Lord Strang's report on his South and Southeast Asian visit in 1949March.pdf

8/14/2019 Lord Strang's report on his South and Southeast Asian visit in 1949March.pdf

1/27

(c) crown copyright

Catalogue Reference:CAB/129/33 Image Reference:0027


2/27

mm \ iDOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MA JESTY S GOVERNMENT

Printed for the Cabinet. March 1949

S E C R E T Copy No.C P . 49) 6717th March 1949

C A B I N E T

S I R W I L L I A M S T R A N G S T O U R I N S O U T H - E A S T A S I A A N D T H EF A R E A S TNOTE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

I a t tach , for the information of my col leagues , a repor t prepared for meby S i r W i l l iam S t ra ng on h i s recen t v i s i t to Sou th -E as t A s ia an d the Fa r Ea s t .

- E . B .Foreign Office S.W. 117th March 1949.

R E P O R T B Y S I R W I L L I A M S T R A N GI . I n t r o d u c t o r y

I g ive below some notes on my recent journey in South-East Asia and theF ar Ea st . The y are not exha ust ive . I t wo uld be tedious to se t down a l l th a tI hea rd ov no ted . W h a t I have t r i ed to do is to p ick out the more im po rta nttrends and note the more significant facts, not for the benefit of the specialistDepar tments , but as being of poss ib le in teres t to the genera l reader , who wil l ,I hope, draw from th is paper some impress ion of current preoccupat ions andthe p lay of forces in th is im po rta nt region. In the prese nt in tro duc tory sectionI m ake some mo re gen era l obse rvatio ns. If I have, in places, stra ye d beyondthe str ict l imits of Foreign Office concern, I hope I may be excused.

2. I ha d no o ther miss ion th an to educ ate myself to mee t H is M ajes ty sRepresenta t ives in the fore ign countr ies v is i ted , to te l l them about developmentsa t home, to g ive them a p ic tu re of the fore ign s i tua t ion as seen f rom Eu rop eand, genera l ly , to demonstra te the in teres t of the Foreign Off ice in Far Easternand Sou th-E ast As ian affa irs . I spent some days each in K ara ch i , Delhi ,Rangoon , S ingapore , Kua la Lumpur , Ba tav ia , Bangkok , Hong Kong , Shangha iand Tokyo, and spen t n ig h ts in t ra ns i t a t Al exa ndr ia and Ca lc u t ta . I ha d ta lkswith the Heads of Miss ions and with their chief advisers , pol i t ica l , economic,f inancia l, labour and informa tion. I wa s received by the lead ing Min is ter s ineach of the coun tr ies v is i ted . I m ad e a poi nt of me et ing and ta lk in g to therepresenta t ives of Commonweal th countr ies , the United Sta tes , France , Beneluxand Ch ina . I saw lead ing mem bers of the B ri t ish Com mun ity in each p lace . TheBr i t i sh Chambers o f Commerce a t Hong Kong and Shangha i en te r ta ined me , andI addres sed them . I wa lke d th ro ug h th e offices of each of H is M aje sty s Miss ionsan d spoke to as m any mem bers of the staff as possible, of all gra de s. A t therequest of the Heads of the Mission I gave a talk to the members of the staffa t Delhi and Tokyo; and a t the request of the Commissioner-General for South-East Asia , Mr. Malcolm MacDonald , I d id the same a t Buki t Serene to a par tyof Bri t ish , Malayan and Chinese notables .

3. I t w ill be observed th at my jou rne y, un de rta ke n mostly by flying-boat,,covered the centra l and eastern par ts of the sea-gir t per iphery , or what the36746 B


3/27

geopol i t ic ians ca l l the Rimland, which sk i r t s the Hear t land of Europe and Asiawhich is a t present in large measure under Soviet control , and the fate of thewe s tern pa r t of wh ich i s now a t issue in the cu r re nt ba t t le for B er l in . I wasinterested to f ind that the s ignif icance of that bat t le is not diminished but ratherenhanced when looked a t f rom the Far Eas t .4. Th e imp or tanc e of our m ain ta in ing cont ro l of the per iphe ry , whichruns round from Oslo to Tokyo, of denying i t to communism, and, i f possible ,defen ding i t ag a in s t m i l i ta r y a t tac k , needs no em phas is . No r i s i t less impor tan t ,from the point of view of the framing of policy, that we should try to look onthe pe r ip he ry as a whole. I foun d th e germ of thi s tho ug ht in the m ind s ofmany of our representat ives, and also the thought that there should not onlybe a Un ite d K ing do m pol icy, but , if possible , a Co mm onw ealth pol icy ( in spi teof divergencies of out look); and that that pol icy should, i f possible , be concertedwi th the Uni ted Sta tes , s ince Amer ican resources would be indispensable .5. I n al l thi s , the In d ia n sub -con t inent has a specia l im po rtan ce. I t l ies

a t a p lace abo ut ha l f -way roun d the pe r iph ery . I f In di a ten ds to look eas tward s ,P ak is ta n looks both eas t and wes t . Th e sub-cont inent should not be rega rded ini so la t ion as a sep ara te sec tion . In dia , in pa r t ic u la r , ha s an im po r ta n t ro le toplay in per iphera l pol i t i cs 1as a Grea t Asian Power ; as a poss ib le member ofthe Commonwea l th ; a s a coun t ry wi th whom the Un i t ed Kingdom has now anoppor tuni ty to develop re la t ions on a new bas is ; as a count ry wi th pol i t i ca l ,cu l tura l and economic in te res t s in South-Eas t Asia , which we should t ry tocarry with us in the framing of pol icies and the development of act ion in thatreg ion . Th e Delh i Conferences on Indo nes ia and Bu rm a may be poin ters to thefu ture .6. F r om th is pe r ip he ra l poin t of v iew, the es tab l i shm ent of the M iddle E as t

Office in C air o and the C om m issio ner -G ene ral s Office i n S ing ap ore w ere movesin the r i gh t direct io n. T he need for them ha s no t dim inish ed. I foun d themin ds of some of Hi s M aje s ty s Rep resenta t ives tu rn in g in the d i rec t ion of,say, year ly regional meet ings of Heads of Missions, and of the associat ion ofCom manders- in-Chief , Colonia l Governors , an d U ni te d Kin gdo m H ig h Commissioners or their representat ives in some measure, i f possible , with such conferences.Th e sugges ted grou ping s for th i s purp ose m igh t be f ir s t, f rom Greece or Turkeyround to Pa ki s ta n , an d secondly , f rom P ak is ta n to J a p a n . For the first g roupor p a r t of i t , the sug gest io n wo uld be for a me et ing in Lo nd on nex t sum me r. Forthe second, a meet ing s imilar to that recent ly held in Singapore, but with moreextended membership than before , and some co-ord ina t ion wi th the s imi la rconference of Colonial Go verno rs . Th is wou ld ca rry wit h i t c lose con tact betweenthe Foreign Office, Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office in London.I t wo uld also be use ful if senior.officials of th e Fo re ig n Office could vis it S outh-East Asia and the Far East f rom t ime to t ime, possibly about the per iod of theS ingapore mee t ings .7. Th ere i s a good dea l th a t is d ar k in the F a r E as te rn p ic tu re , bu t thereare some br i gh ter fea tures . On the da rke r s ide a re 1a the ever-present food shortage, which wil l be a long-term problem forIn d i a and Ja p a n and may be an immed ia t e one fo r Shan gha i if Un i t edSta tes ass i s tance i s cu t shor t ;6 t he p re sen t d i so rde r s i n Burma , Ma laya , Indones i a and Indo-Ch ina ;(c) the revolut ion in China and the menace tha t i t b r ings for South-Eas tAsia wi th i t s grea t Chinese communi t ies and for fore ign in te res t s inthe whole a rea ;d the need of all these countries, in greater or lesser degree, for outsidefinancial assistance;e the popula t ion problem in Japan , which the war has done noth ing tocure but , indeed, has tended to intensify, and any at tempt to solvewhich must , a t the bes t , mean s t rong and growing compet i t ion wi thUni ted Kingdom expor te rs and may, a t the wors t , in the long run ,br i ng some new Jap an es e explos ion .

On the br ighter s ide we may note(/) the success of the In te rn at io na l Em ergen cy Foo d Coun ci l and theCo m m ission er-G ene ral s Office in secu ring fa ir a l locat ion and duedel ivery of the r ice crop, thus making the most of avai lable resources;


4/27

(g) the buoyancy of r ice product ion in Siam and of t in and rubber product ioni n M a l a y a ;(h) t he eas ing of tens ion be tween India and Pakis tan ;(i) the demonst ra t ion by Singapore , Hong Kong, and Japan tha t , g iven peaceand good order , a set t led administrat ion and a reasonably s tablecur rency , the grea t product ive and t rad ing apt i tudes of the popula t ioncome int o play. Sia m points in the same dir ect ion ;

and from a more specif ical ly Bri t ish point of view(j) th e ma inte nan ce of our good name, pol i t ical inf luence an d economicinterests thanks to the example set to the world by the Bri t ish peoplein their effor ts towards recovery;

to ou r act of pol icy in In d ia ;to our policy of non- in te rven t ion and un per turb ed watch fu l w ai t i ng inC h i n a ;to the zeal i demeanour and resource of our representat ives, whether ofthe foreign, C olonial , Com mo nwea lth or arm ed services, an d thegrowing sp i r i t o f co l labora t ion among them, matching theendeavours of our people at home; and to the integri ty, experience,enterprise and flexibili ty of reactions to new conditions shown byour business communit ies , the growth of a team spir i t amongthem, and of confidence between them and the official side.

8 . T hi s wo uld sugges t th a t we have a p a r t to p lay in th i s a rea w hichcan be pla yed by no other P ow er, thou gh we clear ly cann ot play i t a lone. I t canbe best playe d by a com binat ion of B ri t is h experien ce and U ni te d S tate s resources.9. Fin al l y, I wo uld expre ss my sincere th an ks to you Sir , for m ak ing my

journey possible; to my col leagues of the Foreign Service whose generous andthoughtful assis tance mult ipl ied the benefi t and l ightened the burden of thetou r ; and to H is M ajes ty s H ig h Com miss ioners a t K ar ac hi and Delh i , theCommiss ioner -Genera l a t S ingapore , the Governors of S ingapore and Hong Kongand the High Commissioner of the Federat ion of Malaya and their s taffs foral l the courtesies and the very great kindness which I received at their hands. .

