Local Government law; vacancies to removal

7/23/2019 Local Government law; vacancies to removal

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G.R. No. 96817 July 25, 1991

AGUSTIN B. DOCENA, petitioner,vs.THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAIGAN O!EASTERN SA"AR, GO#ERNOR LUTGARDOB. BARBO, #ICE GO#ERNOR CA"ILO A.

CA"EN!ORTE, BOARD "E"BERS "ARCOSALIDO, NONATO GERNA, IS"AEL $HO,"ARCELINO C. LIBANAN, NICOLASPI"ENTEL, GENEROSO %U &'( ATT%.SOCRATES B. ALAR,respondents.

Zaldy B. Docena for petitioner.

CRU), J.:p

Two persons are claiming the same position inthe Sangguniang Panlalawigan of EasternSamar by virtue of separate appointmentsthereto extended to them by the same authority.The first appointment was replaced by thesecond appointment, which was subsequentlywithdrawn to reinstate the first appointment, butthis was later itself recalled in favor of thesecond appointment. To add to the confusion,the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has joined thefray and taen it upon itself to decide who as

between the two claimants is entitled to theoffice.

The case arose when !uis ". #apito, who hadbeen elected to and was serving as a member ofthe Sangguniang Panlalawigan of EasternSamar $SPES% died in office and petitioner

&gustin ". 'ocena was appointed to succeedhim.

The appointment was issued on (ovember )*,)**+, 1by Secretary !uis T. Santos of the

'epartment of !ocal overnment and read infull as follows-

epublic of the Philippines

'epartment of !ocal overnment

P(## "ldg., E'S& #orner eliance St.,

/andaluyong, /etro /anila

0112#E 01 T3E SE#ET&4

(ovember )*, )**+

Sir-

Pursuant to the provisions of existinglaws, you are hereby appointed/E/"E 01 T3E S&(5(2&(P&(!&!&62&(, P072(#E 01

E&STE( S&/&.

"y virtue hereof, you may qualify andenter upon the performance of theduties of the office, furnishing this 0fficeand the #ivil Service #ommissioncopies of your oath of office.

7ery truly yours,

"y &uthority of the President

!52S T. S&(T0S

Secretary

/r. &5ST2( ". '0#E(&

Thru- The 3onorable overnor

Province of Eastern Samar

Pursuant thereto, the petitioner too his oath ofoffice before Speaer amon 7. /itra of the3ouse of epresentatives on (ovember 88,)**+,2and assumed office as member of theSPES on (ovember 89, )**+. *

The record does not show why, but on

(ovember 8:, )**+, private respondentSocrates ". &lar was appointed, also bySecretary !uis T. Santos, to the position alreadyoccupied by 'ocena. +The appointment read infull as follows-

epublic of the Philippines

'epartment of !ocal overnment

P(## "ldg., E'S& #orner eliance St.,

/andaluyong, /etro /anila

0112#E 01 T3E SE#ET&4

(ovember 8:, )**+

Sir-

Pursuant to the provisions of existinglaws, you are hereby appointed

/E/"E 01 T3E S&(5(2&(P&(!&!&62&(, P072(#E 01E&STE( S&/&.

"y virtue hereof, you may qualify andenter upon the performance of theduties of the office, furnishing this 0fficeand the #ivil Service #ommission withcopies of your oath of office.

7ery truly yours,

"y &uthority of the President


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!52S T. S&(T0S

Secretary

&tty. S0#&TES &!&

Thru- The 3onorable overnor

Eastern Samar

0n 'ecember );, **+, the SPES passedesolution (o. :


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0112#E 01 T3E SE#ET&4

/E/0&('5/

T0- /. &5ST2( '0#E(&

"orongan, Eastern Samar

S5">E#T- E#&!! 01 &PP02(T/E(TC

Please be informed that theappointment extended to you as/ember of the SangguniangPanlalawigan of Eastern Samar, last(ovember )*, )**+ is hereby recalledeffective immediately.

4ou are hereby directed to turnDover the

office to /r. Socrates &lar who wasappointed by this 'epartment on(ovember 8:, )**+, immediately uponreceipt hereof.

1or compliance.

cc- The 3onorable overnor

Province of Eastern Samar

/r. Socrates &lar

"orongan, Eastern Samar

'ocena then came to this #ourt in a petitionfor mandamusto compel the respondents torecogni=e and admit him as a lawfully appointedmember of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ofEastern Samar. 3e also sees to hold themofficially and personally liable in damages fortheir refusal to do so in spite of his clear title tothe disputed office.

Pending resolution of thicase, we issued atemporary restraining order on >anuary ),)**), enjoining both 'ocena and &lar fromassuming the office of member of theSangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar.

The pertinent legal provision is Section


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subsequent appointment of &lar had invalidatedthe earlier appointment of 'ocena.

2t is noteworthy that absolutely no reason wasgiven for the recall of 'ocenaBs appointment $orfor that matter, the recall of &larBs appointment%.2t appears that after appointing 'ocena and latertwice sustaining his title to the office, Secretary

Santos simply had a change of heart anddecided to award the position to &lar.

This is not the way things are done in ademocracy.

'ocenaBs appointment having been issued andaccepted earlier, and the petitioner havingalready assumed office, he could not thereafterbe just recalled and replaced to accommodate

&lar. The appointment was permanent in nature,and for the unexpired portion of the deceased

predecessorBs term. 'ocena had alreadyacquired security of tenure in the position andcould be removed therefrom only for any of thecauses, and conformably to the procedure,prescribed by the !ocal overnment#ode. 12These requirements could not becircumvented by the simple process of recallinghis appointment.

6hatever gave the SPES the impression thatthe questioned appointments were revocable atwill can only be left to conjectureA what is certain

is that it was not based on careful legal study.The Provincial ProsecutorBs opinion that theoffice had @become vested@ in &lar suffers fromthe same flaw and a lac of understanding of thenature of a public office. Political rather thanlegal considerations seem to have influencedthe action of the provincial government inrejecting the petitionerBs claim despite itsobvious merit.

The respondents also argue that the petitionershould have sought to enforce his claimed rightin a petition not formandamusbut for uo

warranto, as his purpose is to challenge &larBstitle to the disputed office. That is only secondaryin this case. The real purpose of the presentpetition is to compel the respondent SPES torecogni=e and admit 'ocena as a member ofthe body by virtue of a valid appointmentextended to him by the Secretary of !ocalovernment.

!andamus is employed to compel theperformance of a ministerial duty to which thepetitioner is entitled. 2n arguing that therecognition and admission of the petitioner is nota ministerial duty, the respondents are assertingthe discretion to review, and if they so decide,reject, the SecretaryBs appointment. They haveno such authority. 1aced with a strictly legalquestion, they had no right and competence toresolve it in their discretion. 6hat they shouldhave done was reserve their judgment on the

matter, leaving it to the courts of justice todecide which of the conflicting claims should beupheld. &s a local legislative body subject to thegeneral supervision of the President of thePhilippines, the SPES had no discretion to ruleon the validity of the decisions of the Secretaryof !ocal overnment acting as her alter ego.

Even assuming that the proper remedy is apetition for uo warranto,the #ourt may in itsown discretion consider the present petition a.such and deal with it accordingly. 6e find that as

a petition for uo warranto, it complies with theprescribed requirements, to wit, that it be filed ontime and by a proper party asserting title to theoffice also claimed by the respondent. &ctingthereon, we hold that 'ocena has proved hisright to the disputed office and could not belegally replaced by &lar.

The #ourt will mae no award of damages, therebeing no sufficient proof to overcome thepresumption that the respondents have acted ingood faith albeit erroneously. (evertheless, the

petitioner is entitled to the payment of thesalaries and other benefits appurtenant to the

office of a /ember of the SangguniangPanlalawigan of Eastern Samar, from the time ofhis assumption of office and until he is actuallyadmitted or reinstated.

63EE10E, the petition is &(TE'. Thepetitioner is 'E#!&E' the lawfully appointedmember of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of

Eastern Samar, which is hereby '2E#TE' toadmit or reinstate him as such. The temporaryrestraining order dated >anuary ), )**), is!21TE'. (o costs.

S0 0'EE'.


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epublic of the PhilippinesSUPRE"E COURT

/anila

E( "&(#

G.R. No. 1-9--5 J&'u&/y 1-, 199+

JUAN D. #ICTORIA, petitioner,vs.THE CO""ISSION ON ELECTIONS &'(JESUS JA"ES CALISIN, respondents.

"uan D. Victoria for himself and in his ownbehalf.

#he Solicitor $eneral for public respondent.

0UIASON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari

, under ule 9< ofthe evised ules of #ourt in relation to section8, &rticle 2F of the #onstitution, to set aside $a%the esolution of the #ommission on Elections$#0/E!E#% dated >anuary 88, )**, whichcertified respondent >ames #alisin as thehighest raning member of the SangguniangPanlalawigan of the Province of &lbay and $b% itsesolution dated 1ebruary 88, )**, whichdenied the motion for reconsideration ofpetitioner.

The issue in the case at bench is the raning ofthe members of the Sangguniang Panlalawiganof the Province of &lbay for purposes ofsuccession.

