Lysander and the Devil

L’Antiquité Classique

Lysander and the DevilAuthor(s): Graham WylieSource: L’Antiquité Classique, T. 66 (1997), pp. 75-88Published by: L’Antiquité ClassiqueStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41659300 .

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Lysander and the Devil

Evil has its heroes as well as good. LA ROCHEFOUCAULD

Preface

Lysander' s short-lived pre-eminence heralded a turning point in Spartan history - the onset of a moral and military decline which reduced the greatest power in Hellas within a century to a mere backwater, a museum piece. For this, he personally was largely responsible. At his peak he wielded more power than any Greek before him (PLUT., Lys., 18, 2 y. His victory at Aegospotami effectively ended the Peloponnesian War. Greek cities erected altars and sacrificed to him as if he were a god. He revelled in this idolatry. He kept poets to sing of his exploits, and erected bronze statues of himself and his two admirals at Delphi. His very successes hastened the decline. The masses of gold and silver brought into Sparta by Lysander (and after him by Agesilaus) further weakened the noble if over-rigid Lycurgan regime and within a generation made Spartans hated for their rapacity (NEPOS, VI, 1, 3), their morals despised where they were once respected (XEN., Lac. Pol., 14). With his decarchies and harmosts he forged sharper weapons for megalomaniac Spartan dreams of empire outside Greece, which gradually depleted their manpower. His cruelty, his total lack of scruples, and his cynical use of religion in the form of oracles found ready imitators - and his successor, another empire-builder, carried on his work. Agesilaus' Asian expedition, pace Xenophon (Ages., 1, 8), was little more than an exercise in large-scale banditry2.

Historical background

The calamitous failure of the Athenian expeditions to Sicily (415) triggered off a series of threats to the stability of the Athenian empire. Persia saw its chance to reclaim authority over the Aegean region, especially Ionia and the offshore islands. The Greek cities of Ionia saw their chance to be free of Athenian rule. Sparta saw its chance to gain support in the Peloponnesian War, and concluded the «treaty of Miletus»

1 Plutarch's Lysander and Xenophon's Hellenica will be cited simply as Lys., Hell. 2 For discussion of Agesilaus' war aims, see G.J. Wylie, in Klio, 74 (1992), p. 127-

129.



76 GR. WYLIE

(412) with Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, the Persian satraps in the west. Meanwhile most of the maritime cities, headed by Chios, which had a large navy, indicated their readiness to revolt if backed by a Peloponnesian fleet, and a number did so (Chios, Teos, Miletus, Ephesus, etc.). Athenian victories over Peloponnesian navies at Cynossema (411) and Cyzicus (410) set back the process, and a few cities were retaken. When Lysander came on the scene as Spartan admiral in 408, Athens still held the northern (Euboea, Thasos) and Hellespontine allies (Byzantium, Chalcedon, etc.) but had lost all the west coast of Asia Minor except Lesbos, Samos (the main naval base), Halicarnassus and Cos. The young Persian prince Cyrus had just been appointed military commander in western Asia Minor.

Lysander the man

Lysander was the son of a free Spartan, Aristoclitus - probably not a mothax as is suggested3 - and from age 6 underwent the prolonged toughening and brutalizing ( agoge ) which eventually qualified him to enter the assembly at 30 as a full citizen and become a member of a sussition (mess).The system, and the semi-monastic life which even adult citizens were expected to lead, turned out superbly disciplined soldiers; but were not compatible with a growing taste for luxury (ARIST., Pol., n, 9, 1271b).

Lysander was probably five to ten years older than Agesilaus (whose lover he had reputedly been - Lys., 22, 3), corresponding to a birth date c. 454-449. The Spartans would hardly have appointed a man under 40 as admiral (408), nor one without experience as a senior officer in the armed forces. He was born to poverty (Lys., 2, 1), and unlikely to have been pushed up the ladder, so to speak, unduly fast. How did he come to be appointed to a top command at all, in the relatively peaceful period after 421 ? To be sure, he may have kept up his friendship with Agesilaus, for what that was worth. But he is described as the best man available, a «daring» man (DIOD., XIII, 70, 1), a «leader of exceptional ability» who could cope with Alcibíades after the shattering Spartan defeat at Cyzicus (Lys., 3). How did he get this reputation ? Hitherto he had been quite unknown outside Sparta4, and is not even mentioned as a commander in the main sources (Thucydides, Xenophon, Plutarch, Diodorus) before this date. Nor was he a spectacular fighting general like Brasidas, who would give battle against any odds. Why then was he chosen ?

