Luhmann General Sociology

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Luhmann's General SociologyAuthor(s): Dag sterberg

Source: Acta Sociologica, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2000), pp. 15-25Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4201179Accessed: 24-08-2014 21:10 UTC

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2/12

ACTA OCIOLOGICA000

Luhmann's

General

Sociology

Dag

0sterberg

Department

of

Music

and

Theatre,

University

of

Oslo,

Norway

ABSTRACT

The

article

deals with

Niklas Luhmann's

treatise

Die

Gesellschaft

der

Gesellschaft,

exposing

it

to

a

critique

in

terms of

Luhmann's own

criterion:

plausibility.

It

is

argued

that both Parsons'

general

sociology

and

Marxism

render

more

plausible

accounts

of

modern

society

than

does

Luhmann's

theory

of

autopoietic

systems.

It

is

asserted

that

the fundamental mistake in Luhmann's theory is his conflation of the concepts of

differentiated social

systems

and autonomous social

systems,

a

conflation that

confers

a

ring

of

the

imaginary

to

Luhmann's

treatise.

Dag

0sterberg,

University

of

Oslo,

Department

of

Music

and

Theatre,

P.O. Box

1017,

Blindem,

N-0315

Oslo,

Norway

? Scandinavian

Sociological

Association

2000

1. Introduction

Ten years ago, in a book on general sociology, I

devoted

a

chapter

to Luhmann's

book Soziale

Systeme

(1984).

I

concluded with a

provisional

epokj?,

saying

that it

was

too

early

for

me to

make

up my

mind as

to

the

validity

of

this

avant-

garde

approach.

Since

then,

Luhmann

has

carried

out

his entire

programme.

After

publish-

ing

a

series

of

monographs

on

particular

social

institutions,

he crowned

his

life

work in

1997

with

a

huge

treatise

on

society

as

a

whole,

world

society

-

Die

Gesellschaft

der

Gesellschaft (1997).

As an

opportunity

to

concentrate on

Luh-

mann's

work

and

take

a

stance

towards

it,

the

present

occasion

is

favourable.

Mainly,

I

shall

comment

upon

Die

Gesellschaft

der

Gesellschaft

(GdG).

This

voluminous book

contains

much of

philosophical

and

meta-sociological

concern

-

considerations

on

non-Aristotelian

logic,

on the

'old

European'

ontology

and

how

to transcend

it,

on the

constructivity

of

science,

etc. I

shall,

however,

limit

myself

here

to

questions

of

a

more

straightforward

sociological

character.

But

in

the

first two

sections,

I

comment on

some

aspects

of

Luhmann's

writings,

which

somehow

disturb the

sociological

reading,

before

turning

to the real

subject

matter,

'die

Sache

selbst'.

2. The

aggressively

anti-left-wing

tone

of

Luhmann's writings

uhmann's

writings

Already

in Soziale

Systeme

(1984),

an

anti-left-

wing

attitude

was

discernible,

in

spite

of the

extremely

abstract

or

general

tone

of

the

discussions

in

the

book.

The

reason

for

this

was

that

left-wing political

positions

or

activities

were

relatively

often

used as

negative examples.

In

GdG

this

anti-left-wing

attitude

is

sharper,

as

in

others of

his

later

writings.

All over

the

thousand

pages

are

sprinkled

sarcastic or

condescending

or

polemical

anti-left-wing

remarks,

which

go

beyond

the mere refutation

of a

different,

adverse

doctrine.

It

is hard

to

say

whether

this is

incon-

sequential

to

Luhmann,

considering

that he

purports

to transcend

all

sorts of

politics

and

moralizing.

He

poses

as

one who

has

pierced

the

illusions

of his

contemporaries,

who

are

stuck

in

an

outdated

'semantics'

which does not

suit

what

he calls 'modern

society'.

More than

any

other

great

sociologist

of the

past,

Pareto

is the

one

who

comes

to

mind

when

reading

GdG.

He,

too,

liked or could

not

resist

venting

his

political

antipathies

in

the

midst of

a

huge,

learned

and

serious

treatise

on

general

sociology.

As one

example,

Luhmann writes

(p.

613

in.)

about 'Marx's

trick' of

describing

society

as

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/12

16 ACTA

SOCIOLOGICA000

VOLUME

3

constituted

by

two

social

classes.

Now,

as

most

sociologists

will

know,

Marx

himself

stated

(in

Das

Capital,

III. ch.

52)

that

capitalist

society

in

his

time

was

constituted

by

three

classes,

the

capitalists,

the

wage-earners

and

the land-

owners. This error raises the suspicion that

Luhmann's vast

readings

do

not

include

Marx's

Das

Capital.

But

this is

a

minor

point

here.

The

issue is rather

why

Luhmann

uses

the

word

'trick',

thereby

suggesting

that

Marx

intended to

deceive his

readers.

Another

example

is

Luhmann's

section

(pp.

847

?T.)

on

'protest

movements'

-

the

atmosphere

is

chilly,

sarcastic,

if

not

downright

hateful.

By

ingenious theological

reasoning

-

Luhmann

knows a

lot

about

theology

-

he

manages

to

present

the

position

of

the

protest

movement as that of the Devil: just as the Devil

pretends

to observe

God

from an

independent

position

(which

is

'impossible'),

the

participant

of

a

protest

movement,

Luhmann

asserts,

pretends

to 'know better' than

society,

which

is also

impossible

and

at

best

ridiculous.

Now,

in

my

own

experience, protest

movements

do not

pretend

to

'know better'

than

'society',

but

'better'

than

the

political

authorities,

which

is

quite

another

thing.

Luhmann's

diabolic inter-

pretation

of

protest

movements

is therefore

unfounded.

But he also

goes

on

to

assert that

'nothing' warrants the assumption that a

protest

movement knows

better than the

authorities

and their

experts.

Now,

at

least

in

Norway,

exactly

this

has

happened

several

times.

A third

example

is found in

Die Kunst der

Gesellschaft,

wherein Luhmann refers in

passing

(p.

228)

to Adorno's and

Horkheimer's 'arro-

gant

rejection'

of

mass

culture.

(It

almost

goes

without

saying

that there are

many

other

attacks

on

the Frankfurter

School

in his

writings.)

Adorno

was

-

in

addition to

a

professional

philosopher

-

an

outstanding

musicologist

and

an

expert

on

literature. He

also wrote

on

film music

together

with

Hans

Eisler.

Obviously

he

was

entitled

to have

his

own

opinion

on

'mass

culture',

which

he

disliked.

Why

does

this dislike

qualify

as

'arrogance'?

Why

should

we instead

trust

Luhmann's

judg-

ment

on mass

culture,

and

his

judgment

on

Adorno?

Luhmann

entangles

himself

in

self-

contradictions.