2n the /ay )), )**8 Elections, the followingcandidates from the first, second and third

districts of the Province of &lbay were electedand proclaimed as members of the SangguniangPanlalawigan, to wit-

12ST '2ST2#T

(ame (o. of 7otesarnered

). >esus >ames#alisin 8;,uly ;, )**? the trial court rendered itsdecision, upholding the appointment ofrespondent Palafox by respondent /ayor "arba.2t held-

5nder the facts andcircumstances as shown clearlyin the case, there is no doubtthe law that is applicable is subD

section @#@ of Section ?< ofepublic &ct (o. :)9+otherwise nown as the !ocalovernment #ode of )**)which provides-

2n case the permanent

vacancy is caused by aSanggunian /emberwho does not belong toany political party, the!ocal #hief Executiveshall upon therecommendation of theSanggunian concerned,appoint a qualifiedperson to fill thevacancy.

. . . 2nasmuch as the permanentvacancy is in the Sanggunian"ayan of San (icolas, 2locos(orte, it is the Sanggunianconcerned referred to in the lawwhich recommends theappointment to fill the vacancy. .. This being so, the !ocal #hiefExecutive referred to in subDsection @#@ of Section ?< ofepublic &ct (o. :)9+ is the/unicipal /ayor of San (icolas,

2locos (orte.

2t cannot be denied that theovernor has the authority toappoint a qualified person to fillthe vacancy in the Sanggunian"ayan caused by resignation ofa member thereof as that isvested in him or her by theProvision of (o. 8, Sec. ?< ofepublic &ct (o. :)9+. To themind of the court that authority

is not vested in him or herwhere the permanent vacancy is


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caused by a Sanggunian/ember who does not belong toany political party as thatauthority is specifically vestedupon the !ocal #hief Executiveupon recommendation of theSanggunian concerned as persubDsection @#@ of Section ?< ofthe same epublic &ct (o.:)9+. 5nder (o. 8 of Sec. ?'< @o/&l u/u( o/ =o/ &'o==' u'&:l :y o' 1 y&/ o/ @o/o= @/o'@', ' o 2 y&/ &=//>'< ''A

$b% Those removed from office as a result of anadministrative caseA

$c% Those convicted by final judgment forviolating the oath of allegiance to the epublicA

$d% Those with dual citi=enshipA

$e% 1ugitives from justice in criminal or nonDpolitical cases here or abroadA

$f% Permanent residents in a foreign country orthose who have acquired the right to resideabroad and continue to avail of the same rightafter the effectivity of this #odeA and

$g% The insane or feebleDminded. $Emphasissupplied%
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/oct2012/gr_195229_2012.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/oct2012/gr_195229_2012.html#fnt19


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Section )8 of the 0mnibus Election #odeprovides-

Sec. )8. Disualification. C &ny person who hasbeen declared by competent authority insane orincompetent, or has been ''( :y ='&l

?u(ol>'< @o/&lu/u(, shall be disqualified to be a candidateand to hold any office, unless he has been givenplenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate hereinprovided shall be deemed removed upon thedeclaration by competent authority that saidinsanity or incompetence had been removed orafter the expiration of a period of five years fromhis service of sentence, unless within the same

period he again becomes disqualified.$Emphasis supplied%

The grounds for disqualification for a petitionunder Section 9; of the 0mnibus Election #odeare specifically enumerated-

Sec. 9;. Disualifications. &ny candidate who,in an action or protest in which he is a party isdeclared by final decision by a competent courtguilty of, or found by the #ommission ofhaving & ' @o'y o/ o/ @&/&l

o'(/&o' o '=lu', '(u o/ o//u >o/ o/ u:l o==&l /=o/@'ol&( &'y o= So' 8-, 8*, 85,86 &'( 261, &/&, &'( ,u:&/&ly o'


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information in the certificate ofcandidacy-88nameA nicname or stage nameAgenderA ageA place of birthA political party thatnominated the candidateA civil statusAresidenceaddressA profession or occupationApost office address for election purposesA localityof which the candidate is a registered voterA andperiod of residence in the Philippines before )+/ay 8+)+. The candidate also certifies four

statements- a statement that the candidate is anatural born or naturali=ed 1ilipino citi=enA astatement that the candidate is not a permanentresident of, or immigrant to, a foreign countryA &&@' & &'((& l&o' o= u:l o== &'(@loy@' o=='(/ @&y &>l(, >' = o'=//( :y oul&/ lo'.

8. T (/>&o' o= /o ' &'ylo' =o/ &'y oul&/ l> o== o/ o: l( o u o==.

. T (u&l=&o' =o/ o== o/u:l @loy@' &'( =o/ / o=&'y o= /


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2n Lacuna v. -bes $Lacuna%,8ustice >.".!. eyes,explained the import of the accessory penaltyof /u&l &l (u&l=&o'

0n the first defense of respondentDappellee&bes, it must be remembered that appelleesconviction of a crime penali=ed with prisionmayor which carried the accessory penalties oftemporary absolute disqualification andperpetual special disqualification from the rightof suffrage $&rticle ?8, evised Penal #ode%Aand Section ** of the evised Election #odedisqualifies a person from voting if he had beensentenced by final judgment to suffer one yearor more of imprisonment.

The accessory penalty of temporary absolutedisqualification disqualifies the convict for publicoffice and for the right to vote, such

disqualification to last only during the term of thesentence $&rticle 8:, paragraph , U &rticle +,evised Penal #ode% that, in the case of &bes,would have expired on ) 0ctober )*9).

"ut this does not hold true with respect to theother accessory penalty of perpetual specialdisqualification for the exercise of the right ofsuffrage. This accessory penalty deprives theconvict of the right to vote or to be elected to orhold public office perpetually, as distinguishedfrom temporary special disqualification, which

lasts during the term of the sentence. &rticle 8,evised Penal #ode, provides-

&rt. 8. 5ffects of the penalties of perpetual ortemporary special disualification for thee+ercise of the right of suffrage. C Theperpetual or temporary special disqualificationfor the exercise of the right of suffrage shalldeprive the offender perpetually or during theterm of the sentence, according to the nature ofsaid penalty, of the right to vote in any popularelection for any public office or to be elected to

such office. /oreover, the offender shall not be

permitted to hold any public office during theperiod of disqualification.

The word @perpetually@ and the phrase @duringthe term of the sentence@ should be applieddistributively to their respective antecedentsAthus, the word @perpetually@ refers to theperpetual ind of special disqualification, whilethe phrase @during the term of the sentence@refers to the temporary special disqualification.The duration between the perpetual and thetemporary $both special% are necessarilydifferent because the provision, instead ofmerging their durations into one period, statesthat such duration is @according to the nature ofsaid penalty@ C which means according towhether the penalty is the perpetual or thetemporary special disqualification. $Emphasissupplied%

#learly, Lacuna instructs that the accessorypenalty of perpetual special disqualification@(/> o'> o= /o orto be elected to or hold public office

perpetually.

T &o/y '&ly o= /u&l &l(u&l=&o' &F == @@(&lyo' ?u(o' :o@='&l. The effectivity of this accessory penaltydoes not depend on the duration of the principalpenalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail

sentence or not. The last sentence of &rticle 8states that @the offender shall not be permitted tohold any public office during the period of hisIperpetual specialJ disqualification.@ 0nce the

judgment of conviction becomes final, it isimmediately executory. &ny public office that theconvict may be holding at the time of hisconviction becomes vacant upon finality of the

judgment, and o'> :o@ 'l u:l o==/u&lly. In the case of Lonzanida, hebecame ineligible perpetually to hold, or to

run for, any elective public office from thetime the judgment of conviction against him

became final. he judgment of convictionwas promulgated on !" July !""# andbecame final on !$ %ctober !""#, beforeLonzanida filed his certificate of candidacyon & 'ecember !""# . !(

P/u&l &l (u&l=&o' is a groundfor a petition under Section :; of the 0mnibusElection #ode because this accessory penalty isan 'l


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warranto proceeding under Section 8


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would seem, therefore, that there could indeedbe a gap between the time of the discovery ofthe misrepresentation, $when the discovery ismade after the 8


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limit as a condition for eligibility, the dissentingopinions resort to judicial legislation, ignoringthe verba legis doctrine and wellDestablished

jurisprudence on this very issue.

2n a certificate of candidacy, the candidate isased to certify under oath his eligibility, andthus qualification, to the office he sees election.Even though the certificate of candidacy doesnot specifically as the candidate for the numberof terms elected and served in an electiveposition, such fact is material in determining acandidates eligibility, and thus qualification forthe office. Election to and service of the samelocal elective position for three consecutiveterms renders a candidate ineligible fromrunning for the same position in the succeedingelections. !on=anida misrepresented hiseligibility because he new full well that he hadbeen elected, and had served, as mayor of San

&ntonio, Nambales for more than threeconsecutive terms yet he still certified that hewas eligible to run for mayor for the nextsucceeding term. Thus, !on=anidasrepresentation that he was eligible for the officethat he sought election constitutes false materialrepresentation as to his qualification or eligibilityfor the office.

Legal Duty of )&!5L5)to 5nforce Perpetual Special Disualification

Even without a petition under Section :; of the0mnibus Election #ode, the #0/E!E# is undera legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacyof anyone suffering from perpetual specialdisqualification to run for public office by virtue ofa final judgment of conviction. The final

judgment of conviction is judicial notice to the#0/E!E# of the disqualification of the convictfrom running for public office. The law itself barsthe convict from running for public office, and thedisqualification is part of the final judgment ofconviction. The final judgment of the court is

addressed not only to the Executive branch, but

also to other government agencies tased toimplement the final judgment under the law.

6hether or not the #0/E!E# is expresslymentioned in the judgment to implement thedisqualification, it is assumed that the portion ofthe final judgment on disqualification to run forelective public office is addressed to the#0/E!E# because under the #onstitution the#0/E!E# is duty bound to @'=o/ andadminister &ll laws and regulations relative tothe conduct of an election.@?9The disqualificationof a convict to run for elective public office underthe evised Penal #ode, as affirmed by final

judgment of a competent court, is part ofthe'=o/@' &'( &(@'/&o' of @all thelaws@ relating to the conduct of elections.