3 Kahrstedt, in R.E., XIII, 2, 2503. For discussion, see J.-F. Bommelaer, Ly sandre de Sparte : histoire et traditions , Paris, 1981, p. 36-38. * Bommelaer, op. cit., p. 26.



LYSANDER AND THE DEVIL 77

One must assume at least that he was not chosen primarily for his generalship. Sparta's problem was not military, but economic. Their navy had been all but wiped out at Cynossema and Cyzicus, and there was no money for another. Agis and Pausanias, the reigning kings, did not like him much, but they were no seamen, any more than Mindarus. What was needed was not the usual blunt Spartan, but a leader of parts, who could win the cooperation of the Ionian Greeks and gain the confidence and support of the prince Cyrus, dispenser of unlimited funds. This does not sound much like the later «harsh» Lysander whose arrogance annoyed his equals and terrified his inferiors (Lys., 19), and we must assume that he could be both charming and persuasive at will. Perhaps he came to the fore as leader and organizer of a faction of «Young Turks», who objected to all the commands going to senior men. His appointment must have been to some extent experimental, for his negotiating skills could not have been well known, but he probably was known as a first-rate organizer. Conceivably, the original purpose of appointing him might have been to prepare the ground for an offensive by a more active general.

The office of admiral in 408, with practically no navy to command, might not have appealed to a less patient man. But for Lysander, it was that or nothing. Important land commands usually went to the kings. Here he was able to use his undoubted gifts in a wider field, away from the stultifying atmosphere of Sparta. He made the friendly city of Ephesus his base, enlarging and restoring the fleet and directing merchant ships to land their cargoes there despite the Athenian blockade. From the first, he was on the best of terms with the seventeen- year-old Cyrus, showing him «submissive deference», and encouraging the animosity between the prince and Tissaphernes, the satrap of Ionia, whom Cyrus had superseded as military commander. Lysander himself had prudently avoided hostilities with the much superior forces of Alcibiades (Lys., 9, 2; Hell., II, 1, 14) even at the risk of abandoning allies5; but in winter 407-406 he unexpectedly scored a resounding naval victory at Notium, near Ephesus, over his deputy, who had recklessly offered battle in Alcibiades' absence. The Athenians lost 15 triremes6 and retired to Samos, and Alcibiades was exiled. This may have raised Lysander' s hopes of a third term of office7, especially as he had made

5 Ibidem, p. 89-90. 6 Sources agree (Lys., 7, 1; Hell., II, 1, 7; Diod., XIII, 100, 8) that under Spartan law, no man could be admiral twice; but N. Robertson (in Historia, 29 [1980], p. 291, n. 28; 292) finds confusion in Xenophon's dating, and concludes that both Lysander and his predecessor Cratesippidas had two successive terms of office. Perhaps it was the third term that set a precedent. 7 Hell., I, 5, 14; Plut., Lys., 5, 2; cf. Diod., XIII, 71, 4 and Hell. Oxyrh., 4. For possible explanation, see Bommelaer, op. cit., p. 3-4, n. 56.



78 GR. WYLEE

many influential friends among the Greek cities in Ionia. But only a few months later his term ended (Aug. 407), and a new admiral, one Callicratidas, arrived with more ships (spring 406) thirsting for combat with the Athenians, and quite unimpressed by Lysander's achievements.

Lysander's behaviour towards Callicratidas can hardly be described as cooperative or even patriotic, particularly the returning of surplus funds to Cyrus and then departing for Sparta. He probably summed him up, or was warned about him, as an impetuous hothead who might imperil all his good work by provoking a premature show- down with the Athenian navy. Had Callicratidas been capable of listening to advice, Lysander might have been more helpful. His messages to Lysander and Conon (Lys., 6, 2; Hell., I, 6, 15) were simply bumptious; his failure to get on friendly terms with anybody, and his final defeat and death, were entirely his own doing.

