MAN and

SOCIETY

A Journal of North East Studies

VOLUME VII 2010

ICSSR-NERC

Indian Council of Social Science Research

North Eastern Regional Centre

Shillong Meghalaya

Man and Society A Journal of North East Studies

VOLUME VII 2010

Indian Council of Social Science Research

North Eastern Regional Centre

Shillong Meghalaya

Man and Society A Journal of North East Studies

@ ICSSR-NERC reserves the copyright to all articles and book reviews published and no article/review or a part thereof may be reprinted without written permission from the ICSSR-NERC.

Editor

Udayon Misra

Managing Editor

C. J. Thomas

Editorial Advisory Board

Pramod Tandon

Vice-Chancellor, NEHU and

Chairman ICSSR-NERC

Amiya Kumar Bagchi

Director

Institute of Development Studies

West Bengal, Kolkata

B.G.Verghese

Centre for Policy Research

New Delhi

Atul Sarma

New Delhi

A K Baruah

Shillong

P. S. Ramakrishnan

Jawaharlal Nehru University

New Delhi

Suranjan Das

Vice-Chancellor

University of Calcutta The views and interpretation expressed in the journal are those of the individual author(s) and do not

necessarily represent the views of the ICSSR-NERC.

Subscription: Rs.150 / US $10

Manuscript, editorial, correspondence and books for review should be sent to the Managing Editor, Man

and Society, ICSSR-NERC, NEHU Campus, Shillong-793022, Meghalaya.

For information concerning the preparation of paper, see Style Sheet

ICSSR-NERC acknowledges financial support from ICSSR, New Delhi

Contents

Editorial 1. North-East India: A Continental View

- S.K. Chaube

2. Regionalism, Globalisation and Constraints to Research in the Northeast

- Walter Fernandes

3. Truth and Rights: A Study of the Violation of Rights on the Margins of India

- Samir Kumar Das

4. Fiscal Sociology of States in North-East India: A Theory of the Rentier Economy

and External Rent Curse

- Binod Kumar Agarwala

5. Ethnic and Religious Diversity: The Unresolved Core issue of Myanmar

- T.T. Haokip

6. Performance of the States of North-East India: A Comparative Analysis of Post

and Pre Reforms Periods

- Niranjan Roy and Avijit Debnath

Notes

1. Role of Village Development Board to Regenerate Rural Society of Nagaland:

A Critical Observation

- Janbemo Lotha

2. Drug Addiction in Manipur: Reasons and Remedies

- Tomba Chingtham

Book Reviews

1

North-East India: A Continental View

S.K. Chaube

Synopsis

The developmental issues in northeast India have recently been connected

with the broader developments in southeast Asia through the ‘look east’

policy of the GoI. It is, however, necessary to place northeast India in the

historical context which may reveal its nodal role in the continental

traveland transportation system. Political considerations of sovereignty

and security are impediments to a meaningful cooperation among the

countries of the region. A pragmatic balance between the two concerns is

a necessary condition of inter-regional and inter-national cooperation and

development.

Till about the end of the last century the principal response elicited by northeast India

from the ‘patriotic,’ ‘mainstream’ Indians was suspicion. The region was described as a

‘sensitive borderland’ although it was far more peaceful than India’s north-western

border. Evidently the term ‘sensitive’ attached to the people who live within north-east

India rather than those who lived beyond it. And the tragedy of those inside the northeast

borderland is that freedom of India, bought at the cost of partition, left those people land-

locked and separated from the mainland except for a narrow bottleneck of 20 kilo metres

in north Bengal with all the socio-economic consequences of such isolation. The only

possible access of the region to the sea is through Bangla Desh (Chittagong) or Myanmar

(Yangon).

Through the entire course of history of the world political economy the one theoretical

point that is established beyond doubt is the ultimate primacy of economics over politics.

In the era of capitalism economic value mainly attaches to the productivity of a territory

in terms of the available technological means and its usefulness in trade and transit.

The author is a retired Professor of the Department of Anthropology, North-Eastern Hill University,

Shillong

2

Exploration of gas and other mineral resources today, for instance, has created claims on

sea beds and the polar regions of the earth and, before long, this may be extended to other

planets. The development of sea routes in the late fifteenth century reduced the

importance attached to the traditional land routes. Air transport reduced the importance of

both of them. Yet certain natural limitations continue to hold the traditional attachment to

land. In 2004 an earthquake created an artificial lake on the Tibet side of the Sutlej River

(Paree Chu) that caused devastating floods in the Himachal Pradesh in the same year and

the following. The Sindhu and, more so, the Tsangpho/Brahmaputra rivers originating

from Tibet pose similar problems to India making water management in north-east India

a formidable task.1 There is still a huge amount and variety of trade that requires travel by

land. Hence, the continued need for territories.

To comprehend the new direction of political economy vis á vis India she has to be

situated in the historical context of the broad continental movements and transactions of

people and the specific civilizational context of south and south-east Asia. India today is

the sum of about two-thirds of the former British India, five hundred and fifty four former

princely states, a ‘tribal area’ in the far eastern part of the country (now comprising the

Tuensang district of Nagaland), the former French and Portuguese colonial possessions in

the sub-continent and Sikkim. Her extended northern border from Gujarat to Mizoram,

skirting the Himalayan heights, separates her from the sovereign states of Pakistan, China

(Tibet), Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar besides Bangla Desh (which dents its territorial

integrity without destroying it). The west-north segment of this frontier separates India

from Pakistan. Except for Nepal and Bhutan the entire northern frontier separates her

from the Tibet region of China while the hills of northeast India, viewed notionally as the

south eastern projection of the Himalayas, separates her from Bangla Desh and

Burma/Myanmar. This territorial configuration is a product of a hundred years of colonial

rule that largely destroyed India’s traditional cultural and economic linkages, and

imparted the concept of territorial power (sovereignty) to the Asians.

From the ancient city of Taxila (now in Pakistan) to the modern industrial town of

Tinsukia (in Assam) the entire hilly border was cut across by numerous trade routes

connecting India with Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Tibet, China and Myanmar by

3

land. South to north these routes have connected the sub-continental highway known as

the Grand Trunk Road from Taxila to Bhagalpur and Kolkata and the Lhasa-Leh road,

known also as the ‘minor silk road’ running almost parallel to the Grand Trunk Road.

The western extension of the GT Road, in turn, connected India with the Royal Persian

Road that went up to Europe and Alexandria in Egypt. Until the partition of India in 1947

the sub-continental highway crossed the Ganga and, through Gaur/Malda, moved

northeast, through Dinajpur and Rangpur in today’s Bangla Desh, Goalpara, Kamrup,

Nogaon and Tinsukia in today’s Assam, to Ledo in today’s Arunachal Pradesh and

further, through the Hukong Valley, into Myanmar (as the Indo-Myanmar road) and

South-east Asia. Another eastward route from Dhaka moved through Sylhet and Cachar

into Manipur, touching Silchar, Lakshmipur, Jiribam, Bishenpur (Vishnupur) and Imphal,

and finally joined the aforementioned Indo-Myanmar road.

Of course there were sea routes of almost equal vintage connecting India with the

West, Southeast Asia and the eastern sea-coast of China to which the Arabs and the

Western powers paid greater attention in the later days because of their natural

proficiency in maritime transportation. The entire east coast of peninsular India from

Tamluk to Masulipattanam was dotted by major and minor ports. There are positive

indications that from Bengal, Orissa, Andhra and Tamil regions people went out on sea

trade to Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Siam, and Malaya and, in many cases, settled in the latter

areas since the early Christian time. Ancient Indian colonies in these countries attest to

the veracity of this belief.2 Eventually these routes were taken over first by Arab traders

and later by the Westerners. But the growth of the volume of trade in the late eighteenth

century forced the West to look for greater access to inland Asia through the land routes.

The Trans-Asian highway from Chang an, the Han-period capital of China, to Antioch

in Syria known, originally, as the Royal Persian Road and, since the 19th

century, as the

Silk Road, extended to the east up to Korea and to the west up to Egypt and Rome.

Another road came up from Chang an to the south, moved through Chungking to

Kunming and, while a branch of it went as far as Mandalay and Prome in

Burma/Myanmar, the main road moved into Vietnam and Thailand. The fact that Sadiya

was an important traffic node before its demolition by the 1950 earthquake on Assam

4

suggests that the Sadiya-Rima-Walong route was in use long for minor trade between the

Sikang province of China (formerly, ‘Inner Tibet’) and northeast India. Another route of

equal significance was the Chittagong-Rangamati-Demagiri-Lungleh-Haka route to the

Chindwin valley, Shwebo and Mandalay of Myanmar. There is no doubt, however, of the

great importance of the two roads from eastern India: (1) the Tinsukia-Ledo-Hukong

Valley route to Myitkina, Lashio and Mandalay and the Dhaka-Sylhet-Silchar-

Lakhmipur-Jiribam-Bishenpur (Vishnupur)-Imphal-Moreh route joining the India-

Myanmar road at Swebo. The Dimapur-Kohima-Imphal road was developed in the late

nineteenth century.3 North-east India was thus, a critical node of the continental highway

system in ancient days.4 Archaeological finds in Manipur and Assam suggest trade link

with China at least since the 13th

century.5

There is no reason to assume that the entire road system was established at one go or

that it was built by China alone. The so-called Silk Road was actually known as the

Royal Persian Road in the West linking, at the first stage, Greece, Rome and Egypt with

central Asia where Indian, Chinese and other Asian traders met their European and

African co-laterals. Asoka’s emissaries went to China, central Asia and probably to

Europe and Egypt through this central Asian land route though some others travelled by

sea to Sri Lanka and southeast Asia. The Chinese side of this continental road appears to

have grown by the first century A.D. when Chinese hegemony extended up to the north

of the Kuen Lun mountains. Linkage of central China with Lhasa appears to have

developed by about the seventh century A.D. when Songtsen Gampo (Sron-btsan-sgam-

po) brought a wife (Wen Cheng) from China along with an image of the Buddha. The

other wife (Bhrukuti), with another image of the Buddha, had earlier come from the

Kathmandu valley. There is reason to believe that increased political and commercial

activities of Tibet since the seventh century A.D. led to the linking up of Lhasa with

Gartok (in today’s Tibet) and Leh (Ladakh).

‘When the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) took charge of Lhasa in 1951, there was

hardly any road in Tibet. Lhasa and its environs were better connected to India than

China,’ says a recent report. ‘In May 1954, the roads from Qinghai to the north of Tibet

and Sichuan to the east were formally linked up in Lhasa. Two other roads – linking

5

Tibet with Xinjian to the north-west and Yunnan to the south-east - were also completed

soon after.’6 This is an exaggeration for indeed Tibet, as we have seen, was connected

with the central part of China from early days though not with Yunnan. Of course Tibet

was better connected with India.

The British did not conquer India; they annexed it through stages by questionable

means and the declared their sovereign status over British India only in 1858. The

territorial claim involved in this process was uncertain and they adopted the expedient of

‘the frontier.’ The annexation started immediately after the battle of Plassey (1757) when

the East India Company acquired the zemindari of Calcutta and its neighbourhood from

Mir Zafar to secure its trading base and (to eliminate/control Portuguese and French

competition upstream of the Hoogly river. In 1760 they acquired from Mir Qasim the

zemindari of the districts of Midnapore, Burdwan (the rice bowl of Bengal) and

Chittagong that housed the second biggest seaport on the Bay of Bengal (after Madras) of

the same name on the sea route to Southeast Asia and China. Seven years after the

Company acquiring the dewani of Bengal (1765) Warren Hastings was appointed the first

Governor of Bengal in 1772 and the first Governor-General of British India in 1773.

Hastings undertook an exploration of the Bhutan route to Tibet. Not much was achieved

immediately.7

The British allowed Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan to survive as satellite states and created

a ‘trans-border’ area between this empire and Afghanistan (which they could not annex).

They did not annex Tibet but tried to retain substantial political and economic control

over it. The main reason for the survival on sufferance of these small states was the

presence of two big states – Tsarist Russia and China – with which their relationship was

ever uncertain. In 1937 Myanmar was turned into a separate crown colony. A tract of

trans-frontier area between British India and Afghanistan was designated as a ‘tribal area’

outside British India but within India and under the executive authority of the Governor-

General of British India.8 The same status was given to an un-administered territory

between India and Burma. In 1947 Myanmar became independent and the two wings of

Pakistan came into this picture creating several political and economic problems.

6

The first of these problems that immediately started a war between India and Pakistan,

inaugurating unending hostility, was Jammu and Kashmir. The second but simultaneous

problem was the huge refugee influx, subsequently accompanied by illegal migration.

The third was the drying up of legitimate trade and rise of smuggling. The fourth was the

conflicts in river water sharing. The fifth was a political stand-off responsible for three

major wars between the two countries and numerous skirmishes culminating in the split

of Pakistan in 1971. Although the emergence of Bangla Desh in 1971 gave a respite to

India, it was short-lived – only up to 1975 when the assassination of Sheikh Mujeeb

unleashed a new chain of unrest. The only acquisition of India during this period – but

totally unrelated to these incidents – was the merger of Sikkim with India.

