidal action.-(b) Each LNG facility must be locat-
ed and designed so that the effect ofthe flooding determined under para-graph (a) of this section cannot rea-sonably be expected to result in a haz-ardous condition involving-
(1) Foundations, impounding sys-tems, and other critical components;
(2) Access from outside the facilityor movement of personnel and equip-ment about the LNG facility site forthe control of fires and other emer-gencies;
(3) Power supply to the facility;(4) Operational capability of control
systems, whether electrical, pneumat-ic, or otherwise powered; or
(5) Structural integrity of criticalcomponents and their support sys-tems.
§ 193.115 Soil characteristics.(a) Soil investigations including bor-
ings and other appropriate tests mustbe made at the site of an LNG facilityto determine bearing capacity, settle-ment characteristics, potential for ero-slon, and other soil characteristics ap-plicable to the integrity of an LNG fa-cluty.
(b) The soil characteristics at eachLNG facility site must provide loadbearing capacities, using appropriatesafety factors, which can support,without excessive lateral or verticalmovement, all loads resulting from:
(1) Static loading caused by compo-nents and their contents and hydro-static testing of components; and
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PROPOSED RULES
(2) Dynamic loading caused l&y move-ment of contents of components in-cluding flow, sloshing, and rollover.
§ 193.117 Wind forces.(a) All critical components must be
designed to withstand wind forces inaccordance with the UBC.
(b) In addition to the requirementsof paragraph (a) of this section, eachoperator shall determine the probabil-ity of occurrence of tornadoes in thearea in which the LNG facility is lo-cated. If tornadoes are determined'tohave at-least a 0.5 percent probabilityof occurring within a 50-year period,storage tanks and dikes must be de-signed tb withstand loading from sus-tained wind speeds of not less than 250miles per hour, plus stress or impact.which could retult from the failureand collapse of all connected transferpiping and other appurtenances unlessthe connected transfer piping and ap-purtenances also are designed t6 with-stand a wind speed of 250 miles perhour.
§ 193.119 Other severe weather and natu-ral cbnditions.
(a) In addition to the requirementsof §§ 193.111, 193.113, 193.115, and193.117, each operator shall determinefrom historical records and engineer-ing studies the worst effect of otherweather and natural conditions whichmay predictably occur at an LNG fa-cility site.. (b) The facility must be located anddesigned so that such severe condi-tions cannot reasonably be expected toresult in a hazard involving the factorslisted in § 193.113(b).
§ 193.121 Adjacent activities.(a) Each operator shall determine
the present and reasonably foresee-able activities adjacent to an LNG fa-cility site that could adversely affectthe operation of the LNG facility orthe safety of persons or property lo- °
cated off the site if damage to the fa-cility occurs.
(b) An LNG facility must not be lo-cated where present or projected off-site activities would be reasonably ex-pected to-
(1) Adversely affect the operation ofcontrol systems;
(2) Cause failure of critical compo-nents; or
(3) Cause the LNG facility not tomeet the requirements of this part.
§ 193.123 Separation of omponents.Each LNG facility site must be large
enough to provide for minimum sepa-rations between critical componentsand between components and the siteboundary to-
(a) Permit movement of personnel,maintenance e-quipment, and emergen-
cy equipment within and around thefacility;
(b) Minimize spill and collapse haz-ards to perslis and property on andoff the site, unless protection compa-rable to separation is provided; and
(c) Comply with distances betweenthe critical components' specified inSection 213 through 216 of NFPA 59A.
Subpart C-Materials
§ 193.201 Scope.This subpart prescribes require-
ments for the selection and qualifica-.tion of materials for new componentsor any portion of an existing compo-nent which is replaced, relocated, orsignificantly altered.
§ 193.203 General.Materials for, all 'components must
be-(a) Able to maintain their structural
integrity under all'design loadings, in-cluding applicable environmentaldesign forces under Subpart B of thispart;
(b) Physically, chemically, and ther-mally compatible with any fluid or,other materials with which they are incontact; and
(c) Qualified in accordance with theapplicable requirements of this sub-part.
§ 193.205 Extreme temperatures; normaloperations.
Each operator shall-(a) Determine the range of tempera-
tures to which components will be sub-jected during normal operations, in-cluding required testing, initial star-tup, cooldown operations and shut-down conditions; and
(b) Use component materials thatmeet the design standards of this partfor strength, ductility, and other prop-erties throughout the entire range oftemperatures to which the component,will be subjected in normal operations.
(a) Each operator- shall determinethe effects on critical componentswhich are not normally exposed to ex-treme cold of a spill or other oper-ational error which could cause LNGor cold refrigerant to contact the com-ponent.
(b) Each operator shall determinethe effects on critical components ofthe extreme heat which will result if aspill of LNG or other flammable fluidwere ignited. a
(c) If an operator determines that acritical component would fail due toextreme high or low temperature, thecomponent may not be used unless itis made of suitable materials, or is pro-tected, to prevent failure from at leasttwo hours' exposure to the extreme
temperatures to which the componentmhay be subjected.
(d) If'a material that has low resis.tance to flame temperdtures is used inany component containing a flamma.ble fluid, the material must be protect-ed so that any heat resulting from 4controllable emergency does not causethe release of fluid that would, resultin an uncontrollable emergency.
§ 193.209 Insulation.(a) During normal operations, insu-
cal design loads.(b) Insulation used on the outside of
a component to protect it against tem-perature extremes'must be covered,must provide a vapor barrier, andmaintain insulating properties if ex-posed to water.
The insulation and covering must beself-extinguishing. The covering mustalso have a melting point above 1500'F, not be subject to ultraviolet decay,withstand wind in accordance withUBC, and withstand anticipatedimpact loading which could occur in acontrolled emergency, including theforce of fire hose streams.§ 193.211 Cold boxes.
All cold boxes and their insulationmust be made of materials which do,not, support combustion in the in-stalled condition.
§ 193.213 Piping.(a) Piping made of cast iron, mallea-
ble . iron, or ductile iron may not beused to carry any cold refrigerants orhazardous fluid.
(b) Piping materials intended for useat temperatures below (-28.9' C) -20'F must be qualified by testing in ac-cordance with ANSI B31.3 to complywith § 193.203(b).
§193.215 Concrete material subject tocryogenic temperatures.
Concrete subject to cryogenic tem-peratures may not be used unless-
(a Materials, measurements,mixing, placing, prestressing, and post-stressing of concrete meets generallyaccepted engineering practices;
(b) Metallic reinforcing, prestressingwire, structural and nonstructuralmembers used in concrete are accept-able in the installed condition for the
.temperature and stress levels encoun-tered at design loading conditions; and
(c) Tests. for the compressivestrength, the coefficient of contrac-tion, an acceptable thermal gradient,and, if applicable, acceptable surfacq,loading to prevent detrimental spall-ing are performed on the concrete at'the lowest predictable service tempera-
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 44, NO. 28--THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1979
PROPOSED RULES
ture or similar test data on these prop- erate In the position in which they areerties are available, to be installed.
§ 193.217. Combustible materials.Combustible materials are not per-
mitted for the construction of build-ings, plant equipment, and the founda-tions and supports of buildings andplant equipment in areas where igni-tion of the material would worsen anemergency. However, limited combus-tible materials may be used when anoperator determines that noncombus-tile materials are not commerciallyavailable.
§ 193.219 Records.Each operator shall-keep a record of
all critical components and their mate-rials as necessary to verify that the re-quirements of this subpart and designrequirements of this part are compliedwith. These records must be main-tained-for the life of the component.
ments for the design and installationof new components and buildings orany portion of existing componentsand buildings which is replaced, relo-cated, or significantly altered.
§ 193.303 General.The components of each LNG facili-
ty-must be designed, fabricated and in-stalled to withstand predictable load-ings including applicable environmen-tal design forces under Subpart B ofthis part.
