Lost in Transition: UN Mediation in Libya, Syria, and … · Lost in Transition: UN Mediation in...

NOVEMBER 2016

Lost in Transition:UN Mediation inLibya, Syria, and Yemen

FRANCESCO MANCINI AND JOSE VERICAT

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

FRANCESCO MANCINI is an Assistant Dean and Visiting

Associate Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public

Policy, National University of Singapore. He is also a Non-

Resident Senior Adviser at the International Peace Institute.

Email: [email protected]

JOSE VERICAT is an Adviser at the International Peace

Institute.

Email: [email protected]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

IPI owes a debt of gratitude to its many donors for their

generous support. In particular, IPI would like to thank the

Government of Germany for making this publication

possible. The authors would also like to thank Peter Bartu;

Raymond Hinnebusch, I. William Zartman, Elizabeth Parker-

Magyar, and Omar Imady; and Steven A. Zyck for their

research and insights on the cases of Libya, Syria, and

Yemen, respectively, on which this paper relies. They are

also grateful to the people who were interviewed off the

record for this report for their generosity in offering their

time and providing information.

Cover Photo: Secretary-General Ban Ki-

moon and Joint UN–Arab League

Special Representative for Syria

Lakhdar Brahimi meet with the five

permanent members of the Security

Council to discuss the second

International Conference on Syria,

United Nations, New York, September

27, 2013. UN Photo/Mark Garten.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this

paper represent those of the authors

and not necessarily those of the

International Peace Institute. IPI

welcomes consideration of a wide

range of perspectives in the pursuit of

a well-informed debate on critical

policies and issues in international

affairs.

IPI Publications

Adam Lupel, Vice President

Albert Trithart, Assistant Editor

Madeline Brennan, Assistant ProductionEditor

Suggested Citation:

Francesco Mancini and Jose Vericat,

“Lost in Transition: UN Mediation in

Libya, Syria, and Yemen,” New York:

International Peace Institute, November

2016.

© by International Peace Institute, 2016

All Rights Reserved

www.ipinst.org

CONTENTS

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

The Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Analyzing the Mediation Efforts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

ABDELELAH AL-KHATIB’S MEDIATIONIN LIBYA

FROM KOFI ANNAN TO LAKHDAR BRAHIMI:MEDIATION IN SYRIA

SUPPORTING TRANSITION: JAMAL BENOMARIN YEMEN

Lessons and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

MANDATE

IMPARTIALITY AND INCLUSIVITY

ENTRY AND CONSENT

STRATEGY

LEVERAGE

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Annex: Mediation Timelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

MEDIATION IN LIBYA

MEDIATION IN SYRIA

MEDIATION IN YEMEN

1

Executive Summary

The Middle East is spiraling down the abyss. Allattempts to stop the violence raging in the regionhave failed, while some of the worst possiblescenarios have come to pass. Taking stock of effortsto resolve these conflicts is as urgent as ever. Thecountries examined in this paper—Libya, Syria,and Yemen—all exploded into war after the Arabuprisings of 2010–2011. They are also the threecountries to which the UN sent envoys to facilitatea transition before war broke out. Though thesemediation efforts mainly failed for circumstantialreasons, there are major lessons to be learned.These lessons have been organized around five keychallenges that mediators confront.

Mandate: Clear support from the SecurityCouncil for the mandate of the mediator is essentialfor the success of the mediation effort. This doesnot mean that the mediator needs a clear mandatefrom the beginning. The mediation in Yemen is anexample of the benefit of having a mediator whoshapes his own mandate by entering into theconflict early and with a low profile. What wasessential was for the Security Council to underpinthe mediator’s proposals as he progressed. Libya isthe counterexample. The mediator there alsomolded his own mandate, but without solidbacking from the council, the mandate’s lack ofclarity became a weakness. The mandate was notonly vague but also did not even identify him as thesole mediator. In Syria the diverging interpreta-tions of the mandate, whether it meant powersharing or transition, were crucial to the failure ofthe efforts to resolve the conflict.

Impartiality and inclusivity: Mediating politicaltransitions in an impartial manner is something ofa paradox since such transitions demand that theincumbent step aside in favor of another party. Theproblem in the cases of Libya and Syria was that theremoval of the authoritarian ruler was made acondition for the commencement of the negotia-tions over political transition. However, the needfor impartiality should not be exaggerated;complete impartiality is neither possible nor alwayseven necessary. All that is needed is for themediator to make a proposal that is agreeable to theparties. Regarding inclusivity, every mediator isforced to make choices about who to include, andthe choices made in all three case studies presentdeficiencies. Syria stands out for the focus of the

mediators on Russia and the United States, ratherthan local and regional parties. In post-QaddafiLibya, the mediators directed their attention at theelected institutions, even though these were not thereal power holders. In Yemen, the mediator madegreat efforts to reach beyond forces linked to thestatus quo ante but ultimately forged an elite deal.

Entry and consent: In Syria the UN arrived late,having misjudged the scale of the threat and decidedto give precedence to the League of Arab States tofind a regional solution. Then the violence spun outof control, and the parties never reached a mutuallyhurting stalemate. But early entry and a high level ofpreparedness made no difference in Libya, either inthe early stages of the conflict or in the post-Qaddafiperiod. Yemen is the exception, where the UN envoyarrived early enough to make exploratory visits,carve out his role, and facilitate a leadership change.

Strategy: All three mediation efforts focused onreaching an overall solution to the conflict ratherthan a shorter-term cessation of hostilities. Theinterest in an overarching agreement at the expenseof a more localized fix was particularly palpable inYemen, where the fighting in the north escalatedand eventually overran the political process. Thefirst two mediators in Syria both sought, first andforemost, a comprehensive solution, but thecurrent mediator’s increased focus on cease-firesindicates a change of strategy, while working forthe same overarching goal.

Leverage: The greatest challenge UN mediatorsface in leveraging power is that they represent amultilateral organization made up of a largenumber of member states, each with its owncompeting agenda. This undermines in particularthe mediator’s coercive power. A mediator whofaces either a divided Security Council (as in Syria)or a divided international community (as in Libya)is seriously hampered. There are, however,different forms of power, and a mediator’s leveragecan therefore be greater than it appears at first.While the lack of unity among UN member stateswas highly detrimental to the UN mediation inSyria, the mediators enjoyed leverage through theirgreat personal prestige and the informationalpower they had as the only mediation track. InYemen is the best example of a mediator enjoyingthe support of the Security Council, and he wasable to leverage this to his benefit. The mediatorwas also able to leverage expert power, including inthe management of a complex national dialogue.

2 Francesco Mancini and Jose Vericat

Introduction

The current turmoil and violence in the MiddleEast obfuscates the fact that there exists also a storyof peace efforts across the region—a story of smallsuccesses, big frustrations, setbacks, and failures.The most successful and visible peaceful politicaltransition has been the locally led national dialoguethat pulled Tunisia back from the precipice twoyears ago. On the other side of the spectrum, theconflict that receives the most media coverage isthe Syrian civil war. But violence and humanmisery are present in Libya and Yemen as well,both of which eventually descended into armedconflict after civil protests in 2011 failed to producepeaceful, inclusive political transitions.

These three conflicts—Libya, Syria, and Yemen—share little with last century’s conflicts. Theyoriginated in domestic unrest influenced by theregional upheavals of 2011. They quickly drew inregional and global powers, which “influence orsupport—but rarely fully control—those fighting onthe ground.”1 They became proxy wars in whichboth regional and international players pursue theirgeopolitical rivalries, and non-state armed groupslinked with transnational criminal networksembrace ideologies of violent extremism thatcannot be accommodated in peace agreements.

In addition to confronting this complexity, UNmediators have been further obstructed by frictionsbetween great powers, particularly between Russiaand the West, which have paralyzed the SecurityCouncil’s decision making on issues of geostrategicimportance. They have also been blocked byconfrontations among regional powers—in partic-ular between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the conflictsaddressed here—and the shift of global influencefrom the West toward the East, which makes powermore diffuse.

For all these reasons, the wars in Libya, Syria, andYemen represent fundamentally different cases fromthe post–Cold War peace processes in which theUnited Nations has traditionally engaged, where it

was helping implement peace after civil war. In theseprevious processes, UN mediation efforts were oftenbacked by the deployment of peacekeeping troops,an option that was not under consideration in thesethree countries during the mediation effortsanalyzed here. Moreover, the mainly sub-SaharanAfrican settings in which the UN was involved fromthe early 1990s, while still difficult to address, wereless intricate than the current Arab political transi-tions turned violent conflicts. A previous IPI studydocuments UN involvement in constitutionalcrises during the first decade of the twenty-firstcentury. However, only two of these conflicts—Madagascar (2008–2011) and Kyrgyzstan (2010–2011)—were the result of popular uprisings similarto those in the Arab world more recently. Theothers centered on military coups—Mauritania(2008–2010) and Guinea (2009–2011)—anddisputed election results—Kenya (2007–2011). Buteven the cases of Madagascar and Kyrgyzstan donot display the complexity and particularity seen inthe Arab region.2

In the recent Arab conflicts, UN mediators havesought to achieve the often irreconcilable goals ofending violence while facilitating a political transi-tion and reconciling the parties. This paper looksinto these mediators’ early efforts (2011–2014) inLibya, Syria, and Yemen to draw lessons forongoing and future UN mediation in similarlycomplex and violent political transitions.METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

A team of scholars, including Steven Zyck at theOverseas Development Institute (ODI), PeterBartu at the University of California, Berkeley,Raymond Hinnebusch at the University of St.Andrews, and William Zartman at Johns HopkinsUniversity, conducted extensive research on thecases under examination and collected originaltestimonies from most of the key players involvedin the mediation processes. The InternationalPeace Institute (IPI) published the results of theirinvestigations in three separate papers, releasedbetween 2014 and 2016.3 Their research focused on

1 See Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “The Transformation of War and Peace,” Carnegie Corporation of New York, September 21, 2016, available atwww.carnegie.org/news/articles/international-day-peace/ .

