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London HUG 14/3

Date post: 12-Apr-2017
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Copyright @ 2016 Aqua Security Software Ltd. All Rights Reserved. Who’s Keeping your Secrets? Amir Jerbi, CTO and co-founder Aqua Security
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Page 1: London HUG 14/3

Copyright @ 2016 Aqua Security Software Ltd. All Rights Reserved.

Who’s Keeping your Secrets?Amir Jerbi, CTO and co-founderAqua Security

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DO YOU HAVE SECRETS? Encryption keys Database passwords SSH Keys Cloud service tokens

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SECRET ARE HEAVILY USED IN CONTAINERS

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AND SOME TIMES CAN BE USED INSECURELY…

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PASSING SECRETS TO CONTAINERS – WRONG WAY Cleartext environment variables Mounted volumes Unauthenticated Services (e.g. S3) Saving secrets into images (please don’t)

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CAN EXPOSE SECRETS TO THE HOST “docker inspect …”

/proc/<pid>/environ

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PASSING SECRETS IS NOT THE ONLY CHALLENGE… Controlling who can access a secret Monitoring secret usage Rotating secret values De-provisioning a secret

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AVAILABLE SOLUTIONS Kubernetes Secrets

https://kubernetes.io/docs/user-guide/secrets/ Docker Swarm Secrets

https://blog.docker.com/2017/02/docker-secrets-management/ DC/OS Secrets

https://docs.mesosphere.com/1.8/administration/secrets/ Keywiz

https://github.com/square/keywhiz Hashicorp Vault

https://www.vaultproject.io/https://medium.com/on-docker/secrets-and-lie-abilities-the-state-of-modern-secret-management-2017-c82ec9136a3d#.86vfvlk1t

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WHY HASHICORP VAULT? Purpose built for secrets Key Rolling Comprehensive Access control Expiration policies Extendable Easy to integrate

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CASE STUDY: AQUA SECURITY INTEGRATION WITH HASHICORP VAULT

Solution Highlights Central

management Secrets are

never persisted to disk outside of Vault

Secured communications

Host 1 Host 2

Command Center

Hashicorp Vault

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SECRETS ARE INJECTED INTO CONTAINERS Through environment variables

Or tmpfs mounted volume

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SECRET ACCESS CONTROL Control user and group access to secrets

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USAGE TRACKING Track which containers are using secrets

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SECRET ROTATION & REVOCATION Container secrets can be

updated in runtime No need to restart container Deleting a secret removes it

from all running containers

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Q&A


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