5ffect of a Void )ertificate of )andidacy

& cancelled certificate of candidacy void abinitio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, andmuch less to valid votes.?:6e quote from the#0/E!E#s 8 1ebruary 8+)) esolution withapproval-

&s early as 1ebruary );, 8+)+, the #ommissionspeaing through the Second 'ivision hadalready ordered the cancellation of !on=anidascertificate of candidacy, and had stricen off hisname in the list of official candidates for themayoralty post of San &ntonio, Nambales.

Thereafter, the #ommission En "anc in itsresolution dated &ugust )), 8+)+ unanimouslyaffirmed the resolution disqualifying !on=anida.0ur findings were liewise sustained by theSupreme #ourt no less. The disqualification of!on=anida is not simply anchored on oneground. 0n the contrary, it was emphasi=ed inour En "anc resolution that !on=anidasdisqualification is twoDpronged- first, he violatedthe constitutional fiat on the threeDterm limitA andsecond, as early as 'ecember ), 8++*, he isnown to have been convicted by final judgment

for ten $)+% counts of 1alsification under &rticle):) of the evised Penal #ode. 2n other words,

on election day, respondent !on=anidasdisqualification is notoriously nown in fact andin law. 5rgo, since respondent Lon2anidawas never a candidate for the position of!ayor ;of< San -ntonio, Zambales, the votescast for him should be considered stray votes.#onsequently, 2ntervenor &ntipolo, who remainsas the sole qualified candidate for the mayoraltypost and obtained the highest number of votes,

should now be proclaimed as the duly elected/ayor of San &ntonio, Nambales.?;$"oldfacingand underscoring in the originalA italici=ationsupplied%

!on=anidaBs certificate of candidacy wascancelled because he was ineligible or notqualified to run for /ayor./wphi6hether hiscertificate of candidacy is cancelled before orafter the elections is immaterial because thecancellation on such ground means he wasnever a candidate from the very beginning, hiscertificate of candidacy being void abinitio. There was only one qualified candidate for/ayor in the /ay 8+) + elections D &nti polo,who therefore received the highest number ofvotes.

HERE!ORE, the petition is DIS"ISSED. Theesolution dated 8 1ebruary 8+)) and the 0rderdated )8 >anuary 8+)) of the #0/E!E# En"ane in SP& (o. +*D)


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/anila

E( "&(#

G.R. No. 9*252 Au


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arose out from the case where#ouncilor !arry 0ng, whose eyto his office wasunceremoniously and withoutprevious notice, taen bypetitioner. 6ithout an office,#ouncilor 0ng had to hold officeat Pla=a !ibertad, The 7iceD/ayor and the other

complainants sympathi=ed withhim and decided to do thesame. 3owever, the petitioner,together with its fullyDarmedsecurity men, forcefully drovethem away from Pla=a !ibertad.#ouncilor 0ng denounced thepetitionerBs actuations thefollowing day in the radio stationand decided to hold office at the1reedom randstand at 2loilo#ity and there were so many

people who gathered to witnessthe incident. 3owever, beforethe group could reach the area,the petitioner, together with hissecurity men, led the firemenusing a firetruc in do=ing waterto the people and thebystanders.

&nother administrative case wasfiled by Pancho Erbite, abarangay tanod, appointed by

former mayor osa 0. #aram.0n /arch ), )*;;, without thebenefit of charges filed againsthim and no warrant of arrestwas issued, Erbite was arrestedand detained at the #ity >ail of2loilo #ity upon orders ofpetitioner. 2n jail, he wasallegedly mauled by otherdetainees thereby causinginjuries 3e was released onlythe following day. *

The /ayor thereafter answered +and the caseswere shortly set for hearing. The opinion of the#ourt of &ppeals also set forth the succeedingevents-

xxx xxx xxx

The initial hearing in the

#abaluna and 0rtigo=a caseswere set for hearing on >une 8+D8), )*;; at the egional 0fficeof the 'epartment of !ocalovernment in 2loilo #ity.(otices, through telegrams,were sent to the parties $&nnex!% and the parties receivedthem, including the petitioner.The petitioner ased for apostponement before thescheduled date of hearing andwas represented by counsel,

&tty. Samuel #astro. Thehearing officers, &tty. SalvadorRuebral and &tty. /arino"ermude= had to come all theway from /anila for the twoDdayhearings but was actually heldonly on >une 8+,)*;; in view ofthe inability andunpreparedness of petitionerBscounsel.

The next hearings were reDset to>uly 8


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counsel discussed a proposal totae the deposition of witnessesin 2loilo #ity so the hearing wasindefinitely postponed. 3owever,the parties failed to come toterms and after the parties werenotified of the hearing, theinvestigation was set to'ecember ) to )


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/ayor an=on, claims%, we can not tae hisword for it the way we would have under lesspolitical circumstances, considering furthermorethat @political feud@ has often been a goodexcuse in contesting complaints.

The /ayor has failed furthermore to substantiatehis sayDsoBs that Secretary Santos hadattempted to seduce him to join theadministration party and to operate a lottery in2loilo #ity. &gain, although the Secretary failed torebut his allegations, we can not accept them, atface value, much more, as judicial admissionsas he would have us accept them 18for the samereasons aboveDstated and furthermore, becausehis say soBs were never corroborated byindependent testimonies. &s a responsiblepublic official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing anofficial function, is presumed to be performinghis duties regularly and in the absence ofcontrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed

to him.

&s to /ayor an=onBs contention that he hadrequested the respondent Secretary to defer thehearing on account of the ninetyDday banprescribed by Section 98 of "atas "lg. :, the#ourt finds the question to be moot andacademic since we have in fact restrained theSecretary from further hearing the complaintsagainst the petitioners. 19

&s to his request, finally, for postponements, the#ourt is afraid that he has not given anycompelling reason why we should overturn the#ourt of &ppeals, which found no convincingreason to overrule Secretary Santos in denyinghis requests. "esides, postponements are amatter of discretion on the part of the hearingofficer, and based on /ayor an=onBs abovestory, we are not convinced that the Secretaryhas been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.

The #ourt can not say, under these

circumstances, that Secretary SantosB actuationsdeprived /ayor an=on of due process of law.

6e come to the core question- 6hether or notthe Secretary of !ocal overnment, as thePresidentBs alter ego, can suspend andorremove local officials.

2t is the petitionersB argument that the )*;:#onstitution 2-no longer allows the President, asthe )*< and )*: #onstitutions did, to exercisethe power of suspension andor removal overlocal officials. &ccording to both petitioners, the#onstitution is meant, first, to strengthen selfDrule by local government units and second, bydeleting the phrase 21as may be provided by lawto strip the President of the power of control overlocal governments. 2t is a view, so they contend,that finds support in the debates of the#onstitutional #ommission. The provision inquestion reads as follows-

Sec. ?. The President of thePhilippines shall exercisegeneral supervision over localgovernments. Provinces withrespect to component cities andmunicipalities, and cities andmunicipalities with respect tocomponent barangays shallensure that the acts of theircomponent units are within thescope of their prescribedpowers and functions. 22

2t modifies a counterpart provision appearing inthe )*< #onstitution, which we quote-

Sec. )+. The President shallhave control of all the executivedepartments, bureaus, oroffices, exercise generalsupervision over all !ocalgovernments as may beprovided by law, and tae carethat the laws be faithfullyexecuted. 2*

The petitioners submit that the deletion $of @asmay be provided by law@% is significant, as theirargument goes, since- $)% the power of thePresident is @provided by law@ and $8% hence, nolaw may provide for it any longer.

2t is to be noted that in meting out thesuspensions under question, the Secretary of!ocal overnment acted in consonance with thespecific legal provisions of "atas "lg. :, the!ocal overnment #ode, we quote-

Sec. 98. *otice of Cearing.6 6ithin seven days after thecomplaint is filed, the /inister oflocal overnment, or thesanggunian concerned, as thecase may be, shall require therespondent to submit his verifiedanswer within seven days fromreceipt of said complaint, andcommence the hearing andinvestigation of the case withinten days after receipt of suchanswer of the respondent. (oinvestigation shall be held withinninety days immediately prior toan election, and no preventivesuspension shall be imposedwith the said period. 2fpreventive suspension has beenimposed prior to the aforesaidperiod, the preventivesuspension shall be lifted. 2+

Sec. 9. PreventiveSuspension. C $)% Preventivesuspension may be imposed bythe /inister of !ocalovernment if the respondent isa provincial or city official, by theprovincial governor if therespondent is an electivemunicipal official, or by the cityor municipal mayor if the


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respondent is an electivebarangay official.

$8% Preventive suspension maybe imposed at any time after theissues are joined, when there isreasonable ground to believethat the respondent hascommitted the act or actscomplained of, when theevidence of culpability is strong,when the gravity of the offenseso warrants, or when thecontinuance in office of therespondent could influence thewitnesses or pose a threat tothe safety and integrity of therecords and other evidence. 2nall cases, preventive suspensionshall not extend beyond sixtydays after the start of said

suspension.