2 Charles T. Call, “UN Mediation and the Politics of Transition after Constitutional Crises,” International Peace Institute, February 2012.3 Steven A. Zyck, “Mediating Transition in Yemen: Achievements and Lessons,” International Peace Institute, October 2014, available at

www.ipinst.org/2014/10/mediating-transition-in-yemen-achievements-and-lessons ; Peter Bartu, “Libya’s Political Transition: The Challenges of Mediation,”International Peace Institute, December 2014, available at www.ipinst.org/2014/12/new-ipi-report-explores-the-challenges-of-mediation-in-libyas-political-transition ; and Raymond Hinnebusch and I. William Zartman, with Elizabeth Parker-Magyar and Omar Imady, “UN Mediation in the Syrian Crisis: From KofiAnnan to Lakhdar Brahimi,” International Peace Institute, March 2016, available at https://www.ipinst.org/2016/03/un-mediation-syrian-crisis .

LOST IN TRANSITION 3

4 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), p. xi.5 Gerard Russell, “What Chance for Democracy in the Middle East?” New York Review of Books, October 27, 2016.6 UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (March 17, 2011), UN Doc. S/RES/1973.

a detailed analysis of the decision-makingprocesses of each of the leading UN mediators andtheir teams.

This paper builds upon these case studies andtheir findings, as well as on additional research andinterviews with UN officials involved in the cases,to develop crosscutting lessons. In keeping with thepolitical scientist Alexander George’s teaching,these authors do not seek—and indeed the smallsample of cases would not permit—to draw lessonsfor all instances of UN mediation in politicaltransitions. Rather, this report aims to developcontextualized lessons “intended to help policyspecialists first to diagnose and then to prescribefor new situations” with similar features.4

The Context

There are a few important characteristics that Libya,Syria, and Yemen share that shaped UN mediationefforts. First, all three countries were underlongstanding dictators who ruled through tribalalliances and patronage networks, among othermeans: “These leaders used external wars, internalwitch-hunts, and talk of foreign conspiracies tolegitimize their rule; and at the same time, tosubsidize it, they tolerated or brought about hugeblack economies.”5 Ali Abdullah Saleh, president ofYemen until 2012, maintained power for thirty-three years, while Muammar Qaddafi was the rulerof Libya for forty-two years before he was lynchedby a mob in October 2011. The Assad dynasty hasruled Syria since 1971.

Second, all three countries were riddled bydivisions, whether factional, sectarian, federalist, orseparatist. Libya and Yemen displayed particularlystrong separatist tendencies. In Syria, allegiance tothe Assad regime fell along complex sectarian lines,with a ruling minority (the Alawites, a Shia branchof Islam), supported by influential minorities(Christians and others who feared Islamism morethan Assad’s rule), dominating a largely marginal-ized majority (the Sunnis). Tensions betweendifferent religious denominations—the Houthis (aShia offshoot) and Sunnis—also featured in theconflict in Yemen.

Finally, the three countries share a colonial past.This made them particularly sensitive to violationsof their sovereignty, which complicated the role ofinternational mediators.

At the same time, Libya, Syria, and Yemendisplayed marked differences in their geopoliticalroles, macroeconomic characteristics, and politicalregimes, which also shaped the way in which theyhave descended into conflict and the UN mediationrole. Libya had the most repressive regime, drivenby patronage networks and isolated from theinternational community. Qaddafi had systemati-cally undermined every institution and left behind acountry with no governance capacity. Syria, on theother hand, was one of the leading countries of theArab world with solid institutions. It had long-standing relations with the Soviet Union/Russia andwith Iran. It exercised influence in Lebanon, whichit occupied from 1976 to 2005. It also leveraged theinfluence it had on the Palestinian-Israeli conflictdue to its border with Israel and unresolved territo-rial claims in the Golan Heights. Meanwhile,Yemen, the poorest country in the Middle East andNorth Africa region, with a per capita gross nationalincome around $1,300 and unemployment atroughly 45 percent, has perpetually been listedamong the top five most fragile states and wasfacing serious socioeconomic challenges evenbefore the uprising in 2011.

Differences in the nature of the regimes and themakeup of each country meant that war and statebreakdown took somewhat different forms, shapingthe mediation initiatives. In Libya, while theuprising was locally born, a NATO-led militaryintervention played a decisive role in bringing aboutregime change; originally sanctioned by the UNSecurity Council as an effort to protect civiliansunder attack by Qaddafi’s forces, this interventionultimately supported the opposition through acombination of air strikes, arms embargoes, and no-fly zones.

The UN mediator in Libya, Abdelelah al-Khatib,was appointed in March 2011, before the conflictturned into a full-blown civil war, with the mandateof “find[ing] a sustainable and peaceful solution tothe crisis in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.”6 However,


the mediator’s efforts and those of the internationalmilitary coalition worked at cross-purposes, leadingto the failure of al-Khatib’s mission and to theregime being brought down by force. Al-Khatib’smandate was very brief, from March 7 to August 20,2011, when Tripoli fell. In September the head ofthe UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), IanMartin, was already landing in the country. Martinproceeded to set up a fairly small, so-called “lightfootprint” mission, which focused on supportingthe democratic transition, public security, humanrights, transitional justice, and rule of law.

Because Qaddafi was deposed by force rather thanthrough an agreement—unlike in Yemen—anationally owned transition plan never emerged inLibya, and fighting between the different factionseventually unraveled Martin’s process. Althoughparliamentary elections were held in 2012, andagain in 2014, they did not even produce agreementon a government structure. Currently, an interna-tionally recognized Govern ment of NationalAccord, the product of a two-year, UN-led negotia-tion, continues its struggle to establish legitimacyand territorial control beyond the capital.

In Syria the conflict emerged from the violentresponse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime to streetprotests in support of regime change in March2011. The conflict quickly organized itself alongsectarian lines, and eventually accusations by theregime of extremist groups being responsible forattacks became a self-fulfilling prophecy, as a cycleof violence and vengeance set in.

In the beginning, the UN left the conflict to behandled by the League of Arab States (LAS). TheUN mediation was set up later, in February 2012,with a UN General Assembly resolution thatsupported previous LAS decisions in calling for “aSyrian-led political transition to a democratic,pluralistic political system.”7 The first two UNmediations under scrutiny in this paper—the firstled by Kofi Annan and the second by LakhdarBrahimi—took place under extremely difficultconditions. The mediators devoted their efforts totrying to convince the regime to make concessions,which it never felt threatened enough to do.

Unlike in the other two cases, no actual transitiontook place in Syria. Despite short-lived localized

cease-fires, violence only escalated, so far producingalmost 5 million refugees and causing over 400,000deaths. Brahimi’s successor, Staffan de Mistura, hasnot yet had more success in finding a peacefulsolution to the conflict.

The UN mediation in Yemen was in some waysthe most distinct of the three cases under analysis.Saleh’s rule began to unravel before the uprising in2011, in particular as he alienated allies in trying tohand power to his son. The regime’s violentsuppression of protests could have turned immedi-ately into open war—like it did in Libya and Syria—had it not been for the defection of Major GeneralAli Mohsen al-Ahmar, Saleh’s chief militaryadviser.

The UN secretary-general appointed JamalBenomar as special adviser on Yemen in April 2011,just two months after the Arab uprisings spread tothe country. Despite his small team and no mandatefrom the Security Council or the General Assembly,Benomar’s involvement and influence were consid-erable. He was locally popular and succeeded inbringing the key actors in the conflict to the table.He was instrumental, alongside internationalpressure, including the threat of financial sanctions,in convincing Saleh to accept the Gulf CooperationCouncil (GCC) initiative and cede the seat of powerto his deputy. But his biggest contribution wasworking with major Yemeni parties on designingthe Implementation Mechanism that gavesubstance to the bare-bones GCC initiative. He ledthe application of the nationally led transition planand in particular the National Dialogue Conference(NDC). His mediation efforts can be credited as amajor factor preventing Yemen’s uprising fromevolving into a full-fledged civil war in the shortterm.

But the considerable achievements of the UNmediation were reversed soon after the conclusionof the NDC, when the parties that had committed toshare power started to seek domination. In partic-ular, the Houthis felt they had been shortchangedand decided to turn sporadic violence into atakeover of the capital and a military coup in March2015. Yemen is currently in its second year of civilwar, with over 10,000 dead and 3 million displaced.