§ 193.304 Personnel.For the design and fabrication of
critical components, each operatorshall use-
(a) With respect to design, personswho have demonstrated competenceby training or experiefice in the designof critical components for use in anLNG facility or other cryogenic facili-ty; and
(b) With respect to fabrication, per-sons who have demonstrated compe-tence by training or experience in thefabrication of critical components foruse in an LNG facility or other cryo-genic facility.
§ 193.305 Control valves.(a) Each oerator shall-(1) Determine appropriate" locations
for, and install, control valves whichare necessary for operation in k con-trollable emergency; and
(2) Equip those valves for localnianual operation and both local andrdmote power operation. -
(b) Control, valves used for cryogenicliquid service must be dsigned to op-
§ 193.307 Piping.(a) Piping must be designed, manu.
factured, and tested according to writ-ten specifications based on generallyaccepted engineering practices to func-tion under the full range of operatingconditions, including pressure andtemperature, that are predictable forthe piping's use.
(b) All cryogenic and flammablefluid piping must have connections tofacilitate blowdown and purge.
(c) Each cryogenic or flammablefluid, piping system that is aboveground must be Identified by colorcoding, painting, or labeling.
(d) Seamless pipe or pipe with a lon-gitudinal joint efficiency of 1.0 deter-mined in accordance with ANSI B31.3must be used for process and transferpiping handling cryogenic or otherhazardous liquids.
(e) For longitudinal or spiral weldpipe handling LNG or flammable re-frigerants-
(1) The design maximum pressuremust result in stresses less than 50percent of the maximum allowablestress'set forth In Appendix, Table Iof ANSI B3L3, finless the weld is sub-jec6ed to 100 percent radiographic orultrasonic inspection to Indicate anydefects which could adversely affectthe integrity of the weld or pipe; and
(2) The heat affected zone of theweld must comply with Section 323.2.3of ANSI B31.3.
(f) Threaded piping used In cryogen-ic or flammable fluid service must beat least Schedule 80.
(g) Delete.(h) Delete.
§ 193.309 Pipe attachments and supports.(a) Pipe supports must be designed
to comply with § 193.207.(b) Pipe attachments and supports
for NG or refrigerant piping must bedesigned to prevent excessive heattransfer which can result in either un-intentional restraint of piping causedby ice formations or the embrittle-ment of supporting steel.
§ 193.311 Buildings; design.Each building or structural enclo-
sure in which potentially hazardousquantities of flammable fluids arehandled must be designed and con-:structed to minimie-
(a) Potential fire hazards; and(b) The probability of an explosion
within the structure initiating-(1) Ablast wave by Pressure contain-
ment;(2) Collapse of support members; or(3) Shrapnel-like fragmentation.
8173
§ 193.313 Building; ventilation(a) Each building in which potential-
ly hazardous quantities of flammablefluids are handled must be ventilatedto minimize the possibility, duringnormal operation, of hazardous accu-mulation of a flammable gas and airmixture, hazardous products of com-bustion, and other hazardous vapors inenclosed process areas by one of thefollowing means:
(1) A continuously operating me-chanical ventilation system;
(2) A combination gravity ventila-tion system and normally off mechani-cal ventilation system which is activat-ed by suitable flammable gas detectorsat a concentration not exceeding 15percent of the lower flammable limitof the gas;,.
(3) A dual rate mechanical ventila-tion system with the high rate activat-ed by suitable flammable gas detectorsat a concentration not exceeding 15percent of the lower flammable limitof the gas; or
(4) A gravity ventilation system com-posed of a combination of wall open--ings, roof ventilators, and if there arebasements or depressed floor levels, asupplemental mechanical ventilationsystem.
(b) The ventilation rate must be atleast one cubic foot per minute of airper square foot of floor area. If vaporsheavier than air can be present, theventilation must be proportioned ac-cording to the-area of each level
§ 193.317 Expansion and contraction.Each operator shall determine the
amount of contraction and expansionof each component during operatingand enviornmental thermal cyclingand shall-
(a) Provide components that operatewithout deterimental stress or restric-tion of movement, within each compo-nent and between components, causedby contraction and expansion; and
(b) Prevent Ice buildup from detri-mentally restricting the movement ofcomponents caused by contraction andexpansion.
§193.319 Frost heave.(a) Each operator shall- -
_(l) Determine which critical compo-nents and their foundations could beendangered by frost heave from ambi-ent temperatures or operating tem-peratures of the component; and
(2) Provide protection against frostheave which might impaik their struc-tuial integrity:
(b) For each critical component andfoundation determined under para-graph (a) of this section, Instrumenta-tion and alarm systems must be In-stalled to warn of potential structuralimpairment due to frost heavingunless the component is inspectedmonthly using reference monuments
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 44, NO. 28.-THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1979
8174
and surveying instruments to detectchanges in elevation of the facility.
§ 193.321 Ice and snow.(a) Components must be designed to
support the weight of ice and snowwhich could normally collect or formon them.
(b) Each operator shall provide pro-tection for components from fallingice or snow which may accumulate onstructures.
(c) Valves under § 193.302(a) andmoving' critical components must notbecome inoperative due to ice forma-tion on the component.
§ 193.323 'Electrical systems.(a) Each operator shall select and in-
stall electrical equipment and wiringfor components in accordance withNFPA-70 and, where applicable, Sec-tion 751 of NFPA-59A.
(b) Electrical grounding and bondingmust be -in accordance with Section760 and Sectiorf 761 of NFPA-59A.
(c) Protective measures for stray orimpressed currents must be providedin accordance with Section 762 ofN'FPA-59A.
ing rods, arrestors, and grounds as nec-essary to minimize the hazard to plantpersonnel and critical components, in-.cluding all electrical circuits, fromdamage as a result of lightning.
§ 193.327 Boilers.Boilers must be designed and fabri-
cated in accordance with section I orSection IV of the' ASME Boiler"andPressure Vessel Code. Other pressurevessels subject to that Cdde must bedesigned and fabricated in accordancewith Division 1 or Division 2 of SectionVIII.
§ 193.329 Combustion engines and tur-bines.
Combustion engines and gas tur-bines must be installed i accordancewith NFPA-37.
Subpart E-Impoundmnont Design and Capaciti
§ 193.401 Scope.This subpart prescribes require-
ments for the design and constructionof new impounding systems or anyportion of an existing impoundingsystem that is replaced, relocated, orsignificantly altered.
§ 193.403 Impoundment required.(a) An impounding system must, be'
provided for the following componentsand areas to contain a potential spillof LNG or other flammable liquid:
(1) Storage tanks;
PROPOSED-RULES
(2) Transfer piping in excess of 4inches in diameter; and
(3) Cargo transfer systems.(b) Grading and drainage or an im-
pounding system must be provided toinsure that accidental spills or leaksfrom the following components andareas do not endanger critical compo-nents or adjoining property or enternavigable waterways:
(1) LIquefaction and other -processequipment;
(2) Vaporization equipment;(3) Transfer piping four inches or
less in diameter ;(4) Parking areas for tank cars or
tank trucks; and(5) Areas for loading, unloading, or
storing portable containers and dewarvessels.
(c) Impounding systems must be de-signed and constructed in accordancewith this subpart except that im-pounding systems intended for con-tainment of flammable liquids otherthan LNG must conform to NFPA 30.
§ 193.405. General design characteristics.(a) An impounding system must
have a configuration or design which,to the maximum extent possible, willprevent liquid from escaping inpound-ment under' the worpt predicatablespill condition by leakage, splash fromcollapse of a structure or part thereof,momentum and low surface friction,foaming, failure of pressurized piping,and accidental pumping.
(b) The basic form of an impounding.system may be. excavation, a naturalgeological formation, 'manufactureddiking, such as berms or walls, or anycombination ,thereof.
