Logistics Training and Advisory Teams in Iraq in the Chinese PLA MARCH–APRIL 2010 FORMERLY ARMY...

GFEBS:AdvancingSustainers’CapabilitiesTheContainerManagementQuandaryTransitioningaBaseFromCoalitiontoU.S.ControlLogisticsintheChinesePLA

WWW.ALU.ARMY.MIL/ALOG

MARCH–APRIL 2010 FORMERLY ARMY LOGISTICIAN

Logistics Training and Advisory Teams in Iraq

Approvedforpublicrelease;distributionisunlimited.PB700-10-02Headquarters,DepartmentoftheArmy

ALU’sCollegeofProfessionalandContinuingEducation —RichardW.Price

GFEBS:AdvancingSustainers’Capabilities —LieutenantColonelKarlE.Lindquistand ChristopherLyew-Daniels

StrategicLeadershipCompetenciesCannotWait —MajorAmyL.Gouge

OIFFuelDistributionChallenges —MasterSergeantJohnnyA.Castillo

TheContainerManagementQuandary —MajorDarrylR.Weaver,USAR

The10ThingsWarrantOfficersNeedtoKnow AboutARFORGEN—ChiefWarrantOfficer(W–4) RichardC.Myers,Jr.

TransitioningaBaseFromCoalitiontoU.S.Control —MajorBrianLesiak

LogisticsTrainingandAdvisoryTeams:AConcept intheMaking—MajorMichaelF.Hammond

LogisticsPartneringLessons —ChiefWarrantOfficer(W–2)JulianPrice

StartingaPartnershipThroughLogisticsKeyLeader Engagement—LieutenantColonelChristopherJ.Whittaker

ImprovingAccesstoHAZMATTransportationInformation —Dr.UptonR.ShimpandChristineL.Holiday

PB700–10–02VOLUME42ISSUE2MARCH–APRIL2010www.alu.army.mil/alog

3

7

8

10

16

18

22

26

29

32

Cover:AstheArmypreparestoreduceitspresenceinIraq,oneofitsmostsignificanttasksistotraintheIraqiArmytomanageandmaintainitsownsupply,maintenance,andtransportationsystems.U.S.logisticstrainingandadvisoryteamsandmilitarytransitionteamsaredeployedthroughoutIraqtoteachIraqisoldiershowtomosteffectivelycompletelogisticstasks,likeorderingsuppliesandmaintainingequipment.Thearticlesstartingonpages18,22,26, and29 highlightsomerecenttrainingteammissionsinIraq.Onthecover,amilitarytransitionteamSoldiertrainsa6thIraqiArmyDivisionsoldiertochangeoutheadlightassembliesonahigh-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehicleinKadhimiya,Iraq.(Photo by Petty Officer 2d Class Robert J. Whelan, U.S. Navy)

52

2

PAGE

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS

HEADLINES

WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT

COMMENTARY

FOCUS

ImprovingTrainingforRecruiters —ColonelJamesH.ComishandDonaldD.Copley,Jr.

OperationKilowatt:TheGeneratorShopinaModular EngineerBattalion—FirstLieutenantLeslieMcCann

Commentary:WorkingOutattheJIIM:Embracingthe CommercialSectorasFirstAmongEquals —Dr.ChristopherR.Paparone

StrategicMobility—ColonelKennethE.Hickins

LogisticsinthePLA—Dr.MartinAndrew

JOYCE E. MORROWAdministrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

1000712

BOARD OF DIRECTORSChairman

Major General James E. ChambersCommander

ArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommand

MembersLieutenant General Mitchell H. Stevenson

DeputyChiefofStaff,G-4DepartmentoftheArmy

Lieutenant General N. Ross Thompson IIIPrincipalMilitaryDeputy

totheAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyAcquisition,Logistics,andTechnology

Lieutenant General James H. PillsburyDeputyCommandingGeneral

ArmyMaterielCommand

Lieutenant General Edgar E. Stanton IIIMilitaryDeputyforBudget

AssistantSecretaryoftheArmyFinancialManagementandComptroller

Lieutenant General Eric B. SchoomakerTheSurgeonGeneral

Ex OfficioBrigadier General Jesse R. Cross

TheQuartermasterGeneral

Brigadier General Lynn A. CollyarChiefofOrdnance

Brigadier General Brian R. LayerChiefofTransportation

Brigadier General Mark A. McAlisterCommander

ArmySoldierSupportInstitute

Brigadier General Joseph L. BassCommandingGeneral

ArmyExpeditionaryContractingCommand

Major General James K. GilmanCommandingGeneral

ArmyMedicalResearchandMaterielCommand

ARMY LOGISTICS UNIVERSITYColonel Shelley A. Richardson

President

Barbara G. MroczkowskiVicePresident

STAFFRobert D. Paulus,Editor

Kari J. Chenault,AssociateEditorApril K. Morgan,AssistantEditor

Julianne E. Cochran,AssistantEditorLouanne E. Birkner,AdministrativeAssistant

GraphicsartsandlayoutbyRCW Communication Design, Inc.

Thismediumisapprovedfortheofficialdissem-inationofmaterialdesignedtokeepindividualswithintheArmyknowledgeableofcurrentandemergingdevelopmentswithintheirareasofexpertiseforthepurposeofenhancingtheirpro-fessionaldevelopment.

ByOrderoftheSecretaryoftheArmy:

GEORGEW.CASEY,JRGeneral,UnitedStatesArmy

ChiefofStaff

Official:

34

37

38

39

46

51

Army Sustainment(ISSN0004–2528)isabimonthlyprofessionalbulletinpublishedbytheArmyLogisticsUniversity,2401QuartersRoad,FortLee,Virginia23801–1705.Periodicalspost-ageispaidatPetersburg,VA23804–9998,andatadditionalmailingoffices.

Mission:Army SustainmentistheDepart-mentoftheArmy’sofficialprofessionalbulletinonsustainment.Itsmissionistopublishtimely,authoritativeinformationonArmyandDefensesustainmentplans,programs,policies,opera-tions,procedures,anddoctrineforthebenefitofallsustainmentpersonnel.Itspurposeistoprovideaforumfortheexchangeofinformationandexpressionoforiginal,creative,innovativethoughtonsustainmentfunctions.

Disclaimer:Articlesexpressopinionsofauthors,nottheDepartmentofDefenseoranyofitsagencies,anddonotchangeorsupersede

officialArmypublications.Themasculinepro-nounmayrefertoeithergender.

Reprints:ArticlesmaybereprintedwithcredittoArmy Sustainmentandtheauthor(s),exceptwhencopyrightisindicated.

Distribution:Unitsmayobtaincopiesthroughtheinitialdistributionsystem(DAForm12series).Privatedomesticsubscriptionsareavailableat$23.00peryearbywritingtotheSuperintendentofDocuments,P.O.Box371954,Pittsburgh,PA15250–7954,orbyvisitinghttp://bookstore.gpo.govontheWeb.Forcreditcardorders,call(866)512–1800.SubscribersshouldsubmitaddresschangesdirectlytoArmy Sustain-ment(seeaddressbelow).Army SustainmentalsoisavailableontheWorldWideWebathttp://www.alu.army.mil/alog.

Postmaster:Sendaddresschangesto:EDITORARMYSUSTAINMENT/ALU/2401QUARTERSRD/FTLEEVA23801–1705.



HEADLINES


COMMENTARY

FOCUS



HEADLINES


COMMENTARY

FOCUS



HEADLINES


COMMENTARY

FOCUS

14PAGE

2 ARMY SUSTAINMENT



HEADLINES


COMMENTARY

FOCUS

ALU’sCollegeofProfessionalandContinuingEducation

W iththeopeningoftheArmyLogistics University(ALU)atFortLee,Virginia,on 2July2009,mostoftheeducationalpro-gramsofferedbyALU’spredecessor,theArmyLogis-ticsManagementCollege(ALMC),shiftedtoanewcollegeunderALU:theCollegeofProfessionalandContinuingEducation(CPCE).

Thenewcollege,asthehomeofthefunctionalcoursesthatpreviouslybelongedtoALMC,neededanappropriatenewname.Afterthoughtfulconsiderationofavarietyofproposals,thename“CollegeofProfes-sionalandContinuingEducation”wasselectedforthreeprimaryreasons.First,iteffectivelyreflectsthecollege’stwocentralmissions:professionaldevelopmentandcontinuingeducation.Second,CPCEisalsowell-suitedtorepresentthecollege’sthreecorecompetencyareas:logistics,acquisition,andoperationsresearch.Finally,thenewnamecloselyparallelsthenamesusedforsimi-larprogramsatuniversitiesthroughouttheUnitedStates.

Thenewcollegecomprisesfoureducationaldepart-ments.ThenamesoftwodepartmentswerechangedfromthoseusedinALMCtomoreaccuratelyreflectthecurrentnatureoftheirrespectivecourses.AllfourdepartmentsoffercoursesprimarilyaimedatArmyandotherDepartmentofDefense(DOD)civilianemployees;however,quiteafewcoursesareequallyappropriateforuniformedmilitarypersonnel.

TheDepartmentofSystemsAcquisition(DSA)offerscoursesforacquisitionandnon-acquisitionprofessionals.AcquisitionprofessionalsmakeuptheArmyAcquisitionCorpsandtheArmyAcquisitionWorkforce.DSAcoursesforacquisitionprofessionalsaretaughtattheALUHuntsvilleCampusinHuntsville,Alabama.Thissatel-litelocationishometobasicandadvancededucationforofficersinfunctionalarea(FA)51,acquisition,andfornoncommissionedofficers(NCOs)inmilitaryoccupa-tionalspecialty51C,acquisition,logistics,andtechnologycontractingNCO.Non-acquisitionprofessionalsworkinjobsthatspanthespectrumofcivilianandmilitaryspecialties,buttheirjobsrequirethemtobeinvolvedwithacquisitionprocesses.AnexampleofacourseofferedfortheseemployeesistheContractingOfficer’sRepresent-ative(COR)Course,whichiswidelyviewedbytheArmyacquisitioncommunityasthebenchmarkforCORtrain-ing.Coursesfornon-acquisitionprofessionalsaretaughtatFortLee.

TheDepartmentofSystemsEngineering(DSE)ishometoallcoursesrelatedtooperationsresearchandsystemsanalysis(ORSA).ItconductsFA49,ORSA,

educationbothatthefoundationlevelandforthequalifi-cationlevelofIntermediateLevelEducation.CivilianemployeesinArmyCareerProgram16(engineersandscientists,non-construction)alsoreceivetheirbasicandadvancededucationthroughDSEcourses.

TheDepartmentofStrategicLogistics(DSL)offerscoursesaimedatemployeeswhosepositionsareinvolvedwithnational-andstrategic-levellogistics.UnderALMC,thisdepartmentwasknownastheMate-rielManagementDepartment.Thenewnamemoreclearlyreflectsthenatureoftoday’scourses,whichfocusonstate-of-the-artmanagementofsupplyandmaintenancefrominstallationtoDODlevels.DefenseLogisticsAgencyandArmyMaterielCommandper-sonnelaretypicalcustomersforDSLcourses.

TheDepartmentofAdvancedLogisticsStudies(DALS)ishometocoursesintendedforlogisticspro-fessionalsworkingattheoperationallevel.WithinALMC,thisdepartmentwasknownastheLogisticsExecutiveDevelopmentDepartment.DALSisperhapsbestknownforitsInternLogisticsStudies(iLog)andTheaterLogisticsStudies(TLog)Programs.DALSisalsowidelyknownforitscoursesinjointandmultina-tionallogisticsandforrecentinitiativesintheareaofinteragencylogistics.

CPCEplaysalargeroleinprofessionaleducationforthelogistics,ORSA,andacquisitioncommunities.How-ever,manyofthecollege’scoursescanbereadilyclassi-fiedascontinuingeducation,includingcoursesinallthreecorecompetencyareas.AnewALUinitiativefor2010istoestablishcontinuingeducationunits(CEUs)forapplicablecourses.[ACEUequals10contacthoursofinstructioninacontinuingeducationprogram.]MostCPCEcourseswillbesuitableforCEUcredit.EffortsareunderwaytoresearchtheCEUevaluationmetho-dologiesandaccreditationrequirementsthatwillbeneededtoformallyestablishsuchaprogram.Thecol-legebelievescontinuingeducationbenefitsstudentsbyhelpingthemtomaintaintheirprofessionalstatusandsupportingtheirfutureadvancement.Continuingeduca-tionofemployeesisalsoameasureofanorganization’scommitmenttoexcellence

RichaRd W. PRice, P.e., is dean of the col lege of PRo fes sional and continuing educa tion at the aRmy lo gistics univeRsity at foRt lee, viR ginia. he holds ba cheloR’s and mas teR’s de gRees in civil engineeRing fRom old dominion univeRsity and an m.b.a. degRee fRom floRida insti tute of technology. he is a licensed PRo fes sional engi neeR in the state of viRginia.

by RichaRd W. PRice

MARCh–ApRIL 2010 3

GFEBS:AdvancingSustainers’Capabilities

Ifyouhaven’theardbynow,theArmyisinthe midstofdeployinganew,revolutionaryfinancial systemcalledtheGeneralFundEnterpriseBusi-nessSystem(GFEBS).Justhowbigisit?Inthenext2years,over79,000end-usersatmorethan200ArmyfinancialcentersaroundtheworldwilltransitionfromlegacysystemstothemoreadvancedGFEBS.

Processingoveramilliontransactionsadayandmanagingapproximately$140billioninspendingbytheActiveArmy,ArmyNationalGuard,andArmyReserve,GFEBSwillbeoneoftheworld’slargestenterprisefinancialsystems.ThemostappealingcharacteristicofGFEBSisthatitisnotjustforfinancialmanagementprofessionals.Manyotherusers,suchassupplyandpropertybookmanagers,engineersandpublicworkspersonnel,realpropertymanagers,andleadersatalllev-elswilluseorhaveaninterestinGFEBS.

GFEBSisaweb-based,enterpriseresourceplanning(ERP)solutionthatusesacommercial-off-the-shelfsystemthatallowsuserstosharefinancial,asset,realproperty,andaccountingdataacrosstheArmy.Usersinvolvedinanyofthosefunctionsneedtopayatten-tiontoGFEBSdevelopmentsbecausethispowerfulsystemwillundoubtedlyaffectmanyoftheArmy’scurrentprocesses.That,inturn,willdriveentirelynewtrainingprogramstoensurethatGFEBSissuccess-fullydeployedandsustained.

WhatValueDoesGFEBSAdd?AccordingtoColonelSimonHolzman,theGFEBS

ProgramManager,theobjectivesofGFEBSareto“improveperformance,standardizebusinessprocesses,ensureamoderncapabilityexiststomeetfutureneeds,andprovidetheArmy’sdecisionmakerswithrelevant,reliable,andtimelyinformation.”Thevalueofprovid-ingreliableandtimelydatacannotbeoverstatedandisperhapsthemostsignificantdrivingforcebehindthemassivetransitiontoGFEBS.GFEBSwillallowtheArmytogenerateacomplete,auditablefinancialstate-mentthatmeetsthecongressionalmandatespelledoutintheFederalFinancialManagementImprovementActof1996.Theincreaseinfinancialtransparencyprovid-edbyGFEBSwillimprovetheArmy’scredibilityand

assuredlyleadtobetterrelationswithitscongressionalpurseholders.

GFEBShastremendouspotentialtobenefitfinan-cialmanagers,assetmanagers,accountants,logisti-cians,andcommandersbecauseitoffersnewandimprovedcapabilitiestosupportthemodular,joint,andexpeditionaryArmy.AsanERPtool,GFEBSiscapableofsharingcommondataacrossmultipleagen-ciesandactivities.Currently,theArmyhasmorethan100financial,realproperty,asset,andaccountingmanagementsystems;thisresultsinahostofinte-grationchallenges.GFEBSintegratesover80percentofthesesystems,creatingasingle,authoritativesourceforfinancialandrelatednonfinancialdatafortheArmy’sentireGeneralFund.ImaginehowmuchmoreefficienttheArmywouldbeifallusershadaccesstothesamemasterdata.ByusingGFEBS,financialmanagementandnon-financial-managementprofes-sionalswillbeabletodevotemoretimetoanalysesandlesstimetoprocessingtransactions.

Fromanend-userperspective,GFEBSsignificantlydecreasesthenumberofmanualreconciliationscur-rentlybeingperformed;improvestheplanning,pro-gramming,budgeting,andexecutionprocessthroughtheuseofintegratedoutputdata;eliminatescycletimesandsystemcustomizations;standardizesbusinesspro-cessesandinputoftransactionsacrosstheArmytosupportcostmanagementactivities;andprovidesaccu-rate,reliable,andreal-timedata.Armyfinancialman-agementprofessionalsalsobenefitthroughimprovedcostmanagementandcostcontrol,increasedtimetoperformfinancialanalyses,andmoreaccuratemeasure-mentofthevalueandlocationofGovernmentproperty.

GFEBSSustainmentTrainingAstheArmycontinuestheunprecedentedconver-

sionfromitsmanyarchaicandsometimesunwieldyautomationsystemstothesuperiorERPsystemthatGFEBSprovides,theArmySoldierSupportInstitute’sFinancialManagementSchoolisleaningforwardtoensurethatsustainmenttrainingisavailablewhenGFEBSreachesfulloperationalcapability(currentlyscheduledfor1January2012).

The General Fund Enterprise Business System is providing a new foundationfor how the Army manages and accounts for its money. Financial managersas well as logisticians need to know how GFEBS works and how it will benefit them.

by Lieutenant coLoneL KaRL e. Lindquist

and chRistoPheR LyeW-danieLs

4 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

Understandingtheneedtohaveawell-trainedandeducatedGFEBSworkforce,theArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand(TRADOC)approvedtheAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyforFinancialMan-agementandComptroller’srequesttodesignatetheFinancialManagementSchoolastheproponentforGFEBSsustainmenttraining.Withthisdesignation,theFinancialManagementSchoolisresponsiblenotonlyfordelineatingGFEBStrainingrequirementsforfinancialmanagementprocessesbutalsofordevelop-ingtrainingproductsfornon-financial-managementGFEBSusers.Throughdiligentcoordinationeffortswithexternalagencies,theFinancialManagementSchoolisdevelopingaGFEBStrainingstrategythatwillofferafullcomplementoftrainingopportu-nitiestosatisfytheneedsofallGFEBSoperatorsandstakeholderswhoseparticipationisrequiredtoensurethesystem’ssustainment.

TheFinancialManagementSchooliscurrentlygatheringGFEBStrainingproductsandtoolsinordertobeginadaptingthemtomeetTRADOCrequire-ments.TRADOC-approvedtrainingmaterialswillserveasthefoundationforcreatingnewFinancial

ManagementSchoolcoursesrelatedtotheschool’scompo-nentsofGFEBSandforalign-ingtheschool’scurrentlegacycourses.TheFinancialMan-agementSchoolsustainmenttrainingstrategywillbeflexibleenoughtomeettheneedsofallactivitieswhileprovidingtherigorandsub-stanceneededtoensurethatstudentscangraspthelearn-ingobjectives.

TheFinan-cialManage-mentSchoolwillofferbothcomputer-basedandinstructor-ledtraining.GFEBSstu-dentswillbe

abletotrainattheirowncomputersatworkorreceiveinstructor-ledtrainingattheFinancialManagementSchoolatFortJackson,SouthCarolina.Dependingonthepopularityofthecourses,amobiletrainingteammaybeavailabletoconductGFEBStrainingatstu-dents’dutystations.

CourseOfferingsUpdatingexistinglegacycoursesisatoppriority

fortheFinancialManagementSchool.ThesecourseswillbethefirstcoursesadjustedtointroducetheappropriateGFEBSconcepts,theory,andterminol-ogy.About82hoursofGFEBStrainingwillbeinte-gratedintoprofessionalmilitaryeducation,suchasadvancedindividualtraining,noncommissionedofficerandofficercourses,andsomefunctionalcourses.TheFinancialManagementSchoolwillensurethatleadersgetqualityexposuretoGFEBSattheschoolhousesotheyarenotblindsidedattheirnextassignments.

Tocoverfinancialmanagementtechnicaltrain-ing,eightnewGFEBScourseswillbeoffered.Thesecourseswillprovidethemechanics,or“howto”training,thatstudentswillneedtoaddresstheactual

The Financial Management School is developing eight new GFEBS training courses (top of chart), two new educational courses (bottom of chart), and a full menu of training products for non-financial-management users. The school’s strategy is to take the training products generated by the GFEBS pro gram manager for fielding and adapt them to meet both Army Training and Doctrine Command com pliance requirements and the needs of specific training audiences throughout the Army.

Principles of Cost Accounting and Management

Reimbursables

Funds Management

Intermediate Cost Accounting and Management

Spending Chain

Project Systems

Legacy Courseware(Advanced Individual Training,

Noncommissioned Officer Education System, Officer Education System)

Education

Technical Training

Executive Level

Cost Management

Financials

Instructor-Led Training Distributed Learning

GFEBS Sustainment Course Offerings

Non-Financial Management Roles • Training Support Packages• Distributed Learning Products

GFEBS Essentials

GFEBSPM

Training(53 Courses)


workingofvariousprocessesinGFEBS.Studentswilllearnhowtoprocesstransactions,generateandinterpretreports,andexecutetheiruserroleseffec-tively.Threeinstructor-ledcourses(Financials,CostManagement,andExecutiveLevel)willbeconductedatFortJacksoninaclassroomenvironment.Fivedis-tributedlearningcourses(GFEBSEssentials,Reim-bursables,FundsManagement,SpendingChain,andProjectSystems)willbeaccessedfromanemployee’scomputeratworkorathome.Itisthesedistributedlearningcoursesthatwillprovidenewemployeeswiththeessentialknowledgeandskillstheywillneedtograspthefundamentalsofthebusinessprocessesinwhichtheywillbeengaged.Anentiresuiteofcourse-wareisplannedfordevelopmentfornon-financialmanagementusers.

ACatalystforInstillingaCostCultureInatimeofpersistentconflict,theArmyisincrea-

singlychallengedtoachievesatisfactoryresultswithfewerandfewerresources.Seniorleadersarefacedwiththemonumentaltaskofjustifyingresourcerequestswhentheyhaveonlylimitedtransparencyofcurrentexpenditures,andoftentheymustrelyonestimatesthatcanbeeasilyquestioned.Wecan’tbegintounderstandwhatweneedifwecan’tunderstandwhatwe’veexecuted.Howmuchdoesapatrolbasecostannually?HowmucharetheannualsustainmentcostsforabrigadecombatteaminIraq?WhatistheimpactofexpandingLogisticsCivilAugmentationProgramrequirements?

Resourcemanagers,logisticians,andaboveall,commandersanddirectorsmustbemoreproactiveininstillingacostculturewithintheiragencies,activities,andunits.Leadersmustactivelyidentifyandmanagecosts,leverageeverydollarexpended,andpracticegoodstewardshipasadailyfunction.Costcontrolmustbearoutineanddeliberatepractice—anewwayofconductingbusinessintheArmy.Nolongercanwe“fireandforget”ourresourcesonhigh-dollarrequire-mentswithoutconductingfollowupcostanalysis.Dataonallofourexecutionmustbecaptured,logicallystored,andanalyzedforfuturedecisionsupportinfor-mation.GFEBSprovidesthenecessarytransparencyandthecapabilitiestoapplycostmanagementandcostaccountingprinciples.

Inthepast,theFinancialManagementSchoolrou-tinelyprovidedcostaccountingandmanagementedu-cationtothefield.However,inSeptember1992,whentheDeputySecretaryofDefensedirectedtheDefenseFinanceandAccountingService(DFAS)toassumetheaccountingandcostmissionfortheArmy,demandforthosecoursesplummeteduntiltheyeventuallyfadedintoobscurity.ThefieldingofGFEBS,how-ever,returnstheresponsibilityforcostaccountingandmanagementtotheArmy.Toaddresstheeducational

shortfallinthisvitalfinancialmanagementcapabil-ity,theFinancialManagementSchoolisintroducingtwonewcoursesthataimtoinfuseacostcultureamongjuniorofficersandciviliancareerprogram11(comptroller)personnel,PrinciplesofCostAccount-ingandManagement(PCAM)andIntermediateCostAccountingandManagement(ICAM).

ThePCAMandICAMcoursesareeach3weekslongandaredesignedtofocusontheprinciplesandconceptsassociatedwithcostaccountingandman-agement.PCAMwillbetheintroductorycourseandwillemphasizecostaccounting.ICAMwillbethefollow-oncourseandwillemphasizecostmanage-mentwhileintroducingrelevantcasestudies.PCAMandICAMwillprovidefinancialmanagersthecostaccountingandcostmanagementprinciplesandskillstheyneedtoexecuteessentialcostmanage-mentsupporttocommandersfacingasignificantlyresource-constrainedfuture.Thesecoursesmustbedevelopedandimplementedquicklyasenduringcomponentsoffinancialmanagementeducationaldevelopment.

TheGFEBSConnectiontoGCSS–ArmyManyastute“techies”areprobablywonderinghow

GlobalCombatSupportSystem-Army (GCSS-Army)workswithGFEBSsincelogisticiansexecuteasig-nificantportionoftheArmy’sfundingforacquiringsuppliesandequipment.Forthisreason,afederatedapproachisbeingdesignedthatwillallowthesetwopowerfulERPsystems,GFEBSandGCSS-Army,tocoexistandoperatewithrelativeautonomy.

Theplan,whichstillneedstobefinalized,isforGCSS-ArmytoadopttheGFEBSfinancialtemplateasthestandarddesignwhileretainingtheabilitytoapplyvariouslocalsolutiondesignsinsupportofitsuniquetacticalsupplyandrepairmission.Thisfeder-atedapproachisachievablesincebothoftheseERPsystemsuseSAP6.0astheirsolutionplatform.Asoftoday,thefederatedapproachincludesthefollowing:❏Divisionandinstallationfinancialmanagerswill

pushoperationandmaintenanceArmy(OMA)fund-ingfromGFEBStoGCSS-Armyinordertosupporttacticalunits,whichwillthenfullymanagethosefundsusingGCSS-Army.

❏GCSS-Armywillbethefinancialsystemofrecordfortacticalunitswhentheyaredeployedoringarrison.

❏GCSS-Armywillsupportfullspend-chainandreim-bursableprocesses.

❏FundsmanagementfortravelandtrainingwillnotbesupportedwithinGCSS-ArmyandwillremaininGFEBS.

❏TacticallogisticianswillonlyberequiredtooperatewithinGCSS-Army.

❏Financialreportingwillbeintegratedacrossthetwosystems(GCSS-ArmyandGFEBS).

6 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ThisfederatedapproachwillbetestedfirstattheNationalTrainingCenteratFortIrwin,California,dur-ingfiscalyear2010,whenbothoftheserevolutionaryERPsystemsarescheduledtobefieldedthere.

GFEBSFieldingUpdateGFEBSisbeingdeployedincrementallyin“waves”

alonggeographiclinesusingaregionalfocus(south-east,northeast,andsoforth).Wave1deploymentincludedFortJackson;FortStewart,Georgia;FortBenning,Georgia;ArmyInstallationManagementCommand(IMCOM)headquartersatArlington,Vir-ginia;IMCOMSoutheastRegionheadquartersatFortMcPherson,Georgia;TRADOCheadquartersatFortMonroe,Virginia;ArmyForcesCommandheadquartersatFortMcPherson;Headquarters,DepartmentoftheArmy;DFAS-Indianapolis,Indiana;andDFAS-Rome,NewYork.

Thesuccessofwave1deploymentsetthestagefortheglobalimplementationofGFEBStotherestoftheArmy.Uponcompletionofwave1,GFEBSwillbewellonitswaytoreplacingtheStandardFinanceSystem(STANFINS),themostwidelyusedstandardaccountingsystemforArmyinstallations,andtheStandardOpera-tionandMaintenanceArmyResearchandDevelopmentSystem(SOMARDS),whichiscurrentlyusedbythelogisticsandacquisitioncommunities.

Currently,GFEBSispreparingforitsnextmajordeploymentphase,wave2,scheduledfor1April2010.Wave2fieldingissummarizedinthecharttotheleft.

GFEBSisnowuponus,sobuckleyourchinstrapsandgetyourheadintheGFEBSgame.Wave1dep-loymentiscomplete,whilewave2sitesaredeeplyentrenchedwithGFEBSpredeploymenttrainingastheypreparefortheirgo-livedateof1April.Consid-eringtheamountofchangeinvolvedinthislong-over-duetransformation,itisessentialforallfutureGFEBSuserstolearnasmuchaspossibleaboutthispowerfulERPsolution.FormoreinformationonGFEBS,logontowww.gfebs.army.mil,orcontacttheFMSGFEBSdirector,LieutenantColonelKarlLindquist,[email protected],[email protected].

lieutenant colonel KaRl e. lindquist is the geneRal fund enteR-PRise business system diRectoR at the aRmy financial management school at foRt JacKson, south caRolina. he Recently seRved as g−8 of the 10th mountain division (light infantRy) at foRt dRum, neW yoRK. he PaRticiPated in oPeRation iRaqi fReedom With the division headquaRteRs, WheRe he managed all contingency funding foR multi-national division-centeR. he holds a b.a. degRee fRom viRginia tech and an m.b.a. degRee thRough the aRmy comPtRolleRshiP PRogRam at syRacuse univeRsity. he is a gRaduate of the aRmy command and gen-eRal staff college and is a ceRtified defense financial manageR.

chRistoPheR lyeW-daniels is a financial systems analyst assigned to the aRmy financial management school at foRt JacKson, south caRolina. he seRved on active duty foR oveR 21 yeaRs as a financial management PRofessional and holds an m.b.a. degRee fRom WebsteR univeRsity.

Wave 2 Deployment Sites(as of 28 October 2009)

TR

AIN

ING

ST

AR

TS

Seco

nd

Qu

arter Fiscal Y

ear 2010

GF

EB

S G

o L

ive1 A

pril 2010

Fort Rucker*Fort Buchanan*Fort Gordon*Fort Knox* Fort Bragg*Fort Drum*Fort Campbell*Fort Polk*ARNG-KentuckyHQs slice with MEDCOM, ACSIM,

ASA (FM&C), ARNG, and OCAR Fort McPherson (FORSCOM HQ) Fort Monroe (Slice)DFAS Indianapolis (Slice)DFAS Rome, New York (Slice) Chicago MEPS (Slice)

*Excludes all USASOC, INSCOM, ATEC, and OA22 unitson these locations during this wave.

GFEBS is scheduled to be fielded at the installations and sites shown above on 1 April 2010.

LegendACSIM =AssistantChiefofStaff forInstallationManagementARNG =ArmyNationalGuardASA(FM&C)=AssistantSecretary oftheArmy(Financial Managementand Comptroller)ATEC =ArmyTestandEvaluation CommandDFAS =DefenseFinanceand AccountingServiceFORSCOM =ArmyForcesCommandHQ =HeadquartersINSCOM =ArmyIntelligenceand SecurityCommandMEDCOM =ArmyMedicalCommandMEPS =MilitaryEntrance ProcessingStationOA22 =OperatingAgency (Headquarters,Department oftheArmy,Resource Management)OCAR =OfficeoftheChief, ArmyReserveUSASOC =U.S.ArmySpecial OperationsCommand


StrategicLeadershipCompetenciesCannotWait

by MajoR aMy L. GouGe

M odularizationhasgreatlyaffectedtheArmy overthelastseveralyears,particularly throughthedevelopmentandimplementationofmodifiedforcestructures.Thesemodifiedsustain-mentforcestructuresputalargeamountofcapabilityinthebrigadecombatteam’s(BCT’s)brigadesupportbat-talion(BSB)andforwardsupportcompanies(FSCs).

Undertheoldforcestructure,commandrelation-shipsinadivisionalunitwererelativelylinearanddirect.Theforwardsupportbattalionsandmainsup-portbattalionsprovideddirectsupporttotheirrespec-tivebrigades,buttheywereundertheoperationalcontrol(OPCON)ofthedivisionsupportcommand(DISCOM).Whowassupportingwhowasclearcut,andanysupportissuesrequiringadjudicationabovethebattalionlevelwerepassedtotheDISCOM.