$% &t the expiration of sixtydays, the suspended officialshall be deemed reinstated inoffice without prejudice to thecontinuation of the proceedingsagainst him until its termination.3owever B if the delay in theproceedings of the case is dueto his fault, neglect or request,the time of the delay shall not becounted in computing the timeof suspension. 25

The issue, as the #ourt understands it, consistsof three questions- $)% 'id the )*;: #onstitution,in deleting the phrase @as may be provided bylaw@ intend to divest the President of the powerto investigate, suspend, discipline, andorremove local officialsK $8% 3as the #onstitutionrepealed Sections 98 and 9 of the !ocalovernment #odeK $% 6hat is the significanceof the change in the constitutional languageK

2t is the considered opinion of the #ourt thatnotwithstanding the change in the constitutionallanguage, the charter did not intend to divest thelegislature of its right or the President of herprerogative as conferred by existing legislationto provide administrative sanctions against localofficials. 2t is our opinion that the omission $of@as may be provided by law@% signifies nothingmore than to underscore local governmentsB

autonomy from congress and to brea #ongressB@control@ over local government affairs. The#onstitution did not, however, intend, for thesae of local autonomy, to deprive the legislatureof all authority over municipal corporations, inparticular, concerning discipline.

&utonomy does not, after all, contemplatemaing miniDstates out of local governmentunits, as in the federal governments of the5nited States of &merica $or "ra=il or ermany%,although >efferson is said to have compared

municipal corporations euphemistically to @smallrepublics.@ 26&utonomy, in the constitutionalsense, is subject to the guiding star, though notcontrol, of the legislature, albeit the legislativeresponsibility under the #onstitution and as the@supervision clause@ itself suggestDis to weanlocal government units from overDdependenceon the central government.

2t is noteworthy that under the #harter, @localautonomy@ is not instantly selfDexecuting, butsubject to, among other things, the passage of alocal government code, 27a local taxlaw, 28income distribution legislation, 29and anational representation law, *-andmeasures *1designed to reali=e autonomy at thelocal level. 2t is also noteworthy that in spite ofautonomy, the #onstitution places the localgovernment under the general supervision of theExecutive. 2t is noteworthy finally, that the#harter allows #ongress to include in the localgovernment code provisions for removal of localofficials, which suggest that #ongress mayexercise removal powers, and as the existing

!ocal overnment #ode has done, delegate itsexercise to the President. Thus-

Sec. . The #ongress shallenact a local government codewhich shall provide for a moreresponsive and accountablelocal government structureinstituted through a system ofdecentrali=ation with effectivemechanisms of recall, initiative,and referendum, allocate amongthe different local governmentunits their powers,responsibilities and resources,and provide for thequalifications, election,appointment and removal, term,salaries, powers and functionsand duties of local officials, andall other matters relating to the

organi=ation and operation ofthe local units. *2

&s hereinabove indicated, the deletion of @asmay be provided by law@ was meant tostress, sub silencio, the objective of the framersto strengthen local autonomy by severingcongressional control of its affairs, as observedby the #ourt of &ppeals, lie the power of locallegislation. **The #onstitution did nothing more,however, and insofar as existing legislationauthori=es the President $through the Secretaryof !ocal overnment% to proceed against localofficials administratively, the #onstitutioncontains no prohibition.

The petitioners are under the impression that the#onstitution has left the President meresupervisory powers, which supposedly excludesthe power of investigation, and denied hercontrol, which allegedly embraces disciplinaryauthority. 2t is a mistaen impression becauselegally, @supervision@ is not incompatible withdisciplinary authority as this #ourt hasheld, *+thus-


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xxx xxx xxx

2t is true that in the case of/ondano vs. Silvosa,


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#ode adds nothing to the powerof supervision to be exercisedby the 'epartment 3ead overthe administration of ...municipalities ... . 2f it beconstrued that it does and suchadditional power is the sameauthority as that vested in the'epartment 3ead by section

:*$c% of the evised&dministrative #ode, then suchadditional power must bedeemed to have beenabrogated by Section ))+$l%,

&rticle 722 of the #onstitution. +7

xxx xxx xxx

2n Pelae2, we stated that the President can notimpose disciplinary measures on local officialsexcept on appeal from the provincial boardpursuant to the &dministrative #ode. +8

Thus, in those case that this #ourt denied thePresident the power $to suspendremove% it wasnot because we did not thin that the Presidentcan not exercise it on account of his limitedpower, but because the law lodged the powerelsewhere. "ut in those cases ii which the lawgave him the power, the #ourt, as in $an2on v.ayanan, found little difficulty in sustaininghim. +9

The #ourt does not believe that the petitionerscan rightfully point to the debates of the#onstitutional #ommission to defeat thePresidentBs powers. The #ourt believes that thedeliberations are by themselves inconclusive,because although #ommissioner >ose (olledowould exclude the power of removal from thePresident,5-#ommissioner "las 0ple wouldnot. 51

The #ourt is consequently reluctant to say that

the new #onstitution has repealed the !ocal

overnment #ode, "atas "lg. :. &s we said,@supervision@ and @removal@ are not incompatibleterms and one may stand with the othernotwithstanding the stronger expression of localautonomy under the new #harter. 6e haveindeed held that in spite of the approval of the#harter, "atas "lg. : is still in force andeffect. 52

&s the #onstitution itself declares, localautonomy means @a more responsive andaccountable local government structureinstituted through a system ofdecentrali=ation.@ 5*The #onstitution as weobserved, does nothing more than to brea upthe monopoly of the national government overthe affairs of local governments and as put bypolitical adherents, to @liberate the localgovernments from the imperialism of /anila.@

&utonomy, however, is not meant to end therelation of partnership and interDdependence

between the central administration and localgovernment units, or otherwise, to user in aregime of federalism. The #harter has not taensuch a radical step. !ocal governments, underthe #onstitution, are subject to regulation,however limited, and for no other purpose thanprecisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance selfDgovernment.

&s we observed in one case, 5+decentrali=ationmeans devolution of national administration butnot power to the local levels. Thus-

(ow, autonomy is eitherdecentrali=ation ofadministration ordecentrali=ation of power. Thereis decentrali=ation ofadministration when the centralgovernment delegatesadministrative powers to politicalsubdivisions in order to broadenthe base of government powerand in the process to mae localgovernments @more responsive

and accountable,@ and @ensuretheir fullest development as selfDreliant communities and maethem more effective partners inthe pursuit of nationaldevelopment and socialprogress.@ &t the same time, itrelieves the central governmentof the burden of managing local

affairs and enables it toconcentrate on nationalconcerns. The Presidentexercises @general supervision@over them, but only to @ensurethat local affairs areadministered according to law.@3e has no control over their actsin the sense that he cansubstitute their judgments withhis own.

'ecentrali=ation of power, onthe other hand, involves anabdication of political power inthe favor of local governmentsunits declared to beautonomous, 2n that case, theautonomous government is freeto chart its own destiny andshape its future with minimumintervention from centralauthorities. &ccording to aconstitutional author,

decentrali=ation of poweramounts to @selfDimmolation,@since in that event, theautonomous governmentbecomes accountable not to thecentral authorities but to itsconstituency. 55

The successive sixtyDday suspensions imposedon /ayor odolfo an=on is albeit anothermatter. 6hat bothers the #ourt, and what indeedlooms very large, is the fact that since the /ayor

is facing ten administrative charges, the /ayor


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is in fact facing the possibility of 9++ days ofsuspension, in the event that all ten casesyieldprima faciefindings. The #ourt is not ofcourse tolerating misfeasance in public office$assuming that /ayor an=on is guilty ofmisfeasance% but it is certainly another questionto mae him serve 9++ days of suspension,which is effectively, to suspend him out of office.

&s we held- 56

8. Petitioner is a duly electedmunicipal mayor of !ianga,Surigao del Sur. 3is term ofoffice does not expire until )*;9.6ere it not for this informationand the suspension decreed bythe Sandiganbayan according tothe &ntiDraft and #orruptPractices &ct, he would havebeen all this while in the fulldischarge of his functions as

such municipal mayor. 3e waselected precisely to do so. &s of0ctober 89, )*;, he has beenunable to. it is a basicassumption of the electoralprocess implicit in the right ofsuffrage that the people areentitled to the services ofelective officials of their choice.1or misfeasance ormalfeasance, any of them could,of course, be proceeded against

administratively or, as in thisinstance, criminally. 2n eithercase, /s culpability must beestablished. /oreover, if therebe a criminal action, he isentitled to the constitutionalpresumption of innocence. &preventive suspension may be

justified. 2ts continuance,however, for an unreasonablelength of time raises a dueprocess question. 1or even if

thereafter he were acquitted, in

the meanwhile his right to holdoffice had been nullified. #learly,there would be in such a casean injustice suffered by him. (oris he the only victim. There isinjustice inflicted liewise on thepeople of !ianga They weredeprived of the services of theman they had elected to serve

as mayor. 2n that sense, toparaphrase >ustice #ardo=o,the protracted continuance ofthis preventive suspension hadoutrun the bounds of reasonand resulted in sheeroppression. & denial of dueprocess is thus quite manifest. 2tis to avoid such anunconstitutional application thatthe order of suspension shouldbe lifted. 57

The plain truth is that this #ourt has been ill atease with suspensions, for the abovereasons, 58and so also, because it is out of theordinary to have a vacancy in local government.The sole objective of a suspension, as we haveheld, 59is simply @to prevent the accused fromhampering the normal cause of the investigationwith his influence and authority over possiblewitnesses@ 6-or to eep him off @the records andother evidence. 61

2t is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutorsin firming up a case, if any, against an erringlocal official. 5nder the !ocal overnment #ode,it can not exceed sixty days, 62which is to saythat it need not be exactly sixty days long if ashorter period is otherwise sufficient, and whichis also to say that it ought to be lifted ifprosecutors have achieved their purpose in ashorter span.