193.407 Classes of impounding systems.(a) For the purpose of this part, im-
pounding systems are classified as fol-lows:
Class 1. A system which surrounds thecomponent served with the ihner surface ofthe dike constructed against the outer sur-face of the component.
Class 2. A system which surrounds thecomponent or area served with the dike lo-cated a distance away from the componentor at the periphery of the area.
Class 3. A system which conducts a spillby dikes and floors to a remote impoundingspace which does not surround the compo-nent or area served.
(b) In the case of an impoundingsystem consisting of a combination ofclasses, requirements of this part re-garding a single class apply accordingto the percentage of Impoundmentprovided by each class.
§ 193.409 Structtral requirements.(a) Subject to paragraph (b) of this
section, the structural parts of an im-pounding system must be designed andconstructed to prevent impairment ofthe system's performance reliability
and structural integrity as a result ofthe following:
(1) The imposed loading from-(i) Full hydrostatic head of Im-
pounded LNG;(i) Hydrodynamic action, Including
thb effect of any material injected Intothe system for spill control;
(1i1) The impingement of the trajec-tory of an LNG Jet discharged at anypredictable angle; and
(iv) Anticipated hydrallc forces froma rupture in the component or Itenserved, assuming that the dischargepressure equals design pressure.
(2) The erosive action form a spill,including jetting of spilling LNG, andany other anticipated erosive actionincluding surface water runoff, ice for-mation, dislodgement of Ice formation,and snow removal.
(3) The effect of the temperature,any thermal gradient, and any otheranticipated degradation resulting fromsudden or localized contact with LNG.
'(4) Exposure to fire from impoundedLNG or from sources other than rn-.pounded LNG.
(5) If' applicable, the potentialimpact and loading on the dike dueto-
(I) Collapse of .the component oritem served or adjacent components;and
(ii) If the LNG facility adjoins theright-of-way of any highway or rail-road, collision by or explosion of aland vehicle that could cause the mostsevere loading.
(b) For spills from LNG storagetanks, imposed loading and surgingflow characteristics must be based ona sudden total release of the full con-tents. of the tank. For, other spills, im-posed loading and surging flow charac-teristics from the volume to be im-pounded must be based on the Im-pounding capacities and conditions ofdischarge set forth in this subpart.
C) If an LNG storage tank Is locatedwithin a horizontal distance of 6,100meters (20,000 feet) from the nearestpoint of the nearest runway.of any air-port, a Class 1 impounding systemmust b0e used which is designed to,withstand collision by, or explosion of,the heaviest aircraft which can takeoff or land at the airport.
§ 193.410 Coatings and coverings.'Insulation, sealants, or other coat-ings and coverings which are part ofan impounding system-
(a) Must be self-extinguishing whenexposed to fire in an installed condi-tion;
(b) Must withstand exposure to firefrom sources other than impoundedLNG for a period of time until fireprotective or fire extinguishing actionis taken;
(c) Where such materials might boiconsumed during combustion of the
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 44, NO. 28-THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1979
PROPOSED RULES
impounded LNG, must not releasetoxic fumes that would be hazardousto personnel; and
(d) Must withstand thermal shockfrom LNG.
..§ 193.413 Floors.Floors of Class 2 and Class 3 im-
pounding systems must-(a) Slope away from the component
or item impounded and to a sumpbasin installed under § 193.427;
(b) Slope to the extent feasible awayfrom the nearest adjacent critical com-ponent;
(c) Drain surface waters from thefloor at rates based on predictablerainfall and other water sources; and
(d) Contain channels designed tominimize the wetted floor area.
§ 193.415 Dikes; general.
(a) Penetrations in dikes to accom-modate 'piping or any other purposeare prohibited.. (b) An outer wall of a component
served by an impounding system maynot be used as a dike except for a con-crete wall designed to comply with therequirements of § 193.409(c).
§ 193.417 Vapor barriers.If vapor barriers are installed to
meet the requirements of § 193.109,they must be designed and construct-ed-
(a) As a critical component; and(b) To entrain cold vapor.
§ 193.419 Dike dimensions.In addition to dike dimensions
needed to comply with other require-ments of this subpart, to minirize thepossibility that a trajectory of acciden-tally discharged liquid would pass overthe top of a dike; the distance fromthe inner wall of the vessel served tothe closest inside- edge of the top ofthe dike must at least equal the verti-cal distance from the maximum liquidlevel in the vessel served to the insideedge of the top of the dike.
§ 193.421 Covered systems.(a) A covered impounding system is
prohibited unless it is-(l) Sealed from the atmosphere and
filled with an inert gas; or -
(2) Permanently interconnected withthe vapor space of the uomponentserved.
(b)-Membraneous covering is prohib-ited in a covered system.
(c) For systems to which paragraph(a)(2) of this section does not apply,instrumentation and controls must beprovided to-
(l) Maintain pressures -at a safelevel; and -:(2) Monitor gas concentrations.
(d) Dikes must have adequate struc-tural strength to assure-that they canwithstand impact from a collapsed
cover and all anticipated conditionswhich could cause a failure of the Im-pounding space cover.
§ 193.423 Gas leak detection.Appropriate areas within an Im-
pounding system where collection orpassage of LNG or gas could be ex-pected must be equipped with sensingand warning devices to continuouslymonitor for the presence of LNG orgas and to warn before gas concentra-tion levels exceed 25 percent of thelower flammable limit.
§ 193.427 Sump bains.Except for Class I impounding sys-
tems. a sump basin must be located ineach impounding system for collectionof water and small spills of LNG.
§ 193.431 Water removal.(a) Except for Class 1 systems, im-
pounding systems must have sumppumps and piping running over thedike to remove water collecting in thesump basin.. (b) The water removal system musthave adequate capacity to removewater at rates which equal the maxi-mum predictable collection rate from.rainfall and other natural causes.
(c) Sump pumps for water removalmust-
(1) Automatically operate as neces-sary to keep the impounding space asdry as practical; and
(2) Have controls for operation andredundant automatic shutdown con-trols to prevent operation when LNGis present.
§193.433 Shared impoundment.When an impounding system serves
more than one component, tank car,tank truck, or dewar vessels, a meansmust be provided to prevent low tem-perature of fire resulting from leakagefrom any one of the Items served caus-ing any other Item to leak. If§193.109(a) applies, the means mustnot result in a vapor dispersion dis-tance which exceeds the exclusionzone.
§ 193.435 Piping.Piping and piping supports located
within an impounding system must beprotected against failure due to fire,contact with spilled liquids, or predict-able' impact by falling objects thatcould result in or worsen an emergen-cy.
§ 193.437 Impoundment capacity; general.(a) For covered Impounding systems,
space between the outer wall of thecomponent served and the dike maynot be used to provide the capacity re-quired by this subpart which exceedsthe component's maximum liquid ca-pacity unless the Imponding space andthe component are covered by a roof
that is separate and independent fromthe component.
(b) In addition to capacities other-wise required by this subpart, an im-pounding system must have sufficientvolumetric capacity to tDiovide for-
(1) Displacement by the componenttank car, tank truck, or dewar vesselserved; and
(2) Where applicable, displacementwhich could occur when a higher den-sity substance than the liquid to beimpounded enters the system, consid-ering all relevant means of assuringcapacity.
§ 193.439 Impoundment capacity, LNGstorage tanks.
Each impounding system serving anLNG storage tank must have a muri-mum volumetric liquid impoundmentcapacity as follows.
Number of C1az or type of System capacity intanks In system percent of INGsystem tanks" maximum
liquid capacty
I class I and 110 percent.covered system.
Clas 2 and 3- 150 percenLMorethanl Ch 2and3. 100 percent of all
tanks or 150percent oflargest tank.whichever Isgreater.
§193.441 Impoundment capacity; equip-ment and transfer facilities.