He states and

repeats

that

one

should

not

pose

as

a

Besserwisser,

as

the

Frankfurter

School

did and does

-

so

why

should

he

himself

pretend

to

know better

than

Adorno and Horkheimer?

Aggressive

remarks

like these

may

be

subconscious

slips

of

the

pen;

they

reveal

Luhmann's

political

stances,

but,

strictly

speak-

ing,

should

not

occur

within

a

sociological

treatise

on

this

level

of

abstraction and

general-

ity.

3. Platitudes

and

cynicisms

Platitudes

of

'gesunde Vernunft'

In

Luhmann's

writings,

extreme

radicalism

goes

together

with

a

strong

conformity

and

establish-

ment

attitude.

His books

abound with

extremely

common-sense

remarks in

favour of the

Estab-

lishment.

Here follow

a

few

examples

to

indicate

what

I

have

in

mind.

In

GdG,

Luhmann

writes

(p.

492):

'Who-

ever wants to abolish nuclear plants (Atom-

kraftwerke)

therefore

will

find

himself

con-

fronted

by

the

question:

How,

then,

do

we

otherwise

produce

electricity?'.

One

response

is

that the

consumption

of

electricity

seems

boundless

today.

Norway,

with all

its

waterfalls,

imports

electricity

from

Denmark.

Examples

of

sheer waste can

easily

be

given.

Now,

those

who

oppose

nuclear-driven

plants very

often

oppose

this

boundless

consumption

of

electricity,

mak-

ing

a

plea

for

a

diminished

consumption

of

electricity

if

necessary.

This

is

not

just

a

whim;

surveys in Norway strongly indicate that the

majority

would

prefer

a

simpler

material life.

Besides,

surely

there

are other

possible

energy

sources:

wind,

sea

waves,

the sun.

(In

Norway,

research on

sea waves

had

a

promising

start

around

1970,

but was

neglected

by

the

authorities

when

the North

Sea

oil

was dis-

covered.)

Luhmann's

remark trivializes the

deep

concern about

the

danger

of nuclear

energy;

he

takes

for

granted

that

nobody

will

renounce

warm

showers

and

drawing

rooms

(where

the

temperature

has

risen

from

18?

to

24

?C

on

average

in recent

decades.)

On

p.

531

we read: 'In

the

meantime,

society

has

got

habituated

to

technics',

and on

the next

page

we

read that

turning

away

from

technology

'is

practically

out

of

question'.

This

is

true,

but

a

platitude,

a

very boring

remark.

This

boredom

may

be

intentional;

Luhmann

-

a

sociologist

of unlimited

imagination

-

pretends

to be

confined

within

extremely

narrow

bound-

aries.

Technology

must

be

accepted

-

why?

Because

it

has

become

a

habit. But

habits,

surely,

can be

changed?

No,

that

is

practically

out

of the

question.

But

what does

'practically'

mean in this context? Could it mean just that

Luhmann

feels

comfortable

with

the

present



4/12

Luhmann's

General

Sociology

17

^?mst?***^?;

level of

technology

in

his

everyday

life?

A few

pages

earlier

(p.

523),

he states

peremptorily:

'Since it is

only

too clear that life and

survival

depends

on

technics,

it

becomes

implausible

'to

make the true

human

the

contrary

of

technics .

This, also,

is

a

platitude,

almost

a

tautology:

our

present-day

Western

way

of

life

depends

on

'technics'

for

its survival.

But

that

cannot mean

that

humanity

as a whole

cannot survive

without

technology;

at

any

rate,

this

is

not at

all

'obvious'

(?berdeutlich).

On

the

other

hand,

what

does seem obvious is that the

population

as a whole cannot

adopt

the Western

level of

technology

without the

ecological

system

breaking

down. For

instance,

not

everybody

can have a car. A

reasonable

conclusion

to be

drawn is that

the West

must

considerably

reduce its use of energy-consuming

technology

and

chemical

products,

even if

this

change

makes life

materially

less

comfortable.

Surely,

Luhmann

is

acquainted

with this

simple

reason-

ing; by ignoring

it in his

text,

he

tries

to

induce

in the reader

conformity

to the

Established

order,

which

is still

oriented towards

technolo-

gical

growth

(pace

the

Brundtland

Report).

In

Goffmannian

terms,

Luhmann's

framing

of his

texts,

his

context of

plausibility,

is

very

often that of the

Establishment,

of the

liberal-

conservative

politics

and

ideology

prevailing

within the ruling and dominating circles. His

platitudes

have this

purpose:

to

make the

reader

take for

granted

the code of

Establishment.

Cynicism

and

blas?

attitude

To

exemplify

Luhmann's

cynicism,

I

shall

comment

upon

a

passage

from

?kologische

Kommunikation

(pp. 212ff.).

The

topic

is the

role of values in

contemporary

political

discus-

sions,

how decisions

are

increasingly

under-

pinned by referring

to

'values',

which

leads to

an

inflation of 'values'.

Now,

Luhmann has

got

an

inkling ('man

kann

ahnen)

that

the

discus-

sions of

ecology

will

contribute to

this infla-

tionary process.

In

the first

place,

he

surmises,

pure

air

and

water,

trees and animals

will

attain

the

dignity

of

entering

the 'list of

values'

(in

the

idiom of laconic

German:

they

will

become

Wertkatalogfdfhig).

He then

goes

on:

'And

since it

is

just

a

question

of a

list,

one could extend it

ad

libitum:

pandas,

Tamils,

women

. . . '.

The

reader

is

prone

to

smile

approvingly

at this

remark,

but

also feels

that

this kind of

humour

is an invitation to

cynicism

for

several

reasons.

In

the first

place,

one is

supposed

to

endorse

('mitmachen)

Luhmann's

placement

of

animals

and

human

beings

on

an

equal

footing.

Certainly, pandas

are

darlings,

cherished ani-

mals for

campaigns

of

the World

Wildlife Fund

and

similar

organizations.

But

are

we to think

of

Tamils as

pandas?

For one

thing,

Tamil

Nadu is

a state in

India,

with

approximately

30 million

inhabitants. To

suggest

that

they

should

be

included in

a

list of

threatened

species

is to

suggest

the

possibility

of

exterminating

them.

Perhaps

Luhmann had

in mind

merely

the

Tamil

refugees

in

Germany,

but

why suppose

that

they

are

more or

less valuable

than other

human

beings,

candidates for a

'catalogue

of

values'?

And

then

'women':

the

suggestion

seems to be that the

various

feminist move-

ments,

while

claiming equality

with

men,

will

go

on and claim that

women

are

more valuable

than

men,

or that

they

feel

threatened with

extermination like

pandas,

which

portrays

the

feminist movement as

hysterical

or

extremely

unrealistic. It also

suggests

that a

woman is a

darling

just

like a

panda, easily

arousing

our

immediate

compassion,

which

sort of

sugges-

tion

should be

resisted

by

sensible

sociologists.