Right from the time of Warren Hastings the East India Company was looking for land

routes to Tibet. In 1774 Charles Bogle was sent to Tibet through Bhutan (He went as far

as Shigatse). After the Anglo-Gorkha war of 1815 the British annexed the Kumaon-

Garhwal areas of today’s Uttaranchal state and the hill territories further west up to

Shimla now comprising the Himachal Pradesh and brought Sikkim under their control. In

1850 Dalhousie ordered the construction of the Great Hindustan-Tibet Road from Shimla.

Soon another road linking Srinagar and Leh with Kashgar was undertaken.9 After the

Anglo-Bhutanese war of 1865 that resulted in the annexation of today’s Kalimpong sub-

division to British India the Kalimpong-Yatung-Shigatse route was developed and two

trade marts were established at Gangtok and Gyantse. The urge for developing the

Kalimpong route had been growing since the closure by China of the Shigatse-

Kathmandu route following the Anglo-Chinese conflict involving Nepal and Tibet in

1792.10

Britain’s annexation of territories west, north-west and south-west of the Bengal suba

is a well-documented story. As far as the eastern frontier of British India was concerned,

the Moamaria revolt of 1792 brought the British to Assam for the first time and the 1794

report of Captain Welsh on trading possibilities with Assam merely strengthened the East

India Company’s interest in Assam. On the spurious ground of the 1826 Treaty of

Yandabo the Company annexed Assam along with the hills. By 1885 (the third Anglo-

Burmese war) it annexed the whole of Myanmar (Burma).11

As far as the northern

7

frontier was concerned the focus was confined to Bhutan from which territories were

annexed up to 1865 and Nepal that was placed under a subordinate relationship after

1815. Tibet remained an open question till the end of the nineteenth century except for a

British intervention on Nepal’s side during the Nepal-Tibet war of 1792.

Up to about the end of the nineteenth century British India’s relations with her

immediate neighbours were governed by a flexible ‘frontier policy’ that prevented the

neighbours from exercising any undue influence/authority on her soil but kept the reverse

door open (a policy reminiscent of the colonial expansion in north America). It was in

the far north western part of British India that a new phase of frontier policy was opened

up by the drawing of a ‘frontier’ with Afghanistan by means of an agreement with the

Afghan government in 1893, the actual Durand Line being drawn in 1902. Since 1883 an

Inner Line was being drawn on the foothills of northeast India to prevent the travel of

unauthorized plainsmen into the hills but allowing the travel of hill people into the plains

territories. The Inner Line was an administrative arrangement without any political

significance for, though in the northern area administration did not extend much beyond

the Inner Line till after Independence, in the southern areas it did penetrate almost the

entire hills. With the annexation of Myanmar (Burma) the eastern frontier of British India

moved from the Patkai-Barail range to the Salween River that separated the Thai

territories. The southern part of this Myanmar-Thai border was further secured by Anglo-

French agreements in 1896 and 1904 on neutralization of Thailand while the northern

parts were secured by the relatively autonomous status of the Shan and the Kachin states

as well as the weakness of China.

Existence of Saivism and Vaishnavism12

along with Buddhism as well as substantial

settlement of people of south Indian origin from ancient times attest to more pervasive

Indian contact with southeast Asia in general and Myanmar in particular than with Tibet.

The reason is the accessibility through the sea. Accessibility through land has brought

more people from the east than sent them out the same way. Myanmar was not always a

united country. Her smaller shape (compared to Tibet’s) and proximity to the sea placed

her under a great deal of foreign influence. It is identified with the suvarnabhumi of the

early Buddhist literature where Asoka is said to have sent an emissary. In the first century

8

B.C. (the animist/Vaishnavite Pyu period) the country was fragmented into city

states/kingdoms of which Sri Kshetra was the most prominent. The ‘Burmese’ population

appeared on the scene from the north in the eleventh century and founded the kingdom of

Pagan (Bagan). By the middle of the twelfth century almost the whole of southeast Asia

came under the control of two empires: the Pagan (Myanmar) and the Khmer

(Kampuchia). In the thirteenth century Myanmar was occupied by the Mongol ruler,

Kublai Khan, and the Mongol incursion probably induced large population movement out

of the region toward India (including that of the Ahoms). In the fourteenth century the

country was divided into two major regions: Ava in the north and Pegu in the south.

(Pegu/Bago was also known as Assa, a word, believed to have been derived from

‘Orissa’). In the sixteenth century Myanmar was again united and its expanse went up to

Manipur. In the seventeenth century Myanmar defeated a Portuguese attempt at

domination.

In 1752 Pegu revolted against Ava but was re-conquered in 1758. By the middle of the

eighteenth century Yangon (Rangoon) had grown into a port due mainly to European

contact13

and it became the capital of the reunited kingdom. The Burmese government

soon grew powerful enough to launch upon an imperialist venture up to Arrakan and

Tenassarim to the south. By 1824 they annexed Assam bringing the British East India

Company face to face with them. By the Treaty of Yandabo, 1826, they had to abandon

their claim on Assam, Manipur and their neighbouring areas and cede Arrakan and the

Tenassarim coast to the British. In 1852 lower Burma (Pegu) was annexed (Second

Anglo-Burmese War). The capital of Ava (upper Burma) was shifted to Mandalay. In

1885 upper Burma was annexed and the whole country was constituted as a Lieutenant-

Governor’s province within British India with Rangoon/ Yangon as the headquarters. It

was freed at the end of 1947.

The British undertook an ambitious railway- building programme in Myanmar. By

1886 Yangon (Rangoon) was connected with Prome and Pegu in lower Burma. By 1893

Pegu was connected with Mandalay and Myitkina on the traditional Assam-Burma-

Yunnan road. Simultaneously a rail-route between Bengal/Assam and Burma was

conceived with three probable alignments:

9

(1) From Chittagong on the Assam-Bengal Railway along the Arrakan coast and over

the An Pass to the Chindwin river in Burma; the coast route.

(2) From Lumding on the Assam-Bengal Railway, by way of Manipur, into tho

Kubaw valley at Taromu, and thence, crossing the Chindwin river near Yuwa, to a

junction with the Mu Valley Railway in Burma near Wuntho ; the Manipur route

(3) From Ledo on the Dibrugarh-Sadiya Railway in the north- east corner of Assam,

via the Hukong Valley, to a junction with the Mu Valley Railway in the

neighbourhood of Mogaung ; the Hukoig Valley route.

The report came out in 1922 favouring the Hukong valley route. But, then, the post-

war nationalistic upsurge in India and Burma poured cold water on the plan. In 1923 the

Montagu-Chelmsford scheme was implemented in Burma that had been constituted as a

Lieutenant-Governor’s province in 1899. In 1937 Burma was separated from British

India and constituted as a Crown Colony.14

When, in 1937, Burma was separated from British India as a crown colony, only a

small patch of territory lying between the two crown colonies was left un-administered.

Under the Government of India Act, 1935, this area was designated as a ‘tribal area’

beyond British India and Burma but within India and under the executive authority of the

Governor-General of British India.15

Such a tribal area was created beyond the North-

West Frontier Province bordering on Afghanistan too (today’s Federally Administered

Tribal Area of Pakistan). On the other hand, although the North-East Frontier Tracts of

Assam were legally ‘excluded areas’ to be administered by the Governor of Assam

through his secretaries, they were actually treated as ‘tribal areas.’ In 1942 an Advisor

was appointed by the Governor of Assam to look after the statutory and the actual tribal

areas.16

The British were never sure of the strength of China’s relationship with Tibet or over

its ability to annex Tibet that bordered the Himalayan frontier tracts. It was only with the

Younghusband mission of 1904 under Curzon’s viceroyalty that a positive initiative over

Tibet is noted. And it was only after the Chinese civil war of 1912 that the initiative

10

produced some results. The Younghusband mission obtained three trading posts (Yatung,

Gyantse and Gartok) besides a temporary occupation of the Chumbi valley in Tibet but

what the Simla conference of 1914 obtained was more on paper than on territory. Neither

the Chinese nor the Tibetans were fully reconciled to the conclusions of the Simla

convention. In the late 1930s the British government in India tried to build a supply route

to China through Tibet for the war purpose but was thwarted by the Tibetan government.

Hence the revival of the Hukong valley route under the command of the US general

Stilwell. It was only in the 1950s that the fate of Tibet was sealed; China arrived at the

border of independent India.

There are two broad objectives of war: (i) punishment or destruction and (ii)

occupation, though in most cases the two objectives are combined in different measures

and different methods. Several memoirs and reports have delved into the reasons of the

1962 disaster of India. It is true that the Chinese withdrew their 1962 incursion

‘voluntarily.’ They did not want to destroy India; they merely wanted to punish India’s

territorial pretensions. It is, however, undeniable that 1962 saw the proclamation of

China’s territorial claims on India’s borderlands and the building of bridges with Pakistan

enabling her to construct the Tibet-Xinjian road. As far as the technology of war is

concerned K.M. Panikkar, the great geo-political historian, considered 1498 as the

dividing line between land and sea as India’s major threat to security. World War II,

however, had brought up the sky in the picture. The dropping of atom bombs on

Hiroshima and Nagasaki crushed the Japanese resistance in 1945 as did the bombing of

Iraq in 2003. But occupation is a job of the infantry and the US failed to conquer

Vietnam. Therefore, the Himalayan wall is still a major defence for India. In 1962 India

desisted from using air power on Tibet.

‘The mountainous area to the north of India has to be considered strategically as one, a

great quadrilateral, the middle of which is an elevated plateau 15,000 feet above sea level

and the southern ramparts an invulnerable range of an average height of 20,000 feet.’17

That is a natural advantage per se. But, vis á vis the power in occupation of Tibet, the

advantage dims. For the entire Indian Himalaya is a gradient from north to south. That

may be one reason why the British failed to annex Tibet. Comparatively, the eastern

11

border of British India was much more accessible from the Indian mainland. The average

height of the Patkai range is 2,000 metres (about 6,700 feet)18

allowing better road links

between India and her eastern neighbour. Naturally, British territorial aspirations

developed faster toward the east than toward the north 19

There are two critical points in the eastern Himalayas from the geo-strategic point of

view. (1) The Chumbi valley to the north of Sikkim which belongs to Tibet-China,

although placed in the southern gradient of the watershed. (2) Towang in Arunachal

Pradesh, falling on the northern gradient of the watershed. Both violate the watershed

principle which supposedly governed the drawing of the Macmahon line in 1914. The

Chumbi valley was the most crucial route of India-Tibet trade for a century, and its

occupation by China leaves the trade link at considerable uncertainty for India. On the

other hand, occupation of Towang by India is a matter of political concern for China.

Towang has the only Gelukpa monastery within the Indian territory and has the potential

of becoming a centre of operation as long as the Dalai Lama is in India and in case he is

able to challenge the Chinese occupation of Tibet.

Until the partition of India with the end of British power ‘India’ was constituted by

three broad kinds of regimes: British India, 566 princely states of different sizes and

power and two ‘tribal areas.’ About a third of British India went to Pakistan in two parts

(east and west); 554 princely states joined India while 12 went to Pakistan and one tribal

area each went to India and Pakistan. 20

(The Naga Tribal Area in the east, today’s

Tuensang area of Nagaland, went to India and the North-West Frontier Tribal Area,

today’s ‘federally administered tribal area’ went to Pakistan). Within British India the

tribal-inhabited areas were divided into excluded areas and partially excluded areas.

In the north-east travel of non-tribal outsiders was restricted in most of the excluded

areas by means of the Inner Line under the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873, and

the Government assumed the right to regulate habitation of non-tribal population in not

only the areas covered by the Inner Line but also some other areas by means of the Chin

Hills Regulation, 1896. The excluded and partially excluded areas were insulated from

the power of the provincial legislature to different extents as well as nationalist politics.

12

Administration, under the control of the Governor’s secretaries, was similarly thinned out

in excluded and partially excluded areas. In the tribal areas the Governor-General

exercised only political control through his agents. 21

The two north-east frontier tracts – Balipara and Sadiya – were excluded areas; but the

Government, as has been noted, treated them as tribal areas. In 1942, in the wake of

Japanese threat, an advisor was appointed for the frontier tracts as well as the Naga tribal

area. But ever since the introduction of the 1919 reforms in Burma in 1923 and,

particularly, after the rise of nationalist movement in Burma British officials began to

‘worry’ about the vast hill tract lying between the Irawaddy valley and the Assam-Bengal

plains and the Simon Commission was presented with several official and non-official

memoranda proposing the exclusion of the hills from the scope of the forthcoming

reforms and by 1944 the idea of a Crown Colony crystallized with the backing of

Reginald Coupland.22

No other part of independent India was as much affected by the partitions of 1937

(with Myanmar) and 1947 (with Pakistan) as Northeast India. The first partition created a

wall, without severing all communications, to the east particularly affecting the Nagas

and the Mizos who lived on both sides of the border integrated community lives. The

second partition turned the whole of northeast India virtually into an island with only a

20-kilometre wide land connection with the rest of India (the Siliguri bottle-neck). The

tribal communities of today’s Meghalaya, (Garo and Khasi), Tripura (Tripuri and Reang)

and Mizoram (Mizo, Hmar, Kuki, Chakma) like the Bengalees, besides smaller tribal

groups, were divided into two sovereign states of India and Pakistan. After the 1965

India-Pakistan war border trade was disrupted ruining cash crops like orange. Particularly

tragic was the fate of the Chittagongs Hill Tract which, by virtue of its administrative

association with the Chittagong district alone, went to Pakistan and was subjected to

demographic assault.23

While partition of India in 1947, like the partition of Bengal in 1905, was a political

decision resulting from communal conflict in India, the transfer of the Chittagong Hills

Tract, a non-Muslim majority area to Pakistan, defies all logic particularly against the

13

fact that the Sylhet district of Assam was partitioned on the ground of its communal

demography. Like most of the hill districts of Assam Chittagong Hill Tract, under the

Government of India Act, 1935, was an excluded area and had no voting right. It did not

choose to be in Pakistan as Sylhet did in the 1947 referendum, Neither the Pakistan

government nor its successor, Bangla Desh government, respected the communal rights

of the local people in land or granted them much of administrative autonomy in the

pattern of the northeast Indian hills. On the other hand, both the governments encouraged

non-tribal (Muslim) settlement in the area causing migration of Buddhist Chakma and

other groups toward the Mizo hills of Assam and Tripura and the birth of the Parbattya

Chattogram Jana Sanghati Samity with a militant wing by the somewhat paradoxical

name of Shanti Bahini. This Shanti Bahini took a major part in the 1971 struggle for

Bangla Desh but was alienated by that government after the assassination of Sheikh

Mujibur Rehman in 1975. With alleged support of the Research and Analysis Wing

(RAW) of the Government of India they became very active and, in turn, persecuted.24

In

1976 the Bangla Desh army was deployed in the Tract but a full-scale operation took

place in 1986 and was repeated intermittently after that. To a large extent the Chittagong

Hills Tract’s situation is responsible for Bangla Desh playing host to insurgent groups of

northeast India.