II No tes on Tour

A . A lex an dr ia: 12th January, 1949I s tayed the n ight wi th the Consul -Genera l . His Majesty s Ambassador,Sir J. Troutbeck (British Midd le East O ffice) and the two Com mander s-in-Chief(General Sir J . Crocker and Air Marshal Sir W. Dickson) came from Cairo tosee me an d spent the ni gh t a lso. W e ha d talks before and af t er dinn er .2. Th e fol lowing are some of the poi nts ma de :Palestine. (A t th i s da te , H is M ajes ty s Governm ent ha d not ye t recognisedIsrael.)(a ) Ag reem ent be tween Is rae l , Tra ns Jorda n and E gy pt should be promoted;(6) The f ront ie rs of I s rae l should sa t i s fy the condi t ions(i) of being not too unsat isfactory from the point of view of thedefence of the C an al Zone. Th e G.O.C. s t ressed the vi ta limportance of the Canal Zone and of Egypt general ly f rom thepoint of view of the defence of the whole Middle East ;(ii) of being likely to gain the acquiescence, in the long run at anyra te , o f the Arab Sta tes ;(c ) I s rae l should be dr aw n in to the orb i t of the W este rn P ow ers and denied toSoviet inf luence; for this reason the moderate Israel i par t ies shouldbe su pp or ted . Th is is vi ta l from th e po in t of view of defence.(d) To th is end , a jo in t Uni ted Kingdom-Uni ted Sta tes pol icy should bewo rked out . Dip lom at ic ac t ion should be taken both wi th I s r ae l andthe A rab S ta t e s . The Un i t e d S ta t e s t ak ing the l ead in app rop r i a t ecases , in agreement wi th the Uni ted Kingdom.36746 B 2


5/27

3. Middle East generally.Once the Pa les t in e quest ion is se t t led,(a ) Defence a r ra nge m ents should be worke d ou t be tween the Un i te d Kingdoma nd the Ara b S ta te s .(6) Th e Un ite d Sta tes should be associa ted w it h these , the object being ( i) tobuild up a Middle Eastern front agains t the Sovie t Union; ( i i ) to

sa feguard Middle Eas te rn o i l suppl ies .(c) Specia l a t tention should be given to the economic rehabilitation of theAra b S ta te s , pa r t i c u la r ly I r a q a nd Pe rs i a .(d ) A mee ting should be held in Londo n next summ er a t ten ded by H isM ajes ty s Rep resen ta t iv es in the M iddle Ea s t , the Comm anders- in -Chief and representa t ives of the London Departments concerned.A time could be chosen when some of our representatives wouldnor m ally be on leave. Th is wa s tho ug ht prefera ble to a mee ting inCairo or e lsewhere in the Middle East .(e) Commanders-in-Chief should have greater l iberty to discuss defencem a t te r s w i th H is M a je s ty s Re p re s e n ta t ive s . A t p re s e n t, wh i l e the ymay ta lk to Sir J . Troutbeck, they may not open themselves ful ly toH is Ma je s ty s A mba s s a do r a t Ca i ro .( / ) Spec ia l a t ten t ion should be given to the re la t ionship between the newUni ted S ta tes co-ord ina tor o f p lans and ( i ) our own Commanders - in -Chief ( i i ) the Governments of Arab Sta tes .

B . K ar ac hi : 14th-16th January, 19494. The High Comm issioner (Sir L. Grafftey-Sm ith) k indly m ade i t possiblefor me to see the Governor-Genera l , the Pr ime Min is te r and the Fore ign Min is te rof Pa ki s t an , some of his fore ign an d Com mo nwea lth colleagues , an d mem bers

of th e B ri t i sh business com mu nity . A t K ar ac hi , as a t o ther posts , I m ade a po intof seeing as many as possible of the members of the Foreign Service of all grades,p r iva te ly o r a t the i r work , pay ing par t icu la r a t ten t ion a t Karach i (as a t De lh ian d C alcu tta) to our new colleagues from the In d ia n C ivil an d Pol i t ic a l Services .5. His Majesty s A mbassador at Kabul (Si r Giles Squ ire) came to K ar ac hi tomee t me and I had long ta lks wi th h im about the s i tua t ion in Afghanis tan , andin par t icu la r about the p resen t Afghan-Pakis tan d i f fe rence about the Nor th-Wes tF ro n t i e r P rov inc e . The A fgh a n Amba s s a do r a t K a ra c h i (H is Roya l H ighne s sSardar Shah Wal i Khan) jo ined us on one occas ion and proved as pe rs is ten t , i fmore reasonable and moderate , an advocate of the Afghan case as his colleague

in London .The Governor-General (H is Exce llency K hw aja Naz im udd in) was k indenou gh to ask me to lunch. I t was a cord ia l an d ple asa nt occasion a t wh ich l i t t lebus iness wa s ta lked . H is Exce llency ment ioned in pass in g P a k i s t a n i need fo ra rms and o ther suppl ies and fo r ass is tance f rom the Uni ted Kingdom in ge t t ingthem . H e a lso a l lude d to the diff iculty of re cr ui t in g staff for the P ak is ta n arm edand civil services.7. A t th is lunch I m et my oppo site num ber in the Pa k is ta n For eig n Office(Ikr am ul lah ) . H e wa s anx ious to lea r n w ha t were the func t ions o f thePar l iamenta ry Under-Secre ta ry in the Fore ign Off ice and h is re la t ionsh ip wi th

the Pe r m a ne n t Unde r -Se c re ta ry . Th e P r im e M in i s t e r wa s a bou t to a ppo in t adep uty Fore ign M in is te r an d w ante d to s tudy preceden t . I d id my best toenlighten him and wrote out a few notes for him.8. The Foreign M inister (S i r Mo hamm ed Za fru l la Kh an) asked me totea a t h is house . W e ta lked no business he ha d ju s t concluded some arduou snegot ia t ions wi th the Ind ian Government about p roper ty c la ims and was onth e po int of s t ar t i ng on a vis i t to La ho re . In s te ad he tre ate d me to a bri l l iantta lk on the topography of Devon and Cornwall and on his adventures in theremote r pa r t s o f Sweden an d F in l and . On th is tour he ha d ha d no r iva l a s a ta lke re xc e p t G e ne ra l M a c A r th u r .9 . M y ta lk w i th the Prime Minister (L iaq a t A l i K ha n) was ano th er mat te r .I found him s tudying a te legram recently received from London about the changein the Ki n g s t i t le as a resu lt of developments in Ire la nd an d about the consequentneed for legis la t ive act ion in a l l Com mon wealth countrie s . Th e po int wh ich wasexercis ing his mind was how to describe in persuasive form for Parl iamentary


6/27

purposes the adv anta ge s for Pa ki s t a n of s t ay ing in the Com monw eal th -when i twas clear th at some of th e more sol id of these adva nta ges w ould s t i l l be enjoyedby Ir el an d af te r she we nt out . W e ra ng ed over this quest ion for some t im e an dsugges ted tha t he should d iscuss i t wi th the U ni t ed K ingd om H ig h Commiss ionerwho w as mo re comp etent to help him t h an I could be.10. H e we nt on to p u t the P ak i s t a n i case about the f ron t i e r ques t ion w i th

A fgh an i s t an . The A fgh an a g i t a t i on w a s t he ag i t a t i on o f a K a bu l c l ique an dnot of the A fg ha n people . The A fgh an s th re a ten ed th a t t hey could ma ke t roublein t he N o r t h -W es t F ron t i e r P rov i nce bu t the, t ru t h w as t h a t Pa k i s t a n coul dm ake m ore t roub le fo r A fgh an i s t a n t ha n A f gha n i s t a n fo r Pa k i s t an . The peop l eof the t r ib a l a reas ha d no des i re to jo in Af gh an i s t an . H e was ready to t es tth is by p leb i sc i te . Pa ki s t a n was spen ding on the No r th-W est F ro nt i e r Provin ce asmuch as the whole A fg ha n budge t . A s reg ard s a change of nam e to P a th an i s t an ,he could no t agr ee to any nam e wh ich wo uld hav e a t r iba l connotat ion . I f hedid, t here wou ld be the same problem in the We st Pu nj ab an d in the E as t B enga l .H e added , inc i den t a l ly , t ha t Pak i s t a n w as ga r r i so n i ng t he f ron t ie r a r ea w i t hone brig ad e, wh i le the B ri t i s h ha d needed f if ty bat ta l ion s in the i r day . I n replyto th i s unco mp rom is ing v iew, I t o ld the P r im e Min i s t e r th a t t h i s f ron t i e r ques t ionwas one to wh ich the Sec re ta ry of S ta t e ha d g iven h i s person al a t t en t io n a nd th a the earnes t ly des i red a se tt l ement of i t : i t would be wel l w or th P a k i s t a n i whi l e ,in the general interest , to get this cont roversy out of the way.

11. O th er top ics touched on by L iaq a t Al i were P a k i s t a n i need for suppl i esand equ ipm ent for i r r i ga t ion deve lopm ent s ; an d h i s pe t i dea of an an t i -Communist bloc f r om Turkey t o Pak i s t an .12 . On Indon es ia he spoke a t somewhat gre a te r l ength and wi th wh at Ithought w as m od era t ion and good sense. Th e D utc h wo uld not ga in but lose bytheir la te st pol ice act ion . A lre ad y they we re in m i l i ta ry difficult ies . They w ouldnot be able to m ai nt ai n th ei r posi t ion by force. W h a t they should hav e done wa sto model themselves as fa r as possible on B ri t i sh ac t ion in In di a . Th e Ind on esian s,who ar e n ot s t ro ng eno ugh or experienced enoug h to m arc h alone, wo uld in thelong run the n tu rn to the Du tch aga in for ass i s t ance , as Pa ki s t an a nd In d ia wi l ldo to the B ri t i sh . Old associat ions wi l l count for m uc h; they hav e ha d th ei rbeneficial s ide, as i s now readi ly adm it ted . In ste ad of pr om ot in g in this w ay thedevelopment of col laborat ion between East and West on a new basis , the Dutchhave poisoned the whole s i tu at io n in So uth -E ast Asia . I foun d this analys is ofgreat value in ta lking to the Dutch in Batavia and on other occasions.13. I h ad a good dea l of ta lk from t im e to t im e w i th the H ig h Com missioneron such m at te rs as the supply of inform at io n on foreign affairs to Com mo nwea l th

posts; the future of ex-Indian Civi l Service members of the Foreign Service, ofwhom there a re qu i t e a num ber in P ak i s t a n ; the re l a t ions be tween the Miss ions a tKarachi and Delhi , which are excel lent , though they do not see al l mat ters inthe same l ig h t ; t he adv antag es and d i sadv antag es of memb ersh ip of theCommonweal th for P ak is ta n and In di a . Some of these were not , of course, myaffair, but I was glad to learn about them.