Turn and twist it as

you

like,

this kind of

wit

is

morally

reproachable.

Luhmann,

presumably,

is

fed

up

with

playing

the

sociologist

in the

expected

role as

a

goodie-goodie, backing every

conceivable

Good

Cause,

speaking

for

the

wretched of the

earth, for the underprivileged, for the oppressed,

for

aboriginal populations,

for

those who

are

Different as such.

Instead,

he

opts

for a

certain

cynicism, emphasizing

the

modest role

of

sociology

in social life

today.

On

this

last

point

he

may

be

right,

but

the

situation

does not call

for

cynicism.

The

lawyer

is

committed

to

Justice,

the medical doctor is

committed to

Health,

the

teacher is

committed

to

the

Youth,

etc.

These

are ethical

professions

that

impose

moral

obligations

on those who have

chosen them.

The

sociologist,

too,

may

be

under moral

obligations. But

a

commitment to make society

better is not

sufficient.

What

matters is the

professional

achievement.

The

sociologists

who

make

themselves

spokesmen

for

groups

who

justly

feel that their social

rights

are

being

violated

may appear

to be

goodie-goodies,

but

only

if

they perform

badly.

If

what

they

have

to

say

in

public

comes out as

mere trivial

outbursts

of

indignation, sociologists

are

useless.

Their

specific,

professional

contribution

is

to

underpin

the moral

standpoint

with

better

arguments

and research data than

most

non-sociologists

could

do,

or to

reformulate

the moral

protest

within a more

appropriate

social

context. In

other

words,

the

sociologist

role

is a moral or



5/12

18 ACTASOCIOLOGICA000

VOLUME

3

moralist

one,

just

like that

of the

lawyer

or

medical

doctor. This

may

sometimes be

tiresome

or

cause

uneasy feelings

of

hypocrisy.

But

that is

no reason for the

sociologist

to

opt

for

cynicism.

Let us leave all

consideration

of

attitude

and tone aside, since it disturbs the really

important

subject

matter

of

Luhmann's

work,

i.e. his construction of an alternative

to

all

sociology up

till

now,

to which I now turn.

4. Two basic tenets

Luhmann's two basic tenets are as

follows:

1. 'Modern

society'

is above all

characterized

by ever-increasing

'differentiation' and 'com-

plexity';

2. 'Modern

systems theory'

is best suited to

describe modern

society

in a

scientific

way.

By

'differentiation'

Luhmann

means a

prolifera-

tion of 'autonomous' or

'autopoietic'

social

systems,

each

of them

defined or constituted

by

its own

specific

code or

'leading

difference'.

Any

social

system

deals

with

its

surroundings

-

its Umwelt

-

solely

in

terms of its

specific

code.

Therefore,

it would be

misleading

to

say

that

each

social

system

is a Leibnizian

'monad',

a

'world of its

own',

a solus

ipse.

On

the

contrary,

any

social

system

communicates with its

surroundings

precisely

by

virtue of its

closed-

ness.

Only,

it communicates

through

its own

code.

Social

systems

are

-

according

to Luh-

mann

-

a subclass

of

communication

systems.

Therefore,

sociology

should

be transformed into

a

branch

of communication

theory,

or

-

what

comes

to the same

thing

-

a

branch of modern

systems

theory.

Modern

systems theory

-

according

to

Luhmann

-

has

made

considerable

progress

away

from the

systems thinking

that influenced

Parsons'

and

his school of functional

sociology.

While Parsons described 'social

systems'

in

terms of

'adaptation',

'integration', 'equili-

brium'

and 'maintenance

mechanisms',

thus

presenting

social

life as

by

and

large preoccu-

pied

with

stability

and

self-preservation,

the

recent

systems

theory

of

Maturana and others

emphasizes

wholly

different

characteristics.

5. Stratified

and

functionally

differentiated

societies

'The great transformation' according to Luh-

mann

is the shift

from a

society

constituted

by

social stratification to one

constituted

by

func-

tional

differentiation.

With

him,

the

term

'stratification'

seems to denote a

system

of

estates

or St?nde. Modern

society

is not

without

social

stratification,

but

this is no

longer

an

essential trait. One's social origin (Herkunft)

'hardly plays

any

longer

a role within

the

functional

systems' (p.

734). (This

recalls the

Linton-Parsonian

distinction

'ascribed

status-

achieved

status',

and is

probably

meant

as an

improvement

on

that.)

Within

functionally

differentiated

society,

each 'function'

corre-

sponds

to or defines an

autopoietic

system,

each with a

specific

leitdifferenz,

communicating

with the environment

according

to its code.

From

Parsonian functionalism

Luhmann

makes a most

important

break

-

to

him,

'the

functional' is dissociated from all concerns with

social

'integration' (though,

as

I

shall

argue

later,

he is

inconsequential

on this

point).

With

Parsons,

the

functionally

differentiated institu-

tions

contribute,

each in its

specific way,

to the

maintenance

of

society

as a whole.

Luhmann

expressly

denies this.

In

any

case,

one

must

give up

the

idea

dominating

the research on modernization after

WWII,

that

is.

the idea

that modernization

trends within the

particular

functional

systems

-

political

democ-

racy,

rule of

law.

research

unhampered

by dogmas,

non-censured mass media, schooling of the whole

population

according

to their individual

capacities

etc.

-

will

trigger

off

an

impulse

of

development,

where

the achievement of each

particular

function

system

would

reciprocally support

and affirm the

other,

(p.

568)

Precisely

this was the

presupposition

of Parsons.

Luhmann,

by

contrast,

adds:

'Rather,

the

opposite

is

probable'

(ibid.)

That is to

say.

the

evolution

of modern

societies

points

towards

dissolution

and

disintegration,

if it

has

any

direction

at all.

Luhmann

states that modern

society

is not

predictable,

nor does he think that

sociology

can

tell the truth

about social life.

By

what

criteria

then

are we to

judge

Luhmann's

general

sociology?

His own

criterion is

plausibility:

'The

semantics

in

question

must be

plausible

and

appropriate (passen)

to the structures of the

social

system' (p.

156).

And:

'Every self-descrip-

tion demands

historical

plausibility

in the

situation

in

which

the

self-description

is

regarded

as such'

(p.

1137).

In order

to evaluate the

plausibility

of

Luhmann's sociology I begin by sketching two

pre-existing

plausible

accounts of modern



6/12

Luhmann'sGeneral

Sociology

19

society,

i.e. Parsonian and

Marxist

interpreta-

tions.

6.

The

plausibility

of

Parsons' 'semantics'

In

many ways,

Luhmann's construction endea-

vours to

improve upon

and

supersede

that of his

former

teacher,

Parsons. One

may

therefore

with

good

reason reflect

on the

plausibility

of

Parsons'

interpretation

of the

contemporary

world,

especially

as

presented

in his The

System

of

Modern Societies from

1971.