The Government of India settled a large number of Chakmas from Chittagong Hill

Tract and Hajos from Mymensing of East Pakistan and Bangla Desh in the thinly

populated Arunachal Pradesh hills. The economic success of these sedentary cultivators,

before long, produced jealousy and growing ethno-politics in Arunachal Pradesh after its

achievement of statehood in 1975 is creating tension in that region.

For a long time the security perception of India was dominated by Pakistan and China.

Whereas there is a thaw in India-China tension for the time being and some improvement

of Indo-Pakistan relation, Pakistan continues to be the major source of threat to India’s

security through the promotion of sabotage and killings by militants and ISI agents

directly across her borders. What is growing as another major headache for India is the

ISI’s surreptitious promotion of anti-India militancy through Bangla Desh and even

14

Nepal. Both Bangla Desh and Nepal have suffered from a certain fear complex about

India. Internal politics of the two countries have merely aggravated the distrust.

Nepal, a land-locked country, can have access to the sea only through India, Kolkata

being the closest port. It feels that India takes undue advantage of this geographical

shortcoming of the country. Ever since the 1951 ‘coup’ of King Mahendra against the

country’s Ranacracy suspicion persists about India dabbling in the country’s internal

politics – a suspicion periodically stoked by (well-intentioned but ineffective) leftist

(socialist as well as communist) interventions in Nepalese politics. Gyanendra’s

accession to the throne through a mysterious disaster in early June 2001 took things to a

crescendo and resulted in the end of monarchy. This has not, however, lessened the

suspicion of India which is seen to be ‘arm-twisting’ Nepal with regard to her trading

rights.

Generally speaking, India’s close neighbours view India as seeking to monopolize the

trade relations envisaged by the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

(SAARC) by means of its geographical centrality. Nepal will certainly like free and direct

access to the market and sea port (Chittagong) of Bangla Desh if not to Pakistan. (This

does not mean that relations among the non-Indian members of the SAARC are

completely satisfactory. The Nepalese refugees from Bhutan have soured the Nepal-

Bhutan relations and the free transit of fugitives from north-east India between Bangla

Desh and Bhutan is creating uneasiness between the two countries)

India is by no means in an enviable situation. Sharing of river water with Bangla Desh

and Nepal is a constant headache for her. The refugees and infiltrators from Bangla Desh

and migrants from Nepal are major worries for India severely affecting peace in the

north-east. Escape of north-east Indian militants to Bangla Desh, Bhutan and Nepal

unsettles India’s security drastically. While recent infiltration of Nepalese Maoists has

caused grave concern in India, Bangla Desh accused India of sheltering her fugitives

from the Chittagong hills tract.

Though there is nothing like an LoC (with Pakistan) or an LoAC (with China) between

India and Bangla Desh, border demarcation, occasionally involving the shifting river

15

bases,25

have caused quite a few skirmishes, The open and freely accessible border

between India and Bangla Desh has not only facilitated illegal immigration but also

encouraged smuggling of goods and arms and theft of cattle resulting in exchange of fire

between the border forces. Finally, the internal politics of Bangla Desh has aggravated

the tension between the two countries. While the modernized Bangla Desh elite have

always been uncomfortable with India’s regional ‘big brotherhood,’ the orthodox

religious groups held India responsible for the dissolution of the Islamic unity of Pakistan

in 1971. Since the killing of Sheikh Mujeeb ur Rehman in 1975 this group is gathering

strength with the support of the ISI.26

While Sheikh Hasina is seen to be too weak to

confront them, Begum Khaleda Zia is suspected to be indulgent to, if not in league with,

them.

The long-term impacts of partitions in India were severe in respect of the economy in

the country. In 1937 the separation of Burma from British India was not immediately felt

as both the crown colonies remained under one sovereign. But when, in 1947, Burma

became independent like India the border peoples (Naga and Mizo) were divided under

two sovereignties, upsetting their kinship linkages as well as trade relations. The

partition of 1947 did the same mischief with the Chakma, the Khasi, the Garo, the Hajo,

the Rabha of Assam and Tripuri, the Reang and several other small tribes of Tripura. But

for a narrow stretch of 20 km-wide plain territory in North Bengal the whole of northeast

India was cut off from the rest of the country. Its traditional trade links with the port city

of Calcutta through the plains of eastern Bengal (East Pakistan/Bangla Desh) were

severed. The fate of the Mizos was the worst as they were sand-witched between two

sovereignties (Myanmar and Bangla Desh). Even today the fastest overland transport

from Lungleh in Mizoram to Calcutta will take not less than 48 hours.

At the thirteenth SAARC summit in November 2005 at Dacca India proposed, among

other things, free aerial and overland passage of SAARC countries through each other.

The impact of the proposal will be heightened by the decision of the SAARC summit to

invite Afghanistan to be a member; Interestingly, Nepal, with the tacit support of

Pakistan, demanded the association of China with the SAARC along with Afghanistan’s

membership. Immediately after the SAARC summit Pakistan successfully advocated the

16

same thing. There is no doubt that Afghanistan’s membership of the SAARC will make it

more India-centric, reduce Pakistan’s influence on Afghanistan and even, to some extent,

choke its opening to central Asia

In the east, however, India has a dual problem. It needs the right of passage through

Bangla Desh to her northeast, particularly for Tripura and Mizoram and partly for

Manipur that can develop a faster contact with West Bengal through National Highway

no. 53 through Jiribam and Silchar. The reluctance of Bangla Desh to allow this right has

compelled India to seek a sea route to Mizoram through the Akyab/Sittwe port of

Myanmar and the Kaladan River a survey for which was conducted in the beginning of

this century. The other – and greater – focus of the survey was the exploration of a huge

amount of natural gas reserve at the east coast of the Bay of Bengal.27

As and when Myanmar is brought into the SAARC India is bound to gain more and the

linkages of the old British India will be restored. As of now Myanmar’s political system

stands in the way of such integration even though the mutual benefit of the two countries

stemming from such association is undeniable. India is trying to develop a working

relationship with the Myanmar junta but China, ignoring the democratic predilection, has

established a much better relationship with that country. Even the other SAARC

countries have so far desisted from advocating Myanmar’s membership. Although India

and Myanmar have no political rivalry, the military-dictatorial political order in Myanmar

induces strong reaction in the Indian democratic attitude. Myanmar has no particular love

for India either. On the other hand, Bangla Desh, under Khaleda Zia, declined to allow a

gas pipeline from Myanmar to India through that country, even though India offered

Bangla Desh an annual transit fee of $ 125 million, thereby facilitating PetroChina

entering a 5 trillion cubic feet supply contract with Myanmar for 30 years. India secured

only minor shares in the gas exploration rights at the Shwe offshore reserve near the

Sittwe port.28

A strategic thinking in India is that a dictatorial ruler in the neighbourhood is easier to

handle than a democratic regime that has to cater to diverse popular demands that may

often be grounded in cultural factors and historical memories. Benazir Bhutto’s elected

17

government fostered the Lashkar-Taleban network that became a permanent worry for

India while Begam Khaleda Zia’s elected government hosted the same conspiracy in

Bangla Desh. The record of the dictatorial regimes in India’s neighbourhood has not been

much better. Nepal under Gyanendra hobnobbed with Pakistan. There is little to the

credit of Musharraf with regard to his commitment to stop terrorist activities directed to

India on Pakistan soil. Only Bhutan, a country slowly moving toward constitutionalism,

has a satisfactory relation with India. But her economic backwardness, coupled with an

extremely narrow elite structure, evokes local aspirations for a larger participation of the

country in the world affair beyond the ‘see’ of India. She wants greater access to Bangla

Desh through North Bengal and China through the Chumbi valley.

A pragmatic view would, therefore dictate a modest expectation of returns from

international engagement with only the hope that economics will ultimately prevail over

politics. If China has outbid India over the Myanmar gas, the port of Sittwe29

may

provide for the very crucial river transport from Manipur and Mizoram into the Bay of

Bengal. Sittwe may even become a spot of India-China-Myanmar cooperation as China

too needs an outlet to the Bay of Bengal through Mandalay.30

Notes

1 The problem is manifest also in other sub-Himalayan regions like the Kosi basin. About the Himachal

Pradesh flood see ‘HP floods show Beijing-Delhi link is dry,’ by C. Raja Mohan, The Indian Express, 28

June 2005. 2 Southern Myanmar has an alternative name Assa, believed to have been a corruption of Orissa. There is

an island in the South China Sea by the name of Kalenga. Borobudur stands witness to India’s impact on

Siam while the old Tamil settlement in the northern and the eastern Sri Lanka has become a political

problem in that country. 3 On 22 November 2004, at Guwahati, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh flagged off the India-ASEAN

Motor Car Rally, that moved through Kohima (Nagaland), Imphal and More (Manipur)–Tamu (Myanmar)

border to Mandalay (Myanmar) and then, through the Shan state of Myanmar and the Taichilek (Myanmar)

- Mai Sei (Thailand) border, then through Phitsanulok, to the Thai-Lao border of Nong Khai-Friendship

Bridge, to Vientiane, Paksan and Densavanh (Laos), to Lao Bao, Hue, Nha Trang, Ho Chi Minh City

(Viet Nam), and, through the Moc Bai (Viet Nam)-Bavet (Cambodia/Kampuchia) border, to Pnom Penh

(Cambodia/Kampuchia) and, through the Siem Reap(Cambodia)-Aranya Prahet(Thailand) border, to

Bangkok, Surat Thani, Nakhon Si Thammarat and Dan Nok (Thailand), to Kayum Hitam, Putrajaya and

Johor Bahru (Malayasia), to Singapore and, finally, reaching Batam in Indonesia on December 10 (See The

Indian Express 21 November 2004 and The Assam Tribune 23 November 2004). Earlier, in June 2004, a

12-member survey team travelled in car from Imphal along the same route, to Nong Khai (Thai-Lao

border) and, then, splitting into two routes – one through Vietnam and the other through

18

Cambodia/Kampuchia – met in Bangkok. (‘Asean … by Road,’ by Tutu Dhawan. The Hindu, June 20,

2004). There is already a plan to connect by air Bangkok with Dibrugarh and Guwahati in Assam. 4 Of course there were sea routes of almost equal vintage connecting India with the West, Southeast Asia

and the eastern sea-coast of China to which the Arabs and the Western powers paid greater attention in the

later days because of their natural proficiency in maritime transportation. The entire east coast of peninsular

India from Tamluk to Masulipattanam was dotted by major and minor ports. There are positive indications

that from Bengal, Orissa, Andhra and Tamil regions people went out on sea trade to Sri Lanka, Myanmar,

Siam, and Malaya and, in many cases, settled in the latter areas since the early Christian time. Ancient

Indian colonies in these countries attest to the veracity of this belief.4 Eventually these routes were taken

over first by Arab traders and later by the Westerners. But the growth of the volume of trade in the late

eighteenth century forced the West to look for greater access to inland Asia through the land routes. 5 India’s relation with China is as old as the 2

nd century B.C. But that was in the West, through the central

Asian route. 6 C. Raja Mohan, ‘Many roads to China’s Tibet policy.’ The Indian Express, June 20, 2005.

7 See S.K.Chaube, Hill Politics in Northeast India. New Delhi, Orient Longman. Revised Second Edition,

1999, p.3. 8 Section 311 of the Government of India Act, 1935

9 Partial occupation of Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan in 1957 turned the Srinagar-Leh route vulnerable

as it fell close to the Line of Control. The Kargil war of 1999 exposed this vulnerability inducing India to

develop the alternative trade route from Shimla via Manali and, across the Rhotang Pass by means of a

tunnel, Darchu,,Padam and Nimu to Leh ( ‘Centre paves way for new Leh route via Manali,’ The Indian

Express, 7 September 2005).. 10

Parshotam Mehra, The North-Eastern Frontier: A Documentary Study of the Internecine Rivalry between

India, Tibet and China: Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 112. In the 1880s plans were floated for

building a railway line to Lhasa through Kalimpong. 11

Ibid. pp. 4 – 7. 12

There is a dilapidated Vishnu temple of thin bricks of the Bengali chouchala type at the Bishenpur

village near Moirang, the old capital of Manipur. The once-presiding deity, having had several movements,

is now lodged in the palace temple of Manipur raja. According to some local historians the idol had been

donated by the king of Pong, a Shan state in northeast Myanmar, in the fifteenth century. 13

The other, and older, port city was Akyab, at the mouth of the river Kaladan that flows from the Mizo

hills to the eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal northwest of Yangon and closer to Chittagong, now known

as Sittwe. 14

See Chaube, op. cit., pp. 220-21. 15

. Ibid., pp. 26- 27. 16

See ‘India and the Mongolian Fringe: Note by Foreign Secretary.’ Parshotam Mehra, The North-Eastern

Frontier: A Documentary Study of the Internecine Rivalry between India Tibet and China, Vol. 2, 1914-54.