Each impounding system serving acomponent under § 193.403(a)(2) and(3) afd. when applicable, under§ 193.403(b)(l)-(3), must have a mini-mum volumetric liquid impoundmentcapacity equal to the sum of-
(a) 100 percent 'of the volume ofliquid that could be contained in thecomponent and, where applicable,tank car of tank truck served; and
(b) The maximum volume of liquidwhich could discharge into the im-pounding space from any single failureof equipment or piping during thetime period necessary for spill detec-tion, instrument response, and se-quended shutdown by the automaticshutdown system under § 193.605.
If an impounding system is used toserve an area . listed under§§ 193.403(b)(4) or (5), it must have amumimum volumetric liquid impound-ment capacity which complies withthe requirements or § 193.439, assum-ing each tank car, tank truck, portablecontainer, or dewar vessel to be a stor-age tank.
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8175 ,
PROPOSED RULES
§ 193.445 Flow capacity in Class 3 im-pounding systems.
(a) Each spill conducting space in aClass 3 impounding system must haveadequate flow capacity for the follow-ing volumes and flow rates of a poten-tial spill at all points along its tra-verse:
(1) For storage tanks, the worst com-bination of flow rates and 150 perc~ntof the volume from a sudden and com-plete release of the largest abovegrade maximum liquid capacity of anysingle tank served, plus the dischargefrom all transfer piping which couldbe loading that tank,- assuming theloading transfer piping is dischargingat maximum potential open end capac-ity during the time period set forth by.§ 193.441(b), and less-any upstream orintermediate capacity.
(2) For components listed under§ 193.403(a)(2) and (3), and, when ap-plicable, under §§ 193.403(b)(1)-(3), theworst combination of flow rates andvolumes determined in accordancewith § 193.441, less any upstream or in-termediate impounding capacity.
(3) For areas listed under§ 193.403(b)(4) and (5), the require-ments of paragraph (a)(1) of this sec-tion apply, assuming each tank car,tank truck, portable container, ordewar vessel to-be a storage tank.
(b) When intermediate impoundingspace is used to provide the capacity ofconducting space required by this sec-tion, the capacity of the intermediatespace must be based on the combina-tion of applicable volumes and flowrates set forth in paragraph (a) of thissection to assure adequate capacity ofthe conducting space.
§ 193.447 Sump basin capacity.(a) Sump basins in impounding sys-
tems for LNG storage tanks must haveamumimum volumetric capacity equalto the discharge from relevant con-nected sections of transfer pipingwhich can operate simultaneously, as-suming the transfer piping dischargesat maximum potential open end capac-ity for the time period necessary forspill detection, instrument response,and sequenced shutdown by the auto-matic shutdown system.
(b) Sump basins in impounding sys-tems for • components listed in§§ 193.403(a)(2) and (3) and, if applica-ble, §§ 193.403(b)(1)-(3), must have aminimum volumetric capacity equal tohalf of the lesser of-
(1) The volume of liquid which coulddischarge into the impounding systemfrom any single failure of equipmentor piping during the time period neces-sary for spill detection, instrument re-sponse, and sequenced shutdown bythe automatic shutdown system; or
(2) The volume of liquid that couldbe contained in the component served.
(c) Sump basins in impounding sys-tems for areas listed in §§ 193.403(b)(4)and (5) and must have a minimumvolumetric liquid capacity whichmeets the requirements of paragragh(a) of this section, assuming each tankcar, tank truck, portable container, ordewar vessel to be a storage tank.
Subpart F-LNG Storage Tanks
§ 193.501 Scope.I This subpart prescribes require-ments for the design and constructionof new LNG storage tanks or any por-tion of an existing 1NG storage tank-that is replaced, relocated, or signifi-cantly altered.
§ 193.503 General.(a) LNG storage tanks must comply
with the requirements of this subpartand the other applicable requirementsof this part.
(b) A flammable nonmetallic mem-,brane liner may not be used as an.inner container in a storage tank.
§ 193.505 Loading forces.Each part of an LNG storage tank
must be designed to withstand anypredictable, combination of forceswhich would result' in the higheststress to the part, including the follow-ing:
(a) Internal design pressure deter-mined under § 193.513.
(b) External design pressure deter-mined under § 193.515.
(c) Weight of the structure.(d) Weight of LNG to be stored de-
termined at" its highest density and atthe level creating the highest stress.
(e) Loads due to testing required by.§ 193.1033.
(f) Nonuniform reaction forces onthe foundation due to predictable set-tling and other movement.
(g) Superimposed forces from piping,stairways, and other connected appur-tenances.
(h) Predictable snow and ice loads.(i) The loading of internal insulation
on-the inner container and 6uter shelldue to weight and movement of thecontainer and shell over the design lifeof the insulation.
(j) In the case of vacuum insulation,the forces due to the vacuum.
(k) In the case of a positive pressurepurge, the forces due to the maximum
- positive pressure of the purge gas.
§ 193.507 Stratification.t LNG storage tanks with a capacityof 5,000 barrels, or more must beequipped with means to mitigate a po-tential for rollover and overpressureby:
(a) Selective filling at the top andbottom of the tank;
(b) Circulating liquid from thebottom to the.top of the same tank; or
(c) Transferring liquid selectivelyfrom the bottom of the tank to thebottom or top of any adjacent storagetank.
9193.509 Movement and stress.(a) Each operator shall determineJ
for normal operations of each LNGstorage tank-
(1) The amount and pattern of pre-dictable movement of components, in-cluding transfer piping, and the foun-dation, which could result from ther-mal cycling, loading forces, and ambi-ent air changes; and
(2) For a storage tank with an innercontainer, the predictable movementof the inner container and the outershell in relation to each other. '
(b) Storage tanks must be designedto provide adequate allowance forstress due to movement determinedunder paragraph (a) of this section, in-cluding provisions that-
(1) Backfill does not cause excessivestresses on the tank structure due toexpansion of the storage tank duringwarmup;
(2) Insulation does not settle to adamaging degree or unsafe conditionduring thermal cyclying; and
(3) Expansion bends and other ex-pansion or contraction devices are ade-quate to prevent excessive stress ontank penetrations, especially duringcooldown from ambient temperatures.
§ 193.511 Penetrations.(a) All penetrations in an LNG stor
age tank must be located on the top ofthe tank.
(b) Penetrations must be designed toensure that any failure of the pene-trating component does not result inhazardous structural damage to thetank.
§193.513 Internal design pressure.(a) Each operator shall determine
the internal design pressure at the topof each LNG storage tank.
(b) The internal design pressure of astorage tank may not be lower thanthe highest vapor pressure resultingfrom each of the following events orcombination thereof that predictablymight occur:
(1), Filling the tank with LNG in-cluding effects of increased vaporiza-tion rate due to superheat and sensibleheat of the added liquid;
(2) Rollover resulting from addingLNG which has a different densitythan liquid already in the tank, orfrom weathering in storage;
-(3) Fall in barometric pressure, usingthe worst combination of amount bffall and rate of fall which might credi-bly occur;
(4) Loss of effective insulation that.may result from an adjacent fire, leakof liquid into the intertank space, orother predictable accident; and
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 44,. NO. 28--THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1979
§ 193.515- External design pressure.(a) Each operator shall determine
the external design pressure at the topof each LNG storage tank.
(b)- The external design pressuremay not be higher than the lowestvapoi pressure resulting from each ofthe following events or combinationsthereof that predictably might occur:
(1) Withdrawing liquid from thetank;
(2) Withdrawing gas from the tank;(3) Adding subcooled LNG to the
tank; and(4) Rise in barometric pressure,
based on the worst combination ofamount of rise and rate of rise whichpredictably might occur.
§ 193.519 Internal temperature.LNG storage tanks must be designed
to withstand the minimum tempera-ture of the LNG Liquid to be stored atthe external design pressure deter-mined in § 193.515(b).