Themodifiedforcestructuresdrivetheneedforlead-erstoadapttonewdoctrine.Alongwithadaptabilitycomesarequirementforquickerdevelopmentofcertainstrategicleadershipcompetencies.FieldManual(FM)6–22,ArmyLeadership:Competent,Confident,andAgile,definesstrategicleadershipasthetypeofleader-shipthatoccursatthehighestlevelsoftheorganization.Butstrategicleadershipcompetencieshavenowgainedmuchgreaterapplicabilitydowntothetacticallevel.Becauseofthemodificationofsustainmentforcestruc-tures,twoofthesecompetenciesinparticular,communi-catingandachievingconsensus,holdgreaterrelevanceintoday’soperatingenvironment.AccordingtoFM6–22,inorderforastrategicleadertoachieveconsensus,hemustusepeerleadershipratherthanstrictpositionalauthoritytomonitorprogresstowardthedesiredendstate.

ThemodularstructureassignstheBSBtotheBCT.Thisrelationshipisveryclear,anditmakessensefortheBCTcommandertoownhissustainmentassets.CoordinationbetweentheBSBandsupportedbattalionswithregardtotheuseofFSCsisessentialtoensuringmissionsuccessandaclearunderstandingofadminis-trativeandtrainingresponsibilities.Effectivecommu-nication,especiallyamongbattalionexecutiveofficersandoperationsofficers,ensuresthattheFSCsarefullysupportedandnotcaughtinthemiddleofdisputesbetweenstaffmembers.Ifthestaffmembersoftheseunitsarecommunicatingeffectivelythroughclearandopendialog,issuesshouldnothavetobeelevatedtothebattalioncommandersorBCTcommander.

Highersustainmentcommandstendtobemorecom-plicated.SustainmentbrigadesarenotundertheOPCONofadivision.Thehabitualsupportrelationshipdoesnot

existasitoncedidwiththeDISCOMs.Initsmissionofprovidingsupportonanareabasis,asustainmentbrigadesupportsawidemixofunitsthatareoftenfromdivi-sionsotherthantheonewithwhichitisaffiliated.

Althougha“plugandplay”conceptiseffectiveforbuildingcombatpower,thesustainmentbrigademustdealwiththechallengesofsubordinateunitsresidingatdifferentlocationsandcomingfromdifferentcompo-nentsthaninagarrisonenvironment.Whiledeployed,thedeploymenttimelinesofthecombatservicesupportbattalions,whichareassignedtosustainmentbrigades,tendtovary.Consequently,sustainmentbrigadesareconstantlydealingwithchangeoverscausedbytheirunits’staggeredarrivalsanddepartures.

Becauseofthemanydifferentsustainmentforcestruc-turesandthesustainmentbrigade’sareasupportmission,itiscriticaltoachieveconsensusintermsofwhatsupportcanbeprovidedtotheBSBs.Thecommandandcontrolstructurecreateschallengesattimes.Supportrelation-shipsarenotassimpleassaying“thisiswhoIworkforandalsowhoIsupport”becausetheseentitiesareveryrarely,ifever,oneandthesameatthehigherlevel.Sustainmentfield-gradeofficersespeciallymustworkwiththeirpeersandseniorleaderstoachieveconsensussotheirunitsreceivetherequisitesupport.Thisrequiresopencommunicationandanappreciationofeachother’smissionsandrequirements.Theabilitytoinfluenceothersoutsideofthechainofcommandthroughcommunicat-ingandachievingconsensusisaskillsetthatshouldbeobtainedbeforereachingthestrategiclevel.

Thedevelopmentandimplementationofmodifiedforcestructureshasaffectedsustainmentunits’commandandcontrolrelationshipsandalsotheskillsetsthatarerequiredforfield-gradeofficerstobesuccessfulinthoseunits.AlthoughtheBCThasagreatamountofsustain-mentcapability,competingrequirementsforexternalresourcesrequirefield-gradeofficerstoimprovetheircommunicationandnegotiationskills.Withouttheseskills,missionaccomplishmentbecomesmuchharderthannecessaryand,inextremecases,operationsmaybehindered.Logisticiansmustfigureouthowtoworkthroughthesesustainmentrelationshipsandensurethatthewarfighterscontinuetoreceivethebestsupportpossible.

maJoR amy l. gouge is the executive officeR of the 10th bRigade suPPoRt battalion, 1st bRigade combat team, 10th mountain divi-sion (light infantRy). she has a bacheloR’s degRee fRom the united states militaRy academy and is a gRaduate of the inteRmediate level education, aiRboRne, RiggeR, and JumPmasteR couRses.

8 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

S incethebeginningofmotorizedwarfare,suc- cessfulexecutionoffueldistributionhasbeena majorchallenge.ThischallengeremainsasgreattodayasitwasinWorldWarII.InthebeginningofOper-ationIraqiFreedom(OIF),oneofthebiggestsuccesseswasthedistributionofbulkfuel.Althoughfuelcontinuestobedistributedsuccessfully,thewayitisdistributedhaschangedsignificantlysincetheearlydaysofOIF.

InlandPetroleumDistributionSystemIntheinitialstageofOIF,bulkfuelwasdistributed

usingatacticalpipeline,theInlandPetroleumDistri-butionSystem(IPDS).Onereasonforthedecisiontousethissystemwastheshortageoffueltrucksintheareaofresponsibility(AOR).WithIPDS,theArmycouldissuemorethan1.5milliongallonsofJP8perdaydirectlyfromtheKuwaitirefineriestoafuelfarm.Morethan90milliongallonsoffuelwereusedinthefirst3monthsofOIF,60milliongallonsofwhichweretransportedviaIPDS.IPDSwasinstrumentaltothesuccessoftheinitialphaseofOIF.

AlthoughIPDSprovedtobeasuccess,itbecameapparentthatIPDSalonewouldnotmeettherequire-mentswhentheoperationcontinuedlongerthaninitially

plannedandthebattlefieldchangedfromalineartoanonlinearbattlefield.Italsobecameapparentthataddi-tionalfuelhubswouldbeneededthroughoutIraq.

In2003,mostofthefuelwasstoredinKuwaitandtransportedviaanIPDSpipelinetoIraq,whereitwasdeliveredtoCedarII,amajorhublocatedinsouth-centralIraq.Fromthere,itwasdeliveredbytrucktootherlocations.Asthebattlespacegrew,additionalhubshadtobeestablishedinwesternandnorthernIraq.ThedistancefromKuwaittothehubsinwesternandnorthernIraqwastoogreatfortheDepartmentofDefensetoeffectivelydistributefueltothoselocationsusingIPDS.ThisshortfallcreatedtheneedtobegindistributingfuelfromothersourcesclosertothehubsinwesternandnorthernIraq.

InthebeginningofOIF,onlyoneunitwasrespon-sibleforoverseeingthetheaterpetroleumdistributionplan:the49thQuartermasterGroup(PetroleumandWater),whichownedtheproductandthefueldistri-butionsystem.However,withtheincreaseinrequire-mentsandtheOIFbattlespacesignificantlyincreasing,itbecameclearthatexecutingthefueldistributionplanwouldrequiremorecoordinationandmoreLogisticsCivilAugmentationProgramcapability.

OIFFuelDistributionChallengesby MasteR seRGeant johnny a. castiLLo

Fuel trucks arrive at a fuel storage site for download.


DefenseEnergySupportCenterIncreasedstorageanddistributionrequirements

createdtheneedformorecoordinationwithstrate-gicpartnersandotherservices.TheDefenseEnergySupportCenter(DESC),theexecutiveagentforfueldistribution,providesthepolicies,contractadminis-trationfordelivery,accountability,andqualityassur-anceofDepartmentofDefensebulkfueltotheAOR.TheU.S.CentralCommand(CENTCOM)JointPetro-leumOfficeplansandcoordinatesthereceipt,stor-age,anddistributionofbulkpetroleumproductfortheCENTCOMAOR.

TheSub-AreaPetroleumOffice(SAPO)isthesinglepointofcontactforbulkfuelinlanddistributionintheCENTCOMAOR.TheSAPOmissionistoworkwithotheragenciestoensureallactionscoordinatedarevalidatedaccordingtotheJointPetroleumOffice’s

petroleumplansandpriorities.The1stTheaterSus-tainmentCommandatFortBragg,NorthCarolina,interfaceswithDESC,theCENTCOMJointPetroleumOffice,andSAPOtoplan,coordinate,anddistributebulkpetroleumintheCENTCOMAOR.

ThecurrentIraqtheaterfuelsupplyplanhasadailyrequirementof1.7milliongallonsofJP8,274,000gal-lonsofDF2,and31,000gallonsofmogas.Bulkfuelstoragecapacityhasgrownfrom8milliongallonsofJP8in2003tothecurrent40milliongallonsofJP8,8milliongallonsofDF2,and1.9milliongallonsofmogas.Thisfuelisstoredinacombinationoffourgeneralservicehubs,sixdirectservicehubsinIraq,andtwohubsinKuwait.

TurkeydeliversfueltonorthernIraq,andJor-dandeliverstowesternIraq.FuelrequirementsinsouthandcentralIraqcontinuetobesupportedfromKuwait.Currently,Kuwaitprovides57percentoftheJP8requirement,Jordanprovides28percent,andTurkeyprovides15percent.Eachgroundlineofcommunication(GLOC)executesitsfueldistribu-tioninuniquewayssinceallGLOCsfacedifferentchallenges,suchasgeography,truckavailability,orpoliticalinfluences.Currently,themostchalleng-ingGLOCofallprovidessupportfromTurkey.ThisGLOCisthemostunpredictableandhasthelongestvehicleturnaroundtime,whichvariesfrom14to24days.Tomeettherequirement,theTurkeydistributionnetworkrequiresmorevehiclesthanbothJordanandKuwait.Bycontrast,theaverageturnaroundtimefromKuwaitisabout6days.

AlthoughbulkfueldistributionremainsasmuchachallengetodayasitdidinthebeginningofOIF,itcon-tinuestobesuccessful.Thepetroleumcommunityhascometogethertoexecuteaplan.Dailycoordinationtakesplacebetweenstrategicagenciesandoperationalandtac-ticalcommands.In2008,morethan1billiongallonsoffuelweresuccessfullydistributedinsupportofOIF.

masteR seRgeant Johnny a. castillo is the PetRoleum and WateR noncommissioned offi ceR in chaRge foR the 1st theateR sustain-ment command at foRt bRagg, noRth caRo lina. he has 23 yeaRs of PetRoleum oPeRa tions exPeRience at the tactical, oPeRational, and stRategic levels. he holds a bacheloR’s degRee in accounting and is cuRRently PuR suing a masteR’s degRee in business.

Fuel storage site supporting fuel distribution operations in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.

10 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

C

TheContainerManagementQuandary by MajoR daRRyL R. WeaveR, usaR

ontainerizationofcargohasbeeninstrumental inincreasingsupply-chainvelocityinboththe militaryandcommercialsectors.Althoughtransloadefficiencyhasincreasedexponentiallysincecontainerizationwasintroducedmorethan5decadesago,thecurrentmanagementprocessesandprocedureshavecreatedanear-crisisforlogisticiansintheU.S.CentralCommand(CENTCOM)areaofoperations.

TheU.S.militaryhasbecomedependentonthegreatlyenhancedtransportationefficiencyofferedbycontainerization.Armylogisticians,however,arereluctanttoacknowledgethatthefluidandsometimesunpredictablenatureoflandwarfaremakescontainermanagement,accountability,andtrackingproblem-atic.Logisticsmanagersmustrealizethatiftheyfailtomakechangestothecurrentcontainermanagementsystem,acontainershortagemaybeimminent.

Tomaintainthecurrentlevelofsustainmenteffi-ciencywithintheCENTCOMareaofoperations,somecriticalchangesmustbemadetothecontainermanagementsystem.Ifimplementedeffectively,thesechangescouldalsosignificantlyreducethecostsofreplacingthousandsof“lost”containers.

HistoryofContainerizationIn1959,thecommercialshippingindustrywas

loadingandunloadinganaverageof0.627tonsofcargoperman-hour,accordingtoMatsonresearch.By1976,withcontainerizedshippingwell-estab-lished,thatfigureskyrocketedto4,234tonsperman-hour.Theexponentialgainsincontainermanagementefficiencyduringthe1960sand1970sdidnotgounnoticedbytheU.S.military.Thecapabilityofmov-ingmorecargofartherandfastermadeperfectsensetothemilitary,whichhadbecomemoreinvolvedinsustainingglobalengagements.

BythetimetheUnitedStatesbecameinvolvedintheVietnamWar,containerizationhadbecomeanextensivelyusedlogisticsmethodofoperation.Combinedwiththedevelopmentofautomatedsupply-orderingsystems,containerizationofcargoacceleratedthemovementofsuppliesthroughthelogisticspipelinefromcontinentalUnitedStatesinstallationsanddepotstooverseasunitsanddepots.

In1965,theArmyandAirForcejointlyownedalmost200,000containers.EverymajorArmyunitmov-ingintoVietnamcarrieditsaccompanyingsparepartsandsuppliesincontainers.Thedemandforcontainersincreasedastheconflictescalated,andeventually,the

SoutheastAsiatheaterinventoryexceeded75percentofthecontainersthenownedbytheArmyandAirForce.

The150,000containersintheaterrepresentedabout6millionsquarefeetofcoveredstorage.Thisfigureisimpressivewhencomparedtothefactthatonlyabout11millionsquarefeetofcoveredstoragehadbeenbuiltintheentireSoutheastAsiatheaterbymid-1969.ThesecontainersalsosatisfiedawidevarietyofSol-dier,unit,andsupportactivityneedsforconvenientandreadilyavailablestorageandshelters.U.S.forcesoftenusedcontainersasdispensaries,commandposts,postexchanges,andbunkers.FewofthecontainersmovedtoSoutheastAsiawereeverreturnedtotheUnitedStates.

Throughoutthepost-Vietnamera,cargocontain-erizationcontinuedtobeanintegralcomponentofsupporttogloballydeployedU.S.forces.Containersofferedalow-cost,easilysourcedmethodtobuildthelogisticsfootprint,increasesustainmentvelocity,andreducetransportationsupportandmanpowerrequire-ments.InAugust1990,forOperationDesertShield,theArmyagainwidelyemployedcargocontainersforamassivemilitarybuildupanddeployment.

DuringOperationDesertStormin1991,about40,000commercialandSpecialMiddleEastShip-mentAgreementcontainersweresenttoSouthwestAsia.Theshippingwasrelativelyeasy;determiningthecontentsofcontainerswasnot.Abouthalfofthecontainershadtobeopenedandmanuallysearchedorinventoriedtoascertaintheircontents.Manywereneverevenopened.Supplyrequestswentunfilledorhadtobesubmittedmultipletimes,degradingthereadinessandoperabilityoftherequestingunits.

AfterOperationDesertStormin1991,therapidevolutionoflogisticsautomationsystemsledtoimprovementsincontainercontentidentificationanddistribution.Theseimprovementspermittedthetransi-tionfrom“ironmountain”logisticstoaleaner,smarter“justintime”system,whicheliminatedthetime-consumingactofopeningcontainersattheport.Thesedevelopments,combinedwiththeuseofcoordinatedlandoperationsalonggroundlinesofcommunication,significantlyincreasedthemilitary’sabilitytotransportandpositionsuppliestosustaindeployedforces.Con-tainerizedcargomadelogisticssupportandsustainmentoperationsmoreprecise,flexible,andfar-reaching.

CurrentOperationalPictureContainerizedcargoenterstheOperationIraqiFree-

dom(OIF)theaterthroughboththecommercialPort


ContainerShortageAlthoughthecontainermanagementsystemwas

wellconceivedandwellplanned,theU.S.militaryisexperiencinganincreasingshortageofcontainerswithintheSouthwestAsiaareaofoperations.Thisshortagestemsnotfromlowaggregatenumbersofcontainersbutfromalowavailabilityofcontainerscausedbypoorcontainerturn-inandaccountabilityandtheuseofcontainersforfunctionsotherthanmov-ingcargo.Theincorrectuseofcontainersiscreatingashortfallwhereasufficientsupplyofcontainerswouldbeexpectedtobeavailableforcirculation.

Approximately11,000containersarerequiredannu-allytotransportsustainmentresourcesinIraqandKuwait.Today,containersarrivingattheSPODmaybeidentifiedbyradio-frequencytrackingdevices.Infor-mationoncontainerconsigneesisknownbeforeship-mentsarrive.Containermanagersandusersaregivenappropriateaccesstotheequipmenttrackingsystemto

ofShuaikh,Kuwait,andthemilitaryseaportofdebar-kation(SPOD)atthePortofAshShuwaiba,Kuwait.Fromtheports,groundandairtransportareusedtomovecontainerizedcargotothewarfighter.

Annually,anaverageof11,000containersarereceivedatthecommercialport,transloadedfromcarrier-ownedtoGovernment-ownedor-leasedcon-tainers,andmovedbyconvoyorcontractedbargetothesupplysupportactivities(SSAs)andforwardoper-atingbases(FOBs)withintheIraqibattlespace.Asys-temof10empty-containercollectionpoints(9inIraqand1inKuwait)receives,processes,updatesauto-matedrecordsof,andrecirculatescontainersthrougharoadnetworkcoveringanarearoughlythesizeofTexas.Deployingunitsarriveintheateratnearlythesametimeastheircontainerizedandheavyorganicequipment,whichisefficientlymovedwithrelativelyfewproblemsfromtheporttothetrainingandstagingareasandfromtheretotheFOBsandSSAsintheater.

Units often keep containers to store materiel. This creates a shortage of containers for transport and costs the Department of Defense additional funds to purchase or lease containers to transport materiel to and from the theater.

12 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

observethemovementofconvoystransportingcon-tainersfromtheSPODtotheFOB.Withanaverageof11,000containersenteringthetheaterannually,wewouldexpecttoseeemptycontainersnumberinginthethousandsateachcollectionpointoncethecon-tentshavebeenremovedfromthem.This,however,isnotthecase.

ContainerManagementSystemAswitheverycommodityandresourceownedor

employedbytheU.S.military,accountabilityispara-mountwhenitcomestocontainers.TheArmyhadsolvedtheproblemofhowtoefficientlytransportandtrack(throughradio-frequencyidentificationdevices)containers,aswellashowtoidentifycontainersandtheircontents.Thechallengethatstillfacedmilitarylogisticianswashowtoeliminatetheunrestricteddispositionofcontainers.Todealwiththisproblem,theArmydevelopedtheIntegratedBookingSystem-ContainerManagementModule(IBS–CMM).Thissystemiscurrentlytheprimaryelectronicmanage-mentandtrackingtoolusedtoaccountforcontainers.

IBS–CMMallowslogisticianstotrackcontainersonadigitaldatabase.Everytimethecontainersaremoved,logisticianscanaddorremovetheidentifi-cationnumbersofthecontainersatanidentifiablephysicallocation.Thisprocessiscalledin-gate/out-gate.Whendoneconsistentlyandreinforcedbyaphysicalinventory,IBS–CMMcanprovidenear-real-timetrackingofeachcontainer’slocationanditsdwelltimeateachlocation.

Theproblemencounteredbymilitarylogisticiansusingthiscontainermanagementsystemwasthedif-ficultyinenforcingthein-gate/out-gateprocedures.Lackoftimelydatainputandtheaccumulationofdata-entryerrorsoverthepast6yearshavemadedatainIBS–CMMinaccurateandunreliable.

Today,IBS–CMMlistsabout120,000recordsforcontainersatsitesinIraqandKuwait.However,whenduplicatenumbers,missingdataentries,andundocumentedexportsofcontainersfromtheaterarefactoredin,thedatabasemayhaveasfewas60,000to80,000validrecords.A2008LeanSixSigmateamanalysisofthisproblem,usingIBS–CMMdata,showederrorratesofthesampledcontainersitepop-ulationashighas81.6percent,withanaverageerrorrateof23percent.

Containermanagementexpertsfromthe1184thContainerManagementElement(CME),deployedfromMay2008toMay2009,wereassignedtocleanupinaccurateIBS–CMMdataintheOIFtheater.The1184thCMEworkeddayandnighttocorrectinaccu-raciesinthedatabasesocontainernumbersandsiteinformationwouldbereliable.TheCME’sgoalwastoupdateandmaintainaccuraterecordsbyenforcingthein-gate/out-gateprocedures.Thecleanupprocess

wastediousandprogressedslowly.TheCME,work-ingwithlimitedstafftoundo6yearsofpoordatamanagementpractices,successfullyidentifiedmorethan20,000falseorduplicaterecords.

ContainerAccountabilityWhenautomatedaccountingandinventoryman-

agementsystemsareusedeffectively,containersareaccuratelytrackedbynumberandlocation.Sowhyistherelativelysimplein-gate/out-gatetrackingprocessnotproperlyenforced?Containersarenotdiligentlyprocessedbecausecontainerusersdonotthinkcon-tainersareitemsthatrequirepropertrackingorac-countabilityprocedures.ThismindsetisperpetuatedbythecategorizationofcontainersasclassII(generalsupplies),whichareviewedasrelativelylow-cost,expendable,common-useassets.Inshort,usersofnonassignedcontainersarenotbeingheldaccount-ableforpropercontainerdisposition.

Transportequipmentisannotatedonunitpropertybooksandindividualhandreceipts.Butcontainersareoftennotplacedonpropertybooksandgenerallyareaccountedforonlywhenissuedtoaspecificunitorinstallationsupportactivity.Otherwise,noparticularentityaccountsforthem.Nomaintenancesupportactiv-ityisresponsibleforrepairingorrestencilingthem.Theyarecommon-userassetsandcanbeusedwithoutassigninganyaccountableorresponsibleparties.

Trucks,trailers,andmaterials-handlingequipmentareusuallyunderthecontrolofanassignedopera-tor.Theyhavemaintenanceschedules,propertybookentries,andhandreceiptholders.Ifapieceofequip-mentislostordamagedbeyondfairwearandtear,theresponsiblepartycanbeheldfinanciallyliable.Con-tainers,ontheotherhand,areprocuredandmanagedunderaprograminwhichmanydifferentindividuals,units,andsupportactivitiesusethem.Eachuserhasnomoreorlessaccountabilityandresponsibilityforthecontainersthantheothers.Noexistingrequirementadequatelyassignsaccountabilityandresponsibilitytothemanyusersofnonassignedcontainers.

ContainersVersusWarehouseStorageDuringtheVietnamWar,150,000emptycontainers

providedapproximatelyone-third(6millionsquarefeet)oftherequired17millionsquarefeetofcoveredstoragespace.The11,000containersannuallyputintocirculationintheOIFtheateraresupposedtobeavailableonlyfortransloadingandrecirculationinsustainmentoperations.However,asinVietnam,asimilarneedforwarehousespacealsoexistsintheSouthwestAsiatheater.Ofthe60,000to80,000containersthatmaycurrentlybeavailableintheOIFtheater,alargenumberarebeingusedforstoragebynumerousunitsandcontractedlogisticssupportactiv-ities,thuseffectivelyremovingthemfromcirculation.


Militaryunitsandcontractedoperatorsintheaterneedthereadilyavailablestoragecapabilityprovidedbycontainerstoperformtheirmissions.Contractorsavoidthecostofbuildingwarehousespacebyusingthe“free”containerstoragespace.A20-footcontain-erisapreconstructedfacilitywith160squarefeetoffloorspace.Thisamountofwarehousespacewouldcost$13,120tobuild,basedontheU.S.nationalaveragecostof$82persquarefoot,or$160permonthtolease.A15-month,continuousleaseof160squarefeetofspacewouldequalthecostofanewlypurchasedcontainer.Byusingcontainers,theU.S.militaryavoidsthecapitalcostofwarehousing.Butwhencontainersareusedaswarehousespace,theycannolongerfulfilltheirintendedpurposeasmobiletransportassets.

AstheOIFtheatermaturedandhundredsofunitsrotatedinandoutoftheater,operationalprioritiesshiftedandsodidmaterielrequirements.Militarylogisticianshadtoadjusttomeetthetheater’schang-ingneedforsupplies.ExistingunusedArmysupplystocksintheater,however,remained.UnusedclassII,IV(constructionandbarriermaterials),VI(per-sonaldemanditems),VIII(medicalmateriel),andIX(repairparts)itemspushedfromSSAstoend-usersthroughouttheareasofoperationswerenotretro-graded.WherecouldtheU.S.militarystore6yearsworthofexcess,nonexpended,andpossiblyunder-accounted-forsuppliesandmaterielintheater?Theseitemsarelikelytobefoundinthousandsofcontain-ersatcampsandsupplypointsinIraqandKuwait.

InNovember2008,aLeanSixSigmateamstudy-ingtheproblemofcontainershortagesintheatersampledapoolof1,433containerstodeterminetheirdwelltime.Althoughthesampledcontainerswereidentifiedasbeingavailablefortransloadingandcon-tinuouscirculation,68percent,or972ofthem,werefoundtohavebeenattheirpresentlocationsformorethan180days.TheestimatedtimeforcontainerstomovefromKuwaittoIraqandbackafteroffloadingshouldnothaveexceeded40days.Thisledthestudygrouptoconcludethatmanyofthecontainerstrans-portedtoIraq,likethoseinVietnam,hadbeentrans-formedintowarehousespace.

Althoughtheneedforstoragespaceisincreasing,warehouseconstructionisrestrictedbyhost-nationgov-ernments,whichdonotallowtheU.S.militarytocreateapermanentpresenceorpermanentstructuresinmostlocations.AtU.S.campsinKuwait,militaryactivitiesareexpresslyprohibitedfrombuildingpermanentfacili-ties.SimilarrestrictionsforthecreationofapermanentU.S.militaryfootprintareineffectinIraq.

Theuseofcontainersasstoragespacealsogrewoutofincreasedlogisticssupporttosupplylargermilitaryforcesdeployedtothetheater.InMarch2003,theU.S.militarycontractedsuppliesforonly

50,000troopsfor180daystosupportOIF.Today,theLogisticsCivilAugmentationProgram(LOGCAP)supportcontractissustainingaforceofmorethan200,000personnelacrossthefullspectrumofopera-tions.TheLOGCAPsustainmentcontracthasbeenineffectfor6½yearsintheater.However,despitesteadilyincreasinglogisticssupportandstoragerequirements,U.S.forcescontinuetooperateunderaplaninwhichnopermanentstructureswillbebuilttomeetthegrowingneedforwarehousespaceinKuwaitandIraq.

RecommendationsforChangeTomaximizetheavailabilityandcirculationof

cargocontainersinOIFandminimizethecostofreplacingthesevaluableassets,wemustimproveandenforcethesystemunderwhichcontainersarecurrent-lymanaged.Thefourrecommendationslistedbelowcanhelpensurethatwemaintainanadequatesupplyofavailablecontainersincirculationintheater.Ifimple-mented,theserecommendationscouldsignificantlyreducethelikelihoodofapotentialcontainershortage.

Institute stronger enforcement of in-gate/out-gate procedures. Theautomatedcontainermanagementsys-tem,IBS–CMM,issufficient,available,andinplaceinthetheaterforcontainermanagers.Butthesystemisonlyasgoodasitsusersmakeit.Highdata-inputaccuracyratesmustbeenforcedtoensurethatthedataarevalid.DatainIBS–CMMreportsshouldbeveri-fiedbyphysicalinventories.CMEstaffmustensurethatallsystemusersaresufficientlytrainedoninput-tingdata.Theyalsomustconductperiodicqualitycon-trolcheckstoverifydatainputaccuracy.

Aquarterlyorcycliccontainerinventoryscheduleshouldbedevelopedatallcontainercollectionsites.Thisactionwouldprovideanupdatedcountandver-ifythelocationofallcontainersateachcollectionsite.Itwouldalsohelpensurethatcontainersitedataarereliablesocontainermanagerscanmonitorcon-tainercirculationrates,movement,andusageinsup-portingsustainmentoperations.Accuratecontainercountswouldalsoproducereliabledataonavailablecontainers,enablingthedevelopmentofvalidprojec-tionsforanynecessarycontainerreplacements.

In-gate/out-gateproceduresandcontainer-usepoli-ciesshouldbeclearlyspelledoutanddisseminatedtomilitaryandcontractorusers.Forcontractors,thecontractscopeofworklanguageshouldalsoaddressfinancialpenaltiesforfailuretocomplywithcontain-ermanagementpoliciesandprocedures.ContractorsshouldalsobeassessedacurrentmarketvaluefeeforleasingGovernment-ownedcontainers,thusencour-agingminimaluseofcontainersforstoragespace.ContractorcomplianceshouldnotbedifficulttoachievesincetheGovernmentcanenforcecontractsornotrenewcontractsbasedonnoncompliance.

14 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

Informationonrulesforcontaineruse,enforce-mentofthein-gate/out-gateprocedures,andpoli-ciesfortheappropriateuseofcontainersmustalsobeconveyedtomilitarycontaineruserstogaintheircompliancewithcontainerpoliciesanddispositionrequirements.Compliancebymilitaryusersmaynotbeaseasytoenforce.

Track Government-owned and -leased containers by satellite.Satellitetrackingasameansformanag-ingcontainerswouldnotreplacetheIBS–CMMsys-tem.However,alongwithcyclicinventoryphysicalinspections,satellitetrackingwouldprovideaversa-tilemethodofverifyingcontainerlocations.Whencontainersaremovedintoremotelocations,satellitetrackingprovidesanimmediatemeansofpinpointingtheirlocationsinrealtime.

Usingsatellitetrackingtoprovidein-transitvis-ibilityofsustainmentcargohasadvantagesovertheinterrogatorradio-frequencytrackingnetwork.Satellitetrackingdoesnotrelyoncontainerscrossingcertainknownpoints,andwhenlogisticssitesshifttobettersupportunitsengagedinmilitaryoperations,satellitescantrackcontainerswithoutrelocatingtheinterrogatortrackingdevices.Interrogatorequipmentcanbecomeatargetforenemiesseekingtodisruptsupplyoperationsbydestroyingordamagingit,andthisequipmentcanmarkourmainsupplyroutesfortheenemy.

Satellitereadersortagsfromcommercialvendorscanbepurchasedforaslittleas$150pertag,add-ingabout6percenttothecostofeachcontainerpurchased.Ifthecostincreaseisdeterminedtobe

prohibitiveforeverycontainer,asmallersupplyoftagscouldbepurchasedandaffixedtocontainersbeforetransloadingandmovement.Onceaffixed,thetagswouldrelaycontainerlocationsuntilremoved.Theremovedtagscouldbeaffixedtoothercontainersscheduledformovement.

ThesatellitetrackingdataoncontainermovementscouldalsobeusedtoupdatetheIBS–CMMdataorasanothermeansofcheckingdatainthesystem.

Assign accountability and responsibility to con-tainer users.Unassignedcontainersarecurrentlytrackedasaggregatenumbersofunitsavailableforuse,ratherthanasindividualequipmentitemsthathavelifecycleuse.Assigningaccountabilityandresponsibilitytocontaineruserswouldsignificantlyincreasethecontainermanager’sabilitytoreclaimcargocontainers.AccountabilityassignmentwouldrequirethatallGovernment-ownedor-leasedcon-tainersbeaddedtoaunit’spropertybookorhandreceiptedtoadesignateduser.Thepropertybookmaybearegionalorunitpropertybookorasepa-ratelydevelopedpropertybooklinkedtothemilitarytransportationassetprovider,thecommercialcarrier,themovementcontrolbattalion,ortheCME.Theseorganizationsshouldhavejustificationorauthorityforcontainerownershiporcontrol.

TheorganizationmostlikelytodevelopaseparatepropertybookforcontaineraccountabilitywouldbeanenhancedCME.Handreceiptingcontainersandrequiringthehand-receiptholderstofollowinven-toryprocedureswoulddocumenteachcontainer.

Air-supported structures can provide stable storage space at a lower cost than permanent structures, are easily transported, and do not give the impression to the host nation that U.S. forces are there to stay permanently.


Accountabilityrecordswouldenablecontainerman-agerstoknowhowmanycontainersareputintothedistributionnetworkandhowmanycontainerscomeoutofthedistributionnetworkonamonthlybasis.Withoutassignmentofaccountabilityandrespon-sibility,itishardtoknowwhichcontainersarere-enteringthepool,howlongtheytaketocirculate,orwherethechokepointsinthedistributionnetworkarefound.