(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp 111- 24, at 117-19). Also Chaube, op. cit., pp. 90-91. 17

Panikkar, op cit., pp. 54 – 55. 18

S.C.Bose, Geography of the Himalaya New Delhi, National Book Trust, India, 1976, p. 42. 19

One of the considerations behind Britain’s annexation of Burma is believed be the rising French

influence in Thailand, on the east of Burma. But Burma herself offered many lures besides being a possible

entry route to South China (Yunnan). 20

According to Section 311 of the Government of India Act, 1935, ‘tribal area’ was an area lying between

British India and Afghanistan or British India and Burma but belonging to neither British India, nor

Afghanistan nor Burma nor any princely state but belonged to India. As distinguished from the princely

states the tribal areas were under the executive authority of the Governor-General of British India

The following princely states joined Pakistan: Bahawalpur. Khairpur (Punjab and Sindh states); Kalat,

Las Belas, Makran, Kharan (Baluchistan states); Amb, Chitral, Dir (Dhir), Hunza, Nagar and Swat

(Frontier states). 21

See Chaube, op. cit., pp. 17 – 27. 22

Ibid. pp. 74-78. 23

At the time of Independence the non-tribal population of the Chittagong Hills Tract constituted 9% of its

total population. By 1991 it became the majority thanks to the policy of settlement of non-tribal population

19

in the hills since the Kaptai hydro-electric project beginning in 1951 and several amendments to the 1900

Regulation on the administration of the Chittagong Hills Tract. Quantitatively, the Chittagong Hills Tracts

are still a better place for the tribals than Tripura where the tribals have been reduced to virtually a quarter

of the total population. Qualitatively, however, the situation is worse because (1) non-tribal settlement in

Tripura started long before Independence, under the patronage of the tribal king, but was (2) accentuated

after Independence and partition, without state encouragement, by the influx of refugees. 24

Subir Bhaumik, ‘The external linkages in insurgency in India’s northeast.’ B. Pakem (ed.), Insurgency in

Northeast India, New Delhi: (Omsons Publications, 1997, pp. 89 – 1oo, at 97 – 99. 25

There was an exchange of fire between the Border Security Force of India and the Bangla Desh Rifles

on 20 August 2005 arising out of embankment of the Mahananda river in the Malda district (West Bengal). 26

This group backed several extremist organizations at least one of which – the Jamayet Mujaheedin -

were believed to be behind the series of bomb blasts in Bangla Desh on 17 August 2005 27

See C. Raja Mohan, ‘To the North-East through Myanmar,’ The Hindu, 29 November 2002. 28

See Julien Levesque, ‘Is it the Shwe gas reserves talking?’ The Indian Express, 23 October 2007. 29

The Shwe gas field, one of Southeast Asia’s biggest gas reserves, was discovered in late 2003 by

Daewoo off Burma’s western coast in the Bay of Bengal, and is being developed by the South Korean

industrial conglomerate and Indian companies. Daewoo holds a 60 percent stake in the A-1 and A-3

Blocks, which between them hold more than 8 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas. A further 30 percent

stake is held by two Indian government companies, with 10 percent controlled by the Burmese

government. A proposed pipeline also included in the project will cross into India from gas fields in Arakan

and Chin state in western Burma, passing through India’s Mizoram, Assam and West Bengal. 30

See P.V. Indiresan, ‘The Kunming Initiative,’ Frontline Vol 17, Issue 7, April 1- 14, 2000. In an

international seminar of Indian and Chinese scholars at the Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, New

Delhi, in 2002 the Chinese participants repeatedly suggested the grant of access to Chinese supplies from

Kunming to Chittagong through Mizoram.

Regionalism, Globalisation and Constraints to Research in the Northeast

Walter Fernandes

By its very nature research has to live with constraints. Some of them like the social,

political or historical situation are external. In Northeast India components such as its

ethnic and linguistic diversity belong to this category. The second set that can be called

subjective arises from the researcher‟s person, ideology, values, prejudices or training.

Some others such as the type, purpose and methodology of research, people‟s

participation, the role of the researcher and of the respondents, can be included in either

category depending on the context. Constraints are common to all research but they grow

manifold in the Northeast because of its special features, the first of which is its identity.

Some speak of a common regional identity, a few persons focus on the diversity of its

peoples and cultures and others treat unity and diversity as two sides of the same coin. In

recent years the “Look East Policy” (LEP) and some globalisation-linked conventions

have added to the complexity of the region whose history and development are different

from those of mainland India.

To situate the region in its social and historical context researchers have to gain an

understanding of what some consider a region-specific identity and others call the centre-

periphery syndrome or an ethos of being marginal to India. Those who hold the latter

view believe that some regions of mainland India consider themselves the mainstream

and treat the Northeast as a sub-stream. Researchers have to study the context of this

debate as well as of the nationalist and ethnic conflicts of the region in order to gain an

understanding of its main causes such as lack of productive investment. This task

becomes doubly difficult because many researchers are from outside the region. Their

view of the Northeast influences their research as well the perception the local people

have of outsiders. Because of ethnic conflicts even some persons from the region may

come to be considered outsiders. That turns the person of the researcher into a constraint.

This paper will discuss some constraints and will hint at possible solutions to the

problems that the researcher faces in the region. The first part will deal with the All-India

The author is former Director, Indian Social Institute, New Delhi, Editor, Social Action, and a researcher

on tribal, gender and land issues is at present Director, North Eastern Social Research Centre, Guwahati,

Assam.

constraints such as ideology and methodology and the second part will be on the

Northeast in the context of these issues.

The first constraint on the very nature of research comes from ideology. Since social

scientists study human communities, their value system, outlook and training condition

what they contribute to the communities studied and to new policies. That is why from

the birth of the social sciences some scholars questioned the desirability of academic

research that treats human beings as objects of study.

The ideological difference is between the school who believes that the researcher

should and can take a distance from the communities studied and those who hold that

human beings cannot be treated as objects of study. They hold that natural and organic

scientists can take a purely academic approach because they study flora, fauna and

inanimate matter. But social scientists who deal with human communities or individuals

should get involved with their society and become part of its processes (Dash 2004: 298-

299). In the Northeast, for example, they should not just study the causes of conflicts or

the impact of initiatives such as globalisation and LEP but should also analyse them from

the perspective of the communities affected and should join them in a search for

alternatives.

Linked to ideology is ownership of knowledge. Those who hold that human

communities cannot be treated as objects of study also believe that knowledge is

produced jointly by the external researcher and the community. So outsiders cannot just

study a community without its involvement and write about it in their own name. Those

who do it are not different from the capitalist factory owner who gets the workers to

produce goods and appropriates the product and profit accruing from it (Krishnamurthy

1981). The ideological questions of production and ownership of knowledge are also

ethical issues that bring the researcher‟s role into focus. They are relevant to the

Northeast because of suspicion in some circles that researchers coming from outside the

region do not understand them or that schemes such as globalisation and LEP have been

imposed on the region from outside.

The questioning of the role of researchers from outside a country or region began

already in the colonial era because anthropology, then known as ethnology, was the first

social science discipline to be introduced in the colonies. Though colonialism was

legitimised in the name of the civilising mission of Europe, its objective was to turn the

economy of the colony into a supplier of capital and raw material and a captive market

for the finished products of the European Industrial Revolution (Rothermund 1981: 49-

54). To achieve this goal, colonial administrators needed a good knowledge of the people

they ruled. In order to get it in India some British administrators collected

anthropological data themselves and others employed official ethnologists to do it. The

belief that the administrators introduced this discipline and appointed scholars with the

objective of getting reliable data on the colonised peoples in order to better administer

them for the above objective brought the role of the ethnologist into question (Mbilinyi

and Vuorela 1982: 310-312).

Not every accusation made against the colonial administrators or ethnologists can be

accepted but one cannot treat as totally unfounded the fear that scholars were appointed

to study the colonised peoples in order to better administer them. The term ethnology or

study of the races outside Europe used till the mid-20th

century, betrayed a racial bias of

the superior colonising race studying the inferior colonised peoples in order to civilise

them. It was only when Claude Levi-Strauss showed through structuralism that what was

said of the colonies was true of Europe too that ethnology came to be called anthropology

or study of human beings (Singh 1987: 16-18). However, from this possible bias or

because the colonialist used some studies, one cannot jump to the conclusion that all of

them were done exclusively for a colonial objective. Such an exclusive view would

devalue the rich data that the scholars of that era generated. Their interpretation was often

influenced by the “European century”. That does not justify the rejection of all pre-

colonial data as biased. Instead, one can begin with the data of this period as the starting

point but move away from its Eurocentric interpretation.

From the questioning of the ethnologist‟s role was born the first step of a solution

already in the colonial age, in the form of participant observation. Today it may look like

a compromise between those who believe in pure objectivity and those who think that the

researcher should be involved with the community studied. The latter group would be

unhappy with participant observation because the observers did not get involved with the

community. They continued to treat the people as objects of study (Dooley 1995: 20-26).

However, the thinking about involvement with the community studied is post-colonial

while pre-colonial participant observation satisfied the researcher.

During the decades after World War II some Asian, African and Latin American

scholars reacted to scholars from the colonising countries studying the colonised peoples.

Some of them joined hands to search for alternatives on the basis of a “Third World

identity” in the form of a “Third World Research Methodology” (Hursh-Cesar and Roy

1971) or a “Third World Sociology” (Prabhakar 2001) that would be be different from

what had evolved in the colonial age. Some others like Desai (1981) felt that even this

effort was futile because Indian scholars too had internalised the colonial ideology. The

Indian academia respected scholarship only when it was recognised in the West and

linked the status of scholars to studies done abroad, to the number of teaching and lecture

invitations they received from West European and US universities and papers published

in foreign journals.

The next stage of questioning came from scholars1 who did not subscribe fully to such

“nationalist” questioning because the only commonality between the Third World

continents was their colonial history. While agreeing that many in India and in other

former colonies had internalised the colonial ideology they added that internalisation too

had a class bias. Those who complained about methodologies developed abroad or the

researcher‟s closeness to the colonial rulers belonged by and large to the upper classes.

They continued to treat the poor as objects of study as the foreigner had done with the

colonised peoples. They thought of their own knowledge as absolute and appropriated

what the poor produced. The situation of the masses had not changed much whether they

were ruled by the foreigner or the Indian dominant classes and castes. They though that

the purely academic approach was colonial. To be relevant to the communities studied,

the researcher should develop a new paradigm that neither rejects all knowledge coming

from abroad as colonial nor treats it as the norm for judging all research. In their thinking

the basic issue was ownership. The community and the scholar produce knowledge

jointly so the latter cannot claim its sole ownership (Singh 2001: 16-20).

This questioning arose in the context of the political crises of the 1960s and 1970s and

the consequent radicalisation at the national and international levels. It was symbolised

by the 1968 West European student revolution and the anti-Viet Nam war movement in

North America. In India the economic crisis of the 1960s particularly the 1967 famine

was instrumental in radicalising a section of the middle class youth. The Emergency

touched another section and some professionals felt its influence in the late 1970s and

early 1980s. This questioning was qualitatively different from the “Third World”

alternatives of the decades immediately after independence. The scholars belonging to

this school considered the methodology itself unjust and claimed that the better access to

education and other services that the upper class researchers had, made them outsiders to

the community studied. The issue was the role of the researcher, not of methodology

(Fernandes 1989).

The first response to this questioning was action research suggested by funding

agencies like the World Bank. It was based on the belief that research should not be

purely academic but should lead to action in favour of the community studied. However,

those who were demanding a radical departure from the past felt that this objective was

laudable but action research too treated human communities as objects. Unlike pure

academic researchers they gave feedback to the community whose action they studied but

they themselves remained outsiders. Knowledge, whether got through action research or

through a purely academic approach, belonged to the people but in action research too

scholars continue to treat it as their own (Fernandes 2004: 207-208).

Participatory research was one of the alternatives these thinkers suggested as a step

towards ownership by the producers of knowledge. It went beyond action research in the

sense that it treated the members of the community as active agents of its production.

People put their knowledge together with the help of the scholar who functioned as a

facilitator, contributed the professional component and shared with the people knowledge

about policies and official decisions to which they did not have access. This combination

could turn production of knowledge into a tool of people‟s mobilisation. By coming

together as subjects to share their knowledge with one another and with the researcher the

community members created an atmosphere of mutual support that strengthened them

and helped them to take their own decisions. Researchers got involved with the issues of

concern to the community but remained outsiders. They posed leading questions, shared

information and combined their own knowledge with that of the community in order to

get its members to think and act together and thus produce new knowledge and action

(Mistry 1989: 67-68).

Space has been devoted to the All India debate because of its importance to the

Northeast. Very little of the discussion took place in this region because of the difference

in its priorities. The gap that it shows existing between the region and mainland India is

thus a constraint, particularly to scholars who fail to bridge this gap or limit themselves to

an “All India” perspective. It is doubly true of persons from outside the region. The gap

developed mainly because in mainland India the discussion was on the researcher‟s

ideology, methodology and approach. Ideology is present in the Northeast but within its

complexity, the origin of the researchers becomes as important as their ideology. Possible

polarisation around the nationalist and ethnic conflicts can add to the constraints since

researchers who are involved with the community may find it difficult to take a distance

from the causes of unrest or to make a contribution to peace based on justice or study

whether new policies like LEP and globalisation are an imposition from outside or can

contribute to peace.

