Ltd Cases Hw3

7/31/2019 Ltd Cases Hw3

1/67

1 | L T D C a s e s H W 3

01 Director of Lands vs CA & Abistado 2

02 Roxas vs CA 7

03 Republic vs Marasigan 13

04 Roxas vs Enriquez 18

05 Reoublic vs CA & Ribaya 33

06 Republic vs Register of Deeds of Quezon 40

07 Director of Lands vs Medina 45

08 Esconde vs Barlongay 50

09 Director of Lands vs Agustin 55

10 Director of Lands LMB vs CA 56

11 Valisno vs Plan 62


2/67


G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997.*

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS andTEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA,

MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO,

respondents.

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; Appeals; Petition for Review; Where a party

appeals a final disposition of the Court of Appeals, his remedy is a petition based on Rule 45,

not Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General

thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioners counsel anchored his

petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is

appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one

for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65.

Same; Same; Land Registration; Publications; Absent any publication in a newspaper of

general circulation, the land registration court cannot validly confirm and register the title of

the applicant.Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical t erms that

publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration

court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of

general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and register the title of

private respondents. We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the

demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the publication

requirement.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The word shall denote s an imperative

and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute; If mailing of notices is essential, then

by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative

where the law includes such requirement in its detailed provision.The law used the term

shall in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the

latters receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an

imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. While concededly such

literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately

depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must

be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan, the Court through

Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD No. 1529 requires notice of the

initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be

complied with. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed

in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per

Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land.

Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a

newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such

requirement in its detailed provision.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Actions in Rem; An in rem proceeding is

validated essentially through publication; The elementary norms of due process require that

before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the

applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.It should be notedfurther that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires

constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or

interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication.

This being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be

interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting an

application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking

the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive

evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same

situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of realty. He must prove his title against

the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all

persons concernednay, the whole worldwho have rights to or interests in the subject

property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why theapplication should not be granted. The elementary norms of due process require that before the

claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant,

said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Official Gazette; The Official Gazette is not as

widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that

the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all; The all-

encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders

issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a

manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication,

mailing and posting.It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation

should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in theOfficial Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied

with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is

not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation,

such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all.

Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not

own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration

cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of

disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of

the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Time and again, the Supreme Court has declared that where

the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,


3/67


vacillation or equivocationthere is room only for application.Admittedly, there was failure

to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private respondents did not

proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows

no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory

requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has

declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for

interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no

alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be

dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shallhave been duly complied with.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Apollo T. Tria for private respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land

registration case mandatory or directory?

Statement of the Case

The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure

to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant

the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petitionto set aside the Decision1 promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent

Resolution2 promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of

Appeals3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged

Decision reads:4

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed

from is hereby set aside, and a new one entered confirming the registration

and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7,

Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by

Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado,

represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of

Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under

MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.

The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor

are hereby dismissed for want of evidence.

Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due

on this land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be issued.

The Facts

On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition

for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under

Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.5 The application was docketed as Land

Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional

Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.6 However, during the

pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirsMargarita, Marissa,

Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistadorepresented by their

aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were

substituted as applicants.

The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the

petition for want of jurisdiction. However, it found that the applicants through

their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and

peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.

In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:7

x x x. However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the

provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the

notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. E) in a newspaper of general circulation in thePhilippines. Exhibit E was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits F

and G). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has not

legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance

with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial

hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.

The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982,

which in its pertinent portion provides:8

It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD

1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the provision ofthe aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is


4/67


jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of

the same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but

also in a newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor

the other is dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is

indispensably necessary because without it, the court would be powerless to

assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration case. As to the second,

publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a newspaper of general

circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of procedural dueprocess; otherwise, any decision that the court may promulgate in the case

would be legally infirm.

Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals

which, as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and

ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.

The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA

Resolution dated November 19, 1991.

The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this

recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioners counsel anchored his

petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45

because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we

shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari

under Rule 65.9

The Issue

Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse

of discretion10 in holding

x x x that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86need not be published in a newspaper of general circulation, and in not

dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.

Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial

hearing shall be published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of

general circulation. According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette

is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and x x x in x x x a

newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due

process.11

Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the

requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere

procedural defect. They add that publication in the Official Gazette is

sufficient to confer jurisdiction.12

In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals

ruled:13

x x x although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in anewspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be

gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in the

Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.

Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the

opportunity to explain matters fully and present their side. Thus, it justified its

disposition in this wise:14

x x x We do not see how t he lack of compliance with the required procedure

prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other requirements of: publication

in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at the site andother conspicuous places, were complied with and these are sufficient to

notify any party who is minded to make any objection of the application for

registration.

The Courts Ruling

We find for petitioner.

Newspaper Publication Mandatory

The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiringpublication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc.The court shall, within five

days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of

the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than

ninety days from the date of the order.

The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land

registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.

1. By publication.


5/67


Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the

Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be

published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general

circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the

Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said

notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the

land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and to all whom

it may concern. Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appearin court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said

application shall not be granted.

x x x x x x x x x

Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that

publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land

registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any

publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court

can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.

We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the

demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the

publication requirement.

The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the

Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order

setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and

thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute.15 While concededly such

literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import

ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the

present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning.In Republic vs. Marasigan,16 the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide,

Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by

means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be

complied with. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would

not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all

persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include

owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land. Indeed, if mailing

of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper

of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such

requirement in its detailed provision.

It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem.17

Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as

against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the

property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication.

This being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons

who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be

barred from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has

been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the landregistration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only

his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same

situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of realty.18 He must

prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the

applicant, can best be achieved when all persons concernednay, the whole

worldwho have rights to or interests in the subject property are notified and

effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the application should

not be granted. The elementary norms of due process require that before the

claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name

of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should

be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in

the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have

already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process

and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as

newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices

published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all.

Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and

may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem

nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued

against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as

wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the

requirements for publication, mailing and posting.

Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication

requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if

they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no

excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such

mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time

and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and

categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation orequivocation; there is room only for application.19 There is no alternative.


6/67


Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be

dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal

requisites shall have been duly complied with.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and

Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private

respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), On leave.

Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside. Application

for land registration dismissed without prejudice.

Notes.Publication should precede the date of initial hearing, and where the

issue of the Official Gazette where the notice was published was released

only after the initial hearing, the court did not properly acquire jurisdiction overthe case. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 442 [1994]) The

Supreme Court has consistently accepted the probative value of certifications

of the Director of the National Printing Office in reconstitution casesand

there is no reason for it to deviate from its earlier rulings and to require now

the submission of Official Gazette issues to satisfy the jurisdictional

requirement. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 551 [1995])

o0o

Copyright 2012 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. [Director of

Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 276(1997)]


7/67


G.R. No. 118436. March 21, 1997.*

HEIRS OF MANUEL A. ROXAS and TRINIDAD DE LEON VDA. DE ROXAS

(in substitution of original petitioner), petitioners, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and MAGUESUN MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, respondents.

Actions; Courts; Land Registration; Fraud; The right of a person deprived of land or of any

estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud isrecognized by law [Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529] as valid and legal basis for

reopening and revising a decree of registration.Registra-tion of untitled land under the

Torrens System is done pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration

Decree which amended and codified laws relative to registration of property. Adjudication of

land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not become final and incontrovertible until the

expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree. Before such time, the decision remains

under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after

hearing, may set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another party.

Absence, minority or other disability of any person affected, or any proceeding in court for

reversing judgments, are not considered grounds to reopen or revise said decree. However, the

right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or

confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law (Section 32 of Presidential

Decree No. 1529) as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration.

It is further required that a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration be

filed within one year from the date of entry of said decree, that the petitioner has a real and

dominical right and the property has not yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser.

Words and Phrases; Actual Fraud; Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional

deception practiced by means of misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact.

Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public

interests and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done or committed with an

actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.Fraud is of two kinds:

actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception

practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Constructive

fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public interests and public

or private confidence, even though the act is not done or committed with an actual design to

commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.

Same; Same.Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic

where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts

constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein, and is regarded as extrinsic

where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or

where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which

it is procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. Extrinsic fraud is also

actual fraud, but collateral to the transaction sued upon.

Land Registration; Fraud; The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or

extrinsic fraud has been accepted as grounds for judgment to be annulled or, as in this case, a

decree of registration reopened and reviewed.The distinctions are significant because only

actual fraud or extrinsic fraud has been accepted as grounds for a judgment to be annulled or,

as in this case, a decree of registration reopened and reviewed. In the oft-cited Macabingkil v.

Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation case, the Court drew from American

jurisprudence stating that relief has been granted on the ground that, by some fraud practiced

directly upon the party seeking relief against the judgment or decree, (and) that party has been

prevented from presenting all of his case to the court. The fraud contemplated by the law inthis case (Section 32, P.D. No. 1529) is actual and extrinsic, which includes an intentional

omission of fact required by law. For fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic

or collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the

case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. Persons who were fraudulently

deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case are entitled to a

review of a decree of registration.

Same; Same; Failure and intentional omission of the applicants to disclose the fact of actual

physical possession by another person constitutes an allegation of actual fraud. Likewise, it is

fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a

third person.In Ramirez v. CA, this Court adopted the Court of Appeals ruling that the

suppression of the fact that the applicant spouses possessed the subject ricefield merely asantichretic creditors and the fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation in the application

that no other persons had any claim or interest in the said land, constitute specific allegations

of extrinsic fraud supported by competent proof. Failure and intentional omission of the

applicants to disclose the fact of actual physical possession by another person constitutes an

allegation of actual fraud. Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which

benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person.

PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.



8/67


Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioners.

Briccio P. Contreras for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:

Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas, substituted by her heirs,1 instituted thispetition for review of the Court of Appeals decision dated December 8, 1994 in

Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management and

Development Corporation, (CA G.R. CV No. 38328), alleging reversible error

committed by respondent appellate court when it affirmed the decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Cavite. The issue presented before us is whether or

not private respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in

obtaining a decree of registration over two unregistered parcels of land in

Tagaytay City, actual fraud being the only ground to reopen or review a

decree of registration.

The facts of the case are narrated below:

On July 2, 1990, herein private respondent Maguesun Management and

Development Corporation (Maguesun Corporation) filed an Application for

Registration of two parcels of unregistered land located in Barangay Sungay,

Tagaytay City (Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre) with an

area of 3,641 and 10,674 square meters respectively. The original registration

case was docketed as Case No. TG-373 before the Regional Trial Court of

Cavite, Branch 18, presided over by Judge Julieto Tabiolo. In support of its

application for registration, Maguesun Corporation presented a Deed of

Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990, executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor

and indicating the purchase price to be P170,000.00. Zenaida Melliza in turn,bought the property from the original petitioner herein, Trinidad de Leon vda.

de Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half months earlier, as evidenced by a

Deed of Sale dated March 26, 1990 and an Affidavit of Self -Adjudication dated

March 24, 1990.

Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority (the

National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Authority or NALTDRA) to Hilario

Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna on the basis of Maguesun Corporations

application for registration. Since Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not

named as an adjoining owner, occupant or adverse claimant, she was not

sent a notice of the proceedings. Publication was made in the Official Gazette

and the Record Newsweekly.2 After an Order of general default was issued,

the trial court proceeded to hear the land registration case. On October 4,

1990, the Land Registration Authority reported, among other things, that the

subject parcels of land had previously been applied for registration in Land

Registration Case No. 500, GLRO Record No. 55072 at the Court of First

Instance of Cavite by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon but no decision

has been rendered thereon.3 Eventually, on February 13, 1991 the Regional

Trial Court granted Maguesun Corporations application for registration (Land

Registration Case No. TG-373) in a three-page decision with the following

dispositive portion:4

WHEREFORE, this Court gives imprimatur to the application for registration

of said lands described in plan As-04-000108, Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, one

with an area of 3,641 and the other with an area of 10,674 square meters, as

supported and shown by the corresponding technical descriptions now

forming part of the records, in the name of Maguesun Management and

Development Corporation, with office address at 521 Edsa, Quezon City, free

from all liens and encumbrances and from any other adverse claims of any

kind and nature.