(This

book,

together

with its

preceding companion

volume,

is an overview

published

when

Parsons was 68

years

old,

and thus is a

pendant

to

Luhmann's

GdG,

published

when

he

was

70

years

old.)

Parsons describes modern society in terms of his

action

theory

and its

specification

of

various

types

of

action,

chosen from a

number of

structural

variables-universalism-particular-

ism,

specificity-diffuseness,

etc. The modern

world is

characterized

by

the

paramount

importance

of the

universalism-performance-

affect

neutrality pattern-foreshadowed

by

the

Calvinist

type

of the

Reformation

age.

This

pattern

is internalized

as

a

prevalent personality

type

and

institutionalized

as

a

cultural

pattern.

But this value

pattern,

while

dominant,

is not

the only one. On the contrary, it stands in a

complementary

relation to other

patterns,

such

as

the

pattern

dominating

within

the

family

institution,

and within

institutions

like

science

and art.

Generally,

modern

society

is charac-

terized

by

advanced functional

differentiation:

each differentiated

subsystem

has its function

within

the

system

as a

whole,

which makes

the

system

as such

highly

flexible and

adaptive.

This is

so,

provided

there

is sufficient

integration

of the

system;

i.e. the

subsystems

and their institutions

-

while

having

their own

'logic'

or

specific

value

pattern

-

must at the

same

time

be

functional

to

the

system

as a

whole. The

subsystems

must be

subordinated to

the

system,

through

value

integration.

This is

what

by

and

large

has

gone

on over

the

centuries.

Thus,

one

can

follow

the double

evolutionary process

of differentiation

and

integration

since the

age

of

the

renaissance

and reformation in

Europe.

The

first

stage

was

the differentiation of

political

and

religious

institutions;

the next

was the

differentiation of

economy

and

household

institutions;

the

third

was the differentiation of

professional

life and

educational culture. The

leading

societies of this

evolution

were

England

and

Holland,

but

around the turn of

the last

century,

the

USA

became the lead

society.

It had

become

as

democratic as France and as

industrially

advanced as

England, combining

these two

features on a new level of

integration

and

differentiation.

What makes

the USA so

markedly

modern

is first its absence

of

nobility

and aristocratic

culture. American

culture is

egalitarian,

based

upon

the value of work

and

individual achieve-

ment.

Next,

it is the

absence

of

religious

persecution.

Religious

life in

the USA is

plural-

ist; indeed,

the

emigration

to

America

began

as

an

escape

from the

horrors

of

religious

intoler-

ance

in

Europe.

In the

USA,

religion

is not

part

of the

political

constitution,

but differentiated as

part

of civil

society.

Third,

the

differentiation

between daily community life and the legal

institution is

marked;

the

legal

system

is

important

for

integrating society

as a

whole,

regulating

conflicts

according

to universalist

principles.

Fourth,

the

political

institution

is

sharply

differentiated from

the

economy,

mak-

ing charges

of

'corruption'

very

serious.

Early

America was

characterized

by

a

multitude of different ethnic and

religious

groups.

Their

integration,

socially

and cul-

turally,

has

been

going

on

by

and

large

un-

interrupted.

The

evolutionary

trend has been

towards ever more widespread commitment to

the dominant value

system.

Ethnic and other

differences have been

overcome

through

'adap-

tive

upgrading'

of the cultural

and social

systems, through

a

parallel process

of

general-

ization and

differentiation. The

functionality

of

this most modern of

societies

is shown

by

its

capacity

to

adapt

to new

challenges

from the

environment.

The conflicts within this

modern

society

may

be

considerable,

but

they

do not

challenge

the

dominant

cultural

pattern

as such. Left-

wing opponents

comment

harshly upon

the

glaring inequalities

and

injustices

of the

system,

but in

doing

so,

they presuppose

that

very

value

system.

No alternative cultural and

social model

has been

important

in the USA.

True,

the

Soviet

Union has been a

'counterpart'

model

since the

Cold

War,

at least. But closer

scrutiny

reveals

that

on

many

points,

the Soviet

Union

repeats

the modernization

process

of

Western

countries,

and thus does not

proffer

an

essentially

different

type

of

society.

Its lack of

differentiation

between

the

economy

and the

polity

is a

pre-modern

trait,

making

the

system

less

flexible and

adaptive

than that of the USA. The

prospect

is

that the Soviet Union

will

get

more

and more



7/12

20

ACTASOCIOLOGICA

000

VOLUME3

similar to the

USA in the

future.

The

same

goes

for

other

non-Western

societies

-

Japan,

China,

etc.

Thus,

a

synthesis

of

Durkheimian

and

Weberian

sociology

is attained.

With

Durkheim,

Parsons approaches modern

society

from the

perspective

of social

and

cultural

integration.

Drawing

on

recent

psychology

and

psychother-

apy,

he

gives

a

better

understanding

of how

the

individual

internalizes and

adapts

to his or

her

society,

and how

personality

conflicts

have to do

with

conflicts and

disintegrative

features of the

social

groups

to

which the

individual

belongs.

On

the

basis

of

recent,

neo-evolutionary biology,

he

develops

Durkheim's

sociology

of

differentia-

tion and

integration,

taking

the

'cultural

symbol'

as the

sociological equivalent

of the

biological 'gene', and stressing 'adaptive up-

grading',

thus

meeting

the

objection

that his

sociological theory

is static.

With

Weber,

Parsons

stresses

the

impor-

tance of Western

Rationality.

He

shows how the

professional

in modern

organizational

life

-

within

business,

politics,

science,

etc.

-

has

internalized

the

value

pattern

that

originated

within

English

and

Dutch

Reformed Christian-

ity, stressing

self-control,

individuality,

'inner-

worldly

asceticism'.

Parsons

combines

neo-

Freudian

psychology

with

(neo)-Weberianism:

the paramount role of the universalism-

achievement-affect

neutrality

pattern

entails

considerable

strain on

the

personality,

threaten-

ing

neurosis

and

mental

disturbance. The

function

of modern

family

life is to

counteract

these

tendencies;

the

value

pattern

of

the

modern

family

differs

strongly

from,

say,

that

of the Wilhelmine era. In

the

modern American

family,

affectionate

relations are

all-important,

and the

significance

of marital

sexual

relations

paramount.

The much-derided

'money/sex'

preoccupation

is therefore a case

of

adaptive

upgrading,

of

counteracting

disintegration by

differentiation. Similar

considerations

pertain

to

the

differentiation of the

scientific

subsystem

in

relation to

religion,

or

the

subsystem

of art in

relation

to

science,

etc.

By

an

elaborate

system

of

'pattern

vari-

ables',

combined

with a

refined

theory

of

differentiation,

integration,

functionality

and

conflict,

Parsons succeeds in

giving

a

highly

plausible

account of modern societies.