Suspension is not a penalty and is not unliepreventive imprisonment in which the accused isheld to insure his presence at the trial. 2n both

cases, the accused $the respondent% enjoys apresumption of innocence unless and until foundguilty.

Suspension finally is temporary and as the !ocalovernment #ode provides, it may be imposedfor no more than sixty days. &s we held, 6*alonger suspension is unjust and unreasonable,and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.

&s we observed earlier, imposing 9++ days ofsuspension which is not a remote possibility/ayor an=on is to all intents and purposes, tomae him spend the rest of his term in inactivity.2t is also to mae, to all intents and purposes, hissuspension permanent.

2t is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spiteof the fact that the /ayorBs guilt has not beenproven. 6orse, any absolution will be for naught

because needless to say, the length of hissuspension would have, by the time he isreinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably.

The #ourt is not to be mistaen for obstructingthe efforts of the respondent Secretary to seethat justice is done in 2loilo #ity, yet it is hardlyany argument to inflict on /ayor an=onsuccessive suspensions when apparently, therespondent Secretary has had sufficient time togather the necessary evidence to build a caseagainst the /ayor without suspending him a day

longer. 6hat is intriguing is that the respondentSecretary has been cracing down, so to spea,on the /ayor piecemeal apparently, to pin himdown ten times the pain, when he, therespondent Secretary, could have pursued aconsolidated effort.

6e reiterate that we are not precluding thePresident, through the Secretary of 2nterior f romexercising a legal power, yet we are of theopinion that the Secretary of 2nterior isexercising that power oppressively, and


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needless to say, with a grave abuse ofdiscretion.

The #ourt is aware that only the thirdsuspension is under questions, and that any talof future suspensions is in fact premature. Thefact remains, however, that /ayor an=on hasbeen made to serve a total of )8+ days ofsuspension and the possibility of sixty days

more is arguably around the corner $whichamounts to a violation of the !ocal overnment#ode which brings to light a pattern ofsuspensions intended to suspend the /ayor therest of his natural tenure. The #ourt is simplyforeclosing what appears to us as a concertedeffort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act.

&s we said, we can not tolerate such a state ofaffairs.

6e are therefore allowing /ayor odolfoan=on to suffer the duration of his thirdsuspension and lifting, for the purpose, theTemporary estraining 0rder earlier issued.2nsofar as the seven remaining charges areconcerned, we are urging the 'epartment of!ocal overnment, upon the finality of this'ecision, to undertae steps to expedite thesame, subject to /ayor an=onBs usualremedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, orcertiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we areprecluding the Secretary from meting out further

suspensions based on those remainingcomplaints, notwithstanding findings ofprimafacie evidence.

2n resume the #ourt is laying down the followingrules-

). !ocal autonomy, under the #onstitution,involves a mere decentrali=ation ofadministration, not of power, in which localofficials remain accountable to the centralgovernment in the manner the law may provideA

8. The new #onstitution does not prescribefederalismA

. The change in constitutional language $withrespect to the supervision clause% was meantbut to deny legislative control over localgovernmentsA it did not exempt the latter fromlegislative regulations provided regulation isconsistent with the fundamental premise of

autonomyA

?. Since local governments remain accountableto the national authority, the latter may, by law,and in the manner set forth therein, imposedisciplinary action against local officialsA


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A.". "TJ9811+7. July 2, 1998K

JESUS S. CONDUCTO, complainant,vs.JUDGE ILU"INADO C."ON)ON, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

DA#IDE, JR., J.

2n a sworn letterDcomplaint dated )?0ctober )**9,I)Jcomplainant chargedrespondent >udge 2luminado #. /on=on of the/unicipal Trial #ourt in #ities, San Pablo #ity,with ignorance of law, in that he deliberatelyrefused to suspend a barangay chairman whowas charged before his court with the crime ofunlawful appointment under &rticle 8?? of theevised Penal #ode.

The factual antecedents recited in theletterDcomplaint are not controverted.

0n + &ugust )**, complainant filed acomplaint with the Sangguniang Panlungsod ofSan Pablo #ity against one "enjamin/aghirang, the barangay chairman of "arangay222DE of San Pablo #ity, for abuse of authority,serious irregularity and violation of law in that,among other things, said respondent /aghirangappointed his sisterDinDlaw, /rs. 1lorian/aghirang, to the position of barangay secretaryon ): /ay )*;* in violation of Section *? ofthe !ocal overnment #ode. &t the same time,complainant filed a complaint for violation of

&rticle 8?? of the evised Penal #ode with the0ffice of the #ity Prosecutor against /aghirang,which was, however, dismissedI8Jon +September )** on the ground that /aghirangssisterDinDlaw was appointed before the effectivityof the !ocal overnment #ode of )**), whichprohibits apunong barangayfrom appointing a

relative within the fourth civil degree ofconsanguinity or affinity as barangaysecretary. The order of dismissal was submittedto the 0ffice of the 'eputy 0mbudsman for!u=on.

0n 88 0ctober )**, complainant obtained0pinion (o. 8?9, s. )**IJfrom 'irector >acob/ontesa of the 'epartment of 2nterior and !ocalovernment, which declared that theappointment issued by /aghirang to his sisterDinDlaw violated paragraph $8%, Section *< of ".P."lg. :, the !ocal overnment #ode prior tothe !ocal overnment #ode of )**).

2n its evised esolution of 8* (ovember)**,I?Jthe 0ffice of the 'eputy 0mbudsman for!u=on dismissed the case, but ordered/aghirang to replace his sisterDinDlaw asbarangay secretary.

0n 8+ 'ecember )**, complainant movedthat the 0ffice of the 'eputy 0mbudsman for!u=on reconsiderI


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of suspension from office relating to agiven term may not be the basis ofcontempt with respect to ones $sic%assumption of the same office under anew term $0liveros vs. 7illalu=, ..(o. !D?99, /ay +, )*:)% and, the#ourt should never remove a publicofficer for acts done prior to hispresent term of office. To do otherwise

would deprieve $sic% the people of theirright to elect their officer. 6hen thepeople have elected a man to office, itmust be assumed that they did thiswith nowledge of his life andcharacter, and that they disregarded orforgave his fault or misconduct $sic%, ifhe had been guilty ifany. $&guinaldovs. Santos, et al., ..(o. *?))anuary )**:, respondent assertedthat he had been continuously eeping abreastof legal and jurisprudential development IsicJ inthe law since he passed the )*


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respondent as a judge of poor caliber andunderstanding of the law, very incompetent andhas no place in #ourt of >ustice.

1inally, respondent >udge avowed that hewould not dare soil his judicial robe at this time,for he had only three $% years and nine $*%months more before reaching the compulsoryage of retirement of seventy $:+%A and that for

the last 8< years as municipal judge in the seven$:% towns of !aguna and as presiding judge ofthe /T##, San Pablo #ity, he had maintainedhis integrity.

2n compliance with the #ourts resolution of* /arch )**;, the parties, by way of separateletters, informed the #ourt that they agreed tohave this case decided on the basis of thepleadings already filed, with respondentexplicitly specifying that only the complaint andthe comment thereon be considered.

The 0ffice of the #ourt &dministrator $0#&%recommends that this #ourt hold respondentliable for ignorance of the law and that he bereprimanded with a warning that a repetition ofthe same or similar acts in the future shall bedealt with more severely. 2n support thereof, the0#& maes the following findings andconclusions-

The claim of respondent >udge that alocal official who is criminally chargedcan be preventively suspended only ifthere is an administrative case filedagainst him is without basis. Section) of & +)* $&ntiDraft and #orruptPractices &ct% states that-

Suspension and loss ofbenefits&ny incumbent publicofficer against whom anycriminal prosecution under avalid information under this &ctor under Title :, "oo 22 of theevised Penal #ode or for anyoffense involving fraud upon

government or public funds or

property whether as a simpleor as a complex offense and inwhatever stage of executionand mode of participation, ispending in court, shall besuspended from office.

2t is well settled that Section ) of &+)* maes it mandatory for the

Sandiganbayan $or the #ourt% tosuspend any public officer againstwhom a valid information chargingviolation of this law, "oo 22, Title : ofthe P#, or any offense involvingfraud upon government or public fundsor property is filed in court. The courttrying a case has neither discretion norduty to determine whether preventivesuspension is required to prevent theaccused from using his office tointimidate witnesses or frustrate his

prosecution or continue committingmalfeasance in office. &ll that isrequired is for the court to mae afinding that the accused standscharged under a valid information forany of the aboveDdescribed crimes forthe purpose of granting or denying thesought for suspension. $"olastig vs.Sandiganbayan, .. (o. ))+


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espondents denial of complainants/otion for econsideration left thecomplainant with no other judicialremedy. Since a case for 5nlawful

&ppointment is covered by SummaryProcedure, complainant is prohibitedfrom filing a petition for certiorari,mandamus or prohibition involving aninterlocutory order issued by the

court. (either can he file an appealfrom the courts adverse final

judgment, incorporating in his appealthe grounds assailing the interlocutoryorders, as this will put the accused indouble jeopardy.

&ll things considered, whileconcededly, respondent >udgemanifested his ignorance of the law indenying complainants /otion forSuspension of "rgy. #hairman

/aghirang, there was nothing shownhowever to indicate that he acted inbad faith or with malice. "e that as itmay, it would also do well to note thatgood faith and lac of malicious intentcannot completely free respondentfrom liability.