Upon finality of this Decision, the same ipso facto becomes executory, upon

which eventuality the corresponding decree of registration may thus be

issued.

SO ORDERED.

Consequently, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order for Issuance of the

Decree on March 14, 1991, after the aforementioned Decision in LRC No. TG-

373 became final5 but not before it ordered, on February 14, 1991, Land

Registration Case No. 500 (GLRO Record No. 55072) applied for by Manuel

A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon, dismissed.

It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the

land that petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas learned of its sale and the

registration of the lots in Maguesun Corporations name.

Hence, on April 21, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for review before the

Regional Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1183 to set aside the

decree of registration on the ground that Maguesun Corporation committed

actual fraud. She alleged that the lots were among the properties she

inherited from her husband, former President Manuel A. Roxas, who died on

April 15, 1946 and that her family had been in open, continuous, adverse and


9/67


uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the concept of owner for

more than thirty years before they applied for its registration under the Torrens

System of land titling. Petitioner further denied that she sold the lots to

Zenaida Melliza whom she had never met before and that her signature was

forged in both the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. In

support of her claims, she also listed a number of irregularities in the

documents to prove actual fraud. In addition, and perhaps more significantly,

she claimed that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted her name as an

adverse claimant, occupant or adjoining owner in the application for

registration submitted to the Land Registration Authority such that the latter

could not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing. As a result, an order of general

default was issued and Maguesun Corporations application for registration

was granted. She charged Maguesun Corporation with knowledge or

authorship of the fraud owing to the fact that Maguesun Corporations

president, Manolita Guevarra Suntay after whom the corporation was named,

was her niece. Manolita Suntay is the daughter of Lourdes Guevarra Suntay,

a deceased cousin of petitioner Vda. de Roxas who used to help with the

latters business affairs. Manolita Suntay used to take care of the regis tration

and insurance of the latters cars.6

The sole issue of the case, as laid down by the trial court after the pre-trial,

was whether or not Vda. de Roxas signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale

and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication in favor of Zenaida Melliza were forged.7

Petitioner, who was then already 92 years of age, testified in open court on

February 11, 1992 that she has never met Zenaida Melliza, that she did not

sell the subject lots and that her signatures on the Deed of Sale and Affidavit

of Self-Adjudication were forged.8 A document examiner from the Philippine

National Police (PNP) concluded that there was no forgery.9 Upon petitioners

motion, the signatures were reexamined by another expert from the National

Bureau of Investigation. The latter testified that the signatures on the

questioned and sample documents were not written by the same person.10

Despite the foregoing testimonies and pronouncements, the trial court

dismissed the petition for review of decree of registration on April 15, 1992.11

Placing greater weight on the findings and testimony of the PNP document

examiner, it concluded that the questioned documents were not forged and if

they were, it was Zenaida Melliza, and not Maguesun Corporation, who was

responsible. Accordingly, Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud.

The court further noted that petitioner Mrs. Trinidad Roxas had not been

paying taxes for several years, which fact exhibited what appeared to be

unmistakeable signs of not actually owning (the lots) any more, and that herapplication for registration was previously dismissed and abandoned, thus

indicating that petitioner herself is aware that she had already lost x x x

interest, if not actually her rights, over the property in question.12

In a decision dated December 8, 1994,13 respondent court denied the petition

for review and affirmed the findings of the trial court. The Court of Appeals

held that petitioner failed to demonstrate that there was actual or extrinsic

fraud, not merely constructive or intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite for purposes of

annulling a judgment or reviewing a decree of registration. Additionally,

respondent court stated that the discrepancies or irregularities in the Deed of

Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pointed out by petitioner are not patent

or obvious, involve matters that are too trivial, requiring knowledge of the

intricacies of the law and are not necessarily and exclusively indicia of

extrinsic fraud and/or bad faithespecially when considered in the light of

circumstances hereinafter discussed. The records also show, according to

the appellate court, that Maguesun Corporation had not concealed from the

court either the existence of petitioner or any interest she may have had in the

registration proceedings. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that publication of

the initial hearing in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon

the court.14

Hence, the instant petition for review where it is alleged that the Court of

Appeals erred in ruling that Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual

fraud warranting the setting aside of the registration decree and in resolving

the appeal on the basis of Maguesun Corporations good faith. Petitioners

pray that the registration of the subject lots in the name of Maguesun

Corporation be cancelled, that said property be adjudicated in favor of

petitioners and that respondent corporation pay moral damages not less than

P100,000.00, exemplary damages not less than P36,000.00 and attorneys

fees of P60,000.00.

We find the petition for review impressed with merit.