In

fact,

his

interpretation appears

more

plausible today

than

at the

time

it was

published.

For at

that

time,

the

Student and Counterculture

movements had

started,

protesting against

the achievement

orientation

of the dominant

middle-class cui-

ture. This was the

heyday

of

Marcues's

Eros

philosophy (opposed

to

the

'sex-and-work'

pattern).

Further,

the

USA's

engagement

in

Vietnam

was

becoming

more and

more

alarm-

ing,

demonstrating

violent and

amodern

aggression

as an

aspect

of American

modernity,

an

aspect

Parsons

played

down in

his

account.

In

addition,

Third World

countries

had

important

liberation

movements,

fighting

against capitalist imperialism,

making

a

deep

impression upon public

opinion

in

the

West.

Also,

the

cultural

revolution

in China

had

many

famous

proponents.

From

this

perspective,

Parsons

appeared

as a

model of the

Apologist

of

his

own

society. Today,

Parsons'

anticipations

have been confirmed to a

large

extent.

Norwe-

gian

society,

for

instance,

has

become

more

similar to the USA in recent decades. The

modernization of Asia also

goes

on in an

'American

way'.

Even the

core of

the former

'counterpart',

the Soviet

Union,

has

developed

a

'market

economy'

-

and so

on. The

system

of

modern

societies

appears

to be as

well

inte-

grated

as

ever,

under

the

leadership

of the

USA

-

at least from the

viewpoint

of a

sociology

of

social

integration

and

differentiation.

7.

The

plausibility

of

'Marxism'

There has been

a

widespread

flight

away

from

Marxist

doctrines

in

the last two

decades,

especially

after

the

dissolution of the

Union of

Socialist Soviet

Republics,

and the

reunion

(Wiedervereinigung)

of East

and West

Germany.

These two

momentous

political

events

are

often

presented

as

the reasons for a

turning away

from

Marxist

stances. This

may

hold true in

some

arenas,

but from the

standpoint

of

general

sociology,

Marxist

interpretations

of

the world

have

not

weakened

during

the

1980s and

1990s.

The

mode

of

production

characterizing

Western

societies

is

capitalist

in the

strict

sense: it

is

defined

by

private

ownership

of the

means of

production

and

distribution,

and

this

property

is

administered

as

capital,

i.e.

as value

to be

augmented

in the form of

'profit'.

The

complement

to

capital

is

wage

labour and the

wage

labour-market. The market as an

institu-

tion

makes

for

competition

and

non-co-opera-

tion,

thus

making prices appear

as

the outcome

of

supply

and demand. For this

reason,

the

capitalist

mode

of

production

and

distribution

is

also called the 'market

economy'.

The

main

cultural code

defending

and



8/12

Luhmann's

General

Sociology

21

legitimating

this

mode of

production

is Liberal-

ism.

It

may

be

advocated

in

more or

less

good

faith,

more

or

less

hypocritically.

Liberalism

celebrates

the

capitalist

mode of

production

as

the

bulwark

of

Freedom for

all,

and

also

as

conducive

to economic

or material

Progress

for

all.

Liberalism

defends the

unalienable

right

of

each individual

to

property

and

freedom,

in

the

tradition

of Locke.

Its

blindness

has

been

pointed

out

by

both

Conservative and

Socialist

thinkers,

countless

times.

Sociologically,

it

must

be considered

as

a

refuted doctrine.

Notwith-

standing

this

refutation,

Liberal

thought

con-

tinues

to dominate the cultural

world

of

Capital,

with

its cult of individualism.

On

the

philoso-

phical

or

ideological

level the

prestige

of

neo-

liberal economic

theory

and

its

ramifications

(game theory,

economic

theory

of

marriage,

etc.)

underpin

the

capitalist

mode of

production.

Through

its 'materialist

conception

of

History'

Marxist

thought

points

out

how

the

artefacts

of human

activities

become

a

kind of

'actor'

in

social

life,

in

addition to

its

human

participants.

By

generalizing

the role

of

Capital

as an

acting

historical

force,

one

obtains

the

notion

of

a

'practico-inert

field'

(Sartre

1960)

or

a

'socio-material

field',

which

makes

possible

a

non-intellectualist

doctrine

of

social

action,

thus

contradicting the Liberal doctrine.

Capitalist

production

and

distribution

tend

to

expand unceasingly,

transforming

more

and

more

products

and activities into

'commodities'

and

'services',

thus

making

money

the

general

medium

and mediator of

relationships

between

human

beings. Working

activities are

trans-

formed

into

wage

labour and

profit-seeking,

leisure

time transformed into

consumption

of

capitalized

entertainment such

as

'tourist

packages'

or

the

products

of

'pop

industry'.

As

Marx and

Engels

stated

in

the

Manifesto,

nothing is 'holy' for Capital.

The

capitalist

mode

of

production

and

distribution

entails

the

division of

society

into

two

major

classes

-

the

capitalist

class and

the

wage

labour

class,

or

'proletariat'.

Owing

to the

'permanent

revolution' of the

means

of

produc-

tion

('technology'),

there

exists

at

any

time

a

'reserve

army'

of

wage

labourers.

This

reserve

army

tends

to

exert

pressure

on

the

wage

level,

making

it descend towards

a

subsistence

level.

Hence,

it

is

impossible

for most

wage

labourers

to accumulate

capital

and leave

the

wage

labour

class.

On

the

contrary,

the

historical

tendency

is

to

transform

small

peasants, shopkeepers,

etc.

into

wage

labourers.

The

'relative

pauperiza-

tion'

(Verarmung)

of

the

wage

labour

class

is a

historical trend:

the

wealth

of

the

great capital

owners

being

vertiginous,

the condition

of

the

ordinary

wage

labourer becomes

relatively

worsened.

Social

life revolves around the

capitalist

mode of

production

and

distribution

and

its

inherent

conflicts.

The State

charges

itself

with

the

task

of

ensuring 'peace

in

working

life',

pacifying

and

neutralizing

discontented

groups,

implementing

schemes

for

welfare and social

security

and

protecting

the

regime

of

private

property

through

the

police

apparatus

and

the

prison

system.

On

the

cultural

level,

legitima-

tion

of

the

capitalist

economy

goes

on

unceas-

ingly

in

the mass

media,

as

testified

by

soap

operas

and

the

TV

series of

crime and

action.

This

kind

of entertainment is

only intelligible

provided

the

capitalist

or

market

economy

is

taken for

granted.

The

so-called

'globalization'

process

implies

the

speeding

up

of

capitalist expansion

all

over

the world.

The

semi-corporate

tendencies

of

the

postwar period

have

been

counteracted since

the

1980s

for countries

like

Egypt,

Indonesia

and India as

well

for

Western

Europe.

