Making Governments: Parliamentary Democracies. Tuesday.

Making Governments: Parliamentary Democracies

Tuesday

Government

A parliamentary democracy is one in which the government depends only on a legislative majority to exist.

The government comprises a prime minister and the cabinet.

The prime minister is the political chief executive and head of the government.

The cabinet is composed of ministers whose job it is to be in the cabinet and head the various government departments.

In a parliamentary democracy, the executive branch and the government are the same thing.

Responsibility

Ministerial responsibility refers to the constitutional doctrine by which cabinet ministers must bear ultimate responsibility for what happens in their ministry.

This might sound boring but is actually pretty awkward…..

Greet Hofmans-Affair

IRT-Affair

Responsibility

Collective cabinet responsibility refers to the doctrine by which ministers must publicly support collective cabinet decisions or resign

This might sound boring but is also awkward….

Sebrenica

Government Formation

New governments form in two circumstances:Following elections.

In the middle of an interelection period, following the resignation of the current government.

How do governments form in parliamentary democracies?


The key characteristic of the government formation process in a parliamentary democracy is that the government must enjoy the “confidence” of the legislature both to come to power and to stay in power.

All governments need the support of a legislative majority.


We know that a potential government must enjoy the confidence of the legislature to come to power.

If a single party controlled a majority of the legislative seats, we might expect that party to form the government.

But life is not always that easy

http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/mon may-10-2010/clustershag-to-10-downing---hung-parliament

http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/mon

http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/mon-may-10-2010/clustershag-to-10-downing---hung-parliament

http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/mon-may-10-2010/clustershag-to-10-downing---hung-parliament


Whether you have majority parties depends on the electoral system, cleavage structures and electoral thresholds

We will discuss this in more detail next week

251 of the 310 (81%) governments that formed in Western Europe from 1945 to 1998 emerged from political situations in which there was no majority party.


All we know is that the potential government must control a legislative majority.

There are no rules as to who should be in this legislative majority (unwritten constitution).

In practice, though, the tight discipline of the parties in most parliamentary democracies means that the actual business of forming a government is done by a small group of senior politicians in each party (openhanded slaps).

Can Formateur form government?

Consider the following election results from Germany in 1987.

The German Bundestag after the 1987 Elections

Party Seats Percentage

Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) 223 44.87

Social Democrats (SPD) 186 37.42

Free Democrats (FDP) 46 9.26

Greens 42 8.45

Minor parties 0 0.00

Total 497 100

How do we know what the government will be?

Party Seats Percentage Surplus seats

CDU/CSU + SPD + Greens + FDP 497 100 248

CDU/CSU + SPD + Greens 451 90.7 202

CDU/CSU + SPD + FDP 455 91.5 206

CDU/CSU + FDP + Greens 311 62.6 62

SPD + FDP + Greens 274 55.1 25

CDU/CSU + SPD 409 82.2 160

CDU/CSU + FDP 269 54.1 20

CDU/CSU + Greens 265 53.3 16

SPD + FDP 232 46.7 -17

SPD + Greens 228 45.9 -21

FDP + Greens 88 17.7 -161

SPD 186 37.4 -63

CDU/CSU 223 44.9 -26

Greens 42 8.5 -207

FDP 46 9.3 -203

Are all of these potential governments equally plausible?

Who will be the formateur?

A Simple Model

The leader of the CDU/CSU (Helmut Kohl) was appointed formateur because he controlled the largest party.

Obviously, Helmut Kohl is not going to form a government that does not include his own party. Thus, we can get rid of potential governments that do not include the CDU/CSU.

A Simple Model

The fact that a government must control a legislative majority to come to power suggests that the government formation process might be easier if the proposed government actually controlled a majority of legislative seats.

As a result, we might think of eliminating potential governments that do not control a legislative majority.

Since the Bundestag had 497 seats, any combination of parties controlling 249 ([497 + 1]/2) or more seats would have a legislative majority.




CDU/CSU + SPD + FDP 455 91.5 206



CDU/CSU + SPD 409 82.2 160

CDU/CSU + FDP 269 54.1 20


SPD + FDP 232 46.7 -17

SPD + Greens 228 45.9 -21

FDP + Greens 88 17.7 -161

SPD 186 37.4 -63

CDU/CSU 223 44.9 -26

Greens 42 8.5 -207

FDP 46 9.3 -203

Seven potential governments remain–which one is most likely to form?

A Simple Model

Office seekingAn office-seeking politician is interested in the intrinsic benefits of office; he wants as many ministerial portfolios as possible.

Policy seekingA policy-seeking politician wants only to shape policy.

Pure Office-Seeking World

In an office-seeking world, a formateur can get other parties to join the government only by giving them office (ministerial portfolios).

Strong empirical evidence that you have to give large parties more office than small parties.

Gamson’s Law (Proportionality Norm): Cabinet portfolios will be distributed among government parties in strict proportion to the number of seats that each party contributes to the government’s legislative majority.

