Luther v. Lander, Alaska (2016)

7/25/2019 Luther v. Lander, Alaska (2016)

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Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFICREPORTER.

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email

[email protected].

THESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFALASKA

BONNIEL.LUTHER,

Appellant,

v.

STEVIEW.LANDER,

Appellee.

)) SupremeCourtNo.S-15588

SuperiorCourtNo.3AN-12-10439CI

OPINION

No.7103May13,2016

)))))

)))

AppealfromtheSuperiorCourtoftheStateofAlaska,ThirdJudicialDistrict,Anchorage,PaulE.Olson,Judge.

Appearances:KennethP.Jacobus,KennethP.Jacobus,P.C.,Anchorage, for Appellant. Kimberlee A.Colbo, Hughes

GorskiSeedorfOdsen&Tervooren,LLC,Anchorage,forAppellee.

Before: Stowers,ChiefJustice,Fabe,Maassen,andBolger,Justices.[Winfree,Justice,notparticipating.]

FABE,Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

InNovember2010StevieLanderwasunabletocompletearightturnon

anicyroad,andhervehicleslidintoacardrivenbyBonnieLuther.AlthoughLuther

reportednoinjuriesatthesceneoftheaccident,thateveningshewenttotheemergency

roomforheadandneckpain,andwithinweeksshebegantosufferfromlowerbackpain

thatpreventedherfromreturningtoherjobasaflightattendant. Lutherattributedher
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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pain to the accident and sued Lander for negligence in 2012. Lander admitted

negligenceandmadeanofferofjudgment,whichLutherdidnotaccept. Thecase

proceededtotrialin2014,andthejuryawardedLutheratotalof$3,259forpastmedical

expenses,pastwageandbenefitloss,andpastnon-economiclosses.

ThesuperiorcourtgrantedattorneysfeestoLanderunderAlaskaRuleof

CivilProcedure68(b)anddeniedLuthersmotionforanewtrial. Lutherappeals,

arguingthatthesuperiorcourterredbydenyingheranewtrialbasedoninadequate

damagesandbyexcludingevidenceoftheamountofpaymentsformedicaltreatment

madebyLuthersinsurer. Shealsochallengesthesuperiorcourtsdecisiontogrant

attorneysfeesbasedonbillingrecordsthatwerefiledunderseal. Weconcludethatit

waserrortoexcludeevidenceofpaymentsmadeforLuthersmedicaltreatmentbyher

insurer.Butbecausethaterrorwasharmless,weaffirmthefinaljudgmententeredby

thesuperiorcourt.

II. FACTSANDPROCEEDINGS

A. Facts

In November 2010 Bonnie Luther was stopped at a red traffic light,

travelingsouthboundonSpenardRoadinAnchorage. StevieLanderwastraveling

westboundonNorthernLightsBoulevardandattemptedtomakearightturn.Lander

wasunabletocompletetheturnontheicyroad,andherSUVslidintothefrontdrivers

sideofLutherscar.Photographicevidencerevealed that the accidentcausedonlyminor

damagetoLutherscar: asmalldentabovethefrontdriverssidetire. Andtherewas

nodamagetoLandersSUV. Theairbagsdidnotdeployineithervehicle.

Attheaccidentscene,Luthertoldapoliceofferthatshewasfineanddidnotrequiremedicalattention.Butshewenttotheemergencyroomthateveningbecause

herheadhurtandherneckwasfeelingtight. Atthehospitalshewasdiagnosedwith

acervicalstrain,prescribedpainmedication,anddischarged. Lutherdidnotcomplain

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oflowerbackpainonthedayoftheaccident,andnodiagnosiswasmaderegardingher

back.Luthertestifiedthatthesymptomssheexperiencedimmediatelyaftertheaccident

headpainandtightnessinherneckandshouldersubsidedwithinafewweeksto

amonth.

LutherhadworkedasaflightattendantforAlaskaAirlinessince2007,and

thoughshewasnotworkingatthetimeoftheaccident,asshewasrecoveringfrom

recentsurgery,shewasscheduledtoreturntoworkinDecember2010.Buttwodays

aftertheaccident,LutherwasflyingasapassengeronaflighttoHawaiiwhenshefirst

experiencedpaininherbackandintoherleftbuttock.WhenshearrivedhomeinAlaska

neartheendofNovember,Lutherwasdiagnosedaslikelyha[ving]amuscleand

ligamentstrainofherlowerback... [andhavingpossibly]wrenchedthesacroiliac

joint. An x-ray showed no evidence of fracture, and Luther was referred to

OrthopedicPhysiciansAnchorage. SharonSturley,aphysicianassistantatthepractice,

foundnoacutefractureordislocationandnotedthatthex-raysshowedevidenceof

milddegenerativediscandjointdisease.

LuthercontinuedtoexperiencelowerbackpainandtoseeSturleyfor

monthlyvisitsthroughNovember2011withlittlenotablechangeinhercondition.In

April2011,anorthopedicspecialistinthesamepracticeasSturleydiagnosedLuther

withasmallannulartearandatinydiscprotrusionbutnotedthatLuthersbigger

symptomswereduetotrochantericbursitisandirritationofhersacroiliacjoint. This

doctor did not comment on the cause of either condition and suggested a steroid

injection,which Lutherdeclined. BetweenNovember2011andJuly2012Luther

workedfortheStateofAlaskainJuneau,whereshecontinuedtoseeanorthopedicspecialist. She was againdiagnosed ashaving likely[sacroiliac] joint pain and

bilateraltrochantericbursitis.Thedoctordidnotstatethateitherafflictionwascaused

bythecaraccident,andLutheragaindeclinedarecommendedsteroidinjectioninfavor

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ofcontinuedphysical therapy. Throughouther treatment,Lutherwenttophysical

therapyandreceivedacupuncturetreatment,thoughherattendanceatphysicaltherapy

wassomewhatirregular. BothSturleyandtheorthopedicspecialistinJuneauprovided

LutherwithmonthlyworkstatusreportstobesubmittedtoAlaskaAirlinessothat

Luthercouldremainemployedwhileonmedicalleave.