1. Registration of untitled land under the Torrens System is done pursuant to

Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree which

amended and codified laws relative to registration of property.15 Adjudication

of land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not become final and

incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the final

decree. Before such time, the decision remains under the control and sound

discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may set

aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another party.16

Absence, minority or other disability of any person affected, or any proceeding


10/67

10 | L T D C a s e s H W 3

in court for reversing judgments, are not considered grounds to reopen or

revise said decree. However, the right of a person deprived of land or of any

estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by

actual fraud is recognized by law (Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529)

as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of

registration.17 It is further required that a petition for reopening and review of

the decree of registration be filed within one year from the date of entry of said

decree, that the petitioner has a real and dominical right and the property has

not yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser.18

Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds

from an intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or

concealment of a material fact.19 Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud

because of its detrimental effect upon public interest and public or private

confidence, even though the act is not done or committed with an actual

design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.20

Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic

where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or

where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein,

and is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or

from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters

pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured,

so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy.21 Extrinsic fraud is

also actual fraud, but collateral to the transaction sued upon.22

The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or extrinsic fraud has

been accepted as grounds for a judgment to be annulled or, as in this case, a

decree of registration reopened and reviewed.23 In the oft-cited Macabingkil

v. Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation case, the Court drew fromAmerican jurisprudence stating that relief has been granted on the ground

that, by some fraud practiced directly upon the party seeking relief against the

judgment or decree, (and) that party has been prevented from presenting all

of his case to the court.24 The fraud contemplated by the law in this case

(Section 32, P.D. No. 1529) is actual and extrinsic, which includes an

intentional omission of fact required by law.25 For fraud to justify a review of a

decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts upon which it is based

have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment

sought to be annulled was rendered.26 Persons who were fraudulently

deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case are

entitled to a review of a decree of registration.

In Ramirez v. CA,27 this Court adopted the Court of Appeals ruling that the

suppression of the fact that the applicant spouses possessed the subject

ricefield merely as antichretic creditors and the fraudulent concealment and

misrepresentation in the application that no other persons had any claim or

interest in the said land, constitute specific allegations of extrinsic fraud

supported by competent proof. Failure and intentional omission of the

applicants to disclose the fact of actual physical possession by another person

constitutes an allegation of actual fraud.28 Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly

omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a

third person.29

The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual

fraud in obtaining the decree of registration sought to be reviewed by

petitioner.

Petitioner Vda. de Roxas contended that Maguesun Corporation intentionally

omitted her name, or that of the Roxas family, as having a claim to or as an

occupant of the subject property. In the corporations application for

registration filed with the trial court in LRC No. TG-373, the following

declaration appears:

6. That the names in full and addresses, as far as known to the undersigned,

of the owners of all adjoining properties; of the persons mentioned in

paragraphs 3 and 5 (mortgagors, encumbrancers, and occupants) and of the

person shown on the plan as claimants are as follows:

Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City (no

house No.).30

The highlighted words are typed in with a different typewriter, with the first five

letters of the word provincial typed over correction fluid. Maguesun

Corporation, however, annexed a differently-worded application for the

petition to review case (Civil Case No. TG-1183, Trinidad de Leon Vda. de

Roxas v. Maguesun Management and Development Corporation, et al.). In

the copy submitted to the trial court, the answer to the same number is as

follows:

Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Roxas31.

The discrepancy which is unexplained appears intentional. If the word Roxas

were indeed erased and replaced with Pro-vincial Road all at Tagaytay City

(no house No.) in the original application submitted in LRC No. TG-373 but


11/67

11 | L T D C a s e s H W 3

the copy with the word Roxas was submitted to the trial court in Civil Case

No. TG-1183, it is reasonable to assume that the reason is to mislead the

court into thinking that Roxas was placed in the original application as an

adjoining owner, encum-brancer, occupant or claimant, the same application

which formed the basis for the Land Registration Authority in sending out

notices of initial hearing. Section 15 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 also

requires the applicant for registration to state the full names and addresses of

all occupants of the land and those of adjoining owners, if known and if not

known, the extent of the search made to find them. Respondent corporation

likewise failed to comply with this requirement of law.

The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the property

uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez.32 Respondent

Maguesun Corporation also declared in number 5 of the same application that

the subject land was unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family

caretaker resided in the subject property. Respondent corporation is likewise

charged with the knowledge of such possession and occupancy, for its

President, who signed the Deed of Sale over the property, knew fully well that

her grandaunt Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas owned the property. It isreasonable to expect her as a buyer to have inspected the property prior to

the sale such that the ascertainment of the current possessors or occupants

could have been made facilely. Respondent corpora tions intentional

concealment and representation of peti-tioners interest in the subject lots as

possessor, occupant and claimant constitutes actual fraud justifying the

reopening and review of the decree of registration. Through such

misfeasance, the Roxas family was kept ignorant of the registration

proceedings involving their property, thus effectively depriving them of their

day in court.

2. Respondent Court of Appeals held that Maguesun Corporation had notconcealed from the court either the existence of Trinidad de Leon Vda. de

Roxas or any interest she may have in the registration proceedings for the

records are replete with references by Maguesun Corporation itself to

petitioner.33 Mention of the late Presidents name as well as that of petitioner

was made principally in the Formal Offer of Exhibits for respondent

corporation, in a Copy of Plan of Lots 7231 and 7239, tax declarations and as

predecessor-in-interest. However, this is not sufficient compliance with what

the law requires to be stated in the application for registration. Disclosure of

petitioners adverse interest, occupation and possession should be made at

the appropriate time, i.e., at the time of the application for registration,

otherwise, the persons concerned will not be sent notices of the initial hearing

and will, therefore, miss the opportunity to present their opposition or claims.

3. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing was made in the Official Gazette

and in the Record Newsweekly, admittedly not a newspaper of general

circulation. The Court of Appeals held that pursuant to Section 23 of

Presidential Decree No. 1529, publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to

confer jurisdiction. Said provision of law expressly states that the



circulation in the Philippines. Provided, however, that the publication in the

Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. x x x

While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer

jurisdiction upon the court, publication in a newspaper of general circulation

remains an indispensable procedural requirement. Couched in mandatory

terms, it is a component of procedural due process and aimed at giving as

wide publicity as possible so that all persons having an adverse interest in

the land subject of the registration proceedings may be notified thereof.34

Although jurisdiction of the court is not affected, the fact that publication was

not made in a newspaper of general circulation is material and relevant in

assessing the applicants right or title to the land.