C. Ne w Delhi: 16th-20th January 1949 .14. Fo r reasons which wi l l be p la in f rom the in t rodu ctory rem arks , t hevisit to D elhi w as one of th e hi gh spo ts of the tou r, an d a n ind isp en sab leprel iminary to a vis i t to South-East Asia .15. The High Comm issioner (Gene ral S i r A rch iba ld Nye) believes th at the reis probably gre ate r scope for the development of B ri t i s h influence an d the exerciseof Br i t i s h ac t ion in In d ia a t the presen t t ime th an any where e lse. H e th in ksthat good wi l l between the Bri t i sh peoples and thei r Governments , fol lowing uponthe f a r -s igh ted an d s t a t esman- l ike ac t ion of H i s M ajes ty s Governm ent in 1947,can be deve loped an d tur ne d to m ater i a l adv antag e . W e have an op po r tun i tywhich ou gh t no t to be misse d. B ut we m us t choose ou r men we ll (Sir A . N yehas ideas ab ou t this which wi l l be recorded elsewhere) and ^,ct w i th ci rcum spect ion.We a re t en din g a de l i ca t e p l a n t . The respons ib i l it y ha s sobered Neh ru , Pa te land other members of the ad m inis t rat ion , wh o al l feel the need for su pp or t an dadvice. B u t the y ar e only l ikely to seek or acc ept such su pp o rt or advice , esp ecial lythe l a t ter , i f th ey have confidence in the s ince ri ty an d fr ie ndl ine ss w i th w hich i t


7/27

i s tendered . On the Ka shm ir quest ion , he .h ad wai t ed fo r an app roac h fromNehru and then, but only then, had advised that there should be no mil i tarysolut ion but that the Indian Government should make a ges ture in the direct ionof a pol i t ica l solut ion. H e thou gh t his advice , re inforc ed by the s teadine ss andwisdom of the In d i an Com mander- in -Chief , Gen era l Bucher , ha d borne f ru i t .In order to exercise such influence a t the r ight moment, part icularly in the realmof foreign policy, it is essential that the High Commissioner should receive fullan d t ime ly inf orm atio n abo ut events in the fore ig n f ie ld . I n th is respect, thereha d la t ter ly been a gr eat impro vem ent. Since Fo rei gn Office te legram s na d begunto be repeated direct to him, on, e.g. Indonesia , he was ful ly in the pic ture andhad no complaints .

16. Gen eral Nye th in ks i t l ikely th at , und er s tress of responsibi l i ty , them ind s of the In di an lead ers wil l move s lowly from some earl i er an ti-B ri t ish , ant i-Com monw ealth an d an ti- W est er n posi t ions an d see th a t poli t ica l ly , ideological lyan d economically , the fut ure of In di a l ies in associa t ion wi th the We st , inpa r t i c u la r w i th the Un i te d K ingdom, ra the r tha n a s a n inde pe nde n t c oun t ry ,media t ing be tween Wes te rn ideas and communism and lead ing Ind ia aga ins t therest . I will not develop he re his reasons for t hi s : th ey seemed to me to be cogent.

17. The H ig h Comm issioner and I d ined en famille w i th the Prime Minister(P a n d i t J a w a h a r l a l Ne h ru ) a nd h is s i s te r (Mrs . Pa nd i t , In d ia n Am ba s s a do r a tMoscow) an d her two da ug hte rs . Th e splend ours of the former Com man der-inC hi ef s house, w her e he ha s now been bid de n to live, seemed to ir k him . H ewas unwell and ra ther s i lent a t d inner, but af terwards he took me into a corneran d ta lk ed. H e chose the topics himself18. H e spoke first of com mun ism. Th e res ult s of com mun ism in Ru ssiam us t in th e long ru n be evil because the mean s are evil. H e said th is in spi te ofthe in te l lec tua l a t t r ac t ion wh ich M arx ism has fo r h im. M arx i sm suppl ies acoherent explanation of the march of his tory and none has tr ied to do this s inceM ar x. P er h ap s i t is now poss ible to compass such a synthesis . Th e vas t development of scientific discovery has made the world almost incomprehensible to thes ingle m ind. M ar x ma y be out of dat e now, bu t a t leas t he tr i ed a nd ha s ha d nosuccessors . H e adde d, incid enta l l y , th at he tho ugh th at communism, in whatevercountry i t might appear, would in the long run be overla id and transformed bythe na t iona l charac te r , which mus t p reva i l in the end .19. A bo ut M ala ya , he wo nde red why we w ere finding i t so difficult tosup pre ss the Com mu nis ts an d res tore law an d order. W as this not because theso-cal led bandits had support from the local populat ion for economic reasons?

W oul d i t not be well , therefore , to supplem ent th e me asures of sup press io n withmeasures to improve the materia l welfare of the people a t large As he. hadgiven me an opening, I asked him, given that i t had a lways been and s t i l l wasour policy to work to wa rds the autonomy and e ventu al independen ce of colonialter r i t or ies , how he saw the fu tu re of M alay a. To this he ha d no read y answer.He admitted the diff icult ies of a plura l community ( in which incidenta l ly hecompla ined tha t In d i an s were less we l l t rea ted th an C hinese ) . H e though t tha ta composite or m ult i la ter a l s ta te m ig ht be the even tual solut ion. B ut he di d notseem to th in k the problem an ur ge nt one. H e did not men tion Indo nes ia ( thoughth is wa s the eve of the De lhi Conference) excep t to say tha t M ala ya a nd Indonesia(unlike Burma) were terr i tories which had had c lose and sympathetic contact withIn d ia in the pas t and where Ind ia n in fluence wa s s t rong . I repea ted th is p a r to f the conversa t ion in my var ious ta lks a t S ingapore and Kua la Lumpur .

20. The Governor-General (C . Ra jago pa la cha r i ) k ind ly inv i ted me to tea a tthe form er Vic eroy s house , wh ich he now occupies . H is Hi gh nes s the Gaekw arof Baroda was present for a short t ime, but he took his leave and I was a lone withH i s Excellency (as he dislik es be ing called) for over an hou r. .21 . H e s ta r ted ( I do n t know why) by ex pa t ia t in g on the advantages ofmonarchy and of the disabil i ty of Pres idents and e lected or nominated persons l ikeM r . T r u m a n o r himself T he absence of m ona rch y leaves a lac un a in the lives ofthe people . The In di an people , in part icu lar , need a symbol in the ir sys tem of

gov ernm ent. Th e prin cely fam ilies , ha d they no t become deg ene rate an d lifeless,m ig ht have furnished a co ns t i tu t io na l mon arch, but the re was now small hope oft h i s . Once th e gr ea t figures of the libe ratio n had pa ssed away , the re would bea gap which it would be difficult to fill . He was astonished that the regime hadsurv ived as we l l a s i t had the b loodba th Ind ia had gone th rough .


8/27

22. H e was much in favour of the establ i shme nt of provinces on a l in gu ist icbasis . Th i s would d i s rup t the un i ty of In d i a . Nat iona l i sm wa s a d i s rupt iveforce. Be t ter a ra th er wea ker s ta te based on the tolera t ion of varie ty. Suc hap pa ren t weakness was no t necessar ily such a d i sadv antage as the a pp are n tst re ng th of the na t ion al s ta te . T he Eur op ea ns would have done bet te r to preservet he A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n E m p i r e .23. H e tho ug ht th a t fear of the atomic bomb wa s the cause of the prese nttension in the world and this would lead to war unless the tension could be eased.Th e best wa y to ease the tension would be not only to out la w th e use of the atom icbomb b u t to cal l a hal t to al l atom ic research, p eacefu l as well as war l ik e, for aperiod . Th e worloT real ly di dn ' t need, in a ma te ria l sense, the fru i t s of a tom icresearch in in du st r y in the pre sen t phas e. Be t ter establ i sh peace on a sur e foot ingfirs t. Th e Soviet regime m ig ht evolve in the di rect ion of m ode rat io n an dscrup ulousn ess i f tension , based on fea r, could be removed. B u t t im e wo uld berequi red, and an act of fai th .24. H e thoug ht tha t t he Br i t i sh ha d g iven gr ea t g i f t s t o In d ia . They were :the rule of law, the heri tage of a great l i terature, and the freedom of the individualand an inst inct for l iberal democracy.25. H e said tha t the pre sen t U ni te d State s wa y of l i fe would lead to chaosand would have to be reformed when the t ime of scarci ty arr ived.26. I wa s much t ake n by the Gove rnor-Gene raFs shrewdness , wi sdom a ndsimple fr iendl iness. H e walke d w i th me rou nd the gre at gar den , in th is seasonat i t s br i l l iant best , which, wi th certain advent i t ious mechanical a ids in themat ter of the movement of waters , imi tates the famous gardens of Moghul days.A t one po int he s toppe d an d as ke d: W h at am I to do about a l l this pom p?I employ 5 000 men on these es t a t e s .27. I spe nt a sho rt whi le w i th Sir Girja Shanker Baivai (Secre ta ry-Genera l ,M ini s t ry of Ex ter na l an d Comm onweal th Rela t ions) , an o ld f r i end . W e eschewedspeculat ions and got down to business. 2 8 . H e d id no t th ink tha t t he presen t sys tem of comm unica t ing inform at ionon foreign affai rs from Lon don to De lhi by te legr am was adequate . . M ore shou ldbe done thr ou gh the H ig h Commissioner an d his staff in Londo n. H e w asar r an gin g to have the H igh Com miss ioner^ s ta ff reorgani sed and re inforced forthis purp ose. H e hoped th at th e Fo reig n Office would give the H ig h Commissioners ' office l iberal day-to-day information, especial ly on European affairs,on wh ich the Gov ernme nt of In d ia h ad no othe r good source of info rm at ion .Th ei r missions in Eu rop e were not yet com petent to rend er ade qu ate repo rts . O nmat t e rs of cur ren t in t e res t , where urgent ac t ion was be ing t aken in the in t e r nat io nal f ie ld , i t wou ld be useful i f in for ma t ion could come thro ug h the H ig hCom missioner in De lhi also. H e wo uld alw ays be at the disp osa l of Sir A . Nye,of whom he spoke in very w arm term s. H e also thre w out the sugge st ion th atmembers of the Foreign Office should come to Delhi from t ime to t ime.29. Lik e his col league in K ar ac hi , Si r Gi r ja wa s anx ious to know someth ing about the func t ions of the Pa r l i a m en tar y U nder- Secre ta ry of S ta t e forForeign Affai rs , as there was some quest ion of appoint ing a Deputy Minister .I enl ightened him to the best of my abil i ty.30. A s I wa s ta ki ng my leave, S i r G ir j a w ent ou t of his wa y to say t ha tIndia was not seeking the leadership of Asia; but that events were forcing this

role upon them.31. I called on Si r G ir j a ' s tw o. subo rdinates , the Foreign Secretary( K . P . S . Menon) and the Secretary for Com monwealth Relations (S . D ut t ) .No thing of mom ent passed, but i t may be w or th record ing th at the la t t er ha dprepared a ser ies of quest ions for me (which I did ray best to answer) on oursystem of post ing and promot ions in the Foreign Service, how we tackled theproblem of special i sat ion, how we organised the Commercial Diplomat ic Service,and how the Foreign Office maintained l ia i son wi th the Commonweal th Relat ionsOffice.32. One of my most inte res t ing ta lks wa s wi th H . V. R. Iyen ga r [Secretaryof the Ministry of Hom e Affairs , ex -In dia n Civ i l Serv ice an d a former P r iv a tebec retary to the Pr im e M inister . H e spoke f irst abou t communism. Th ere areabout 100,000 p ar ty mem bers in In di a, about 1,500 of them in pr iso n. Th ere