InJuly2012LutherreturnedtoAnchorageandcontinuedherworkforthe

State. Luther was evaluated by James Glenn, another physician assistant in the

orthopedic practice, in December 2012. Glenn reported that he was somewhat

perplexedastowhyLutherwasstillpursuingtreatmenttwoyearsaftertheaccident

withoutseekingmoreaggressivemeasures. Hesuggestedvarioustreatmentoptions

includinginjections,anewMRI,andx-rays,andhenotedthatLuthermightconsidera

discreplacementinordertoreturntoworkasa flightattendant. Glennrefusedto

provideLutherwithaworkstatusreporttoindicatethatLutherhadafulldisability

thatpreventedherfromreturningtowork. AfterherappointmentwithGlenn,Luther

appearstohavestoppedseekingmedicaltreatment,andinDecember2012sheresigned

fromherpositionwithAlaskaAirlines.

B. Proceedings

InOctober2012Lutherfiledacomplaintinthesuperiorcourtallegingthat

Lander was negligent and thather negligence had caused Luther to incur injuries

resultinginongoingmedicalexpenses,lostwages,andpainandsuffering. Lander

admittednegligenceandinDecember2013servedanofferofjudgmentfor$28,500plus

prejudgment interest, allowable Alaska Civil Rule 79 costs, and Alaska Civil

Rule82(b)(1)attorneysfees.Lutherdidnotaccepttheoffer,andthecaseproceededtotrialinMarch2014.

Attrial,Luthertestifiedthattheaccidenthadleftherunabletoperformher

dutiesasaflightattendant,butshedidnotcallanyofherowndoctorsorotherexpert

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medicalwitnesses. Instead,Lutherreliedonherowntestimonyabouthertreatmentand

onhermedicalrecords. Insupportofherclaimfordamagesforpastmedicalexpenses,

Lutherintroducedevidenceofthetreatmentshereceivedaftertheaccident.Someofthe

evidenceshesoughttointroducerevealedthatLuthersinsurer,GEICO,paidsomeof

Luthersmedicalexpensesafter theaccident. ThesuperiorcourtgrantedLanders

requestthattheevidencebeexcluded. Thesuperiorcourtalsoexcludedallevidenceof

thecostsofthevarioustreatmentchargespaidforbyGEICO.ButLutherwaspermitted

tointroduceevidenceofthetreatmentsthemselves.

Luther testified that her total unpaid medical expenses amounted to

$6,745.86. Lander,relyingonthereportandtestimonyofDr.Bald,anindependent

medicalexaminerretainedbyLander,askedthejuryonlytoawardLuther$809forpast

medical costs, theamountLutherpaidfor treatmentincurredwith OrthopedicPhysicians

AnchorageinNovember2011andheracupuncturistinJune2011. Dr.Baldreported

thatLutherdidnotincuranythingmoresignificantthanamuscularstrain-typeinjury

asaresultofthecaraccidentandthatgiventhedelayintheonsetofsymptoms,the

accidentcouldnothaveinjuredhersacroiliacjointorherlumbarspine. WhileDr.Bald

believedthatthetreatmentLutherreceivedduringtheyearfollowingtheaccidentwas

reasonable, appropriate, and necessary for treatment of injuries incurred in [the]

accident, he concluded that it was improbable that Luthers persistent pain was

attributabletotheaccident.HealsofoundthatbythetimeheexaminedLutherin2013,

shewasdoingobjectivelyverywellandshouldhavebeenabletoreturntowork,and

thatLutherspre-accidentsurgeryandinconsistentattendanceatphysicaltherapycould

haveslowedherrecovery.Lutheralsoclaimedlostwagesandbenefitsofmorethan$50,000forthe

timebetweentheaccidentandNovember2011.Shetestifiedthatherbasepayforthe

relevanttimeperiodwouldhavebeen$28,872. ButaccordingtoherW-2s,shemade

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considerablylessthanthatintheyearsprecedingtheaccidentbecauseshewassubject

tofurloughsin2009and2010andwasonmedicalleavefromJuly2010throughthe

timeoftheaccident. Lutheralsoclaimedlossesforvariousbenefitsshereceivedasa

flightattendant,includingadditionalpay,anannualbonus,andflightbenefits forherself,

herfriends,andherfamily.Acknowledgingthatitwasdifficulttovaluethoseadditional

benefitsaccurately,Lutherestimatedtheirvalueatatotalof$15,100. Lutherclaimed

$7,150.52inpaymentsshemadeforCOBRAmedicalinsuranceandalsorequested

damagesfornon-economiclosses. Lutherdidnotclaimfutureeconomiclosses.