7 UN General Assembly Resolution 66/253 (February 16, 2012), UN Doc. A/RES/66/253.

Analyzing the MediationEfforts

To make the lessons comparable across these threecases, the analysis is organized around five keychallenges that mediators confront: (1) mandate;(2) entry and consent; (3) impartiality andinclusivity; (4) strategy; and (5) leverage.8 Theseelements can also be found in the UN Guidance forEffective Mediation, which the Department ofPolitical Affairs’ (DPA) Mediation Support Unitdeveloped to identify “a number of key fundamen-tals that should be considered in a mediationeffort.”9 Therefore, the performance of eachmediator has been tested against these fivechallenges. This section analyzes them case by case,while crosscutting lessons from the three experi-ences are drawn in the conclusion.

Briefly, the five challenges can be described asfollows:1. Mandate: The relationship between mediators

and their authorizing agency, in this case theUnited Nations, is established by the mandate,which defines the goals of the mediation. Muchof the success or failure of a mission depends onthis. The mandate can be wide or narrow,defined or general. Mediators might have a freehand or be very restricted in what they can dowithout specific authorization. The mandatealso determines the level of support from thegranting agency.10

2. Impartiality and inclusivity: UN mediatorscannot be neutral in regard to the values of theUN Charter. They must, however, be impartialin their efforts to run a balanced process thatengages with all actors and deals with themfairly.11 A related issue is inclusivity of theinterests of the different parties to the conflict.The greater the impartiality, the more it ispossible to be inclusive. But the more inclusive

the process, the greater the likelihood of adiluted settlement. Inclusivity in power transi-tions is particularly challenging, becauseincumbent regimes are often resistant,understandably, to mediate their own exit.Inclusivity in mediation is also key to questionsof sovereignty and local ownership.12

3. Entry and consent: Ideally, mediators areinvited to engage in a conflict by the warringparties. This, however, is rarely the case. Mostoften, it is the mediator’s initial task to instill inthe parties a sense of the need to reach a negoti-ated solution to the conflict. In fact, mediationshould only be initiated when a conflict is ripefor such intervention, a state William Zartmanhas defined as a “mutually hurting stalemate”—the point where the parties perceive that theyhave more to gain by negotiating than byfighting.13 Still, mediators can only push so farlest they lose their entry altogether.14

4. Strategy: Mediators have to consider how toachieve the goals defined in their mandate.Should they aim for a one-off comprehensiveagreement or adopt a step-by-step strategy? Andshould they focus first on cease-fires or onperipheral issues? Sequencing has conse -quences, as stopping bloodshed could bedetrimental to long-term peace by creating atolerable stalemate in which the disputants haveno incentives for granting further concessions.On the other hand, while agreement on theprocedure to resolve the conflict can be requiredbefore actual mediation begins, negotiationpreconditions may end up obstructing themediation process.

5. Leverage: Leverage refers to the ability ofmediators to move the parties in a particulardirection. Mediators generally have little hardpower at their disposal, a particular limitation toUN mediators. Their power is borrowed fromother parties. First, it comes from their


8 This framework is based on Hinnebusch, Zartman, et al., “UN Mediation in the Syrian Crisis.” Zartman and Saadia Touval introduce a number of these conceptsin “International Mediation,” in Unleashing the Dogs of War, edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: USIP, 2007).For a more conceptual discussion on mediation, see Jacob Bercowitz, “Mediation and Conflict Resolution,” in SAGE Handbook on Conflict Resolution, edited byJacob Bercowitz, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2009).

9 United Nations, Guidance for Effective Mediation (New York, NY, 2012), p. 3.10 Ibid., pp. 6–7.11 This distinction between impartiality and neutrality was often used by Secretary-General Kofi Annan. See, for example,

www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990119.sgsm6865.html . See also United Nations, Guidance for Effective Mediation, p. 10.12 See United Nations, Guidance for Effective Mediation, pp. 10–13 (on impartiality and inclusivity) and pp. 14–15 (on national ownership).13 Zartman, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments,” Global Review of Ethnopolitics 1, no. 1 (2001).14 United Nations, Guidance for Effective Mediation, pp. 8–9.

mandating agency, and more specifically theSecurity Council. A stalemated or dividedSecurity Council seriously undermines UNmediators’ leverage. They might also deriveleverage from the other levels at which theyoperate—local, regional, or international—playing them against each other. Power, ofcourse, is not only military or political; it canalso depend on mediators’ personal characteris-tics, status, legitimacy, expertise, and interper-sonal relationships with the parties.15

ABDELELAH AL-KHATIB’S MEDIATIONIN LIBYA

Mandate

Soon after the Security Council referred thesituation in Libya to the International CriminalCourt (ICC) in February 2011 on the basis ofalleged crimes against humanity, the UN secretary-general appointed Abdelelah al-Khatib, formerforeign minister of Jordan, as special envoy.16 Thisquick reaction reflected a high degree of prepared-ness in the UN. Unfortunately, preparedness wasnot matched by equal support for al-Khatib’smandate. In fact, al-Khatib’s failure to mediate apeaceful transition in Libya was in large part due tobitter divisions within the various organizationsinvolved in the peacemaking effort. Beyond theconsensus reached over Security CouncilResolution 1970, the members of the council werestrongly divided, with none of the unity theyshowed in supporting the UN envoy’s work inYemen.

However, it wasn’t just the lack of unity thatexplains the absence of support for the mediator.There was also little hope that Qaddafi would agreeto a negotiated transition. This lack of hope wasalso strong among many of the parties involved,including the Libyan National Transitional Council(NTC), the League of Arab States, NATO and itsmembers (in particular France, Italy, the UK, andthe US, which entertained bilateral relations withthe NTC), and Qatar. Even the African Union(AU) was split over this issue. In fact, the

reluctance was such that al-Khatib was physicallyconstrained from carrying out his mediation tasks.For example, he had to get NATO permission to flyto Tripoli and Benghazi, and on one visit to TripoliNATO shelled the city while al-Khatib wasattempting to meet with some ministers, which alsoimpeded him from seeing Qaddafi himself.Similarly, the Libyan opposition was far fromconsensus over the need for mediation. The NTCwas marked by infighting from the very beginning,and the bulk of the opposition refused to negotiate.Mediation efforts were clearly pushed aside infavor of war efforts. The UN mediator thus workedat cross-purposes with most of the partiesinvolved.17

Probably as a consequence of this skepticism, UNtechnical support to al-Khatib was limited. Thiswas compounded by the fact that al-Khatib hadlimited inside knowledge of how to work the UNsystem. Al-Khatib ran his mediation efforts fromhis native Jordan, removed from UN headquarters.He was briefed on at least one occasion by DPA’sMediation Support Unit, but otherwise he limitedcontacts with the UN bureaucracy to privatebriefings with the head of DPA, Lynn Pascoe. Onlyone member of the UN standby mediation teamwas deployed to Benghazi to support his effort, andthis person was shared with UN special adviser IanMartin, a British national charged with developingplans for a UN support mission.Impartiality and Inclusivity

While al-Khatib’s mandate lacked the necessarypolitical support, his mission was also underminedby the lack of impartiality of his authorizing agents.The Security Council, as mentioned above, hadalready referred Libya and its leadership to the ICC,and the NATO bombing campaign left no doubtabout the desired outcome. This also obviouslymeant that, unlike in Yemen, the leadership changewas not agreed upon by the faction ruling thecountry, which would become a serious obstacle toa smooth transition.

Despite these daunting circumstances, which


15 Jeffrey Rubin suggested six forms of power in international mediation: reward power, coercive power, expert power, legitimate power, referent power, andinformational power. See Jeffrey Z. Rubin, “International Mediation in Context,” in Mediation in International Relations, edited by Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z.Rubin (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992).

16 UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (February 26, 2011), UN Doc. S/RES/1970.17 Al-Khatib was further undermined by divisions within the membership of the Security Council, in particular after it become evident that the United States, with

France and the UK, used the protection of civilians mandate to promote regime change, a fact that particularly angered Russia, with repercussions for the Syrianconflict.

made it very difficult for Qaddafi to imagine thatthe international community sought a negotiatedsolution to the conflict, the Jordanian mediator waswidely seen as impartial, in that within hisoperational constraints he made an effort to reachout to different constituencies. He met with theAfrican Union on several occasions, with seniorQaddafi officials in Tripoli, and with NTCmembers in Benghazi. He attended all the meetingsof the Libya Contact Group created by Westernand Arab countries supporting the opposition. Still,shuttle diplomacy was cumbersome, and al-Khatibconducted most of his work over the phone, as hisbase in Amman made him less immediatelyavailable. This contrasts with Ian Martin’s efforts toreach out to all levels of Libyan society, includingthe grassroots, despite discouragement from theLibyan government, tribal elders, and local militias.