4. The allegations of forgery and the discrepancies in the documentary, as

well as in the testimonial evidence regarding this issue which are all crucial to

this case, compelled the Court to undertake a careful review of the facts of the

case.35 A close scrutiny of the evidence on record leads the Court to the

irresistible conclusion that forgery was indeed attendant in the case at bar.

Although there is no proof of respondent Maguesun Corporations direct

participation in the execution and preparation of the forged instruments, thereare sufficient indicia which proves that Maguesun Corporation is not the

innocent purchaser for value who merits the protection of the law.

In response to the questions fielded by the trial court and by counsel for

petitioner, PNP Document Examiner Zacarias Semacio sought to explain all

the differences pointed out in the questioned signatures and in the sample

signatures as having been caused merely by natural variation.36 He

concluded that the questioned signatures were not forged. In contrast, Chief

of the Questioned Documents Division of the National Bureau of Investigation,

Arcadio Ramos, testified with more specificity as befits an expert that the

questioned and sample signatures were not written by one and the same


12/67

12 | L T D C a s e s H W 3

person because of (t)he manner of execution of strokes; the personalized

proportional characteristics of letters; the link-ing/connecting between letters;

the structural pattern of letters and other minute details x x x.37 Moreover,

petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas categorically declared that she has

never met Zenaida Melliza and did not sell the subject property.38 Petitioner,

then over ninety years old, has no motive to attest to a falsehood. Petitioner

and her family also own several other pieces of property, some of which are

leased out as restaurants, e.g. Leos Res taurant and Ma Mon Luk

Restaurant.39 This is an indication that petitioner is not unaware of the value

of her properties. Hence, it is unlikely that she would sell over thirteen

thousand square meters of prime property in Tagaytay City to a stranger for a

measly P200,000.00. Finally, even to a laymans eye, the documents, as well

as the enlarged photographic exhibit of the signatures, reveal forgery. The

questioned signatures taken from the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-

Adjudication are starkly different from the sample signatures in several

documents executed by petitioner. The questioned signatures are smooth and

rounded and have none of the jagged and shaky character of petitioners

signatures, characteristic of the penmanship of elderly persons.

There are also added considerations reflective of the dubious character of the

Affidavit of Self-Adjudication purportedly executed by petitioner.40 In it she

declares that she is a resident of 22 8th Street, New Manila, Quezon City,

when she actually lives in 2 Park Road, North Forbes Park, Makati. She also

states that she is the sole heir of the late Manuel De Roxas who died

sometime on the year 1944 at Manila. Petitioners husband is President

Manuel A. Roxas and she refers to herself as Trinidad de Leon Vda. de

Roxas. President Roxas was survived by petitioner and their two children, Ma.

Rosario Roxas and Gerardo Roxas (who predeceased petitioner). The fact

that petitioner was not the sole heir was known to the general public, as well

as the demise of the late President on April 15, 1946 while delivering a

speech at Clark Field, Pampanga. The aforementioned irregularities are too

glaring to have been ignored. If petitioner did in fact execute said Affidavit,

there is no reason why she should state facts other than the unadulterated

truth concerning herself and her family.

Additionally, Zenaida Mellizas non-appearance raises doubt as to her

existence. Her given address was Matina, Davao City. How was she related to

petitioner and what led her to purchase the subject property? Respondent

corporation could very well have presented her to prove the legitimacy of their

transaction. If petitioner were selling said property, would she not have offered

them first to interested relatives such as Manolita G. Suntay? Would an

ordinary person sell more than thirteen thousand square meters of prime

property for P170,000.00 when it was earlier purchased for P200,000.00?

These questions highlight several implausibilities in the alleged sale of the

subject property by herein petitioner. As Maguesun Corporations President

who is related to petitioner, Manolita G. Suntay should have verified the sale

of the subject property by Zenaida Melliza. Manolita G. Suntays closeness to

petitioner Vda. de Roxas, as one who even regis tered the latters car,

suggests acquaintance with the late petitioners properties as well as the

possibility that she took advantage of such knowledge.

From the foregoing, it is quite clear that respondent corporation cannot tack its

possession to that of petitioner as predecessor-in-interest. Zenaida Melliza

conveyed no title over the subject parcels of land to Maguesun Corporation as

she was not the owner thereof.41 Maguesun Corporation is thus not entitled

to the registration decree which the trial court granted in its decision. Palpably,

petitioner has not been interrupted in her more than thirty years of open,

uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious possession in the concept of an owner

over the subject lots by the irregular transaction to Zenaida Melliza. She

therefore retains title proper and sufficient for original registration over the twoparcels of land in question pursuant to Section 14 of Presidential Decree No.

1529.42

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 38328 (Trinidad de Leon Vda. de

Roxas v. Maguesun Management & Development Corporation, et al.)

promulgated on December 8, 1994 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

Accordingly, registration of title over the subject parcels of land, described in

Plan AS-04-000108, Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, with an area of 3,461 and

10,674 square meters, respectively, as shown and supported by the

corresponding technical descriptions now forming part of the Records of LRCNo. TG-373, is awarded to herein petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas

and her heirs, herein substituted as petitioners. Upon finality of this Decision,

the Land Registration Authority is hereby directed to ISSUE with reasonable

dispatch the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title

pursuant to Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Petition granted.


13/67

13 | L T D C a s e s H W 3

Note.The principle of indefeasibility of title is unavailing where there was

fraud that attended the issuance of the free patents and titles. (Meneses vs.

Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 162 [1995])

o0o

Copyright 2012 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. [Heirs ofManuel A. Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 309(1997)]

G.R. No. 85515. June 6, 1991.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. FLORENCIA

MARASIGAN, and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Land Registration; Reconstitution; Respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred

in affirming the order of the trial court granting the petition and in holding that

Section 13 has been at least impliedly amended by Section 23 in relation to

Section 110 of P.D. 1529.Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 has not been altered,

modified or amended. Since the requirement therein of service of notice of the

initial hearing to the adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land

was not complied with in this case, the court below did not, therefore, acquire

jurisdiction over the petition for the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title

No. 66062. Accordingly, the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in

affirming the Order of the trial court granting the petition and in holding that

said Section 13 has been at least impliedly amended by Section 23 in

relation to Section 110 of P.D. No. 1529 which took effect on 11 June 1978.