LanderarguedthatthemaximumLuthershouldbeawardedforlostwages

was$9,000,theaverageofLuthersannualearningsin2008,2009,and2010. And

Landerassertedthat,becauseLutherhadnotworkedenoughhoursin2010toqualifyfor

medicalinsurancecoveragefromAlaskaAirlines,shehadalreadybeenpayingfor

COBRAatthetimeoftheaccident. Landerarguedthateveniftheaccidenthadnot

occurredandLutherhadreturnedtoherjobasaflightattendantinDecember2010as

planned,shewouldhavetohavecontinuedpayingforherowninsuranceuntilshehad

workedlongenoughtoqualifyforcoverage.

Attheconclusionofthetrial,thejuryreturnedaverdictawardingLuther

$809forpastmedicalexpenses,$1,700forpastwageandbenefitloss,$750forpast

non-economiclosses,andnoamountforfuturenon-economiclosses,foratotalaward

of $3,259. Lander moved for attorneys fees under Alaska Rule of Civil

Procedure68(b)(2)1 andfiledherbillingrecordsunderseal. Thisdesignationwas

laterchangedtoconfidential.

1 Rule68(b)provides: Ifthejudgmentfinallyrenderedbythecourtisatleast5percentlessfavorabletotheoffereethantheoffer...theofferee...shallpayallcostsasallowedundertheCivilRulesandshallpayreasonableactualattorneysfeesincurredbytheofferorfromthedatetheofferwasmade.

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LuthermovedforanewtrialunderAlaskaRuleofCivilProcedure59(a), 2

arguingthatthejurysverdictwasmanifestlyunfair...undertheevidenceproduced

andthecircumstancesofthecase. Shearguedthatthejurysawardsforpastmedical

expensesandlostwagesandbenefitswereinsufficient,andshechallengedthejurys

awardforpain,suffering,andlossofenjoymentoflifeasridiculouslysmall. Luther

also contended that the jury should haveawarded her damages for future lossof

enjoymentoflifeandthecostofCOBRAinsurance.

ThesuperiorcourtawardedLander$8,590.75inattorneysfeesandentered

finaljudgment,offsettingLuthersdamagesawardandprejudgmentinterestsuchthat

LutherowedLanderatotalof$6,494.17. 3

Lutherappeals,arguingthatthesuperiorcourterredby(1)denyingher

requestforanewtrialonthegroundofinadequatedamages,(2)excludingevidenceof

$10,000inmedicalexpensespaidbyLuthersinsurer,GEICO,and(3)allowingLander

tofileherbillingrecordsunderseal.

III. STANDARDOFREVIEW

We review the superior courts evidentiary rulings for abuse of

discretion.4 UnderAlaskaCivilRule61,errorsintheadmissionorexclusionof

2 Rule59(a)provides: Anewtrialmaybegrantedtoalloranyofthepartiesandonallorpartoftheissuesinanactioninwhichtherehasbeenatrialbyjuryorinanactiontriedwithoutajury,ifrequiredintheinterestofjustice.

3 Onthesamedaythatthesuperiorcourtenteredfinaljudgment,thecourtalsoinadvertentlygrantedLuthersmotionforanewtrial. Uponreceiptoftheorder

grantingthenewtrial,Landerfiledamotionforreconsideration.Recognizingthatithadnotintendedtograntthemotion,thesuperiorcourtwithdrewitsordergrantinganewtrialondamagesandsubsequentlydeniedthemotion.

4 Noffke v. Perez,178P.3d1141,1144(Alaska2008)(citingBierria v.(continued...)

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evidencearegroundsforreversal only iffailuretoreverseappearsto[this]court

inconsistentwithsubstantialjustice.5 [W]emustdisregardharmlesserrorsthathave

nosubstantialeffectontherightsofpartiesorontheoutcomeofthecase. 6

Arefusaltograntanewtrialisreviewedunderanabuseofdiscretion

standard;accordingly,wereviewtherecordinthelightmostfavorabletothenon-

movingparty.7 Anabuseofdiscretionexistswhenevidencetosupporttheverdict

wascompletelylackingorwassoslightandunconvincingastomaketheverdictplainly

unreasonableandunjust.8 Wedisturbthetrialcourtsexerciseofdiscretiononlyin

themostexceptionalcircumstancestopreventamiscarriageofjustice9andwillnot

disturbaverdictunlesstheevidence...issoclearlytothecontrarythatreasonable

personscouldnotdifferintheirjudgment.10

4(...continued)

Dickinson Mfg. Co.,36P.3d654,657(Alaska2001)).5 Loncar v. Gray,28P.3d928,930(Alaska2001)(alterationinoriginal).

6 Pedersen v. Blythe,292P.3d182,184(Alaska2012)(firstcitingAlaskaR.Civ.P.61;thencitingCoulson v. Marsh & McLennan, Inc.,973P.2d1142,1146(Alaska1999)).

7 Getchell v. Lodge,65P.3d50,53(Alaska2003)(quotingBierria,36P.3dat656).

8 Id. (quotingBierria,36P.3dat656).

9 Id. (quotingBierria,36P.3dat656).

10 Pralle v. Milwicz,324P.3d286,290(Alaska2014)(omissioninoriginal)(quotingAlaska Democratic Party v. Rice,934P.2d1313,1320n.10(Alaska1997)).

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Wereviewthedecisiontoawardattorneysfeesforabuseofdiscretion

and[will]overturnitonlywheretheawardismanifestlyunreasonable.11However,

[t]heindependentstandardofreview...appliestoconsideringwhetherthetrialcourt

properlyappliedthelawwhenawardingattorneysfees.12

IV. DISCUSSION

A. TheSuperiorCourtsExclusionOfEvidenceOfLuthersTreatmentExpensesWasError,ButTheErrorWasHarmless.

1. Evidence of the full cost of Luthers medical treatment is

relevanttoadeterminationoftheseverityofherinjuries.