Dataonassignedcontaineruse,includingroaddistancemoved,thetimetotravelfromtheporttotheFOBandback,andcontainerdwelltime,couldgreatlybenefitcontainermanagers.Moreimportantly,assignmentofaccountabilityandresponsibilitywouldgivecontainermanagerstheauthoritytoenforcethecontainerusepoliciesdesignedtoensurethatcontainersarenot“lost”inthesystemandaremorelikelytobereturnedforreuse.

Obtain contractor- or Government-provided mobile warehouses.TheLeanSixSigmateam’scontainershortageanalysisrevealedtheteamconsensusthattheU.S.militaryisexperiencingnotsomuchacontainershortageasastoragespaceshortage.Containersarebeing“lost”touseasstoragespace.ThisisconsistentwithhowcontainerswereusedinVietnam.

Withinformationontheatercontainerusage,theU.S.militarycanplanforadequatestoragespacetosupportsustainmentoperations.Militaryplannersanticipatesustainmentneedsandmaybuildinexcessstockstoensuresupplyshortagesdonotbecomewar-stoppers.Havingexcessstock,however,leadstoagreaterneedforstoragespace.

Alackoffixedstoragefacilitiesincreasesthelikelihoodofcontainersbeingconvertedintowarehousespace.TheOIFtheaterneedsmobile,compartmental-izedstoragefacilitiesthatofferamaximumvolumeoftemporarystoragespace.Air-supportedstructurescouldfillthisneedandhaveseveraladvantages:❏At$15persquarefootforconstructionanderection,

air-supportedstructureswouldcostapproximately80percentlessthanconventional,permanentstructures.

❏Military-ownedand-warehousedair-supportedstructurescanbeorderedandreceivedinaslittleas6weeks.

❏Air-supportedstructuresareeasilytransported;a60,000-square-footstructurecanbetransportedonfivestandardpallets,withfourpalletsforthestruc-turematerialsandonepalletforthefanassemblyandpowerunit.

❏Afteruse,theair-supportedstructurecanbetakendown,decontaminated,andrepackagedforship-ment,storage,andreuse.

❏Air-supportedstructuresdonotrequiresignificantgroundpreparationorequipmentforinstallation,andnosheetmetal,concrete,orskilledlaborisrequired.

❏Maintenanceandrepairofthefabricisdonewithapatchandaheatgun.

❏Thestructuresaredurable,havealifespanof20years,canwithstand130-mile-per-hourwinds(witharrestercablingassemblies),andwillstayinflatedwithlargetears.

❏Thestructureshavealowoperatingcostbecausepowerisprovidedoff-gridbytheorganicgenera-torandthefabricthestructuresaremadefromistranslucentsoartificiallightisnotneededduringdaylighthours.Theuseofair-supportedstructurescanbejustified

andrequiredinacontractperformanceworkstatementeitherrequiringacontractortoprocureoneorrequiringthecontractortouseoneprovidedbytheU.S.military.

Astemporaryfacilities,theair-supportedstructureswouldhelpreassurethehost-nationgovernmentthattheU.S.militarydoesnotintendtobeapermanentpresenceinthecountry.

Containerizationofcargohasenabledexponentialincreasesintransloadingefficiency,greatlyenhanc-inglogisticssupporttocombatoperations.However,poormanagementofexistingcontainerassetscouldcausesignificantcontainershortagesinthenearfuture.Toavoidthisproblem,militarylogisticiansmustimprovecontainermanagementproceduresfortrackingcontainermovements,accuratelyrecord-ingcontainerlocationdata,assigningcontaineruseraccountabilityandresponsibility,andensuringthatcontainersareemployedwithinthescopeoftheirintendedpurpose.Anotherwaytoreducecontainerlosseswouldbetoprocureandsetupconvenient,temporary,portable,cost-effective,andreusablewarehousespacetoadequatelymeetthetheater’sexpandingneedforsupplyandmaterielstorage.

Intoday’sfluid,unpredictableenvironmentoflandwarfare,militarylogisticsoperationsmustbecapableofmovingcargofarther,tomorelocations,andmorerapidlyintotheaterthaneverbefore.Inthiseffort,cargocontainersplayanimportantroleinthesup-portofglobalmilitaryoperations.Mobile,durable,andreusable,theseassetsarecriticaltothecurrentlogisticscapabilityoftheOIFtheaterandshouldbecarefullyconservedinordertoeffectivelycontinuesustainingthewarfighter.

maJoR daRRyl R. WeaveR, usaR, is the tRansPoRtation officeR foR the 63d Regional Readiness command in los alamitos, cali-foRnia. he holds a b.s. degRee in histoRy fRom centRal missouRi state univeRsity and is a gRaduate of the tRansPoRtation officeR basic couRse and the combined logistics caPtains caReeR couRse.

the authoR thanKs maJoR belinda a. may, Public affaiRs offi-ceR, 311th exPeditionaRy sustainment command, foR heR assis-tance in PRePaRing this aRticle foR Publication.

16 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

The10ThingsWarrantOfficersNeedToKnowAboutARFORGEN

IfArmyForceGeneration(ARFORGEN)isthe processofthefuture,whatdowarrantofficers needtoknowaboutittobesuccessful?IrecentlysentoutarequestforinformationontheWarrantOfficerNetwebsite(partoftheBattleCommandKnowledgeSystem)tocapturethewarrantofficer’sperspectiveofARFORGEN.Specifically,IrequestedinformationonARFORGENeducation,issues,chal-lenges,solutions,andresources.Asexpected,myfel-lowwarrantofficersprovidedmewithplentyofsolidinformation.Thankyoutothosewhoansweredmypriorityinformationrequest.

ARFORGENisamodelforhowtheArmyintendstoman,educate,fund,source,equip,train,anddeploycohesiveunitsandindividuals.Themodelisawaytosynchronizeoperationalrequirementswithpredictableforceavailabilityinarational,methodicalprocess.ForActiveArmyunits,itentailsa36-monthlifecyclepro-gramwheretheoperationalrequirementsarepredictablesothatfamiliescanbenefitfromgreaterstability.WhenARFORGENiscompletelyfunctional,itwilltakethespeculationoutofwhenunitswilldeploy.

BasedonthefeedbackIreceivedfromWarrantOfficerNetandmypersonalexperiences,Ihaveiden-tifiedthe10thingswarrantofficersneedtoknowaboutARFORGEN.

1.KnowThatARFORGENIsHeretoStayAswarrantofficers,wemustrecognizethatARFOR-

GENisrelativelynewandthatitwillnaturallyexperi-encegrowingpains.Thatmeanswehavetogetpastitsdeficienciesandmakeaconsciousefforttoidentifyandtakeadvantageofopportunitiestoimprovetheprocess.TheArmycontinuouslyupdatesormodifiespolicies,procedures,andcapabilitiestoimprovetheefficiencyandeffectivenessoftheARFORGENprocess.Astech-nicalexperts,wewarrantofficershaveauniqueoppor-tunitytoimprovethemodel,soletusfocusonhowwecanmakeitworkratherthanwhywedonotlikeit.

2.UnderstandtheCommander’sAssessmentAunitprogressesthroughtheforcepoolsbasedon

thecommander’sassessmentthattheunithasachievedspecifictrainingproficiencyandcapabilitylevels.Thecommander’sassessment(withapprovalfromthehigherheadquarters)establishesaunitastrained,equipped,andmannedtomeetcapabilitiesdesignatedbythecommander.Warrantofficersserveasadvisers

tocommandersatalllevels,andcommandersdependonourhonestassessment.Wemustmakeaconsciousefforttoensurethatthecommanderhasthenecessaryinformationtomakeeducateddecisions,andforthatreason,wehavetotakeanactiveroleinunderstandingtheassessmentprocess.

3.ObtainInformationWarrantofficersshouldgainsituationalaware-

nessand,moreimportantly,situationalunderstandingoftheArmyPostureStatementandtheintentoftheARFORGENprocess.Weneedtoeducateourselvesandacquireasmuchinformationaspossible.Itiscriti-calthatyoudothelegworkandidentifykeyplayersandcapabilities.Makeanefforttomeetthecontractors,civilianemployees,andmilitarymemberswhoaffecttheprocessonyourinstallation.Thosecontactshaveanenormousamountofinformationthattheyarewillingtoshare.Usingthisinformationwillstreamlinetheprocessandultimatelymakeyourunit’sprogressionthroughARFORGENmucheasier.

4.ExpectPersonnelShortagesThefactthattheArmyisinvolvedinwarandinsur-

gencyontwofrontshasadetrimentaleffectonmanningtheforce.Untilthingsslowdown,itisreasonabletoassumethatduringtheearlystagesoftheARFORGENcycle,yourunitwillfacesignificantpersonnelshort-ages.Soldiersofallrankswillleavetheunittochangedutystations,completetheirmilitaryservice,attendprofessionalmilitaryschooling,orretire.Commandersdependonwarrantofficerstobecreative,adaptive,flex-ibleleaderswhoovercomedifficulties.Seekalternativemethodstoaccomplishyourmissionuntilyouachievetheappropriateforcemakeup.Makeuseoftheclosebondamongwarrantofficerstoestablishaprofessionalrelationshipwiththedivision-levelhumanresourcestechnician(afellowwarrantofficer).Yes,personnelgainsaretheS–1’sresponsibility,butuseyourcontactstomonitorthestatusofincomingpersonnel.

5.PlanAccordinglyThetimingofseniorSoldiersarrivingundoubtedly

willnotcorrespondwithkey-leaderplanningcycles,midgradenoncommissionedofficers(NCOs)likelywillnotbepresentforindividualorcollectivetraining,andjuniorSoldierswillnotbepresentforgunnerytrainingorfieldexercises.Youwillfieldequipmentandreceive

by chief WaRRant officeR (W–4) RichaRd c. MyeRs, jR.


newequipmenttrainingeventhoughthepropermilitaryoccupationalspecialtiesforthosetasksarenotadequate-lyavailable.

Overcomingtheseobstaclesrequiresasignificanteffortonyourparttosynchronizeevents.Useyourroleasanadvisertoworkwiththecommander,executiveofficer,andS–3tostresstheimportanceofaligningtrainingtothearrivalofkeyplayers.Bydoingso,youaretakingresponsibilityandmakinganextraefforttocontributetothereadinessandsurvivabilityofyourunit.

6.PlayanActiveRoleinEquipmentFieldingWarrantofficersadminister,manage,maintain,oper-

ate,andintegratetheArmy’ssystemsandequipmentacrossthefullspectrumofArmyoperations.Withoutadoubt,yourunitwillreceiveequipmentfrommoreplacesatonetimethanyoueverthoughtpossible.Youwillreceiveresetequipment,lateraltransfersfromwithintheinstallation,lateraltransfersfromexternalsources,andnewequipment.Asatechnicalexpert,youareaninvaluableresourceinmanagingresetoperations.Itreallyisyourresponsibilitytobeonsiteservingasthecommander’seyesandears.Infact,thecommanderisdependingonyoutoprovidehimwithanhonestassess-mentofpersonnelandequipmentreadiness.

7.BetheContinuityWithintheUnitSoldierswilllikelybegintheirtimeinaunitwithone

commandgroupandfinishtheirtimewithacompletelydifferentone.Atypicalcommander’stourlengthis2years.Whenyoucouplethatwith12-monthassignmentsforexecutiveofficers,S–3s,andsupportoperationsofficers,unitsoftenlackstability.Startingovercanbepainful,butitemphasizestheimportanceofthewarrantofficerwhoprovidesthecontinuitybetweencommands.

Warrantofficersareinvaluablebecauseoftheirwillingnesstomastertheirroleandgainsituationalawarenessandsituationalunderstanding.Thecom-manderwillseekkeyplayerswithintheorganization,andbecauseofwarrantofficers’activeroleinequip-mentfieldingandunderstandingofthecommander’sassessment,thecommanderwilldependonthemtocatchhimuptospeed.Awarrantofficercanhelptre-mendouslybyservingasakeyintermediarybetweenoutgoingandincomingcommands.

8.TrainYourTeamandBuildRelationshipsIfArmyleaderstrulyexpecttooperateeffectively

andefficientlyduringtheARFORGENprocess,theymustestablishcohesiveteams,units,andorganizations.EstablishingateamthatstrivesforcommonobjectivesencouragesSoldierstotakeprideintheiraccomplish-mentsandenablesleaderstomaximizeresources.TheroleofArmyleadersistobuildateamofwell-trainedSoldierswhoarefullypreparedtodeployandfighttogether.Theabilitytocreategroupcommitmentisa

criticalingredienttothesolutionthatoffsetsmanyofthedifficultiesassociatedwithARFORGEN.

9.TheProcessWillRemainCompressedAslongaswehavewarandinsurgencyontwo

fronts,wewillexperienceacompressedcycle.IamconfidentthattheArmywillcontinuetopushnewequipmenttounitsandresetasquicklyaspossible.However,a36-monthcyclemaynotbepossibleuntilthedrawdowninIraqandtheforceadjustmentinAfghanistanarecomplete.Ihighlyrecommendthatyouremainproactiveandbegintheplanningprocesswhiledeployed.CapitalizeontheopportunitytoincludeARFORGENresetandtrainingintheplan.

10.EmpowerYourNoncommissionedOfficersIpersonallylovetothinkthatIcanaccomplish

everythingonmyown.Infact,mostwarrantofficersbelievetheyareone-personwreckingmachines,butwecanallusetheassistanceofagoodNCO.AlwaysensurethatyourseniorNCOsareintegratedintothedecisionmakingprocess.

Whenusedcorrectly,NCOscanplayasignifi-cantroleinsynchronizingpersonnel,equipment,andtraining.OnceyouprovideNCOswithaclearintent,authority,andtheresourcesnecessarytoaccomplishthemission,takeastepbackandhaveconfidencethattheobjectivewillbemet.UseyourNCOstoprepare,research,coordinate,andexecutetasksrelevanttotheARFORGENprocess.NCOsaccomplishcriticalmis-sionsdayinanddayout,anditisourresponsibilitytoeffectivelyusetheirabilities.

Commandersdependonwarrantofficerstobecreative,adaptive,flexibleleaderswhoovercomechallengesassociatedwithsuccessfulmissionaccom-plishment.ThisevenholdstruefordealingwithARFORGEN’sgrowingpains.

AstheArmy’stechnicalexpertswhoadminister,man-age,maintain,operate,andintegratetheArmy’ssystemsandequipmentacrossthefullspectrumofArmyopera-tions,warrantofficershavearesponsibilitytoensurethatthecommanderhasallofthenecessaryinformationtomakeeducateddecisions.Ichallengemyfellowwarrantofficerstocontinuouslyparticipateincreatingandmain-tainingadatabaseofinformationregardingthechalleng-es,solutions,andresourcesavailablethatwillultimatelyimprovetheARFORGENprocess.

chief WaRRant officeR (W–4) RichaRd c. myeRs, JR., is the PRoPonent officeR foR the WaRRant officeR caReeR college at foRt RucKeR, alabama. he holds bacheloR’s and masteR’s degRees in business administRation and is a gRaduate of the WaRRant officeR basic couRse, WaRRant officeR advanced couRse, WaR-Rant officeR staff couRse, and the inteRmediate level education couRse at the aRmy command and geneRal staff college.

18 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

TransitioningaBaseFromCoalitiontoU.S.Control

by MajoR bRian LesiaK

C hangesintheIraqioperationalenvironment promptedtherenegotiationofsecurityagree- mentsbetweentheIraqiGovernmentandcoalitionforces.Theoutcomeofthesenegotiationsledtotheredeploymentofmorethan17coalitionnationalforcespositionedthroughoutIraq.AlthoughmostofthecountriessupportingOperationIraqiFreedomredeployedwithouttheneedforreplacement,somedeparturesinevitablycreatedasecurityorpoliticalvoidthathadtobefilledbyU.S.militaryforces.ThetransitionofcontrolfromcoalitiontoU.S.forcesandtheassociatedshiftstonewgeographiclocationstrig-geredacyclicprocessofrequirementsidentification,missionanalysis,course-of-actiondevelopment,andcontinualrefinementinthelogisticscommunity.

ThisarticleexaminestheplanningandexecutionbehindtwoexamplesoftransitionfromcoalitiontoU.S.control:thetransitionoftheKorean-occupiedZaytunbaseinnorthernIraqtothe3dArmoredCavalryRegimentandtheBritish-occupiedBasrabaseinsouthernIraqtothe10thMountainDivisionduringtheperiodfromOctober2008throughMarch2009.ItalsoexploresthemajoreventsleadingtothetransitionofZaytunandBasra,includingtheestablish-mentofajointplanningteam,buildingofplanningestimates,synchronizationoftheplanthroughtoitsexecution,andpurchaseofcoalitionequipment.ThelessonslearnedfromthisexperiencecanbeappliedintheAfghanistancampaignandinfutureoperationsthatinvolvecoalitionpartners.

However,evenwiththemostdisciplinedapproachtoplanningforamajortransferofcontrol,itisimpos-sibletoforeseeeverypossibleconstraint,limitation,orriskthatwillbeencounteredduringtheperiodleadinguptotheactualtransition.Flexibility,teamwork,andcommunicationwillalwaysbeessentialforasmoothtransitionandsuccessfuloperation.

JointPlanningTeamandSynchronizationDependingonthesizeandcomplexityofaforce

transition,itmaybebeneficialtoinitiatealogistics-focusedjointplanningteam(JPT)tocoordinatestaffestimatesandmanageactivitiesrangingfrompur-chasingcoalitionequipmentundertherelevantacqui-sitionandcross-servicingagreements(ACSAs)toestablishingnewservicecontracts.Thecompositionoftheteamcanvarydependingonanumberoffactors,buttheintentwillremainthesame:achievingasyner-

gisticapproachtothetransitionthatisbasedonaclearunderstandingofthecommander’sintentandthatissupportedbyplanningestimatesthattierequirementstocapabilities.OurexperienceintheMulti-NationalCorps-Iraq(MNC–I)C–4withtheKoreansatZaytunandtheBritishatBasradifferedbecausetheBasraoperationwasmorecomplex.ThefollowinglessonsareprimarilybasedontheplanningeffortassociatedwiththeBasratransition.

TheJPTfortheBasratransitionwasrelativelylargeandincludedrepresentatives,actionofficers,andplannersfromtheMNC–Iand10thMountainDivisionC–4/G–4,C–3/G–3airsections,legaloffices,C–8/G–8,andC–7(engineers);theLogisticsCivilAugmentationProgram(LOGCAP);JointContractingCommandIraq(JCC–I);U.S.AirForce;3dExpedi-tionarySustainmentCommand(ESC)supportopera-tionsoffice;coalitionforces;ACSAstaff;andothers,suchasclassesIII(petroleum,oils,andlubricants)andV(ammunition)subject-matterexperts,dependingonthefocusareascovered.Theintentwastobuildsyn-ergyintotheplanningprocessandcollectivelycovereachkeyarealeadingtothetransition.

TheJPTprimarilyreliedonvideo-teleconferencecapabilitiestocoordinatewithBritishforcesinBasra;however,sub-workinggroupsusedtheMicrosoftBreezetoolontheSecureInternetProtocolRouterNetwork(SIPRNET)tofurtherdevelopandrefinethetransitionplaninasmall-groupsetting.(MicrosoftBreezeisavoice-capablecollaborativeprogramthatallowsuserstosharePowerPointpresentations.)Mul-tiplesitesurveyswereconductedtoimprovecoordi-nationand,whenapplicable,meetwithcontractorsandothersupportelementstoaddressconcernsinrealtime.

PlanningEstimatesOncethecommander’sintentisclearlydefined,

solidplanningestimatesinsupportoftheoperationbuildthefoundationforasuccessfultransition.InplanningforthetransitionofU.S.forcesintoBasra,thekeyareasofsustain,move,equip,arm,fix,andfuelbecamethecornerstonesfortyingrequirementstocapabilities.Requirementswereoverlaidonthesekeyareas,andcapabilitiesweredevelopedandexe-cutedbasedonwhatwasneededformissionsuccess.Forexample,theESCpositionedaforwardlogisticselement,whichcontainedasmallmaintenancesupport


teamandamovementcontrolteam,tooperateamul-ticlassbreakpointforsuppliespushedfromanearbysupplysupportactivity.Anumberofbaselife-supportcontractsalsoweredevelopedandawardedtocoverbaseoperatingrequirementsandsupportoflogisticssupportareas.

ThetransitiontoBasrahighlightedoneareainpar-ticularwheredevelopingplanningestimates,require-ments,andcapabilitiesposedachallenge.Thatareawasairfieldoperations,whichbecamemiredinapoliticalstruggle,contractchanges,interservicesup-portquestions,andanoveralldifficultyindetermin-ingwhatwastrulyneededtoaccomplishthemission.DuringtheBritishoccupation,afullyfunctioningairfield—completewithairtrafficcontrol;crash,fire,andrescue;andaerialportandpassengerterminalper-sonnel—wasmaintainedinsupportofBritishforces.Earlyintheplanningcycle,theC–3airsection,incoordinationwiththe10thMountainDivision,pro-videdadecisionbrieftotheMNC–IchiefofstaffwithoptionsforhowtheU.S.transitionintoBasraAirfieldcouldbesupported.

Thechiefofstaffdeterminedthattheairtrafficcon-trolandbaseoperationsfunctionsshouldbesupportedbyU.S.militarypersonnelthroughanofficialrequestforforces(RFF)andthattheremainingrequirements,suchasaerial-portcargoloadingandunloading,shouldbeprovidedbyacontractor.Thissolutionappearedtobebothsimpleandexecutable.AnRFFwouldbesubmittedforanairoperationbattaliontoperformairtrafficcontrolfunctions,andKBRwouldmanagetheotherairfieldservicesundertheLOGCAPIIIcontract.

TheRFFfortheairoperationbattalionwassub-mittedand,afterseveralmonthsofstaffing,wasapprovedbytheSecretaryofDefense.HowevertheplantocontractouttheotherairfieldservicesthroughLOGCAPIIIbegantounravel.Underanational-levelpolicyshift,theLOGCAPcontractwasconvertedintoLOGCAPIV,whichwasdesignedtoinjectcompeti-tionamongthreemainserviceproviders.Asthestatementsofworkwerebeingredone,asubsequentdecisionwasmadetoremoveLOGCAPIVasasourc-ingsolution.ThischangeforcedanotheredittothestatementsofworkasthecontractswereshiftedtoJCC–Iforsourcing.

ThisperiodofturmoilconsumedconsiderabletimeandbegantoaffecttheabilityofU.S.fixed-wingair-crafttobringcargoandsuppliestotheairfield.WhenthreeU.S.aircraftwereturnedawaybecauseofalackofcargooffloadsupport,itwascleartotheJPTandseniorleadersthatanimmediatestopgapsolutionwasrequiredtoprovideaerialportcapabilityuntilanenduringJCC–Icontractcouldbeestablished.Inanattempttogainsupport,twoindirectmeasuresweretaken.First,aninformalrequestforassistance

wassubmittedtoU.S.AirForcesCentral(AFCENT).Second,theairfieldplanningestimates(theprojectednumberoffixed-winglandingsandtheirestimatedcargo)werebriefedtotheU.S.CentralCommand(CENTCOM)SeniorLogisticsRoundTable.

Thesetwoindirectmeasures,coupledwithanum-berofkeyengagementswithleaders(specifically,ageneralofficersteeringcommitteebriefthatincludedtheMNC–IchiefofstaffandtheAirForceaircom-ponentcoordinationelement),ledtoadecisionthataformalRFFwouldbeneededforAFCENTtodeployacontingencyresponseelementintoBasraandpro-videtemporarymilitarysupporttooperations.Thiscourseofactionwaspursuedandultimatelyprovidedthetemporarycapabilityneededattheairfield.How-ever,theoriginalplanningestimateswerecalledintoquestiononnumerousoccasions.Theseestimates,builtattheonsetofplanning,becameinstrumentalinshow-ingseniorleadersthat,withoutimmediatesupport,themissionwouldcontinuetobedegradeduntiltheJCC–Icontractwasestablished.

ThekeylessonlearnedintheBasrascenariowasthatplanningestimatesneedtobedemandedandcapturedattheonsetofaU.S.-coalitionbasetransi-tion.HavingsolidestimatesallowstheJPTtobuildonthefoundationofthecommander’sintent,framethechallenge,andresourcethepropercapabilitiestoperformthemission.Toavoidconfusionandduplica-tionofeffort,theestimatesmustbeagreeduponattheJPTlevelandbestronglysupportedbyseniorlead-ers.Onceestimatesaresolidified,backwardplanningcanbeusedtoprovidethemilemarkersanddecisionpointsontheroadtoasuccessfultransition.Shouldtheplandeviate,theestimateswillprovidethebackingforcontingencyplans,suchasanRFForothertempo-rarystopgapsolutions.

ManagingExecutionDuringtheplanningoftheBasratransition,it

becameincreasinglyclearthattheenvironmentinIraqwaschangingandthatMNC–IwasstartingtoseethefirsthintsoftheapproachingterminalstagesofOper-ationIraqiFreedom.ThisplacedagreaterfocusonthefiscalaspectsofthetransitionandontheRFFssubmittedtosupporttheoperation.Managersofatransitionmustrecognizetheimpactthatthepoliticalenvironment,thestageofaconflict,futureplans,andotherenablerswithintheoperationalenvironmentcanhaveonthetimingofthetransition.Thefollowingarelessonslearnedaboutmanagingtransitiontiming.

RFF.Requestsforadditionaltroopsandequipmentreceivedincreasingscrutiny.Cross-levelingwasusedwhenpossible.Forexample,thetheaterfirechiefidentifiedandtaggedcrash,fire,andrescueequipmentwithinIraqforcross-levelingtoBasra.Withouttheseassets,atremendousamountoftimeandresources

20 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

wouldotherwisehavebeentiedupinnegotiationstoobtaincriticalequipment.

The “Golden Rule” of support. Supporttoopera-tionsbeganwithaninternallookatwhatcouldbeaccomplishedbymilitaryforces.Iftrooplaborcouldnotperformthemission,JCC–Icontractingwasrequested,withLOGCAPasthefinalsupportalterna-tive.TheinitialplanfortheBasratransitionreliedonLOGCAPcontracts;thiswaschangedwhenitwasidentifiedthatLOGCAPdidnotmeettheintent.

Know your battle buddies.UnderstandingwhatourfellowSoldiers,Marines,Airmen,andSailorscouldbringtothefightwasessentialtofacilitatingopera-tions.AirForceRedHorse(civilengineer)personnelprovidedatremendousamountofconstructionsup-port,whiletheAirForce’saircomponentcoordinationelement,directorofmobilityforces,andairmobilityliaisonofficerprovidedsubject-matterexpertiseonair-fieldoperations.

Retrograde support to coalition forces.Evenahighlycapablecoalitionpartner,suchasGreatBrit-ain,mayrequireretrogradeassistance.Thisshouldbeaplanningassumptionupfront,evenifsuchassis-tanceisnotrequestedinthemonthsleadinguptothetransition.

Demilitarization of coalition ammunition.ResearchconductedbytheMNC–IC–4classVofficershowedthatitwouldbemorecost-effectivetodemilitarizemostofthecoalitionammunitionratherthanprepareit,packit,andretrogradeitoutofcountry.Brit-ishammunitionwasshippedtoanotherlocationfordestruction,whichsavedtime,money,andtrans-portationresources.

The second order effects of new contracts. Newcontractsrequireavettingandbadgingprocessforthecontractemployees.Ensuringthatabiometricsteamisestablishedandcanhandletheamountoflocalcon-tractpersonnelinthetimeallottedisfundamentaltomeetingacontractstartdate.Itisimportanttonotethat,unlikeLOGCAP,establishingcontractsthroughJCC–Iincreasestheneedforcontractingofficer’srep-resentatives.

Facilities renovation and modification.WhiletheirfacilitieswerenotnecessarilybetterorworsethanthecurrentU.S.“sandbookstandard,”ourcoalitionpartnersinZaytunandBasralivedandworkedunderdifferentconditionsthanU.S.forces.ModificationstoareassuchasthediningfacilityandbilletingwererequiredtomeetrequirementsforU.S.forces.

AcquisitionandCross-ServicingAgreementsTwosignificantACSArequestswereplannedin

conjunctionwiththedepartureoftheKoreanandBritishforces.TheassociatedplanfortransferringeachbasetoU.S.controlcontaineduniqueaspectsinapproach,planning,andexecution.

InresponsetotheKoreandeparturefromnorthernIraq,U.S.forcespositionedthemselvestofillinthearea.Multi-NationalDivision-North(MND–N)coor-dinatedwithKoreanforcestoidentifyequipmentneededtofacilitatetheU.S.assumptionofcontrolofZaytun.TheitemsrequestedbyMND–Nwererela-tivelylimitedinscopeandprimarilycenteredonpowergenerationequipmentandmiscellaneoustentsandshelters.DuringtheplanningprocessleadinguptotheacquisitionofKoreanequipment,theterm“reverseACSA”wascoinedtorepresenttheconceptofbuyingequipmentfromanothercountryinsteadofthetypicalscenarioinwhichtheUnitedStatessellsequipment,supplies,orservicestoanothernation.

AfterextensiveplanningandcoordinationwithcorpsanddivisionACSArepresentatives,plussup-portfromU.S.ArmyCentral(ARCENT)andCENT-COM,thefinalplandevelopedwasrelativelysimple.First,theKoreanswouldinformthecorpsofthedollaramounttheyoriginallypaidfortheitemsrequested.Next,aU.S.teamcomposedpredominatelyoflogis-ticsandengineersubject-matterexpertswouldcon-ductasitesurveytoinspecttheequipmentandapplyastandarddepreciationmodeltotheitems;ifbothpartiesagreedonthevalue,theywouldthenproceedwiththetransaction.Finally,theequipmentvalueswouldbecompiledonaspreadsheet,attachedtoastandardformCC35(acquisitionrequest),andplacedintothestaffingprocess,withARCENTasthefinalapprovalandfundingauthority.Executingthisbasicplantookconsiderabletime,andtheredeploymentdateoftheKoreanforcesultimatelybecamesocon-strainedthattheKoreansoptedtodonatetheequip-mentwithoutcost.

TheassumptionofBasrafromtheBritishwasvastlygreaterinscaleandinvolvedalargerforcetransferthanreplacingtheKoreansatZaytun.TheequipmentrequestedforpurchasefromtheBritishbyMulti-NationalDivision-Center(MND–C)wasalsosignificantlygreaterthanthatofZaytunandtookadifferentpaththroughtheacquisitionprocess.Britishleadersdevelopedamassivespreadsheetknownasthe“Compendium”thatoutlinedeveryitemofequipmenttheywouldofferforsale.TheCompendiumincludedmultipletentsinlogisticssupportareas(LSAs),powergenerationequipment,diningfacilityequipment,bulkfuelequipment,andothersupportitems.

TheplanningforthispurchasewasextensiveanddrewmorescrutinythantheKoreantransaction.TheBritishusedaspecialteamtoarriveatthedollaramountsthatfactoredindepreciationfortheCom-pendium.ThiseliminatedtheneedforaU.S.teamtocalculatedepreciationandnegotiateafinalcost.However,thefirstrenditionoftheCompendiumonlyprovideddollaramountsassociatedwithgroupsofequipment,suchas“TentLSA–AlphacostXXdollars.”


Itdidnotprovidealine-itemcostlistingforeachitem(tent,generator,shelter)withinthegroup.Thisbecameapointofcontention.

Duringtheplanningprocess,keyfiscalandlegalchallengesbegantosurface.First,itwasdeterminedthatthetotaldollaramountperitemcouldnotexceed$500,000.ThisposedaproblembecausetheBritishhadnotprovidedaline-itemcostlisting.Second,itwasdeterminedthata“majorenditem”couldnotbepurchasedunderACSA,whichledtoadebateoverwhatconstitutedamajorenditem.Finally,justifica-tionoftheneedfortheequipmentwaschallengedbyMNC–IC–8,primarilybecausealargevolumeofitemswererequestedforpurchasewithoutasupport-ingplanshowingdetailedrequirements.