9/27

ar e no Co m m unis t mem bers of tbe legis lature . Com mu nism is not bann ed, exceptin Ben gal . Th e Com mun is t press i s f ree . Th e Co mm unis t s a re hos t i le to theCongress P ar ty . Th is i s the usua l s i tua t ion . Com mu nis t s sup po r t the Nat iona l i s tP a r ty u nt i l i t a t ta ins , power , an d then t ry to und erm ine i t . Th is i s one reasonwhy the F rench and Du tch a r e unwise in weaken ing the Na t iona l i s t Pa r t i e s i nSo uth -Ea s t A sia . T his wi l l p lay in to the ha nd s of the Com mu nis t s .33. Su pp res sion alone, he thin ks, is no cure for comm unism. Th ere are12 ,000 t roops ac t ing aga ins t the Communis t s in Hyderabad, but a t the same t imerem edia l economic measures a re be ing take n . Lik e P a n d i t Ne hru , he wonderedw he the r some such com binat ion should no t be t r i ed in Ma lay a. Th e economic l ifeof the people was of a very low standard and should be raised.34. On the F ren ch and Por tu gue se e s t ab l ishmen t s i n Ind ia he says t ha tN eh ru s pol icy w as not to squeeze them out , but r at h er to press t h a t the peopleshould dec ide the i r fu ture . Th e Governm ent of In d ia wou ld have pa t ienc e . Butthe Fre nch and Po r tugu ese were behaving fool ish ly. How ever , the re we re moreimpor tant ques t ions than these .35. In di a , he said, needed economic as si s ta nc e: no t a dole, bu t a loan andfac i l i t ies to pu rch ase . In d ia w as pas sing th ro ug h a very difficult per iod. Onlymen of the personal pres t ige of Nehru and Pa te l and Rajagopalachar i couldhave pul led her through.36. H e thou ght i t im po r tan t not to un der es t im ate the imp or tan ce of theF a r E as t , bu t he recognised the imp or tance of E uro pe in the pres ent s ta te ofthe wor ld . I t wa s a l so im po r tan t to rea l i se th a t the Am er ican s , for a l l the i rgood wi l l , could not supp ly every th ing th a t everybody w an ted .37. H e m ade a po in t of say in g th a t re la t ion s be tween the U ni ted KingdomH ig h Com miss ion , un de r the prese nt H ig h Com miss ioner , and the M ini s t r y of

E xt er n al Affairs , w ere very cordial . Th er e h ad been a ce r ta in coolness a t anearl ier s tage.38. The H ig h Commiss ioner and I d ine d a lone w i th the Un ited StatesAmbassador (Mr . Loy Hen derson ) , w i th whom I w as a l rea dy wel l acquain ted .Mr . Henderson i s tak ing h is dut ies very ser ious ly and i s showing a good dea lof pu bl ic act ivi ty, not a lways of the most adro i t . H e is mu ch incensed by Ind iancri t ic ism of the American way of l i fe and of United States pol icy, more so, Ishould have tho ugh t , tha n he need be. Th ou gh he ha s given his staff s t r ic tins t ruc t ions not to express or countenance ant i -Br i t i sh sent iments , I th ink he i sra th er rest ive a t f inding th at Ind ia n cr i t ic ism is so of ten dire cted ag ai ns t theU ni ted S ta tes ra th er tha n aga i ns t the U ni t ed Kin gd om ( the same is t ru e of China) .39. I a l so met In di an journa l i s t s , the new In d ia n Com mander- in-Chief(Genera l Car iappa) and h is predecessor (Genera l Bucher ) , and the Canadian ,Aus t r a l i an and Ch inese r ep resen ta t ives .40. I t rem ain s to touch on the vis i t of Dr. Burton Dr. Evat fs ch iefl ieu tenant , who came to represent Aus t ra l ia a t the Delh i Conference on Indones iawhich opened on the day of my dep ar tu re . I had severa l t a lk s w i th h im a nd theH ig h Com missioner . H e is obviously a m an of gre at abi l i ty an d ha s the gif t ofimagina t ion; but we found tha t he had ar r ived wi th a d i s tor ted idea of Uni tedKingdom pol icy on Indones ia and tha t he had seemed to a t tach grea ter weightto pre ss rep ort s an d specu lat ions than to official inf orm atio n from Lo ndo n. He

seemed to nave convinced h imsel f t ha t the Un i ted K ing do m Gov ernm ent hadknown in advance tha t the Dutch would take the i r second pol ice ac t ion; tha t theU ni te d King dom Governm ent ha d been consul ted by P a n d i t N eh ru before he hadca l led the Conference ; tha t the Uni ted Kingdom Government had assured theD utch on the quie t th a t no ac t ion would be tak en a ga ins t them a nd th a t theAt lant ic Pac t would take f i r s t p lace ; and tha t the a rms which the Dutch wereus ing in Indones ia had been bought wi th dol la rs suppl ied under the EuropeanRecovery Pro gra m m e. Th at , in fac t, there was noth i ng to be done w i th the Dutch ,except apply sanc t ions ; tha t Dutch ac t ion was a breach of the Char te r ; and tha tsanct ions should be appl ied whatever the consequences might be in other par tsof the world.4 1 , Ge nera l N ye s ha nd l in g of him could not have been bet ter . H e w as firmb ut f r ien dly ; and , ba sin g himself on the ample doc um enta t ion received from London,was able to br ing Dr. Burton to see United Kingdom pol icy in a rather less


10/27

jau nd ice d l igh t . I do not record a l l th is for i t s own me ri ts , bu t ra the r to show, byexample , how essent ia l i t i s that our High Commissioners in Commonweal thcountr ies should have prompt , ample , f i rs t -hand informat ion on fore ign quest ionsaffecting the countries in which they serve. , .D . C al cu tta : 20th January 1949

42. W e sp en t only a sho rt ni gh t at C alc utta , bu t were able to see some of th estaff of the D ep uty H ig h Comm ission an d of the business com mu nity . W h a t weheard tended to conf i rm what we had been to ld a t Delhi , namely, that a new andbe t te r r e la t io nsh ip was t end ing to g row up be tween Br i t i sh and In d ian s , and th a tp rospec t s fo r Br i t i sh commerce were p romis ing : we were ge t t ing con t rac t s nowthat we should probably not have got before , in the days of pol i t ica l tension.JL-Rango on: 21st-23rd January 1949

43 . B ur m a presen t s a much less encou rag ing p ic tu re tha n In d i a and t h i swas reflected in a l l th a t w e he ar d there . I saw several of the Burmese M inis ters ,as wel l as the Pr es ide nt . The in te rvie w w ith the las t nam ed was purely socia land we ta lked no business .

44. The Prime Minister (Th ak in Nu) gave the Am bassador (Mr . Bowker )and myself tea one af ternoon in the garden of h is house , which, l ike a l l Burmeseofficial residences and public offices, was enclosed in a compound protected bybarbed w ire an d closely gu ard ed . M r. Bow ker took occasion to conduct someofficial business w i t h the P r i m e M inis ter a nd f rom th e la t te r s demean our I wa sable to judge why i t i s sa id that , whi le a man of in tegr i ty , s impl ic i ty , even ofsa int l ine ss , he is a lso suspic ious , credulous , s tubb orn and s low.45. W e found T ha k in Nu s t i l l in te n t on l eav ing the Governm ent a t an ea r lyda te . H e th inks he can o rgan ise sup po r t fo r the Government among p ar tymembers an d am ong the people a t larg e f rom outs ide bet ter th a n f rom ins ide . Iexpressed the Secre ta ry of S ta te s misg ivings a t th is prospec t .46. O n more gen eral topics , Th ak in N u recal led th at he ha d recent ly s ta te d inpubl ic that he would ra ther be f ree than ruled by others ; but i f he had to be ruledby o the rs he p re fe r re d the Br i t i sh . Th e B r i t i sh ha d in t roduc ed the ru le of l awinto Bu rm a, an d the idea of perso nal f reedom. In fac t , be t ter the devi l you kno wtha n the devi l you do n t . I found th is sent im ent expressed in In d ia a lso .47. H e p u t in a pre ss in g plea for f inancia l a i d f rom the U ni ted K ingd om ,

bu t d id no t deny tha t , fo r a l l tha t , the Government were t ak ing an an t i -cap i ta l i s tline, inc lud ing H is Ma jes ty s Government , in the i r s t r i c tu res , an d tha t the re w asa good dea l o f an t i -B r i t i s h p ro pa ga nd a in the coun t ry . H e asked abou t Chinesecommunism and I gave the view current in London, as expressed in In te ls , andconf i rmed to me by the Chinese Ambassador to India wi th whom I had a ta lk inDelhi . H e himself wa s caut io us an d non-c om mit ta l .48. I d id no t see the Fore ign M inis ter on th i s occasion, bu t he came to theM arin e A ir po r t to see me for a wh i le on my re tu rn journ ey. Of the othe rM inis ters , I saw most of U Oh n, Minister of Comm erce a n d Am b a s s a d o r -Des ign a te to London . H e sa id , among o the r th in gs th a t he w as con tem pla t ing anappeal to the Burmese people for auster i ty in the use of r ice , to avoid waste and

reduce consum ption, an d so increase the am oun t avai lab le for expor t . A n e thicaland hu m an i ta r ia n ap pe al of th is k ind should be effective w i th the Burme se people .H e also sa id tha t he w as in favour of developing B ur m a s o the r na tu ra l resourcesto the maximum, but for the good of mankind and not for Burmese domest icadvan tage .49. H i s M ajes ty s Am bassado r h as exce llen t con tac t s wi th BurmeseM inis ters and officials an d they come gla dly to hi s house. D u ri n g my visi t th efo rmidab le U Ba Swe , Secre ta ry -Ge nera l of the an t i -Fa sc i s t Peo p le s F reedomLeague and of the Socialist Party, came to the Embassy for the f irst t ime.50. T he senior Burmese officials whom I saw were general ly in despondent

mood. Some of them were incl ined to b lame us for hav ing ha nd ed B ur m a over toan inexper ienced Go vernm ent which wo uld not face fac ts or l i s ten to skil led advice ,but pre ferre d to re ly on outs id ers of doub tful in teg r i ty . They ha d got r id of the i rexperienced Brit ish and Indian officials , and had not enough good officials to carry36746 ^ c