However, one of the main challenges for themediators was that the local opposition was deeplydivided, largely because Qaddafi’s brutal authori-tarian rule had erased any local institutions orviable alternative leaders. The challenge with localownership continued under al-Khatib’s successor,Ian Martin, who also lacked a representative Libyanleadership to engage. Once Qaddafi was killed, thedeep federalist instincts in some parts of thecountry contributed to the centrifugal forces thattore the country apart. Then Martin’s successor,Tarek Mitri, carried out a national dialogue thatwas not inclusive enough, focusing on a narrowpolitical class that had emerged from the GeneralNational Congress (GNC) but that did not includethe real power holders—the militias and the headsof the municipalities. Entry and Consent

Al-Khatib engaged in Libya when violence was notyet out of control. His early entry, however, did notprovide any benefit, as the NATO interventionmade clear there was no interest for a negotiatedsolution. Aside from the profound distrust andcontempt between the Libyan parties, the opposi-tion, empowered by the support of the world’sstrongest military powers, felt no need to negotiateor compromise. On the other hand, thoughQaddafi did signal that he wished for a negotiated

solution and attempted meeting with al-Khatib onat least two occasions.18

In the post-Qaddafi era, the UN’s difficultyoperating in Libya was aggravated by the stronganti-colonialist rhetoric of the former regime,which led one UN official to describe the popula-tion today as almost “xenophobic.”19 Libyansopposed any peacekeeping operation from the verybeginning, immediately associating it with theinvasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. This was despitethe historical role the UN played in the formationof the modern Libyan state from 1949 to 1951,when the UN official Adrian Pelt oversaw a transi-tional period in which Libyans wrote a constitutionthat united its three regions—Cyrenaica, Fezzan,and Tripolitania—into one country.Strategy

On the basis of Security Council Resolution 1970,the international mediation between Qaddafi andthe Libyan rebels started by exploring thepossibility of a cease-fire. This was the aim of al-Khatib’s discussion with the Libyan minister offoreign affairs on the first day of his first visit toTripoli, on March 13th, only days after his appoint-ment. However, on his second visit to Tripoli, onMarch 30th, he introduced for the first time the ideaof a political transition. Security CouncilResolution 1973, passed on March 17th, whichcalled for political reforms while also authorizingthe NATO campaign against Qaddafi, clearlyinfluenced al-Khatib’s new proposal. But theseresolutions gave al-Khatib only very broad—andcontradictory—outlines, and much of his strategywas his own initiative. For example, he wasconcerned that a cease-fire without a broaderpolitical objective would have caused a protractedstalemate and split the country into de factoseparate enclaves.

At first, when the regime still thought it wouldquell the uprising, it was not willing to accept eithera cease-fire or a transition. But as the regimestarted to realize how precarious its position was inmid-April, al-Khatib discussed with the primeminister and acting foreign minister ways oflinking a cease-fire with a political transition. Theyagreed that the UN should coordinate an interna-


18 On Qaddafi’s interest in a negotiated solution, see Hardeep Singh Puri, Perilous Interventions: The Security Council and the Politics of Chaos (Harper Collins,2016), p. 96.

19 Interview with UN official, 2016.


tional monitoring mechanism for the cease-fire butwere still reluctant about a transition. For its part,the NTC refused to negotiate with Qaddafi andcontinued to condition a cease-fire on himstepping down. Al-Khatib put forward a bridgingproposal, by which each side would agree on aninterim president, but the idea gained no traction,mostly because of the NATO intervention andincreased violence. Matters were further compli-cated by the AU’s own cease-fire proposal, whichdid not demand Qaddafi’s exit and which the NTCcould not accept as, again, it would have meant thedivision of Libya based on existing lines of control.Turkey released its own peace plan, which wassimilar to al-Khatib’s—a cease-fire, humanitarianaccess, and a transition to constitutional govern-ment. However, Turkey soon dropped thisproposed sequencing and endorsed the NTC’sposition of having a political transition first.

The controversy around strategic sequencing didnot end with al-Khatib’s mandate. Ian Martin’sdecision to go for elections before addressing issuesthat eventually became more pressing, such assecurity sector reform, also has detractors. Inretrospect, it is easier to criticize Martin’sapproach, which resulted in elected institutionsthat were unable to properly assert their authority.However, it is important to remember that theLibyans were set on having elections as soon aspossible.20 It is also questionable whether the UN,or any other organization, for that matter, couldhave had any traction on security issues. Althoughit soon became clear that asserting control over thevarious militias was a top priority, this would haverequired major coercive power, which was politi-cally off the table, and long-term engagement.Arguably, a more assertive approach would havebeen met with an equally assertive resistance. TheLibyans’ resistance to foreign intervention onsecurity issues was evident, for example when theychanged UNSMIL’s security white paper.Leverage

The fragmentation of mediating authority in Libyagreatly limited al-Khatib’s leverage. The UN wasnot the sole mediator, as multiple tracks—carriedon, among others, by the African Union, League of

Arab States, Libya Contact Group, NationalTransitional Council, and Turkey—worked atcross-purposes and ended up undermining eachother. Such fragmentation reduced al-Khatib’sinformational power, which derives from being thesole go-between. In addition, lacking the fullsupport of the Security Council, he could notexercise any coercive power.

The multiplicity of voices and efforts unequivo-cally contributed to the current outcome. Beyondthe peace efforts, the presence of different externalpowers that funded and supported differentmilitias according to their national interests andrivalries further reinforced the fragmentation onthe ground. Once the common threat they facedfrom Qaddafi was over, these forces turned againsteach other. Security sector reform and disarma-ment were not responsibilities the UN could haveassumed without major involvement of those verycountries that supported the different militias.FROM KOFI ANNAN TO LAKHDARBRAHIMI: MEDIATION IN SYRIA

Mandate

Kofi Annan, the former UN secretary-general,received his mandate as UN and Arab Leagueenvoy to Syria on February 23, 2012, and resignedon August 2nd, blaming the Syrian government’srefusal to implement his peace plan, the opposi-tion’s escalating military campaign, and the lack ofunity in the Security Council.21 His efforts werecontinued by Lakhdar Brahimi, the former foreignminister of Algeria and a UN diplomat, who wasappointed joint UN–Arab League envoy to Syria onAugust 17, 2012. He resigned the position on May14, 2014, as he considered the conflict not ripe forresolution.22 Both Annan and Brahimi appeared tobe the perfect candidates to find a way out of theSyrian crisis, enjoying high prestige and facing nocompeting mediation missions. However, theSecurity Council was divided over the interpreta-tion of the mediators’ mandate and therefore foundit difficult to provide sufficient support to theirefforts. While the West and the Syrian oppositionwere setting Assad’s departure as a preconditionfor negotiations, the Russians wanted a power-

20 The first road map by Mahmud Jibril, head of the NTC, was for an enlarged and more representative NTC to draft a constitution. Elections would then take placeafter the adoption of the charter. This proposal was debated in Benghazi in August 2011 and rejected in favor of a road map that included early elections.

21 Kofi Annan, press conference, UN Office in Geneva, August 2, 2012.22 See Hinnebusch, Zartman, et al., “UN Mediation in the Syrian Crisis,” p. 1.


sharing compromise.23

This division over the interpretation of themandate also meant that when the mediatorsappealed to the Security Council to support themandate, the great powers hesitated. For example,Annan set up an Action Group for Syria totranslate his plan into the Geneva Communiquéand secure the commitment of regional and worldpowers, but the communiqué was not endorsed bythe Security Council until more than a year later. Inthe end, the communiqué did become a permanenttemplate for settlement of the conflict, but clashesover its interpretation continued and prevented thecouncil from taking a unified stance behind itsimplementation.Impartiality and Inclusivity

The problem with impartiality that doggedmediation in Libya also blocked progress in Syria,where mediation aimed at a power transition—thereplacement of the Assad regime. Yet evenmediating a power transition requires treating theparties in a minimally balanced way, and Assad didnot feel that he received fair treatment. Annan’s six-point plan placed all the demands on the regime.The fact that the mediators had a joint mandatefrom both the UN and the Arab League also workedagainst them, as the regional organization hadadopted a hostile attitude toward Assad early on.The mediators’ attempts to temper demands to oustand prosecute Assad were insufficient to convinceeither the regime or the opposition.

At the same time, the mediators attempted to beinclusive, trying to bring to the table as manySyrian factions as possible. In those early stages ofthe conflict, no rebel group was considered tooextreme to talk to. Yet despite these efforts, manyparties failed to join the negotiation process. At theGeneva I Conference, which Annan engineered,the regime was crucially missing. At the secondround of negotiations in Geneva, Brahimi madegreat efforts to bring in Iran, a key regional player.However, the secretary-general’s invitation to Iranproduced an immediate boycott by the oppositionparties and so was rescinded. The achievement ofGeneva II was the inclusion of the opposition andthe regime, even if they came with the intention ofavoiding actual negotiation. It must also be noted

that despite these attempts at inclusivity, themediators considered negotiating with the greatpowers, especially Russia, a top priority and did notengage sufficiently with the Syrian regime and theopposition.Entry and Consent

The UN’s entry into the Syrian conflict was, by allaccounts, late. The League of Arab States was left todeal with the conflict not as a misjudgment, butunder the assumption that it would enjoy moreconsent. By the time Annan arrived, positions hadalready become inveterate. The situation thatconfronted Brahimi was even more entrenched.From a social-psychological approach, earlyintervention is considered essential to avoid thehardened positions and deep-seated enmity thatprolonged violence provokes. On the other hand,too early an entry might mean that a negotiatedsolution is less appealing to the parties, which havenot yet seen the limits of what can be achievedthrough violence or experienced its cost. The lateentry in Syria thus could have had the advantage ofreaching the parties when they had already reacheda mutually hurting stalemate.