Toovercomethesechallenges,theMNC–IC–4deliberatedwiththeXVIIIAirborneCorpsstaffjudgeadvocate(SJA),ARCENT,andCENTCOMtoarriveataconsensus.TheBritishwereaskedtoreexaminetheoriginalCompendiumlistingandarriveatline-itemcostlistingsinordertovalidatethatnosingleitemexceededthe$500,000pricecap.Throughnegotiationandsenior-levelengagement,theBritishcompliedwiththerequestandprovidedthedetailedinformation.Theresultwasthateachitemwasvaluedunder$500,000.ThecorpsSJAprovidedlegalguidanceandawrittendepositionthattheitemsrequesteddidnotmeetthecriteriaofamajorenditem.Finally,justificationfortheequipmentbecameincreasinglyclearovertime.Withoutthisequipment,MND–C’stransitiontoBasrawouldhavebeensignificantlyhampered,resultingineitheraslowtransferoratransferatapotentiallyhighercost.

Theprocessdevelopedforthisacquisitionactiv-ityvariedslightlyfromtheKoreanmodelinthatthefinalizedpackagewouldbestaffedthroughtheJointFacilitiesAcquisitionReviewBoardprocessanduptoARCENTforfinalapprovalintheformofaSuperCoalitionAcquisitionReviewBoardpackage.AlongwithacompletedCC35,adivisionletterofjustifica-tionwasrequiredinthefinalpackage.

AchievingaSuccessfulReverseACSAAlthoughtheACSArequestsforKoreanandBritish

equipmentvariedinscope,cost,andprocess,certainelementsremainedtrueforbothscenarios.Thefollow-ingsixrulesforasuccessfulreverseACSAwerecap-turedduringtheplanning:1. Start the planning early.Equipmentidentification,

inspection,pricing,anddocumentationwillconsumeconsiderabletimeandmanpower.

2. Involve the staff at all levels.Havingdivisionandcorpslegalrepresentatives,C–8/G–8personnel,andlogisticiansinvolvedfromtheonsetofplanningwillincreasesituationalawarenessandpaydividendsastheprocessunfolds.

3. Utilize ARCENT and CENTCOM.Thesetwocommandswillnotonlyprovideguidance,theyultimatelywillcontrolthefunding.Questionsandconcernsneedtoberesolvedattheonsetoftheprocess,andkeepingtheminformedoftheplanwillhelpensureasmoothtransition.Aswithrule2,involvethemearlyandkeepthemawareassitua-tionschange.

4. ACSA does not equal a “going-out-of-business sale.”Toomanytimes,theterm“garagesale”or“firesale”wasusedinconjunctionwithourplanstopurchasecoalitionequipment.Havingasolidplanthataccountsforrequirementsandbriefingittokeyleaderswillminimizetheperceptionthataunitwantstobuyeveryitemoffered.

5. A “good deal” does not equate to need.Thisruletiestorule4.Simplybecauseequipmentisbeingofferedataminimalpricedoesnotmeanthatitistrulyneededforthemission.Eachechelonmustsharefiscalresponsibility,andeveryattemptshouldbemadetocross-levelU.S.assetstofillarequirement.

6. Solicit outside agency support.Dependingonthetype,amount,andlocationoftheequipmenttobepurchased,assistancemaybeneededfromtheaterpropertybookpersonneltoproperlyinventory,cata-log,andbringtorecordtheitemsrequested.Thesepersonnelmustbeincludedintheplantoproperlysynchronizetheeffort.

Planningandexecutingthelogisticsofacoalitionforcesdrawdownandsubsequenttransferoftheoper-ationalenvironmenttoU.S.controlisbothanartandascience.Themissionblendstheessentialingredientsofclearintent,missionanalysis,rock-solidestimates,andcourse-of-actiondevelopmentandtimelyexecu-tionwiththeconstraintsoftime,money,andresourcesatthetacticalthroughstrategiclevels.Thelogisticianfindshimselfswitchinghatsbetweencityplanner,mediator,recordkeeper,facilitator,anddecisionmaker.Pushingandpullinginformationthoughthegauntletofcontractingagencies,legaldispositions,fiscalbat-tles,andbureaucraticstaffingoftentranscendsserviceandgovernmentlines.Theultimatelessonlearnedistokeepyoureyesontheprizeandholdonforabumpyride!

maJoR bRian lesiaK is the executive officeR of the 7th tRansPoRtation battalion, 82d sus tain ment bRigade, at foRt bRagg, noRth caRo lina. he is a “blue to gReen” tRansfeR to the oRdnance coRPs Who seRved as the multi-national coRPs-iRaq c–4 futuRe Plans officeR. he has a b.a. de gRee in cRimi-nal Justice fRom Kent state univeR sity and an m.a. degRee in busi ness/oRganizational manage ment fRom the uni veRsity of Phoenix and is a gRaduate of the aiR command and staff college.

22 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

LogisticsTrainingandAdvisoryTeams:AConceptintheMaking

F ieldManual(FM)3–24,Counterinsurgency, says,“Successincounterinsurgency...operations requiresestablishingalegitimategovernmentsupportedbythepeopleandabletoaddressthefun-damentalcausesthatinsurgentsusetogainsupport.”Developingandmaintainingastronghost-nationsecu-rityforceisthekeytosuccessforsuchagovernment.Thatgovernment’slegitimacyisthendevelopedandstrengthenedbyitsabilitytodealwithbasicissuessuchasdevelopinginfrastructureandlocalbusinesses.Astronghost-nationsecurityforceallowsthegovernmentsufficientroomtogrowanddealwiththeseriousissuesthatplagueanemergingandstrugglingdemocracy.

CoalitionforcesinIraqandAfghanistanaresuc-cessfullyhelpingthehostnationsdeveloptheirsecu-rityforces.Thebasictrainingandmodernizationofsecurityforcesinthesecountriesisproducingforcescapableofengagingandwinningagainstinsurgentforces.InthecomplexenvironmentofIraq,trainingtheIraqiSecurityForces(ISF)presentsahugechal-lengetocoalitionforces.Thedichotomyofsocialissues,suchassectariandivisionsandtribalandfam-ilyaffiliations,requiresastutemilitaryplannersatthebrigadeandbattalionlevelstoformpartnershipscapableofunderstandingtheseissuesandbuild-ingresponsiveteams.Thesuccessofcoalitionforcepartnershipsisdeterminedbytheabilityofthechainofcommandandmilitaryplannerstorecognizethepowerofsuchsocialissuesandtheirabilitytodeter-minethecourseofgrowthwithinthehostnation’ssecurityforces.

PartnershipsinIraqDuringOperationIraqiFreedom(OIF)07–09,

the2dBrigadeCombatTeam(BCT),101stAirborneDivision(AirAssault),establishedasuccessfulpart-nershipwiththe6thIraqiArmyDivision(IAD).Throughitspartnershipefforts,the2dBCTsup-portedthe6thIAD’stremendousgrowth.Brigadeplannersdevelopedabrigade-levelISFplanningcellthatcoordinatedtheeffortsof14militarytransitionteams(MiTTs).Staff-levelpartnershipsweredevel-opedfromtheISFbattalionlevelstothe6thIADstaffandcommander.The2dBCTbattalionstaffsmentoredandtrainedtheirIraqiArmycounterpartsdailyinareassuchasintelligence,operationalplan-ning,soldiertraining,administrativeprocedures,andpersonnelmanagement.

Thelogisticssystemiscriticaltothesuccessofanyarmy.Inadditiontotheabove-mentionedpartnershipsandfocusareas,the2dBCT’s526thBrigadeSupportBattalion(BSB)developedapartnershipwithits6thIADlogisticsbrethrentomeetthe6thIAD’scriticallogisticsshortcomings.Alogisticstrainingandadvi-soryteam(LTAT)wasformedinNovember2007.ThiseffortandtheeffortsofotherBSBsinIraqledtothecreationofanXVIIIAirborneCorpsstandardforfollow-onBSBstouseintheireffortstoassistISFcommandersindevelopingaresponsiveandcrediblelogisticssystem.

Overa13-monthperiod,the526thBSBLTATsawsignificantgrowthinitspartneredIraqiArmybri-gades.Brigadeandbattalioncommandersinthe6thIADbegantoadoptlogisticspoliciestostreamlineandimprovetheirunit-levelsystems.Theirefforts,combinedwiththeeffortsofthe526thBSBLTAT,resultedinadramaticimprovementinmaintenanceandsupplypoliciesand,moreimportantly,adramaticriseintheoperationalreadinessrateoftheirM1114up-armoredhigh-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehiclefleets.

EstablishinganLTATItisimportanttodescribetheISFlandscapethat

existedinwesternBaghdadwhenthe2dBCTarrivedintheareaofoperations.TwoIraqiArmybrigades,the54/6and22/6,operatedprimarilyinwesternBaghdad,alongwithotherIraqiArmyandNationalPoliceunits.The6thIADheadquartersanditsrelatedunitsoper-atedintheKarkh,Kadamiya,andMansourdistricts,backedbyanalmostnonexistentISFlogisticssystem.Theoperationalreadinessfloatratehoveredaround25percentforcriticalsystemssuchastheM1114.Troopandcargo-movingtrucks,whichwerePolish-andRus-sian-built,wereatastaggering90percentnot-mission-capablerate.

EnginerepairpartswerenotavailableattheunitlevelandweremiredinbureaucracyattheTajinational-levelrepairshop.Authorizedstockagelistsandpre-scribedloadlistrepairpartswereforeignconceptsforthedivision.Unitsdidnothavesupplypersonnel,suchascompany-levelsupplysergeants,becausefewofthesupplyslotsonthemodificationtableoforganizationandequipmentwerefilled.Unit-levelsupplyproce-dureswerenonexistent.TheISFusedamanualsupplysystemthatfurthercomplicatedthelogisticscommon

by MajoR MichaeL f. haMMond


operationalpicture.Theculturalfactorsofpatronage,sectarianism,andold-fashionedgraftproducedanISFlogisticssystemmiredinbureaucracyandinefficiency.

Theplanningfactorsusedbythe526thBSBplan-nersprovedsuccessfulandcanbeusedinbothIraqandAfghanistanbyfollow-onBSBstoestablishLTATs.First,BSBplannersmustdevelopadesiredend-statefortheirefforts.Second,adedicatedteammustbebuilttopartnerwiththehostnation’smilitarylogisticiansateverylevel.Third,LTATmembersmustlearnthehostnation’smilitarylogisticsinfrastructureandpolicies.Fourth,linksbetweentheBSBLTATandthecoalitionforcedivisionISFcellandG–4officearecriticalandmustbeestablishedbeforethepartnershipactivitiescommence.

Evenwiththeseriouslogisticsproblemsinemerg-ingarmiesinnationslikeIraqandAfghanistan,asuccessfullogisticspartnershipcanbeestablished.Utilizingthefourprinciplesmentionedabove,BSBsandothersupportunitscanestablishaviableLTAT.LogisticspartnershipsareacriticalpartoftheMiTTadvisoryconceptandwillenhancetheoverallgrowthanddevelopmentofhostnationsecurityforces.

DevelopingaDesiredEnd-StateThefirstplanningfactoristodecidewhatyouwant

toaccomplish—developadesiredend-state.Beforeexecutinganylogisticspartnershipswithhost-nationsecurityforces,thepartneredunitsmustconductacare-fulassessment.The526thBSBplannersconductedsev-eralassessmentvisitswiththe54/6and22/6brigadesdowntothebattalionlevels.TheBSBplannerscon-sultedMiTTchiefsandlogisticsofficersforassistanceindevelopinganaccuratecommonoperationalpictureoftheIraqiArmybrigadesandbattalions.IraqibrigadeandbattalionS–4swerealsointerviewedandmadeanintegralpartoftheassessmentprocess.

IraqiArmyunit-levellogisticiansweremadeapartofthesolutionprocessfortheirunit-levellogisticsissues.Whentheinitialassessmentvisitswerecom-pleted,BSBplannersdevelopedacomprehensivepart-nershipplanandawayahead.

SustainablesecurityforIraqwastheoverarchinggoalandcouldnotbereachedwithoutsustainablelogistics.BSBplannersdeterminedthattheIraqilogis-ticssocialandtribalnetworksarethecurrentdrivingforcesbehindastagnantlogisticssysteminthe6thIAD.ToreachsustainablesecurityinwesternBaghdad,the6thIADneededsignificantlyimprovedoperationalreadinessrates,trainedIraqiArmymechanicsandsup-

plypersonnel,trainedMiTTlogisticsofficerswiththeabilitytoguidetheircounter-parts,andmostimpor-tantly,aresults-orientedlogisticssystem.

Toovercomethesesignificantlogisticsissues,BSBplannersdeterminedthatstandardizedtrainingpack-agesshouldbeusedtotrainIraqiArmylogisticians.ThesestandardizedtrainingpackagesneededtobeabletoprovidecriticalfeedbacktoMiTTchiefsandtheircounterpartIraqicommanders.Traininghadtoberelevantandflexibleenoughtoreacttounit-levelchanges.MiTTlogisticsofficershadtobefamiliarwiththecharacteristicsandpoliciesoftheISFlogisticssystem.Logisticsrelationshipsbetweentheunit-levellogisticiansandthestrategic-levellogisticiansattheTajiNationalDepotneededtobestrengthenedwithaworkinginformationflowsystemtoprovidevisibilityforMiTTchiefsandtheircounterparts.

AnLTATconceptofoperationsmustbebroadinnatureandhavetheabilitytoreacttounit-levelchang-es.AsinthecaseoftheISFlogisticssystem,thedriv-ingforcebehindchangeisatthenationalandstrategiclevels.AnLTATattheunitlevelwillsucceedwhentheconceptofoperationscanadaptbasedonchangesathigherlevelsofhost-nationcommand.

BuildingaDedicatedTeamInaddressingthesecondplanningfactor—build

adedicatedteamtopartnerwiththehostnation’smilitarylogisticiansateverylevel—BSBplanners

A Military Transition and Training Team member trains an Iraqi soldier with the 6th Iraqi Division to change out headlight assemblies on a high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle. (Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Robert J. Whelan, U.S. Navy)

24 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

musttakeintoconsiderationtheircurrentmissionsetandrequirementswhendevelopingtheirLTAT.MissionsupporttotheBCTistheprimarymission.BSBsdeploy-ingtoIraqwilldeploytoaverymaturetheater,andthetraditionalBSBmissionsetsusedduringforced-entryoperationsarenolongerrequired.Therefore,nonstandardmissionrequirementsliketheLTATconceptareworkable.

The526thBSB’spersonnelrepresentmorethan60militaryoccupationalspecialtiesandcanprovideahost-nationmilitaryunitwithvaluabletrainingandexperience.The526thBSBLTATtaskorganizationwasdevelopedtomeetthe6thIAD’slogisticsneeds.Tofacilitatethecoordinationrequirementswiththecoali-tionforcebrigadeanddivisionISFcells,theLTAToffi-cerincharge(OIC)mustbeafield-gradeofficer.

OthercriticalmembersoftheteamincludedtheMuthanalogisticscellandtheTajilogisticscell.TheMuthanalogisticscell’smissionwastopartnerwiththe6thIADG–4andworkdivision-levellogisticsissues.TheTajilogisticscell’smissionwastopartnerwithISFlogisticiansatthestrategiclevelattheTajiNationalDepot.Inaddition,thisteampartneredwiththe6thMotorizedTransportationRegimentheadquar-teredinTaji,whosedoctrinalmissionwastoprovidetransportationsupporttothe6thIAD.Themainte-nance,supply,andmedicaltrainingteamsactedastheBSB’sbedrocktrainingteamsandweresupplementedbyspecialtytrainingteams.

TheBSBmaterielmanagementcellassistedMiTTchiefsandtheLTATOICwithcriticallogisticsinfor-mation.Theofficerandseniornoncommissionedoffi-cermanagingthissectionneededtheabilitytoprocesslargevolumesoflogisticsdataandassisttheLTATOICindevelopingnewcoursesofactiontoalleviateissuesthatarosefromchangesintheISF’sgrowinglogisticssystem.

Performanceindicators,suchasoveralloperationalreadinessrates,critical-systemsoperationalreadinessrates,TajiWheelShopproductionrates,andIraqiArmyrequisitionapprovalrates,weretrackedonadailyandweeklybasis.ThisinformationassistedBSBplan-nersandMiTTchiefsintheirpart-nershipefforts.Suchinformationallowedfortargetedpartnershiptop-icswiththe6thIAD’scounterparts.Moreimportantly,thisinformationprovidedthebrigadecommanderwiththeabilitytopresentacurrentlogisticscommonoperationalpic-turetothe6thIADcommander.

MilitaryLogisticsInfrastructureandPoliciesThethirdplanningfactorisforLTATmembersto

learnthehostnation’smilitarylogisticsinfrastructureandpolicies.AfterassumingtheLTATpartnership,itwasclearthatMiTTlogisticsofficersandtheirISFcounterpartsdidnotunderstandthehostnation’slogisticssystem.BSBplannersovercamethisissuebydevelopingaMiTTlogisticsofficertrainingmanual.ThismanualprovidedareferencedocumentforMiTTlogisticsofficerstouseinresearchingtheIraqiArmylogisticssystemwhilediagnosingandfixingissuesattheunitlevel.ThemanualalsoallowedMiTTlogisticsofficerstoprovidedailytrainingandmentoringfortheirIraqiArmycounterpartswhenneeded.Butmostimportantly,themanualactedasatoolfordevelopingIraqisolutionstologisticsproblems.Buy-inwascre-atedbyISFsolutions,andbeliefinthelogisticssystembegantogrowattheunitlevel.

EstablishingLTATandISFG–4LinksLinksamongtheBSBLTATandthecoalitionforce

divisionISFcellandG–4shoparecriticalandmustbeestablishedbeforepartnershipactivitiesbegin.

Earlyinthe526thBSB’sassessmentphaseofitsLTAToperation,theLTATdetectedalackofcoordina-tionamongthevariouslevelsoftheISFlogisticssystem.Likewise,linkswithincoalitionforcestaffsareessentialtothesuccessofanyLTATprogram.AprogramcannotsucceedwithoutbeinglinkedtothebrigadeISFcell,variousotherstaffagenciesattheBCTlevel,thedivisionISFcell,G–4,andthecorpsC–4ISFcell.

ABSBLTATprogrammustbeabletoseethestra-tegiclevelwhenplanningpartnershipactivities.ThisiscriticalbecauseoftheLTAT’sdirectconnectiontoIraqiArmylogisticsdecisionmakingprocessesatthestrategiclevel.WithoutthelinkagetothestrategiclevelofMiTTpartnerships,thedivisionISFcell,andG–4ISFlogisticsplanning,visibilityofISFlogisticsactivitiesisnearlyimpossibleandtheBSBLTAT’simpactonpartnered

A Logistics Training and Advisory Team officer instructs Iraqi Army soldiers on vehicle maintenance.(Photo by SPC Lisa A. Cope)


unitsbecomesnegligible.Moreimportantly,vis-ibilityofstrate-gic-levelplansanddecision-making,bothontheISFandcoalitionsides,increasestheprobabilitythatactionstakenattheLTATlevelwillsupportthishigher-levelplanning.

ReinforcingtheISFlogisticssystemiscriticaltothelong-termgrowthoftheIraqiArmy.VisibilityfromtheunittothestrategiclevelisastrongconnectionandlinkstheBCTleveltoactionstakenbyhigher-levelstaffs.Notonlymustlinkstoembeddedprovincialreconstruc-tionteams(ePRTs),BCTISFcells,S–9staffs,andjointprogrammanagementofficeactivitiesprovideexpertadvice;staffandresidentexpertsmustbemadeavailabletotheBSBLTATtosustainthepartneredunits’growthandconductjointpartnershipactivities.

Inagovernmentalsystemwithdepartments,orminis-triesinthecaseoftheGovernmentofIraq,thatseemtooperateindependently,linkingtotheePRTgovernancesectionattheBCTlevelisimportanttoaddressingissuessuchashost-nationarmydivisionfuelandoildistribution.Likewise,classVIII(medicalmateriel)distributionandrequestissuescanbelinkedtotheMinistryofHealth.

Whenitiscriticaltoengagelocalbusinessestodevel-opandstrengthenanexistingmilitarylogisticssystem,theBCTS–9andhumanterrainteamcanbeofinvalu-ableassistance.[AhumanterrainteamconsistsofArmyandcivilianexpertswhocantrytoclosetheculturalgapsbetweenU.S.forcesandIraqisoldiersandpoliticians.]TheBCTjointprogrammanagementofficecellcanalsoprovideLTATswithguidanceondevelopingpackagestoimproveinfrastructureonhost-nationarmybases.

Militaryplannersmustrememberthatlogisticspart-nershipsarejustasimportantasthetraditionalMiTTsthatpartnerwithahost-nationunitandteachitslead-ershowtoconductpropermilitaryplanningandbringthefighttotheenemy.Sustainablesecuritycannotbeattainedwithoutastrongsustainablelogisticsstructureinplaceforthehost-nationmilitaryunit.ManeuvercommandersmustunderstandthatresourcinganLTAT

programiscriticaltothesuccessofitspartneredunits.Host-nationleadersinbothIraqandAfghanistanmustunderstandthatoperationalplanningteamsmustincludearesidentstafflogistician.

Throughcoaching,teaching,andmentoring,wemustencourageourhost-nationmilitarycommandersnottoconsideroperationalplanningcompletewithoutfirstcompletingastronglogisticsassessment.We,aspartners,mustencouragethedevelopmentofaculturethatencouragesthegrowthoflogisticsexpertswithintheirranks.EstablishinganLTATprogramwillallowhost-nationmilitaryunitstodevelopapathtosuccessandgoodstewardshipoftheirinternalassets.

AdedicatedLTATteaminaBSBorothercoali-tionforceunits,combinedwithaworkingknowledgeofthehost-nationlogisticsinfrastructureandpolicies,willcreatebuy-inbypartneredunits.BSBplannersandlogisticiansmustnotputacoalitionfaceonhost-nationproblemsolving,buttheymustsetouttocoachourbrethrentofindtheirownsolutions.SupportfromtheBCTstaffiscriticaltothelong-termeffectivenessoftheLTATprogramwithintheBCT.

DuringitsOIF07–09deployment,the526thBSBLTATsawhugesuccessesfromitsefforts.Operationalreadinessratesimprovedtoasteady85percentforM1114s.Division-levelpoliciesforsubmittingandprocessingoftheIraqiArmyForm101(thebasicIraqiArmysupplyandlogisticssupportrequestform)wereimplemented—thefirstoftheirkind.The6thIADimplementedclassIX(repairparts)prescribedloadlistsandauthorizedstockagelists.TheflowofclassIXfromthestrategictotheunitlevelsimproveddrasti-callywhencomparedtolate2007.

IraqiArmybrigadeandbattalioncommandersbegantoinsistonstaff-levellogisticsmeetings,andIraqiArmyofficersandnoncommissionedofficersbegantodiscusslogisticsissuesandimplementtheirownsolutionswithintheirunits.MiTTchiefsandmaneu-vercommandersencouragedtheimplementationoflogisticstrainingwithintheircounterpartunits.Theseeffortsweresuccessful,andthelogisticsindicatorswithinthe6thIADimproveddramatically.Sustain-ablesecurityinwesternBaghdadwasachievablewhenbackedbyanimprovingsustainablelogisticssystemwithinthe6thIAD.

maJoR michael f. hammond is the aide de camP foR the dePuty commanding geneRal of the aRmy mateRiel command. he has dePloyed thRee times in suPPoRt of oPeRation iRaqi fReedom. he has a masteR’s degRee in logistics and tRansPoRtation management fRom noRth daKota state univeRsity.

While setting up a supply system for the 6th Iraqi Army Field Engineer Regiment, an Iraqi lieutenant learns how the U.S. military uses the parts manual to order parts. (Photo by SSG April Mota, 16th Engineer Brigade Public Affairs)

26 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

LogisticsPartneringLessonsby chief WaRRant officeR (W–2) juLian PRice

hiledeployedtoOperationIraqiFreedom (OIF)07–09,thelogisticstrainingand advisoryteam(LTAT)ofthe47thForwardSupportBattalion(FSB)“ModernPioneers,”2dBri-gadeCombatTeam,1stArmoredDivision,executednumerouspartnershipevents.The47thFSB(nowthe47thBrigadeSupportBattalion)wastaskedwiththemissionoftrainingandmentoringthe9thand17thIraqiArmy(IA)Divisionsonlogistics.Theobjectivewastoteachamethodofself-reliancethatwouldenabletheIraqilogisticianstosustainandequiptheirarmy.

Overthecourseofthedeployment,thePioneersconductedmorethan55classesandtrainedmorethan300IAsoldiersfromthetwodivisions.TheLTATprovidedweeklytrainingtothedivisionsbasedonthelogisticsprioritiesoftheirG–4sandmotorizedtransportationregiment(MTR)commanders.Training

topicsincludedmaintenanceoperations,supplyman-agement,driving,convoysecurity,staffdevelopment,andmedicalsupport.

IntroductiontotheCommandTeamBeforeinitiatingeachpartnership,thePioneerspar-

ticipatedinakeyleaderengagement—oneofthemostcriticalinitialstepsinanypartnership.Throughtheseengagements,thecommandteambuiltabondandasenseofmutualrespectwiththeIAcommandteam.EstablishingarelationshipwiththeleadersensuredthattheIAtrustedthePioneersandfeltcomfortableworkingwiththemtodeterminehowbesttousetheLTATpersonneltotrain,giveadvice,andmakerecom-mendationstotheIAcommand,staff,andsoldiers.

GettingStartedThefirststepwastocreatetheLTAT,which

comprisedsubject-matterexpertsfromallfieldsoflogistics.TheLTATmemberswererequiredtoattenda5-daycourseatthePhoenixAcademyinCampTaji,Iraq.Theretheylearnedhowtoproviderelevant

andviablesustainmenttrainingpackagesformaintenance,sup-ply,medical,andotherreadinesssupportinordertoachieveIAself-reliance.TheattendeesalsolearnedthelogisticspoliciesandproceduresoftheIraqiMinistryofInteriorandMinistryofDefense.

Next,thePioneersprovidedthe9thand17thIADivisionG–4sandthe17thIADivisionMTReachwithanembeddedliaisonofficer(LNO).TheLNOsservedasliai-sonsamongthecommandteams.Theywerebeneficialforsitu-ationalawareness,planning,andtrackingprocedures.TheLNOsprovidedaconstantpresenceformentoringandtrainingthedivi-sionG–4andhisstaffonadailybasis.ItwasvitalfortheLNOtosupportandshowfaithintheMin-istryofInteriorandMinistryofDefenseproceduresthroughoutalltrainingandassistance.

TheembeddedLNOstooktheleadinfindingtheIA’sdailylogis-

W

A mechanic from the 47th Forward Support Battalion shows the components of an International Harvester 5-ton vehicle to mechanics from the 17th Iraqi Army Division Motorized Transportation Regiment.


ticsproblemsandthenprovidedtheIAwithrecom-mendedsolutionstotheirproblems.TheLNOsadvisedIApersonnelonhowtheIAsystemshouldworkandhelpedthembuildtheconfidenceneededtoaddresstheirproblemsthroughtheIAsystem,usingthecoali-tionforceonlyforreportingandfollow-upprocedures.

BestPracticesTheLTATinitiallytrainedeachIAsoldierseparately

fromtheofficersandseniornoncommissionedofficers(NCOs).ButtheLTATpersonnelsoondiscoveredthatthemoretheyinteractedwiththeIAsoldiers,themorethelowerenlistedsoldierscametotheLTATinsteadoftheirownleadersforguidance.

TheLTATeventuallyfocusedondevelopingstrong,confidentleaders.Onemethodusedwastotraintheleadersforadayortwoandthenhavetheleaderspres-enttheclasstheyhadjustattendedtotheirsoldiers.Thisworkedverywellwiththedevelopmentalstaffcoursesandthesupplyclasses,butitdidnotworkaswellwithotherclassesthathadmoretechnicalinfor-mation.Forexample,theseniorleaderswereunabletoteachthemaintenancecoursewithconfidence,sotheLTAThadtheseniorleaderassisttheLTATtrainerinpresentingtheinformation.AlthoughitwasnotIAled,thiskepttheIAleaderinthefrontoftheclass,whichbuilttheconfidenceoftheIAsoldiersintheirleaders.

TheLTAToftenuseda“crawl,walk,andrun”methodoftrainingfortheIAsoldiers.Sinceallofthepersonnelhadadifferentlevelofknowledgeindif-ferentareas,itwaseasiertostartwiththebasicstoensurethatallpersonnellearnedthenecessarytasks.

OneproceduretheLTATfoundtobeusefulwastouseasign-inroster.TheIAplatoonleadersandjuniorstaffofficershadahardtimeplanningandmanagingper-sonnelforfuturetrainingandmissions.Onmanyocca-sions,theLTATwouldstartatrainingserieswithonegroupofpersonnelandenditwithanentirelydifferentgroup.Theimplementationofsign-inrostershelpedthetrainersassistthestaffofficersandplatoonleaderstomoreaccuratelymanagetheirpersonneltraining.ThisalsokepttheLTATfromtrainingthesamepersontwiceandallowedthestudentstomoveontotrainingthatwasmoretechnical.

Becausethesign-inrosterscouldbeusedtoverifycoursecompletion,theLTATwasabletopresenttheIApersonnelwithcertificatesduringanawardsceremony.Thecertificates,whichweresignedbythe47thFSBcommanderandcommandsergeantmajor,certifiedtherecipientstotraintheirsoldiersinaformaltrainingenvironment.TheawardceremonygavetheIAsoldiersagreatsenseofprideandaccomplishment,whichmadethemeagertocontinuetrainingatthenextlevel.TheIAleadersandsoldierswantedthecoalitionforcestoknowtheywerecapableofperformingtheirmissions,andforsome,thiswasthefirstcertificateofschoolingthattheyeverreceived.TheIAwasproudofthethingsthattheylearnedandwouldconstantlyrequestfeedbackfromcoalitionforces.ItisimportanttoalwayslettheIAknowhowwellboththeleadersandsoldiersaredoingandhowmuchtheireffortsareappreciated.

TheLTAToftenusedpracticalandwrittenexamina-tionsduringtraining.TheIAstudentswererequiredtopassthepracticalexamstoadvancetothenext

The 47th Forward Support Battalion commander and the 17th Iraqi Army Division Motorized Transportation Regiment commander brief their staffs on the intended outcome of an Iraqi Army division staff visit to Camp Striker.

28 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

trainingevent.ThisallowedtheLTATtomonitortheirprogressandensurethattheywereretainingthemate-rialbeingcovered.Afterimplementingthisstep,itbecameevidentthattheIApersonnelwerefollowingEnglishinstructionsandunderstandingcoalitionforceequipmentbetterthanthetrainersthought.Duringafter-actionreviews,theIAsoldiersexpressedhowintimidatingtheEnglishinstructionshadinitiallybeentothembecausemostofthemdidnotspeakorreadEnglish.(ManydidnotevenreadArabic.)Yetwiththetrainingtheyreceived,theywereabletounderstandtheinstructionsclearly.Thiswasvitalbecausemosttech-nicalmanualsfortheirequipmenthavenotyetbeentranslatedintoArabic.

StaffDevelopmentCourseAnotherbeneficialeventwastheStaffDevelop-

mentCourse,whichwasa2-dayblockofstaff-relatedtrainingfor17thMTRinstructors(usuallytwoorthreeofficersorNCOs).Thecoursewasledbythe17thMTRmilitarytransitionteam(MiTT),whichwaspartneredwiththeMTRinJanuary2009tomentorandtrainthemalongsidethePioneers.Afterattendingthecourse,theIAinstructorspresenteda3-dayblock

ofinstructiontotheirstaffofficersandNCOs.

EachMiTTfacilitatorstruc-turedtheclasspresentationtomeetthecontentofthecourse.Forexample,duringthestaffestimatesclass,eachstudentwasrequiredtodevelopanestimateforamissionandapplytheconceptslearnedtoahands-onapplication.Themostdifficultconstraintwaskeepingthestudentsenrolledintheclass.However,afteradjustingtheprogramofinstructiontoallowleaveopportunitieswithinthe17thMTR,theprogramflowwasmuchsmoother.