To begin with, he managed to offend Cyrus, probably by ignoring the usual protocol in seeking an audience (Lys., 6, 5). Otherwise the prince would hardly have refused to meet the military commander of his chief ally, or allowed his flunkeys to insult him (Lys., 6, 5), or even told him to go away and await an answer (Hell., I, 6, 5). If they did meet, the Spartan no doubt displayed what Plutarch calls «Doric simplicity» but what the courteous Persian would see as blundering schoolboy rudeness. A general who thought it a lesser indignity to be beaten by the Athenians than to beg money from barbarians (Lys., 6, 4) was not likely to be very tactful. At any rate, he got no money till much later (Hell., I, 6, 18).

Nor was he more successful with the Greek cities. His speeches (Hell., I, 6, 5; 6, 8-11) show some muddled thinking. Was he offering to go home if Lysander thought himself the better admiral - or offering to free Miletus from Persian rule ? Lysander's friends hardly needed to be warned against Callicratidas - once confronted by that grim, arrogant figure, embodying the most unlovely Spartan virtues. Even Plutarch, who admired Callicratidas (Lys., 1, 1), admits (Lys., 6, 5) that his negotiating skills were a minus quantity.

Events turned out as Lysander had foreseen. The Athenian navy was still formidable in line of battle. After some preliminary successes, Callicratidas gave battle near the Arginusae islands, against his pilot's advice (Aug. 406). He was outmanoeuvred and totally defeated, losing his own life and two-thirds of the fleet8.

In spring 405, at the urgent request of the Greek allies, supported by Cyrus (Lys., 7, 2; Hell., II, 1, 7), Lysander was sent out again to Ephesus, nominally as vice-admiral under Aratus but in fact with supreme power as before. So began the most glorious phase of his

8 For details, G.J. Wylie, in Civ. Class. Crist., 11 (1990), p. 233-249.




career. He was rid of an obstructive rival, albeit at a heavy cost in warships - but soon made up the losses, again in an unexpected way.

The making of a God

The foundations for his great work had been laid during his previous term of office (407). His purpose was nothing less than to replace the Athenian empire by a new empire in the east, consisting of a wide network of Greek cities forcibly transformed into oligarchies ruled by his own creatures and owing allegiance to himself alone. Athenian rule had been mild, exacting tribute from allies in return for naval protection against enemies, including Persia, but meddling little with internal affairs; the new rulers, wielding near-absolute power (Lys., 19, 1), would be councils of ten citizens (decarchies) protected by a Spartan governor (harmost) and garrison, and offering no benefits to any but Lysander and themselves. Oligarchic coups supported by foreign powers were not uncommon in Greece, as at Samos in 411 (THUC., VIII, 73 ff.); but this was something new - widespread, arbitrary and unprecedentedly bloody. Whether Lysander intended ultimately to hand over the network to Spartan administrators we shall never know. By the time his activities were discovered, he was «master of Greece» (Lys., 21, 1).

Plutarch tells us that Lysander summoned from various cities «men outstanding in courage and enterprise» (Lys., 5) to form political clubs ( hetaireiai ), which might not too fancifully be called covens, given that his future oligarchs had to be most carefully chosen and brainwashed, and enjoined to observe the strictest secrecy until the time came for action. The blood-bath at Miletus exemplifies what could happen if news got out too soon (Lys., 8).

Lysander' s choice of recruits, most of them initially known to him only by repute, must have involved him in prolonged one-to-one interviews if he was to establish dominance over their minds - no easy matter with conspirators who, however greedy and ambitious, would prefer to keep their options open. So difficult and time-consuming, that one is tempted to conclude that Lysander relied on surgery rather than medication : on the direct implanting of a whole new code of morals, perhaps backed by supernatural authority (cf. Lys., 25, 2) and embodying the Satanic principle : «Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the law». The conventional gods were abjured; and conventional sins such as murder, oath-breaking, lies and treachery were merely operating tools. His recorded remarks (e.g. Lys., 7, 3-4; 8, 4; 22, 1) and actions certainly give that impression. The penalty for betraying the group, the coven, however, would be death; and he seems to have had few if any defectors.