However, like in Libya, it was hard to identify afavorable entry point, since at no time did theparties and their supporters feel the conflict to betoo costly to fight, and instead they saw the threatsas existential. The mediators spent an initial periodurging a sense of ripeness—that is, a sense thatneither side could win militarily—but found thatthe parties did not perceive the costs of fighting tobe unsustainable. The opposition was counting, atleast at first, on a decisive NATO intervention, as inLibya. Similarly, the regime was relying on its alliesfor support, namely Russia, Iran, and Hizbullah. InBrahimi’s words, the conflicting parties werebrought “kicking and screaming” to Geneva II, asneither side was ready for serious negotiations.Brahimi contrasted this situation with the 1989Taif Agreement that ended the Lebanese civil war,in which the parties were exhausted and ready for adeal.Strategy

Both mediators used cease-fires in an effort to buildconfidence among the parties. However, whilecease-fires figured prominently in Kofi Annan’s

23 The precedent of NATO forcing a power transition in Libya, with questionable wisdom and to the great chagrin of Russia, also weighed heavily.


24 The first mention of Benomar’s role is in UN Security Council Resolution 2014 of October 21, 2011 (UN Doc. S/RES/2014). The text “requests the Secretary-General to continue his Good Offices, including through visits by the Special Adviser, and to continue to urge all Yemeni stakeholders to implement theprovisions of this resolution, and encourage all States and regional organizations to contribute to this objective.” Security Council Resolution 2051 of June 12,2012 (UN Doc. S/RES/2051) welcomes Benomar’s expanded role, including the presence of a team of experts based in Yemen.

strategy—in as far as the short-lived UN Super -vision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), established inApril 2012, had a mandate to monitor violence—they were a subtler leitmotif for Brahimi, whoinherited the mediation at a time when violencehad seriously escalated. He brokered a four-daycease-fire in October 2012. But the Homs cease-fireto evacuate civilians in early 2014 happened tocoincide with the Geneva II Conference, and it isquestionable whether Brahimi had major input onit. In the end, both regime and opposition had anongoing appetite for violence, and a serious cease-fire only took place under Staffan de Mistura, whotook over from Brahimi.

As mentioned earlier, given how the positions ofthe Syrian and regional parties were firmly locked in,both Annan and Brahimi were more focused onnegotiations among world leaders, particularlybetween the US and Russia, than among the Syrianparties on the ground. They pursued a top-downstrategy to achieve an overarching resolution to theconflict, convening bilateral meetings to producesome degree of agreement. Unfortunately, all theycould achieve was a joint US-Russian acknowledg-ment in May 2012 that there was no military solutionto the conflict. However, the “mother of all issues”was the future of Assad, on which no commonposition was found. Arguably, more engagementwith the Syrian parties could have been advisable,even if there was little space for compromise.

Under his initial strategy, Annan also expectedthe regime to make all the concessions. Thisapproach was evident also in his six-point plan.Such a maximalist approach left little room for theregime to negotiate, and actual mediation, in thesense of a search for compromise between theSyrian sides, never really happened. ThoughBrahimi tried to relax the precondition of Assadstepping down prior to negotiations, which theopposition National Coalition accepted implicitlyby entering talks in the Geneva II Conference, hecould not bring most of the opposition to the table.Leverage

The mediators in Syria enjoyed a rare monopolyover negotiations with the regime, as no parallel

international mediation track existed. They alsoenjoyed high prestige and respect among allparties. However, this did not translate intosubstantive leverage over the parties. Thefundamental problem was that the mediators werenot backed by a united Security Council. Nocoercive power was available to push demands onthe Syrian regime. At the same time, the oppositiondid not have enough military capacity or externalsupport to force the regime to make concessions.As such, the mediators had little leverage toconvince the regime to step down, or even to agreeto a gradual political transition. Mostly, they citedthe high costs of the conflict on civilians, hoping toleverage this to restrain both sides. But the popula-tion remained unrepresented, and warnings ofhumanitarian tragedies did nothing to change thepositions of the warring parties.

Mutual distrust among the parties defined themediation environment, while the mediators hadno leverage to ask regional powers to push for apeaceful solution rather than supporting one sidepolitically and militarily. Despite the overall goodrelations that Annan and Brahimi kept with thewarring parties (also known as referent power), theoverwhelming absence of any coercive poweroutweighed their diplomatic skills.SUPPORTING TRANSITION: JAMALBENOMAR IN YEMEN

Mandate

The secretary-general appointed Jamal Benomar, aMorocco-born UN official, as his special adviser onYemen in April 2011, just two months after theArab uprisings spread to the country. With a teamof only two or three people, he quickly stepped intothe crisis without a mandate from either theSecurity Council or the General Assembly, carvingout his own political space.24 This “soft interven-tion,” as Benomar characterized it, reflected hisdeep knowledge of and confidence with the UNsystem and was significant for a number of reasons.It represented a more liberal interpretation of theuse of the secretary-general’s good offices and wasa highly proactive move in a UN structure that hasgrown increasingly wary of overstepping mandates


25 Ultimately, the NDC’s 565 participants consisted of 30 percent women and 20 percent youth.26 For a peace process to be effective, it should include those who will make peace and not just those who have made war. See Marie O’Reilly, Andrea Ó Súilleabháin,

and Thania Paffenholz, “Reimagining Peacemaking: Women’s Roles in Peace Processes,” International Peace Institute, June 2015.

or drawing the ire of influential member states.The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—with

significant input from the US—drafted the initiativefor a political transition, which was successfulbecause it enjoyed the backing of the internationalcommunity. By October, Benomar was leveragingSecurity Council Resolution 2014, which called onPresident Ali Abdullah Saleh to sign the GCC initia-tive, reflecting the consensus within the SecurityCouncil membership. Benomar was key inconvincing Saleh to accept it, thus helping facilitatepolitical change in Yemen. After Saleh stepped down,the GCC asked the UN to monitor the implementa-tion of the agreement. Benomar then developed theGCC Implementation Mechanism in such a way thatit received broad buy-in from Yemenis.

Unlike al-Khatib in Libya, Benomar coordinatedwell with the Security Council throughout hismandate. But the support of the internationalcommunity and the Security Council was notunwavering. Later in the process, he felt that he didnot gather enough backing from the council for thenew power-sharing agreement he wanted to forgeafter the Houthi uprising. He also thought that hedid not obtain the support that he had wanted toproperly sideline Saleh, who continued to exerciseinfluence through his political party—despitehaving been pressured to step down—and becameone of the major spoilers of the transition.

The transition in Yemen was a very ambitiousand complicated process. Benomar had toundertake both diplomatic and managerial tasks.He had to get all major parties to begin talking,establish the Implementation Mechanism, andensure the involvement of the south of the countryand the agreement of all major parties to a newstate structure. The rest of the time, the jobinvolved organizing and facilitating a large confer-ence—the National Dialogue Conference (NDC)—which lasted for ten months and required effectiveprocedural control, organizational capacity, stayingpower, and flexibility. The envoy and his teamassumed too many responsibilities on their ownand might have benefited from having exertedgreater efforts to reach out for support fromdifferent parts of the UN system.

Impartiality and Inclusivity

Benomar tried hard to avoid being perceived as a“fig leaf” for foreign powers, and he managed topresent himself as a relatively impartial mediator,at least during the early part of his mediation. Theabsence of a Security Council mandate—untilOctober 2011—might even have contributed to hisimage of independence. In this way, he builtconfidence in the UN and its claim to universalvalues. Nonetheless, he was not to everyone’sliking. The GCC initiative handed power fromSaleh to his deputy, Mansour Hadi, which some feltdid not go far enough, serving the status quo ante,and in particular the Saudi regional order, whichthe GCC represented. Others would later accuseBenomar of the opposite—of siding with theHouthis against Saudi interests.

Benomar was credited for going out of his way tobe inclusive and to reach out to a wide range ofstakeholders. The ultimate example of this was theNDC, where he made it his personal mission toensure that a significant number of women andyouth were included.25 This was in keeping with theprinciple that inclusion is about bringing in not justconflict parties but also broader segments ofsociety.26 Benomar also made an effort to includethe different Yemeni factions, in particular thesouthern separatist movement al-Hirak al-Janoubi,which was essential to address the conflict betweenthe central government and that region of thecountry. And though he fell short in guaranteeingsufficient buy-in from key southern stakeholders, itwas not for want of trying.

In general, Benomar did not want to be seen asleading the implementation process. Formally,leadership of the transition and the NDC restedwith the Yemeni government, and in particularwith the office of President Hadi. However,Benomar became in some ways a victim of his ownsuccess as the informal leader of these processes,and with the passing of time Yemenis began toquestion the degree of local ownership, how muchpower Benomar wielded individually, and theprominent role he had acquired. The backing of theSecurity Council provided Benomar withcredibility in the country, but some Yemenis


increasingly interpreted the support of the world’sgreat powers as a threat to their sovereignty.Despite his calls for a locally owned and locally ledprocess, he came to be seen as determining thecourse of the transition, at times forgingdecisions—such as on restructuring the military—outside of the appropriate consensus-building fora.As the conflict with the Houthis began to escalate,some blamed him for exercising excessive influenceover the response of the central government andforcing it on the path of appeasement.