§ 193.521 Foundation.(a) Each .LNG storage tank must
have a stable foundation designed inaccordande with generally acceptedstructural engineering practices. Thedesign must. take into account theforces which may exist due to the dif--ference in density between the con-tained liquid and the displacedground.
(b) Each foundation must supportdesign loading forces without detri-mental settling that could impair thestructural integrity of the tank.
(c) When the location of an LNGstorage tank foundation is subject toflooding or is near the natural watertable, each operator shall determinethe weight of the foundation and theempty tank and shall anchor the tankso that the buoyant water forces willnot float the tank or impair the struc-tural integrity of the tank.
§ 193.523 Frost heave.
If the protection provided for LNGstorage tank foundations from frostheave under § 193.319(a) includes heat-ing the foundation area-
(a) An instrumentation and alarmsystem must be provided to warn ofmalfunction of the heating system;and
(b) A means tci correct the malfunc-tion must be provided.
§ 193.525 Insulation.(a) Insulation on the outside of an
LNG storage tank may not be used tomaintain stored LNG at an operatingtemperature.
(b) Insulation between an inner con-tainer and the outer shell of an LNGstorage tank must-
(1) Be compatible with the containedliquid and its vapor.
(2) In its Installed condition, be self* extinguishing; and
(3) Not significantly lose insulatingproperties by melting, settling, orother means if a fire occurs outsidethe outer shell.
§193.527 Instrumentation for LNG stor-age tanks.
(a) Each storage tank must beequipped with redundant sensing de-vices and personnel warning devices,as prescribed, which operate continu-ously while the tank Is in operation toassure that each of the following con-ditions Is not a potential hazard to thestructural integrity or safety of thetank.
Condition Instrumentation
(1) Amount of Liquid level gauges andliquid In the recorders with top filltank. alarms and a separate
overfill alarmu(2) Vapor pressure Pressure gauges and recorders
within the tank. with high and low pressurealarms.
(3) Temperatures Temperature Indicating andat representative recording devices withcritical points In alarm.the foundation.
(4) Temperature of Temperature recorders.contained liquidat variousvertical Intervals.
(5) Excessive Thermocouples located atthermal stress In representative critical pointstank structure. with recorders.
(6) Excessive Linear and rotationalrelative movement indicators locatedmovement of between Inner container andInner container outer shell with recorders.and outer shell.
(b) Each storage tank must be de-signed as appropriate to provide forcompliance with the Inspection re-quirements of this part.
§ 193.529 Metal storage tanks.(a) Metal storage tanks with internal
design pressures of not more than 15psig must be designed and constructedin accordance with API Standard 620and, where applicable, Appendix Q ofthat standard.
(b) Metal storage tanks with internaldesign pressures above 15 psig must bedesigned in accordance with the appli-cable division of Section VIII of theASME Boiler and Pressure VesselCode.
§ 193.531 Concrete storage tanks.
Concrete storage tanks must be de-signed and constructed in accordancewith Section 42 of NFPA 59A.
§ 193.533 Thermal barriers.Thermal barriers must be provided
between piping and an outer shellwhen necessary to prevent the outershell from being exposed to tempera-
tures lower than the design tempera-ture.
§ 193.535 Support system.(a) Saddles and legs must be de-
signed In accordance with generallyaccepted structural enginering prac-tices, taking into account loads duringtransportation, erection loads, andthermal loads.
(b) Storage tank stress concentra-tions from support systems must beminimized by distribution of loadsusing pads, load rings, or other means.
(c) For a storage tank with an innercontainer, support systems must be de-signed to-
(1) Minimize thermal stresses im-parted to the inner container andouter shell from expansion and con-traction; and
(2) Sustain the maximum applicableloading from shipping an operatingconditions.
(d) The bottom of a storage tankwith a capacity of more than 15,000barrels or Its foundation may not beInstalled over an air space.
§ 193.537 Internal piping.(a) Piping connected to an inner con-
tainer that is located in the space be-tween the inner container and outershell must be designed for not lessthan the pressure rating of the innercontainer. The piping must contain ex-pansion loops where necessary to pro-tect against thermal and othersecond-ary streeses created by operation ofthe tank. Bellows may not be usedwithin the space between the innercontainer and outer shell.
(b) Storage tanks with a design pres-sure above 15 psig must be equippedwith interil excess flow valves.
§ 193.539 Marking.(a) Each operator shall install and
maintain a name plate in an accessibleplace on each storage tank and mark itin accordance with the applicable codeor standard incorporated by referencein § 193.529 or § 193.531.
(b) Each penetration in a storagetank must be marked indicating thefunction of the penetration.
(c) Marking required by this sectionmust not be obscured by frosting.
Supbpart G-Design of Transfer Systems
§ 193.601 Scope.This subpart prescribes require-
.ments for the design and installationof new transfer systems or any portionof an existing transfer system,hat isreplaced, relocated, or significantly al-tered.
§ 193.603 General.(a) Transfer systems must comply
with the requirments of this subpart
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8177
8178and other applicable requirements ofthis part.
(b) The design of transfer systemsmust provide for stress due to the fre-quency of thermal, cycling and inter-mittent use to which the transfersystem may be subjected."(c) Slip type expansion joints are-
prohibited and- packing-type jointsmay not be used at cryogenic tempera-tures.
(d) A suitable means must be pro-vided to precool the piping in amanner that prevents excessive stressbefore transferring cold fluids.
(e) Stresses due to thermal and hy-draulic shock in the piping systemmust be determined and accommodat-ed by design to avoid damage topiping.
§ 193.605 Shut down control system.Each transfer system" must be
equipped with a shutdown controlsystem. The control system must auto-matically actuate the shutdown of ap-propriate valves and pumping equip-ment and provide pressure relief asnecessary for trapped fluids when anyof the following occurs:
(a) Transfer piping failure;(b) Liquid in the receiving vessel
reaches design maximum liquid level;(c) Pressure outside the limits of the
maximum and minimum allowable op-erating pressure;
(d) Temperature outside .the rangedetermined under § 193.205;
(e) Gas concentrations in the atmos-phere exceeding 25 percent of thelower flammable limit; or
(f) A sudden flow change; pressureloss, or other condition indicating anaccidental spill or potential spill.
§ 193.607 Backflow.(a) Each transfer system must oper-
ate with a means to-(1) Prevent backflow of liquid from a
receiving container, tank car, or tanktruck from causing a hazardous condi-tion; dnd
(2) Maintain one-way flow wherenecessary for the integrity, or safe op-eration of the LNG facility.
(b) The means provided. under para-graph (a)(1) of this section must be lo-cated as close as practical to the pointof connection of the transfer systemand the receiving container, tank car,or tank truck.
§ 193.609 Overfilling.Each transfer system 'must be
equipped with sensing devices and ameans which alerts personnel whenthe amount of liquid in a receivingvessel approaches the design maxi- -
mum liquid level. The alert must begiven in time for the safe terminationof the transfer.
PROPOSED RULES
§ 193.611 Cargo transfer systems.(a) Each cargo transfer sytem must
have-(1) A means of safely depressuizing
and venting that system before discon-nection;
(2) A means to provide for safe vapordisplacement during transfer;
(3) Transfer piping,-pumps, and com-pressors located or protected by suit-able -barriers so that they are safefrom damage by tank car or tanktruck movements;
(4) A signal light at each control lo-cation of remotely located pumps orcompressors used for transfer whichindicates whether the pump or com-press6r is idle or in operation; and,
(5) A means of communication be-tween loading or unloading areas andother areas in which personnel are as-sociated with the transfer operations.
(b) Hoses and arms must be designedas follows- '-
(1) The design must accommodateoperating pressures and temperaturesencountered during the transfers;
(2) Hoses must have a bursting pres-sure of not less than five times the op-erating pressure.
(3) Arms must meet the require-ments of ANSI B31.3.