Lutherarguesthatthesuperiorcourterredbyexcludingevidenceofthe

costofhermedical treatmentpaidbyGEICO,Luthers insurer. Landersought toexcludetheevidenceofLuthersmedicalbillsonthegroundthatourdecisioninRuggles

v. GrowwouldpreventLutherfromrecoveringanyportionofthemedicalexpensespaid

byGEICO.13 Luthercounteredthatexcludingtheamountoftheexpenseswouldmislead

thejuryintobelievingthatLuthersinjurieswerelessseriousbecauseshehadincurred

fewmedicalexpenses. Toaddressthatproblem,Lutherrequestedajuryinstructionthat

wouldinformjurorsthatheractualmedicalexpensesexceededthoseclaimedattrialby

$10,000,theamountofmedicalexpensespaidbyherowninsurer.

Thesuperiorcourtruledontheissuefromthebenchatthebeginningofthe

trial,grantingLandersrequesttoexcludetheevidence. Thesuperiorcourtnotonly

11 Alaska Fur Gallery, Inc. v. First Natl Bank Alaska,345P.3d76,84(Alaska2015)(alterationinoriginal)(quotingWilliams v. GEICO Cas. Co.,301P.3d1220,1225(Alaska2013)).

12 Baker v.Ryan Air,345P.3d101,106 (Alaska 2015) (alterationsinoriginal)(quotingDeNardo v. Cutler,167P.3d674,677(Alaska2007)).

13 See Ruggles ex rel. Estate of Mayer v. Grow,984P.2d509,512(Alaska1999).

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prohibitedevidenceofthesourceofthepayments,butalsopreventedanyevidenceof

theamountschargedforLuthersvarioustreatments. Forinstance,oneofLuthers

exhibitswasachronologicaltreatmenthistorypreparedbyherorthopedicspecialist,and

thesuperiorcourtsrulingrequiredredactionofanytreatmentpaymentsshowninthat

exhibit that were covered by GEICO. Luther argued for either an exhibit or an

instructiondemonstratingwhatthecostswereforeachtreatmentandsuggestedthat

Luthersinabilitytorecoverthoseexpensescouldbeexplainedinajuryinstruction.But

thetrialcourtconfirmedthatpaymentsbyGEICO,costs,theamountofmoneypaidby

GEICO,billingspaidbyGEICO,mentionofinsurance,allthatisdisallowed.

Thesuperiorcourtdidnotelaborateonthebasisforexcludingeventhe

amountsofthetreatmentcosts,notingonlythatbaseduponthepreviousrulings[the

courthad]alreadymade,[theamountoftheGEICOpayments]shouldbetakenout.

Presumably,thesuperiorcourtwasmindfuloftherulewesetoutinRuggles v. Grow,

whereweheldthatonceaninsurerrequeststhataplaintiffnot...presentitsclaimfor

medicalexpenses,theplaintifflos[es]therighttopresenttheclaimbecausethe

subrogatedclaimbelongstotheinsurer.14 Insurersmaythereforeseekreimbursement

inoneoftwoways: Theinsurercanallowaplaintifftopursuethesubrogatedclaim

alongwiththeplaintiffsownclaimandthenseekreimbursementfromtheplaintiff,or

theinsurercanrequestthattheplaintiffomitthesubrogatedclaim,allowingtheinsurer

toseekreimbursementinseparatelitigation. 15

Inthiscase,thereisnoquestionthatGEICOrequestedthatLutherrefrain

fromincluding the insurers medical-payment claim inher lawsuit and thatunder

Ruggles,Lutherthereforecouldnotrecoveranyportionofthe$10,000paidbyGEICO.

14 Id.

15 Id.

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ButwhileLutherrecognizesthatshecouldnothaverecoveredanyofthe$10,000,she

contendsthatexclusionoftheevidenceofthecostofhertreatmentwasprejudicial

becauseitappeared[tothejury]that[Luther]onlyincurredmedicalexp[e]nsesinthe

amountof$809,theamountshepaidoutofpocket.Landerarguesthatevidenceofthe

costofLutherstreatmentpaidbyGEICOwasirrelevant,misleading,andunfairly

prejudicial.ButLuthermaintainsthatthecostincurredfortreatmentwasrelevantto

the jurys determination of the severity of Luthers injuries and that without that

information,thejurycouldhaveassumedthattheinjuriesmusthavebeenminor.

ThedefinitionofrelevantevidenceunderAlaskaRuleofEvidence401is

broad.16 Forevidencetobeconsideredrelevant,itneednotbedirectorconclusive;it

needonlyhavesometendencytoadvancethepropositionforwhichitisoffered. 17 The

amountexpendedonmedicaltreatmentafteranaccidentmaybearontheseverityofthe

plaintiffs injuries.Justasphotographicevidenceandtestimonyabout thelackofserious

damagetoLuthersandLandersvehicleswasrelevantaspotentiallyreflectingthe

severityoftheaccident,sotooistheamountofmedicalpayments. Itisthenforthejury

todeterminetheweighttobegiventhatevidence.