This #ourt, in the case of !ibarios and'abalos, )** S#& ?;, ruled-

2n the absence of fraud,dishonesty or corruption, the

acts of a judge done in hisjudicial capacity are notsubject to disciplinary action,even though such acts may beerroneous. "ut, while judgesshould not be disciplined forinefficiency on account merelyof occasional mistaes orerrors of judgment, yet, it ishighly imperative that theyshould be conversant withbasic principles.

& judge owes it to the publicand the administration of

justice to now the law he issupposed to apply to a givencontroversy. 3e is called uponto exhibit more than a cursoryacquaintance with the statutesand procedural rules. Therewill be faith in the

administration of justice only ifthere be a belief on the part oflitigants that the occupants ofthe bench cannot justly beaccused of a deficiency intheir grasp of legal principles.

The findings and conclusions of the 0fficeof the #ourt &dministrator are in order. 3owever,the penalty recommended, i.e., reprimand, is toolight, in view of the fact that despite his claimthat he has been continuously eeping abreast

of legal and jurisprudential development IsicJ inlaw ever since he passed the "ar Examinationsin )**


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only to administrative liabilities committed duringthe previous term of an elective official, thus-

). The first problem we are to grapplewith is the legal effect of the reelectionof respondent municipal officials. Saidrespondents would want to impressupon us the fact that in the last generalelections of (ovember )?,)*9: the

/aati electorate reelected all of them,except that 7iceD/ayor Teotimoealogo, a councilor prior thereto, waselevated to viceDmayor. Theserespondents contend that theirreelection erected a bar to theirremoval from office for misconductcommitted prior to (ovember )?,)*9:. 2t is to be recalled that the actsaverred in the criminal information in#riminal #ase );;8) and for whichthey were convicted allegedly occurredon or about >uly 89, )*9:, or prior tothe )*9: elections. They ground theirposition on Pascual vs. ProvincialBoard of *ueva 5ciEa, )+9 Phil. ?99,and Li2ares vs. Cechanova, ): S#&


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may have held, even if conferred bypopular election.@

2t is manifest then, thatsuch condonationof an officerBs faultor misconduct during aprevious e+pired term by virtue of hisreelection to office for a new term canbe deemed to apply only to

his administrative and not tohiscriminal guilt. &s succinctly stated inthen Solicitor eneral $now &ssociate>ustice% 1elix R. &ntonioBsmemorandum for the State, @to holdthat petitionerBs reelection erased hiscriminal liability would in effect transferthe determination of the criminalculpability of an erring official from thecourt to which it was lodged by lawinto the changing and transient whimand caprice of the electorate. Thiscannot be so, for while his constituentsmay condone the misdeed of a corruptofficial by returning him bac to office,a criminal action initiated against thelatter can only be heard and tried by acourt of justice, his nefarious acthaving been committed against thevery State whose laws he had swornto faithfully obey and uphold. &contrary rule would erode the verysystem upon which our government isbased, which is one of laws and not ofmen.@

1inally, on 8) &ugust )**8, in-guinaldo v.Santos,I88Jthis #ourt stated-

#learly then, the rule is that a publicofficial cannot be removed fromadministrative misconduct committedduring a prior term, since his reDelection to office operates as acondonation of the officers previousmisconduct to the extent of cutting offthe right to remove him therefor. The

foregoing rule, however, finds noapplication to criminal cases pending

against petitioner for acts he may havecommitted during the failed coup.

Thus far, no ruling to the contrary has evenrippled the doctrine enunciated in the aboveDmentioned cases. 2f respondent has truly beencontinuously eeping abreast of legal and

jurisprudential development IsicJ in the law, itwas impossible for him to have missed or

misread these cases. 6hat detracts from hisclaim of assiduity is the fact that he even citedthe cases of &liveros v. Villalu2and-guinaldo v.Santosin support of his + >une )**udge of the egional Trial #ourt of0riental /indoro to stop the provincial governorfrom placing a municipal mayor under preventive

suspension pending the investigation ofadministrative charges against the latter.

0n &pril )), )**), one amir aring of (aujan,0riental /indoro, filed a sworn letterDcomplaintwith Secretary !uis Santos of the 'epartment of2nterior and !ocal overnment charging /ayor(elson /elgar of (aujan, 0riental /indoro, withgrave misconduct, oppression, abuse ofauthority, culpable violation of the #onstitutionand conduct prejudicial to the best interest of thepublic service. The charge against /ayor /elgar

reads-

0n or about ?-+ in theafternoon of /arch 89, )**), inthe /unicipality of (aujan,0riental /indoro, theaforementioned person, (elson/elgar, being the /unicipal/ayor of (aujan, 0riental/indoro, with abuse of official

function, did then and therewilfully, unlawfully andfeloniously attac, assault anduse personal violence upon theperson of amir aring, by thenand there boxing and icingthereby inflicting upon the latterphysical injuries on differentparts of his body and not beingcontented ordered his arrestand detention in the municipal

jail of (aujan, 0riental /indoro

without filing any charges untilhe was released the followingday /arch 8:, )**) at about;-+ in the morning. $p.+, %ollo.%

&n identical letterDcomplaint was filed by aringwith the Provincial overnor of 0riental /indoro$herein petitioner overnor "enjamin 2. Espiritu%accusing /ayor /elgar of the same violations oflaw and requesting that the mayor be placedunder preventive suspension pending

investigation of the charges.

& third complaint filed by aring with thePresidential &ction #enter, 0ffice of thePresident of the Philippines, was forwarded toovernor Espiritu with a request for promptaction $&nnex @#@, p. 9, %ollo%.

0n &pril 88, )**), the SangguniangPanlalawigan of 0riental /indoro required/ayor /elgar to answer the complaint, which

was doceted as &dm. #ase (o. *)D+) $&nnex@'@, p. :, %ollo%.

0n /ay 88, )**), /ayor /elgar submitted hisanswer in which he recounted the events of/arch 89, )**) that led to the filing of aringBscomplaint against him-

&t around 9-+ in the evening of89 /arch )**), while 2 was inthe middle of my speech at the(aujan Public ymnasium, this/unicipality, where the >ose !."asa /emorial graduationceremonies were then beingheld, a prolonged butnonetheless loud andintermittent clapping suddenlyerupted from one of thenumerous people then inattendance. 2 paused. Thehandclapping stopped. 2resumed my speech. The fellow

started all over again.

The audience was visiblydisturbed and 2 found myselfunable to proceed not because 2could not collect my thoughtsbut because 2 felt the solemnityof the occasion had irreversiblybeen shattered by a rudenessso totally unexpected.

2 ended my speech andinstructed a policeman toinvestigate the culprit whoturned out to be amir aring.3e was drun. 2 did not hurt himas can be gathered from hismedical certificate $&nnex @"@ tothe complaint% which palpablycontradicts his affidavit $&nnex@&@ to the complaint%.

2 was informed that said amir

aring was momentarily placed


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in custody for his own protectionbecause he was drun. &n opennife $balisong% was taen fromhim. 2 was liewise informed thatafter he had sobered up, he wastold to go home, but he refusedto go and only did so thefollowing morning.

#ertainly under thecircumstances, charges couldhave been filed against amiraring under the provisions of

&rticle ).!. "asa/emorial School as &nnex @&@,the joint affidavit of the/unicipal >ailer and the Police2nvestigator as &nnex @"@, the

affidavit of 1ireman )st #lassoy !omio as &nnex @#@, and axerox copy of the pages in thePolice "lotter where the incidentin question was entered. $pp.?+D?), %ollo%.

&fter evaluating the complaint and its supportingdocuments, as well as the /ayorBs answer andthe affidavits of his witnesses, the SangguniangPanlalawigan of 0riental /indoro passedesolution (o. uly )9, )**). 3ence, this petitionfor certiorari and prohibition.


45/70

6ithout giving due course to the petition, werequired the private respondent to comment andwe issued a Temporary estraining 0rdercommanding respondent >udge to cease anddesist from further proceeding in Special #ivil

&ction (o. D


46/70

Phil. )+)%. Preventive suspension is allowed sothat the respondent may not hamper the normalcourse of the investigation through the use of hisinfluence and authority over possible witnesses$!acson vs. oque, *8 Phil. ?


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E( "&(#

G.R. NO. 15+-98 July 27, 2--5

JOSE C. "IRANDA,Petitioners,

vs.HON. SANDIGANBA%AN, O!!ICE O! THEO"BUDS"AN, SEC. JOSE D. LINA, ' &&y & S/&/y o= DILG,&'(!AUSTINO D%, JR. ' &&y &Go>/'o/ o= P/o>' o= I&:l&,Ro'('.

' E # 2 S 2 0 (

PUNO, J.

1irst, the facts.

The 0mbudsman placed petitioner >ose #./iranda $/ayor /iranda% then the mayor ofSantiago #ity, 2sabela, under preventivesuspension for six months from 8< >uly )**: to8< >anuary )**; for alleged violations ofepublic &ct (o. 9:), otherwise nown as the#ode of #onduct and Ethical Standards forPublic 0fficials and Employees.)Subsequently,then 7ice /ayor &melita S. (avarro $7ice /ayor(avarro% filed a #omplaint with the 0ffice of the

0mbudsman $0mbudsman% on ) 'ecember)**: which was doceted as 0/"D)D*:D8)8.82n the said #omplaint, 7ice /ayor(avarro alleged that /ayor /iranda committedthe following acts on 8? (ovember )**: despitethe continuing effectivity of the 0mbudsmanspreventive suspension order- $a% issued amemorandum addressed to (avarro advisingher that he was assuming his position as #ity/ayorA$b% gave directives to the heads ofoffices and other employeesA?$c% issued 0ffice0rder (o. ))D+8) which authori=ed certain

persons to start worA


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/irandas act fell within the catchDall provision @xx x or for any offense involving fraud upongovernment.@8une8++8.89H', /' o' &&l'< S&'('>u'o'. The petitioner contends that theSandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion

when it preventively suspended him on a groundnot authori=ed by law and raises the followingissues- $)% whether Section ) of .&. (o. +)*applies only to fraudulent acts involving publicfunds or propertyA and $8% whether the crime ofusurpation of authority or official functionsinvolves @fraud upon government or public fundsor property@ found in Section ) of .&. (o.+)*.