DuringthePioneers’partnershipwiththe17thIADivisionMTR,oneofthemostbeneficialeventswasthestaffvisittoCampStriker,wherethePioneershostedselectedMTRcommandandstaffmembers

atasitevisitoftheirshopsandcommodityareas.Eachvisitorwasmatchedwithhiscoalitionforcecounterpart.ThevisitgavetheMTRstaffafirsthandviewofthesituationsthatacoalitionforcelogisticsbattalionfaceswhileprovidingsupporttoitsBCTandthecoursesofactionthathavebeeneithereffectiveorineffective.ThePioneersalsowantedtoillustratetothe17thMTRhowtheyconductedsustainmentopera-tionsforthe2dBCT,coalition,andIraqiSecurityForcesduringOIF07–09.ThevisitgavetheMTRafirsthandexplanationofwhyandhowthePioneerstrainandadvisetheMTR.

Thetrain-the-trainerconceptwasverybeneficialbecauseitremovedthelanguagebarrierfromIAsol-diers’primaryinstruction.TheeaseandaccessibilityoftheclassplacedtheLTATandMiTTonestepclosertotransitioningownershipofthetrainingtotheIAleader-ship,whichisonestepclosertotheIA’sself-reliance.

chief WaRRant officeR (W–2) Julian PRice is the bRigade ammunition officeR foR the 24th bRigade suPPoRt battalion. he seRved as the logistics tRaining and advisoRy team officeR in chaRge While dePloyed to oPeRation iRaqi fReedom 07–09. he is a gRaduate of the WaRRant officeR candidate school and the WaR-Rant officeR basic couRse.

A medic from the 47th Forward Support Battalion uses an artificial human arm to show two 9th Iraqi Army Division personnel the correct procedures for putting an intravenous needle into a patient’s vein.


StartingaPartnershipThroughLogisticsKeyLeaderEngagement

by Lieutenant coLoneL chRistoPheR j. WhittaKeR

irkuk,Iraq,isaquietplace.Itdoesnot garnertheheadlinesthatBaghdaddoes, butitrepresentstheethnicfaultlinesthatmaydetermineIraq’sfuture.AtandaroundKirkuk,Kurds,Arabs(bothShiaandSunni),andTurkmenhavefoughtoverlandforgenerations.Thismakesthemilitarysituationveryinteresting.IraqiArmydivi-sionswithArabandKurdishcommandersarebasednexttoKurdistanRepublicGovernmentbrigades.Eachisinterestedinwhattheothersaredoingorwhatitsuspectstheyaredoing.Eachunitisflavoredbytheethnicmakeupofthecommanderandthesoldiers.Attheseniorlevel,aninvitationordeclinationofaninvitationcanbeseenasfavoritismorasnubbetweenethnicgroups.

FriendshipBeforeBusinessIhavenothadmanykey-leaderassignmentsinmy

career,sotheKeyLeaderEngagementsCourseattheJointReadinessTrainingCenter(JRTC)atFortPolk,Louisiana,wasaninvaluablecrashcourseonArablife,culture,andpolitics.ThescenariospresentedatJRTChelpedidentifykeyengagementstrategiesthatwereusefulduringtheinitialkey-leaderengagementsIhadwithmyIraqipartners.JRTCprovidedvariousstrate-gies(suchastheartofsayingyeswithoutcommitting)thatdemonstratedthecomplexenvironmentfacedwhendealingwithIraqipartners.Theenduringstrat-egythatIusedforallengagementswas“friendshipbeforebusiness.”ThistacticwasinvaluableduringmyinitialengagementsbecauseIhadnotargetfolderstoprovidevaluablebackgroundinformationbeforeenter-ingtheengagements.

12thMotorizedTransportationRegimentThe2dBrigadeCombatTeam(BCT),1stCavalry

Division,arrivedinKirkukinJanuary2008.TheBCTfilledthegapcreatedwhenabrigadefromthe10thMountainDivisionhadleft6monthsearlier.Thismeantthatmanyofthe2dBCTunits,includingthoseofusinthebrigadesupportbattalion(BSB),hadtostartpartnershipswithIraqiunitsfromscratchorrenewneglectedpartnerships.Intheory,weshouldhavereplacedthe10thBSBastheywereredeploying.IwasofficiallytaskedtopartnerwiththeIraqiArmy(IA)12thMotorizedTransportationRegiment(MTR),butIwasunofficiallypartneredwiththe12thIADivi-

sionG–4andtheLocationsCommand.Fortunately,allofmypartnerswerelocatedonthesameIraqibase.

MyfirstopportunitytomeetallofmypartnersoccurredattheLocationsCommand’smonthlymeetingatK1(theIraqiArmybaseatKirkukthatwashometothe12thIADivisionHeadquarters,theLocationsCom-mand,andsomeotherdivisionalunits).Mydesignatedpartner,the12thMTR,wasthemainlogisticsforceforthe12thIADivision.The12thDivisionitselfwasnew.Formerlyastaticpipelineguardforce,thedivisionwasstandingupwithnewleaders,newequipment,newunits,andnewlocations.Alsoabrandneworganiza-tion,the12thMTRwasat50-percentstrength,had25International5-tontrucks,andhadacaptain(insteadofacolonel)asitsbattalioncommander.

Imetthiscaptainwiththemilitarytransitionteam(MiTT)chief,myS–2,andmyinterpreterinthebattal-ioncommander’soffice—aroominthebattalionhead-quartersthatwasemptyexceptfortwodesks,sevenchairs,andonecoffeetable.Afterenteringthesmoke-filledroom,wewereseatedinthechairsinfrontofthecommander’sdesk.HavingjustbeenbriefedbytheMiTTchief,Iwasawarethatthiswasnotgoingtobeeasy.Wetalkedwiththecaptainandtriedtogleanwaystopartnerandbuildhiscapabilities.Aswetalkedwiththecommander,herepeatedlyofferedusciga-rettesandchai(tea)butrefusedourattemptstohelppreparehisunitfortheunitsetfieldingthatitwastoconductatBesamiatrainingarea.

Becausehisunitwasstillforming,hehadnofunctionalstafforcompanyorganizations,althoughhismodificationtableoforganizationandequipmentauthorizedhimsevencompanies.TheMiTTchiefandItriedeverymeanstoconvincehimtodosomelogisticstraining(capacitybuilding)sothathisunitwouldbereadytodriveitsnewvehiclesandshootitsweapons.Wetriedalltherapport-buildingstepstaughtatJRTC,buttheywerenotbreakingtheice.Thecom-manderwasverycoldandunreceptivetoourrequests.Duringtheconversation,hesaidthathehadapaininhisarm,soItooknoteandbroughtmydoctorfrommymedicalcompanyonthenextvisit.

Thedoctordiagnosedthecommander’sinjuryasnervedamageandgavehimsomeaspirin.Buttheeffectofourcaringabouthishealthwaspowerful;Ihadshownhimthatfriendshipwasmoreimportantthanbusiness.IhadlearnedthistechniqueatJRTC

K

30 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

andrealizedwhatavarietyofservicesIwasluckytohaveavailableforpartnering.ThecommandertheninsistedIsmokeoneofhiscigarettesandthatIbringmyinterpreterwhenIreturned.Thesethreethingsweretheicebreakerafteraratherfrostybeginning.

Theinterpreterbecamemymaininterpreterbecauseshebroketheicewiththecaptain.Thisclearedthewayforsomerathertoughnegotiationsfordrivers’trainingclasses,weaponsmaintenance,andmedicaltrainingthatwentaboveandbeyondthetrainingondrillandceremonythattheyhadbeenconducting.EverytimeIreturned,ItookaSoldierwithanotherspecialtyfrommybattalion,smokedacigarette,dranksomechai,andworkedonconvincingmypartnertoagreeonsomepartnershiptraining.Thisbecamethebasisforourworkingrelationship.

LocationsCommandMysecondandeasiestpartnerwastheLocations

Commandcommander.AKurdfromIrbil,hewaseasytopartnerwithbecausehehadenjoyedtherelation-shiphehadwiththe10thBSBandoftenstatedhowhehadmissedthatpartnershipduringthe6-monthgapbetweenU.S.units.Hewasveryopenandgenerousinhisspaciousofficeandoffereduswater,soda,candy,andbaklavaduringeveryvisit.Hisofficewaslikeatrainstation.Besidesthe15peopleitcouldseatonthecouches,5to10Iraqiofficersandsoldierswerealwaysenteringwithafootstompandsaluteandexitingwiththeobligatorysignatureandsealfromthegeneral.AskedwhenIwasgoingtovisit,Itoldhimthat,basedonmyschedule,IcouldvisitonSundays,Tuesdays,orThursdays.HeimmediatelyinsistedthatIvisithimeveryTuesdayat1000(thedayandtimethatthe10thBSBcom-manderhadvisited)foranofficecallandthatIeatlunchathistableintheLocationsCommanddiningfacility.

Unlikethe12thMTR,theLocationsCommandhasexcellentfacilities,trainedpersonnel,andanexperiencedleader.TheLoca-tionsCommandhadofficebuild-ings,barracks,andaclinicthatwereabout3yearsoldandfullyfurnishedandequipped.Thelead-ersatalllevelsoftheLocationsCommandwereeagertotrainandbuildtheircapacity.Wejusthadtomakesurethatwewerebuildingtheircapabilities,notdoingtheworkforthem.

Themostsignificantpartnershipsforuswerewiththemaintenancefacilityandtheclinic.ThelevelIIImaintenancefacility(levelsIandIIoccuratthebri-gadeandMTR,respectively)wasrunbyanIAcolonelwhosesoleconcernwasrepairparts.Hehadverygoodmechanicsbutlimitedtoolsandrepairpartstorepairthevehiclesthatwereprovidedbysixdifferentnations.Duringmyfirstencounterwithhim,hewastothepoint,saying“Idon’tneedanyhelpifyoucan’tgetmeparts.”

ThecommanderoftheLocationsCommandhadotherideas;heaskedustoevaluatehismaintenancesystemandlookattheorganization.Asaresult,andincoordinationwiththelogisticstrainingandadvisoryteam,weprovidedsomeorganizationalhelp,whichincludedidentifyingrepairparts,organizingloca-tions,validatingrepairpartsonorderintheIraqiArmyMaintenanceProgram,andassistingwithacquiringtoolsfromtheTajiSupplyDepot.

TheLocationsCommandclinicprovidedarobustpartnershipopportunity.Theclinic’scommanderwasexcitedaboutcontinuingthepartnershipafterexpe-riencingthevoidleftbythedepartureofthe10thBSB.Ourfirsteventwasaninvitationtoprovideoversightandmentorshipduringcombatlifesavertrainingandamasscasualtyexercise.Thiswasfol-lowedbyvisitsfromourphysician’sassistants,

The commander of the Iraqi Army Locations Command meets with his U.S. partners in his office.


dentist,x-raytechnician,preventivemedicineperson-nel,labtechnicians,andtheotherspecialistsinmymedicalcompany.Thechallengewastoteachthemorenablethemwithoutgivingthemsuppliesordoingtheworkforthem.Forexample,wesentourden-tisttoteachtheirdentaltechnicianhowtodobasicprocedures,suchasexamsandcleaning,sincetheyhadnodentist.Althoughtheywantedustododentalexams,weturneditintoatrainingsession.Wewerealsoaskedformedicines,butinstead,wepointedtheminthedirectionoftheirownsupplysystemtoordertherightitems.

OnechallengewastogettheLocationsCommandsectionstoworktogether.Thecliniccommanderaskedusonedayforsomerashcreamthathedidnothave.Afterfurtherinvestigation,wediscoveredthatthecreamwasinoneofsixtrucksofmedicalsuppliesthatwereatTajiawaitingdelivery.ThecliniccommanderhadnoideahowtogetthesuppliesbacktoK1,soIconvincedhimtogotothecommanderoftheLocationsCommandandrequesttrucksupporttogetthesupplies.

12thIADivisionG–4Ifirstmetthe12thIADivisionG–4attheK1

maintenancemeeting.Aformertwo-stargeneralundertheoldIraqiArmy,hehadhishandsfullwithanewundermannedandunderequippeddivision.Hisbiggestchallengewasequippingthedivisionusingthecur-rentprocessofsubmittingtheIAForm101(thebasicIAsupplyandlogisticssupportrequestform)throughfourlevelsofbureaucracytoobtaintheproperstamps.SomeoftherequisitionsIsawwerethesizeofnovelsbecauseofthenumberofstampedpagesthatwentalongwiththerequest.

TheK1monthlymaintenancemeetinghaddisinte-gratedfromarobustmeetingthatincludedthebrigadecommandersofthe12thand4thDivisionstoapoorlyattendedmaintenancemeetingofthebrigadeexecutiveofficersandmaintenancetechnicians.TheG–4wasnothappyaboutthepoorattendance,sotheMiTTchiefandIsuggestedthatthey—❏Usethedivisioncommanderstoforceattendance.❏Provideinformationonwhatthedivisionwasdoing

toobtainrepairparts.❏Provideattendeeswithacurrentpictureofopenand

workingmaintenancejobsattheLocationsCommand.❏Makethemeetingaplatformtovoiceunitissues

andtoprovidetheIraqiGroundForcesCommand(higherheadquarters)withsolutions.

ImprovingCommunicationTheleadershipchallengeduringthedeployment

wasgettingthelogisticsorganizationstotalkandworktogethersothattheycouldbemutuallysupporting.OncetheMTRwascapableofdoingmissions,alogis-ticssynchronizationmeetingwasheldbetweenthe

12thDivisionG–4,theMTR,andtheLocationsCom-mand.Thismeetingwasbeneficialtocoordinatingthemovementofsuppliesandlogisticswithinthearea.

Acaseinpointwasthechallengeofobtaining44palletsoftoolsthattheLocationsCommandneededtohavemovedfromTajitoK1.TheLocationsCommandhadsignedforthepartsandputtheminawarehouse,butithadnowayofgettingthemsincethe12thMTRdidnothavevehiclesorqualifieddriversandtheLoca-tionsCommandhadnotransportationassets.The12thDivisionhadtransportationassets,butnooneaskedthemforhelp.WhenthecommanderoftheLocationsCommandfinallyaskedthemforhelp,the12thDivi-sionG–4sent15truckstopickupthepallets.Success!ThepalletswereatTaji,releasedandreadyformove-ment,fromJanuarytomid-March.

Theproblemwassolvedinternallybygettingthetwomainplayerstotalk.Thisstrugglecontinuedthroughoutourdeploymentaswecontinuedtocoach,prod,andmentortheIAlogisticsstaffstoroutinelytalkandcoordinatewitheachother.Towardtheendofourdeployment,wesawseniorstaffmembersfromthe12thDivisionexecutetheevacuationofmission-criticalvehiclestoTajiforrepairandreturnin2months—allbecauseofcross-coordinationamongthevariouslogisticselements.Buildingandsustainingtrustwasaconstanteffortthatweworkedonthroughkeyleaderengagements.

Thechallengeinkeyleaderengagementsistobuildtrustfirst,thenconsensus—astheIraqissay,“friend-shipbeforebusiness.”Iusedavarietyoftechniquestogainthattrustandfriendship,andtheyhadvaryingresultsandlevelsofsuccess.Eachkeyleaderhadadifferentleadershipstylethataffectedhowheconduct-edbusiness.Thetrueartwastoswitchstylesmultipletimesduringavisitinordertointeractandaggressive-lypartnerwhilenotsimplygivingtheIraqissupplies.Overthepastfewyears,ArmyunitshavesimplygivenIraqisstuff,andtheyhaveconditionedtheIraqistoaskandthentrytoshameusfornotsupportingthem.ThiseasierpathwasnothelpfulinassistingtheIAunitstobecomeindependent.

HavingapartnershipthathelpstheIraqissolvetheirownproblemsismorebeneficialtothembecauseitallowsthemtolearntooperateefficientlyontheirown.ThiswasourgoalaswepartneredwiththeIraqiunits.

lieutenant colonel chRistoPheR J. WhittaKeR is the commandeR of the 15th bRigade suPPoRt battalion, 2d bRigade combat team, 1st cavalRy division. he Was dePloyed to oPeRation iRaqi fReedom When he WRote this aRticle. he holds a b.a. degRee in histoRy fRom the viRginia militaRy institute and an m.a. degRee in manage-ment foRm the ameRican militaRy univeRsity and is a gRaduate of the aRmy command and geneRal staff college.

32 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ImprovingAccesstoHAZMATTransportationInformation

by dR. uPton R. shiMP and chRistine L. hoLiday

ransportinghazardousmaterials(HAZMAT), especiallyammunitionandexplosives,carries inherentrisksandmustbeexecutedwiththeutmostattentionandcare.Amistake,suchasmislabel-ingorincorrectlypackagingHAZMAT,couldbecata-strophic.TheDepartmentofDefense(DOD)hasanexcellentrecordofsafelydistributingammunitionandotherHAZMATtothewarfighter,butuntilrecentlyacommonsourceforobtainingandsharingcriticalHAZMATknowledgedidnotexist.

InJanuary2009,theArmyDefenseAmmunitionCenterlaunchedtheHAZMATTransportationCom-munityofPractice(CoP)portal,whichcanbeaccessedthroughboththeArmyKnowledgeOnline(AKO)websiteandtheBattleCommandKnowledgeSystem(BCKS).ACoPisacollectionofpeoplewhohaveacommoninterestinaparticularsubjectandwhointeractregularlytobroadentheirknowledgeonthatsubject.TheCoPportalconnectstheHAZMATtransportationcommunityandprovidesaforumforsharingexpertknowledge,lessonslearned,andbestpractices.

KnowledgeManagementviatheInternetOurwarfightersneedaccesstocriticalinformation

sotheycanactquicklyanddecisively.Recognizingthis,DODlaunchedamajorinitiativetoembraceknowledgemanagementbyleveragingthepoweroftheInternetandthelatestinformationtechnology.Knowledgemanage-mentdisciplinesallowthewarfightertoobtaincriticalandrelevantcontext-richinformation,connectandcol-laboratewithexpertsandcolleagues,andaccelerateandenhancesituationalperformanceanddecisionmakingtoachievemissionobjectivesinrealtime.

AccurateandtimelyinformationhasbecomemoreimportantthaneverbeforeasU.S.militaryforcesarestretchedacrosstheglobeconductingnumerousandvariedoperations.Tomakeoperationsasefficientandsafeaspossible,thosewithinformationmustsharewhattheyknow.Unfortunately,anextraordi-narynumberofseasonedDODemployeeswillsoonreachretirementage,andDODwilllosedecadesof

experienceandknowledgewiththeoncomingwaveofretirements.CoPwebportals,liketheHAZMATTransportationCoPportal,areamongthetoolsDODcanusetocapturethatknowledgebeforeitislost.

AnotherCoPportalistheAmmunitionCoP,whichwaslaunchedbytheArmyDefenseAmmunitionCenterin2008andresidesontheDefenseAcquisi-tionUniversity’sAcquisitionCommunityConnectionwebsite(https://acc.dau.mil/ammo).ThisCoPbringstheammunitioncommunitytogethertodiscussvariousammunition-relatedissues,suchasinformationsys-tems,operations,training,andlogistics.

HAZMATTransportationCoPTheArmyDefenseAmmunitionCenterisDOD’s

focalpointforammunitionknowledgeandlogisticssup-port.ItsTrainingDirectorateisresponsiblefortrainingprofessionalsinexplosivessafety,logisticsoperations,transportability,andthedemilitarizationanddisposalofexplosivesandotherHAZMAT.Overtheyears,thenumberofstudentsrequiringtrainingintheseareashasincreasedsignificantly,andasaresult,thedemandforpost-trainingresourceshasalsoincreased.TheHAZMATTransportationCoPhelpsmeetthisdemand.

TheHAZMATTransportationCoPisaninteractiveknowledgebasethatenablestransportationprofessionalstocommunicateandsharetheirexperiencesdistributingammunitionandotherHAZMATaroundtheworld.TheCoPisanexcellentresourceforlessonslearned,bestpractices,andlinkstoHAZMATregulations,policies,andotherrelevanttopicsofinterest.OneofthisCoP’skeyfeaturesistheonlinediscussionforuminwhichmemberscanaskthecommunity-at-largequestions.TopicsrunthegamutofHAZMATtransportation—fromshippingpapers,marking,labeling,placarding,andpackagingtocompatibilityofmaterialsshippedtogetherandemergencyresponseinformation.TheArmyDefenseAmmunitionCenter’sHAZMATinstructors,whohavemanyyearsofexperienceshippingHAZMATthroughouttheworld,regularlymonitortheforumsandansweranyquestionsleftunaddressed.

T

The HAZMAT Transportation CoP is an interactive knowledge base that enables transportation professionals

to communicate and share their experiences distributing ammunition and other HAZMAT around the world.


TheArmyDefenseAmmunitionCenterwillalsousetheportaltopushtimelyandrelevantHAZMATtransportationinformationtotheCoPmembers.Forexample,memberscanvisittheportaltofindinforma-tionandschedulesforanyofthecenter’supcomingHAZMATcoursesandtrainingsessions.

TheCoPisespeciallyhelpfulforSoldiersandtrans-portationpersonneldeployedtoIraqandAfghanistan,whereaccesstoHAZMATexpertsandresourcesislimited.Theycannowlearnwithinhours,ratherthanmonthsoryears,correctHAZMAThandlingpracticesandapplythatknowledgeimmediatelyandsafely.

BecauseofthehazardsassociatedwithshippingHAZMATandammunition,numerousdomesticandinternationalregulationsmustbefollowed.Manycoun-trieshaveagreedtoHAZMAT-relatedsafetystandards,butsomecountrieshaveuniqueHAZMATrequire-ments,especiallyregardingitstransportation.Eventhemostseasonedandexperiencedshippersmaysometimeshavedifficultyinterpretingandhavingfullawarenessofeachcountry’svariousrequirements.Becauseofthis,theArmyDefenseAmmunitionCentercreatedtheHAZMATTransportationCoPtoprovideHAZMATprofessionalsongoingtrainingandassistance.

HowthePortalWorksTheCoPportalhasfourmajorsectionsspecificto

themodesoftransportation:commercialair,militaryair,land,andsea.Italsohasasectionforfrequentlyaskedquestionsandlinkstootherrelevantwebsites.

Undereachtransportationmode,informationiscat-egorizedbytopic.Forexample,undercommercialair,informationiscategorizedintocommercialairmark-ingchecklist,segregation/compatibility,andshippingpapers.CoPmemberscaninitiateorparticipateinforumdiscussionswithinanytopicorexplorepastdis-cussionstofindtheinformationtheyneed.A“populartags”capabilityallowsmemberstoseethemostoftenreaddiscussionsandsearches.Similartothepopulartags,memberscanhavelinkstotheirownfavoriteresources.Tofurtherthelearningexperience,theportalalsofacilitatesthesharingofvideosandothermedia.

TheportalestablisheslinkstoanetworkofHAZMATprofessionalsinthefield.Becauseeach

membermustcreateaprofile(withbriefbackgroundinformation),itiseasytofindmemberswithspecificexpertiseorinterests.WhenaCoPmembercreateshisuserprofile,hemayincludekeywordsthatallowotherstoidentifyhimeasily.TheCoPportaluserscandevelopalistofcontactsandaskotherstojointheirnetwork—ausefulresourceforentry-levelSoldiersandcivilians.

WhileseasonedprofessionalsfromtheArmyDefenseAmmunitionCenterwillberesponsibleformaintainingandaddingthemajorityofthecontenttotheportal,memberscantakeownershipofthepor-tal’sdevelopmentbysuggestingwaystoshareknowl-edge,sotheportalconstantlyadaptstomeettheneedsofitsmembers.

HowtoAccessthePortalThosewhohaveAKOaccountscanaccessthe

portalthroughAKOornavigatedirectlythroughtheBCKSprofessionalforumsathttps://forums.bcks.army.mil/.Ifyouareinterestedinbecomingacom-munitymemberanddonothaveanAKOaccount,youcanregisterathttps://www.us.army.mil/suite/pages/reg/start.ext.Contractorsmusthaveamilitaryspon-sortoobtainaccesstoAKOandBCKS.Onceyouarelogged-inonAKOorBCKS,doakeywordsearchforHAZMATCoPwtoaccesstheportal.

ForaworkforceaswidespreadastheHAZMATcommunity,usingtheCoPportalimprovestransporta-tionoperationsandenhancestheDefenseAmmunitionCenter’ssupportforthe21stcenturywarfighter.ItalsobuildsontheArmy’seffortstotransformitselfintoanet-centric,knowledge-basedforce.TheArmyDefenseAmmunitionCenterknowsammunition,andtheHAZMATTransportationCoPportalprovidesacriti-caltooltohelpSoldiersdotheirammunitionmissionsafer,faster,andbetter.

dR. uPton R. shimP is the associate diRectoR of tRaining and oPeRations at the aRmy defense ammunition centeR in mcalesteR, oKlahoma. he holds a Ph.d. degRee in occuPational education fRom oKlahoma state univeRsity.

chRistine l. holiday is the KnoWledge management officeR at the aRmy defense ammunition centeR. she holds a masteR’s degRee in libRaRy science fRom geoRge Peabody college.

Many countries have agreed to HAZMAT-related safety

standards, but some countries have unique HAZMAT requirements,

especially regarding its transportation.

The Army Defense Ammunition Center is

DOD’s focal point for ammunition knowledge and

logistics support.

34 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ImprovingTrainingforRecruitersby coLoneL jaMes h. coMish and donaLd d. coPLey jR.

heRecruitingandRetentionSchool(RRS)is responsibleforpreparingSoldierstoperform oneoftheArmy’smostimportantjobs:procur-ingthenextgenerationofSoldiersandretainingthosealreadyinservice.Theschool,partoftheArmySol-dierSupportInstituteatFortJackson,SouthCarolina,hasdevelopedtheinnovativeandadaptivetrainingprogramsneededtodeveloprecruiterswhoarewellpreparedtopresentwhattheArmyhastooffertotheAmericanpublic.

ThetrainingprogramsofRRSofferacombinationofblendedlearningapproaches,streamlinedtrainingdevelopmentprocesses,onlinelearningopportunities,andinnovativetrainingsolutionsthatblurthelinesbetweentheinstitutional,organizational,andself-developmenttrainingdomains.

BlendedLearningBlendedlearningisacombinationoftwoormore

trainingmethods.Thegoalistodelivereffectivetrainingwhilesavingtimeandmoney.Thisapproachcombinesavarietyoftechniquesthatrangefromtra-ditionalworkshopsandsmall-groupinstructiontotheuseofelectronictextandothermediasuchasCD–ROMsandDVDs.

Web-basedtrainingeliminatesmuchofthecostofclassroominstruction.Web-basedapproachesincludevirtualclassrooms,self-paceddistancelearning,col-laborativelearningwithorwithoutaninstructor,andstreamingvideo,audio,andtext.

AtU.S.ArmyRecruitingCommand(USAREC)headquartersandRRS,trainingdevelopersandinstructorshavetakenadvantageofblendedlearn-ingtocreateflexiblelearningenvironments.Inpre-residenttraining,thestudentcompletesmodulestogainbasicknowledge;thatbasicknowledgebuildsthefoundationforahigherleveloflearningduringsubsequentface-to-faceinstruction.Thisisthepri-marypurposeofablendedlearningcurriculuminpre-residenttraining.Studentfeedbackreinforcestheimportanceofcompletingthetrainingtoprepareforactiveclassroomparticipationandtoobtainafirmergraspoftheinstruction.

SixRRSpre-residentprogramssupportblendedlearning:theStationCommanderCourse,HealthCareRecruiterCourse,GuidanceCounselorOperationsNCO[noncommissionedofficer]Course,RecruitingMasterTrainerCourse,RecruitingCompanyCom-manderCourse,andPre-CommandCourse.These

coursesuseweb-basedtechnologyfordistributedlearningbymeansoftheArmyAccessionsCommandLearningManagementSystem(LMS)andtheVirtualClassroomServer(VCS).

BothLMSandVCShaveproveneffectiveforunittraining,newsystemstraining,andArmyReserverecruitertraining.USARECmastertrainersuseVCSformonthlyandquarterlytrainingsessions.VCSiseffectiveinpreparingstudentsforclassroominstruc-tion,anditalsoallowsRRSinstructorstoworkwithstudentsbeforetheyreportfortheresidentphaseofcourses.

UsingLMS,VCS,anddistributedlearningwithtraditionalclassroomlearningisthewayofthefuture.Thetechnologyisheretoday.Web-basedtoolscanfacilitatecommunication,interaction,andcollabora-tivelearninginwaysthatwerenotavailablebefore.Ablendedlearningmodelcanimprovelearningretentionbyreinforcingconceptsandprovidinghands-onprac-ticethroughapplicationsharing.

StreamlinedDevelopmentProcessesTheRRSTrainingDevelopment(TD)Directorate,

whichisresponsibleformanagingandmaintainingtrainingmaterialforUSAREC,hasbecomeoneofthecommand’sleadagentsinchangemanagement.InUSAREC,changeshappendaily.KeepingpacewiththesechangesrequiresTDtostreamlineitsdevelop-mentalprocesses.Streamliningabusinessprocessallowsanorganizationtomaintainitsbattlerhythmsandprovidereadyandrelevanttrainingmaterialsaschangesoccur.

Becauseoftheuniquenatureofrecruitingbusinesspractices,thetraditionalapproachtotrainingdevel-opmentthatallowedacoursemanagertheluxuryofupdatingcoursematerialoverseveralmonthsisnolongeracceptable.TherapidchangesassociatedwithUSARECrequiretheexpeditiousdevelopmentoftrainingmaterialinamatterofdays,sometimeshours.Asaleadingchangemanagementagent,theRRSTDshophaspioneerednewandinnovativemethodstoensurethattrainingmaterialsareready,relevant,andavailableinashortamountoftime.

TheRRSTDisheavilyengagedinstreamliningtheprocessoflessondevelopment.MostTDshopsacrosstheArmyhaveatleast21to30personnelsharingamoderateworkload.RRScustomersdemandupdatesatarapidpacetomeettheirdailychallenges,buttheRRSTDhasonly11personnel.Thesolutionwasthe

T


developmentofastreamlinedprocesstoaccomplishallofthenecessarywork.Whatusedtotakeastandardtrainingdeveloper125hourstoaccomplishnowtakesonly12to18hours.Thesenewprocesseshaveallowedtrainingdevelopersmoretimeduringaworkweektofocustheirenergyondevelopingnewcapabilitiesandnewtrainingmaterials.

EachTDteammemberplayedanimportantroleindecidingwhichpartsoftheprocessesweredeletedorstreamlined.Teammemberswereassignedaparticu-larstepinthedevelopmentandupdatingprocessandthenwerechallengedtostreamlineit.Throughseveralbrainstormingsessions,thestepswithintheprocesswerereducedandcumbersomeworkwaseliminated.TheeliminationofstepswithintheprocessallowedTDtoproduceproductsatamuchfasterratethanotherTDshopswithintheArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand(TRADOC).

TheuseoftheArmySystemsApproachtoTrain-ing(ASAT)databaseisthecornerstonefortrain-ingdevelopmentacrosstheArmy.Itissometimesreferredtoasanold,outdated,antiquated,andcum-bersomesystem.However,theRRSTDdevelopedinnovativeandmorerapidapproachestolessondevelopmentprocedures,expeditingthecumbersomeactionsformallyusedinASAT.

TRADOCisfieldinganewtrainingdevelop-mentsystemcalledTrainingDevelopmentCapability(TDC).ItisintheimplementationphaseandwillbereviewedforapplicationtotheLeanSixSigmaprojectonceitisonlineandreadyforuse.Meanwhile,theuseofASATisstillrelevantbecauseRRSmustcontin-uetoproduceTrainingRequirementsAnalysisSystem(TRAS)documents.TRASdocumentsconsistof—❏Soldiertrainingpublications,whichlistcriticaltasks

andperformancestepsforthosecriticaltasksateverylevel.

❏Officer-civilianfoundationstandards,whichlistindividualcriticaltasksforofficerandcivilianstaffmembers.

❏Courseadministrativedata,whichcontainalloftheadministrativeinformationforeachfunctionalcoursetaughtatRRS.

❏Programsofinstruction,whichprovideinstructionsonhowaparticularcoursewillbetaught,includingwhatmethodswillbeused.