80 GR. WYLIE

Installation of the oligarchies no doubt began after the battle of Notium and the final exile of Alcibiades, when Athens had been thrown on to the defensive. Few cities are specified by the sources, but the first targets were probably those in the south-west (Caria and Ionia) known to have revolted against Athens9. During this period (405-403), Lysander was also engaged in subduing a few Athenian allies who were still holding out. Meanwhile the main operation proceeded steadily northward. It was when his activities extended into Hellespontine Phrygia that he incurred the wrath of Pharnabazus, the satrap of the region, which eventually brought about his ruin.

Details of Lysander' s operations given by ancient sources are scrappy but generally corroborate one another. The most gruesome were those at Miletus (Lys., 8, 1-3; Hell., I, 6, 12; DIOD., XIII, 104, 5), where democratic rule was probably firmly entrenched and the conspirators were anxious to kill off their opponents rather than let them escape into exile. Lysander himself deliberately reassured some 800 intending fugitives who were afterwards murdered (Lys., 19, 3). Other horrifying examples were Iasus (DIOD., XIII, 104, 7) and Cedriae (Hell., H, 1, 15), two Carian cities taken by storm, where all adult males were slaughtered, women and children enslaved and the cities razed. These seem to be isolated cases; cities taken by storm were often looted, as with Lampsacus (Lys., 9, 4; Hell., II, 1, 18) and Samos (Lys., 14, 1-2; Hell., II, 3, 6), but free citizens allowed to leave. After Aegospotami, even Athenian garrisons were spared, but the decarchies were installed. «In the other cities», says Plutarch (Lys., 19, 3), «untold numbers of the popular party were slain, since [Lysander] killed not only for his own private reasons, but also to gratify the hatred and cupidity of his many friends everywhere, and shared the bloody work with them». Diodorus (XIV, 13, 1) says that Lysander established decarchies and oligarchies «according to the will of the ephors», but obviously little was known in Sparta until his exposure by Pharnabazus.

Athens

Lysander' s naval victory at Aegospotami (Sept. 405) was notable for the capture of almost the whole Athenian fleet and for the mass execution of 3 000 Athenian prisoners, rather pointless but not out of character10. After reducing Byzantium, Calchedon and other Athenian allies and ordering the garrisons to return to Athens, he sailed to Piraeus

9 The more important were probably Cos, Cnidus, Halicarnassus, Miletus, Ephesus, Erythrae, Lebedus, Clazomenae, and the city-states of Rhodes and Lesbos. See R.J.A. Talbert, Atlas of Classical History , Beckenham, 1985, p. 44-45. 1 0 Pausanias (IX, 32, 6) says 4000. For discussion of this massacre, see G.J. Wylie, in L' Ant. Class., 55 (1986), p. 125-141.




and imposed a total sea blockade on the city. He was joined by Agis from Decelea and Pausanias with an army from Sparta.

Lysander's subjugation of Athens was reminiscent of that of the Ionian cities, but with complicating factors. In Athens, a much larger city, he could count on support from a strong minority not averse to some weakening of democracy, rather than from only a handful of ambitious individuals. On the other hand, some antipathy to Sparta and Spartans was to be expected in a conquered city whose empire was lost. Therefore, he should work through intermediaries. And it would be no easy matter to formulate acceptable peace terms which would make a defence of Athens impossible in case of a revolt. Lastly, Lysander did not have a free hand as before, since the kings were present. With his usual foresight, he managed to surmount these obstacles.

The beleaguered city surrendered only after a siege followed by protracted peace negotiations, the point at issue being the demolition of Athens' main defences, the Long Walls and those round Piraeus. Starving an enemy into submission was of course no more than any besieging general would have done, and indeed Agis set the pattern by referring Athenian ambassadors to the ephors in Sparta. But it was apparently Lysander, with his Athenian confederate Theramenes, who spun out negotiations for three months. The victors entered the city at the end of March 404, and the kings then departed.