6e rule in the negative.

!/. Section ) of .&. (o. +)*, as amended,provides-

Section ). Suspension and loss of benefits. C&ny incumbent public officer against whom anycriminal prosecution under a valid informationunder this &ct or under Title :, "oo 22 of theevised Penal #ode or for any offense involvingfraud upon government or public funds orproperty whether as a simple or as a complexoffense and in whatever stage of execution andmode of participation, is pending in court, shallbe suspended from office. Should he beconvicted by final judgment, he shall lose allretirement or gratuity benefits under any law, butif he is acquitted, he shall be entitled toreinstatement and to the salaries and benefitswhich he failed to receive during suspension,unless in the meantime administrativeproceedings have been filed against him.

2n the event that such convicted officer, who mayhave already been separated from the service,has already received such benefits he shall beliable to restitute the same to the overnment.

The Sandiganbayan properly construed Section) of .&. (o. +)* as covering two types ofoffenses- $)% any offense involving fraud on thegovernmentA and $8% any offense involving publicfunds or property. #ontrary to the submission ofthe petitioner, nothing in .&. (o. +)* evincesany legislative intent to limit Section ) only toacts involving fraud on public funds or property.The phrase @any offense involving fraud upon

government or public funds or property@ is clearand categorical. To limit the use of @government@as an adjective that qualifies @funds@ is baseless.The word @public@ precedes @funds@ anddistinguishes the same from private funds. Toqualify further @public funds@ as @government@funds, as petitioner claims is the laws intent, isplainly superfluous. 6e are bound by the rulethat a statute should be construed reasonablywith reference to its controlling purpose and itsprovisions should not be given a meaning that isinconsistent with its scope and object. .&. (o.

+)*, commonly nown as the &ntiDraft and#orrupt Practices &ct, should be read to protectthe State from fraud by its own officials.

So'(. 6e further hold that theSandiganbayan did not gravely abuse itsdiscretion when it ruled that petitioners act fellwithin the catchDall provision @x x x or for anyoffense involving fraud upon government. Theterm @fraud@ is defined, vi2.-

&n instance or an act of tricery or deceit esp.

when involving misrepresentation- an act ofdeluding8:

2t is obvious to the eyes that the phrase @fraudupon government@ means @any instance or act oftricery or deceit against the government.@ 2tcannot be read restrictively so as to beequivalent to malversation of funds as this iscovered by the preceding phrase @any offenseinvolving . . . public funds or property.@ 2t ought tofollow that @fraud upon government@ wascommitted when the petitioner allegedly

assumed the duties and performed acts

pertaining to the 0ffice of the /ayor underpretense of official position.

The dissent opines that fraud upon governmentis not necessarily an essential element of thecrime of usurpation of authority. The submissionmay be correct as a general proposition butgeneral propositions hardly decide a case. 2n thecase at bar, the issue is whether the alleged acts

of usurpation of authority committed by thepetitioner involve @fraud upon government orpublic funds or property@ as the term isunderstood under Section ) of .&. (o. +)*.2n ruling in the affirmative, the Sandiganbayanheld-

!et us tae a loo at the acts complained of asalleged in the &mended 2nformation dated >uly8:, 8++)-

x x x the aboveDnamed accused, a public officer,being then the elected #ity /ayor of Santiago#ity, while under preventive suspension did thenand there, willfully, unlawfully and nowingly andunder pretense of official position, assume theduties and functions of the 0ffice of the /ayor,issue directives and memoranda, and appointcertain persons to various positions in the #ityovernment and perform acts pertaining to anoffice to which he nowingly was deprived of.

/oreover, in private complainant &melita S.

(avarros &ffidavit of #omplaint dated (ovember89, )**:, she said- @x x x, he proceeded to hisoffice and started giving directives to the variousheads of office and other employees, theunexpected acts of respondents had causedserious disruptions in the day to day affairs ofthe city government.@

&ccuseds acts therefore in assuming the dutiesand function of the 0ffice of the /ayor despitehis suspension from said office resulted to aclear disruption of office and worst, a chaotic

situation in the affairs of the government as the
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employees, as well as the public, sufferedconfusion as to who is the head of the 0ffice.This actuation of herein accused constitutesfraud which in general sense is deemed tocomprise anything calculated to deceive,including all acts, omissions, and concealmentinvolving a breach of legal or equitable duty,trust or confidence justly reposed, resulting indamage to another or by which an undue and

unconscious advantage is taen of another $:&m. >ur. 8d )* at Sec. )*%. 3ence, the actcomplained of against accused herein falls in thecatchall provision @x x x or for any offenseinvolving fraud upon government x x x.@

/oreover, the firmly entrenched doctrine whichwas held by the 3ighest Tribunal in a long line ofcases is that @x x x under Section ) of the &ntiDraft and #orrupt Practices !aw, the suspensionof a public officer is mandatory after adetermination has been made of the validity of

the 2nformation x x x.@ 2n fact, as early as )*;? inthe case of B&yo >. S&'(ustice elova said-

0nce the information is found to be sufficient inform and substance, then the #ourt must issuethe order of suspension as a matter of course.There are no ifs and buts about it. x x x

&fter a perusal of the amended informationherein, it clearly appeared that the same wasapparently valid for it conforms to therequirements laid down under Section 9I,J ule))+ of the ules of #ourt. 2n fact, accusedherein interposed a negative plea theretothereby tacitly acquiescing to the validity of thesaid 2nformation.

There being no valid ground raised by theaccused sufficient enough to warrant denial ofthe prayer of the prosecution in its /otion toSuspend &ccused Pende;n


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'>ol>'< u:l =u'( o/ /o/y.86hat ismore, adopting the dissenting opinionGsline ofreasoning would render superfluous the phrase@fraud upon government@ as malversation issubsumed by @any offense involving public fundsor property.@

T/(. 6e are not a bit persuaded by theposture of the petitioner that he reassumed

office under an o' :l= that he was nolonger under preventivesuspension. Po'/; /' &''o&'( /u'y.Petitioners own affidavitstates-

;. That on (ovember 8?, )**:, at that time, $sic%2 had already served my single preventivesuspension for a total number of 0(E35('E' T6E(T4 $)8+% days more or lesscounted from >uly 8?, )**:, which far exceedsthe allowable period of 9+ days as maximum

preventive suspension, for a single suspensionfor a local elective official lie me as provided forunder the !ocal overnment #ode of )**) $sic%on the same date, (ovember 8?, )**: in goodfaith and upon the advise $sic% of my lawyers, 2notified both the 0mbudsman and '2! of myintention to assume my office as the duly elected#ity /ayor of Santiago #ityA

*. That earlier on (ovember 8?, )**: 2 started toreassume my office and functions as #ity /ayorof Santiago #ityA surprisingly on the same date,

(ovember 8?, )**: 2 received a memorandumissued by 5ndersecretary /anuel . Sanche= of'2! instructing me to cease and desist frommy plan to reassume the functions and duties ofmy officeA

)+. !o/ l &' & F, &=/ No>@:/ 2+,1997 7iceD/ayor &/E!2T& (&7&0relentlessly harassed and threatened me andmy constituents with bodily harm using thestrong arm of the law thru the brute force of theP(P courteousy $sic% of 5ndersecretary /anuel. Sanche= I & o'/&'( o &(

=/o@ /=o/@'< @y (u &'( =u'o' o&>o( &'y o:l u'=o/u'& '(' &@&y &' o @ &'( &'y o'u'A x xx.?$5mphases supplied%

"y petitioners o' &(@o', he /=u( toleave his position (the memorandum of5ndersecretary Sanche= and l= only a fewdays after receipt thereof (u o o/o'

o= Pl' N&o'&l Pol. Thiscontradicts his assertion thathe @@(&ly complied with thememorandum of 5ndersecretarySanche=.uan !atorre%as 7iceD/ayor was assuming the duties of theabsent mayor. 3owever, 3ilvano refused to

yield, arguing that he had been designated bythe /ayor. 6hereupon the 7iceD/ayor sent atelegram to the Executive Secretary informingthe latter of the controversy. &nd the saidSecretary replied by letter, that under sec. 8)*u'o' & o '&:l '>(' & &'( (='lylo'/,ou '&/ly u:/:'< oo'/M l&@ & Lo&l Go>/'@'

Co(, &>//( oul( &ly o & o= &' l> lo&l o==&l, & :'>ol&(.True, under said #ode, preventivesuspension may only be imposed after theissues are joined, and only for a maximumperiod of sixty days. 3ere, petitioner wassuspended without having had the chance torefute first the charges against him, and for themaximum period of six months provided by the0mbudsman !aw. "ut & /o'(' &//'@' Co(.

espondents point out that the shorter period ofsuspension under the !ocal overnment #odeis intended to limit the period of suspension thatmay be imposed by a mayor, a governor, or thePresident, who may be motivated by partisanpolitical considerations. 2n contrast O@:u(@&', o &' @o & lo''> u'o', 'o lFlyo : @l&/ly @o>&( :&u &

o'uo'&l :o(y. The distinction is valid butnot decisive, in our view, of whether there hasbeen grave abuse of discretion in a specific caseof preventive suspension.?:$5mphasessupplied%

(owhere in G&/& is it stated that the limitsprovided in the !ocal overnment #ode apply tothe 0mbudsman. 2n fact, the#ourt /lystated that its decision wasrendered without subscribing to the petitionersclaim that the !ocal overnment #ode had been

violated. 2n fine, the #ourt only ruled that the0mbudsman acted with grave abuse ofdiscretion in imposing a 9Dmonth preventivesuspension since it was admitted that thedocuments required were already obtained by)* >uly )*** or 8? days after the imposition ofthe preventive suspension. Therefore, thepurpose for which the suspension was imposedwas already served.