In

addition,

the

market

economy

is

sought

in

Eastern

Europe,

even

in the

People's

Republic

of

China. This

globalization

entails

unfettered

world markets - a process that considerably

weakens

the collective

bargaining

strength

of

trade

unions

and

other

wage

labour interest

organizations.

A world

proletariat

arises

of

hitherto unseen

magnitude

-

millions and

millions of

wage

earners

working

on

or

below

subsistence

level.

They

are

badly

organized,

even

disorganized

-

a

condition

upheld

in

many

cases

by

the State's

armed

forces.

Precisely

because

Eastern

Europe

failed

to

construct

an alternative

economy,

Marx

and

Engels' interpretation

accords

better

with

plain

facts than it has done for many decades. In order

to defend

Marxist doctrines

in the

period

1950-

80,

one

had to

be

subtler,

one

had

to

point

out

latent structures

of

oppression

and

domination,

showing

that,

contrary

to

appearances,

capital-

ist class

society

was

still

with

us.

Today,

the

basic traits of

a

society

based

upon

a

capitalist

mode

of

production

are

quite

manifest,

even

openly

declared

and hailed as

historical

pro-

gress.

This,

I

presume,

is one

of

the

reasons

why

a

Marxist

interpretation

has lost

its

spell

for

many

sociologists.

Since

it

accords

('stimmt)

so

well with

facts,

it

does

not

pose

the

same

intellectual

challenge

as

before;

it

cannot

satisfy

the

need

to be

sophisticated

and

brilliant;

a



9/12

22 ACTASOCIOLOGICA

000

VOLUME3

Marxist

description

has become

plainly

in

accordance

with

facts,

and hence

banal.

True,

on one essential

point,

the Marxist

doctrine

is not

plausible,

on

the

topic

of the class

struggle.

The

class

struggle

does not evolve

according to Marxist interpretations. The

labour movements

in the

West are weak at

present,

and

the

huge

masses of

wage

labourers

in countries

like South

Korea,

Thailand,

the

Small

Tigers,

etc. seem at least to live

under

the

sway

of

capitalist

domination. If there is class

struggle,

it

seems

that the

rising

class

is

rather

the

capitalists,

not the

proletariat.

Despite

this,

taken as a

whole,

the Marxist

doctrine

is

quite

plausible

as an

interpretation

of

world

society

today.

This is so because

it

does

-

just

like Parsons'

-

base itself

upon

what Weber

termed 'central cultural values'. Marxist doc-

trine bases

itself

upon

the fundamental notions

of

Modernity

-

Reason,

individual

liberty

and

historical

Progress.

The

shortcomings

of

Liber-

alism

cannot

simply

be

regarded

with forbear-

ance,

since

Liberal

thought,

too,

is committed to

Modernity.

Marxism,

as the internal

critique

of

Liberal

thought,

is

plausible

and

important

as

long

as and

in

so

far as Liberalism

prevails

in

our culture.

8.

The

implausibility

of Luhmann's

semantics

The world

is not

acentric;

it has one

or

more centres

'Functional

society',

Luhmann

states,

Operates

without

a

top

and

a

center'

(p.

803).

This

is,

he

thinks,

one

of the

main

reasons

the

protest

movements

are ill-conceived

and

doomed

to

failure.

But

the statement is

implausible;

it even

goes

against

widespread experience.

Luhmann

speaks

of

'premature (vorzeitige)

fixation

of

ideas'

(p.

540),

which

in fact

applies

in the

present

case.

According

to the

theory

of

autopoietic

systems,

'society'

should be

an

acentric

system.

But world

society

certainly

has a

centre,

or

at

least,

it

is

polycentric.

The

centre

of the

world is

the

leading

strata of

the

USA

-

it

dominates the

world

economically,

politically,

culturally

and

militarily.

Several of

the

mega-cities

of the world

-

New

York,

London,

Paris,

Tokyo

-

exert

a

strong

influence

upon

the rest

of the

world,

an influence which is

not

reciprocated

by

the lesser

agglomerations.

There is not even a

tendency

in an acentric

direction;

on

the

contrary,

the concentration

of

economie,

political,

etc.

power

has

apparently

become

stronger recently.

The

notion

of an acentric world

can be

found in anarchist

thinking,

such

as in

Deleu-

ze's

philosophy

of

Difference.

But this

philoso-

phical notion cannot support the statement that

today

world

society

is acentric. That statement

is

simply wrong.

Whoever

goes

outside

the

Western

hemisphere

will

have

the

experience

that

people

are,

whether

they

want

to be

or

not,

'other-directed',

oriented towards the

Western

world and under

its domination. It is

almost

embarrassing

to

point

out this fact.

World

society

does not

become

ever more

functionally

differentiated

One

may

venture

the assertion that there exist

few, if any, autopoietic systems in social life. Again,

modern

systems

theory, imported

from

biology

into

sociology,

leads

astray.

To

demonstrate

this

may

be

embarrassingly

trivial,

all the

more

so

as

Luhmann

himself

addresses a list of

weighty

objections

to

his own thesis.

Nevertheless,

I

make an

attempt

to

point

out the

obvious,

beginning by

commenting upon

a

couple

of

quotations.

Luhmann

states: 'We have

already empha-

sized

that

those

who

possess

do not

deserve

more

esteem

(Achtung)

than those who do not'

(p. 406). This does not demonstrate Luhmann's

personal

attitude,

but that of modern

society.

But

as such

it is

plainly

wrong. High

income

and

wealth do

in

fact serve

or

function

as status

symbols.

This

was

pointed

out

long ago

by

functionalists

(Sorokin

1927;

Parsons

1940;

Davis

&

Moore

1945).

Thus,

one of the main

justifications

for income differentiation

within

organizations

is

that those who fill the most

important

positions

should earn more than the

rest

as

a kind of

'reward' and

sign

of

esteem.

Luhmann

states: 'Not even the

very

rich

have for that

reason

political power

or

better

artistic

understanding

or better chances

to be

loved'

(p.

767).

Once

more,

the

incorrectness

of

this as

a

statement

of

fact

is

palpable.

As

for

'the

chances

to be

loved',

it is documented

that

very

few

rich

men

are not

married,

even

if the

proverb

says

that love

may

befall

upon

dirt

as

well as

upon

a

lily.

That

being

rich

does

not

influence

social standards

of art

may perhaps

be

defended,

though investigations

such as

those

by

Bourdieu

clearly

indicate

that

the

opposite

is

true. As for

the

political

power

of rich

people

as

such,

this is

almost

true

by

definition. To

be

very

rich cannot but have political consequences.

Therefore

the

political

and economic

systems



10/12

Luhmann's

General

Sociology

2 3

must

be

taken

as

one

politico-economic

system.