The discussion on ideology and methodology described above was a response to the

changing socio-economic and political scenario. In the Northeast too the difference in the

response to the nature and methodology of research changed according to its specific

context so it differed in many aspects from that in mainland India. In order to respond to

its specificity researchers had to modify many norms developed at the All India level to

suit the needs of the Northeast. That becomes a constraint for those who think of a

“universal approach” to research and are not equipped with the skills required to

understand the specificity of a region and adapt professional methodology to its ethos.

The basis of this constraint was the ethnic and cultural differences as well as the fact

that during the years of the above discussion in mainland India, the Northeast was in what

can be called “an inward looking mood” of a search for an identity. Its first component

was the centre-periphery issue. Some mainland Indian communities consider themselves

representative of the whole country i.e. its “mainstream” or centre. That turned the

Northeast into a periphery (Misra 2000) or a sub-stream which would at some stage have

to merge with the “mainstream” on the terms of the latter. Those who called themselves

the mainstream also identified the Indian state with the totally different entity of an

Indian nation. A nation is a people with a language and a culture that confers an identity

on them. A state is a legal entity with a territory that confers citizenship on them (Karna

2008: 19-21). During the decades after independence most mainland leaders failed to

keep this distinction or accept the difference between the Northeast and the rest of India,

particularly the Hindi region considered the “mainstream”. As R. N. Datta (1990: 41)

says, the danger arises from the fact that the national leaders speak of “one state one

nation” and “take the degree of Aryanisation as the measure of Indianisation.”

Researchers who want to join the communities in analysing their situation have to

understand this difference. For example, in order to turn research into a tool of peace,

they would have to join the community in its effort to understand the causes of conflicts.

Peace is not mere absence of armed conflict but is primarily a move towards a just

society. So a solution can be found only through an understanding of the causes of

conflicts and by situating them within their socio-political context (Subuddhi 2006: 24-

30). It requires an understanding of the broader national or international context without

carrying only the “mainstream” thinking to research in the region. One has to keep the

nation-state and local-regional-national distinction also while trying to understand the

broader situation. In the failure to keep a distinction between the local and the national

lies the origin of many conflicts.

An example is the imposition of a single administration on the region particularly on

its “un-administered” communities. The conflicts that ensued because of it are among the

reasons why much of the Northeast was discussing its identity and its link with mainland

India at a time when the questioning in mainland India was on the purpose and nature of

research and the role of the researcher. The 1960s and 1970s that were the decades of this

questioning in mainland India were also the years of nationalist struggles in the region.

The Naga struggle that began in 1947 was in full swing (Horam 1988: 59-70). The Mizo

struggle began in the mid-1960s (Rangaswami 1978). In the early 1970s Assam was

dealing with the immigrant issue that resulted in the 1979-1985 Movement (Baruah 2005:

44-49). By 1970 the indigenous tribes of Tripura had lost more than 60 percent of their

land to the Hindu Bangladeshi immigrants because of the Tripura Land Reforms and

Land Revenue Act 1960 which ignored their traditional community-based ownership

pattern and recognised individual pattas alone (Debbarma 2008: 120-122). The Tripura

nationalist struggle that began in the 1970s was a result of this loss and later to the

Dumbur hydro-power dam (Bhaumik 2003: 84). The indigenous tribes of Arunachal

considered the Chakmas of the Chittagong Hill tracts displaced by the Kaptai dam in the

erstwhile East Pakistan and resettled in their state a threat to their identity (Chakraborty

2002: 162-165). The non-Assamese speaking hill tribes perceived The Official Language

Act 1960 as a threat to their identity. That resulted in the formation of Meghalaya in 1972

(Sangma 2008: 211).

Thus, during these crucial years the major areas of concern in the Northeast differed

from those of mainland India. While researchers in the rest of India were responding to

the radicalisation of the 1960s or the state of Emergency 1975-77, the concern in the

Northeast was the Armed Forces Special Powers Act that many consider more repressive

than the Emergency. Another issue was the indigenous status which the Tribes and some

Dalits are demanding in mainland India as an All India status. Amid the fear of being

submerged in the “mainstream” or by the immigrants from Bangladesh, Bihar and Nepal

the debate in the Northeast was around the indigenous status in the region. A thinking

developed based on chronology alone that, indigenous to the region were all communities

that lived in the Northeast before the Yandabu Treaty of February 1826 through which

the Burmese emperor ceded his territories in the region to the East India Company. This

definition makes no distinction between the tribal and non-tribal communities or the more

and less powerful groups. Included in this category are groups like the Meitei, Tai Ahom,

the ethnic Assamese as well as the tribes. Excluded from it are others like the tea garden

workers who were impoverished by the same colonial processes and were forced to come

to the Northeast in search of a livelihood (Fernandes, Bharali and Kezo 2008: 15-17).

These processes place many constraints both on research and on the person of the

researcher. Since research is conditioned by the prevailing social, economic and political

situation, from the 1960s to the 1980s conflict was the major theme in the region. Its

causes were studied more than possible solutions. Much attention was paid also to the

indigenous issue. In fact, much thinking on the indigenous issue developed in the 1970s

prior to the Assam Movement. Among issues such as land alienation, loss of culture,

identity or lack of development greater attention was paid to the identity and

development issues than to loss of land and other resources that would lay the foundation

of later ethnic conflicts. One finds in these decades a relatively large number of studies

on immigration, nationalism and the mainstream-sub-stream dynamics (see details in

Singh et al (ed). 1998).

One of the reasons why such controversies became constraints for researchers is that

many of them were from outside the region. Some of them did not free themselves from

their “nationalist” ideology that perceived the Northeast as an area of conflict alone

which they interpreted only as a problem when many in the Northeast considered them

integral to a search for solutions. Such persons found research difficult not merely

because they did not search for causes but also because their approach could create a

suspicion of mainland India in the minds of the people of the region. That made the

search for a solution difficult. It is true that also some persons from the Northeast took

this stand but the constraint was greater for outsiders (D‟Souza and Kekhrieseno 2002:

14-16).

The possibility of the researcher‟s origin becoming a constraint or influencing analysis

gives the third dimension of the outsider-insider debate. In the colonial age it was around

the ethnologists from the colonising country or those appointed by the administrator to

study the “natives”. After independence some debated the issue of Indian scholars

internalising the colonial ideology. The second dimension that came amid the turmoil of

the 1960 and 1970s turned “objective” or purely academic researchers into outsiders to

the community studied. Its third dimension is the outsider-indigenous debate in the

Northeast. In a polarised situation some local communities refuse to share data with

persons from outside the region for fear that they will use them for their own benefit or

that of mainland India. Many outsiders too are not clear on their role.

The first problem that one faces is that of authentic and reliable

information on issues of our concern. The social scientists not belonging

to the region falter to write freely about problems being faced by the

people of the region as they are apprehensive of attacks by the locals. The

native scholars on the other hand, attempt to conceal the facts in order to

camouflage uncomfortable and outmoded practices of their community.

Under such conditions truth is the casualty. That is why the portrayal of

India‟s Northeast is more mythical than real. The rest of India gets a

picture of the region only as one of conflicts. The contradictions the

Northeast faces in its relations with the so-called “mainstream India” are

never mentioned in the media (Karna 2008: 18).

The constraints are not limited to social scientists from outside because the conflicts

that were at first nationalist, as such between the Northeast and mainland India, have now

been extended to the ethnic groups of the region mainly because of shortages caused by

encroachment by immigrants, high unemployment, low productive investment and the

real or perceived attacks on the local cultures and identity. As a result, also persons of

North Eastern origin face this constraints today because the shortages have resulted in

competition between the ethnic groups of the region for scarce resources. For example,

studies show that unemployment is an important, though not the only, cause for the youth

joining the militant groups (Mahanta 2008: 105-106). Most ethnic conflicts in the region

are around land or jobs (Damzen 2008: 58-60). That creates constraints and

misunderstandings also for indigenous social scientists. On one side, as Karna says

above, social scientists studying their own community can be victims of narrow

parochialism. On the other suspicion that ethnic conflicts polarise the communities in the

region and extend this suspicion to them. Since most communities do not perceive their

resources as economic assets alone but link them closely to their own identity, in their

struggles the economic, political and cultural issues merge into one (Datta 1990: 40).

That is another facet of the insider-outsider debate. Basic to it is the exclusive stand

most communities take around their resources and their refusal to share them with others.

Sharing was intrinsic to tribal culture but it was within the tribe. Every tribe also

maintained links with the neighbouring communities in the form of trade and other forms

of exchange. Conflict was one form of exchange because of the need to protect their

resources from attackers. So each tribe considered the area it inhabited its exclusive

domain and treated its resources as theirs alone (Chakraborty 2006: 69-72). That situation

has changed considerably during the last few decades. Modernisation has brought many

benefits to their communities but has also created new needs that put additional pressure

on their resources. That is compounded by individualism that has entered their

communities. It results in class formation in their otherwise egalitarian societies

(Nongkynrih 2008; Fernandes and Pereira 2005; Barbora 2002) mainly because of

competition between communities and individuals.

Polarisation resulting from it makes an objective assessment of the situation difficult.

Suspicion that was in the past limited to persons from outside the region can extend also

to those from other ethnic communities of the Northeast. As Karna (2008: 18) has said

above, outsiders are often afraid of making an honest analysis of the situation and those

from the region may have to conceal many facts because of social pressure. Even persons

belonging to other ethnic groups of the region may not have full freedom for research.

For example when a person from one Naga tribe was sent to another tribe for fieldwork

the leaders of the latter decided not to give her all the information both because they

wanted to keep it within the tribe for its members who may want to do studies from

within and because they were afraid that the other tribe would use this information

against them. In another study, the investigators got very good information when they

met persons individually but not in a group because of the fear that informants of the

other militant faction or of the state were present among them and that those who made

any statements would have to pay the price.

The conflicts and shortages have to be studied also in the light of the constraint of

very low productive investment and high unemployment in the region. An analysis of the

Annual Economic Surveys of the States show that the Northeast has an unemployed

backlog of around 40 lakh persons or 25 percent of its active workforce (Fernandes and

Pereira 2005: 16). Globalisation, the LEP and new projects being planned are presented

as development and as means of employment generation. However, research shows that

more often than not such projects destroy people‟s livelihood without replacing it and

that the situation is deteriorating with globalisation. For example, a study on

development-induced displacement in Assam 1947-2000 shows that development

projects used more than 14 lakh acres of land during these decades and deprived 19 lakh

persons of their livelihood. Meagre compensation was paid for 3.9 acres of private land.

The remaining 10 lakh acres of community owned land are people‟s livelihood. But the

colonial land laws that continue to be in force even today treat what does not have

individual pattas as state property. By official count these 3.9 acres displaced 4.1 lakh

persons. The remaining 15 lakh persons were not even counted because they were

considered encroachers on land that was their habitat for hundreds of years before these

laws were enacted. People have been deprived of it without their consent and without

even the meagre compensation paid to individual owners. Out of more than 3,000 files

studied, only 10 showed signs of partial rehabilitation (Fernandes and Bharali 2006: 77 &

107).

Impoverishment is the consequence of such deprivation. However, new projects like

the 48 hydro-electrical dams proposed for the region in the next decade and a list of 168

that has been prepared for possible construction later are presented as development. 69 of

them are in Arunachal Pradesh which has the highest component of biodiversity in the

Northeast (Menon et al. 2003). They will destroy much of it and the rest of people‟s

sustenance. For example, according to its Environmental Impact Assessment the Lower

Subansiri dam in Arunachal will displace only 38 families from two villages. In reality it

will submerge at least 12 villages on the right bank and more on the left bank. Most

families to be displaced live on community land which is considered state property

according to the present land laws and is not counted even for compensation. Kameng,

Lower Subansiri and Middle Siang (Arunachal Pradesh) and Tuivai and Bairabi

(Mizoram) have already acquired large tracts of jhum (shifging) cultivation land with no

assessment of potential landscape level changes around the area. Project documents state

that jhum degrades the environment. But land alienation without compensation or

improper and inadequate measures to mitigate these impacts will force the communities

to bring new areas under shifting cultivation for their survival. So their impact will be the

opposite of the above claims (Menon 2008: 135-138).

That creates a dilemma for researchers committed to the people. On one side they

cannot ignore problems such as lack of development, unemployment, need for jobs. On

the other they need to question the development paradigm that destroys livelihoods

without alternatives. The people to be affected by them are often unaware of their

negative impacts (Sachdeva 2005: 216-220). That turns the form of development into a

constraint for participatory researchers, not necessarily to those who do not get involved

with the community studied. Participatory researchers are often aware of the negative

impacts through the professional component of their studies and are tempted to impose

their views on the people and “tell them what to do”. That can go against the spirit of

internalisation that requires a participatory process of the communities becoming subjects

of a study. Researchers have to develop methods of reflecting with the community on the

implications of the schemes and of other processes and their possible link with

globalisation without imposing their views on the community.

The need to think out globalisation, LEP and other recent schemes with the community

adds a new dimension to research because the state presents the projects as development

and LEP as a link with Southeast Asia to which the identity of many communities of the

region is related. The identity issue is important in the Northeast and one has to

encourage this search. But the researcher has also to be open to questions that many

persons in the region have been asking about the implications of such policies. From

where does one look east, from Delhi or from the Northeast? By allowing the dams to

supply power to the rest of India and to Southeast Asia will the region be deprived of its

biodiversity and sustenance and remain a supplier of one more raw material in the form

of power? (Menon 2008: 140-141). Researchers have to reflect on these issues by

themselves and with the community in order to become aware of their implications and to

search for creative alternatives together with the people.