Even then Lysander took care not to appear too openly in «restoring the ancient constitution» of Athens as laid down by the ephors {Hell., II, 3, 2), but merely called an Assembly and advised them to elect a Council of Thirty to do this. By a curious coincidence, most of the Thirty chosen were of a very similar type to the politicos he had chosen in Asia. He then departed, to settle affairs in Samos and elsewhere before returning to Sparta11. Meanwhile the Thirty proceeded to invest themselves with supreme power and kill off political opponents in larger numbers, under the protection of a Spartan garrison and harmost, one Callibius, supplied by the agency of the obliging Lysander. But the situation was too explosive to last. Within six months the Thirty, thrown out of the city by a popular revolt, took refuge in Eleusis, where they appealed to Sparta for aid.

The political situation, however, was changing, and not in his favour. About the time the victorious Spartans entered Athens, the Persian king Darius died and was succeeded by his elder son Artaxerxes. Lysander's friend Cyrus, accused by Tissaphernes of

1 1 Cf. Lys., 15, 5. He must have appeared in Athens personally at least once after the Thirty had assumed power.



82 GR. WYLIE

plotting against the king12, was imprisoned for a time, though he was later reinstated in his province (An., I, 1, 3). Meanwhile Lysander's influence in the Ionian cities, which had been under Tissaphernes' control (An., I, 1, 7), must have been materially weakened, and there is no evidence that he ever resumed his close relation with Cyrus. And in Sparta, although he was briefly13 a national hero after Aegospotami (Lys., 18), opinion was hardening against him. Sparta was still mainly concerned with retaining power in the Peloponnesus and Greece generally, and having demolished Athenian power, was reluctant to take over the empire, and deeply suspicious of Lysander's imperialist activities. The ephors were busy replacing his harmosts and decarchies with oligarchies of a less controversial kind, possibly by public election, though garrisoning was maintained; and the kings had buried their hereditary rivalry and combined against him. Opinion seemed to be trending towards peace with Persia. Lysander was allowed to tidy up the affairs of a few remaining Athenian allies, and then recalled permanently (Lys., 21, 1). The Pharnabazus scandal had fatally wounded his credibility; even the wealth he brought into the city did not redeem him - indeed was deplored by more far-seeing Spartans. Only the revolt against the Thirty in Athens at the end of 404 gave him a fresh opening. He must still have had a following in Sparta - including ex-harmosts and others clinging to his coat-tails - for he persuaded the ephors to send him as harmost to restore order, together with his brother Libys, the current admiral. The city was again besieged and blockaded. But for once Lysander was outmanoeuvred. Pausanias arrived with an army and, after an initial show of force, pacified the rebels by making a secret peace. Lysander's career was brought to a full stop.

For the ensuing seven years there are long periods when the sources give no indication at all of his activities14. He took no part in any of the expeditions set on foot : neither the war against Elis led by Agis (399 - Hell., Ill, 2, 23-25); nor in Asia with his former friend Cyrus (401), who chose Clearchus, a disreputable Spartan exile (Art., I, 1, 9; II, 6, 3-4; DIOD., XIV, 12), to lead his Greek mercenaries15; nor in the Spartan forces sent to aid the Greek cities of Ionia against Tissaphernes (400-396) and led successively by Thibron and Dercylidas. We do not hear of him in the war preparations of Agesilaus during 397. Certainly

12 Plutarch ( Artax 3, 3-5), following Ctesias, was not sure that the accusation (of plotting the king's murder) was unfounded; and Diodorus, quoting Ephorus (XIV, 11, 2; 12, 8; 19, 2), says Cyrus was plotting against his brother from the outset. A bitter family feud was involved (Ctesias, 54-56). 13 Bommelaer, od. cit.. d. 134.

14 Ibidem , p. 179. 15 If Cyrus had wanted Lysander as general, he could have asked for him (Hell., Ill, 1, 1); but Cyrus was now in his mid twenties, and perhaps saw him for what he was.




Lysander could claim no important military successes to match his naval victories. Arguably, Clearchus and Dercylidas were better generals, and Lysander was included in Agesilaus' Spartiate entourage primarily out of friendship. But it can hardly be doubted that he had lost his pre- eminence.

He might at first have hoped for another command, for the kings were no generals. Agis was old and hidebound, and Pausanias was incompetent, judging by his inept handling of the attack on the Athenians {Hell., II, 4, 31-34) - and moreover was being criticized for letting Athens throw off its oligarchy and regain independence (Lys., 21, 4). But the conservative element in office did not like enterprising generals. Even the great Brasidas was only entrusted with a body of neodamodeis of dubious loyalty, but not the money to pay them. Lysander would not be called on again, except in a national emergency.