(4) Adequate support must be pro-vided, taking into account ice forma-tion.
(5) Couplings must be designed forthe frequency of any coupling or un-coupling.
§ 193.615 Cargo transfer area.The transfer area of a cargo transfer
system must be designed-(a) To accommodate tank cars and
tank trucks without excessive maneu-vering;, and,
(b) To permit tank trucks to enter orexit the transfer area without backing.
§ 193.617 Shutoff valves.(a) Shutoff. valves on transfer sys-
tems must be located:(1) At the inlet of each vaporizer;(2) On return lines and on manifolds
used in cargo transfer;(3) At the connection of a transfer
system with a pipeline; and(4) To provide for proper operation
and maintenance of each transfersystem.
(b) Transfer system shutoff valvesmust be power and manually operableat the valve and power operable at a,remote location at least 50 ,feet fromthe valve.,
(c) In addition to valves required byparagraph (a)(2) of this section, trans-fer piping supplying a cargo transfersystem must be equipped with a shut-off valve for each, liquid and eachvapor line, including a common line tomultiple transfer areas, where it can
'be operated readily during a controlla-ble emergency.
(d) Shutoff valves must be designedand installed so that excessive strainin the piping system does not exces-sively stress the shutoff seats of' thevalves.
Subpart H-Vaporization Equipment
§ 193.701 Scope.This subpart prescrlbes require-
ments for the design, fabrication, andinstallation of new vaporization equip-ment or any portion of existing vapori-zation equipment that Is replaced, re-located, or significantly altered.
§ 193.703 General.Vaporizers must comply with the re-
quirements of this subpart and theother applicable requirements of thispart.
§ 193.705 Vaporizer design.(a) Vaporizers must be designed and
fabricated in accordance with applica-ble provisions of Section VIII, Division1 of the ASME Boiler and PressureVessel Code.
(b) Each vaporizer must be designedfor a maximum allowable operatingpressure at least equal to the maxi-mum discharge pressure of the pumpor pressurized container system sup-plying it, whichever is greater.
193.711 Operational control.(a) Vaporizers must be equipped
with devices which monitor the inletand outlet temperature and pressureof the LNG, natural gas, and heatingmedium fluids.
(b) Manifolded vaporizers must beequipped with:
(1) Two inlet valves in series to pre-vent LNG from entering an Idle vapor-izer; and
(2) A means to remove LNG or gaswhich accumulates between thevalves.
§ 193.713 Shutoff valves.(a) Each shutoff valve located on
transfer piping supplying LNG to a va-i orlzer must meet the following applicable requirements-
(1) A shutoff valve must be locatedat a sufficient distance from the va-porizer to minimize potential fordamage from explosion or fire at thevaporizer.
(2) If the vaporizer Is installed in abuilding, the valve must be locatedoutside the building.
(b) A shutoff valVe must be locatedon each outlet of a vaporizer.
(c) For vaporizers designed to use aflammable intermediate fluid, a shut-off valve must be located on the Inletand outlet line of the intermediatefluid piping system where they will beoperable during a controllable emer-gency involving the vaporizer.
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 44, NO. 28-THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1979.
PROPOSED RULES
§ 193.715 Relief devices.The capacity of pressure relief de-
'vices required for vaporizers by§ 193.905(b) is gcverned by the follow-ing:
(a) For heated vaporizers, the capac-ity must be at least 110 percent ofrated natural gas flow capacity with-out allowing the pressure to rise morethan 10 percent above the vaporizermaximum allowable operating pres-sure.
(b) :For ambient vaporizers, the ca-pacity must be at least 150 percent ofrated natural gas flow capacity with-out allowing thd pressure to rise morethan 10 percent above the vaporizermaximum allowable operating pres-sure.
§ 193.719 Combustion air intakes.(a) Combustion air intakes to vapor-
izers nust be equipped with sensing* devices to detect the induction of a
flammable vapor.(b) If a heated vaporizer or vaporizer
heater is located in a building, thecombustion air intake must be locatedoutside the building.
Subpart 1--Liquefaction Equipment
§ 193.801 -Scope of part.This subpart prescribes require-
ments for the design of new naturalgas liquefaction equipment or any por-tiofi of existing natural gas liquefac-tion equipment that is replaced, relo-
- cated, or significantly altered.
§ 193.803 GeneralLiquefaction equipment must
comply with the requirements of thissubpart and the other applicable re-quirements of this part.
§ 193.805 Control of incoming gas.(a) A shut-off valve must be located
on piping delivering natural gas toeach liquefaction system; and
(b) The valve must be actuated auto-matically by -a shut-down controlsystem when any of the followingoccurs:
(1) Gas concentrations in the area ofliquefaction equipment exceed'40 per-cent of the lower flammable limit; or
(2) Temperatures exceed the limitsdetermined under § 193.205.
§ 193.807 Contaminants.Each operator shall provide a means
of monitoring the incoming gas to liq-uefaction equipment to ensure thatdetrimental contaminants are re-moved.
§ 193.809 Backflow.Each multiple parallel piping system
connected to liquefaction equipmentmust have devices to prevent backflowfrom causing a hazardous condition.
§ 193.811 Cold boxes.Each cold box in liquefaction equip-
ment must be equipped with a meansof:
(a) Detecting a concentration of nat-ural gas in the Insulation space; and
(b) Introducing a purge gas toreduce the possibility of a gas in airconcentration between 25 percentlower flammable limit and 30 percentbyvolume.
§ 193.813 Air In gas.Where incoming gas to liquefaction
equipment contains air, each operatorshall provide a means of preventing aflammable mixture from occurringunder any operating condition.
§ 193.815 Equipment supports.Supports for liquefaction equipment
must comply with the requirements of§ 193.207.
Subpart J-Control Sysfems
§193.901 ScopeThis subpart prescribes require-
ments for the design and installationof new control systems or any portionof an existing control system that Isreplaced, relocated, or significantly al-tered.
§ 193.903 General.(a) Control systems must comply
with the requirements of this subpartand other applicable requirements ofthis part.
(b) Each control system must be ca-pable of performing Its design func-tion under normal operating condl-
- tions and in a controllable emergency.(c) Control systems must be designed
and installed in a manner to permitmaintenance, including Inzpection ortesting, in accordance with this part.
(d) Local, remote, and redundantsignal lines Installed for control sys-tems must be routed separately.
§ 193.905 Relief devices.(a) Each component containing a
hazardous fluid must be equipped witha system of automatic relief deviceswhich will release the contained fluidat a rate sufficient to prevent pres-sures from exceeding 110 percent ofthe maximum allowable operatingpressure. In addition, each LNG stor-age tank must be equipped with a re-dundant system of automatic relief de-vices. In establishing relief capacity,each operator shall consider trappingof fluid between valves; the maximumrates of bolloff and expansion of fluidwhich may occur during normal oper-ation, particularly cooldown: and con-trollable emergencies.
(b) In addition to the automaticrelief devices, a manual means must beprovided to . relieve pressure in anemergency.
8179(c) Relief devices must be Installed
in a manner to minimize the possibil-Ity that release of fluid could-
(1) Cause an emergency;, or(2) Worsen a controllable emergen-
cy.(d) A component In which internal
vacuum conditions can occur must beequipped with a system of relief de-vices or other control system to pre-vent development in the component ofa vacuum that might create a hazard-ous condition. LNG storage tanksmust be equipped with a redundantrelief system. Introduction of air orgas into a'component must not createa flammable mixture within the com-ponent.
(e) The means for adjusting the set-point pressure of all adjustable reliefdevices must be sealed.
(f) Relief devices which are installedto limit minimum or maximum pres-sure may not be used to handle bofloffand flash gases.
§ 193.907 Vents.
(a) Flammable fluids may not be re-lieved into the atmosphere of a build-ing or other confined space.