This issue has attained greater importance with new international threats to their

livelihood particularly biodiversity. The Northeast is one of the 25 mega-biodiversity

zones of the world and one of its 18 biodiversity hotspots. Biotechnology owning

companies want to turn their resources into commodities for their own profit. They have

attempted to do it in the past but recent legal measures have given them additional power.

In the past, without their realising it some researchers have played into their hands. Under

the belief that they were producing new objective knowledge they studied and published

their biodiversity and knowledge developed around it and thus put it in the public

domain. That gave the entrepreneurs and the commercial forces the possibility of pirating

it without the communities that had produced or preserved it getting any benefits out of it

(Singh 2005: 175-184).

That is a threat to their intellectual property rights (IPR) over biodiversity and

knowledge that they have developed around it. For many decades immigration was a

major threat. Immigrants came in search of the fertile land that they could it occupy

somewhat easily because of legal ambiguity around it (Bora 1986: 46-49). The recent

international conventions attack their IPRs. The Convention on Biodiversity (CBD)

signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1992 acknowledges that tribal and farming communities have

preserved biodiversity for centuries but it rests control over it in the hands of the

sovereign state. Thus, the CBD protects biodiversity from the biotechnology owning

companies that were trying to gain control over it but it does not protect the legal right of

the communities over it (Rao 1992: 331). It would have been possible to get over this

constraint by negotiating benefit-sharing mechanisms with the sovereign state. That

possibility disappeared with the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)

Agreement of the World Trade Organisation (formerly GATT) signed in April 1994. It

put traditional knowledge in the public domain. So none owns it and anyone can use it

with no benefits accruing to the community (Rao and Guru 2003: 128-132). It thus

deprives the people even of the possibility of legal recourse to protect their right or

demand a share of the benefits.

Equally important is the debate around climate change. The biodiversity-rich Northeast

has been identified as one of the carbon sinks to protect Europe from climate change.

That is a threat to the role of biodiversity as people‟s livelihood. The people of the region

are expected to preserve their livelihood not for their own benefit but in order to let

Europe pollute the biosphere with petroleum products and reverse its consequences by

getting the Northeast to function as a carbon sink. To the people of the region

biodiversity is not merely flora and fauna. It is also intrinsic to their identity and to their

natural resource management systems (Fernandes and Goga D‟Souza 2001: 10-11). But a

carbon sink is perceived primarily as greenery that can be a commercial forest, not

biodiversity.

These Conventions that are intrinsic to globalisation put many limitations on

researchers. They cannot afford any more to bring traditional knowledge to the public

domain as they have done in the past without being aware of its consequences. Today

they are expected to be aware of its legal implications but also remember that, much of

the biodiversity and knowledge have not been documented. So they need to document

them while simultaneously identifying ways of protecting community rights since TRIPS

has deprived them even of the theoretical possibility of recourse to legal measures to

protect them. Purely academic research can play into the hands of the biotechnology

owning enterprises. Researchers have to find way of documenting their knowledge and

searching for benefit-sharing mechanisms together with the community. This search

begins with the understanding of the environment as an ecosystem with the people‟s

communities at its centre i.e. as their livelihood over which they have a right

(Sacchidananda 2004: 115-118).

That cannot be done through traditional tools of research alone. Much new thinking is

required on the ideology and methodology of research as well as the role of the

researcher. Ways have to be found of mobilising people around this issue without

sacrificing objectivity. While studying biodiversity and traditional knowledge researchers

have to maintain a balance between national and international interests and combine it

with commitment to the local people and regional interests on the other. To achieve it

they have to help the community to understand the conventions and to find benefit-

sharing and other alternatives through a participatory process.

That requires an alliance between social and technical scientists and the community.

This need places on both social and natural scientists the onus of coordinating their work

among themselves and with the communities. It also reinforces the ideology of

participatory research. Relatively few social scientists and fewer biologists are conversant

with this approach. Failure on this count can bring on them the accusation of indifference

to the marginalisation of the region or of trying to impose a mainland perspective on it.

That possibility also shows the need to find a balance between traditional and

participatory research and a common ground between outsiders and insiders. The

trajectory of commitment to truth, basic human values and human rights that they have to

traverse for the social and economic development of the communities can be a way out of

this dilemma. Commitment to protect their rights and a search for technical alternatives

that can help the community to share its knowledge with a broader constituency without

losing its right over its benefits can strengthen the meeting point between social and

technical scientists and the community.

An effort has been made in this paper to take a look at the constraints under which

researchers have to work in the Northeast. Some constraints are ideological and others

result from the origin and training of the researcher. The constraints increase in the

Northeast because of the specific identity of the region. Constraints are also challenges.

Globalisation and the LEP provide to the researcher an opportunity to interact with the

people of the region and assist them in their search for an identity specific to the

Northeast. The mainstream-sub-stream dynamics challenge those coming from outside

the region to provide a national perspective without compromising the regional

specificity. Thus, a constraint cannot be taken in isolation but has to be studied in the

totality of the situation.

Notes

1 The present writer includes himself in this school.

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Truth and Rights:

A Study of the Violation of Rights on the Margins of India

Samir Kumar Das

The orator who speaks the truth to those who cannot accept his truth, for instance, who

may be exiled, or punished in some way, is free to keep silent. No one forces him to

speak, but he feels that it is his duty to do so. When, on the other hand, someone is

compelled to tell the truth (as, for example, under duress or torture), then his discourse is

not a parrhesiastic (the Greek word „parrhesia‟ stands for free speech, the author)

utterance. A criminal who is forced by his judges to confess his crime does not use

parrhesia. But if he voluntarily confesses his crime to someone else out of moral

obligation, then he performs a parrhesiastic act. To criticize a friend or a sovereign is an

act of parrhesia insofar as it is a duty to help a friend who does not recognize his

wrongdoing, or insofar as it is a duty towards the city to help the king to better himself as

a sovereign – Foucault (2001:19).

Paradoxical though it may sound, while rights violations are a part of everyday reality in

India‟s Northeast corresponding cases of exposure and conviction are by all accounts

extremely rare compared to such violations. The victims, in other words, find it difficult –

if not impossible – to establish such violations as truths in the eye of law and hence

punishable by law. Rights violations therefore do not necessarily translate into

institutional truths. The paper proposes to focus not so much on the violation of rights as

such, but very much on the problems we more often than not face while trying to

establish such violations as institutional truths. These violations often (though not

always) take place outside the realm of what Foucault would have called, the „regime of

truth‟ (Foucault 1980: 131) established according to the rules and protocols of the

Constitution, law of the land and its vast repertoire of institutions including various

legislative and judicial bodies. It is by way of observing the rules and protocols, the

regime establishes for us in the society, that violations can be rendered and demonstrated

as „true‟ and also become institutionally entertainable truths to be provided with legal

guarantee and remedy. Not all violations therefore enjoy the status of being true in any

The author is Professor of Political Science at the University of Calcutta, Kolkata.

2

given society. There are many violations of rights in the society that are not considered

and sustained as true violations. The paper proposes to drive home the distinction

between violations per se and violations as truth – often ignored and lost sight of in the

commonplace understanding and writings on violations of rights particularly in

contemporary India.

Violations of rights unless translated into truths are seldom regarded as true violations.

While untrue violations do not cease to be called violations by those whose rights are

violated, these –as we will argue - because of their very nature also deprive the victims,

their families, concerned citizens and relevant groups of the subjectivity that entitles them

to seek Constitutional and legal remedies. Subjectivity consists not in experiencing

violations but in acting on such experiences by way of seeking remedies. It is only by

way of translating violations into true violations that the victims, their families and the

concerned citizens and the relevant groups can hope to seek legal and institutional

remedies. The regime of truth circulating in the society sets forth the rules and protocols

within which such remedies can be and will have to be sought.

One has to be fearless – as Foucault in the above epigram tells us - while speaking the

truth. Truth in this sense springs from complete fearlessness. One who is fearful of

reprisals feels too intimidated to speak the truth. One has to successfully conquer one‟s

fear in order to speak the truth. While the importance of being fearless can hardly be

doubted, this paper seeks to trace varieties of speech acts that span between supine

silence and complete fearlessness a la Foucault. Not all of us will have to be like the

brave and fearless Greeks and lay down our lives in order to speak the truth. There is

more to the politics of enunciation than simple acts of fearlessness and martyrdom as

Foucault would have us believe.

The argument is sought to be driven home with reference to India‟s Northeast – more

particularly, to the role of three leading human rights organizations of the region: Manab

Adhikar Sangram Samiti (MASS) and Naga Peoples‟ Movement for Human Rights

(NPMHR) operating in Assam and Nagaland respectively especially in the late-1990s.

3

NPMHR – the first organization to work for human rights amongst the Nagas - came into

being on 9 September 1978 under the leadership of Luingam Luithui.

Assam has a fairly long history of struggle for human rights. Between 1949 and 1951,

many workers and supporters of then undivided Communist Party of India (CPI) and

other Left forces were detained without trial under the notorious Preventive Detention

(PD) Act. It was in this context that the All-Assam Civil Liberties Union (AACLU) was

established in 1951 with a view to obtain their release. Although in the initial year, it was

highly active, it gradually lost its steam particularly after 1952 when the first General

Elections were held throughout the country. As the Central Government proclaimed the

emergency (1975-77) all over the country and nearly all voices of opposition were

choked and throttled in Assam alongside of course the rest of the country, such leaders as

Amrit Phukon, B. C. Baruah, B. C. Chakrabarty etc. were instrumental in founding the

People‟s Committee for Human Rights and Civil Liberties (PCHRCL). Its main objective

was to provide legal aid to those who were held under the P. D. Act. As elections were

held in 1977 and democracy was restored, this organization too started losing its tempo. It

was in 1980 when the increasing police torture in the wake of the Assam movement since

1979 that, such leaders as Surendranath Medhi, Debkanta Kakati and J. C. Medhi

established Citizens‟ Civil Liberties Association (CCLA). In 1984, the People‟s Union of

Civil Liberties (PUCL) established its Assam branch in Guwahati and both CCLA and

PUCL joined their hands and organized a common platform for creating public opinion

against police terror and providing legal aid to those subjected to the torture by the

security forces. In late-1980s, both these organizations however became increasingly

inactive. In the early 1990s when the first-ever military operation was launched against

the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the security forces unleashed what in

some circles was interpreted as a „reign of terror‟, Manab Adhikar Sangram Samity

(MASS) came into being with Parag Kumar Das and Ajit Bhuyan – General Secretary

and President respectively. The organization has been demanding impartial inquiry into

all cases of alleged violation of human rights and immediate withdrawal of armed forces

and the „Black and draconian‟ laws operating in Assam and in other parts of the region.

In 2002, Lachit Bardoloi – the organization‟s chairman, denied any linkage with ULFA

and even dared the state Government to prove its charge that it had been maintaining

4

links with the insurgent organization. It was about the same time another organization

viz. Ganatantrik Adhikar Sangram Samity (GASS) was established with the same

objective of restoring peace and democratic rights in Assam. GASS sought to unify under

its umbrella such diverse and often conflicting political forces as Congress (I) and many

other anti-communal groupings, Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), Communist Party of India

(CPI) etc. The last two became full members of the Secretariat in its State Convention

held on 6 and 7 September 1994. It was in the words of one of its very eminent leaders „a

conglomerate of forces that was not confined to party politics‟ (Baruah 1998: 69). Unlike

MASS, GASS in the said Convention castigates „all sorts of terrorist activities‟. While

holding the „armed struggle as an alternative method of solving the state‟s problems‟ by

ULFA and the-then Bodo Security Force (BdSF) as the „unintended consequence‟ of

„neglect and deprivation by New Delhi towards the region‟, it warned against the

government‟s „repressive policies‟ and called for „a political solution to a political

problem‟. It also urged on the government to lift the ban on these organizations and

thereby enable them to „democratically convey their message‟. Thus, it will not be an

overstatement if one says that it is only in the context of military operations against some

of the insurgent organizations in the state that the human rights movements gathered

momentum. In the words of a commentator writing in 1997: “Of late in Assam, there has

appeared to be much public awareness of human rights mainly because of violation of

human rights both by the terrorists and the authorities” (Phukon 1998 mimeo).

While both are primarily local and at best regional organizations, which came into

being primarily as a civil society response to state actions in handling insurgencies,

references are also made to the role of Amnesty International that has a network cutting

across the local, regional and national boundaries. We have also made some references to

the report entitled Jeeban Aamader Noi (Life is not ours) prepared by the Parbatya

Chattagram Commission (Commission on the Chittagong Hills Tracts) in 1991 on the

situation of the indigenous people of Bangladesh mainly concentrated in this district.1

Subsequently the Commission also prepared at least 4 updates till the year 2000. The

Bengali compendium however includes all the four updates published till 2000 and hence

offers a fuller understanding of the evolving situation in the area and is obviously

intended to reach a wider vernacular readership.2 Although in Bangladesh, its inclusion in

5

this paper was driven by the consideration that the experience of a contiguous territory

that often is clubbed together with the Northeast redefined as a larger geopolitical region

also extending laterally to parts of Bangladesh and Burma/Myanmar and other

neighbouring countries helps in reinforcing and enriching our argument and shows that it

is by no means applicable only to the region in question.