Party No. of legislative seats

No. of cabinet

portfolios

% of government coalition seats

% of cabinet portfolios

Social Democrats

45 6 46.4 42.9

Liberal Democrats

14 3 14.4 21.4

Liberals 38 5 39.2 35.7

Allocation of Cabinet Seats in the Netherlands, 1998

Gamson’s Law

Note: 150 seats in legislature.


An implication of the office-seeking logic is that you will not want more parties in government than are strictly necessary to obtain a legislative majority.

As a result, you will form a particular type of coalition government called a “minimal winning coalition.”A minimal winning coalition (MWC) is one in which there are no parties that are not required to control a legislative majority.

A second implication is that you will choose the smallest or “least minimal winning coalition.”

The least MWC is the MWC with the lowest number of surplus seats.

Party Seats Percentage Surplus seats Type



CDU/CSU + SPD + FDP 455 91.5 206



CDU/CSU + SPD 409 82.2 160 MWC

CDU/CSU + FDP 269 54.1 20 MWC

CDU/CSU + Greens 265 53.3 16 Least MWC

SPD + FDP 232 46.7 -17

SPD + Greens 228 45.9 -21

FDP + Greens 88 17.7 -161

SPD 186 37.4 -63

CDU/CSU 223 44.9 -26

Greens 42 8.5 -207

FDP 46 9.3 -203


If Helmut Kohl was a pure office seeker, we would expect him to form a government between the CDU/CSU and the Greens.

Pure Policy-Seeking World

What if Helmut Kohl was a pure policy seeker?

What would he do?

To answer this question, you need to know something about the policy position of the parties along the salient issue dimensions in West Germany in 1987.

Policy Positions

Left Right

Greens SPD CDU FDP

42 186 223 46Seats


In a policy-seeking world, a formateur can get other parties to join the government only by giving them policy concessions.

In other words, the formateur cannot implement policy at his own ideal point. Instead, he has to implement a coalition policy that is somewhere between the ideal points of all his coalition partners.

It is likely that a formateur will have to give more policy concessions to large parties than small parties.


An implication of the policy-seeking logic is that you will want to form coalitions with parties that are located close to you in the policy space.

As a result, you will form a particular type of coalition government called a “connected coalition.”A connected coalition is one in which the member parties are located directly next to each other in the policy space.

A second implication is that you will choose the connected least MWC because you do not want to “buy” more legislative seats with policy than you strictly have to.


Type

CDU/CSU + SPD + Greens + FDP 497 100 248 Connected

CDU/CSU + SPD + Greens 451 90.7 202 Connected

CDU/CSU + SPD + FDP 455 91.5 206 Connected



CDU/CSU + SPD 409 82.2 160 Connected MWC

CDU/CSU + FDP 269 54.1 20 Least connected MWC


SPD + FDP 232 46.7 -17

SPD + Greens 228 45.9 -21

FDP + Greens 88 17.7 -161

SPD 186 37.4 -63

CDU/CSU 223 44.9 -26

Greens 42 8.5 -207

FDP 46 9.3 -203

Hypotheses

Office-seeking worldYou would expect to observe least minimal winning coalitions.

In terms of our German example, the prediction would be a coalition between the CDU/CSU and Greens.

Policy-seeking worldYou would expect to observe connected least minimal winning coalitions.

In terms of our German example, the prediction would be a coalition between the CDU/CSU and the FDP.

This looks pretty easy, right?

Helmut Kohl actually formed a government between the CDU/CSU and the FDP.

This was the prediction from the policy-seeking model.

Did this mean that policy seeking dominates office seeking in West Germany?

So this is pretty easy is not it?

(1) Why minority coalitions? (2) Why Surplus coalitions?

(3)Why does it take so long?

Trade-off

Even if politicians were pure policy seekers or pure office seekers, we believe that the reality of political competition will force them to act as if they cared about both policy and office.

A pure office seeker is unlikely to be able to win election by saying that he does not care about policy.

A pure policy seeker will have to care about winning office because this is the only way he can implement the policy he

wants.

Different Types of Government

We know that a government must control an implicit legislative majority to come to power.

Until now, we have assumed that governments must contain enough parties that they control a majority of legislative seats.

This has led us to look at various types of minimal winning coalitions.

However, a quick glance around the world reveals that other types of government often form.

Government Types in Western Europe, 1945-1998

Country Single-party majority

Minimal winning coalition

Single-party minority

Minority coalition

Surplus majority

Total

Austria 4 14 1 0 3 22

Belgium 3 16 2 1 11 33

Denmark 0 4 14 13 0 31

Germany 1 17 3 0 5 26

Greece 7 1 1 0 1 10

Ireland 6 5 6 5 0 22

Italy 0 3 14 9 22 48

Luxembourg 0 15 0 0 1 16

Netherlands 0 9 0 3 10 22

Norway 6 3 12 5 0 26

Spain 2 0 6 0 0 8

Sweden 2 5 17 2 0 26

United Kingdom 19 0 1 0 0 20

Total 50 92 77 38 53 310

Minority Governments

A minority government is one in which the governmental parties do not together command a majority of legislative seats.