11/27

ar e no Co mm unist mem bers of the leg islatu re. Com mun ism is no t ban ned , exceptin Be nga l . Th e Co mm unist pres s i s f ree. Th e Co mm unists ar e host i le to theCongress P ar ty . Th i s i s t he usua l s i tua t ion . Com mun is t s sup po r t t he Nat ion a l i s tP a r ty u n t i l i t a t t a in s , power , an d then t ry to und erm ine i t . Th i s is one reasonw hy t he F rench and D u t ch a re unw i se i n w eaken i ng t he N a t i ona l i s t Pa r t i e s i nSo uth -E as t As ia . Th i s wi l l p l ay in to the ha nd s of the Com mu nis t s .33. Su pp ress ion alone, he thin ks , i s no cure for comm unism. Th ere are12 ,000 t roops ac t ing aga ins t t he Communis t s in Hyderabad , bu t a t t he same t imerem edia l economic measu res a re be ing take n . L ike Pa n d i t Ne hru , he wonderedw he the r some such com binat ion should no t be t r ie d in M ala ya . Th e economic li feof the people was of a very low standard and should be raised.34. On the Fren ch and Po r tug ue se es t ab l i shme nt s in In d ia he says tha tN eh ru s po l icy was no t to squeeze them ou t , bu t ra th er to press t h a t t he peopleshould dec ide the i r fu ture . The Gov ernm ent of In d ia wou ld have pa t i ence . Butthe Fre nch and Po r tugu ese were beha ving fooli sh ly . How ever , there we re moreimpor tan t ques t ions than these .35 . In di a , he said, needed economic as sis tan ce : not a dole, bu t a loan andfac i l i t ies to pur cha se. In d ia w as pa ss ing th ro ug h a very difficult per iod . Onlymen of the personal p res t ige of Nehru and Pa te l and Rajagcpalachar i couldhave pul l ed her th rough.36. H e thou ght i t im po r ta n t no t to und eres t ima te the imp or tan ce of theFar Eas t , bu t he recogni sed the impor tance of Europe in the presen t s t a t e ofthe wo r ld . I t wa s a l so im po r ta n t to rea l i se th a t t he Am er ican s , for a l l the i rgood wi l l , could no t supply eve ry th in g th a t everybody w an ted .37. H e made a po in t o f say ing th a t re l a t ions be tween the U ni t ed Kingdo mHigh Commiss ion , under the presen t High Commiss ioner , and the Mini s t ry ofE xt er n al Affai rs , we re very cordial . T he re ha d been a ce rta in coolness at anear l i e r s t age .38. The H ig h Comm issioner an d I d ine d a lone w i th the United StatesAmbassador (Mr . Loy He nders on) , w i th whom I w as a l re ad y wel l acquain ted .Mr. Henderson i s t ak ing h i s du t i es very ser ious ly and i s showing a good dea lof pub l ic act ivi ty , not a lw ays of the mo st ad ro i t . H e i s m uch incensed by In dia ncri t ic i sm of the American way of l i fe and of Uni ted States pol icy, more so, Ishou ld have thoug ht , tha n he need be. Th oug h he ha s given his s taff s t r ic tins t ruc t ions no t to express or countenance an t i -Br i t i sh sen t iment s , I t h ink he i sra th er res t ive a t f ind ing th a t In d i an c r i t i c i sm i s so of t en d i rec ted ag a in s t t heUni t ed S ta t es ra ther than aga ins t t he Uni t ed Kingdom ( the same i s t rue of China) .39. I a l so met In d i an journa l i s t s , t he new In di an Com mander- in-Chief(Genera l Car i appa) and h i s p redecessor (Genera l Bucher) , and the Canadian ,A us t r a l i an and C h i nese r ep re sen t a t i ves .40. I t rema ins to touch on the vis i t of Dr. Burton Dr. Evat fs ch ie fl i eu tenant ; who came to represent Aust ra l i a a t t he Delh i Conference on Indones iawh ich opened on the day of my dep ar t ur e . I ha d severa l t a lk s w i th h im and theH ig h Com missioner . H e i s obviously a m an of grea t ab i l i ty and ha s the gi f t ofim ag ina t ion ; bu t we found th a t he ha d a r r ive d wi th a d i s tor t ed idea of U ni t edKingdom pol i cy on Indones ia and tha t he had seemed to a t t ach grea te r weightto pre ss rep or ts an d spe culat ion s th a n to off ic ial info rm at io n from Lon don . Heseemed to have convinced h imsel f t h a t t he Uni t ed K ing do m G overnm ent hadknown in advance tha t t he Dutch would t ake the i r second pol i ce ac t ion ; tha t t heUni t ed Kingdom Government had been consul t ed by Pandi t Nehru before he hadca l l ed the Conference ; tha t t he Uni t ed Kingdom Government had assured theDu tch on the qu ie t t h a t no ac tion would be t ak en ag a in s t t hem a nd th a t t heAt lan t i c Pac t would t ake f i r s t p l ace ; and tha t t he a rms which the Dutch wereus ing in Indones ia had been bought wi th do l l a rs suppl i ed under the EuropeanRecovery Pro gra m m e. Th at , i n fac t , t here wa s no th ing to be done wi th the Dutch ,except apply sanc t ions ; t ha t Dutch ac t ion was a breach of the Char t e r ; and tha tsan ct ion s should be app l ied wh atev er the consequences m igh t be in othe r p artsof the world.41 , Ge ner al Ny e s ha nd l in g of him could not have been bet ter . He w as f irmbu t fr ie nd ly; an d, ba sin g himsel f on the am ple doc um entat ion received from London,w as able to br in g Dr . Bur ton to see U ni ted K ingd om pol icy in a rat h er less


12/27

jaun dic ed l igh t . I do not record a l l th i s for i t s own me ri ts , bu t ra th er to show, byexample , how essent ia l i t i s that our High Commissioners in Commonweal thcountr ies should have prom pt , ample , f i rs t -hand infor ma t ion on fore ign quest ionsaffecting the countries in which they serve. ,

D . C al cu tta : 20th January 194942. W e sp en t only a sho rt ni g ht a t Calc utt a, bu t we re able to see some of th estaff of the D ep uty H ig h Commission an d of the business comm unity . W h a t weheard tended to conf i rm what we had been to ld a t Delhi , namely, that a new andbe t te r r e la t ionsh ip was t end ing to g row up be tween Br i t i sh and Ind ians , and tha tp rospec t s fo r Br i t i sh commerce were p r om is in g : we were ge t t i ng con t rac t s nowthat we should probably not have got before, in the days of poli t ical tension.E . R an go on : 21st-23rd January 1949

43 . B ur m a presen t s a much less encourag ing p ic tu re tha n In d i a and th i swa s reflected in a l l th a t we he ard there . I saw several of the Burm ese M inis te rs ,as wel l as the Pr es ide nt . The in te rvie w w ith the las t nam ed w as purely socia land we ta lked no business .

44. The Prime Minister (T hak in Nu) gave the Am bassador (Mr . Bowker )and myself tea one afternoon in the garden of his house, which, l ike al l Burmeseofficial residences and public offices, was enclosed in a compound protected bybar bed wi re an d closely gu ard ed . M r. Bow ker took occasion to conduc t someoffic ia l business w i th the Pr im e Mi nis ter and f rom the la t t er s demeano ur I w asable to judge why i t i s sa id that , whi le a man of in tegr i ty , s impl ic i ty , even ofsa int l ine ss , he is a lso suspic ious , credulous , s tubb orn a nd s low.45. W e foun d Th ak in Nu s t i l l in ten t on leaving the Gov ernme nt a t an ear lyda te . H e th in ks he can o rgan ise sup por t fo r the Government among pa r tymem bers an d amon g the people a t large f rom outs ide bet ter tha n f rom ins ide . Iexpressed the Se cre tar y of St a te s misgiving s a t th is pro spect .46. O n more gen eral topics , Th ak in Nu recal led th at he ha d recent ly s ta ted inpubl ic that he would ra ther be f ree than ruled by others ; but i f he had to be ruledby other s he pre fer red the B ri t i s h . Th e B ri t i sh ha d in t rod uced the rule of lawinto Bu rm a, an d the idea of person al f reedom. In fac t , be t ter the devi l you knowth an the devi l you do n t . I found th is sent im ent expressed in Ind ia a lso .47. H e p u t in a press ing plea for f inancial a id f rom the U ni t ed Kin gdom ,

but d id not deny that , for a l l tha t , the Government were taking an ant i -capi ta l is tline, inc lud in g H is M ajes ty s G overnment , in the i r s t r i c tu res , and th a t the re w asa good deal of an t i - B r i t i s h pr op ag an da in the country . H e asked about Chinesecommunism a nd I g ave the view cu rre nt in Lond on, as expressed in In te ls , a ndconf i rmed to me by the Chinese Ambassador to India wi th whom I had a ta lk inDelhi . H e himself wa s caut ious an d non-com mit ta l .48. I di d no t see the Fo rei gn M ini ste r on th is occasion, but he came to theM ari ne A ir p or t to see me for a wh i le on my re tu rn journ ey. Of the otherMinis ters , I saw most of U Ohn, Minister of Com merce a n d Am b a s s a d o r -De s igna te to Londo n . H e sa id , among o the r th ing s th a t he wa s con tem pla t ing a nappeal to the Burmese people for auster i ty in the use of r ice , to avoid waste and

reduce consum ption, and so increase the amou nt avai lable for exp or t . A n e th icaland humani tar ian appeal of th is k ind should be effect ive wi th the Burmese people .H e a lso sa id tha t he w as in favour of developing B ur m a s o ther na tu ra l resourcesto the maximum, but for the good of mankind and not for Burmese domest ica d v a n t a g e .49. H i s M ajes ty s Am bassador has exce llent con tac ts w i th BurmeseM in ist ers an d officials an d they come glad ly to his house. D u ri ng my visi t th eformida ble U B a Swe, Sec re tary -G ener al of the ant i - Fas cis t P eop le s FreedomLeague and of the Socialist Party, came to the Embassy for the f irst t ime.50. T h e senior Burm ese officials whom I saw were general ly in despondent

mood. Some of them were inclined to blame us for ha vin g ha nd ed B ur m a over toan inexperienced Government which would not face facts or l isten to skil led advice,but pre ferre d to re ly on outs iders of doub tful in te gr i ty . They ha d got r id of the i rexperienced Brit ish and Indian officials , and had not enough good officials to carry36746 c