Courtsinotherjurisdictionshaveaddressedthisissueandconcludedthat

evidenceofmedicalexpensesisadmissiblewhenitisrelevanttotheseverityofan

injury. Forexample,theGeorgiaSupremeCourthasheldthattheamountofmedical

billsmaybeadmissibleonaclaimofpainandsufferingtoshowtheseriousnessofthe

16 Marsingill v.OMalley,128P.3d151, 158 (Alaska 2006)(citingVan Meterv. State,743P.2d385,392(AlaskaApp.1987)).

17 Id. (quotingMcLaughlin v. State,818P.2d683,687(AlaskaApp.1991)).

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injury.18 Thisistrueevenincasesinwhichth[e]expensesshouldnothavebeen

awardedasdamages.19 Similarly,theVirginiaSupremeCourtconcludedthatthetrial

courterredinexcluding[aplaintiffs]medicalbillswhentheplaintiffarguedthatthe

medicalbillswereofferedsolelytoshowthathewastreatedforphysicalinjurieswhich,

hecontends,support[]hisallegationthatheenduredpainandsuffering. 20 Thatcourt

recognizedthattheplaintiffdoesnotseekrecoveryfortheamountofthemedicalbills;

rather,heseeksrecoveryforthepainandsuffering. 21 AndtheMontanaSupremeCourt

reversedthetrialcourtsexclusionoftheamountchargedformedicaltreatment,holding

thatmedicalbillsreceivedbyatortvictimcanberelevantevidenceofissuessuchas

thenatureandseverityoftheinjuries. 22 Anumberoffederalcourtshavealsopermitted

evidence of the amount of medical expenses when introduced for the purpose of

demonstratingtheseverityofaninjury. 23

18 Warren v. Ballard,467S.E.2d891,893(Ga.1996)(citingMelaver v.Garis,138S.E.2d435,436(Ga.App.1964))(holdingthatadoctorsbillwasadmissibleasillustrativeofpainandsuffering).

19 College Park Cabs, Inc. v. Justus,488S.E.2d88,89(Ga.App.1997).

20 Parker v. Elco Elevator Corp.,462S.E.2d98,100(Va.1995).

21 Id.

22 Meek v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.,349P.3d493,495(Mont.2015)(citingChapman v. Mazda Motor of Am.,7F.Supp.2d1123,1125(D.Mont.1998)).

23 See, e.g.,Hannah v. Haskins,612F.2d373,375(8thCir.1980)(notingthatwhile[p]aymentsreceivedfromcollateralsourcesarenotgenerallyallowedtobe

introduced into evidence for purposes of reducing a damage award or showingwrongdoing[,] . . . [e]vidence relating to such payments . . . has been held to beadmissible for the purposeofestablishing the extent ofinjury)(internal citationsomitted);Brice v. Natl R.R. Passenger Corp.,644F.Supp.220,224(D.Md.1987)(holdingthattheamountofmedicalexpensesincurredbyaplaintiffinaworkplace

(continued...)

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We havenot directly considered the questionwhether the amount of

medicalpaymentsisadmissibleforthepurposeofdemonstratingtheseverityofan

injury.ButwepointedoutinRuggles v. Growthatalthoughthesuperiorcourtruledthat

theplaintiffsmedicalexpensesmustbedeductedfromherrecovery,itnevertheless

allowedevidenceofthetreatmentexpenses. 24 Thoughtheadmissibilityofthatevidence

wasnotatissueonappeal,werecognizedthatthepaymentshadbeenadmittedas

evidencebearingontheseverityof[theplaintiffs]injury. 25

InRuggleswewentontoholdthataplaintiffmaynotbringaclaimthatthe

insurersoughttocontrol.26 Buttoexcludeallevidenceofmedicalcostswhenaninsurer

hasmadepaymentsandsubsequentlyrequeststocontroltheclaimwouldcreatean

unintendeddichotomy. Plaintiffsinvolvedinlitigationinwhichtheirinsurersdonot

makesucha requestwould beable to introduceevidenceofall medicalexpenses

includedintheirclaims: Iftheinsurerdoesnotobject,theinsuredmayincludethe

subrogatedclaiminitsclaim....27 Butincasesinwhichaninsureractivelyrequests

thattheplaintiffnotpursuehersubrogationclaim,28aplaintiffwouldbeprohibitedfrom

23(...continued) accidentwasrelevanttothedeterminationofthefullextentandnatureoftheplaintiffs injuries).

24 Ruggles ex rel. Estate of Mayer v. Grow,984P.2d509,511(Alaska1999).

25 Id.

26 Id. at512.

27

Id.28 ODonnell v. Johnson,209P.3d128,135(Alaska2009)(holdingthatthe

commonfunddoctrine,whichallowsalitigantorlawyerwhorecoversacommonfundtoseekreasonableattorneysfeesfromtheentirefund,doesnotapplywhenaninsurer

(continued...)

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presenting evidenceof the expense of medical treatment. Ruggles should not be

interpretedtoproducesuchananomalousresult.

Becauseevidenceoftheamountofmedicalbillsisrelevanttotheseverity

ofaplaintiffsinjury,weconcludethatsuchevidencecannotbeexcludedsolelyonthe

groundthattheplaintiffcannotrecoverthemoney. Thus,ourdecisioninRuggles does

notprecludetheintroductionofevidenceoftheamountsofinsurancepaymentsforthe

purposeofdemonstratingtheseverityofaninjury.

2. TheprobativevalueoftheevidenceofLutherstreatmentcosts

isnotoutweighedbyanydangerofprejudice.