At the same time, the real limitations Benomarfaced in steering the transitional authorities towardwhat he thought was best for the country shouldnot be ignored. For example, he was limited in hisability to guarantee sufficient southern representa-tion in the NDC. It is also important to acknowl-edge the dilemma he faced between risking thatsterile discussions would drag on and becomeentangled, on the one hand, and pushing thetransition forward, on the other.Entry and Consent

Benomar made a timely entry into the countrywhen, a mere two months into the Arab uprisings,he offered the secretary-general’s good officeswithout waiting for the Security Council or theYemeni regime to demand UN action. He waswarmly received from the very beginning. In fact,for months his popularity and prestige seemed onlyto increase. This was because the early involvementof the UN created a crucial space for dialogue.Benomar brought all of Yemen’s major politicalparties together for the first time since the uprisingbegan. In doing so, he helped to open lines ofdialogue and begin tangible plans on how to moveYemen forward once Saleh had stepped down. Inthe context of the Arab uprisings, Benomar’s earlyaction was unique.

Benomar was not satisfied with the consent of theregime. Upon his arrival he worked hard to gaintrust among Yemenis. He addressed them directlyin Arabic in the public squares where protests andsit-ins were being held, clarifying that the UNsupported their aspiration for change while alsoshaping their expectations, emphasizing thatchange should come peacefully and gradually.Strategy

Benomar believed a long-term political solutionwas necessary to remedy Yemen’s short-term

challenges. His real strategic decision was to focuson the NDC and the debates surrounding thepolitical transition. An example of his belief ininitiating the political process before the cease-firewas his initial unwillingness to become involvedwith the conflict that was then brewing in northernYemen. However, in the end the Houthi coupbecame the central challenge to the peaceful transi-tion, eventually forcing his departure. In this caseagain, greater focus on ceasing the violence orother short-term fixes might have been morebeneficial than an overall resolution of the conflict.

In retrospect, the NDC launched a slow processof negotiation among key stakeholders, buildingtrust among several parties and turning theirattention away from the battlefield. At the sametime, however, it addressed an unreasonably largenumber of issues, making it difficult for the partic-ipants to fully understand and engage with all theissues at hand. It ended with a daunting set of 1,800recommendations. Some felt that the process wasrushed, reaching conclusions that were not fullythought through or properly endorsed, whichserved to heighten rather than dissipate tensions.Moreover, the very sensitive issue of how todelineate the different regions of the country—among other crucial questions—remainedunresolved.Leverage

Benomar suffered from a fragmentation ofmediating authority similar to that experienced byal-Khatib in Libya. The UN had to work closelywith a whole array of external actors and mediatorsinvolved in Yemen, including the so-called Groupof Ten Ambassadors (G10) formed in the midst ofthe uprising and comprising the five permanentmembers of the Security Council, the GCC, and theEU. However, Benomar was able to exploit theleverage of other actors who were pushing for theexit of Saleh. Thus when his persuasive power ranout, he borrowed power from the GCC and thenthe Security Council, for example to arrange for thedeparture of President Saleh.

In particular, Benomar was able to leverage withgreat success the support he enjoyed in the SecurityCouncil resulting from Resolution 2014, passed inOctober 2011, a document that had been difficultto forge due to tensions within the membershipover the Libyan crisis. Once the resolution waspassed, Benomar leveraged it to create momentum,

using its demand for a report in thirty days topressure the sides to meet and produce the transi-tion agreement. The backing of a united SecurityCouncil gave the transition the veneer of interna-tional legitimacy, and having established himself asthe sole message carrier, Benomar could exerciseinformational power. He also held considerableexpert power in advising the national dialogueprocess, which the Yemenis appreciated.

This did not always work. He failed, for example,to convince President Hadi to implement theconfidence-building measures necessary to attainal-Hirak’s greater participation in the NDC. Thereality was that, besides the projection of powerfrom the unified Security Council, Benomar hadlittle leverage of his own over Yemeni stakeholders,and by the time the Houthis reached the gates ofthe capital, Sanaa, he had lost the confidence ofsome of the Yemeni parties who thought he wasmaking excessive efforts to accommodate theirdemands. Benomar was also unable to marginalizeSaleh and temper the ambitions of Hadi to remainin power, thus torpedoing the transition, whichforesaw fresh elections. After the NDC ended andthe power-sharing agreement that emerged was notrespected, Benomar had no leverage to ensure itsimplementation or to prevent violence fromescalating.

Lessons andRecommendations

A few crosscutting lessons can be drawn from thesecases to inform future UN mediation in similarcontexts. The lessons are organized around thesame five challenges used to frame the analysisabove: mandate, impartiality and inclusion, entryand consent, strategy, and leverage.MANDATE

Disunity of Intent

The first lesson that clearly emerges from theanalysis of the three cases is the importance ofinstitutional support. The unity of intent in themembership of the Security Council providedBenomar with leverage over Yemeni leaders—atleast for the early part of his intervention—which

was never at the disposal of the mediators in Libyaand Syria. Even if no divisions emerge during thedrafting of a resolution, once the mandate isestablished it requires consistent support from thepermanent members of the Security Council.When this support is missing, even the most skillfulmediators cannot achieve the goal of a peacefulresolution.

In Libya the international community and al-Khatib worked against each other. Like in Yemen,the mediator was dispatched without a clearmandate. Resolution 1970 served as a reference forthe mediator but actually made no mention of themediation. This is not necessarily a constraint, as itallows the mediator to carve out his or her ownrole. But in the case of Libya it became a problem,as the Security Council never made a clear commit-ment to al-Khatib’s mediation as the sole track orspecified his exact mandate. This meant thatsupport for his mission was unclear and that he wascompeting with other mediation tracks. In Syria,while Annan and Brahim’'s efforts constituted thesole mediation track, the Security Council was inopen disagreement, with the West supporting onlypolitical transition and Russia seeking a power-sharing agreement.27

Predefined End Results

Like a lack of unified political support, conditionsthat preconfigure the desired end results ofmediation undermine the work of mediators. InYemen, Benomar was able to adapt his role to thecontext before a mandate was forged. Anexploratory engagement helped him build relation-ships between the parties, and the absence of amandate actually provided the flexibility to do this.Benomar’s proactive interpretation of thesecretary-general’s good offices is an interestingmodel that merits consideration in other contexts.

On the contrary, little leeway was given to themediators in the other two cases. In Syria the factthat the opposition and Western members of theSecurity Council treated the end result—politicaltransition—as a precondition for negotiation hasbeen particularly problematic. Annan and Brahimisought the relaxation of this precondition, but invain. Libya was a similar case, where the NTC’s


27 Having a single mediation track is a feature of Annan’s mediation style. In his intervention in the conflict in Kenya in 2008 he had also insisted on exclusivity asmediator. See Call, “UN Mediation and the Politics of Transition after Constitutional Crises,” p. 9.


insistence that Qaddafi step down, the SecurityCouncil’s referral to the ICC at the onset of al-Khatib’s mediation effort, and the NATO campaignthat followed did not help the mediator’s task.IMPARTIALITY AND INCLUSIVITY

Partial Impartiality

A direct consequence of preconditions is the loss ofthe mediator’s impartiality. It was not some deficitin the personalities of the mediators in these casesthat cost them their impartiality, but rather thelimitations imposed by the mandating powers. Themediators were engaged in facilitating not reconcil-iation but a power transition in which the govern-ment was expected to exit and the opposition tobenefit. Mediators could only avoid a zero-sumgame by negotiating some guarantees for the rulers.In this context, in which mediators cannotmaintain their impartiality, the danger is that theyare perceived—by the ruling authority in partic-ular—as attempting to legitimize a change ofregime.

Syria is the clearest example of this, with theopposition and Western powers making thedesired end result—the ousting of the regime—as aprecondition for negotiations. The mediators’double-hat as UN and Arab League envoys alsocomplicated their efforts to look impartial, giventhe anti-Assad position of the LAS. SecurityCouncil Resolution 1973, which mandated al-Khatib to find a peaceful solution to the Libyanconflict, also authorized the NATO-led militaryintervention in the country. Though al-Khatibhimself might have been perceived as impartial,this undoubtedly compromised his mediationefforts and caused the regime to associate the UNwith the NATO intervention. Yemen was theexception, as the absence of an initial mandateprovided Benomar a certain distance from greatpowers’ interests. Benomar managed to separatehis role from that of the Security Council—at leastfor a while—while at times also using the council asa tool for coercive power. Based on his experience,the Security Council should be careful not tomicromanage political transitions with requeststhat limit mediation options but should also offervigorous support when sought by the mediator.