Almost all the human rights organizations mentioned here exist as a network having

close ties with each other. On 10 December 1995, as many as 12 human rights

organizations came together and established the North-East Coordination Committee of

Human Rights (NECCHR). The organizations that represented various ethnic

communities and came together to form this Coordination were: Naga People‟s

Movement for Human Rights, Movement for Kuki Human Rights (Manipur), Bodo

People‟s Union for Human Rights (Assam), Human Rights Organization (Meghalaya),

Committee for Human Rights (Manipur), NEFA Indigenous Human Rights Organization

(Arunachal Pradesh), Bodo Human Justice Forum (Assam), Manab Adhikar Sangram

Samity (MASS), Manab Adhikar Sakha, MNF (Nagaland), Borok People‟s Human

Rights Organization (Tripura), Tribal Students‟ Federation (Tripura) and All-Manipur

United Clubs Organization (AMUCO).

The paper develops its argument in three closely interrelated parts: The first part shows

how truth in a society like the one under review hardly exists as an all-pervasive „regime‟

and contains many unanticipated cracks and fissures particularly on such margins of India

as the Northeast. Margins only point to the limits of the established truth regime. The

second part discusses why unlike what happens in other parts of the society, violation of

rights fails in translating them as truths. It focuses on the question of why violations

articulate them as truths in some cases and in some parts of the society and not in others.

The third part seeks to derive the political implications of the above argument and points

out how violations bring as it were into circulation a secret agenda of rights and with it as

it were a secret civil society.

Rights produce truth in either of the two senses: First, they produce truth in the sense

that they are firmly rooted and enshrined in the Constitution, laws of the land and are

6

guaranteed by the established political institutions particularly the judiciary that we are

given to understand serves as the vanguard of our rights. The violation of rights enshrined

and guaranteed in this sense necessarily amounts to violation of the Constitution, the laws

and is therefore regarded as a punishable offence by the judiciary. Secondly, rights are

often believed by a body of people to be truer than the Constitution, existing laws and the

established institutions in the sense that any claim to rights „minimizes both the

rigidification of the institutional order and the risks of subjugation‟ (Unger 1997: 374).

ULFA‟s erstwhile demand for the inclusion of the right to self-determination in the

Constitution by making a Constitutional amendment as a condition of negotiation with

the Centre may be cited as a case in point. That this right is not included in the

Constitution does not mean that it is unimportant. The Constitution after all is for the

people, the people, as some of us believe, are not for the Constitution. Truth and rights in

the second sense, show a tendency of not only getting divorced from the established

Constitution, existing laws and political institutions but constantly destabilizing them.

A brief reference to the recent resurgence of conflicts between traditional tribal

institutions on one hand and modern rational-legal institutions on the other will not be out

of place in his connection. In many parts of the region, traditional tribal institutions are

seen to be involved in asserting their rights vis-à-vis and more often than not in

opposition to the modern political institutions based on the principle of what Max Weber

calls „rational-legal authority‟. Siyems have been one of these traditional Khasi

institutions functioning in almost all the Khasi-inhabited parts of Meghalaya. When a

man was lynched in 2003 reportedly after being convicted by one of them and was

awarded death penalty, a sitting judge wondered how the power to award death penalty

could be retained by such an institution. Such examples of conflict between these two

sets of institutions - by no means rare in the Northeast - point to the divergence between

rights enshrined in and guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws of land and protected

by the law courts of India and rights the „traditional‟ institutions seem to be asserting all

over the region. In simple terms, rights are by no means confined to whatever is

stipulated by the Constitution of India and the law of the land. There is always an uneasy

equilibrium between them.

7

Describing them as „official‟ and „activist‟ discourses respectively - on (human) rights

circulating in contemporary Indian society, Upendra Baxi sets forth what he calls, „the

prime task of human rights historiography in India‟ in the following terms:

A prime task of human rights historiography in India would be to assess changes

in patterns of discursivity. How far for example, have the institutional modes of

production of official truths been affected by changes/discontinuities in the power

of activist discursive practices? What resilience do these practices have? Or how

does the politics of human rights movement in India impact upon national-state-

level politics? And by what indicators do we locate the impact of the former on

the latter? (Baxi in Mohanty et al. 1998:341)

The argument that rights defined in the first sense produce truth effects across the

society cannot account for the differential nature of the effects produced by them. The

distinction between the mainland and the margins – core and periphery as some would

call them - may be important in appreciating differential nature of truth effects of

institutions. The margin - being on the margin - escapes albeit in a relative sense the truth

effects of the mainland. We define margin only in that sense. Being outside it almost by

definition, societies of the margin have the opportunity of experiencing the power of truth

from a distance or even resisting it. The problem with the early-Foucauldian formulation

of individuals and groups as mere „effects‟ of power is that it rules out those cases where

individuals and groups being relatively autonomous and free from the truth regime retain

in some sense their capacity for „understanding‟ it on their own.3

The reports prepared by the organizations named above, emphasize on the inability of

the (state) institutions to operate within the given framework of the Constitution and laws

that they have given to themselves. One, they point out how the multiplication of the

extraordinary legislations (the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958),

institutions like the unified command structure and practices like „secret killings‟ in

Assam have rendered the everyday constitutional and legal reality „shapeless‟ and

„fictitious‟ (Arendt 1966: 392-419). The Constitution and laws of the land somehow

come to a grinding halt as we enter some parts of the Northeast. Two, the „consistently

8

arbitrary‟ and indiscriminate nature of the violation does not seem to suggest the presence

of any „objective enemy‟ (like the Jews in Nazi Germany and class enemies in Stalinist

Soviet Union). A MASS document, for example, observes:

No one is sure what is in store for him … Anyone might be killed at will, anyone

might be assaulted, women molested and raped, and property looted by none other

than the „peace keepers‟ of the Indian state (MASS 1998: 18).

Everyone in the society could be a potential victim and the entire society of the margin

shivers in shock and waiting for the worst to happen. The fear numbs the society into a

state of submission. Three, the violation of rights presupposes the presence of a rights-

bearing subject – dead or alive. It is through the subjectivity of the victim that the

violation of rights gets registered. The disappearances and highly charred and mutilated

bodies of the victims make identification impossible and violations difficult to establish.

The killing of the family members of the cadres of the insurgent organizations was meant

for numbing the people to a state of shock in which they would refuse to believe that the

„victims ever existed at all‟. It raises „doubts in their minds about their own truthfulness‟

(Arendt 1951: 439). Taken together, these examples point to the limits of the

Constitutional-legal truth to produce or reproduce itself on the margin. The reports regret

the inability of the state institutions to secure and guarantee the rights that the state had

itself promised to “its” people from time to time.

Viewed from within the institutionally established truth regime, violations of rights

that take place on the margin are counted as untruths. The paradox is: On the one hand,

since the truth regime experiences its limit only on the margin, unlike in the mainland the

margin makes violations all the more a felt and experiential reality. When truth ceases to

become an effective way of governing some of the people, the state has to rule them by

making exceptions to it. The phrase „Northeast Exceptionalism‟ is coined precisely to

refer to the deviations that the state makes while governing parts of the region (Das in

Wirsing & Ahrari 2010). As a result, power appears before the people more as raw reality

with all its monstrosity and fearfulness, than as one producing truth effects.

9

On the other hand and quite parallel to it, it imposes on the margin the painful

obligation of seeking remedies to such violations keeping to the same Constitution, law

of the land and the institutionally established rules and protocols. The argument hinges on

the assumption that the truth of violation can be exposed only in such places where the

truth regime is in operation and circulation. I propose to argue that it is impossible for the

margin to be part of this politics of exposure and enunciation.

Let us cite an example. The example is culled from one of our studies conducted in

Kolkata. One must make a distinction between reasons that remain particular to the group

of claimants of rights and reasons that are public in the sense that they cut across the

particular group of claimants and reach others in the society. The concept of „public

reason‟ is pivotal to Rawls‟ theory of rights and justice. Thus, the reasons held in

justification of the right claim to home and abode of those who are under the threat of

being evicted as part of urban planning in metropolitan Kolkata may be reasons in

themselves, but cannot be called, reasons for others. They have justifications only for

those who hold them. But they do not have the same justification in the eyes of those

from whom such rights are claimed. These rights claims therefore are singularly unable to

bind the potential givers and takers within a common rights discourse.

The imperative of making the rights claims intelligible and plausible to those who are

responsible for the displacement of the victims severely restricts the field of

communication by the victims. It renders certain claims to rights simply incommunicable

and screens them off from the public domain. Right to communication is not necessarily

the communication of rights.4 Rights, in simple terms, do not exhaust the entire field of

communication and in our pursuit of this right we must not lose sight of those other

means and forms of communication through which victims try to communicate their

claims. I propose to elaborate this argument by way of referring to the narrative that one

can reconstruct from an interview of Arati Dasgupta facing the threat of being displaced

from what she considers as her „home‟, as a result of the government‟s decision of

dredging and widening the Beliaghata Circular Canal (in north Kolkata) as part of urban

planning. The state government felt it necessary in order to save the city from heavy

water logging during rainy season by way of enhancing the water-carrying capacity of

10

these canals. It is interesting to examine the reasons she expounds in support of her claim

to the right against displacement. When asked how she had come to settle in the place

from where she now faces the threat of being evicted, she replies:

With God. I came here holding the hands of God. Don‟t you believe? This is my

motherland. I had nobody. On the other hand, I had everybody. My mother died

after giving birth to me. I have never seen my father. The people on the banks of

this canal raised me. One grandma raised me up during my childhood at her place.

She too died when the ice factory had caught fire. Believe me, my dear sister (in a

reference to the interviewer, the author); I grew old by crawling on this soil and

bathing in this canal. You will see, no one will be able to evict me. I came here

holding the hands of God. Only God will be able to lift me up. It does not matter

whether my home is destroyed. How can they deprive me of this soil and sky?

(quoted in Shalti Research Group 2003: 31)

A careful reading of the above narrative brings us face to face to face with at least two

broad principles that expressly run counter to the reasons – the institutional truths of the

modern state - from whom she seeks to claim her right to home. As a result, she will find

it absolutely impossible to make her rights claims sound intelligible and plausible to the

state and its authorities: First, natural endowments like soil and sky are a divine gift and

therefore for everyone to enjoy. We can cite the example of Lakshmi – another woman

who was faces the same threat. The world, she says, has places even for the garbage

heaps to be dumped. She has no place for home. As she observes: “Let us remain like

garbage heaps dumped at one corner. My dear sister (with an obvious reference to her

interviewer, author), are we to remain with our feet hanging up in mid-air? We too are

creatures of this world. Isn‟t there anything left in our part?” How can she survive

without a place where she can rest her feet? In simple terms, some form of a divine

theory is invoked in support of their claim to right to home.

Secondly, she establishes her claim by way of emphasizing on the fact that she was

raised in the same place - in the new home of her neighbours, crawled on the soil and

took bath in the same canal. The fact that she was raised here makes her an integral part

11

of the culture of the locality and most importantly, makes her feel at home in the same

place. Home is not simply a piece of land and a structure that can be owned and

transferred at one‟s will. By home, she understands a space where one can feel at home

and does not feel homeless.

The principles mentioned above do not qualify her as what the protagonists of the

modern liberal state call „public reason‟. For one thing, public reason stipulates that one‟s

claim to right must be informed by a concern for „common good‟ or what we often

describe as national interest. If Arati Dasguptas and Lakshmis are to be evicted in the

interest of saving the city from regular floods and of the collectivity of city-dwellers, then

they can voice their rights claims only in opposition to the „common good‟ of the

collectivity in question. The irony of the situation is that they can express their claims

only at the risk of being „antinational‟ and alienating the larger collectivity. Secondly, the

protagonists agree that God has given the endowments for everyone‟s use but God, as

Locke tells us, has also given us „reason to make use of them to the best advantage of life

and convenience‟ (Locke in Barker ed. 1946:23-24). Since reason is innate to the person

and hence to be regarded as personal property, it entitles him to whatever he makes of the

natural endowments and it - as Locke categorically informs us - „excludes the common

right of other men‟ (Locke in Barker ed. 1946:24). The state therefore understands only

the language of ownership titles established by the due process of law. Dasgupta and

Lakshmi do not have any legally valid document establishing their claims to the place

where they live. One‟s crawling on the land and bathing in the canal cannot be the basis

of one‟s landownership. Thus, „public reason‟ only imposes some limits on certain kinds

of rights and makes their utterances impossible. The only way the modern state can

respond to them is by dislocating and evicting them (Mohapatra in Tandon & Mohanty

eds. 2003:298).

Other examples are not uncommon. Why do the Chakmas who lost their homestead

and cultivable land in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)

in the mid-1960s when the Kaptai dam on the river Karnaphuli was constructed, find it

difficult now to merely prove that they were once the original inhabitants of the same

land? Precisely because they inhabited it for generations without ever bothering to get

12

their titles registered. Precisely because their ancestors never considered it as the means

of establishing their right to homeland. „Public reason‟ in other words acted like a „sluice

gate‟ that made communication and representation of certain rights claims difficult – if

not simply impossible5. This has led them to assert their rights in other and patently extra-

institutional ways and has introduced „a culture of insubordination‟ to their political

practice of claiming rights.