Same; Same; Same; View that Section 13 of RA No. 26 appears to have

been at least impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529 totallyunfounded.We further find to be totally unfounded the view of the Court of

Appeals that Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 appears to have been at least

impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529. There is absolutely

nothing in P.D. No. 1529 which intimates or suggests, indirectly or even

remotely, an intention to amend said Section 13.

Same; Same; Same; Requirements of Section 12 and 13 of R.A. No. 26

mandatory and jurisdictional.In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et

al., We ruled that the requirements of Section 12 and Section 13 of R.A. No.

26 are mandatory and jurisdictional and noncompliance therewith would

render all proceedings utterly null and void.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 23 of PD No. 1529 never meant to

dispense with the requirement of notice by mailing and by posting.This

proviso was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice by

mailing and by posting. What it simply means is that in so far as publication is

concerned, there is sufficient compliance if the notice is published in the

Official Gazette, although the law mandates that it be published once in the

Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the

Philippines. However, publication in the latter alone would not suffice. This is

to accord primacy to the official publication.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Argument of respondent Court of Appeals

that it would be unfair to impose upon the private respondent the duty to

comply with the requirement of service of notice unacceptable.The

belabored argument of respondent Court of Appeals that it would be unfair to

impose upon the private respondent the duty to comply with the requirement

of service of notice because it was not through her fault that the original copy

of the Transfer Certificate of Title was lost is unacceptable since the law does

not make any exception or exemptions; besides, it is, to say the least, a

ludicrous proposition. Equally unacceptable is the opinion of said Court that itwas the duty of the trial court to serve the required notices and private

respondent should not be prejudiced if it failed to do so. It suggests, quite

unfortunately, and gives the wrong impression that mandatory requirements of

notices may be dispensed with if the failure to comply with them is attributable

to the court. It likewise negates the principles of responsibility, integrity, loyalty

and efficiency which the Constitution directs public officials and employees to

faithfully observe. We should stress here that lapses on the part of courts or

their personnel cannot be made a reason or a justification for non-observance

of laws. By the very nature of their functions, they should be the first to obey

the laws.

PETITION for review by certiorari from the decision and resolution of the

Court of Appeals. Melo, J.


The Solicitor General for petitioner.

J. Renato V. Leviste for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:


14/67

14 | L T D C a s e s H W 3

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside

the Decision of 29 August 19881 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No.

15163 2 and its Resolution of 18 October 19883 which, respectively, affirmed

the Order of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Fourth

Judicial Region, of 17 June 19874 granting the petition of private respondent

for the reconstitution of the original and the owners duplicate copies of a

transfer certificate of title despite lack of service of notices to adjoining owners

and the actual occupants of the land, and denied petitioners motion for the

reconsideration of the Decision.5

The issue in this petition is whether notices to adjoining owners and the actual

occupants of the land are mandatory and jurisdictional in judicial reconstitution

of certificates of title.

On 4 November 1986 private respondent, claiming to be one of the heirs of

Epifania Alcano, registered owner of a parcel of land located in Canubing,

Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, containing an area of 33,294 square meters, and

covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in the Registry of Deeds

of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, filed a petition for the reconstitution of the

original and duplicate copy (sic) of the said Transfer Certificate of Title on the

basis of the owners duplicate copy.6 She alleged therein that she is in

possession of the title subject matter of the petition but she, however, did not

allege the reason why she asked for the reconstitution.

In its Order of 4 November 1986 the trial court set the petition for hearing and

required its publication in the Official Gazette, which was done. Required

notices, except to the adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land,

were given.

Upon prior authority of the trial court, reception of private respondents

evidence was made by the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court. Thereafter, on 17 June

1987, the trial court handed down an Order7 which made the following

findings of facts:

From the evidence adduced by the petitioner, it appears that she is one of

the vendees of a certain parcel of land s ituated in Malamig, Calapan, Oriental

Mindoro, containing an area of 33,294 square meters, embraced in and

covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 and registered in the

name of Epifania Alcano (Exh. B) as evidenced by a document of sale

executed by the registered owner (Exh. I). The origina l copy of said title

which was usually kept in the Office of the Register of Deeds of this province

was destroyed by reason of the fire which razed to the ground the entire

Capitol Building then housing said office on August 12, 1977 (Exh. C). It

appears further that there are no co-owners, mortgagees, lessees duplicate

copy of said certificate of title which had been previously issued by the

Register of Deeds of this province; that the petitioner is in actual possession

of the area of 16,647 square meters which was sold to her and that she is

benefitting from the produce of the improvements existing on the area

belonging to her.

and disquisition:

Accordingly, finding the instant petition to be well-founded and there being no

opposition to its approval, same is hereby granted. The Register of Deeds of

this province is hereby directed to reconstitute the original and the owners

duplicate copies of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in the name of the

registered owners (sic) thirty days after receipt of this Order by the Register of

Deeds of this province and the Commissioner of the Land Registration

Commission, on the basis of the existing owners duplicate copy thereof.

Petitioner herein, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed from

said Order to the Court of Appeals and made the following assignment of

errors:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUIRING JURISDICTION OVER THE

INSTANT PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL AND THE

OWNERS DUPLICATE COPIES OF TCT NO. T-66062 WITHOUT THE

REQUISITE SERVICE OF NOTICE OF HEARING TO THE ADJOINING

OWNERS AND ACTUAL OCCUPANTS OF THE LAND AS REQUIRED BY

SECTION 13 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 26.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR

RECONSTITUTION.8

The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163.