At the same time, the lack of impartiality was not

the ultimate explanation for why mediators inLibya and Syria failed to reach a negotiatedsolution: “Mediators must be perceived as havingan interest in achieving an outcome acceptable toboth sides and as being not so partial as to precludesuch an achievement.… [T]he question for theparties is not whether the mediator is objective butwhether it can provide an acceptable outcome.”28 Inparticular, when it comes to power transitions—asopposed to reconciliation, where more evenhand-edness is arguably required—mediators withoutenough coercive power need to make the prospectof an exit from power sufficiently attractive to thegovernment. But in doing so, they will not beperceived as impartial to the interests of the rulers.Limited Inclusivity

The tendency is to think that mediation processesshould be as inclusive as possible. In Syria themediators focused on the external circle ofplayers—particularly the US-Russian relationshipand key regional powers such as Iran—but failed tomake progress. Instead, they should have focusedmore on the primary actors in the conflict.Although positions were locked in, the mediatorsshould have devoted more effort to bringingtogether opposition groups and searching forcommon interests beyond stated positions. Thus,the Syrian regime was crucially absent from theGeneva I Conference. Brahimi did not engage inshuttle diplomacy during the Geneva II Conferenceand perhaps threw in the towel too early. But thechallenge was huge, as the mediators in Syria hadlimited options and no means to impose costs onthe warring parties without the unified support ofexternal powers. In Libya al-Khatib did carrymessages from one side to the other—thoughperhaps not as much as he could have—but undersuch negative conditions and with so little time thathe was unable to gain traction. In Yemen, Benomarwas unable to bring in a delegation from thesouthern movement that was representativeenough.

However, inclusivity is not a question ofincluding the largest number of actors possible. Amediation process should be considered inclusiveenough when it does not exclude parties that coulddisrupt an agreement from the outside or include

28 Zartman and Touval, “International Mediation,” p. 444.


29 O’Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin, and Paffenholz, “Reimagining Peacemaking."30 See UN Secretary-General, Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results, UN Doc. S/2011/552, August 26, 2011; and the subsequent endorsement by the UN Security

Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2011/18, September 22, 2011.

parties that could prevent an agreement internally.In the post-Qaddafi phase, the vacuum of powerwas such that the UN envoys struggled to find acredible leadership with which to engage. Given thefierce competition among Libyan oppositiongroups, a less inclusive and more technocraticprocess to draft a new constitution before holdinglegislative elections might arguably have workedbetter than the path established by the NTC.

Moreover, for peace processes to endure, theyshould also include those who did not take up armsbut were working for peace. This is not only asound argument but is also corroborated by data.Research shows that when women have been ableto influence such processes, an agreement wasalmost always reached and was more likely to beimplemented.29 While Yemen is ultimately not asuccess story, Benomar’s efforts to make the transi-tion inclusive, particularly of women and youth,are to be noted. His team drew upon UN normsand standards to overcome Yemeni misgivingsabout the inclusion of women in the NDC, and theNDC ended up including 30 percent women and20 percent youth. Thus Benomar reached outbeyond the traditional power holders and warringparties to ordinary people demonstrating in thesquares asking for change. However, the impact oftheir inclusion on bringing about a change ofregime was limited, and the process as a wholeremained centered on elites.ENTRY AND CONSENT

Unfavorable Entry

In Syria the UN, in particular Annan, is oftenfaulted for having been late to the conflict. As soonas the conflict began to escalate militarily, theconviction grew among the parties that they couldovercome each other by force of arms, makingBrahimi’s mediation almost futile. NATO’sintervention in Libya convinced the Syrian opposi-tion that they could also obtain internationalsupport to defeat the Assad regime. Though NATOdid not intervene, the support of regional powershelped all sides believe military victory was foresee-able. In other words, an earlier entry might nothave mattered since the conflict was not ripe for

mediation, and any strategy for ripening it wasweak. Despite the attempts by Annan and Brahimito urge a sense of ripeness, stressing the high costsof conflict and the impossibility of a militarysolution, the warring parties still perceived theycould win without mediation.

Libya is a good example where early entry did notimprove the chances of mediation, in part becauseof a lack of consent. Qaddafi never empowered hissenior officials to negotiate a political transition,while the NTC agreed to negotiate only upon thedeparture of the regime. In Yemen, on the otherhand, the mediator entered just at the right timeand made himself indispensable to the transition.Exploratory Engagement

Exploratory engagements can serve to developmore favorable entry points and ripeness formediation. The Yemen case is an archetypalexample of successful proactive engagement usingthe secretary-general’s good offices prior toreceiving a Security Council mandate. It illustratesthe benefit of sending a low-key team to establishcontact with the actors on the ground in order toget a direct perspective on the conflict and the UN’spossible role. This provides opportunities foranalytical depth in exploring idiosyncrasies in thecountry that could be magnified during a politicaltransition and affect peacemaking strategies. Thisapproach also helps to identify a political space forthe UN and build relationships with keystakeholders. Exploratory engagement should beviewed as a model meriting replication in futurecontexts that appear to be falling into violentconflict. The secretary-general should also use hisor her prerogative of “preventive diplomacy” topursue such low-key engagements in politicaltransitions.30

STRATEGY

Cease-fire Dilemma

There is no general answer regarding the use ofcease-fires as conflict management tools. Cease-fires were at the forefront of the strategies tomanage conflict in Libya. Al-Khatib’s mandate wasto look for a cease-fire to end violence. He eventu-ally introduced the idea of a political transition,


because he was aware that a cease-fire without apossible resolution could have provoked aprotracted stalemate, which would have onlyfurther split the country.

In fact, cease-fires rarely hold without parallelprogress toward a political solution to the conflict.In Syria, both mediators used cease-fires in aneffort to build confidence among the parties, butthese were not their focus.31 In Yemen, Benomaralso focused on the political process rather thannegotiating a cease-fire, mainly because he wasreluctant to get involved with the conflict that wasthen brewing in the north. However, this was adecision that came back to bite him, because in theend the Houthi coup became the central challengeto the peaceful transition, right up to his departure.Hence a cease-fire might have been more beneficialthan an overall attempt to resolve the conflict.

Given the entrenched positions of the warringparties in all three conflicts and the politicalimpossibility of finding compromises betweenmajor external powers, the mediators could havemade more liberal use of cease-fires, both as entrystrategies and to relieve civilians from the miseriesof war. While this strategy is not risk-free, it canincrease trust among the warring parties andprovide a space for conflict resolution. But it canalso create a stalemate that further entrenchesparties’ positions, as was the case in Libya.Therefore, if used as more than a way to providehumanitarian relief, cease-fires should beunderpinned by a longer-term strategy beyondviolence reduction.LEVERAGE

Leveraging Multilateral Organizations

Because of the complex nature of multilateralbodies like the UN—whose interests are acomposite of their member states’ interests—theleverage of mediators seems to depend on severalfactors: (1) how important it is to the conflictparties to have a multilateral, rather than state-based, stamp of approval; (2) the mediator’s abilityto satisfy the organization’s member states; and (3)the mediator’s capacity to move his or hersometimes cumbersome organization along.32

Internal disagreements are therefore one of thebiggest threats to multilateral mediation efforts,which the mediator often solves by relying on asmaller, more determined group of member statesto push the process forward.Limited Leverage

Even this last option of relying on a smaller groupof member states was not available in the cases ofLibya and Syria. In some ways, Annan and Brahimiwere in a privileged position, enjoying high levelsof prestige and a monopoly over the mediationtrack, something al-Khatib could not count on inLibya. However, the divisions in the SecurityCouncil removed all possible coercive power overthe Assad regime. Al-Khatib’s leverage was activelyundermined by multiple negotiations and theNATO-led air campaign. Short of coercive power,the mediators in Syria and Libya tried to appeal tothe humanitarian costs of conflict and toconvincing powerful regional and internationalsponsors to push for a solution, rather thansupporting their proxy group on the ground, butthe parties did not budge. On the contrary,Benomar, who also operated in a fragmentedmediation environment—at least at the beginningof his mandate—was able to leverage the power ofthe Security Council most successfully.Insider Knowledge and ProcessManagement Skills as Leverage

Benomar’s knowledge of the system and its bureau-cratic mechanisms even enabled him, in oneinstance, to delay a Security Council presentationto allow a set of actors to make more tangibleprogress that he could then report on. Al-Khatib,who was new to the UN system, could not navigatethe intricate multilateral bureaucracy with thesame effectiveness. His so-called expert power wastherefore rather limited, especially compared to theother mediators.

On top of knowledge of the UN system, in politicaltransitions characterized by dialogue amongmultiple actors at multiple levels (local, regional, andinternational)—as in Yemen—mediators also needto be skilled in dialogue facilitation, informationmanagement, communication strategies, and

31 Political science research has indeed shown that cease-fires can help build trust among parties and alter the warring actors’ calculation of the benefits of fightingversus talking. See Madhav Joshi and J. Michael Quinn, “Is the Sum Greater Than the Parts? The Terms of Civil War Peace Agreements and the CommitmentProblem Revisited,” Negotiation Journal 31, no. 1 (January 2015).

32 For more on multiparty mediation, see Chester A. Crocker, Fen O. Hampson, and Pamela Aall, Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World(Washington, DC: USIP, 1999), pp. 11–12.

17

technical coordination mechanisms. This points tothe need to give senior diplomats empowereddeputies, whose skills traditionally include relation-ship building and institutional coordination.