Lysander' s reaction to this situation showed up the soft spot in his character. His judgement was sound and his diplomatic and tactical skills undoubted. He was no coward in battle. But unlike a Caesar, a Brasidas, or event a Cinadon {Hell., Ill, 3, 5 ff.), he had no stomach for a major gamble. His successes had been won by trickery, or by seizing on an adversary's false move. His future now depended on overcoming the factions arrayed against him in Sparta, particularly those of the kings and the Gerousia. He dared not use force, in a society ruled for centuries by the rigid Lycurgan regime; his own savagely disciplined upbringing, perhaps, inhibited him. All had to be done within the law, and without himself appearing openly. The idea of initiating (but not leading) a popular movement to change the constitution, to throw the kingship open to all Spartans, probably occurred to him long before he acted. Meanwhile the authorities might well have thought it prudent to keep such a man busy on minor army duties outside Sparta, such as garrisoning; or since discussing such a step even in private was risky, it is quite likely that he simply hesitated to take the plunge - until driven to it by a last bitter disappointment. And then, for the first time his judgement failed him.

Lysander no doubt judged correctly in throwing his powerful16 support behind Agesilaus' claim to the throne on the death of his brother king Agis in 399 (Lys., 22, 5-6; Hell., Ill, 3, 2-3). Arguably, even probably, Agesilaus would have been elected anyway, for many Spartans, including king Agis himself, believed that Agis' son Leotychides was a bastard sired by the Athenian Alcibiades while he was an exile in Sparta. Only on his deathbed was Agis persuaded by the

16 Plutarch twice states (Ages., 3, 3; Lys., 22, 6) that Lysander's influence was «very great», and so it may have been after Aegospotami; but this may be doubted after seven years of obscurity.



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youth's «sobs and tears» to acknowledge him as his heir (PLUT., Ages., 3, 2). Moreover Agesilaus was a man in his forties (born 444), good- humoured and popular with his fellow-citizens; his rival was an untried youth who had never been honoured as a legitimate son. Lysander's intervention turned aside an awkward oracle and won him Agesilaus' warm regard. Its long-term effect on his career, however, was quite another matter.

Lysander might have been able to dominate the teenager Leotychides, but if he thought he could manipulate Agesilaus he made a fatal mistake. Agesilaus indeed was somewhat of an enigma. Small, lame, insignificant in appearance, gentle or even playful in manner (Plut., Ages., 2, 3), he seems never to have taken part in a major campaign before Agis' death, having lived his adult life under the Thirty Years' «Peace». Yet he like Lysander had learned physical hardiness, obedience to customs and respect for authority, and ambition for military distinction (Ages., 2, 1). In fact he became one of the strongest and ablest of Sparta's kings17. It did not take him long to sum up Lysander's status in the east, still extraordinary after seven years' absence, and put him in his place once and for all.

Agesilaus had needed little urging from Lysander to take the field against Persia, with whom relations had noticeably cooled since Artaxerxes' succession and the Cyrus expedition. The ostensible cause was to «free the Greek cities of Asia», all of which except Miletus had sided with Cyrus, though the report of a Phoenician fleet in preparation (Hell., Ill, 4, 1) may have hastened matters. But the Greek cities could not contain their joy at the return of their friendly Spartan under whom they had enjoyed relative freedom and prosperity, and at the prospect of escaping reprisals from the dreaded Tissaphernes, now satrap of the region. Lysander on his side was possibly less than tactful; and less than anxious to discourage suitors from flocking to his door. He was, after all, only one of thirty Spartiate staff officers, and had many jealous colleagues ready to report real or fancied slights to the king. Agesilaus was an exceptionally unassuming (PLUT., Ages., 4, 3) and popular commander, but his patience had its limits, and eventually he gave Lysander a severe and well-deserved reprimand. It is surprising that Lysander, even in his euphoria, should have been so impervious to the snubs already given him (PLUT., Ages., 7, 4-5) and have the effrontery to demand an explanation. He was now evidently dismayed, and rushed off to the Hellespont, where he managed to subvert a distinguished Persian whom he brought back and laid at the king's feet - rather like a dog with a bone - in the hope of pacifying him. But the governorships and the staff commands for the expedition had been allotted, and it is

17 W.G. Forrest, A History of Sparta 950-192 B.C., London, 1968, p. 126.




doubtful whether he would have got one anyway. He was given no more commissions; and when his year's term was up he sailed home with the other Spartiates, and another group headed by Herippidas took their place. He was gone when Xenophon, who had been campaigning under Dercylidas, joined Agesilaus; and Xenophon does not mention him again except to record his death a year later.