❏Individualtrainingplans,whichprovideinformationonhowSoldiersinamilitaryoccupationalspecialtywillbetrainedthroughouttheirprofes-sionalcareers.RRShastheabilitytoproducelessonplansina

formatthatadherestoalltheregulatoryguidanceforlessondevelopmentmandatedbyTRADOCpoli-cies.Multiplebenefitshaveresultedfromthistypeofstreamlineddevelopment.Firstandforemost,itallowsRRStomaintainpacewiththeconstantchangesin

thefield.Second,RRScanprovidestudentswiththemostrecentinformationfortheirusewhentheyreporttorecruitingduty.Third,RRScanplaceallcoursewarematerialforallfunctionalcoursesonitswebsiteandSharePoint(www.rrs.army.mil).Finally,RRSsavedatremendousamountoftimeandlaborusingaLeanSixSigmaapproachtostreamliningthedevelopmentpro-cess.Inshort,theschool’sstreamlinedprocesseshaveallowedittoeffectquickchangesinlessonplandevel-opmentandchangemanagementprocedures.

AsUSARECcontinuestochangeandleveragetechnology,theneedtodevelopcoursematerialsinatimelymannerremainsacriticalareaofconcern.TheLeanSixSigmaprojectassistedtheschoolinmodify-ingthewayitdidbusinessandensuredthatitprovidesanup-to-datetrainingsupportpackageforitscustom-ersacrossUSAREC.AsRRScontinuestosupportthefieldforceanditsinstructors,itwillcontinuetopio-neerchangesinantiquatedprocessesandprocedurestoproducereadyandrelevanttraining.

VirtualTrainingInanefforttosupportArmyleadershipandcoun-

selingdoctrine,RRSisofferingvoluntaryVCStrainingsessionsthatprovideopportunitiesforcon-tinueddevelopment.Withthemandatorytrainingonactivatingchangebeingcompletedthroughoutthecommand,RRSallowedUSARECunitstohaveaddi-tionalprepackagedcertifiedtraining,whichprovidesthemflexibilityinplanningandexecutingtrainingrequirements.

Thesevoluntarysessions,facilitatedbycertifiedRRStrainers,canalsobescheduledforcompanytrain-ingrequirements.Eachoftheeightinteractivesessionsare90minutesinlength,designedtocoverissuesfac-ingthefield,andcontainanalyticalandverbalpracti-calexercises.

Thesevirtualtrainingsessionsstartedon31July2009.ThefieldbegantoseetheseofferingspromotedintheRecruiterJournalmagazine,RecruitingProNet(partoftheBattleCommandKnowledgeSystem),andintheUSARECProNetnewsletter.TheselessonsareofferedasadownloadedvideofromtheRRSwebpage(www.rrs.army.mil)underthe“LiveTraining”link.TheyalsohavebeenintegratedintotheresidentStationCommanderCourse,FirstSergeantCourse,andthenewlydevelopedSeniorMasterTrainerCourse.

FillingtheTrainingGapforNewRecruitersRRSalsohasalsoembarkedonaprojectfornew

recruiters.Formanyyears,nosustainmenttraininghasexistedforrecruitersbetweenthetimetheyleaveRRSandthetimetheyinitiallyreporttotheirrecruitingbat-talions.TheaveragewaittimeforaSoldierreportingtotheirbattalionis2monthsaftertheygraduatefromthebasicArmyRecruiterCourse.

36 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

InSeptember2009,RRSlaunchedapilotprogramdesignedtoassistnewrecruitersinmaintainingtheircounselingskills.TheprogramrunsontheArmyLearningManagementSystem,andallstudentsenrollintheprogram’strainingmodulesbeforetheydepartfromRRS.ThispilotprogramisajointeffortamongRRS,USAREC,andLeeDuboisTechnologies.Ithasthreedistinctandinnovativeelements.Thefirstandsecondelementsarearesurrectionofoldandvaluabletactics,techniques,andprocedures(TTP).ThefinalcomponentisatrainingpackagefromtheLeeDuboisTechnologiesteam.

Thefirstelementofthisnewtrainingprogram—❏Introducesthefieldtotheskillsrequiredtorecruit

successfullyinaparticularmarketandtomoveeachrecruiterfrom“self-centeredconcerns”oran“it’sanumbersgame”mindsettoafocusontheapplicant.

❏Revealssignificantmarketinformationthatdefinesandtargetsthemultiplemarketsinwhichtherecruit-eroperates.

❏Identifiesbadhabitsthathavehamperedproductionandreplacesthemwithnewdynamicskillsetsthattaketherecruitertothenextlevel.

❏Initiatesthemovefrom“whatwehave”to“whatwecandoforyou”intheArmyInterviewpresentation.

❏Providestherecruiterwithearlyvalidationofhisknowledgeandunderstandingofthemillennialgen-eration.

❏Excitestherecruiterforthenextelementinthetrainingpackage,the“RecruiterTutor”module,whichoffersadvancedcounselortrainingasadynamic,real-worldsolutionformanyofhisprob-lems.

❏EnsuresthatRecruiterTutorandfuturetrainingmodulessustaintherecruiter.

❏Preventsadrop-offinskillssorecruitersinthefieldwillbepreparedtomaximizetheavailabletools.

❏Helpstherecruitertounderstandandsupportthecurrentadvertisingcampaign, “Army Strong,”sothathecanbuildonitasatoolforgeneratingleads.Thesecondelementofthisnewtrainingpack-

ageisRecruiterTutor,whichwasfirstintroducedtoUSARECin2000.RecruiterTutoristhekeytomak-ingamorecompellingcareerpresentationtopotentialrecruitsandprovidesadditionalkeystotherecruiter

formissionattainment.Thiselementprovidesinsightonhowto—❏Establishinstantrapport.❏Uncoverhiddenneeds.❏Buildstrongerrelationships.❏Arousecuriosity.❏Buildaprofessionalapproach.❏TargetGenerationXandY—themarketingmatch.❏Deliveradynamicpresentation.❏Convincetheskeptical.❏Knowwhentoclose.❏Listenandobservebodylanguage.❏Elicitacommitment(closing)—ethically.❏Handlethecompetitiveobjection(obstacle).

ThelastcomponentofthetrainingprogramisanewtrainingpackagefromtheLeeDuboisTechnolo-giesteam,“ProspectforSuccess.”Thisprogramisconstructedinamodernvirtualtextbookinterspersedwithcompellingvideos.Recruitersgettoseepower-fulprospectingtechniquesinfullvideo,ortheycanactuallywriteinlive-fireexercisesthatwillbuildtheirskills“onthefly.”

Theinitialdeploymentofthistrainingprogramissetforthenext4,000SoldierswhograduatefromthebasicArmyRecruiterCourse.RRSwilladministerasurveyfollowingthegraduationofthe4,000Soldierstoascertainthesuccessoftheinvestmentinthisnewtrainingprogram.ThissurveywillusethesamesurveytoolthatRRSdesignedforpreviousgraduatesandhasusedasabenchmarktotracktheknowledgerecruitersretain.

RRSdesignedthisnewtrainingprogramtoenhancearecruiter’sabilitytoretaincriticalskillsduringthelagtimebetweengraduationandarrivalattherecruit-ingbattalion.Duringtheirentiretimeasrecruiters,these4,000SoldierswillmaintaintheirlicensesforthetrainingandwillbeabletocontinuouslyreferbacktoitforTTP.

RRShasbeenrecognizedbymanyexternalentitiesasapremierlearninginstitution,employingblendedlearningtechniquesandleveragingstate-of-the-arttechnologies.RRSiscommittedtoprovidingqual-ityinstruction,effectivesustainmenttraininginfieldunits,andcomprehensivedegreeprogramsforself-development.AsRRSisthefirststoponanassign-menttoUSAREC,thefutureisbrightforSoldierswhochoosetoserveinthisdynamicorganization.

colonel James h. comish is the commandant of the RecRuiting and Retention school at the soldieR suPPoRt institute at foRt JacKson, south caRolina.

donald l. coPley, JR., is the diRectoR of tRaining and PeRson-nel develoPment of the RecRuiting and Retention school at the soldieR suPPoRt institute at foRt JacKson, south caRolina.

Recruiter Tutor is the key to making a more compelling

career presentation to potential recruits

and provides additional keys to the recruiter for

mission attainment.


OperationKilowatt:TheGeneratorShopinaModularEngineerBattalion

by fiRst Lieutenant LesLie Mccann

nitedStatesandcoalitionforceshavebecome increasinglyfocusedonself-sustainingoperations. ThedrawdownofU.S.forcesinIraqrequirestheexpansionofsomesustainmentcapabilities,includingpowergeneration.Coalitionforcesatforwardoperatingbases(FOBs)andjointsecuritystations(JSSs)haveagreatneedformoregeneratorpower.ManyFOBsandJSSshavelittleornocapabilitytogeneratepowertosupportdailylivingandday-to-dayoperations.

ThePowerGenerationProblemRecognizingthescarcityofpowergenerationcapa-

bility,theforwardsupportcompany(FSC)assignedtothe5thEngineerBattaliondevelopedOperationKilo-watttobuildpowergenerationcapabilitywithinitsareaofoperations.

ThepowergenerationcapabilitygapinIraqbecameevidentinDecember2008afterthe5thEngineerBat-talionhadbeendeployedfor8months.Withthesupportofthe25thInfantryDivision,thebattalion’sFSCbeganrepairingnotmissioncapable(NMC)generatorslocatedatFOBsandJSSs.TheFSC’staskwastotraveltoFOBsandJSSsthatwereidentifiedashavinglittletonogen-eratorpower,makeaninitialassessment,andperformanynecessaryrepairs.

TheDefenseReutilizationandMarketingService(DRMS)becameamajorresourcefortheproject.Atotalof10NMCgeneratorsweredrawnfromDRMS,andofthose10,3wererefurbishedintofullymissioncapablegeneratorsandredistributedtolocationsthatneededthem.TheFSCcreatedaservicepacketforthegenera-torsthatincludedamaintenanceandservicechecklistaswellaseliminationcriteria.Thecommonsystemicprob-lemsfoundwithDRMSgeneratorsandothergeneratorsthroughouttheprocesswerefaultywiring,missingmajorcomponents,andoldage.

MobileGeneratorRepairStationAnotherkeyissuewasdeterminingtherightequip-

mentforrepairinggeneratorsonsite.TheinitialplanwastotransformanRG–31Mk3mine-protectedarmoredpersonnelcarrierintoamobilegeneratorrepairstation.Temporaryshelvesandcompartmentswerefabricatedandmountedinsidethebackofthetruck,whichallowedforadditionalstorageofpartsandtools.Benchstockandanauthorizedstockagelist(ASL)wereformedbydeter-miningthesystemicproblemsandidentifyingthepartsneededtoaddressthoseproblems,suchasfiltersandelectricalcomponents.

Anaircompressorandpressurewasherwerealsobuiltintothetruck.Piecesofequipmentthatareexposedtothedesertelementsareconstantlycakedindustandsand,makingitdifficulttoidentifyleaksorotherfaults.TheaircompressorandpressurewasherincreasedproductivityanddecreasedthetimeittooktodiagnoseNMCgenerators.

BecauseRG–31Mk3vehicleswereeventuallyrequiredtobeturnedin,asecondmobilegeneratorrepairstationprototypewasdevelopedinmid-April.Aftermanydaysofbrainstormingandsearchingthemotorpoolforareplace-ment,theFSCdecidedthataweldingtrailercouldbecon-vertedintoamobilegeneratorrepairstation.

Thefourcompartmentsonthesidesoftheweldingtraileralreadycontaingeneraltoolkitsandanaircom-pressor.Theinsideisalsolargeenoughforasmallgener-atoranda55-gallonwaterdrumforthepressurewasher.Thetrailer’sadvantagesareitsabilitytobetowedbehindmostvehicles,itstremendousstoragecapability,anditsmultifunctionality,whichmakesiteasytoconvertbacktoadedicatedweldingtrailerifnecessary.However,afewdisadvantagesdoexist:thebenchstockandASLonthetraileroftenneedtobetailoredtothetypeofgeneratorthatmechanicsarecurrentlyworkingon,anddependingonthetypeofgenerator,spacemaybelimitedforstoringgenerator-specificparts.

Themobilegeneratorrepairstationwassuccessfullyhauledbehindaguntruckanddriventolocationsthatneededpowergenerators.In4months,theFSCrepaired20generators.Ofthose,16hadbeendeemedunfitforrepairbecauseofeliminationcriteriaestablishedintheservicepacket.Theprojectmaturedleaguesbeyondwhatwasexpected.

OperationKilowattisaneconomicreconstructionprogramthatcanhelpbothcoalitionforcesandtheIraqiArmywithgeneratorrepair.OperationKilowattcouldbecomeanenablerfortheIraqi-BasedIndustrialZoneandlocalmerchants.Theprojectalsohasthepotentialtosaveasignificantamountofmoneybyrefurbishingandrepairinggeneratorsratherthanpurchasingnewones.ThesuccessofOperationKilowattisproofthatamobilegeneratorrepairtrailerisefficientandproducespositiveresults.Thehardworkputintotheoperationsignificantlyenhancedthequalityoflifeforunitsstationedatoutlayingposts.

fiRst lieutenant leslie mccann is a maintenance Platoon leadeR in the 5th engineeR battalion’s foRWaRd suPPoRt comPany. she holds a bacheloR’s degRee in health education and PRomotion fRom east caRolina univeRsity.

U

38 ARMY SUSTAINMENT38 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

uchofourcommunicationaboutcomplex lifeexperiences(includingeconomics, wars,famine,andsoon)isbasedontheuseofmetaphors.Forexample,militaryprofession-alstendtoborrowmeaningsfromotherknowledgecommunities.(Foradiscussionontheprominenceofmetaphorinourday-to-daylanguage,seemyarticle,“ReflectiononMetaphorsWeAreLedBy,”intheNovember–December2008issueofMilitary Review.)

Wealsotendtoexpandmeaningsforoldtermsandinventnewwordswhenfacedwithcomplexandnovelsituations.Thistendencytocreate“neologisms”isespeciallycommoninthemilitaryprofession.[Aneologismisanewwordthatisintheprocessofbeingacceptedintomainstreamlanguageoranewmeaningforanoldword.]

Inanutshell,Ifindthatothercommunitiesborrowwordsfromthemilitarycommunity(like“strategy,”“logistics,”and“tactics”)whilethoseofusinthemilitarycommunityborrowtermsfromothers(suchas“enterprise,”“centerofgravity,”“opera-tions,”“systems,”andsoon).Itisimportantthatwerememberthatthesewordsconstituteanalogousreasoningasweremainprofessionallyawareoftheinadequacyofcompletemeaningalwayspresentinthem.Nevertheless,metaphorsarenecessarytoenableotherwisedisparatesectorstocommunicatemeaningacrosstheboundariesthatseparatethem.

Keepinginmindtheimportanceofmetaphorsinourprofessionaldiscourse,mypurposeforthisshortarticleistofocusonthemilitarycommunity’sfondnessforaparticularneologism:“JIIM”(pronounced“gym”).Nowpartofourlingo,JIIMreferstotheintegrationofjoint,interagency,intergovernmental,andmultinationalorganizationsandprovidescontextfortheirassociatedactivities.

Ibelievethatwe,asprofessionalmilitarylogisticians,shouldcallforanexpandedviewofJIIMthatincludesthecommercialsector.Asaresult,thisneologismshouldbecome“JIIM–C”(pronounced“gym-see”),referringtoourcontinuedintegrationofandinterdependencewithindustryinmilitarylogistics.TheJIIM–Cconstructbuildsaconceptuallinkagethatrecognizeshowtheindustrialbaseandtheformsoftheatercontractingarevitaltoachievingthedesirableunityofeffort.Inshort,thejointforce’srequirementtoconductthefullrangeofmilitary

operations(ROMO)ortheArmy’scorollaryoffullspectrumoperations(FSO)demandthisadditionofthe“–C.”

Friendlygovernmentsandnongovernmentalorganizationscannolongerprepare,plan,orexecutesignificantROMOorFSOwithouttheintimateinvolvementofthecommercialsector.Theevidencesupportingthisobservationisclear.TheArmyhasnotdeployedintoconflictswithouttheuseoftheLogisticsCivilAugmentationProgramsincetheearly1990s.ThenumberofcontractorpersonnelsupportingcoalitionoperationsinIraqnowexceedsthenumberofuniformedmilitarypersonnel.OneofthelargestportionsofU.S.Governmentdiscretionaryspendinggoestowardbuyingmaterielandservicestosupportcomplexoperations,bothoverseasanddomestic.Thecommercialsectorisavitalingredienttosuccessandneedstobeacknowledgedassuch.

OneoftheimplicationsofJIIM–C,aswithanyoftheinterorganizationalseamsoftheotherJIIMcategories,isthatweneedawell-developedbodyofprofessionals(fromallsectors)tomaketheintegrationofsupportworkbetter.The“boundaryspanners”(notethemetaphor!)includeprocurementofficers,officerswhotrainwithindustry,andbusinesspeoplewhofindwaystointeractwithmilitaryorgani-zationsandotheractorsinthelargerJIIM–Cnetworkcommunity.Theseboundaryspannersareessentialtodevelopingunityofeffort.Theymustnotonlyrepresenttheirownprofessionsandmarkets;theyalsomustpracticedialoging,collaborating,andparticipatingindecisionmakingevenbeforecomplexoperationsemerge.

Empoweredbyrapidimprovementsincommunica-tionstechnology,themilitarylogistician’scharter(asitalwayshasbeen)istoexerciseleadershipininfluencingothersinamoreholisticcommunitytobetterintegratesupportoperations.Theadditionofthe“C”toJIIMshouldbeinterpretedasaddingasectorthatisprimus inter pares(firstamongequals)inourprofessionallanguageinROMOandFSO.Letusadvocatetheterm“JIIM–C”!

dR. chRistoPheR R. PaPaRone is an associate PRofessoR in the aRmy command and geneRal staff college’s dePaRtment of logistics and ResouRce oPeRations at foRt lee, viRginia. a RetiRed aRmy colonel, he has a Ph.d. fRom Pennsylvania state univeRsity.

WorkingOutattheJIIM:EmbracingtheCommercialSectorasFirstAmongEquals

by dR. chRistoPheR R. PaPaRone

M

COMMENTARY

MARCh–ApRIL 2010 39MARCh–ApRIL 2010 39

n2001,Iauthoredtwoarticles,“StrategicMobility:TheU.S.Military’sWeakestLink”and “TransformingStrategicMobility,”thatwerepublishedinArmy Logistician.Inthosearti- cles,ImadetheargumentthatstrategicmobilitywastheU.S.military’sgreatestdeficiency.

Inthe8yearssincethosearticleswerepublished,manythingshavechangedandmanyhavenot.Logisticiansarestilljustasguiltyasothertacticiansofrefightingthelastwar.TheUnitedStatescontinuestofighttheGlobalWaronTerrorism(withunprecedentedmilitaryspending)whileconductingmodernizationprograms,theC–17Globemasterandlargemedi-um-speedroll-on-roll-off(LMSR)vesselprocurements,andbaserealignment.

TheArmyhasrecentlyaccomplishedthelargesttransformationinitshistory;yet,despiteallofthechangesinprocurements,modernizations,andmodularity,myoriginalargumentstillholdstrue:Strategicmobilityhasnotbeenfixedandistheweakestlinkinthestrategicchainofgettingtherightforcestotheproperplaceinspaceandtimetoallowcombatantcommanderstodeter,de-escalate,ordecisivelydefeatanadversary.

WhatistheStrategicMobilityProblem?Thefutureoperationalenvironmentwillbecharacterizedbyawidevarietyofpotential

adversarieswithfull-spectrumcapabilitiesandmotivestodomajorharmtotheUnitedStates’homelandandnationalinterests(andtothoseofourallies).CriseswilldeveloprapidlyandwillrequireswiftresponsebyU.S.forces.Thesecriseswillresultinmissionsrangingfromhumanitarian,peacekeeping,andcounterterrorismtomajorcombat.

SuchoperationswilltakeplaceinareaswheretheUnitedStateshaslittleornofootprintandincountriesthathavelittleornodevelopedinfrastructure.Theywilllackmajorports,railandroadnetworks,andmodernairfields.Thesecountriesmaynotbeconducivetorapidentry.Furthermore,theadversarycouldadoptanti-accessandarea-denialmeasuresthatwoulddrivetheUnitedStatestouseforcibleentry.

The2001QuadrennialDefenseReview(QDR)ReportdirectedtheDepartmentofDefense(DOD)tomoveawayfromathreat-basedplanningmodeltoacapabilities-basedmodel.1ItcalledforDODtopossessthecapabilityto“swiftlydefeataggressioninoverlappingmajorconflictswhilepreservingforthePresidenttheoptiontocallforadecisivevictoryinoneofthoseconflicts—includingthepossibilityofregimechangeoroccupation”2andto“conductalimitednumberofsmaller-scalecontingencyoperations.”3

The2001QDRalsostatedthat“theU.S.militaryhasanexistingshortfallinstrategictransportaircraft,”4whichispartofthestrategicmobilityproblem.Strategicmobilityisthecombinationofairlift,sealift,andpre-positionedforces.Together,theymakeupthestrategicmobilitytriad.Ittakesthecombinedassetsofthetriadtomeetthecombatantcommanders’requirements.

Writtenlessthan5yearslater,the2006QDRstates,“Extensiveinvestmentsincargotrans-portability,strategiclift,andpre-positionedstocksoverthepastdecadehaveyieldedmilitaryforcescapableofrespondingtoabroadspectrumofsecuritychallengesworldwide.”5Didthemilitaryreallyfixitsstrategicmobilityshortfallsin5shortyears?Whatarethetruecapabili-tiesofthestrategicmobilitytriad?Whatneedstobedonetofixit?Isstrategicmobilityreallyacriticalrequirement?



HEADLINES


COMMENTARY

FOCUS

StrategicMobilityby coLoneL Kenneth e. hicKins

I

1Quadrennial Defense Review Report,OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,Washington,DC,2001,pp.17–18.2Ibid.,p.17.3 Ibid.4Ibid.,p.18.5 Quadrennial Defense Review Report,OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,Washington,DC,2006,p.54.

40 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

6WilliamS.Cohen,Annual Report to the President and the Congress,OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,Washington,DC,2001,p.C–1.71997National Military Strategy,JointChiefsofStaff,Washington,DC,1997,p.3.8ANational Security Strategy for a New Century,TheWhiteHouse,Washington,DC,1999,p.11.

Shortcomingsstillexistinthecurrentcapabilitiesofthestrategicmobilitytriad.After7yearsofmajorcombatoperationsandtransformation,theseweak-nessescontinue.ThisarticlefocusesonwhystrategicmobilitystillhasnotbeenadequatelyaddressedandwhatchangesareneededinthetriadtomaketheArmyonceagainaviablefirstoption.Itwillanalyzeavail-ableoptionsandproviderecommendationsonhowtobridgetheever-wideninggapbetweenmobilitycapa-bilitiesandrequirements.

StrategicMobilityBackgroundTheArmyhasbeenimplementingmajorchanges

duringthelast10years.IthasundertakenamajortransformationtomoveawayfromtheArmyofExcel-lencemodeltoonethatislighter,morelethalanddeployable,andlessdemandinglogistically.

TheArmyhasmadeitsbrigadesmodularandhasembracedtheideaofbeingexpeditionary;however,oneproblemhasnotbeenadequatelyaddressed.Inordertoprojectlandpoweratthespeedandtemporequiredbythecombatantcommanderstodetercon-flict,preventescalation,ordefeatopponentsquicklyanddecisively,themilitarymustbeabletoprojectitslandpowerintoorwithintheareaincrisis.Unfortu-nately,thiscriticalrequirementcannotbemetwiththeresourcestheUnitedStatescurrentlypossesses.

Forthelast20years,theUnitedStateshasbeenpayinglipservicetoaddressingitsstrategicmobilityrequirements.Thestrategicmobilitytriadhadbeensteadilyimprovingthroughoutthe20thcentury.ButsinceOperationDesertStorm,themilitary’sabilitytoprojectpowerhasatrophied.

SincetheendoftheColdWarwhentheUnitedStatesreduceditsforwardpresenceoverseas,thecen-terpieceoftheU.S.defensestrategyhasbeenpowerprojection.PowerprojectionistheabilitytorapidlyandeffectivelydeployandsustainU.S.forcesinandfrommultipledispersedlocations.Complement-ingoverseaspresence,powerprojectionstrivesforunconstrainedglobalreach.Globalpowerprojectionprovidesnationalleaderswiththeoptionstheyneedtorespondtopotentialcrises.

DuringtheColdWar,theUnitedStatespursuedacontainmentstrategy.Thisstrategyreliedheavilyonmassiveamountsofpre-positionedequipment.Thisequipmentwasstoredinpreconfiguredsetsknownaspre-positionedmaterielconfiguredtounitsets(POM-CUS).POMCUSweresetsofequipmentdesignatedfordifferentArmydivisionsandpositionedinstrategicEuropeanlocations.

ThetroopsbasedinthecontinentalUnitedStates(CONUS)couldquicklyreceivePOMCUSviaairlift.Afterthetroopsemployedthepre-positionedequip-ment(inaccordancewiththeirgeneraldefenseplantocontaintheSovietthreat),follow-onsustainmentmaterielandadditionalforceswouldbetransportedbyseafromCONUStothetheaterofoperations.Thisprocessemployedallthreelegsofthestrategicmobil-itytriad.

AttheendoftheColdWar,theUnitedStateswasleftastheworld’sonlysuperpowerandthestrategychangedfromoneofcontainmenttooneofengage-ment.TheClintonadministrationcashedinonthe“peacedividend”andshranktheArmy’sendstrengthanditspresenceoverseas.From1990to1999,morethan239,000troopsreturnedfromforwardlocationsand82militaryinstallationsonforeignsoilwereclosed.6

NationalStrategyTosupporttheengagementstrategy,themilitary

adoptedapowerprojectionstrategy.ThisstrategydependsonthestrategicmobilitytriadtorapidlysendU.S.ArmedForcesanywhereintheworld.Thispowerprojectionstrategywasreinforcedandbuiltuponinkeyplanningdocuments,speeches,andcommentsmadebytheNation’sleaders.

The1997NationalSecurityStrategyintroducedanintegratedstrategicapproachthatwasbasedonthreeconcepts:shape,respond,andpreparenow.Basedonthoseconcepts,theNationalMilitaryStrategyof1997expandedonthepremisethattheUnitedStateswouldremaingloballyengagedtoshapetheinternationalenvironmentandcreateconditionsfavorabletoU.S.interestsandglobalsecurity.ItemphasizedthatU.S.ArmedForcesmustrespondtothefullspectrumofcrisestoprotectnationalinterests.Thestrategyfurtherstatedthat,astheUnitedStatespursuesshapingandrespondingactivities,itmustalsotakestepstopreparenowforanuncertainfuture.7

The1999NationalSecurityStrategystated:

Strategicmobilityisakeyelementofourstrat-egy.ItiscriticalforallowingtheUnitedStatestobefirstonthescenewithassistanceinmanydomesticorinternationalcrises,andisakeytosuccessfulAmericanleadershipandengagement.DeploymentandsustainmentofU.S.andmulti-nationalforcesrequiresmaintainingandensur-ingaccesstosufficientfleetsofaircraft,ships,vehiclesandtrains,aswellasbases,ports,pre-positionedequipmentandotherinfrastructure.8


InOctober1999,theArmyChiefofStaffannouncedastrategicmobilityrequirementtohavetheabilitytomoveamediumbrigadeanywhereintheworldin96hours,deployadivisionin120hours,anddeployfivedivisionsin30days.In2000,theArmyScienceBoardpublishedastudythatincludedaveryprofoundandstillrelevantstatement:“AhighlylethalandsurvivableforceincapableofrapiddeploymentwasnotrelevantinapowerprojectionArmy.Likewise,ahighlydeployable‘light’forcewithlimitedlethalityandsurvivabilityisnotalikelydeterrenttoadeterminedfoe.”9

The2004NationalMilitaryStrategystates:

Overlappingmajorcombatoperationsplacemajordemandsonstrategicmobility.Achievingobjec-tivesinsuchoperationsrequiresrobustsealift,airlift,aerialrefuelingandpre-positionedassets.Strategicmobilitythatsupportstheseoperationsalsorequiressupportingequipmenttostore,moveanddistributematerielandaninformationinfrastructuretoprovidereal-timevisibilityoftheentirelogisticschain.10

On23September2004,thecommanderoftheU.S.EuropeanCommand,MarineCorpsGeneralJamesJones,testifiedtoCongressthatbuildingalargerarrayofairliftandsealiftplatformsisanessentialcompo-nentofthesweepingoverhaulthatwould,ifapproved,positionU.S.forcesatanumberofsmall,dispersedbasesacrosstheEuropeanregion.11

So,isstrategicmobilityreallyacriticalrequire-ment?TheNation’sleadersandplanningdocumentshaveshowntheanswertobeyes.

RequirementsandCapabilitiesThe2001QDRsetdeploymentgoalsfortwodiffer-

entstrategies.Thefirststrategywastosimultaneouslydefendthehomeland,conductdeterrenceinfourregionsoftheglobe,andexecutetwomajorcampaignsinswiftfashion.Thesecondstrategycalledfordeliveringneed-edforcestoatheaterwithin10daysofadeploymentorder,swiftlydefeatingtheenemytherewithin30days,andresettingtheforce30daysafterthatvictory.12

The2006QDRdoesnotaddressspecificrequire-ments,butitgivesthefollowingguidance:“Mobilitycapabilitieswillbefullyintegratedacrossgeographictheatersandbetweenwarfightingcomponentsand

forceproviders,withresponsetimesmeasuredinhoursanddaysratherthanweeks.”13Itgoesontostatethat“futurejointforceswillincreasinglyusehost-nationfacilitieswithonlyamodestsupportingU.S.pres-ence,decreasingtheneedfortraditionaloverseasmainoperatingbaseswithlargeinfrastructuresandreducingexposuretoasymmetricthreats.”14

Theassumptionsputforthinthe2006QDRareabitproblematicsinceitonlyaddressesplanningforbestcasescenarios.AnalystshavearguedthatothercountriescouldbecomeincreasinglyunwillingtopermitU.S.forc-estooperateoutoftheircountrytocarryoutcombinedoperations.SomeanalystshavealsosuggestedthatfutureadversariesmaynotfreelyallowU.S.forcestobuildupatnearbyairandseaportsastheyhaveinrecentopera-tions(suchasDesertStormandIraqiFreedom).15Theseaccessissuesshouldbeaddressedandnotassumedaway.

Thestrategicmobilitytriadnecessitatestransportaircraft,cargoships,forwardbases,equipmentafloat,andgroundtransportationoperatedbyDODandcom-mercialcarriers.Whilethecapabilitiesofthemobil-itytriadappeartoprojectapictureofrobustnessanddepth,theyhavebuilt-inweaknessesanddonotmeettherequirementslaidoutbyDOD.

AirliftStrategicairliftisacombinationofmilitaryairlift

capabilitiesandcommercialaircraftthatparticipateintheCivilianReserveAirFleet.TheMobilityRequire-mentsStudy2005(MRS–05)identifiedaneedforaminimumof51.1millionton-milesperday(MTM/D)ofairliftcapability.ThestudyalsoobservedthatadditionaldemandsontheairliftsystemearlyinmajortheatercampaignswouldincreasetherequiredMTM/Dto54.5,withthepossibilitythattheincreasecouldbeashighas67MTM/D.16

ThechairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,theser-vicechiefs,andcombatantcommandersreviewedthestudyandagreedwiththerequirementof54.5MTM/Dofairliftcapabilityastheminimum“moderate-risk”capabilitytosupporttheNationalMilitaryStrategy.17TheGovernmentAccountabilityOfficeandtheAirForcebothagreethatthemilitaryisstillanywherefrom17-to30-percentshortofitsrequiredairlift,andallofthecombatantcommanderslisttheshortfallinstrategicliftintheirtopfivepriorities.18Accordingto

9“TechnicalandTacticalOpportunitiesforRevolutionaryAdvancesinRapidlyDeployableJointGroundForcesinthe2015–2025Era,Volume1,ExecutiveSummaryReport,”ArmyScienceBoard,Washington,DC,2001,p.33.