Conclusion

This paper has drawn a set of lessons from the UN’sfirst attempts at mediation in Libya, Syria, andYemen after the Arab uprisings. However, there aretwo important caveats. First, the context in whichthese mediations took place had a definitive impacton the success or failure of diplomatic efforts; it isoften difficult to disentangle the individualmediator’s responsibility for a particular outcomefrom the broader circumstances.

Second, caution should be exercised when trying

to apply these lessons to other political transitionsand mediations more generally. Though thesemediations share certain basic characteristics—they all took place in the Middle East duringbroadly similar processes of political transition—the specificity of each context affected themediations in wildly different ways. Independentvariables, such as the local and geopolitical milieusand the level of violence, varied from one case tothe other and greatly limited the mediators’capacity to bring about change. The complexity ofthese conflicts notwithstanding, it is necessary tolearn from the efforts to resolve them, both as partof ongoing mediation efforts in all three countriesand in considering how to respond to any futureconflicts with similar characteristics.

18

Annex: Mediation Timelines

MEDIATION IN LIBYA

2011February 15th Libyans take to the streets in Benghazi

February 22nd Qaddafi gives a speech in which he urges a violent showdown

Arab League suspends Libya’s membership

February 25th Human Rights Council calls for dispatching an independent international commis-sion of inquiry into human rights violations

February 26th Security Council Resolution 1970 refers the situation in Libya to the InternationalCriminal Court (ICC) and applies an arms embargo

February 27th Revolutionary leadership in Benghazi forms the National Transitional Council(NTC)

March 3rd Abdelelah al-Khatib is first approached by the UN secretary-general

March 7th Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) requests Security Council to enforce no-fly zoneover Libya

Al-Khatib is officially appointed as UN mediator in Libya

March 10th France is the first country to recognize the NTC

March 13th Al-Khatib makes first visit to Tripoli

March 17th Qaddafi’s columns converge on Benghazi

Security Council introduces Resolution 1973 authorizing member states to take allnecessary measures to protect civilians, paving the way for the NATO militaryintervention

March 19th Multi-state coalition begins military intervention in Libya, ostensibly to implementSecurity Council Resolution 1973

March 25th AU releases first road map proposal for Libya, calling for a cease-fire, humanitarianaccess, dialogue between the parties, an inclusive transition period, and politicalreforms

March 29th First meeting of the Libya Contact Group takes place (attended by al-Khatib but notthe AU)

March 30th Al-Khatib returns to Tripoli, where the regime is more willing to discuss a cease-fireand accepts the AU road map, and al-Khatib introduces the idea of a political transition

April 1st Al-Khatib meets the NTC chairman in Benghazi

April 7th Turkey releases road map calling for cease-fire, humanitarian access, and transitionto constitutional government

ANNEX 19

April 10th African delegation meets Qaddafi

Mid-April Al-Khatib returns to Tripoli to continue discussions on cease-fire and push fortransition

April 26th Ian Martin is appointed special adviser to coordinate UN post-conflict planning forLibya

April 30th NATO bombs Qaddafi’s family home and kills one of his sons

UN offices are ransacked

End of April Al-Khatib puts forward proposal for power sharing

May 5th Second Contact Group meeting takes place in Rome, and Mahmud Jibril presentsthe NTC road map

Early June NTC chairman tells al-Khatib that Qaddafi could stay in Libya but under UNsupervision (this offer is rescinded in July)

June 9th Third Contact Group meeting takes place in Abu Dhabi

June 27th ICC issues arrest warrant for Qaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam, and Head of MilitaryIntelligence Abdullah al-Senussi

July 15th Fourth Contact Group meeting takes place in Istanbul, at which al-Khatib’smediation role is confirmed

NTC becomes more assertive due to recognition and legitimacy

August 3rd NTC issues Constitutional Declaration

August 20th Tripoli falls

Al-Khatib resigns

Early September Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Ian Martin, arrives in thecountry

October 20th Qaddafi is killed

2012March UNSMIL puts forward comprehensive one-year proposal for the mission that

addresses security sector reform

July First election for Libyan General National Congress (GNC) is held

October Tarek Mitri succeeds Ian Martin as head of UNSMIL

2014June Libyans elect Council of Deputies to replace GNC

2015December Libyan Political Agreement sets the basis for Government of National Accord

MEDIATION IN SYRIA

2011March Growing protests against the Assad regime are met with violent repression

May EU and US impose sanctions on senior Syrian officials

July 10th Syrian officials announce national dialogue

August 18th US and European leaders call on Assad to resign

August 23rd Syrian National Council, the first opposition coalition, is formed

October 4th Russia and China veto UN Security Council resolution threatening sanctions againstSyria

November 12th League of Arab States (LAS) suspends Syrian membership

November 27th LAS approve sanctions against Syria

December 19th LAS establishes monitoring mission for Syria

2012January 28th LAS suspends monitoring mission due to rising violence

February 4th Russia and China veto Security Council resolution threatening sanctions and callingfor Assad to step down

February 16th General Assembly Resolution 66/253 provides the mandate for UN intervention inthe Syrian conflict, calling for a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, plural-istic political system

February 23rd Kofi Annan is appointed joint UN-LAS special envoy

March 16th Annan proposes a six-point plan, which is endorsed by the Security Council and thegovernment of Syria

April 3rd Syrian troops begin withdrawing from population centers in accordance with six-point plan

April 12th Cease-fire between government and Syrian National Council enters into effect

April 21st Security Council Resolution 2043 approves creation of UN Supervision Mission inSyria (UNSMIS)

May 25th More than 100 people are killed in a massacre near the town of Houla, for whichUNSMIS blame pro-Assad forces

June 12th UN official declares the conflict a full-scale civil war

June 16th UNSMIS suspends its activities due to increasing violence

June 30th Action Group for Syria issues Geneva Communiqué in a meeting later referred to asthe Geneva I Conference

July 19th Russia and China veto Security Council resolution threatening sanctions

20 ANNEX

August 2nd Annan resigns as special envoy

August 17th Lakhdar Brahimi is appointed joint UN-LAS special envoy

October 24th Four-day cease-fire marking Eid al-Adha is brokered, taking effect on October 26th

November 11th Syrian National Coalition is formed under pressure to make the Syrian NationalCouncil more inclusive

December 6th Brahimi convenes meeting with US secretary of state and Russian foreign minister inDublin

December 9th Brahimi convenes meeting with Russian deputy foreign minister and US deputysecretary of state in Geneva; they meet again in Geneva on January 11, 2013

2013April 18th Security Council reaches agreement and issues non-binding statement condemning

violence

May 7th US secretary of state and Russian foreign minister meet in Moscow, agreeing tojointly push for a transitional government

September 27th Security Council adopts Resolution 2118, requiring Syria to destroy its chemicalweapons and endorsing the Geneva Communiqué

2014January 22nd First round of Geneva II Conference begins

February 15th Second round of Geneva II Conference ends

May 13th Brahimi resigns as special envoy

May 22nd Russia and China veto Security Council resolution referring Syria to theInternational Criminal Court (ICC)

June 3rd Assad wins a third seven-year term in presidential elections

MEDIATION IN YEMEN

2011January Demonstrations against the regime begin in Taiz and Sanaa

President Ali Abdullah Saleh promises not to extend his presidency in 2013 or tohand over power to his son

March 18th Government snipers kill more than fifty demonstrators as demonstrations grow inintensity

April Jamal Benomar is appointed as the secretary-general’s special adviser on Yemen andmakes his first visit to the country

June 3rd Saleh is injured in an attack on the presidential compound and is later flown to SaudiArabia, returning home in September

ANNEX 21

22

September 24th Security Council issues a statement urging an end to violence and implementation ofa “Yemeni-led process of political transition, on the basis of the Gulf CooperationCouncil [GCC] Initiative”

October 21st Security Council Resolution 2014 urges Saleh’s departure

November 23rd President Saleh agrees to hand over power to his deputy, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi

December 10th National unity government with a prime minister from the opposition is sworn in

2012February 25th Hadi is sworn in as president the day after winning a single-candidate election

2013March 18th National Dialogue Conference (NDC) launches with 565 participants

September 18th NDC continues, despite reaching the end of its official time frame

2014January 21st NDC ends with an agreement after ten months of deliberation

February 10th Presidential panel gives approval for Yemen to become a federation of six regions aspart of its political transition

September 2nd President Hadi dismisses his government and promises to review a controversial fuelprice rise following two weeks of anti-government protests in which Houthi rebelsare heavily involved

September 21st Houthi militants, seizing on growing discontentment with talks the group claims arenot inclusive, begin taking control of Yemen’s capital, Sanaa

2015January 5th Houthis reject the draft constitution proposed by government

January 20th As talks on the constitution break down, Houthis seize the presidential palace

January 23rd President Hadi and his cabinet resign in protest, and Hadi is placed under housearrest

February 6th Houthis appoint presidential council to replace President Hadi

February 21st Hadi flees to the southern city of Aden and rescinds his resignation

March Houthi rebels start to advance toward southern Yemen, and President Hadi fleesAden

Saudi-led coalition of Gulf Arab states launches air strikes against Houthi targets andimposes naval blockade

April 15th Benomar steps down

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