The decline

Augurs and understood relations have ... brought forth The secreť st man of blood.

SHAKESPEARE, Macbeth , Act m

Back in Sparta, Lysander must have been like a caged animal. His bitter resentment against Agesilaus and the whole Spartan system cannot entirely have blinded him to the fact that the catastrophe was largely his own doing. Revelling in the old atmosphere of flattery and adulation, he had forgotten his usual caution. He had sacrificed the king's goodwill for the passing pleasure of playing king himself. There was nothing for it now but to return to the undeniably risky project of unkinging the kings18. It is characteristic of his devious mind that he chose an almost ludicrously roundabout method - using Apollo, the god of truth and prophecy, for his own nefarious ends.

To this period (Lys., 25, 1; but cf. DIOD., XIV, 13, 1-2) belong his efforts to seduce the Spartans through their well-known reliance on oracles (DIOD., ibidem , 2). Having ransacked the extant oracles of Apollo in vain for relevant material, he offered bribes first to the priestess at Delphi, then to those at Dodona, and finally to the priests in the temple of Zeus Ammon at Cyrene. All three refused, and the Libyans denounced him to the ephors in Sparta. He seems to have talked his way out of the charge. We are not told how the desired prophecy was worded, but those serving the oracles not unnaturally saw the unwisdom of counselling a citizen of Sparta, however indirectly, to overthrow the ruling government. Moreover, Sparta was a good customer. His efforts ended with a farcical attempt, which failed, to pass off a youth from Pontus as Apollo's son, qualified to read his secret oracles. The eloquent speech written for him by Cleon of Halicarnassus was never delivered.

1 8 Cf. N. Machiavelli, The Prince , chap. 6 : «Nothing is more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, and more doubtful of success than initiating changes in a state's constitution.»



86 GR. WYT.TF.

Conclusions

Lysander then lapsed into permanent melancholy (Lys., 28, 1) and seems to have become so evil-tempered that even the ephors were glad to send him off into Phocis to collect troops for a campaign against Thebes. His orders were to join with the main army under his old enemy Pausanias, the chief commander, at Haliartus (Hell., Ill, 4, 6); but arriving first, he did not wait but attacked the city, which was strongly held by the Thebans, who had intercepted his message to Pausanias. He was killed at once, and his force fell back with heavy losses. Pausanias was later tried for his life for making a truce with the Thebans, who had been joined by the Athenians, and died in exile.

So Lysander died at the first assault, probably with a spear through him, and his body lay unburied on the field for several days. His career was over; but how was it judged by commentators of his own time and after ?

Not admiringly enough, according to Westlake19, who regards him as a «great man», and considers that he could have planned and led the Asian campaign better than Agesilaus. This is debatable. Agesilaus was a very competent field commander; whereas on land, Diodorus (XIII, 104, 8) remarks that apart from sacking a city or two, Lysander «accomplished nothing of importance». He never commanded in a major land battle; and the skirmish where he lost his life does not impress one with his ability (PLUT., Comp. Lys. & Suli, 4, 3; XEN., Hell., III, 5, 18-19)20. He does, indeed, deserve credit for his reorganization of the Spartan navy, and for his two great naval victories. We may guess that he would not have fallen into the same trap as Callicratidas at the Arginusae - though we may wonder how he would have fared as admiral in such a prolonged battle, where there was no chance of surprising the enemy.