(b) Bofloff vents for flammablefluids may not draw in air during oper-ation.
§ 193.909 Sensing devices.
(a) Each operator shall determinethe appropriate location for and in-stall sensing devices as necessary to:--
(1) Monitor the operation of criticalcomponents to detect a malfunctionwhich could cause a hazardous condi-tion If permitted to continue; and
(2) Detect the presence of fire orcombustible gas In areas determined inaccordance with Section 500-4 ofNFPA 70 to have a potential for thepresence of flammable fluids.
(b) Buildings in which potentiallyhazardous quantities of flammablefluids are used or handled must becontinuously monitored by gas sensingdevices set to activate audible andvisual alarms in the building and atthe control center when the concen-tration of the fluid in air is not morethan 25 percent of the lower flamma-ble limit.
devices in the control center to warnof hazardous conditions detected byall sensing devices required by thispart. Warningsmust be given both au-dibly and visibly and must be designedto gain the attention of personnelWarnings must indicate the locationand nature of the existing or potentialhazard.
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 44, NO. 28-THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1979
8180
§ 193.915 Pump and compressor control.(a) Each pump and compressor for
flammable fluids must be equippedwith-
(1) A control system, operable local-ly and remotely, to shut down thepump or compressor in a controllableemergency;
(2) A signal light at the pump orcompressor and the remote control lo-cation which indicates whether thepump or compressor is in operation oroff;
(3) Adequate, valving to insure thatthe pump or compressor can be isolat-ed for maintenance; and
(4) A check valve on each dischargeline where pumps or compressors oper-ate in parallel.
(b) Pumps or compressors in a cargotransfer system must have controls atthe loading or unloading area and atthe pump or compressor site.
§ 193.917 Shutoff valves.Each shutoff valve or combination
of valves must-(a) Have a failsafe design;(b) Operate to stop fluid flow which
would endanger the operational integ-rity of plant equipment; and
(c) Close at a rate to avoid fluidhammer which would endanger theoperational integrity of a critical com-ponent.
§ 193.919 Shutdown control systems.(a) Each critical component other
than a control center must beequipped with an automatic shutdowncontrol system. The control systemmust automatically actuate the shut-down of the ,critical component -whenany of the following occurs:
(1) Temperatures in the area of thecomponent exceed the limits deter-mined under § 193.205;
(2) Relief valves open;(3) Gas concentrations in the area of
the comporient exceed 25 percent of'the lower flammable limit; and
(4) Failure of the component.(b) Except. for critical components
other than the control center that aredesigned to operate unattended, a rea-sonable delay may be programpned inautomatic shutdown .control systemsrequired by this part between warningand automated shutdown to providefor manual response.
(c) Each LNG facility must have ashutdown control system to safelyshut down all operations of the facili-ty. The system must be operable at-
(1) The control center; and(2) In the case of a facility where
critical components other than thecontrol center are designed to operateunattended, at the site of the criticalcomponents.
PROPOSED RULES
§ 193.921 Control center.(11) Each LNG facility must have a
control center from which operationsand warning devices are monitored asrequired by this part. A control centermust have the following capabilities
.and characteristics-(a) It must be located apart or pro-
tected from other critical componentsso that it is operational during a con-trollable emergency.
(b) Each remotely actuated controlsystem and each automatic shutdowncontrol system required by this partmust. be operable from the controlcenter.
(c) Each control center must havepersonnel in continuous attendancewhile any of the critical componentsunder its control are in operation,unless the control is being performedfrom another control center which haspersonnel in continuous attendance.
(d) If more than one control centeris located at a facility, each controlcenter must have more than onemeans of communication with eachother center.
(e) Each control center must have ameans of communicating a warning ofhazardous conditions to other loca-tions within the facility frequented bypersonnel.
§ 193.925 Failsafe control.Controlsystems for critical compo-
nents must have a failsafe design. Asafe cbndition must be maintaineduntil personnel take appropriateaction either to reactivate the compo-nent served or to prevent a hazardfrom occuring.
§ 193.927 Sources of power.(a) Eldctrical control systems, means
of communication, lighting, and firefighting systems must hae at leasttwo sources of power which functionso that failure of one source does notaffect the capability of the othersource.
(b) Where auxiliary generators areused as a second source of electricalpower-
(1) They must be located apart orprotected from critical components sothat they are not unusable during acontrollable emergency; and
(2) Fuel supply must be protectedfrom hazards.-
Subpart K-Construction
§ 193.1001 Scope.This subpart prescribes require-
ments for the construction or installa-tion of a new component or any por-tion of an existing component which isreplaced, relocated, or significantly al-tered.
§ 193.1002 Construction acceptance.No- person may place in service any
component until it passes all applica-ble Inspections and tests prescribed bythis subpart.
§ 193.1005 Procedures.(a) In performing a critical process,
an operator must follow comprehen-sive written specifications, procedures,and drawings, as appropriate, that areconsistent with this part, taking Intoaccount relevant mechanical, chemi-cal, and thermal properties, compo-nent functions, and environmental ef-fects that are Involved.
(b) All procedures must be substanti-ated by testing or experience to pro-duce a component that Is reliable andcomplies with the design and Installa-tion'requirements of this part.
§ 193.1009 Qualification of personnel.(a) Supervisors and other personnel •
utilized for critical processes musthave demonstrated their capability toperform satisfactorily the assignedfunction by-
(1) Appropriate training in themethods and equipment to be used orrelated experience and accomplish-ments; and
(2) Performance on any generally ac-cepted qualification test relevant tothe assigned function.
(b) Each operator must periodicallydetermine whether inspectors per-forming duties under § 193.1011 aresatisfactorily performing their as-signed function.
§ 193.1011 Inspection.(a) All construction, installation, and
testing activities must be inspected asfrequently as necessary in accordancewith a written plan to assure that-
(1) Activities are In compliance withall applicable requirements of this sub-part; and
(2),,Components comply with the ap-plicable material, design, fabrication,installation, and construction require-ments of this part.
(b) In addition to the requirementsof paragraph (a) of this section, theconstruction of concrete storage tanksmust be inspected in accordance withACI-311-75.
(c) Each operator shall inspect com-ponent materials to verify that theycomply with the design specificationsand are free of detrimental defects.
§193.1014 Inspection and testing methods,Except as otherwise provided by this
subpart, each operator shall deter-mine, commensurate with the hazardthat would result from failure of thecomponent concerned, the scope andnature of
(a) Inspections and tests required by,this subpart; and
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 44, NO. 28--THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1979
(b) Inspection and testing proce-dures required by § 193.1005.
§ 193.1015 Cleanup.After construction or installation, as
the case may be, all components mustbe cleaned to xemove all detrimental
-contaminants which could cause ahazard during operation, including thefollowing.
(a) All flux residues used in brazingor soldering must be removed from thejoints and the base metal to preventcorrosive solutions from being formed.
(b) All solvent type cleaners must betested to ensure that they will notdamage equipment integrity or reli-ability.
(c) Incompatible chemicals must beremoved.
(d) All contaminants must be cap-tured and disposed of in a mannerthat does not reduce the effectivenessof corrosion protection and monitoringprovided as required by this part.
§ 193.1D17 Pipe welding.(a) Each-operator shall provide the
following for welding on pressurizedpiping for 1MG and other flammablefluids:
(1) Welding procedures and weldersqualified in accordance with SectionIX of the ASME Boiler and PressureVessel Code or API 1104, as applicable.
(2) When welding materials whichare qualified by impact testing, weld-ing procedures selected to minimizeilegradation of low temperature prop-erties of the pipe material; and
(3) When welding attachment topipe, procedures and techniques select-ed to minimi the danger of burnthroughs and stress intensification.
(b) Oxygen fuel gas welding is notpermitted on flammable fluid pipingwith a service temperature below-20°C (-22°F).