10The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow,JointChiefsofStaff,Washington,DC,2004,p.17.11 JohnT.Bennett,“IncreasedLiftAssetsSeenasKeytoEUCOMTransformationPlans,”Inside the Pentagon,30September2004.12JonD.Klaus,“StrategicMobilityInnovation:OptionsandOversightIssues,”CRS Report for Congress,Washington,DC,29April2005,p.3.13 Quadrennial Defense Review Report,2006,p.53.14Ibid.15 JonD.Klaus,p.3.16 Mobility Requirements Study 2005,OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,Washington,DC,January2001,pp.4–5.17 JonD.Klaus,p.4.18 ChristianLowe,“MilitaryNotAbletoMeetAirliftRequirementforWar,”Defense Week,18December2000,p.1.

42 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

MRS–05,the54.5MTM/DairliftrequirementwouldbereachedbyhavingtheCivilianReserveAirFleetcontribute20.5MTM/DandtheAirForcecontributetheremaining34MTM/D.19

Attheendoffiscalyear2001,themilitaryairliftfleetconsistedof58C–17s,88C–141Starlifters,104C–5Galaxies,and418C–130Hercules.Currently,theairliftfleetconsistsof158C–17sintheactiveAirForce,8intheAirNationalGuard,and8intheAirForceReserve.NoC–141sareleftintheinven-tory.Themilitaryhasatotalof111C–5s,andthereare151C–130sintheactiveAirForce,181intheAirNationalGuard,and103intheAirForceReserve.Thatisan18.8-percentgaininliftcapability.However,AirMobilityCommandleadersestimatethatthetrueliftrequirementisnot54.5MTM/Dbutbetween69.5MTM/Dand76.5MTM/D,basedonactualexperienceinAfghanistanandIraq.20

Militaryairliftcapabilitieshaveimprovedsomewhatoverthelast7years,butthesegainshavebeenout-pacedbyincreasedrequirements.Thelevelofmobilityisinconsistentwiththeimageportrayedbytheplan-ners.Thenewsisevenworsewhenyouconsiderthemanyotherfactorsnottakenintoaccount,forinstance,maintenanceposture,airfieldthroughputcapability,andthelevelofairfieldmodernization.

SealiftSealift,thesecondtriadleg,isdesignedtogetthe

bulkoftheneededequipmenttotheareaofoperationsbetween10and30daysaftercallup,anditisthepri-marymeansofsustainingthefight.Sealiftcapabilitycomesfromthreesources:Government-ownedships,commercialshipsunderlong-termchartertoDOD,andshipsoperatingincommercialtrade.

Aswithairlift,thecurrentnumberandcapabilitiesofthefleetdonotmeetprojectedrequirements.MRS–05requires10millionsquarefeetoforganicDODsealift.21Itcallsfor19fastsealiftships(FSSs),LMSRships,and330othershipspluscontractstomeettherequire-ments.22Currently,theNavyownsorcharters120ships.Ofthe120,82areintheMilitarySealiftCommandactiveforceand38areintheReadyReserveForce.Only28ofthe120shipsaremediumspeedorhigher.TheMilitarySealiftCommandowns8FSSs,whichcantravelinexcessof30knots,and20LMSRships,whichcantravelatspeedsupto24knots.23

Together,all8FSSscantransportnearlytheequiva-lentofamechanizeddivision(200C–17payloads)fromtheCONUSeastcoasttoEuropeinlessthan6daysortothePersianGulfin18days.TheLMSRscantransporttheequivalentof500C–17payloadsupto12,000nauticalmilesat24knots.24

Justliketheairliftlegofthemobilitytriad,thesealiftleglooksgreatonpaperandbriefswelluntilproperanalysisisdone.DuringtheGulfWar,threeoutoftheeightFSSswerelateandafourthbrokedownenroute.Thefirstwaveofshipsonlyaver-aged23knotsversustheexpected33knots,adding5daystothetransittime.TheReadyReserveForcefaredmuchworse,withonly25percentoftheshipsdeployingontimeand50percentover5dayslate.Duringthesecondphaseofactivation,anadditional26ReadyReserveForceshipswereactivated;only4wereontime,andoverhalfofthemweremorethan10dayslate.25Theproblemscontinuedaftertheterroristattacksof11September2001whenaReadyReserveForceshipfailedtomakeitsdeploymenttimeafternumerouscrewmemberswalkedofftheship.

Overthelast20years,theGovernment-ownedfleethasbeenmodernizedsomewhatwiththepurchaseof20LMSRsandtheprocurementofanewlogisticssup-portvessel(LSV).However,theseshipsareslowandonlyaccountfor25percentofthetotalfleet.Andthefleetisnotyoung.TheaverageReadyReserveForceshipisover37yearsold.26

Pre-positioningThefinallegofthemobilitytriadispre-positioning.

Pre-positioningismadeupofland-basedpre-positionedequipmentandtheMilitarySealiftCommand’sAfloatPre-positioningForce(APF).Land-basedstocksincludesevenbrigadecombatteams(BCTs)spreadoutinEurope,SouthwestAsia,andKorea.IntheAPF,allshipsareself-sustaining.Theyallhaveorganiccargo-handlingcapabilitythatenablesthemtodis-chargetheircargodespitelimitedornonexistentportfacilities.

Armypre-positionedstocks(APS)consistofpre-positionedequipmentthatisstoredinpreconfiguredunitsetsthatareeitherashoreorafloat.APSarecon-figuredascombatbrigadesetswithammunition,butnoto-accompany-troopequipment(individualweaponsandequipment).APSaredividedintofiveregional

19WilliamS.Cohen,p.21.20JohnA.Tirpak,“TheAirliftGap,”Air Force Magazine,October2004,p.34.21 Mobility Requirements Study 2005,p.6.22Ibid.,p.7.23 MilitarySealiftCommand,“ShipInventory,”www.msc.navy.mil/inventory,accessedon23December2008.24NormanPolmar,The Naval Institute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet,NavalInstitutePress,Annapolis,2005,p.296.25 RonaldF.Rost,Sealift in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm: 7 August 1990 to 17 February 1991Research Memorandum 91-109,CenterforNavalAnalyses,May

1991,p.28.26 DefenseScienceBoard,“DefenseScienceBoardTaskForceonMobility,”OfficeoftheUnderSecretaryofDefense,Washington,DC,2005,p.77.


locations:CONUS,Europe,afloatnearDiegoGarcia(anislandintheIndianOcean),NortheastAsia,andSouthwestAsia.WiththeexceptionoftheCONUSlocation,allofthesitescontainsetsofequipment.

Land-basedpre-positioningprogramsaremain-tainedinEurope,SouthwestAsia,andthePacificregion.InEurope,theArmystocksequipmentforthreeBCTs(twoincentralEuropeandoneinItaly).InSouthwestAsia,theArmystocksequipmentfortwoBCTs(oneinKuwaitandoneinQatar).TheArmyhasstockforoneBCTinKorea.27

TheArmy’scurrentstrategyofbecomingmoreexpeditionaryreliesheavilyonpre-positionedequip-mentandmaterielthatisreadytobeissuedtoSoldiers.TheAPSprogramsupportstheNationalMilitaryStrat-egybystrategicallypre-positioningvitalwarstocksafloatandashoreworldwide,therebyreducingthedeploymentresponsetimesofthemodular,expedition-aryArmy.WiththeNationalDefenseStrategyorderingagreaterproportionoftroopstobebasedintheUnitedStates,APSabroadandafloatareindispensabletoAmerica’sglobalforce-projectioncapability.

APShasafewchallenges.Thefirst,andthehard-esttoovercome,isships.DuringOperationRestoreHopeinSomalia,threepre-positionedLMSRswereunabletounloadtheircargobecausetheirdraftpre-ventedthemfromenteringanyport.After2weeksoftryingtolocateasuitableport,theshipsreturnedtoDiegoGarciawithoutdischargingtheircargo.28Theadvantageprovidedbythesizeoftheseshipsisalsoadisadvantagesinceitlimitsthechoiceofports.

DODconductedaworldwideportstudyofpotentialseaportsofdebarkation(SPODs)intheU.S.CentralCommand(CENTCOM)andU.S.PacificCommand(PACOM)areasofresponsibility(astheseareasareviewedasthemostlikelyareasforfutureconflicts).PortsareconsideredmilitarilysignificanttodayiftheycanaccommodatetheLMSR,whichhasadraftof35feet.Seavesselswithshallowdraftandlimitedoveralllengthcanaccessmanymoreportsthatarenotcon-sideredmilitarilysignificant.29Forexample,inKorea,shallow-draftvesselsexpandthenumberofaccessibleportsby84percent.30

TheamountofequipmenttheLMSRscancarryalsomustbetakenintoaccount.Thespaceneededforreception,staging,onwardmovement,andintegrationisimmense.BecauseoftheUnitedStates’increaseddependencyonlargemodernports,apotentialadver-sary’sstrategytodenyordelaytheUnitedStatesindeployingforcesbecomesverysimple.Usingmines,

submarines,specialforces,terrorism,sabotage,ortac-ticalballisticmissiles,theenemycouldgreatlyhampertheUnitedStates’abilitytoresupplybysea.

Thesecondchallengeisthatthetransportproblemcrossesovertotheland-basedpre-positionedequip-ment.DuringoperationsinKosovo,theUnitedStatesdeployedtwoLSVstoprovideintratheaterlifttotrans-portheavyequipmentbetweentheBalkansandItaly.Ittook23daystomovetheLSVsfromCONUStotheequipmentsiteinItaly.31Theproblemwithland-basedpre-positionedstocks,unlesstheconflictiswithin100milesofthesite,isthattheyaredifficulttomoveatthespeedrequiredbythecombatantcommander.

Currently,APSareexhaustedinalltheaters.TheplanforAPSatthebeginningofcombatoperationsinIraqwastoissueequipmentfromAPSandthenreconstitutetheAPSascombatunitsrotatedbacktoCONUS.Thisdidnothappen.TheAPSwerefurtherdepletedin2007whenthestockatDiegoGarciawasoffloadedtoconstituteBCTsatFortRiley,Kansas,andFortHood,Texas.SignificantcriticalequipmentshortagesacrosstheArmyalsoaffectAPS,includingshortagesofup-armoredhigh-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehicles,materials-handlingequipment,andcrew-servedweapons.

JointLogisticsOver-The-ShoreUnlesssealiftandAPSassetshaveaccesstoamod-

ernport,theyaredependentonanotherdeploymentmultiplier:jointlogisticsover-the-shore(JLOTS).JLOTSisaunifiedcommander’sjointemploymentofArmyandNavylogisticsover-the-shoreassetstodeployandsustainaforce.JLOTSoperationsallowU.S.strategicsealiftshipstodischargethroughinad-equateordamagedportsoroverabarebeach.JLOTSwatercraftcanalsobeusedoperationallytorepositionunitsandmaterielwithinatheater.

Aswithalllegsofthemobilitytriad,JLOTSalsohasseriouschallenges.JLOTSreliesontheArmy’s

27WilliamS.Cohen,p.23.28KennethAllard,Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned,NationalDefenseUniversityPress,Washington,DC,January1995,p.50.29 Quick Reaction Requirements Analysis for the Theater Support Vessel,DepartmentoftheArmy,Washington,DC,4April2003,p.1.30Ibid.,p.7.31 MarcStrass,“Armywants14High-SpeedCatamaranstoSpeedIntra-TheaterBrigadeLift,”Defense Daily,20November2000.

The United States cannot fix each leg of the triad, but by focusing on intratheater lift and positioning of the pre-

positioned equipment, the United States can use the strengths of each leg to fix the whole.

44 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

watercraftfleet,whichismadeupof6LSVsand35landingcraftutility2000series(LCU–2000)vessels.TheLSVtransportscombatvehiclesandsustainmentcargoworldwide.Itisusedprimarilyforintratheaterlinehaulofcargoandequipmentfortacticalresup-plymissionstoremote,underdevelopedcoastlinesandinlandwaterways.TheLSVisalsousedforJLOTSmissionsbydischargingorbackloadingstrategicsea-liftvesselsliketheLMSR.Alltrackedandwheeledvehicles,includingAbramstanks,canbetransportedonanLSVduringJLOTSoperations.ThemainproblemwithLSVsisthatfourofthesixvesselswillreachtheireconomicusefullife(EUL)in2013.

TheLCU–2000hassimilarcapabilitiesandusesastheLSV,butitsdeployabilityislimitedbydistance,weather,andseaconditions.TheLCU–2000fleetwillreachitsEULby2018.32

JLOTSfacestwootherchallenges.Thefirstislackofimportance.ManyyearshavepassedsincethelasttimetheUnitedStateswasforcedtousesubstandardports,soJLOTS,toalargedegree,hasbeenforgotten.AcompleteJLOTSoperationhasnotbeenconductedinyears.Thesecondchallengeisseastatesaroundtheworld.AccordingtotheDefenseScienceBoardTaskForceonMobility,seastatesatthenorthendofthePersianGulfwouldallowJLOTSoperationsonly32percentofthetime,andseastatesofftheeastcoastofKoreawouldallowthemlessthan40percentofthetime.33

OptionsEachlegofthemobilitytriadhasdeficiencies.Air-

liftrequirementsoutnumbercapabilities.Theutilityofsealiftisdegradedbylackofaccesstoports,inad-equateportcapacity,poorconditionsoffacilitiesatseaportsofembarkationanddebarkation,andtheageoftheU.S.fleet.Land-basedpre-positionedequipmentisnotpositionedcorrectly,takesalengthyamountoftimetoarriveintheater,andisdepleted.TheUnitedStatesneedsabridgingstrategythatdeliversviablesolutionstothecombatantcommanders.

DODcouldpursuemanyoptionsinsolvingthestrate-gicmobilitydilemma.Thefirstistodonothing.Accord-ingtothe2006QDR,strategicmobilityhasnoproblemsandmanyanalystswouldpointtocurrentoperationsinIraqandAfghanistantoprovethatpoint.Buttheywouldbewrongintheirchoiceofexamplesbecausethecur-rentfightsarenotexpeditionaryfights.Sowhatotheroptionsarepossibletoaddresstheproblem?

Tofixairlift,eithercapabilitiesmustbeincreasedorrequirementsreducedtomatchcurrentcapabilities.

TheairliftfleethasalreadygonethroughextensivemodernizationwiththeretirementoftheC–141,theprocurementoftheC–17,andtheupgradestotheC–5.Shortofbuyingmoreairframes,theUnitedStatescannotdomuchmoretoincreaseitsairliftcapabilities,sothebestoptiontofixairliftistousetheotherlegsofthetriadtomitigatetheairliftshort-falls.Thatbeingsaid,theUnitedStatesstillneedstoconsiderthefutureneedsofairliftandpursuethedevelopmentandprocurementoffutureplatforms,suchastheglobalrangetransport,ultra-largeairlifter,C–17aircraftwithapayload/rangeextensionprogram,andsupershorttake-offandlandingaircraft.

TheUnitedStatesalsoneedstocontinuetopursuetheacquisitionanddevelopmentoffuturesealiftplat-formsliketheshallowdrafthigh-speedship(SDHSS),monohullfastsealiftship,andotherhigh-speedNavyvessels.

RecommendationUntiltechnologyallowstheUnitedStatestomove

forcesfromCONUStoanywhereintheworldinlessthan7days,regardlessofSPODsandaerialportsofdebarkation(APODs),forwardpositioningofequip-mentisthekey.Thewaytofixthemobilitytriadistotaketheholisticapproach.TheUnitedStatescannotfixeachlegofthetriad,butbyfocusingonintratheaterliftandpositioningofthepre-positionedequipment,theUnitedStatescanusethestrengthsofeachlegtofixthewhole.

Acurrentoff-the-shelfcapabilitycanprovideabridgingstrategyuntilfutureplatformsbecomeattain-able.Thatcapabilityisthehigh-speedcatamaran.Cou-plingthecatamaranwithAPSandpositioningtheminthedifferentcombatantcommandareasofresponsibil-ity(AORs)wouldprovideaforcethatacombatantcommandercouldrapidlydeploy.ItwouldalsoprovideorganicintratheaterliftcapabilityoncethevesselsdischargetheAPS,andthatwoulddecreasetheairliftrequirements.Thecatamaranwouldprovideaplatformtorapidlydeliveraidsuppliesduringnaturaldisasterswithoutusingwarships,whichcansendthewrongmessagetothoseinneed.

Thecurrentcommercialoff-the-shelftheatersupportvessel(TSV)isalsoanoptionforbolsteringsealiftcapability.ArecentexampleofaTSV-typecapabilitywasdemonstratedinOperationIraqiFreedom.TheSpearhead,acommercialfastshallowdraftferrythattheArmywasleasingfromanAustralianfirm,movedthe101stAirborneDivision’smilitarypolicefromDjiboutitoKuwait,makingthe2,000-miletripin2½

32Operational and Organizational (O&O) Plan For The Theater Support Vessel (TSV),DepartmentoftheArmy,Washington,DC,14November2002,p.12.33DefenseScienceBoard,p.131.34 NateOrme,“ArmyCatamaranhaulsEquipmentDouble-Time,”Defense Link,www.defense.gov,8September2003.35Quick Reaction Requirements Analysis for the Theater Support Vessel,p.1.


days.AnLSVwouldhaveneeded10daystomakethevoyageandcouldhaveonlytransportedequipment,requiringthetroopstoflyseparately.34

In2003,theArmyconductedaportstudyofCENT-COMandPACOMAORstoexaminetheaccessibil-ityof282portsin26countries.AnLMSRcanonlyaccess27percentoftheseportsbecauseofitsdraftof9.1to10.5meters.TheTSV,however,canaccess74percentoftheportsbecauseitsdraftisbetween4.6and6meters.35

Thehigh-speedcatamaranwouldalsoprovideaccesstomoreaustereports,thuslimitingthearea-denialoptionsthatpotentialadversarieswouldhave.IfwelookbackatWorldWarIIandtheInchonlandingsinKorea,theUnitedStateshashadtoconductforcedentriesbeforewithouttheuseofports.Whydowenowdiscountthatpossibility?

DuringtheVigilantWarriors01wargame,U.S.andalliedforcesemployedamixtureofcurrentliftassetsandpromisingfutureconcepts.Ofallcurrentandfutureairliftandsealiftcapabilities,theSDHSSandtheTSVmostsignificantlyaffectedforceclosureratesbecauseoftheirspeed,throughputcapability,andcapacity.TheSDHSSandTSVweretheonlyplat-formsthatcouldsufficientlydelivertroopsandequip-menttobringimmediatecombatpowertobear.Whileintransit,commanderswereabletoconductenroutemissionplanningandreceiveintelligenceupdates.TheTSVprovidedtransformationalcapabilityandopera-tionalmaneuverofArmyformations.SincetheTSVcancarryapproximately7timesasmuchastheC–17and24timesasmuchastheC–130,ithadtheaddedbenefitofreducingintratheaterairliftrequirementselsewhereinthetheater.

Iproposeacquiringenoughhigh-speedcatama-ranstocarryfourBCTs.EachcombatantcommanderwouldhaveaBCTafloatthatcouldrapidlydeploytoanintermediatestagingbasetomarryuptheequip-mentwithtroopsdeployedoutofCONUS,andeachofthesetscouldbemutuallysupportingifthecrisiscalledformoreforces.Forexample,thePACOMsetcouldmovequicklytotheCENTCOMAORifneededandvice-versa.

Thestrategicmobilitytriadhasmanyweaknesses.Waitingforfutureplatformsisnottheanswer.Thisdilemmamustbeanalyzedholisticallyasajointprob-lem.Itisnotasingleserviceproblemand,therefore,cannotbeapproachedasone.

Strategicmobilityhasnotbeenfixedandistheweakestlinkinthestrategicchainofgettingtherightforcestotheproperplaceinspaceandtimeinorderto

allowthecombatantcommandertodeter,de-escalate,ordecisivelydefeatanadversary.

The2006QDR’sstatement,“Extensiveinvestmentsincargotransportability,strategiclift,andpre-posi-tionedstocksoverthepastdecadehaveyieldedmili-taryforcescapableofrespondingtoabroadspectrumofsecuritychallengesworldwide,”36isatbestmislead-ingandatworstwishfulthinking.Eightypercentofallcountrieshavebordersonacoast,80percentoftheworld’scapitalsliewithin350milesofacoast,and95percentoftheworld’spopulationliveswithin500milesofacoast.37Currently,theUnitedStatescan-notmovesignificantgroundforcestocrisisareasinatimelymanner.

ThemostrecentNationalSecurityStrategystatesthateitherhost-nationoralliedAPODsandSPODswillbeusedtoquicklymoveforcesintoacrisisarea.Manyofthecountriesinvolvedinpastcrisesorthathaveahighpotentialforfuturecrises(suchasSoma-lia,Iraq,Iran,Israel,Yemen,Myanmar,Pakistan,India,SierraLeone,SriLanka,China,Korea,Taiwan,Geor-gia,Sudan,EastTimor,Venezuela,andCuba)bordertheworld’soceansandareinremote,unimprovedareasoftheworld.Halfofthesecountriessitastridestrategicwaterways,andtheirlocationscouldimpedetheUnitedStatesanditsallies.

IftheUnitedStateshadtoengageanyofthesecountriesmilitarily,thecombatantcommanderwouldneedalltheassetsthatthemobilitytriadhasinordertorespond.IftheUnitedStateswantstocontinuetoprovidetheworldwithpolitical,economic,informa-tional,andmilitaryleadership,itneedstheabilitytosendmilitaryforcesintothenumeroustroublespotsthroughouttheworld.

TheUnitedStatescannotaffordtorelyonhostnationoralliedsupport.Norcanitrelyonlimitedairtransportandslowsealifttogetourforcestothecrisisarea.TheUnitedStatesmuststoppayinglipservicetotheshortfallsinourstrategicmobilitytriadandlever-agetheavailabletechnologyandcreateatrulyinter-dependentandcomplementarymobilitytriadthatiscriticalforoperationalandstrategicsuccess.

colonel Kenneth e. hicKins is assigned to the u.s. aRmy euRoPe g–4 office. he has a bacheloR’s degRee in business administRation fRom the univeRsity of nebRasKa, masteR’s degRees in national secuRity and stRategic studies fRom the naval WaR college, and a masteR’s degRee in stRategic studies fRom the aRmy WaR college. he is a gRaduate of the aRmoR officeR basic couRse, the quaRteRmasteR officeR advanced couRse, the insPectoR geneRal’s couRse, and the aRmy WaR college stRategic aRts PRogRam.

36Quadrennial Defense Review Report,2006,p.54.37Revised Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the Theater Support Vessel (TSV) ACAT III,DepartmentoftheArmy,Washington,DC,14March2003,p.10.

46 ARMY SUSTAINMENT46 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

heChinesePeople’sLiberationArmy’s(PLA’s)emphasisonxinxihua zhan(informa- tionalizedwarfare)hasnowbeensupercededbytheconceptsofPei Shu andZhi chi. Pei Shutranslatesto“attachingtroopstoasubordinateunit,”meaningcreatinginde-pendentbattlegroupswithinthedivisionoraugmentingadivisionseamlesslywithheavierforces.Zhi chi means“tosupport,”whichdescribesthecreationofabattlefieldlogisticsorganizationabletosupplyandsupportforcesdeepinsideanenemy’sreararea.Thissupportisenvisionedtobebasedatthecorpslevelandincludebrigades,whicharefurthersplitintocombinedarmsbattlegroupsthataregenerallybasedaroundabattalionheadquarters(andnormallyamaneuverelement).

Logistics,beingthe“poorcousin”ofcombatarms,sufferedfrominadequatefundingfromthebirthofthePLAuntilveryrecently.Thereorganizationofunitsintomechanizedbrigadesandtheemphasisonout-of-areaoperationsmeantthatlogisticshadtobeupdated.In2005,theGeneralLogisticsDepartment(GLD)embarkedonthemodernizationofitscombatlogis-ticscapabilitytoenablesustainedoperationsonChina’speripheryandbeyonditsborders.Thisarticlelooksathow,in4shortyears,thePLAhascreatedamodernlogisticsorganiza-tioncapableofsupportingextendedlarge-scaleoperationsoutsideitsmainoperatingareas.

PeaceMission2007ThePeaceMission2007exercisebetweenRussiaandChinainRussia’sChelyabinsk

OblastwasheldinJuly2007,andbesidesbeingthefirstmajortestofthePei shuconcept,itwasusedtoshowthatthePLAcouldnowcreateanddeployacompositezhandui(battlegroup)oflightarmorandhelicopters.Thisbattlegroupwascreatedfromexistingforcesandwasabletoconductlightinfantryoperations,includingcounterterrorism,reconnaissance,andscreeningoperationsacrossawidearea.

Forthisexercise,thePLAdeployed—❏Awheeledmechanizedinfantrybattalioncomprising40type92wheeledinfantryfighting

vehiclesand15type92Awheeledarmoredpersonnelcarriers.❏Twocompaniesof18PL02100-millimeterassaultguns,eachmountinganenclosedturret

witha100-millimetercannonandacoaxial7.62-millimetermachinegun.❏Onebattalionof16Z–9Wattackhelicopters.❏Onebattalionof16Mi–17Hipmultimissionhelicopters.❏Acompanyof12ZBD–03airbornecombatvehicles,eachwithamounted30by165-

millimeterautomaticcannonandacoaxial5.8-millimetermachinegun.The55wheeledvehiclesand18PL02assaultgunsusetheWZ551six-wheeledarmoredchassis.1Theentiregroundforcewasmovedbytrain,andthehelicopterswereflownfromXinjiang.

Thetype92scantransportamechanizedinfantrybattalionofthreecompanieswiththesupportprovidedbytwocompanies’worthoftheassaultguns,whichisanunusuallylargeamountof huoli(firepower)foramechanizedinfantrybattalion.Thetype92Asprovidedtransportationforthebattalionheadquartersandcompanysupportweapons.

DeployedinfantrysupportweaponsincludedtheQBZ8735-millimeterautomaticgrenadelauncher,PF98120-millimeterantitankrocketlauncher,andtype74backpackflamethrow-ers.TheMi–17scouldlifttwoinfantrycompanieswiththeirsupportelements,providingthe



HEADLINES


COMMENTARY

FOCUS

LogisticsinthePLAby dR. MaRtin andReW

T

1Compiledfrom:“Hepingshinming-2007duoguolianhekandianjiexi,”Binggong keji,Zhongdi2007,pp.18–21;Kuachuguomin-zhanxiongfeng-“hepingshinming_2007yanxizaixianshang,”Tanke zhuangjia cheliang,2007Niandi,9Qi,Zhongdi259,pp.17–19;“Jiefangjunkuaifanzhuangbeiliangxiang,”Guoji zhanwang jianduan keji baodao,2007Niandi,16Qi,Zhongdi570,p.21;“Wanlifurang-hepingshinming-2007fankongjunyan,”Hangkong shijie,2007Niandi,9Qi,Zhongdi99,pp.16–23.

©Martin Andrew 2009. Reproduction for personal and educational purposes is authorized.


brigadecommanderwithsixcompany-levelmaneuverelements.TheZ–9Wattackhelicoptersprovidedaerialreconnaissance,firesupport,andliaison.

Thebrigadeprovideditsorganicresupplyandmedicalevacuationcapabilitythroughthetype92AarmoredpersonnelcarriersandMi–17helicoptersanduseditsownlogisticssupportforammunitionandspareparts.

CurrentBattlefieldLogisticsOn11August2009,thePLAlaunchedanexer-

cisecalledStride-2009.Oneoftheexercise’smajorobjectiveswastoimprovethePLA’sabilitytoprojectlong-rangepower.Stride-2009wasChina’slargest-everpeacetimetacticalmilitaryexerciseanditslargestdeploymentofarmorsincethe1979Sino-VietnameseWar.Theexerciseinvolvedover50,000personnel.2Thegeneralstaffheadquartersplannedandwrotethemanifestsovera3-monthperiodtopreparetherailnetworkandarrangeforChina’scivilianairlinesandmilitarytransportfleetstoprovidepassengerandspe-cialistcargoflights.

AmechanizeddivisionfromShenyangMilitaryCommand(northeast)wastransportedtoLanzhouMilitaryCommand(northwest),andtroopsfromJinanMilitaryCommand(east)andGuangzhouMilitaryCommand(south)wereexchanged.ThemovewasimportantbecauseitenabledthePLAtoidentifyandthenrectifydifficultiesofmovingtheirtwoelitecom-binedarmsmechanizedcorpsbetweenXinjiangandShenyang.Thepurposewastoidentifyproblemsandenablerapidreinforcementintheeventofacrisis.

Eachdeploymentlasted2months.Uponarrival,theywereputthroughaseriesoflive-fireexercises.TheforcesinJinanwererequiredtosupportaninva-sionofTaiwanandtheforcesinGuangzhouintheeventofanarmedinterventionintoNorthKorea.Thepersonnelweremoved,wheneverpossible,byair,andtheheavyequipmentwasmovedbyrail.However,thelightlyarmoredtroopsdeployedtoJinanMilitaryCommandwentbyChinaRailway’shigh-speedtrains,whichtravelupto350kilometersperhour.

Inthenewcombinedarmsmechanizedcorps,thelogisticsbrigadeisheldatthecorpslevelandlogisticssupportissupplieddirectlytothebrigadesandbattlegroupsusinga“pullsystem.”Besidesmilitaryopera-tions,thenewlogisticsbrigadetasksinvolveprovid-inglogisticssupportformilitaryoperationsotherthan

war,whichincludefloodcontrolandresultingrescues,earthquakeanddisasterrelief,nuclearandchemicalterrorism,andcounterinsurgencyoperations.

Fortheexercise,thelogisticsbrigadeissued34kindsofequipmentand4categoriesofspecialinstru-mentstodedicatedcompanies,platoons,squads,andindividuals.Itevaluatedcommandandcontrolissuesaswellastheamountofequipmentrequiredintheeventofaparticularmission.

Beforetheexercise,thelogisticsbrigadestressedtheneedtooutsourceequipmentandfacilitiesformilitaryoperationsotherthanwar,signsupportagree-mentswithcivilianequipmentandfacilitysupplyandmaintenanceproviders,andbuild(accordingtothebrigade)“areliableoutsourcingsupportnetworkforequipmentandfacilities.”3ThelogisticsbrigadefortheXinjiangcombinedarmsmechanizedcorpsinitiatedasimilarsystemthatincludedtheprovisionoflogisticssupportonover1,900milesofroadnetworkandatelevationsof14,000feetandhigher.4

BattlefieldResupplyMostofthevehiclesusedforresupplyareDong

Feng4x2and4x4mediumtrucks,whicharebasedonvariousmodelsofMercedes-Benztrucks.Resupplyneartheforwardedgeofthebattlefieldhasbeenmadeeasierwiththerecentintroductionofthetype06trackedarmoredsupplyvehicle.5Thevehicleislargerbutsimilarinappearancetothetype85armoredcommandvehicle.Ithasamodifiedhullfromthetype83152-millimeterself-propelledgun-howitzer,sixarmoredhatchesontheroof,andacranemountedontheleftsidebehindthecommander’scupola.Thevehicle’smainroleistosupplyammunitionforthedivision’sself-propelledguns.

Weighinginat19tonsfullyloaded,thetype06hasamaximumroadspeedof65kilometersperhourandmaximumroadrangeof500kilometers.Itcanclimba32-degreeslopeandcanbeona25-degreeslopewithoutrollingoversideways.Thevehicleuses3crewmembers,andthevehiclecommanderhasa12.7by108-millimetermachinegunattachedtohiscupolaonacircularframe.Fourtwin76-millimetersmokedischargerscompletethevehicle’sarmament.

Forward-arealogisticswillbeimprovedfurtherwiththeacquisitionofthe4x4Hummerlicenseandproduc-tionfacilitiesbySichuanTengzhongHeavyIndustrialMachineryCompany,Ltd.,fromGeneralMotors.ThePLAhadbeensorelylackingintheareaoflogistics

2“PLAKicksoffLargestLong-RangeTacticalMilitaryExercise,”China Military Online,11August2009,http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2009-08/11/content_4020975.htm,accessedon18August2009;“LargestEverMobilizationofTroopsSees50,000MoveAcrossNation,”China Military Online,12August2009,http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2009-08/12/content_4021351.htm,accessedon18August2009.

3“BrigadeCarriesOutEquipmentSupportExerciseUnderComplicatedConditions,”Chinese Military Online,27August2009,http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/newschannels/china-militarynews/2009-08/27/content_4029337.htm,accessedon28August2009.