The dissenting opinionalso cites the caseof Ro >. S&'(


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mentioned in the said provision and was notmeant to be governed thereby. 2ndeed, thereason is not hard to distill. The President,governor and mayor are political personages. &ssuch, the possibility of extraneous factorsinfluencing their decision to impose preventivesuspensions is not remote. The 0mbudsman, onthe other hand, is not subject to politicalpressure given the independence of the office

which is protected by no less than the#onstitution. This view was embraced by the#ourt in H&. GooD&(ol?*and G&/& >."o?&. u'o' ou &yu'(/ So' 2+ o= O@:u(@&' A @u oo /u'>u'o' /o>(( :y So' 6* o= Lo&l Go>/'@' Co( o >' 'o@&'&' &l&o'. T o /o>o'

/' (==/'ly.2n order to justify thepreventive suspension of a public official underSection 8? of .&. (o. 9::+, the evidence ofguilt should be strong, and $a% the chargeagainst the officer or employee should involvedishonestly, oppression or grave misconduct orneglect in the performance of dutyA $b% that thecharges should warrant removal from theserviceA or $c% the respondentBs continued stay inoffice would prejudice the case filed against him.The 0mbudsman can impose the 9Dmonthpreventive suspension to all public officials,

whether elective or appointive, who are underinvestigation. 5pon the other hand, in imposingthe shorter period of sixty $9+% days ofpreventive suspension prescribed in the !ocalovernment #ode of )**) on an elective localofficial $at any time after the issues are joined%, itwould be enough that $a% there is reasonableground to believe that the respondent hascommitted the act or acts complained of, $b% theevidence of culpability is strong,$c% the gravity ofthe offense so warrants, or $d% the continuancein office of the respondent could influence the

witnesses or pose a threat to the safety andintegrity of the records and other evidence. u'o' u'(/ O@:u(@&' L& @u oo /u u'o' :y @@:/ o= u> :/&', to wit-

T P/('.


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the charge against such officer or employeeinvolves dishonesty, oppression or gravemisconduct or neglect in the performance ofdutyA $b% the charges would warrant removalfrom the serviceA or $c% the respondentBscontinued stay in office may prejudice the casefiled against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until

the case is terminated by the 0ffice of the0mbudsman :u 'o @o/ &' @o',without pay, except when the delay in thedisposition of the case by the 0ffice of the0mbudsman is due to the fault, negligence orpetition of the respondent, in which case theperiod of such delay shall not be counted incomputing the period of suspension hereinprovided.


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/anila

SE#0(' '272S20(

G.R. No. 17-81- Au


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?. 'irecting the Sangguniang "ayan of>uban, Sorsogon to serve anew thepetitioner with a copy of the'ecisionesolution (o. )8D8++< andfrom receipt of which the petitioner shallenjoy his right to appeal such decisionto the Sangguniang Panlalawiganpursuant to Section I9J: of .&. :)9+.

6ith costs against the respondentsSangguniang "ayan /embers and /unicipal/ayor.

S0 0'EE'.))

The trial court having denied)8petitioners/otion for econsideration,)the petitioners filedthe present Petition for eview on #ertiorari,manifesting early on that they are raising onlyquestions of law. They fault the trial court)?

). . . . in holding that the Sangguniang"ayan of >uban, Sorsogon, furnishedrespondent with a copy of its esolution(o. )8D8++


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Panlalawigan, as the case may be. $Emphasisand underscoring supplied%

The conditions that would afford respondent tofile a petition for certiorari under ule 9< of theules of #ourt as he did file one before the T#

Q that a tribunal, board, or officer exercisingjudicial or quasiDjudicial functions has actedwithout or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or

with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lacor excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy inthe ordinary course of law Q are not herepresent.avvphi

HERE!ORE, the petition is GRANTED. The0ctober 8?, 8++< 'ecision of the egional Trial#ourt of Sorsogon #ity, "ranch


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/anila

T32' '272S20(

G.R. No. 17-626 "&/ *, 2--8

THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGA% O!BARANGA% DON "ARIANO "ARCOS,"UNICIPALIT% O! BA%O"BONG PRO#INCEO! NUE#A #ISCA%A //'( :yBARANGA% $AGAAD JOSE CENENSANTOS, "ARIO BACUD, ALTER!RANCISCO, ROSITA SEBASTIAN, LAURETACABAUATAN, CECILIA ALINDA%U &'( "EL%SI"ANGAN,petitioners,vs.PUNONG BARANGA% SE#ERINO"ARTINE),respondent.

' E # 2 S 2 0 (

CHICONA)ARIO, J.

This is a Petition for eview on )ertiorariunderule ?< of the ules of #ourt, assailing the0rders dated 8+ 0ctober 8++


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of the Punong "arangay of "arangay'on /ariano /arcos, "ayombong,(ueva 7i=caya and for complainant>0SE #E(E( S&(T0S to #0(T2(5Eassuming and discharging the functionsof the said office in T2( #&PT4pursuant to the provisions of Sections9: and 9; of epublic &ct (o. :)9+.

0n 89 &ugust 8++


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&rticle )8


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"ayan may impose on the erringelective barangayofficial is suspensionA if itdeems that the removal of the official fromservice is warranted, then it can resolve that theproper charges be filed in court.

Petitioner alleged that an interpretation whichgives the judiciary the power to remove localelective officials violates the doctrine of

separation of powers. This allegation runscontrary to the )*;: #onstitution itself, as wellas jurisprudence.

The )*;: #onstitution is explicit in defining thescope of judicial power. 2t establishes theauthority of the courts to determine in anappropriate action the validity of acts of thepolitical departments. 2t speas of judicialprerogative in terms of duty.8)Paragraph 8,Section ), &rticle 7222 of the )*;: #onstitution,provides that-

>udicial power includes the duty of thecourts of justice to settle actualcontroversies involving rights which arelegally demandable and enforceable,and o (/@' / o/ 'o /& :' & &:u o= (/o'&@ou''< o l&F o/ o=

?u/(o' o' &/ o= &'y :/&'o/ '/u@'&ly o= Go>/'@'.$Emphasis provided.%

The doctrine of separation of powers is notabsolute in its applicationA rather, it should beapplied in accordance with the principle ofchecs and balances. The removal from office ofelective officials must not be tainted withpartisan politics and used to defeat the will of thevoting public. #ongress itself saw it fit to vestthat power in a more impartial tribunal, the court.1urthermore, the local government units are notdeprived of the right to discipline local electiveofficialsA rather, they are prevented fromimposing the extreme penalty of dismissal.

Petitioner questions the 'ecision dated 8+0ctober 8++< of the trial court for allowing thepetition filed before it as an exception to thedoctrine of exhaustion of administrativeremedies. 2f, indeed, the Sangguniang "ayanhad no power to remove /artine= from office,then /artine= should have sought recourse fromthe Sangguniang Panlalawigan. This #ourtupholds the ruling of the trial court.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrativeremedies calls for resort first to the appropriateadministrative authorities in the resolution of acontroversy falling under their jurisdiction beforethe same may be elevated to the courts of

justice for review. (onDobservance of thedoctrine results in lac of a cause of action,which is one of the grounds allowed by theules of #ourt for the dismissal of thecomplaint.88

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrativeremedies, which is based on sound public policyand practical consideration, is not inflexible.There are instances when it may be dispensedwith and judicial action may be validly resortedto immediately. &mong these exceptions are- )%where there is estoppelon the part of the partyinvoing the doctrineA 8% / &ll'


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,Petition is DENIEDand the assailed 'ecision ofthe "ayombong T# in Special #ivil &ction (o.9:8: is A!!IR"ED.

SO ORDERED.

Jnares'Santiago, )hairperson, -ustria'!artine2,, *achura, %eyes, "".,concur.

ule 9 sec ? )**: rules of civil procedure responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, act with So' 6. an/ and 0alary.C The


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p

So' +.Local government ordinances. C 2nany action involving the validity of a localgovernment ordinance, the correspondingprosecutor or attorney of the local governmentalunit involved shall be similarly notified andentitled to be heard. 2f such ordinance is allegedto be unconstitutional, the Solicitor eneral shall

also be notified and entitled to be heard. $?a,9?%

Ru:l o= Pl'Co'udicial and "ar #ouncil, andfrom a list of three $% nominees for eachvacancy thereafter, which shall be filled within

three $% months after it occurs, each of whichlist shall be published in a newspaper of generalcirculation.

2n the organi=ation of the 0ffice of the0mbudsman for filling up of positions therein,regional, cultural or ethnic considerations shallbe taen into account to the end that the 0fficeshall be as much as possible representative ofthe regional, ethnic and cultural maeDup of the1ilipino nation.

So' 5. -ualifications.C The 0mbudsmanand his 'eputies, including the SpecialProsecutor,

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