13/27

on with , an d many of these were qu it ti ng in despa ir. Some of them said th at ifAung San had lived, Burma might still be in the Commonwealth.5 According to one of the British advisers stil l employed by the BurmeseGovernment the most encouraging and stabilising element in the present precarioussituation is the administration of law, based on English principles and stillappli ed with integ rity by the judges. Another of them, a man of great experience,

said that ho wise man could prophesy about the future of Burma. The realobstacle to progress was tha t the people did not really need to work ha rd . Therewas no lack of food; they need never be cold, and clothing was simple; and bambooand thatch for shelter were there to be picked up.52 The British commercial community were naturally despondent, but inquite good heart, de termined to go on hoping for a tu rn to bet ter days. One ofthem thought that the local Chinese, in league with their compatriots in China,were laying plans to take advantage of Burma s present weakness, and that, as thiswould not be in In dia s interest, Nehru should intervene and tr y to have orderrestored.53 Mr . Pot ter , theFinancial Adviser.to our Missions in Kara ch i, Delh i andRangoon, was good enough to give me a comprehensive review of the situat ionwhich, though it will be familiar to Departments, I will record here.54 He said the pla in fact was th at the country was in ruins . I t had beentwice fought over and once occupied. The year afte r th e end of hostilit ies hadbeen disastrous. By collaborating wi th Au ng San, instead of drivi ng him intorebellion, we could have set the admini stration on the right road. Poli tica l p art iesnow had well-armed private armies, with British weapons acquired during theresis tance or since. There were three left-wing armies, and lots of th ings inadd ition. The rice mills ju st across the river from Rangoon were still being heldto ransom. All this, in add ition to the trouble wit h the Kar ens .55 Burma, unlike India and Pakistan, had unwisely dismissed all Britishofficials. Th is was a ma rk of inexperience an d conceit. The Burmese Government did not trust its own skilled officials, who were now leaving Governmentservice The admini strati on was pitifully understaffed. The Finance Min ist rywas on the verge of a breakdown. The banks were in ra th er better shape. Evenif law and order could be restored, the country could not be run with its presentstaff. I n spit e of this, the Government were launching into new Sta te enterpr isesriver shipping, timber, oil. They needed 13 million to balance the budget,9 million from the Oil Company and several millions more to move the rice crop.56 If financial help was to be given, it was essentia l to provide safeguards,such as the appointment of foreign advisers, especially in finance and banking.

There should also be compensation arrangements. The United Kingdom couldnot conduct this kind of operation alone, if only for poli tical reasons. TheBurmese were turning to us, but still regarded us as predatory capitalists whohad exploited Burma in the past and now owed Burma something in return.They would not easily agree to safeguards or compensation. On the other hand,it was essential that Burmese Ministers should face the facts and take stepsto develop the vast potential wealth of the country.57 In Mr. Po tt er s view, which is shared by Hi s Majes ty s Ambassador, theBurmese problem should be tackled jointly by the United Kingdom, India andPakistan . Pan di t Nehru could speak with author ity to the Burmese Min iste r asostensibly a non-capitalis t. I t was in In di a s interest th at he should take a hand,since India has a primordial interest in Burma as a supplier of food and aneighbouring State, and since the continuance of the present disorder could onlywork for the advantage of China or the Communists, the presence of neither ofwhom would be welcome to In di a. In di a had her own ma terial interest s too,though Nehru might be chary of sup por tin g them too openly. Even if In di a couldnot contr ibu te financially or find advisers , she could be a pa rtne r in an d sponsorto any scheme which would combine assistance wi th safeguards. I t was essentialto break fresh ground in this way.

Singapore: 24th-28th and 31st January 194958 After the charm, colour, shabbiness and fecklessness of Rangoon,Singapore makes a st riking impression. Itself a monument to Br iti sh ente rprise.


14/27

t h i s g rea t seapor t , t hank s to an ef fic ient B r i t i s h ad m ini s t ra t ion and to the pur po seful act ivi ty of it s teem ing po pu lat io n, larg ely Ch inese, ha s ma de a rem ark ab lerecovery s ince the occupa t ion . W i t h H on g Ko ng, and to a l esser degree, Ban gkok ,Singapore i s a demonst rat ion of the vast economic possibi l i t ies that would openout to So uth -E as t A si a i f only peace an d good ord er could be restored. Ev en inMalaya , i n sp i t e of the d i s turbances , p roduct ion of t i n and rubber has beenm ai n t a i ned .5 9 . I w as for tun a te to a r r ive a t S ingap ore before the d i spersa l of th eColonia l Go vern or s Conference and was ab le to meet in add i t ion to theCommiss ioner -Genera l (Mr . Malco lm MacDonald) and the Governor ofS i ngaporet he G ove rno r s o f H ong K ong , Sa raw ak and N or t h B orneo and t heHigh Commiss ioner for the Federa t ion of Malaya .

60. I s taye d successively w i th the Com mission er-Ge neral , w i th the Fo rei gnAffa i rs Advi ser (Mr . Scr ivener) , wi th the High Commiss ioner for the Federa t ionof Malaya (S i r Henry Gurney) , a t Kuala Lumpur , and wi th the Governor ofS i ngapore (S i r F rank l i n G i m son) .61. A good p a r t of our conversa t ions re l a t ed to pur e ly Colonia l p roblemsan d to the s t ru ctu re and fun ct ions of th e Co m m issio ne r-G en era rs Office, an d neednot be recorded here . B ut the Colonia l Gove rnors have the i r fore ign p reoccupat ions and I ga ther tha t t he Fore ign Serv ice members of the Commiss ioner G en er al s s taff have been of ass is tan ce to them .62. Th e Governor of S ing apo re an d the H ig h Commiss ioners a t K ua laLumpur admini s t e r t e r r i to r i es a t t he meet ing-p lace of th ree races , t he Ind ian , t heChinese and the Malaythere has been age- long r iva l ry be tween Indian andChinese in this area and i t i s not l ikely to be al layed, but , indeed, rather to beintensi f ied in the pr ese nt an d pro spe ct ive s ta te of the wo rld. Developm ents inbo th In d i a and C h i na m ay m ak e t h i s an i n t e rna t i o na l ques t ion of g row i ngimpo r tance . Both t e r r i to r i es have l a rge Chinese pop ula t ions , and the twoGovernors look on the communisat ior i of China as a mat ter of int imate concern.One i s consc ious of Ind ia and of Pandi t Nehru a t S ingapore and i t i s on ly whenone ge ts rou nd the corn er to Ba ng ko k th a t his shad ow seems to gro w less . Fe el ingbetween M alay s an d Chinese i s s t ron g . Th e M alay an Fede ra t io n al so ha s i t sdi ff icul t ies wi th Siam, though there are encouraging signs of growing col laborat ionbetween the two admini s t ra t ions in the suppress ion of Chinese Communis tband i t ry .63. S in ga po re, a t the crossin g of the sea-way s, i s a l so an indisp ensa ble l in kin comm unica t ions w i th A us t ra l i a . One feel s onesel f t here w i th in the sphere

of A u st ra l i an inte rest , an d i t seemed f itting to celebrate A us t ra l ia Da y inS i ngapore .64. The foca l po i n t fo r t he ga t he r i ng t oge the r o f a l l t he se s t r an ds -d e f en ce ,fore ign a ffa ir s , co lonia l ad m ini s t r a t ion , economicsis the Co m miss ione r -G ener arsoffice in Sin ga po re. Th ou gh some hav e spoke n of i t wi t h less enth usia sm th a nothers , op in ion is , I t h ink , una nim ous as to i t s u t i l i t y . W i th the prese n t r i ceshortage, the work done by the Economic Sect ion to fol low up and see to thefulf ilment of the I .E .F .C . a l locat ions i s s t i l l qu i te indisp ens able . In the f ie ld offoreign affai rs i t pe rfo rm s a mo st valuab le co -or din at in g funct ion a nd enablesthe view of the Foreign Office to be expressed and promoted in places which i twould o therw ise no t so eas i ly reach . The recent me et ing of H i s M aje s ty s

Representa t ives in fore ign count r i es in South-Eas t Asia under the pres idency ofM r. M acD onald w a s most successfu l . I t wa s hoped tha t t he exp er ime nt wouldbe rep eate d an d i t i s for con sider at ion w he the r the ne t should not be sp rea d ne xtt im e t o b r i n g in Ind i a , C eyl on , P ak i s t a n and J a p a n by i nv i t i ng t he a t t endan ceof the High Commiss ioners a t Delh i , Karachi and Colombo and the Head of theUn i t ed King dom Lia i so n Miss ion a t Tokyo. S i r A . Gascoigne to ld me tha t hewould welcome this .65. One of the most in t e res t in g func t ions I a t t end ed was a d inn er g ivenby M r. M acD onald to which he ha d inv i t ed the G overnor of S ingap ore , t he Na valand Mi l i t a ry Commanders- in-Chief , t he Pr ime Mini s t e rs o f f ive of the MalayS t a t e s ( i nc l ud i ng D a t o O nn B i n Jaa fa r f rom Johore , P re s i den t o f t he U n i t edMa lay Nat io na l i s t O rgan i sa t ion ) , some pro m inen t Chinese an d official an dunoffic ia l Br i t i sh from S ingap ore . A f te r d in ner , a t M r . M acD ona ld s reques t ,I gave a shor t t a lk on the wor ld s i tua t ion , as seen f rom Europe , and an in t e res t ing3674 6 c 2