To

conceive the

economy

as an

autopoietic

system,

the code of

which

is

'pays/pays

not',

Luhmann makes

the distinction

between

the

'achievement'

(Leistung)

of the

economy

and

its

function,

to

'secure

future

subsistence

(k?nftige

Versorgung)'

(p.

758).

Even

so,

the

construction

is awkward.

Luhmann

praises

the

'money

economy'

as the most

spiritual

achievement of

modern

society

(ibid.).

However,

the

world

economy

is not

about

money,

but

about

production

and

distribution of

'use

values',

about the 'metabolism

with

nature'

(Marx),

whereby humanity

transforms

the

environment

and

thereby

itself.

Even

within a

capitalist

economy,

where financial

capital

plays

an

important

role,

as is

the case

today,

where

speculators all over the world can threaten

national economies

-

even

today

business

people

are

preoccupied

with

'real

capital'

as

distinct from

'money

assets'.

Institutional

eco-

nomics has shown

over and over

again

that

the

economy

is not

autonomous

-

what,

then,

is

gained by

characterizing

economy

as

autopoie-

tic? Mutatis

mutandis,

one could

show

that

the

other institutions of

society,

too,

do not

qualify

as

'autopoietic' systems.

As for

the

institution

of

Art,

the

autopoietic

thesis

may,

at

the

very

least,

hold

for a

segment

of

the

modern

art

institution,

but not for the institution of art as a whole.

The class

distinction

is not

replaced

by

an

inclusion/exclusion

distinction

Luhmann

himself

emphasizes

that

'social stra-

tification is

by

no means

abolished' in

present-

day society (p.

772).

But he

thinks that

stratification

-

and a

fortiori

social

class

-

is

less

important

than

the

distinction

between

those

who are

included

in

society

and

those

who

are

excluded.

The

inclusion/exclusion

distinc-

tion recalls

that

of the

'2/3

society' image. Most

of the

population

is

integrated,

they

have

jobs,

satisfactory

family

or

other

primary

relations,

they

take

an

interest

in

public

matters,

etc.

A

minority

is

marginalized

and

excluded

-

the

homeless,

the

junkies,

the

criminals,

the

hope-

lessly

poor,

etc.

This

conceptualization

induces

one to

think

and feel

that

wage

earners have

more

in

common with

the

great

capitalists

than

with

the

'excluded'

-

'after

all,

I

have a

home,

a

job,

I

am

included'.

This

is a

comforting thought

for

'the little

man'. Der

kleine

Mann

should

not

ask for too

much,

but

must be

content

with

little. In fact, the conflicts in modern

society

are

still

not

constituted

mainly

by

the

exclusion/

inclusion distinction

-

but

by

class

conflicts

and

similar

interest

group

conflicts.

The

notion

of

progress9

is

not

obsolete

Luhmann

discards the

notion

of

'progress'

many

times in GdG. For

instance,

he

asserts

that 'since

the end of

the

19th

century

one

dares

no

longer

(traut

man

sich

nicht)

presuppose

progress' (p.

567).

Luhmann

may

be

thinking

of

Nietzsche

or

Georges

Sorel,

Max

Weber,

Spen-

gler,

etc.,

even the

Dada

movement

-

all

of

whom

rejected

the

notion

of

Progress.

But

even

so,

there can be

no doubt

that

the notion of

progress

is

still

important

within

modern

society.

Thus,

the

semantics of

scientific

pro-

gress,

or

economic

progress

(Allianza

para

el

progreso,

etc.)

has

permeated

public

discourse

since 1945 until this

very day.

Those who

follow,

or

have even heard of

names like

Koyr?,

Kuhn, Foucault,

or

who know

anything

about

'paradigm

shifts'

constitute

a

dwindling

minor-

ity.

9. The

imaginary

character

of

Luhmann's

sociology

Parsons'

Empiricist

and

Positivist-minded

adver-

saries used to

dismiss his

general

sociology

as

empty verbiage, as words and utterances with

no

'empirical

reference',

as mere

thoughts.

Parts

of

Luhmann's

doctrine

may provoke

similar

responses.

But

-

except

in the

specific

sense of

Heidegger

and

Sartre -1 for

my

part

do

not

accept

that it is

possible

to

think

about

nothing.

All

thinking

is about

something

in

the

world.

Therefore,

even if

there

may

not be

many

autopoietic

systems

in

the

world,

and

world

society may

not

be

structured

by

functional

differentiation,

Luhmann's

general

sociology

cannot for

that

reason

be

rejected

tout court. It

remains to account for the delight of his texts,

what

makes

them so

fascinating

and

brilliant.

The answer

proffered

here,

is

twofold.

First,

Luhmann's erudition

makes his books

highly

valuable.

In

themselves

all

the

bibliographical

references

make his

books treasures for

anybody

occupied

with the

history

of ideas and

cultural

history.

Also,

his

style

of

writing

is

fluent,

light

and

elegant.

Secondly,

and

more

importantly,

the

fascination of

a

work like Die

Gesellschaft

der

Gesellschaft

is one

of

the

imaginary.

Luhmann's

sociology

is about

society

in

an

imaginary

mode

of

being,

as contrasted with

society

in

the

modus of

the

real.

Here,

as

on

many

occasions

before,

I take

the

distinction

between the

real



11/12

24

ACTA

SOCIOLOGICA

000

VOLUME

3

and

the

imaginary

in the sense

of

Sartre,

in

his

phenomenological

study

from

1940,

L'imagi-

naire

(Sartre

1940,

published

in

English

as

The

Psychology

of

Imagination).

While

the

real is

characterized

by

a

general causality,

the

ima-

ginary is not. Therefore, dreams are so hard to

retell;

they

seem

to

dissolve when we tell others

about

them,

since

they

do

not

obey

the

general

law

of cause

and effect. The

imaginary

is

unreal,

a

specific

attitude

of

consciousness

towards the

world.

Luhmann's

writings

often

take

on

this

imaginary

character. One sometimes

gets

the

impression

that

he

is

'playing'

at

being

a

scientist,

for

instance,

when

he

writes

about

choosing

between

different

'theoretical

strate-

gies'

or sets forth

'hypotheses'

that

are

not

subsequently put to any test. The imaginary

character

of the

treatise

also stems

from his

slippery

use of

biological

metaphors.

While

Luhmann

asserts

that

one

should

not

think

of

society

in

terms

of

biology,

he time and

again

writes

in

a

biological

vein.

Thus,

he tells

us

(p.

504)

that

Lamarck

introduced

the word

'irritabilit?'

into

biology.

But

he

himself writes

about modern

society

letting

itself

be 'irritated'

by

the environment,

and

this

time,

he does

not

mean

'irritation'

in

the

sense

that a

person

gets

irritated

with another.

He

suggests

'irritability'

in the sense of Lamarck, that is, the capacity of

responding

to a

stimulus.