GiventhatLuthersevidenceoftheamountschargedformedicaltreatment

wasrelevant,thenextstepintheanalysisiswhethertheevidenceoftheamountofthe

paymentsshouldhavebeenexcluded[because]itsprobativevalue[was]outweighed

bythedangerofunfairprejudice,confusionoftheissues,ormisleadingthejury,orby

considerationsofunduedelay,wasteoftime,orneedlesspresentationofcumulative

evidence.29 Landerarguesthatto theextentthatevidenceofthecostofLuthers

treatmentsmayhavehadminimalprobativevalue,thatvaluewasfaroutweighedby

itsprejudicialeffectandtendencytoconfuseandmisleadthejury. ButLanderdoesnotexplainwhyadmissionoftheevidencewouldhavebeenprejudicialtoher.Landerwas

freetoargueattrialthatthetreatmentsLutherreceivedwereunnecessaryorwerenot

attributabletotheaccident;indeed,shedidpreciselythat.

28(...continued)activelyrequeststhataplaintiffrefrainfrompursuingasubrogatedclaim).

29 AlaskaR.Evid.403. Wehaveobservedthatthisbalancingtestmeasurestheprobativevalueoftheevidenceagainstitsdeleteriouseffects. Wheretheprejudicialeffectisdemonstrably greater,theevidencemustbeexcluded. Conley v. AlaskaCommcns Sys. Holdings, Inc.,323P.3d1131,1143n.3(Alaska2014)(emphasisadded)(quotingCommentaryAlaskaE.R.403).

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In support of her argument that the evidence could have misled and

confusedthejury,LanderreliesonourdecisioninLoncar v. Gray.30 Theplaintiffinthat

personalinjurycasesoughttointroduceevidenceofherownMedicareandMedicaid

paymentsinpartbecausesheclaimedtheevidencewasrelevanttoherdamagesbecause

she sufferedhumiliationfromacceptingpublicassistance.31 Thesuperiorcourtexcluded

theevidenceofhercoverage,notingthatwhiletheplaintiffcouldnotintroduceevidence

ofMedicaidpayments,shecouldtestifyabouthermedicalcondition,...her medical

bills[,]...herdifficultyinobtainingmedicalcare,...her bills and the amount that has

been run up withoutmentioninginsurance.32 Weaffirmed,reasoningthatevidenceof

Medicaidpaymentswouldhaveopened[thedoor]toevidencefrombothsidesonthe

largerissueofinsurancepaymentsandthispotentiallyverylargebodyofevidence

wouldcreatemoreconfusionoftheissuesthan...anyprobativevalueitmayhave. 33

But here, unlike the plaintiff inLoncar, Luther was prohibited fromentering into

evidenceeventheamounts chargedforhermedicaltreatment. Landersconcernsabout

confusingthejurycouldeasilyhavebeenalleviatedbypermittingevidenceregarding

theamountsofthemedicalbillswhileexcludingtheirpaymentsource.

Thesuperiorcourtcouldhavetakenseveralapproachestoensurethatthe

jurydidnoterroneouslyawardLutheranyportionofthesubrogatedclaim. First,the

superiorcourtcouldhaveinstructedthejurynottoawarddamagesforthemedical

expensesthathadalreadybeenpaidbyLuthersinsurer. Thiswastheremedythat

Luthersuggestedtothesuperiorcourt.

30 28P.3d928(Alaska2001).

31 Id. at933.

32 Id. (alterationomitted)(emphasesadded).

33 Id. (omissioninoriginal).

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Second, the superior court could have instructed jurors not to award

damagesfor treatmentundertakenafter a particular date, whichwouldnecessarily

preclude an award for expenses covered by the insured partys medical-payment

coverage.

Third,thesuperiorcourtcouldhaveallowedthejurytodeterminethetotal

medicalexpensesattributabletotheaccidentandthenreducedthatawardtoprevent

recoveryforpaymentsmadebyGEICO. Wehaveconcluded that thisapproach is

appropriateinthecontextofadamagescap. InKodiak Island Borough v. Roe,we

determinedthatthesuperiorcourtimproperlyinstructedthejuryonastatutorynon

economicdamagescapinanintentionaltortcase:While[t]helegislaturemaylimitthe

amountofdamagesthatcanbeawarded,...itisforthejurytodeterminetheextentof

theplaintiffsinjuryandthedamageawardthatwillmake[himor]herwhole. 34

Anyoftheseapproacheswouldallowaplaintifftointroduceevidenceof

thefullcostofmedicaltreatmentwithoutallowingtheplaintifftorecoveranycosts

precludedbyRuggles,leavingtheinsurerfreetopursueitsseparatelitigation.

3. Thesuperiorcourtsexclusionofevidenceofthefullcostof

treatmentwasharmlesserror.Havingconcludedthatthesuperiorcourterredbyexcludingtheevidence

ofthecostofLuthersmedicaltreatmentcoveredbyGEICO,wemustnextconsider

whetherthaterrorwarrantsanewtrial. Unlesswecandeterminethattheexclusionof

theevidencehadasubstantialeffectontheoutcomeofthetrial, 35wemustconclude

thattheerrorwasharmless. WhileLutherwasimproperlyprecludedfrompresenting

34 63P.3d1009,1016-17(Alaska2003).

35 Pedersen v. Blythe,292P.3d182,184(Alaska2012)(firstcitingAlaskaR.Civ.P.61;thencitingCoulson v. Marsh & McLennan, Inc.,973P.2d1142,1146(Alaska1999)).