15/27

discussion fol lowed. Ev en here , i t was s ignif icant t h a t the claws were out betweenMalays and Chinese .66. Mr MacDonald w as good enoug h to give me l iberal ly of his t ime and wediscussed many things together , but I wil l confine the record to a few points .67. H e was em pha t ic th a t i t would be very bad for our s ta nd in g in South-E as t A sia i f we fai led to su pp or t or to pres s for th e execu t ion of the la te st U nitedN at io ns Resolu t ion on Ind one s ia . W e had es tab l i shed a s t ron g m ora l pos it ionin this par t of the world by our act ion in India, and i t would be a t ragedy i f wefor fe i ted i t over Indo nes ia . N at ion a l i sm in M ala ya was behin d the Governmentin i t s ac t ion ag a in s t Chinese Com mu nis t d i sor ders . In th i s , M ala ya d iffe redf rom Indones i a and Indo-Ch ina , where t he Du tch and the F rench were d rawingthe Na t iona l i s t s an d Com mu nis t s toge ther . I t would a l so , he thoug ht , be a seriousblow to ou r pre st ig e an d inf luence i f In d ia ent i r ely lef t the Com mo nw ealth. InM alaya , ne i ther Chinese nor In d ia ns nor M alay s w an ted to force the pace ofprogress towa rds se l f -governm ent ; bu t the temp o m igh t be increased by recentdevelopm ents elsewhere. A s re ga rd s Ch ina , l ike alm ost everyone to wh om I putthe ques t ion , he thought tha t in the long run , though perhaps not in the shor t run ,China would not succumb to communism of the Soviet type.68. I a sked h im abou t A us t r a l i a n po l i cy , i n S ou th -Eas t A s ia and inpa r t i cu l a r why the A us t r a l i an Governm en t were t ak in g so pass iona te and ex tr emea l ine about Indon es ia . H e sa id , firs t, tha t A us t ra l ia ns were temperam enta l lypro ne to the use of unc om pro m ising la ng ua ge ; secondly, th a t they bel ieve s tronglyth a t the B r i t i sh way in In d ia w as the r igh t way, and the more s t rong ly so, in th a tAust ra l ia knew what i t was to have to make good her own f reedom and had ace r ta in fellow fee l ing ; th ird ly , th at there w as an elemen t of com pensa t ion forthe W h i t e Au s t r a l i a Po l i cy -here was a chance fo r A us t r a l i a t o show

f r i endsh ip to an A s ian peop le ; fou r th ly , t ha t t he A us t r a l i a n Governm en t weres incere ly concerned a t the prospec t of d i s turbances in South-Eas t Asia whichthe D utc h act ion wo uld pro vo ke; f if thly, they exp ect th a t a free Ind on esi a wouldbe a ba r r ie r to Chinese sou thw ard expan s ion .69. Fo r a l l A u s t ra l i a ^ in te re s t in th i s reg ion , however , he d id not th inkAust ra l ia was ready or f i t to assume defence or o ther mater ia l respons ib i l i t i esther e, an d i t would be best no t to pre ss he r too h a rd to do so. On the othe r han d,Aust ra l ia ' s par t ic ipa t ion in the Delh i Conference on Indones ia had been a goodth in g . I t had preven ted the Conference from being a l ine-up of A sia aga ins tthe West , and to tha t ex tent had been of advantage to the Uni ted Kingdom in

So uth- Eas t As ia . I th in k the re i s gr ea t force in th i s observa t ion .70. A t K u a l a L u m p u r , Sir Henry Gurney w as k in d enough to exp la in tome the var ious measures he was tak ing to res tore order in Malaya , and I a l sohad a shor t t a lk wi th Genera l Boucher , commanding the mi l i ta ry forces , andw ith the Chief of Pol ice, Colonel G ra y. S ir H en ry m ad e thre e po ints affectingforeign relat io ns. I n the f irst place, the sp rea d of com mu nism in Ch ina wasmaking his task more diff icul t ; the local Chinese, who had been brought to ameasure of co l labora t ion wi th the Government and the Government Forces , werenow cooling off. Secondly, i t wou ld be a seri ou s m a tt e r if th e Chines e deportees,who now by taci t agreement of the Chinese authori t ies were al lowed to sai l to

Amoy or Swatow wi thout t rave l documents , were re fused ent ry in to China bythe Com mun is t s . Th i rd ly , he re fe r red to S iam and re la t io ns be tween the M alayanaut ho r i t ies and the Em bassy a t Bangko k. Th ere ha d been some f r ic t ion , butf rom what S i r Henry sa id and f rom what I have s ince heard a t Bangkok andelsewhere , the s i tua t ion i s now much improved. J o in t Malayan -Siam ese opera tionshave been organised aga ins t Chinese Communis t concent ra t ions , and a good sp i r i tof col laborat ion between the local authori t ies on both s ides of the front ier nowprevai l s , and misunders tandings be tween our own author i t ies have been removed.71. A t Sing apore , I w as inform ed of the im por ta nce of our re t a in ing longte rm influence over M alay a an d , in pa r t ic u la r , possess ion of S ing apo re itself Wehave a role to play in South-East Asia , which no one else is competent to play,in ord er to prom ote col labo rat ion between Ea st an d W est . In so doing, we shouldbe serv ing our own advantage by he lp ing to deny South-Eas t Asia to communism,to safeguard va luable suppl ies of raw mater ia l , to safeguard communica t ions wi thAustral ia and New Zealand, and to give an impulse to economic recovery.


16/27

G^Ba tavia: 29thh-30th January, 194972. Th e first imp ress io n on seeing B ata vi a is to wo nder why the D utchhave no t m ade more of i t in the 300-odd ye ars they have been the re . I t canno tbear comp ar i son w i th S ingap ore o r H on g Ko ng . I am to ld th a t the in te r io rof Jav a, whic h I d id not see , i s more credi tab le to D utc h ente rpr is e .73. His Ma jesty s Consul-Gen eral (S i r F . Shepherd ) , ha d a r r an ge d in te r viewS for me with the High Representative of the Netherlands Crow n (D r. Beel)and , a t the l a t t e r s sugges t ion , w i th Indo nes ian l eaders , bo th Rep ubl ican andFe de ral ist . I also me t su nd ry D ut ch officials an d businessmen, mem bers of theB ri t i s h Com mercia l com mun ity , an d some of S ir F . She ph erd s fore ign col leagues .A s a cu r ta in ra i se r , S i r F . Shep her d s mi l i t a ry adv ise r exp la ined to me , w i th theaid of a map, the extremely di f f icul t mi l i tary s i tuat ion in which the Dutch nowfind themselves.74. I ta lk ed to Dr. Beel in his office and was also his guest at lunch, when

I m et some of h is chief colleagues , c iv i l ian a nd m il i ta ry . D r . Beel i s not impress ive .H e i s d ry , r ig id an d un im agin a t ive a nd no t the m an to pu t th roug h a g rea tpol i t ic a l ope ra t ion , w i th the need for wh ich the D utc h are now faced. B u t hespoke w i th modera t ion . A n agreem ent abou t Indon es ia wa s necessary , bu t t im eand pa t ience would be requ i red , and in te rna t iona l in te r fe rence would no t he lp .He d id no t th ink tha t the Uni ted Na t ions Reso lu t ion , the t ex t o f which he hadonly ju s t received, could be eas i ly carr i ed out , bu t he ha d so fa r ha d no ins t ru ct io nsfrom The H ag ue and could not exp ress h imself def in i te ly . H e thou gh t the th reepa r t ie s we re s lowly com ing c loser toge ther . Ce r ta in ly he an d his G overn me ntwanted an ear ly solut ion, and that solut ion was the ear l ies t poss ible es tabl ishmentof the U ni te d Sta te s of Ind on esia . B u t law an d ord er mu st be es tabl ishe d f irst .He had no object ion to negot ia t ing wi th the Republ ic as such, but th is must beon the same basis as w i th the other const i tu ent pa r t s of Ind on esia . H e w as notcer ta in that the present Republ ican leaders could del iver the goods, and theywere no t a t a l l a s mo dera te as S j ah r i r .75. S i r F . Sh eph erd took occasion to press upon Dr . Beel the acc eptanceof the Uni ted Na t ions Reso lu t ion and I to ld n im wha t I had heard abou t Ind ianv iews on Indones ia , an d d rew th e pa ra l l e l of our ac t ion in In d i a an d i t s he lp fu lresu l t s . D r . Bee l sa id he w as impressed by these a rgu me nts , bu t thou gh t th a tthe In d i an pa ra l l e l w as no t an exac t one . The In d ia ns were much be t te r ab leto govern themse lves th an the Indo nes ian s . A nd in Ind ia , no one ha d a rm sexcep t the Goverment : in Indones ia , a s in o the r pa r t s o f Sou th-Eas t As ia , theAl l i e s had supp l ied a rms to the res i s tance movements and the Japanese had le f td u m p s wh e n t h e y d e p a r t e d .76. The Republican leaders, head ed by Dr. Sjahrir, came to the Co nsula te -G ene ral to mee t me. I w as s t ru ck by the m ode rat ion and lack of b i t ter nes s w i thwh ich, on the whole, they spoke. The Ind on esia n quest ion seems to have engen dered mo re pass ion outs id e th an ins ide B ata via . A t f irst, Dr . S ja h r i r left h iscol leagues to do the ta lk ing , bu t la te r he in terven ed. H e opened with the di sa rm in gobserva t ion tha t whereas the Br i t i sh and Ind ians were bo th g rea t peop les andcould do th in gs in a b ig w ay, th is was not the case w i th th e D utc h and Indo nesia ns ,wh o w ere both smal l peoples . Ind eed , the Ind on esia ns ha d picked up some of

the fau l ts of the D utch . A l l agre ed th at a se t t lement m ust be reached in agree me ntw ith the D utc h. B ut the re w as a cr is is of conf idence. D utch acts d id no t matchD utc h declara t io ns . D r . Beel w as the au tho r of two pol ice ac t ions , an d the f irstCa thol ic app ointe e for 300 years . V an Mook, for a l l h is faul ts , had been bet ter .The impor tan t th ing was to make sure , beyond a pe radven ture , tha t the Uni tedSta tes of Ind one sia would soon actua l ly be es tabl ished. The quest ion of theform of the U nio n could w ai t . I f th i s m ain poi nt w as c lear ly es tabl ished,imm ediate prac t ica l d i ff icult ies could be solved. W he n a Co nst i tu ent A ssemblywas called, Indonesians of al l shades of opinions could easily come to a commonview on the Con s t i tu t ion . Th e D utch mus t dea l w i th the Rep ubl ican l eaders asrepresen ta t ives o f the Republ ican Government and no t a s ind iv idua l s ; bu t i twas not pract ica l pol i t ics to imagine that , in the in ter im per iod, the Republ iccould be res tored in i t s or i g in al g lory . Th e Fe de ral is ts could help i f they wou ldcome out in favour of th is l ine . Co ntac t among a l l thre e pa r t ie s w as now beingpromoted.