Commentators do in fact offer somewhat ambiguous judgements of Lysander, and this may well be, as Westlake21 suggests, because of his character, which he describes as «unattractive, even for a Spartan», adding that he was not conspicuous for honesty or patriotism. Plutarch (Comp. Lys. & Suli., 4, 5) says that he did more harm to Sparta than Sulla did to Rome; and Pausanias (IX, 36, 6-10) agrees that his evil deeds outweighed the good. Nepos (Lives, VI, 1) and Polyaenus (Strat., 1, 45) comment on his cruelty and treachery, and remark that his reputation was gained largely by good fortune and the poor discipline of

19 H.D. Westlake, Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History, Manchester, 1969, chap. 12, p. 222. 20 Cf. Westlake, ibidem , p. 222-223, who criticizes Xenophon on this point, and refutation by B. Due, in Class. Med., 38 (1987), p. 60-61. 21 Westlake, op. cit., p. 223-224.




his opponents, as at Aegospotami22. Diodorus (XIII, 104, 5-7), perhaps the least critical, records his massacres at Miletus and Iasus. Xenophon, his contemporary, records his actions objectively and with few comments - though not approvingly enough for Westlake23, who claims that Xenophon as an Athenian was «prejudiced» against Lysander, but produces little evidence that he omitted or distorted facts24.

While there was nothing in contemporary Greek religion to correspond with the Christian concepts of sin, guilt and repentance25, many Greeks of his time must have seen Lysander as one assuredly marked out for divine retribution. His life was one long defiance of the gods and everything they stood for. He jeered at oaths, he degraded the oracles of the gods by offering their servants bribes for false prophecies, he tainted himself and his city by wholesale murder. And what could be greater hubris than allowing himself to be worshipped as a god ? He ridiculed those who jibbed at using lies, deceit and treachery as political weapons (Lys., 7, 3) and revelled in cruelty. To one like Xenophon with the moral outlook of an agathos and eusebes, reinforced by Socrates, he could only be an object of repugnance.

What was the motivation of this powerful but somewhat enigmatic personality ? There was something inhuman about him. In Christian times, he might have been deemed a Satanist, a devil-worshipper, who recruited others to carry on the devil's work of revolution, wars and destruction26. His «friends» were hirelings, tempted by ambition and greed (Lys., 5, 3-4) and governed by fear (Lys., 19). We look in vain in Plutarch and other chroniclers for any act of disinterested kindness or generosity. He was truly diabolic; his «virtues» were mere abstentions. He was not tempted by wealth or luxury, and immune to fleshly vices. All he sought, it seemed, was supreme power and adulation; and he made himself well-nigh all-powerful in the East. Yet when at last faced by a serious challenge, he collapsed like a pricked balloon. His subsequent attempts to reinstate himself by challenging the monarchy

22 Probably true as regards Aegospotami; of the six Athenian admirals, five had had little or no naval experience, and the sixth, Conon, was not the admiral in charge on the day of the battle. See Wylie, art. cited in note 70, d. 130-131.

23 Westlake, on. cit ., d. 216-225. 24 Cf. Due, l. cit., p. 53-62; disagrees with Westlake's view that Xenophon' s

treatment of Lysander is proof of Xenophon' s «inability to understand real greatness and as an illustration of his prejudices and their effects upon the work» (p. 54). 25 G.L. Dickinson, The Greek View of Life , London, 1947, chap. 1, especially p. 16 ff. 26 Cf. Richard Baxter, An Historical Discourse of Apparitions and Witches (1691), who writes that Revenge is «the most ordinary Business of Witches and Devilized Souls», who may be known by three marks, Lying, Malignity, and Hurtfulness. These appear most clearly in the members of Secret and Subversive Societies, whose whole business is revenge - upon all orderly and peaceful life, upon religion, upon culture, upon beauty.



88 GR. WYLIE

can only be described as spasmodic and inept. And in the end he threw his life away, after provoking a rather pointless war with Thebes. His work was done, and his master had done with him. The seeds of destruction were sown in Sparta's simple way of life, always fragile, but fine and chivalrous while it lasted. The Lycurgan constitution was ideally suited to promote harmony and equality among the citizens and to preserve their freedom (POLYB., VI, 10; 48) - but it also made them ambitious and eager for supremacy. It could not survive hegemony over all Greece, much less a foreign empire.

Monash University Melbourne Australia

Graham WYLIE



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Lysander and the Devil

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