In support of the first assigned error, petitioner maintained that the

requirement of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 is not only mandatory but

jurisdictional as held in MWSS vs. Sison, et al., 124 SCRA 394.

In its Decision of 29 August 19889 respondent Court of Appeals brushed

aside the arguments of petitioner and held that:


15/67

15 | L T D C a s e s H W 3

1) Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 which requires the sending out of notices to the

adjoining owners and actual occupants to vest jurisdiction, appears to have

been at least impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529 because it

is inconsistent with Section 23 of said Decree which provides that in original

registration cases publication of notices of initial hearing in the Official Gazette

is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court. Section 110 of said Decree

provides:

SEC. 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens Title.

Original copies of certificates of title lost or destroyed in offices of Register of

Deeds as well as liens and encumbrances affecting such titles shall be

reconstituted judicially in accordance with the procedure prescribed in

Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not inconsistent with this Decree. (emphasis

supplied)

2) The MWSS vs. Sison case is not on all fours with the instant case for in the

former both the original and the owners duplicate copies of the certificate of

title were claimed to be lost, unlike in the instant case where the duplicate

copy is intact; it was not shown that the original copy in the custody of the

Register of Deeds was destroyed; the copies of the titles alleged to have been

lost were later found intact in the names of other persons; and, more

importantly, the Petition was not published in the Official Gazette but in the

Manila Daily Bulletin, unlike in the instant case.

3) The duty to send notices to adjoining owners and actual occupants is

imposed upon the court, not the party filing the petition for reconstitution

(herein private respondent); any lapse in regard thereto should not prejudice

or injure the latter.

4) Finally, in the instant case, the private respondent cannot be blamed for the

loss of the original copy of the transfer certificate of title; it was lost by reason

of the burning of the Capitol Building; she should not, therefore, be put to

trouble, anxiety and expenses.

Petitioners motion to reconsider the Decision having been denied by the

Court of Appeals in its Resolution of 18 October 1988, petitioner filed the

instant petition on 22 December 1988 alleging therein that:

a. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals acted contrary to law when it

did not consider that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the instant

petition for reconstitution of the original owners (sic) duplicate copies of TCT

No. 66062 as there is no requisite service of notice of hearing to the adjoining

owners and actual occupants of the land as required by Section 13 of R.A.

No. 26;

b. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals acted contrary to law in

granting the petition for reconstitution of the original and duplicate copies of

TCT No. 66062.

In Our resolution of 16 January 1989,10 We required the respondents to

comment on the petition. Private respondent filed her comment on 10February 1989.11 She practically copied therein the questioned decision of

respondent Court of Appeals.

In Our resolution of 15 March 1989 We gave due course to the petition and

required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda,

which petitioner complied with on 3 July 198912 and private respondent on 10

June 1989.13

The petition is impressed with merit.

The questioned Decision of 29 August 1988 and the Resolution of 18 October1988 of respondent Court of Appeals, as well as the Order of Branch 39 of the

Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro of 17 June 1987, must be set aside.

Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 has not been altered, modified or amended. Since

the requirement therein of service of notice of the initial hearing to the

adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land was not complied with

in this case, the court below did not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction over the

petition for the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66062.

Accordingly, the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the

Order of the trial court granting the petition and in holding that said Section 13

has been at least impliedly amended by Section 23 in relation to Section 110of P.D. No. 1529 which took effect on 11 June 1978.

In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,14 We ruled that the

requirements of Section 12 and Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 reading as follows:

SEC. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2

(c), 2 (d), 2 (e), 2 (f), 3 (c), 3 (e) and/or 3 (f) of this Act, shall be filed with the

proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any

person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain,

among other things, the following: (a) that the owners duplicate of the

certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owners


16/67

16 | L T D C a s e s H W 3

mortgagees or lessees duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been

issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and

boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or

improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the

names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e)

the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the

property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may

have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the

encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no

deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for

registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not been

accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to

be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be

attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the

reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2

(f) or 3 (f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan and

technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General

Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from

a prior certificate of title covering the same property.

SEC. 13. The court shall cause a notice of petition, filed under the preceding

section, to be published, at the expense of the petition, twice in successive

issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the

provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in

which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The

court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or

otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein

whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said

notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed

certificates of title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the name of

the occupants or person in possession of the property, the owner of the

adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and

boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any

interest therein must appear and file their claim or objection to the petition.

The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting

and service of the notice as directed by the court.

are mandatory and jurisdictional and non-compliance therewith would render

all proceedings utterly null and void. We reiterated this rule in Tahanan

Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.15 where, in respect

particularly to the required notice to an adjoining owner, We categorically

declared:

The failure or omission to notify Tahanan as the owner, possessor or

occupant of property adjacent to Lot 2 or as claimant or person having

interest, title or claim to a substantial portion (about 9 hectares more or less)

of Lot 2, as well as the failure or omission to post copies of the Notice of

Hearing on the main entrance of the municipality (sic) on which the land is

situated, at the provincial building and at the municipal building thereat, are

fatal to the acquisition and exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.

In MWSS vs. Sison et al., supra., We further re-affirmed the foregoing

doctrine:

The publication of the petition in two successive issues of the Official

Gazette, the service of the notice of hearing to the adjoining owners and

actual occupants of the land, as well as the posting of the notices in the main

entrance of the provincial and municipal buildings where the property lies at

least 30 days prior to the date of the hearing, as prescribed by Section 13 of

the law, are mandatory and jurisdictional requisites.

This re-affirmation is clear enough as to leave no room for any convoluted

logic to support a sophistic distinction between said case and the instant case

and an implausible interpretation of the law.

We further find to be totally unfounded the view of the Court of Appeals that

Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 appears to have been at least impliedly amended

by Presidential Decree No. 1529. There is absolutely nothing in P.D. No.

1529 which intimates or suggests, indirectly or even remotely, an intention to

amend said Section 13. The Court of Appeals either misapprehended or read

out of context that portion of Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 reading as follows:

x x x that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer

jurisdiction upon the court.