17/27

77. The Federalist leaders were a more miscellaneous collection, from theas tu te and power fu l P r ime Min is te r o f Eas t Indones ia (Anak Agoeng GdeAg oeng) to the playboy Su l tan of P on t ia na k from W est Borneo. The ta lk wasless sa t i s fac to ry than tha t wi th the Republ icans , s ince the Federa l i s t s had no treached agreement among themselves and were incl ined to watch each other andsta l l . Lik e the others , they sa id tha t the object ive w as the se t t in g u p of theU n i t e d Sta tes of Ind one sia . They ha d no object ion to dea l ing w i th theRepubl icans as a Government , but the Republ ic must be t rea ted on a par wi ththe othe r Sta te s an d not g iven a pre fere nt ia l posi t ion. Also, the re mu st be freeelect ions in the Re pu bl ic an e lsewhere : the Re pub l ican s ha d as yet nopop ula r m and a te . They d is l iked the revo lu t iona ry app roach and cen t ra l i s t tendencies of the Re pu bl ica ns , bu t tho ug ht a Con st i tu ent A ssembly could, w i thoutdif ficulty, ag ree upo n a Cons t i tu t ion . The y resented fore ign in terfere nce inIndonesian affa i rs , and a lso the fac t that they had not been permit ted to expresstheir v iews before the Secur i ty Counci l .

78 . A s Si r F . Sh ep he rd said, in a tele gra m sent off at the t im e, th e impressiong iven by the i r t a lks w as d i scourag ing and d i sap po in t in g . A l l pa r t i e s seem towant , broadly speaking, the same th ing: yet no one makes any posi t ive moveto w ar ds i t . Th e Good Offices Co mm ittee (as i t th en wa s) ha d ne ith er the capacitynor the pres t ige for th is in fa ct i t s mem bers ma de a very poor impress ion on me.A n d ne i the r Soek arno nor S ja hr i r i s a N ehru , nor Beel a M ou ntb at ten . Also,the Ne the r lan ds Governm ent , un l ike H is M aje s ty s Government , a re l iv ing inano ther age . The N e the r land s d ip lomat ic and consu lar r epresen ta t ives whomhave seen on th is journey are , wi th one or two except ions , a poor lo t ; and theyseem to love ta lk ing about the days of Queen Victor ia .

H . B a n g ko k: lst-Ath February 194979. I n Siam the teem ing t ropical li fe , vegetable an d hum an, seems to reacha clim ax. Ba ng ko k, too, ha s a cha rm of i ts ow n as the ce ntre of a r ive r civil isation.80. H ere , f rom the poin t of v iew of B r i t i s h in teres ts , ther e is a mo re cheerful ta l e to te l l. H is Ma jes ty s Am bassa dor (S ir G. Thom pson) gave me an out lineon th e da y of my ar r iv al . H e believes th at the genera l app roa ch to the Siameseshould be one oi f r i en ds hip a nd cour tesy. Ro ug h me asure s wi l l not pay . Thepresent Government is wel l d isposed and there have been no real t roubles wi thSiam s ince the w ar . B r i t i sh fi rms are doing wel l . C on trac ts are coming our way.70 pe r cen t , of the ca r s imp or ted a re Br i t i sh . Br i t i sh in te res t s in the imp or t ex po r t t ra de , in t i n an d in teak, are on the Whole respected. O ur informat ionservices obta in am ple coverage for Br i t i s h news. O ur ac t ion in In d ia ha s enhancedour good name and has opened out the prospect of an extension of Brit ish influencein Sou th- Ea st Asi a . (Sir G. Thom pson w as only one of severa l who m ade th isre m ark to me.) Th e cou ntry is a t prese nt pros pero us , thou gh th is pro sp er i t y maynot be very f irmly based . A record r ice shi pm en t is exp ected th is m ont h. I t waspointed out to me, however , by a number of informants that there are darkeraspe cts of the s i tu at io n. The Go vernm ent is a us ur pi ng ol igarchy, not popular lybased. Th e cou ntry i s fac t io n-r id den and both c ivi l ian and m il i t ary e lementsm igh t cause t rouble . Th ere is wa ste an d cor rup t ion . A nd there is the Chinesequest ion, growing Chinese nat ional ism directed against Siam among other p laces ,ac t ing through the local Chinese communit ies .81 . Th e A m bas sad or does not th in k th a t the Siamese are to be counted uponto res is t incu rs ion or a t t ac k f rom Co mm unis t Chin a . A s is thei r wont , they wi llbow to the s torm and t rus t to thei r d iplomat ic agi l i ty to secure thei r survival , asso of ten in the pa st . On the othe r han d, they could probab ly deal w i th an in ternaloutbre ak, thou gh they ma y need arm s f rom abroad . Th ere was l i t t le Communismam ong the Siamese themselves . I t w as thr ou gh the Chinese Com mu nity thatCom mun ism would come. Al l Si r G. T ho m p so ns col leagues whom I consul tedon this point share these views.82. I asked a num ber of people , inc lud ing fore ign repres enta t iv es , w ha t wasor would be the reaction of the spread of Communism in China on the Chinese

com mu nity in Siam. Th e genera l v iew w as th at the r ich Chinese wou ld havepr imary regard for thei r own in teres ts and would s i t on the fence as long as theycould . I f th e Siamese Gov ernme nt took a s t ron gly ant i -Co m mu nis t l ine , theymight suppor t the Government , but that suppor t would be precar ious because the


18/27

r i ch Chinese depended in thelast re sorton thecooliesando ther w orkers ,and thesewould beun der s t ro ng Com mu nist influence. Th ere ares i gns t ha t the sp read ofCommunism in China wi l l b r ing about a neww aveof Chinese na t iona l i sm amongthe Chinese Communis t s in Sou t h -Eas t A s i a , and t h a t the Chinese in Siam wi l lt ake t h i s oppor t un i t y to get back at the Siamese in revenge for pas t s l igh t s andoppress ions . H isM aj es t y ' s A m bassador suspec t s t ha t the Siamese are consciousof this, and t h a t it is t h i s t ha t has recent ly brought the Siamese Government tocol laborate act ively wi th theM al ayan au t ho r i t i e s aga i ns t C h i nese band i t s on theSi am ese -M al ayan f ron t i e r .83. I wasen t e r t a i ned tod i n n e r by theFore i gn M i n i s t e r HisSe rene H i gh ness Pr ince Pr ide Debyabongs) , whowasprofuse in hisassevera t ionsof f r i endsh i pfo r G rea t B r i t a i n . I also met,both in his office, and at d i n n e r at the Embassy,the Pr ime Mini s t e r (Marsha l Phibun Songgram) , whose mi ld and d i sa rm i ngm anne r m asks a ru th less ambi t ion . A t his sugges t ion , a f t e r d inne r , we had al ong t a lk wi th Mr. N o r m a n Y o u n g of HisM aj es t y ' s T reas u ry ( a lso on a t ou r ofthe F a r E a s t ) and Mr.Dol l , F ina nc ia l Ad vi ser to theSiamese Governm ent aboutthe vexed quest ionof the Siamese gold and compensat ion claims.84 . In o rde r to see someth ing of the m a i n s t a y of l ife in So uth-E as t A sia ,I w en t to see a r ice-mi l l by the r i ve rs i de . H e re pad dy wascoming in byboat asi t leaves thefa rm s ; s am pl ed for qu a l i t y ; deh usked ; c l ea red of thebr an ; po l i shed;g r a d e d for qual i ty , whether for e x p o r t or hom e consum pt i on ; put up in 240 lb.sacks and ca r r i ed by coolies down to the r i ve r a ga i n for despa t ch . In hea t anddus t and a m o n g p e r s p i r i n g h u m a n i t y the m a c h i n e r y has been chugg ing aw aysinceit wassh ipped f rom G lasgow in 1895.

I . H on g Kong: 4th-8th February 94985. H on g Ko ng, l ike Sin gap ore , gives an intense feel ing of p r i d e in B r i t i shachievement . It hasm a d e a remarkable recovery in prosper i ty s ince the occupat ion. I t s en t r epo t t r ade is abo ut three, t imes the value and abou t the same involume as before the war, though s t a t i s t i cs are difficult toeva lu a te s ince so muchof the t ra de w i th Ch ina passes th ro ug h i l li c i t channel s . T ra d i ng , l awful or un-lawful , is in the Chinese bones. H on g Ko ng is anexam pl e to show w ha t can bedone in the economic field in th i s reg ion if law and order preva i l s , if t he re is aj u s t and effic ient ad m inis t rat i on , a s t ab le cur rency , and faci l i t ies for the expedi t ious and sa fe hand l i ng of goods. I t hasre-establ i shed and extended its t r a d i n gconnec t ions th roughout the Fa r Eas t e rn a rea . A good many Shanghai f i rms arenow moving toH o n g K o n g . Solong as t he re is no r iva l f ree p or t in the a r e a

and t he re is no p rospec t of t h i s a n d so long as poli t ical t roubles leave ituntouched, Hong KOng's commercial future seems secure.86 . In H o n g K o n g , as in Sou t h -Eas t A s i a , the t h o u g h t is all of China .Mr. Seba ld , Genera l MacArthur ' s Pol i t i ca l Advi ser , asked me in Tokyo whetheranyonein Sou t h -Eas t A s i awast h i n k i n g of J a p a n . I said that most people seemedto havep ut Japan firmly in thebackof t he i r m i nds as a problem tha tdid notneedtobebothered about for thet ime be ing but it m i g h t bedifferent in A us t r a l i a .87 . A t the suggest ion of the Governor Sir A l e x a n d e r G r a n t h a m ) I madea tour of the NewT e r r i t o r ie s on the ma in land , accom panied by Mr. H ea t hco t e -Sm i t h the G ov ern o r s Fo re i gn Se rv ice A dv i se r ) , the Dis t r i c t Comm issioner and

the. Comm issioner of Pol i ce . We drove round the per ime ter a long the f ront i e rw i t h C h i na andvisi ted thepol ice posts from wh ich a w a t ch is k e p t for refugeesand smugglers . We also looked at the so-cal led walled ci ty of Kowloon, a verytumbledown place, the scene of the recent inciden t .88. The Governor k indly put us up at Government House ( rebui l t by theTapanese and redecora ted in exquisi te taste by L a d

Date post:	04-Jun-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	tun-kyaw-nyein
View:	216 times
Download:	0 times

Lord Strang's report on his South and Southeast Asian visit in 1949March.pdf

Documents