Minority governments may be single-party minority governments or minority coalition governments.

A minority government can exist only as long as the opposition chooses not to bring it down.


Many people used to see minority governments as undemocratic and as an anomaly.

Strom challenged this accepted wisdom. He argued that minority governments were a normal and democratic outcome of party competition in parliamentary democracies.


Strom noted that minority governments form quite frequently.

A third of all the governments in Western Europe are minority governments.

Minority governments are particularly frequent in some countries–Denmark (82%), Sweden (81%), Norway (65%).


Every time we see a minority government, there must be an implicit majority in the legislature that supports it.

Why does this happen?

Parties do not want to be in the cabinet

In some countries, we know who makes up this implicit majority because they publicly state that they will sustain the government against votes to overthrow it but do not want to be in the cabinet.Maybe they do not want to be identified with policiesNo capable governors Flexibility in the futurePre-election promises

Minority coalition Watchdog

Right-Wing populist

Establishment has no response……

He knows his party is not able to rule

They do not want to exclude a winning populist

Ad hoc coalitions more efficient

In other countries, the government does not rely on specific “support” parties. Instead, it builds legislative majorities on an ad hoc basis.

Why is this useful?

Danish political economy (stylized)

Three partiesSocialist party (1%)

Want high unemployment benefits

Want labor protection

Conservative party (50%)

Wants no labor protection

Wants high unemployment benefits

Liberals (1%)

Want no labor protection

Want no unemployment benefits

Other reasons for MCs

Powerful opposition (Strom)

Corporatism (Luebbert)

Strong party/fragmented opposition (Laver and Shepsle)

No investiture vote

Testing Theories of Minority GovernmentsDependent variable: Did a Minority Government Form? 1 = Yes, 0 = No

Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5

Opposition strength 0.31***

(0.05)0.39***

(0.11)

Corporatism 0.57**

(0.22)0.60*

(0.31)

Investiture vote -0.54***

(0.16)-0.84**

(0.34)

Strong party -0.52**

(0.21)-0.08(0.33)

Constant -1.63***

(0.28)-2.06***

(0.79)0.20

(0.12)0.29*

(0.17)-3.86***

(1.42)

N 251 106 251 155 85

Log-likelihood -152.46 -69.53 -167.55 -104.28 -39.66

Note: Cells show unstandardized coefficients from a probit model with robust standard errors in parentheses. * greater than 90% significant; ** greater than 95% significant; *** greater than 99% significant.

Insert table 11.8

Surplus Majority Governments

A surplus majority government is one in which the cabinet includes more parties than are strictly necessary to control a legislative majority.

Surplus majority governments form roughly 20 percent of the time in West European parliamentary democracies.

They make up about 50 percent of the governments in the Netherlands and Italy in the postwar period.

Why Surplus Majority?

Surplus majority governments may be common in times of crisis.

Governments of national unity immediately after WWII. Examples: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,

Luxembourg, Netherlands. BUT “grand coalitions” like this are rare in modern Europe.


Surplus majority governments may be required to change the constitution. Constitutional amendments may require more than 50 percent

legislative support. These coalitions may look “oversized” but they are no larger than

legally necessary in these circumstances.

Pacification of 1917 (stylized)

Three partiesCatholics (20% )

Extension suffrage: no

Funding religious education: yes

Social democrats (16%t)

Extension suffrage: yes

Funding religious education: no

Protestants (40%)

Extensions suffrage: yes

Funding religious education: yes


It may make strategic sense to have surplus majority governments. If you have a minimal winning coalition, then any single party

(no matter how small) could bring the government down whenever it wanted.

If you had a surplus majority government, no single party could

unilaterally threaten to bring the government down.

Why does it take so long?

Uncertainty (Diermeier and Van Roozendaal)

More than one policy dimension

Complicated environment (Marin and VanBerg)

Finally, world champions!!!

http://lerecorddumonde.be/

FLemish

New Flemish Alliance 17.3 27

Christian Democrats 10.9 17

Socialists 9 13

Liberals 8.4 13

Extreme Right 7.7 12

Greens 4.2 5

Conservatives 1.3 1

TOTAL 88

FRENCH

Socialists 14 26

Liberals 9.5 18

Christian Democrats 5.7 9

Greens 4.9 8

Conservatives 1.3 1

TOTAL 64

A complicated puzzle

Pre-electoral coalitions

Small research area (read only Sonja Golder)

Hard to measure

Golder uses election promises

Does not account for cheap talk (VVD-LPF)

It is interesting nevertheless

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Making Governments: Parliamentary Democracies. Tuesday.

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