Worse, it committed a serious blunder when it used this clause to support its

proposition of implied amendment of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 by virtue of

Section 110 of the Decree.

Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 is entitled Notice of initial hearing, publication,

etc. and provides, inter alia, that:


17/67

17 | L T D C a s e s H W 3

The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land

registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.

As regards publication, it specifically provides:

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the



circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in theOfficial Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. x x x

This proviso was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice by

mailing and by posting. What it simply means is that in so far as publication is

concerned, there is sufficient compliance if the notice is published in the

Official Gazette, although the law mandates that it be published once in the

Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the

Philippines. However, publication in the latter alone would not suffice. This is

to accord primacy to the official publication.

That such proviso was never meant to dispense with the other modes ofgiving notice, which remain mandatory and jurisdictional, is obvious from

Section 23 itself. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would

not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all

persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include

owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land.

The above view of the Court of Appeals negates one of the principal purposes

of the Decree, which is clearly expressed in its exordium, namely, to

strengthen the Torrens System through safeguards to prevent anomalous

titling of real property. It opens wide the doors to fraud and irregularities in

land registration proceedings and in proceedings for the reconstitution of

certificates of title. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that only very few

have access to or could read the Official Gazette, which comes out in few

copies only per issue. If publication in the Official Gazette of the notice of

hearing in both proceedings would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the

court, owners of both unregistered and registered lands may someday

painfully find out that others have certificates of title to their land because

scheming parties had caused their registration, or secured reconstituted

certificates of title thereto and sold the property to third parties.

The belabored argument of respondent Court of Appeals that it would be

unfair to impose upon the private respondent the duty to comply with the

requirement of service of notice because it was not through her fault that the

original copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title was lost is unacceptable since

the law does not make any exception or exemptions; besides, it is, to say the

least, a ludicrous proposition. Equally unacceptable is the opinion of said

Court that it was the duty of the trial court to serve the required notices and

private respondent should not be prejudiced if it failed to do so. It suggests,

quite unfortunately, and gives the wrong impression that mandatory

requirements of notices may be dispensed with if the failure to comply with

them is attributable to the court. It likewise negates the principles of

responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency which the Constitution directs

public officials and employees to faithfully observe. We should stress here that

lapses on the part of courts or their personnel cannot be made a reason or a

justification for non-observance of laws. By the very nature of their functions,

they should be the first to obey the laws.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered

GRANTING the instant petition and SETTING ASIDE the Decision of 29

August 1988 and the Resolution of 18 October 1988 of respondent Court of

Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163 and the Order of Branch No. 39 of theRegional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Fourth Judicial Region in Petition

No. 11,456. Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Petition granted and decision and resolustion set aside.

Note.Publication of the notice of hearing in the Official Gazette at least 30

days before the hearing of a petition for reconstitution of title is a mandatory

requirement that confers jurisdiction upon the court. Any defect in such

publication deprives the court of jurisdiction to hear the petition. (Register of

Deeds of Malabon vs. RTC, Malabon, MM, Br. 170, 181 SCRA 788.)

o0o

Copyright 2012 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. [Republic vs.

Marasigan, 198 SCRA 219(1991)]


18/67

18 | L T D C a s e s H W 3

[No. 8539. December 24, 1914.]

MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN, petitioner and

appellee, vs. RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ ET AL., objectors and appellants.

1.REGISTRATION OF LAND; NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS IN.The proceedings for the

registration of land, under Act No. 496, are in rem and not in personam. A proceeding 'in rem,

dealing with a tangible res, may be in stituted and carried to judgment, without personal service

upon the claimants within the state or notice by name to those outside of it. Jurisdiction is

secured by the power of the court over the res. Such a proceeding would be impossible were

this not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of the

claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding

is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. Rep., 49.)

2.ID.; TORRENS SYSTEM; PURPOSE AND EFFECT.The real purpose of the Torrens Land

Registration system is to relieve the land of the burden of known as well as unknown claims. I f

there exist known and just claims against the title of the applicant, for the registration of his

land under the Torrens systems, he gains nothing in effect by his registration, except in the

simplicity of subsequent transfers of his title. The registration either relieves the land of all

known as well as unknown claims absolutely, or it compels the claimants to come into court

and to make there a record, so that thereafter there may be no uncertainty concerning eitherthe character or the extent of such claims.

3.ID.; ID.; NOTICE OF APPLICATION.The requirement that personal notice shall be a

prerequisite to the validity of registration would absolutely prohibit the foreclosure of unknown

claims, for the reason that personal notice could never be given to "unknown claimants." The

great difficulty in land titles arises from the existence of possible unknown claimants. Known

claimants can be dealt with. They furnish no valid impediment, in fact, to the transfer of title.

Courts have held that in actions in rem, personal notice to owners of a res is not necessary to

give the courts jurisdiction to deal with and to dispose of the res. It is admitted in the present

case that the petitioner was not guilty of fraud. The record shows that she named all persons

who might have any interest in the registration of her land. She is not charged even with

negligence. She did all the law required her to do.

4.ID.; ID,; ID.; PERSONAL NOTICE.Looked at either from the point of view of history or of

the necessary requirements of justice, & proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be

instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the state,

or notice by name to those outside of it and not encounter any provision of the fundamental law

of the land, Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. Proceedings in the

land court for the registration of land would be impossible were this not so, for it hardly would

do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and

those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the purpose of the proceeding is to bar all.

5.ID.; ID.; STATE CONTROL OVER PROPERTY.The law, even before the Torrens Law,

provided means by which title to land might be quieted "by notice by publication to all

persons." Even before the Torrens Law was adopted, the state had the power and right to

provide a procedure for the adjudication of title to real estate. Th

Date post:	05-Apr-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	gabriel-pachoro
View:	228 times
Download:	0 times