(c) Marking materials for identifyingwelds on pipe must compatible withthe basic pipe-material.
(d) Surfaces of components that areless than 6.35 mm (0.25 in.) thick maynot be field die stamped.
(e) Where die stamping is permitted,any identification marks must bemade -with a die having blunt edges tominimize stress concentration.
(f) All contaminants must be cap-tured and disposed of in a mannerthat does not reduce the effectivenessof corrosion protection and monitoringprovided as required by this part.
§ 193.1019 Piping connections.(a) Piping more than two inches
nominal diameter must be joined bywelding, except that-
(l) Threaded or flanged connectionsmay be used where neceksary for spe-cial connections, including connectionsfor material transitions, instrumentconnections, testing, and maintenance;
/
(2) Copper piping In cryogenic serv- § 1931027 Nondestructive tests.ice may be joined by silver brazing;, (a) The following percentages ofand each day's circumferentlally welded
(3) Material transitions may be made pipe joints for flammable fluid piping,by any joining technique proven rell- selected at random, must be nondes-able under § 193.1005(b). tructively tested over the entire cir-
(b) If socket fittings are used, a cumference to indicated any defectsclearance of 1.6 to 3.2 mm (0.63 to which could adversely affect the integ-0.126 in.) between the pipe end and rity of the weld or pipe:the bottom of the socket recess mustbe provided and appropriate measure-ment reference marks made on the cal.
Wltye Comn- Other Test methodpiping for the purpose of inspection. Wend t e-t(c) Threaded Joints must be-(1) Free of stress from external load- Butt welds more 100 30 Radlographic or
ing; and than 2 Inche3 in ultrasonic.nominal size.(2) Seal welded, or sealed by other Butt wel 2 o 30 Radograph
means which have been tested and inches orless in ultrasonc. liquidproven reliable. im se. peetrant. or
(d) Compression type couplings magneticmust- PFlletandsocket 100 30 Llquldpenetrant
(1) Not be larger than 12.7 mm (0.50 welds. or magnet1cin.) nominal pipe size for service tem- patcl._peratures below -30"C (-22F); and
(2) Meet the requirements of Section "(b) Evaluation of weld tests and318 of ANSI B31.3. renair of defects must be in accord-
§ 193.1023 Retesting.After testing required by this sub-
part is completed on a component tocontain a hazardous fluid, the compo-nent must be retested:
Ca) Penetration welding other thantie-in welding is performed; or
(b) The structural integrity of thecomponent is disturbed.
§ 193.1025 Strength tests.(a) A strength test must be per-
formed on each piping system andcontainer to determine whether thecomponent is capable of performingits design function, taking into ac-count-
(1) The maximum allowable operat-ing pressure;
(2) The maximum weight of productwhich the component may contain orsupport;
(3) The weight of Ice and snowwhich may reasonably accumulate onthe component resulting from weatherand from conduction on cold fromLNG or refrigerants; and
(4) Other applicable environmentaldesign forces under Subpart B of thispart.
(b) For piping, the test required byparagraph (a) of this section must in-clude a pressure test conducted in ac-cordance with Section 337 of ANSIB31.3. except that test pressures forpiping that is a critical componentmust not be less than prescribed bySubsection 337.4.2 of ANSI B31.3.
(c) All shells and internal parts ofheat exchangers to which SectionVIII, Division 1 or Division 2 of theASME Boiler and Pressure VesselCode, applies must be pressure tested,inspected, and stamped In accordancetherewith.
ance with the requirements of ANSIB31.3 or API 1104, as applicable.
(c) Where longitudinally or spiralwelded pipe is used in transfer sys-tems, 100 percent of the seam weldmust be examined by radiographic orultrasonic inspection.
(d) The butt welds in metal shells ofstorage tanks must be radiographicallytested in accordance with Section0.7.6. API 620, Appendix Q, exceptthat for hydraulic load bearing shellswith curved surfaces that are subjectto cryogenic temperatures, 100 percentof both longitudinal (or meridional)and circumferential (or latitudinal)welds must be radiographically tested-
§ 193.1029 Leak tests. qCa) Each container , and piping
system must be initially tested toassure that the component will con-tain the product for which it is de-signed without leakage.
(b) Shop fabricated containers andall flammable fluid piping must beleak tested to a minimum of thedesign pressure after installation butbefore placing It in service. '
(c) For a storage tank with vacuuminsulation, the inner container, outershell, and all internal piping must betested for vacuum leaks in accordancewith an appropriate procedure.
§193.1031 Testing control systems.Each control system must be tested
before being placed in service to assurethat It has been installed properly andwill function as required by this part.
§ 193.1033 Storage tank tests.In addition to other applicable re-
quirements of this subpart, low pres-sure tanks for cryogenic flammablefluids must be tested in accordance
FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL 44, NO. 28-THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1979
8181PROPOSED RULES
8182
with Section Q.8 and Q.9 of API 620,Appendix Q, as applicable exceptthat-
(a) For the hydrostatic test, eachtank must be filled with water to itsmaximum liquid level, and reductionof this water level in accordance withSection Q.9.1 is prohibited;
(b) The hydrostatic and pneumaticpressure tests must be maintained fora period of 36 hours; and
(c) Reference measurements must bemade with appropriate precise instru-ments to assure that the tank is gastight and lateral and vertical move-ment of the storage tank does notexceed predetermined design toler-ances.§ 193.1037 Construction records.
For the service life of the compo-nent concerned, each operator shalretain appropriate records of the fol-lowing:
(a) Specifications, procedures, anddrawings prepared for critical process-es; and
(b) Results of tests and inspections -required by this subpart.
PIROPOSED RULES
APPENDIX A-NcoRPoRATIOx BY REFESENcE
L LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS AND ADDRESSES
A. American Concrete Institute (ACI),P.O. Box 19150, Redford Station, Detroit,Michigan 48219.
B. American Gas Association (AGA), 1515Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia22209.
C. American Petroleum Institute (API),2101 L Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.
D. American Society of Mechanical Engi-neers (AMSE), United Engineering Center,345 East 47th Street, New York, New York10017.
E. International Conference of BuildingOfficials, 5360 South Workman Mill Road,Whittier, California 90601.
F. National Fire Protection Association(NFPA), 470 Atlantic Avenue, Boston, Mas-sachusetts 02210.
II. DOCUMENTS INCORPO.ATED SY REFERENCE
A. American Concrete Institute (ACI)1. ACI Standard 311-75 "Recommended
Practice for Concrete Inspection," 1975 edi-tion (ANSI A188.2).
B. American Gas Association (AGA)1. American Gas Association Project IS-3-
1, LNG Safety -Program Interim Report ofPhase II work, July 1974.
2. Evaluation of LNG Vapor ControlMethods, October 1974.
C. American Petroleum Institute (API)1. API Standard 620 Recommended Rules
for Design and Construction of Large,Welded, Low Pressure Storage Tanks, sixthedition, July 15, 1977.. D. American Society of Mechanical Engi.neers (ASME)
1. ANSI B31.3 Chemical and Plant Petro-leum Refinery Piping, 1976 edition.
2. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel CodeSection 1, Power Boilers, 1977 edition,
3. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII Division 1, 'Pressure Vessels:Division 2, Alternative Rules, Pressure Ves-sels 1977 edition.
4. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section X, Welding and Brazing Qualifica-tions, 1977 edition.
E. International Conference of BuildingOfficials
1. UBC, Uniform Building Code, 1976 edi-tion.
F. National Fire Protection Association(NFPA)
1. NFPA No. 10, Portable Fire Extinguish-ers, 1978.
2. NFPA No. 37, Stationary CombustionEngineers and Gas Turbines, 1975.
3. NFPA No. 51B, Cutting and WeldingProcesses, 1977.
4. NFPA No. 59A, Storage and HandlingLIquifed Natural Gas, 1975.