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evidenceofallofhermedicaltreatmentexpensesbecausesomewerepaidbyGEICO,

Lutherwasfreetoadmithermedicalrecordsandtotestifyaboutthetypeofmedical

treatmentshereceivedfromthedateoftheaccidentthroughtrial. ItwasLutherwho

electednottopresentasinglemedicalexperttosupportherclaimthattheaccident

causedherpersistentlowerbackpain. Andthemedicalrecordsreflectedthateven

Luthers own orthopedic specialist found her continued need for treatment

perplex[ing]. Lander,ontheotherhand,presentedthetestimonyofDr.Bald,who

underminedanycausalconnectionbetweentheaccidentandLutherscontinuingpain,

alongwithevidenceindicatingthatLutherfailedtomitigateherdamages.

Inlightoftheevidencepresentedandthetrialstrategiesemployedinthis

case,wecannotconcludethatadmissionoftheamountoftheGEICOpaymentswould

havehadasubstantialeffectontheoutcomeofthetrial. Wethereforeconcludethatthe

errorwasharmless.

B. TheSuperiorCourtDidNotErrByDenyingLuthersMotionForA

NewTrial.

Lutheralsoarguesthatthesuperiorcourtshouldhavegrantedhermotion

foranewtrialbecausethejurydidnotawardadequatedamagesand[t]heresultreachedbythejurywasmanifestlyunfair.Butbecausetherewassufficientevidencetosupport

thejurysverdict,weaffirmthetrialcourtsruling.

Lutherhasfailedtoestablishthatthecircumstancesinthiscaseconstitute

thetypeofexceptionalcircumstancesinwhichwewillreverseatrialcourtsdenialof

anewtrialtopreventamiscarriageofjustice. 36 Wehaveheldthat[i]nadequacyof

ajuryverdictisgroundsforanewtrialincaseswherenegligenceisconcededorproved,

Getchell v. Lodge, 65 P.3d 50, 53 (Alaska 2003) (quotingBierria v.Dickinson Mfg. Co.,36P.3d654,656(Alaska2001)).

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36


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butno damages are awarded.37 Butincaseswherethejurymakessome award...

where negligence is conceded or proved, we have not reversed that award as

inadequate.38 Here,thejurydidawarddamages. Becausereasonableminds[can]

differonthecausalrelationshipbetween[an]accidentand[aplaintiffs]injuries...[t]he

resolutionof[the]issue[ofdamages]turnsuponthecredibilityofthewitnesses.39

Here,thejurymaynothavebeenpersuadedthattheaccidentcostLutherasmuchasshe

claimedinmedicalexpenses,lostpay,andpainandsuffering.

Lutherreliesonseveraldecisionsinwhichwereversedasuperiorcourts

denial of a new trial because of inadequate damage awards, but those cases are

unpersuasivehere. Forexample,inPugliese v. Perdue,wereversedanawardofno

damageswhereevidencethattheaccidenthadcausedtheinjurywasindisputable. 40 And

inFancyboy v. Alaska Village Electric Cooperative, Inc.,thejuryawardeddamagesfor

property lossandmedicalexpensesarisingoutofafire thatwasdeterminedtobe

partiallycausedbythedefendant,but itgavenoawardfornon-economicdamages

despitethefactthattheplaintiffssufferedpainfulburnsand...lossofconsortium. 41

Buthere, thejurymadeawards forbothpastmedicalexpensesandnon-economic

damages. AndthecasescitedbyLutherinwhichweupheldasuperiorcourtjudges

37 Glamann v. Kirk,29P.3d255,263(Alaska2001)(emphasisadded).

38 Id.(emphasisadded);seealso Hutchinsv. Schwartz,724P.2d1194(Alaska1986)(affirmingajuryawardof$250forlostearningsratherthanthe$18,500the

plaintiff claimed; $0 instead of $75,000 for lost enjoyment of life and physicalimpairment;and$937forpastmedicalexpensesinsteadoftheclaimed$20,794).

39 Hutchins,724P.2dat1203.

40 988P.2d577,583(Alaska1999).

41 984P.2d1128,1136(Alaska1999).

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discretionarydecisiontogrant anewtrialonthegroundofaninadequateawardof

damages42 supportthepropositionthattheremustbeexceptionalcircumstances...

whichwouldrequireustooverrulethesuperiorcourtsdiscretionarygrantofanew

trial.43 Suchcircumstancesdonotexistinthiscasebecauseareviewoftherecord

revealsthattherewassufficientevidencepresentedtosupportthejurysaward.

First,Lutherchallengesthejurysdecisiontoawardheronly$809forpast

medicalexpenses,arguingthat sheshouldhavebeenawarded $1,578.86,theundisputed

totalof past medicals due for that year. But the jurywas free to make its own

assessmentoftheamountofmedicalexpensesthatwereattributabletotheaccident.As

Landerpointsout,Dr.Baldqualifiedhis statement thatoneyearwasa reasonable

treatmentperiodbyobservingthathewas[g]ivingMs.Lutherquiteabitofbenefitof

thedoubt. AndthejurycouldhavereliedonDr.Baldstestimonythathe[couldnot]

attribute[Luthers]complaintsofintermittentpaininherbuttockto[the]accident.The

jurycouldalsohavedeterminedthatLutherfailedtomitigateherdamages: Dr.Bald

testifiedthatLuthersfailuretoattendallphysical therapy sessions could haveprolonged

herpain,andLutherconcededthatshetwicerefusedsteroidinjectionsrecommendedby

herdoctors. Finally,wehaverecognizedthatwherethedamagetothevehicleisminor,

thatevidencecanbeprobativeoftheforcewithwhichtheaccidentoccurred[]andthe

likelihoodthatitcausedseriousharmtoaparty. 44Sothejurycouldhaveconsidered

thatevidenceinreachingtheconclusionthatLuthersharmfrom theaccidentwasminor.