By

this

perpetual

quidproquo

and

Vexierbild

our

image

of

modern

society

becomes

flimmery

and

dreamlike,

i.e.

imaginary.

10. A

fundamental

objection:

conflation

of

differentiation

and

autonomization

The

most

serious

error,

it

seems

to

me,

is

Luhmann's

abuse

of,

or an

imaginary,

equivocal

use

of the

term

functional

differentiation.

This

term

has

a clear

meaning

within

the Durkheim/

Sorokin/Parsons

perspective,

where

it

gener-

alizes

the

notion of

'division of

labour'. The

socially

functional

is connected

to

what

is

differentiated,

and social

differentiation

is con-

ceptually

connected

to

social

integration,

just

as

the

differential

and the

integral belong together

in

Mathematics.

Sometimes

Luhmann

writes

about

the

functional

in

the

above-mentioned,

traditional

sense

as

something

that serves

(dient) general

society,

that

is,

contributes

in

a

specific

way

to

its

preservation.

He

also

some-

times

partakes

of the Durkheimian concern

with

social

preservation,

as when

he

uses

his

favourite

phrase,

'so

geht

es

nicht

weiter,

it

cannot

go

on

like this

any

longer.

Then

he

describes

society

as

perpetually

striving

to

obtain

integration

in a

world

of

ever-increasing

complexity.

But

elsewhere,

Luhmann confers

another meaning upon the term 'functional' -

every

social

system

is

functional

by

virtue

of

its

performance

according

to

its

specific

code.

Now,

he

describes

society

as a

multitude

of

systems,

each

acting according

to its own

code.

What

he

aims

at is

to

generalize

Weber's

notion

of

mutually

irreconcilable

value

spheres

(the

political,

the

moral,

the

erotic,

the

religious,

etc.).

Weber

(1922)

tends

to

present

modern

society

as

constituted

by

autonomous

interest

spheres

-

where

art

challenges morality

(instead

of

sup-

porting

it,

as

in

Kant's

Critique

of

Judgment

and

other idealist aesthetic doctrines); where the

erotic

challenges

the

political,

and

so

on,

in

the

famous

'demonic

struggle'

between value com-

mitments.

Weber's value

spheres,

owing

to their

supposed

autonomy,

may

serve as

examples

of

'autopoietic

systems'.

Moreover,

Weber

himself

very

seldom

writes

about

'differentiation' of

these

spheres,

since

'differentiation' refers to

the

twin

concept

of

'integration'.

It

seems

to

me that

Habermas

was

the

first

to blur

the

opposition

between

Durkheim/

Parsons

and

Weber,

imputing

to

Weber a notion

of modern

differentiation

which

is

foreign

to

his

thought

(Habermas

1981).

Luhmann

appears

to make

the same

mistake. This

mistake is

at

the

same

time obvious

and

grave

-

differentiation

and

autonomization

are

opposite processes.

They

point

in

opposite

directions: differentiation

towards

integration,

autonomization

towards

disintegration

and

conflict.

Luhmann

conflates

the

perspectives

of

Durkheim

and

Weber.

But he

leans

more

towards

Weber

than Durkheim.

His

autopoietic

conception

of

modern

society

emphasizes

its

fragmented

character,

consisting

of a multitude

of autonomous

contexts

and

groups

trying

to

maintain

their

autonomy.

Within

such

a

picture,

there

is

no

place

for

the

term 'functional

differentiation'.

Society,

as

described

by

Luh-

mann,

is

not

differentiating

itself;

therefore

it

is

misleading

to

designate

the social

systems

as

'functional'.

The

fascination

of Luhmann's

general

writings

partly

stems

from this

con-

ceptual

conflation;

his

synthesis

is

not

real,

but

imaginary.

A

possible

rejoinder

may

be that,

after

all,

the

proliferation

of

autopoietic

systems

may

'serve' modern

society by augmenting

the

mass of alternatives to select from. To cope with

complexity,

modern

society

then

has at

its



12/12

Luhmann'sGeneral

Sociology

25

disposal

an

increasing complexity

of

alterna-

tives

-

and to

Luhmann,

the functional

con-

notes

alternatives.

Possibly,

this

may

be

granted,

but

since the evolution of modern

society

-

according

to

Luhmann,

by

contrast with

Parsons

-

has no

direction,

this functional

interpretation

of

autopoietic systems

adds little

to our

understanding

of world

society

-

it

reminds

me of

the mild

optimism

of classical

Deism.

11. Final

remark

By

no means does this 'critical

critique'

intend

to

reject everything

in Luhmann's

sociology.

His

book on

intimacy

is an

important

contribution,

as is much of his

sociology

of the art institution.

However,

these

and other fine

contributions

do

not

depend

for their

validity

on the

general

theory

of

autopoietic systems,

the

specific

doctrine

of

evolution,

etc.

What

I

oppose,

in

this

comment,

is Luhmann's most

general

tenets,

as

presented

in

Soziale

Systeme

and Die

Gesellschaft

der

Gesellschaft.

First version received

May

1999

Final version

accepted August

1999

References

Davis,

?. &

Moore.

W.E. 1945. Some

Principles

of Stratification.

American

ociological

eview.

Habermas,

j.

1981.

Theorie des kommunikativen

andelns.

Frankfurt m Main:

SuhrkampVerlag.

Luhmann,

N. 1984. Soziale

System.

Frankfurt am Main:

SuhrkampVerlag.

Luhmann,

N. 1986.

?kologisch

Kommunikation.

Opladen:

Westdeutscher

Verlag.

Luhmann,

N. 1995. Die Kunst der

Gesellschaft.

rankfurtam

Main:

SuhrkampVerlag.

Luhmann,

N.

1997.

Die

Gesellschaft

er

Gesellschaft.

rankfurt

am

Main:

SuhrkampVerlag.

Mane,

K.

1895.

Das

Kapital.

Book

??.

Marx,K,

&

Engels,

F. 1848. Communist

Manifesto.

Parsons,

T. 1940. An

analyticalapproach

o the

theory

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stratification. n

Essays

n

Sociological

heory.

lencoe,

L:Free

Press.

Parsons,

T.

1971.

The

System of

Modern

Societies.New

Jersey:

Prentice-Hall,

nc.

Sartre,J.

P.

1940.

L'imaginaire.

aris:Gallimard.

Sartre,

J.-P.

1960.

Critique

de la raison

dialectique.

Paris:

Gallimard.

Sorokin,

P. A. 1927. Social

mobility.

New

York:

Harper

and

Brothers.

Weber,

M. 1922. Der Sinn der

'Wertfreit'

er

soziologischen

und

?konomischen

Wissenschaften. In

Gesammelte

Aufs?tze

ur

Wissenschaftslehre.?bingen:JCB

Mohr.

0sterberg,

D.

1988.

Metasociology:

n

Inquiry

ntothe

Origins

nd

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