4XuBichengandZhangYingxiang,“SupportBrigadeExploresJointSupportMethodsinJointOperations,”PLA Daily On-Line,18December2008,http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/news-channels/2008-12/18/content_1590465.htm,accessedon19December2008.

5“Zhongguo06kuanzhuangjiabujche,”Bingqi Zhishi,2007Niandi,3Qi,Zhongdi233,pp.28–36.

48 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

vehicles.6Theuseofpersonnelasporterstomovemuni-tionsandsuppliesforwardisnowathingofthepast.

BaseFeedingUntilrecently,providingpersonnelwithfoodduring

militaryoperationshadbeenlargelytheresponsibilityoftheprovincialmilitia.ThiswasahugeproblemforunitsoperatingonChina’speriphery,andthe1979Sino-VietnameseWarexposedalltheproblemsthatoccurwhenrelyingonthemilitiaforlogisticssupport.Thelogis-ticschainbrokedownandstruggledtosupplyevenmodestamountsoffoodtothefrontline.AndthePLAlogisticschainhadnotbeenimprovedsincetheKoreanWar.

Until2005,unitsinmountainousandremoteareassufferedfromalackoffreshfoodand,throughoutthePLA,therewasagenerallackofsuitableandstandard-izedmealsandmenus.7InNovember2005,toimprovenutrition,theGLDdirectedthat“acupofsoymilkandaneggbeprovidedforeachservicemanatbreakfast.”Companieswerealsodirectedto“preparefruitforser-vicementwotothreetimesaweekifconditionspermit.”8

ThestandardandquantityoffoodforChinesesol-diershaddecreasedmarkedlysincetheKoreanWarandwerelongoverdueforimprovement.9Inestab-lishedmesses,cateringformorethan500personnel,electronicovens,freezers,andmachinestomakenoodlesandbeancurdwereintroduced.10Rear-echelonunitsreceivedtheequipmentfirst,andthearmsmess-es,staffedbytheunitsatthecompanylevel,benefitedfromtheseimprovementsasfundingpermitted.

InJuly2009,therationswerefurtherimproved.ThePLA’sbasicdailyrationforenlistedpersonnelandcommissionedofficersstartedtoincludemorefreshfruitandanincreasedproportionofanimalproteinintheformofdairy,poultry,andseafood.Someporkandbeefmealswerereplacedbypoultryandlow-fat,high-proteinseafood.11

FieldFeedingInthefield,newmobilekitchenvehicleshavebeen

introduced.Onevehicleenables4cookstoprepare4

differenthotmealsandasoupfor300peopleinlessthananhour.12Thelong-heldtraditionofsquadseat-ingfromthesamericebowlwasonlydiscontinuedin2003becauseofthefearofspreadingdiseaseslikesevereacuterespiratorysyndrome(afactthatraisesquestionsaboutthePLA’spriorcommitmenttocon-trollingdiseaseandcontamination).InPLAinfantryunits,whichoperatedingroupsoffourorfive,eatingfromthesamericebowlwasseenasawayofempha-sizinggroupcohesion.

Moreimportantly,newfieldwaterpurificationandenvironmentalheathequipmenthasbeenintroduced.ThePLA’sRedArmyDivision,whichwasusedinopposing-forcetraining,wasthefirstunittousenewfieldwaterpurifyingequipment,fieldshowersthatusesolarenergyforheating,andotherequipmenttoimprovefieldenvironmentalhealth.13Thesesystemsenablesustainedoperationswithouthavingtodependonthelocalpopulationforrationsorwater.

AGLD-rundeploymentsustainabilityexerciseandthejointSino-RussianPeaceMissionexerciseinAugust2005revealedtheimprovementsrequiredforthePLAtoperformlogisticsmissionsonextendedoperationsawayfromestablishedinfrastructures.Areashighlightedincludedtheneedforimprovedcombatuniformsandpersonalprotectiveequipment,high-mobilitytransportation,modularequipment,andbettersystemizationofthelogisticssupplychain.14Supplyingpersonnelwithadequatefoodsuppliesinthefieldalsoreceivedspecialmention;ithadbeenaconstantissueinthePLAsinceitsinception.

Toenablesustainedoperationsinthefieldwithouttheneedforresupply,thePLAintroducedin2005the05seriesofprepackagedfieldrations,whichwereinshortsupplyfortheexercise.15Therationsusering-pullcanscontainingsuchdelicaciesasseafood,bird,fruit,greenvegetables,andmeatwithrice.Soupbasestoaccompanythemaincoursesareavailableinindividualsoftfoilpouches.MCF–240militarycom-pressedfood(“ironration”)blocksarealsoavailableinahalalversion.Theseareheatedinaflamelessheater

6AaronSmith,“GMUnloadsHummertoChineseBuyer,”CNN.Money.com,http://money.cnn.com/2009/06/02/news/companies/gm_hummer/index.htm,accessedon25November2009.

7GuanDaxueandFanJuwei,“PLACooksUpNewMenustoBeefUpSoldiers,”PLA Daily On-line,6November2005,http://www.chinamil.com.cn,accessedon6Novem-ber2005.

8GuanDaxueandFanJuwei,“MakingDishesMoreNutritiousforOfficersandMen,”PLA Daily On-line,3November2005,http://www.chinamil.com.cn,accessedon4November2005.

9InDecember1952thedailyrationwas900gramsofcereal,670gramsofmeat,vegetablesandoilswith180gramsofcondiments(soysauce,salt,spices).C.R.Shrader,Communist Logistics in the Korean War,GreenwoodPress,Westport,CT,1995,pp.94–95.

10GuanDaxueandFanJuwei,“PLACooksUpNewMenustoBeefUpSoldiers.”11“FoodQuotaStandardofPLATroopstobeAdjusted,”PLA Daily,4June2009,http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/news-channels/2009-06/04/content_1787079.htm,

accessedon7June2009;“PLAtoMarchonBetterFedStomachs,”PLA Daily,5June2009,http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/news-channels/2009-06/05/content_1787761.htm,accessedon7June2009.

12DingShunguoandZhaoGonghu,“Militaryunitdevelopsmoderncookingequipmentforfieldoperation,”PLA Daily On-Line,4January2005,http://www.chinamil.com.cn,accessedon5January2005.

13“Newtypeofequipmententersserviceintraining,”PLA Daily On-line,25August2005,http://www.chinamil.com.cn,accessedon5January2005.14BaoWeidongandLiuMingxue,“All-ArmyQuartermasterEquipmentInspectionYieldsRichFruits,”PLA Daily On-Line,25September2005,http://www.chinamil.com.

cn,accessedon26September2005.15“Zhandoulizhiyuanwojunjunyongshipinzonghentan(xia),”Bingqi Zhishi,2006Niandi,6Qi,Zhongdi224Qi,pp.53–55.


pouchsimilartomealsready-to-eat.Thepouchcanheatmealsto60degreesCelsius.16Forthesquad,thereare10-manboxedrationsaswellastheindividualrationsmentionedearlier.

PLAforcesonextendedoperationscannoweatwellwithouthavingtoforageoffthepopulation.Specificcold-weatherrationpacksarenowavailableandcomeinself-heating,tinned,softpackaging.17Abattery-operatedthermostatsimilarinsizetoapor-tablecalculatorcanbepluggedintospecialheatingpouches,enablingfood,suchasrice,tobeheatedupto60degreesCelsius.Motorizedandmechanizedunitspreviouslyhadeatencoldrationsorusedheatfromtheirrunningenginestocooktheirmeals.Soldiersinvolvedincold-weatheroperationsrequiremealswithmorecarbohydrates,fats,andproteintoincreaseredbloodcellformation.

BattlefieldEngineeringThePLAhasanarrayofvehiclestoenableand

enhancebattlefieldmobility.Forgapandrivercross-ings,thePLAemploystwotypesofpontoonbridges:thetype84bridge-layingtankandthetruck-mountedscissors-typefoldingbridgethatincorporatesbuilt-inpylons.18Forinitialcrossings,thePLAhasmotorizedsmallrigidinflatableboatsandanamphibiousfour-wheeldrivevehiclethatisalmostidenticaltotheU.S.Army’sWorldWarIIamphibiousjeep.19Replacingthetype62lighttankwiththetype03Pamphibioustankwillenablereconnaissanceunitstocrossriverbarri-ersandpaddyfieldsmoreeasilybutattheexpenseofarmoredprotection(althoughexplosivereactivearmorkitsarereportedlyavailable).20

TheGJT211Aarmoredbulldozerisusedforrap-idlybreachingminefieldsandbattlefieldengineeringtasks.21EquivalenttotheM9armoredcombatearth-mover,itisequippedwithalargebulldozerbladeinthefrontandatrayovertherearofthehullthathousesthetype84Arocket-launchedmine-clearingexplosivehosesystem.

Toensureadequateall-weather,high-altitudesup-port,thePLAregularlyoperatesinlateautumninXin-jianginextremeweatherconditions.InOctober2005,anengineerregimentoftheXinjiangMilitaryAreaCommandconductedahigh-altitude,cold-weatherexerciseat4,000metersintheKunlunMountains.22

Theexercisecomprisedover1,000menwithover100piecesofengineeringequipment.Theengineersdevel-opednewmethodsforprovidingsupport,includingarollingdevicethatalmosthalvesthetimeittakestobuildabridge,newtypesofcamouflagesuitedtotheterrain,andanewfront-endloader.23

Torepairvehiclesinthefield,thePLAhasdevel-opedtwovehiclestoproviderepairfacilitiesforarmoredvehiclesintheforwardbattlearea.TheZJX93armoredrapidbattlefieldrepairvehicleisbasedontheZSD89armoredcommandvehiclehullandisdesignedtoproviderapidrepairofarmoredvehiclesandquicklybringastrickenvehiclebackintooperationwithoutanarmoredrecoveryvehicle.Thevehicle’screwoffivehasacomprehensivearrayoftools.Itcontainsanautomaticoilfiltrationsystem,abatterycharger,testsetsforthetarget,radioandsta-bilizationsystems,andtoolstoenablerapidentryintothedisabledvehicle.

Fullyamphibiousandweighinginatjustover15tonsfullyloaded,theZJX93hasamaximumroadspeedof55kilometersperhourandcantravel6kilo-metersperhourinwater.Thevehicleincludesaturret-mountedtype5912.7-millimeterheavymachineguninasemi-enclosedturret,eight76-millimetersmokegrenadedischargers,andthreetype77/85submachine-gunsforclose-inprotection.ItisaverybusyvehiclewithasmallerprofilethantheWZ8581armoredmain-tenancevehicle.

TheWZ8581isbasedontheextendedZSD89hulloftheWZ252trackedambulanceandhassixroadwheelsinsteadoffive.24Thevehicleisbasicallyagarageontracks;thecrewcanaccessacomprehensivearrayoftools,includinganarcwelder,anaircompres-sor,andarapidbatterycharger.

Designedtoenablefieldmaintenanceofarmoredvehiclesduringoperationsinthefield,theWZ8581visuallydiffersfromtheWZ252ambulancebyhav-inga1-toncapacityhydrauliccraneontheleftsideofthevehicleandaturret-mountedQJC8812.7by108-millimeterheavymachinegun.TheWZ8581isalsoequippedwithfourtwin76-millimetersmokegre-nadedischargers.Thevehicleisamphibious,weighs17.5tonsfullyloaded,andhasamaximumroadspeedof60kilometersperhourandamaximumspeedof5kilometersperhourinwater.

16Ibid.17“Zhantoulizhiyuan(liu)zijiereshipin,”Bingqi Zhishi,2007Niandi,2Qi,Zhongdi232,pp.66–67.18“Dujianghejingongzuozhan(xia’),”Qing Bingqi,2005Niandi,8Qi,Zhongdi200,pp.46–49.19“Dujianghejingongzuozhan(shang),”Qing Bingqi,2005Niandi,8Qi,Zhongdi199,pp.5–9.20“Guochan03Pxingshuiliutanke,”Qing Bingqi,2008Niandi,4Qi,Zhongdi246,pp.20–21.21“Zhongjiagongchengbaozhungzhangbei,”Tanke Zhuangjia Cheliang,2004Niandi,12Qi,Zhongdi226,pp.5–10.22SuiJianqiangandXuYunjian,“EngineerregimentofXinjiangMACtoughenstroopsinfreezingplateauareas,”PLA Daily On-line,26October2005,http://www.chinamil.

com.cn,accessedon26October2005.23Ibid.24“Tankezhuangjiachelingde‘hushi’he‘baomu’WuguoyanshideWZ8581ludaishetankejishubaoyangche,”Tanke Zhuangjia Cheliang,2008Niandi,10Qi,Zhongdi272,

pp.37–41.

50 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

BattlefieldMedicalServicesPLAbattlefieldmedicalserviceshavealsobeen

modernized.Currently,therearethreestagesofmedicalservicebeforeaninjuredpersonisevacuatedtoamajorarmymedicalfacility.Themedicscollectthepatientsandprovideimmediatefirstaid,andthentheytransportthepatientstothebattalionaidpostwheretheyaresta-bilized.Thepatientsarethenmovedtothefieldordivi-sionalhospitalforearlytreatmentoftheirwounds.

WiththereorganizationofthePLAintoabrigadeandcorpsstructure,thecorpswillnowowntheearlystagetreatmentfacility.ThePLAisinvestinginitsbattlefieldhealthserviceswiththeadditionofarmoredtrackedambulancesthatuseboththetype85and89chassis.Theambulancewiththetype85chassisisarmedwitha12.7-millimetermachinegun,andthetype89,whichisfullyamphibious,isusedtotransportwoundedpersonneltoandfromlandingcraftoroverwatercrossings.25

TheextentofthePLA’sneedformodernizationwasdemonstratedinAugustandSeptember2005,whensoldiersdeployedtothefrontierborderareasoftheGuangxiZhuangAutonomousRegionweregivenindividualmedicalkitsprocuredbythePartyCommitteeoftheWenshanMilitarySub-CommandPoliticalDepartment.26Qualitymedicalkitsshouldhavebeenstandardizedandavailablelongbefore2005,butthekitsthatthePLAhadbeenprocuringwerenoimprovementoversimilarkitssuppliedtoPLAsol-diersinthe1960s.

ComputerizedProcurementTocutcostswhileimprovingtheprovisioningof

suppliesinthefieldandinbaseareas,thePLAnowusescomputerizedoutsourcingandprocurementtobuyequipment,includingtools,stationery,andengi-neeringequipment,directlyfromtheciviliansector.AdivisionstationedintheeasternpartofLiaoningProvinceinAugust2005testedtheinitialsystemwithamockemergencyprocurementdrill(stagedbytheGLD)withlocalsuppliersinnortheastChina.27Thesuccessoftheexercisedemonstratedthatthesystemwasviableandpointedthewayforfuture“integratedarmy-civilianemergencyprocurementsystems.”28Thesystemhassinceundergoneexpansionandimprove-mentandisnowinservicethroughoutthePLA.

Theneedtoprotectintellectualpropertywhenout-sourcingequipmentproductionhasbecomeanissuein

thePLA,asithasinothermilitaries.Thenewcamou-flageuniformissolelyforthemilitary,buttheuniformcanbefoundforpurchasethroughChinesedefensemagazinesorinmarkets.29Chinesedefenseclothingsupplierswillprovideanystyleofmilitarycamouflageabuyerseeks.

Mobilization

ThePLA,liketheformerSovietarmy,keepsthemajorityofitsmostmodernequipmentinstorageforuseinapotentialwar;earlierversionsandonlysmallamountsofthemorerecentequipmentareusedintraining.Althoughthisensuresthatnewequipmentisavailableduringtimesofmobilization,italsoleadstoproblems.Personnelareunfamiliarwiththemod-ernizedequipment,andbreakdownsoccurfrompoormaintenance.Furthermore,themassmobilizationofmodernizedmilitaryequipmentalertsanopponenttothearmy’sintentions.

ThePLAwasawareoftheseproblems,andinthelast3monthsof2005,theStateNationalDefenseMobilizationCommitteeissuedaseriesofpropos-alstoimproverapidmanpowermobilizationsystems.AlthoughthePLAhasdeployeditstwomajorarmoredcorpsforwardandpracticedrapiddeploymentwiththeStride-2009exercise,theunitsonlydeployedsufficientequipmenttopracticethelive-fireportionoftheexer-cise.Variousphotographsofrecentexercisesshowtheoldtype59tank(rebuiltcopiesoftheRussianT–54A)actingasamaneuverelementfortheredforces(the“goodguys”).

By2007,themajormodernizationplanannouncedbytheGLDin2005hadstartedtobringlogisticsinthePLAuptotheexpectedlevelofamodernmili-taryforce.Bytheendof2009,thePLAwasabletoconductsustainedindependentoperationsoutsideChina’sborders—anactivityithadneverbeenabletoundertakebefore.ThePLAhasfinallyacknowledgedthatlogistics,Zhichi,isthekeyforcemultiplierandshouldneveragainbethe“poorcousin.”

dR. maRtin andReW RetiRed fRom the austRalian defence foRce in 2005 afteR 28 yeaRs of seRvice. he has a doctoR of PhilosoPhy degRee fRom bond univeRsity and has been a ReseaRch affiliate at haRvaRd univeRsity. the second edition of his booK, How tHe PLA FigHts: weAPons And tActics oF tHe PLA, Was Published in seP-tembeR 2009.

25“Zhanchangyidongzhuangjiahusuo___wuzhangyanshidexinxingjudaishijiuhuche,”Tanke Zhuangjia Cheliang,2004Niandi,11Qi,Zhongdi225Qi,pp.5–9.26LiuGengwuandHuGuangsheng,“WenshanMilitarySub-Commandissuesmedicinekitstofrontierofficersandmen,”PLA Daily On-line,16September2005,http://

www.chinamil.com.cn,accessedon17September2005.27ZhangXinzhongandTangXiangdong,“IntegratedArmy-CivilianProcurementSystemBuiltinNortheastChina,”PLA Daily On-Line,26September2005,http://www.

chinamil.com.cn,accessedon26September2005.28Ibid.29“ChinatoLaunchSpecialRectificationonAdministrationofMilitaryUniform,”China Military Online,6November2009,http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/

china-military-news/2009-11/06/content4075405.htm,accessedon8November2009.




HEADLINES


COMMENTARY

FOCUS

PlannersHoldRehearsalofConceptDrillforNextPhaseofIraqDrawdown

LogisticsplannersgatheredatCampArifjan,Kuwait,on14December2009forarehearsalofconcept(ROC)drilltodiscussstrategiesandcoordinatethenextphaseoftheIraqdrawdown,whichbeganinDecember2009andwillconcludethisAugust.TheROCdrillwascohostedbyseniorstafffromtheDepartmentofDefense,theThirdArmy,andthe1stTheaterSus-tainmentCommand(TSC)andincludedbriefingsonwithdrawaltimelinesforspecificunits,classifiedplansforammunition,weatherpredictions,andthreattrends.

StakeholdersincludingtheArmyMaterielCom-mand,theDefenseLogisticsAgency,JointContractingCommandIraq/Afghanistan,andtheDepartmentoftheArmywererepresentedatthemeeting.

AccordingtoinformationprovidedbyplannersattheROCdrill,theArmyisonitswaytofulfillingPresidentBarackObama’sgoalofhavinglessthan50,000troopsinIraqbyAugust2010.

LieutenantColonelEricReinkober,1stTSCmobilitybranchchief,saysthattheArmyisaheadofscheduleforitsmonthlyretrogradegoalsforstockitemsandcontain-ers.AsofDecember,theArmyhadbeenmovingout300,000containerspermonth.Reinkobersaidthatmoretransportationassetswillbeneededasfurtherdrawdownoperationstakeplace.

“Thecentralquestioneveryonewantstoknowis,dowehavethetransportationcapacitytomovetherequirement?”saidReinkober.Heexplainedthatifadditionalvehiclesareneededtomovetherequirement,the1stTSCwillneedtocontractaddi-tionaltruckstohaulequipmentbacktoports.

SinceMay2009,morethan76,000equipmentitemsand10,000vehicleshavebeenretrograded;morethan30,000ofthoseretrogradeditemsarenowfillingotherU.S.CentralCommandrequirements.

NewTaskForceandSpecialOfficeCreatedtoOverseeEquipmentDrawdowninIraq

TheArmyMaterielCommand(AMC),theexecutiveagentforresettingtheArmy,hassetuptheResponsibleResetTaskForce(R2TF)tooverseeArmyequipmentleavingIraqaspartofthedrawdownscheduledtobecompletedby2011.R2TFwillensurethevisibility,accountability,andpromptmovementofassetsastheyheadforresetandrefurbishment.

TheCommunicationsandElectronicsCommandLifeCycleManagementCommandhasalsocreatedaneworganizationtoaiddrawdownefforts.TheSpe-cialProjectOfficeisworkingwithR2TFtodraw-downandmovecommand,control,communications,computers,intelligence,surveillance,andreconnais-sanceequipmentandpersonnelinIraq.

AMC’sasset-visibilityandaccountabilityeffortsinthepastfewyearshaveeasedsomeoftheburdenas-sociatedwiththedrawdownofequipment.Asof11November2009,theArmyhadidentifiedsome60,000piecesofequipment,includingtrucks,trailers,andcontainers,tobemovedoutofIraqand22,000itemstoberepositionedwithintheU.S.CentralCommandareaofresponsibility.

DLAPreparesforDrawdownTheDefenseLogisticsAgency(DLA)isalready

seeingasurgeofactivityduetodrawdowneffortsinIraq.DLAprovidestheU.S.militaryanditsalliedforceswithlogistics,acquisition,andtechnicalser-vices—includingthedisposalorredistributionofexcessmilitarypropertyandthedisposalofhazardouswaste.Earlierthisyear,membersofDLA’sDefense

Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525–3–0, The Army Capstone Concept, overhauls the 2005 Army Capstone Concept based on lessons learned in the past 4 years of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This document is subtitled “Operational Adaptability: Operating under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict (2016–2028).” Released in December 2009, the concept examines how Soldiers operate under complex conditions and in a time of continuing conflicts and how they will fight wars in the future.

Sustainment operations are addressed significantly in this document, making it a must-read for sustainment community members. The concept explains that while future developments in vehicle reliability, fuel efficiency, and durability, as well as the development of unmanned vehicle technology, could reduce sustainment demands, the sustainment tasks that remain will be more difficult to complete, because of increasing operations in locations without well-established supply routes.

The Army will need to acquire new capabilities to ensure delivery of supplies and will have to work jointly to ensure an “uninterrupted flow of personnel, supplies, equipment, and units into and throughout the theater of operations.” Logistics support will also have to be decentralized “to ensure that forces have what is necessary to seize upon unexpected opportunities or protect against unanticipated dangers.” Furthermore, while the Army will continue to use contract support, “forces must retain the capability to sustain operations in unsecure, austere environments.” Though logisticians must maintain their skills, the document also emphasizes the need for Soldiers to be “warfighters first and logisticians second.”

RECENTLY PUBLISHED

52 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ReutilizationandMarketingServicedisposalteamremovedmorethan3millionpoundsofscrapfromalargeforwardoperatingbasein30daysinsupportofthedrawdowneffort.

“Thisismuchmorethanmovingamountain,”saidColonelMikeBird,commanderofDefenseLogisticsAgency-CentralCommand.“Itsurpassesanylogisticalchallengewehaveundertakentodate,allwhilewearestillfightingtwowars.”

WhileequipmentneedsaredecreasinginIraq,theyarebuildinginAfghanistan,andalotofconsum-ableitemsarebeingshippedfromIraqtoDefenseDistributionDepot-Kuwaitforredistribution.WhileconsumableitemscanbeusedeasilyinAfghanistan,DonaldBruce,DLA’sJointLogisticsOperationsCen-terleadplannerfordrawdown,retrograde,andreset,saysequipmentisamorecomplexissue.High-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehiclesandotheritems

inneedofretrogrademustreturntoArmyrepairdepots.

“There’sabigimpactthereforDLAbecausethere’salotofequip-mentthathastocomebackandberepairedbeforeitcanbeprovidedtounitstoprepareforthenextfight,”saidBruce.

Thetransferofequipmenttorepairdepotscreatesanaddi-tionalimpactonDLAbecauseitincreasestheagency’srequirementtosupplytherepairpartstorebuildequipment.DLA’ssupplycentersareexpectedtoseeasurgeinbusi-nessasthemilitary’srequirementsforresetandrefurbishmentchangeandgrow.

RapidPortOpeningElementsJoinSDDC

TheArmyhasaddedthreerapidportopeningelements(RPOEs)totheMilitarySurfaceDeploymentandDistributionCommand(SDDC)toprovideexpeditionarysupportforini-tialportsetup.Theseunitsaredesignedtoarrivebeforedeploy-ingunitsandequipmenttoensureaccountabilityandvisibilityonceassetsarrive.Thisisespeciallyimportantincontingencyopera-tionswhenlargersustainmentunitsarenotyetavailable.Whileitcantakeatheatersustainmentcommandamonthtodeployin

supportofportopeningandforwarddistribution,RPOEscanbereadywithin36hoursbecausetheyaretailoredtothesizeandtypeofeachmission.

The688th,689thand690thRPOEsactasthe“ontheground”elementsfortheU.S.Transporta-tionCommand’sJointTaskForce-PortOpeninganddeployaspartofajointexpeditionarylogisticsforcetosetupaportofdebarkationandaforwarddistributionnode.RPOEsprovidecommanderswithin-transitvisibility,conductclearanceanddistribu-tionoperations,andreceiveandtransloadcargoasaninitial-entryportopeningforce.RPOEscontinuetoperformthesedutiesuntiltheyarerelievedbyorinte-gratedintofollow-onsustainmentforces.

The690thRPOE,thenewestofthethreeunits,wasactivedon16October2009.The688thcom-pletedthetaskforce’sairandseaportofdebarkationverificationsinMay2009,andthe689thparticipatedinitsfirstoperationaldeploymentwiththetaskforce

IraqiandU.S.ArmyPartnertoDestroyOldMunitionsNearBaghdad

The 704th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team and soldiers from the 9th Iraqi Army Division destroyed 1.5 tons of old munitions, including mortar shells and tubes, rocket-propelled grenades, and Russian-made anti-tank grenades, on the Besmiayah Range Complex near Baghdad on 26 October. The partnership is one of many across Iraq in which Iraqi soldiers are learening the skills needed to support the Iraqi Army. (Photo by SPC Philip Turner, Multi-National Division-Baghdad PAO)


whilemovingthe5thStrykerBrigadeCombatTeam,2ndInfantryDivision,toAfghanistaninthesummerof2009.

Theseunitsprovidenotonlyaquick-reactioncapabilitybutalsocanaugmentdeploymentanddistributionunitsmorereadilybecausethetaskforcedesignrequireslesscoordinationwithhigherheadquarterselementstoauthorizedeployment.

ArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollegeNamesDistinguishedMasterLogistician

TheDepartmentofLogisticsandResourceOpera-tionsoftheArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCol-lege(CGSC)recognizedMajorErikE.Hilberg,aLogisticsCorpsandtransportationofficer,astheMajorGeneralJamesM.WrightDistinguishedMas-terLogisticianforIntermediateLevelEducationclass2009–02.

TheDistinguishedMasterLogisticianprogrambeganin1983andrecognizesthetoplogisticianineachCGSCclass.Theprogramprovidesexpandedlearningopportunitiesinlogisticsthrougha3-phaseprocess:awrittenexamonawidevarietyofsus-tainment-relatedsubjects;anoralexambeforeaboardoflogisticians,whoaskscenario-basedques-tions;anda3-houroralpresentation.Forthepre-sentation,eachcandidateisgiven7daystodevelopajointtaskforceconceptofsupportforoperationsinacountrywithminimalsupportinfrastructureandthenpresentshissupportplanbeforeaboardofseniorlogisticians.

SoldiersinAfghanistanGetLettersDeliveredFasterWithNewHooahMail

TheArmylaunchedanew1-yearpilotprogramon1December2009thatisprovingcapableofdeliver-ingpaperlettersandphotosoffriendsandfamilytoSoldiersinAfghanistanwithindaysinsteadofweeks.Initsfirst21daysinservice,“Hooahmail”delivered1,690letterstoSoldiersinAfghanistan,manyinlessthan24hours.

Hooahmailisahybridsystemcombiningthebenefitsofdigitalandtraditionalmail.Individualswishingtosendlettersandphotossignintowww.hooahmail.us,typeintheirmessages,andattachdigi-talphotos.Thisinformationissentto1of10sitesinAfghanistan,whereitisprintedout,folded,stuffedinenvelopes,anddeliveredviaintratheatermailusingtheSoldiers’traditionalmailingaddresses.

Dependingonthedestination,Hooahmailcantake1to4daystodeliver,muchlessthantheapprox-imately14daysitnowtakesmailfromtheUnitedStatestoreachSoldiers.ServiceforHooahMailisprovidedbySuperLetter.Com,Inc.,whichhasdevel-opedasimilarprogramfortheMarineCorps.

OperationsResearchEducationColloquiumTheMilitaryOperationsResearchSociety

(MORS)2010EducationandProfessionalDevelop-mentColloquiumwillbeheldfrom14to15April2010attheArmyLogisticsUniversityatFortLee,Virginia.Thethemeforthisyear’sforumis“Opera-tionsResearch:AGlobalSolutionMethodology.”

Theforumprovidesoperationsresearchstu-dentsandprofessionalswithanopportunitytohearaboutrecentacademicprojectsandfutureresearchandprofessionaldevelopmentopportuni-tiesinoperationsresearch.Studentswillalsobeabletopresentcurrentresearchprojects,interactwithstudentsfromotheracademicinstitutions,andreceiveguidanceandlessonslearnedfromexpertsinoperationsresearch.

Formoreinformationortoregister,visittheMORSwebsiteatwww.mors.org.

CultureSummitIVTheArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand

(TRADOC)CultureCenterwillholdCultureSummitIVfrom19to21AprilattheHiltonElConquistadorinTucson,Arizona.Thesummitbringstogethermilitaryleaders,scholars,andotherprofessionalexpertstoprovideparticipantswithrelevant,applicablelessonslearnedforbuild-ingcross-culturalknowledgetouseinthecurrentoperationalenvironment.Thisyear’sthemeis“KnowledgetoApplication:EmployingCross-CulturalCompetencySkillstoPositivelyShapetheEnvironment.”

MajorGeneralJohnCuster,commandinggeneraloftheU.S.ArmyIntelligenceCenterofExcellence,saysSoldiersdeployedtoforeignnationswhounderstandthelocallanguageandaremoreculturallyawareoftheirsurroundingsoffermorecompletereportingcapabilitiesthanSoldierswithoutthisskillset.

CultureSummitIVwillincludepresentationsontherolesplayedbyculturalawareness,non-governmentalorganizations,anddiplomacyinthecurrentoperationalenvironment.Toregister,visittheIntelligenceKnowledgeNetworkonlineathttps://icon.army.mil/.Select“CultureAware-nessSummitIV”inthebottomleftcolumnofthescreen,andlogintotheregistrationsiteusingyourArmyKnowledgeOnline(AKO)usernameandpassword.GuestswithoutanAKOaccountcanaccessthesitewiththeusername“TccSum-mit.guest”andthepassword“2010TccSummit”inordertoregister.RegistrationendsApril2.

UPCOMING EVENTS

PERIODICALS POSTAGEAND FEES PAIDAT PETERSBURG VIRGINIAAND ADDITIONAL CITIES

ISSN 0004–2528DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYARMY SUSTAINMENTUS ARMY LOGISTICS UNIVERSITY2401 QUARTERS ROADFORT LEE VIRGINIA 23801–1705

Official Business

o 16thSustainmentBrigadeinIraqo GlobalizationofMilitaryLogisticso RecruitingandRetentionSchoolBestPracticeso MDMPforSustainmentUnitso CorpsLogisticsPlanningandDecisionCycleo CSSBsThatThink“InsidetheBox”o UnitContractingProblemsDuringOverseasTrainingExerciseso HumanResourcesOperationsBrancho SustainingtheArmy’sFirstAABo 6thMedicalLogisticsManagementCentero SustainingtheAfghanNationalArmyEmbeddedTrainingTeamo ContractorsontheBattlefield

Coming in Future Issues

Date post:	27-Apr-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	vominh
View:	215 times
Download:	0 times