42 See Buoy v. ERA Helicopters, Inc.,771P.2d439(Alaska1989);Sebringv. Colver,649P.2d932(Alaska1982).

43 Buoy,771P.2dat442.

44 Marron v. Stromstad,123P.3d992,1009(Alaska2005).

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Second,thejuryawardedLuther$1,700inlostwagesandbenefitsdespite

herclaimedlossof$51,122.52. GiventhevariablenatureofLutherscompensationas

aflightattendant,abroadrangeofawardscouldhavebeensupportedbytheevidence.

Weneedonlydeterminewhethertherewassufficientevidencetosupportthejurys

award,andweconcludethattherewas. Inlightofthetestimonyandevidencepresented

attrial,itisplausiblethatthejurysawardreflecteditsbeliefthattheaccidentdidnot

actuallypreventLutherfromreturningtoworkforthefullyear. Dr.Baldtestifiedthat

Luthercouldreturntowork[i]fshesodesired,andGlennrefusedtosignhertotal

disabilityworkstatusreports. Andagain, the jurymayhaveconsideredevidence

presentedbyLanderofLuthersfailuretomitigateandthepossibilityraisedbyLander

attrialthatevenifLutherhadreturnedtoworkinDecember2010,shecouldhavebeen

placedonadditionalfurloughs.Similarly,thejurysdecisionnottocompensateLuther

forherCOBRApaymentswassupportedbyevidencethathervariableworkschedule

maynothaveentitledhertoemployer-providedhealthinsurance. Thus,therewas

sufficientevidencetosupportthejurysawardof$1,700.

Finally,Lutherclaimsthattheamountawardedforherpainandsuffering

resultingfromtheaccidentwasinadequate. Butgiventhesubjectivenatureofajurys

awardofnon-economicdamages,wecannotconcludethattheawardwasunsupported

bytheevidence.WhileLuthertestifiedthatherinjurieshavecausedinterruptedsleep

andpainwhensittingforlongperiodsoftime,Dr.Baldtestifiedthatherexamination

wascompletelyandtotallynormal,andGlennwasperplexedbythefactthatshewas

stillrequestingdisabilitystatustwoyearsaftertheaccident.

Becausetherewasevidencetosupportthejurysawardof damagesandourprecedentdoesnotwarrantareversalofthesuperiorcourtsdenialofLuthersmotion

foranewtrial,weaffirmthatdenial.

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C. TheSuperiorCourtDidNotErrInItsOrderGrantingAttorneysFeesBecauseLutherHadAccessToAllOfLandersBillingRecords.

Finally,LutherarguesthatthesuperiorcourterredingrantingLander

attorneysfeesunderRule 68becauseLanderfiledthedocumentssupportingherrequest

forfeesunderseal. Butwhilethebillingrecordswerefiledunderseal,thecourt

promptlyredesignatedthemasconfidentialinApril2014,providingthepartieswith

accesstothedocuments.45 Andinanyevent,Landerprovidedallofthebillingrecords

insupportofhermotiondirectlytoLuther. Thus,Lutherdoesnotclaimthatshewas

denied access to the supporting billing documentation, and as Lander points out,

Luthersabilitytocontestorrespondtothe[motion]wasinnowayburdenedbythe

factthatthedocumentationwasfiledundersealanddesignatedasconfidentialbythe

court.

Luther makes a persuasive policy argument against the ability of a

prevailingpartytodesignateasconfidentialbillingrecordsinsupportofamotionfor

attorneysfees: Shearguesthatthispracticecouldplaceanundueburdenonparties

opposingthosefeesbypreventingthemfrommentioningtheconfidentialinformation

intheiroppositiontothemotion. Buthere,Lutherdidnotopposethereasonablenessofthehourlyratesortheamountoftimeexpended,andsheexpresslyallowedthatthe

awardofattorneysfeeswaswithinthediscretionof[thesuperiorcourt]. Thus,

Luthersargumentishypothetical,andwedonotneedtoconsiderithere.

Lutheralsoarguesthatasageneralprinciple,courtproceedingsareopen

andthatthereisnoreasondocumentssupportingamotionforattorneysfeesshouldbe

45 UnderAlaskaAdministrativeRule37.5(c),[c]onfidentialmeansaccesstotherecordisrestrictedto: thepartiestothecase;counselofrecord;individualswithawritten orderfromthecourt authorizingaccess;andcourtpersonnelforcaseprocessing

purposesonly,while[s]ealedmeansaccesstotherecordisrestrictedtothejudgeandpersonsauthorizedbywrittenorderofthecourt.

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treateddifferently. Shemaintainsthattheinformationshouldbepublicasamatterof

policybecauseknowledgeoftheprevailinghourlyrateforattorneysmaybeusefulin

futurecases. Thismaybetrue,butLutherdoesnotsuggestthatthetrialcourthas

consideredordeniedanyrequestforaccesstothesedocuments. Andthetrialcourt

may,byorder,limitaccesstopublicinformationinanindividualcaserecordbysealing

ormakingconfidentialthecasefile[or]individualdocumentsinthecasefile. 46 Absent

anyindicationthatLutheroranyotherpartyhasrequestedorbeendeniedaccesstothese

documents,wecannotconcludethatthesuperiorcourtabuseditsdiscretion.

V. CONCLUSION

Forthereasonsdiscussedabove,weAFFIRMthefinaljudgmentofthe

superiorcourt.

AlaskaAdmin.R.37.6(a).

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46

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Luther v. Lander, Alaska (2016)

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