The „objectivity‟ of Parbatya Chattagram Commission‟s report mentioned above has

been stressed time and again by the Commission itself. The objectivity is attained at great

risk that posed a grave threat to the personal safety of not only the interlocutors but also

the Commission‟s members. As power is experienced not so much as truth that appeals to

one‟s mind but as a physical and material experience impinging on one‟s body, one has

accordingly to cope with it. One can be objective only by interrogating the intricate

designs of biopower. Even many of the respondents are afraid of taking recourse to law

courts against army atrocities for fear of enraging the powers that be and the state

authorities. The Commission is of the opinion that many a time, „important information‟

is expunged from reports on brutalities allegedly perpetrated by the Shanti Bahini

(Commission 2001:190) – the premier insurgent organization once very active in the

region. That many of the Shanti Bahini killings are in the nature of retributions is seldom

brought to the notice of the public. Rumours defaming the human rights activists (like

Kalpana Chakma) and trivializing their struggles are rampant (Commission 2001:300).

Government advertisements are denied to those newspapers that try to bring these issues

to light. Many of the accusations (like forcible collection of subscriptions, abduction and

killing etc.) leveled by the army against the members of the Bahini were found to be

„hollow‟ by the Commission (Commission 2001:64). The report shows how the issue of

CHT has become a subject of diplomatic football between India and Bangladesh and how

both these countries strive for gaining political mileage from it. Objectivity viewed in this

sense is like bringing the truth of physical violence into existence by way of facing and

experiencing it almost on an everyday basis. Objective truth then is nothing but a political

strategy. The Commission adopted the following steps to vindicate its claim to

objectivity:

13

1. In camera interviewing of the respondents for it saw that on many occasions the

respondents retracted their versions, the moment the security personnel stepped

out of the hearing distance. Lying, as James Scott informed us albeit in a different

context, is the means of their survival.

2. Refusing financial and logistic help and support offered by the Bangladeshi and

Indian Governments and more particularly the Bangladesh Army

3. Selecting an appropriate sample that would be representative of the universe of

study

In sum, biopower applies to those who cannot be governed by truth, hence have to be

governed by force and violence.

Force and violence, as the report shows, are deployed against those who do not

subscribe to the truth that the regime of the Constitution, law of the land and its

institutions has established and hence are situated on the margins of the nation. The

nation being deeply embedded in the truth regime seldom feels the necessity of writing its

autobiography for it does not have any other truth to expose and enunciate. Writing

autobiography becomes redundant when truth of the state enjoys its uncontested

supremacy. It is on the margins that the truth regime is threatened and requires the

externality of physical violence to fortify and strengthen itself. Truth on the margins is

not the same as that within it. It requires a Commission from outside to tell, reveal and

expose itself.

It is only in opposition to this externality of force and coercion employed by the state

and other agencies acting in unison with it that the truth of violation can be produced. It is

a truth that can establish itself only by taking on, combating and successfully resisting the

violence on the margins. The state denies this truth of the conditions of its emergence.

Thus notwithstanding the frequent regime changes in Bangladesh throughout the 1990s –

some of which had had enormous implications for her democratic prospects, the

parameters of state responses to the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) problem, according to

the Commission, have remained the same. The changeover from the military to the

14

civilian regime in the early 1990s was significant in the life of the Bangladeshis; hardly

could it bring about any significant democratic transformation in the life of the hill people

of CHT. Four updates published subsequent to the report in the entire decade of the 1990s

place the problem in the longer diachronic perspective and offer rare insights that compel

us to rethink and redefine the relationship between truth and margin.

The truth creates its outside or the margins and denies democracy to it by increasingly

militarizing it. The Bangladeshi envoys in various international and diplomatic forums

(like in UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations) according to the report continue

to label Bangladesh‟s population as „belonging to the same nation (jati)‟. Denial of the

existence of the margin is usually accompanied by militarization. Militarizing the outside

is the other name of violating democracy. It includes the following processes:

1. Creating the Village Defence Committees amongst the Bengali settlers, arming

them and encouraging them to fight against the indigenous people of the CHT

2. Encouraging the Bengali settlement in these areas for „imposing the Bengali

culture and means of administration‟ (Commission 2001:78) on them

3. The dominance of the military over the civil administration

4. The overwhelming presence of the security forces. Even a conservative estimate

suggests that for every ten hills-men, there is one from the security forces

5. Unleashing a reign of terror and torture on the people in a bid to evacuate the

insurgency-affected areas so that the army can have a free hand to „deal‟ with the

insurgents

6. Bunching the villagers together within the well-guarded village conglomerates in

order to isolate them form the insurgents and subject them to constant physical

monitoring and surveillance and also to bring them to „the modernist path‟

7. Undertaking and implementing small-scale development projects as part of

counter-insurgency operations in an attempt to placate the local people and

mitigate their grievances

15

Even the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) established in South Africa in

1994 with the termination of the apartheid regime recognized this when it asked the

victims to narrate their experiences more as means of healing and reconciliation than as

one of fixating the responsibility and holding their aggressors personally accountable for

the crimes and violations. TRC accorded only a non-juridical status to such narratives and

personal truths. Narration, according to TRC, is more an act of healing than one of

justice.6 Healing and reconciliation, TRC thought, are much more important than justice

in a post-conflict society. For justice has a tendency of tearing the body politic apart by

bringing the offenders and violators to book and thereby sharpening the divisions within

it. Mamdani (n. d.: mimeo; also Bharucha 2001: 3763-73) makes a critique of the „legal

fetishism‟ underlying the whole process and implicitly a plea for translating the victims‟

narratives into truths. Can modern states with their rational-legal claims ever allow this to

happen?

As a result, margins find it impossible to articulate their voices of protest within the

scope of the established truth regime for they are by definition outside it. The margins

can raise the voice of protest only by violating the truth regime and breaking its rules and

protocols and by accepting what Foucault in the above epigram calls, „the moral

responsibility‟ of the consequences of such violations. Nowhere is this more visible than

in the difficulties or even the impossibilities they face while establishing their land rights

and most importantly, right to homeland in CHT (Commission 2001: 81). Land

alienation, according to the Commission, is one of the „most important‟ problems of

CHT. For the communities outside the nation face the perennial problem of laying the

claim to land that they consider, as their own in a language that will be in tune with the

juridical-legal requirements of the modern state. It is only when the claim is expressed in

that language that it transforms itself into a right as truth. Rights as truth impose on the

claimants the obligation of expressing their claim in the language of rights. More often

than not, it is understood as the technical inability of a group of people to master the

language and accordingly express their claim in it. But, the report looks upon the problem

as „a clash between two different notions‟ of land-ownership. Indeed, these are so

different that one cannot go hand in hand with the other. As the report suggests:

16

The land for shifting and jhum cultivation in Chittagong Hill Tracts is the

common property, the owner of which is the community, kinship group within the

community and even the members of the ghostly world (pretlok). Individual

families only enjoy the right to use it, in the western parlance, it is called, usufruct

or only the right to use (Commission 2001: 81).

Modern state‟s juridical-legal modes of determining title of land-ownership are clearly

at odds with this notion and hence the indigenous people hardly qualify for it. It is

precisely for this reason that tribal land alienation defies all systems of measurement and

calculation and the cadastral survey that was initiated in the late-1980s in Meghalaya

with much enthusiasm ultimately turned out to be a disaster and had to be abandoned in

the midway. The dominant language of rights allows only some - and certainly not all

claims to land as legally and institutionally entertainable in the eyes of the modern state

particularly its law courts. As a result, many people who have been living there for

generations could not simply establish their rightful claim over their land - whether

cultivable or homestead and hence were rightfully alienated.

Interestingly, communities on the margin cannot sustain their rights-claims in the way

modern states with their juridical-legal stipulations want them to. These claims in other

words can be entertained and sustained only through the invocation of a difference

between the margin and the mainland, between the nation governed by the power of truth

and other communities governed by the raw power of force and coercion. Ironically,

politics of the communities cannot but be the politics of difference. Although the report

provides ample evidence in support of this conclusion, it still makes a plea for

enumerating laws that will be sensitive to and take care of these problems (Commission

2001: 321). The ideological sources of difference are readily available in the colonial

discourse that, as we know, was predicated on the principle of difference and hierarchy

between diverse groups of colonial subjects. Schedule 35 of the Chittagong Regulation of

1900 for example, kept Chittagong hills outside the purview of direct colonial rule and

imposed a ban on the settlement of the outsiders in the land of the hills people without the

consent of their headmen. The Regulation serves as a powerful ideological instrument for

the communities in their negotiation with the Bangladeshi nation. Everywhere their

17

relationship with the colonial authorities is marked by a certain degree of ambivalence

and equivocation.

The state encourages immigration of settlers from outside for the modern „democratic‟

state looks upon the freedom of movement and settlement as the necessary means of

assimilation of the people otherwise drawn from a multiplicity of ethnic groups and

communities into the „nationalist mainstream‟. A very reputed Bangladeshi journalist for

example viewed inter-community marriage as a „good way‟ of unifying them. In many

areas of CHT, the Bengali settlers have already outnumbered the locals. The report

underlines in detail the active role of such Saudi-funded Islamic missionary organizations

as Al Rabita in creating an attraction for the so-called, Bengali-(Muslim) mainstream. In

fact, two major arguments advanced by the Bangladeshi state in support of its hitherto

followed policy of „sponsored migration‟ are: The formation of a nation presupposes

recognition of the unfettered right to freedom of movement and settlement, enumerated in

Art. 36 of the Constitution of Bangladesh. This facilitates the process of their assimilation

into a single nation. Secondly, it also is keyed to a „pragmatic‟ consideration that any

policy of trying to deport the settlers from CHT is bound to trigger off communal

backlash. But still the Government disregarded any inflexible interpretation of this

Article and sought to impose restrictions on immigration, which may be regarded as „an

indirect method‟ of curtailing the freedom of movement. The enactment of 1989 took it a

step further by way of arming the new Jela (sic) Parishads (District Councils) with the

power of banning any land transfer to the new settlers. The Commission actually came to

know of many such lands which once had belonged to the indigenous people but are now

cultivated by the Bengali settlers.

Don‟t the reasons of the modern state render the reasons of the victims

incommunicable through the dominant language of rights? Doesn‟t communication as a

strategy call for a certain disentangling of these two kinds of reasons? Communication of

the victims‟ reasons is possible only by transcending the rules and limits set forth by the

public domain. The greatest challenge of democracy in today‟s India is „to be self-critical

of its existing institutions and extend the scope of informed participant exchange‟ (Norris

1993:299).

18

From the perspective of the insurgent struggles in the Northeast, two rather

distinguishable sets of demands present themselves: One, the demand for those rights that

are guaranteed, secured and safeguarded by the Constitution, established laws and

institutions and flow from the institutionally established regime of truth and that people

from many other parts (though not all) of India seem to enjoy but the people from the

parts of the Northeast evidently do not; and two, the demand for inclusion of many other

rights (e.g. self-determination) in the future agenda of rights. For purposes of

convenience, we call the second set as rights and the first as freedoms defined in this

context also as conditions necessary for the fulfillment of the second set of demands.

Unlike the NPMHR, MASS for example considers the right to self-determination as a

negotiable and not a blanket right – a right that in order to be negotiated requires the

freedom of speech and expression and preserving a community‟s linguistic and cultural

identity etc. already enshrined in the Constitution. The chairman of MASS for example,

at a convention pleads for „advancing the debate on the right to self-determination as the

only solution for the diverse problems resulting in the upsurge of armed conflict in the

region‟ (Voice of MASS April-July, 2001:33). In the hierarchy between freedoms and

rights, rights are considered as fundamental while freedoms are not. Freedoms are the

instruments of rights in the sense that they are looked upon as the conditions for carrying

out the negotiations and voicing the rights claims. Freedoms are considered as only the

springboard – the necessary first step towards the realization and accomplishment of

one‟s rights claims.

The strategic reduction of Constitutionally and legally guaranteed rights to the status of

conditions implies a certain destabilization of the institutionally produced truth regime.

Most of the insurgent organizations seem to voice their claim to the right to self-

determination by way of taking advantage of the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution

of India and the law of the land. When rights claims are voiced without these conditions

put in place, rights violations do not appear to be legally and institutionally establishable

truths. Each such instance of non-establishability contributes to the production of

alternative truths and with them alternative agendas of rights. „Strategic knowledge‟

(savoir), Foucault says, articulates itself only by way of being censored, de-legitimized

and resisted by the established truth regime. Their success lies not in their ability to

19

establish them as another truth regime but in their ability to interrogate the established

regime and exploring alternative possibilities of truth production. These truths and rights

circulate within the society without the freedoms, that is to say, without the necessary

conditions of their enunciation and circulation. The freedoms that the established truth

regime approves of are only the conditions of existence of the agenda of rights that exists.

When odds are heavily against us and we are unable to voice our rights claims, we push

our agenda of rights only secretly. A militant movement with an essentially alternative

agenda of rights thus goes underground (Voice of MASS April 2000:6).

A society where rights claims are not voiced should not be confused with a society

where such claims are completely non-existent. When rights claims are articulated

without freedoms, that is to say, the conditions that are necessary for their emergence,

they form part of what I call a secret agenda. The absence of the making of rights claims

does not necessarily reflect the absence of rights claims. For example, the right to

livelihood that is so crucial to the survival of the poor and the dispossessed implies that

they have some access to forest reserves and draw the means of livelihood from them

notwithstanding the fact that this is an illegal activity. Many of the non-governmental

organizations funded by the Dutch Core Funding Agencies (CFA) are involved in the

civil society building (CSB) exercise in different parts of the country. We had the

opportunity of evaluating some of their activities back in 2000-1. As part of our

assignment, we visited some of the poorest villages of drought-prone Nayagarh district of

Orissa. The poor and lower-caste women of the village Karadabani for instance, know

pretty well that their dependence on the produce collected from nearby forests, which is a

reserved one, is illegal and cannot be a permanent solution to their problems of daily

living. There have been examples of forest guards opening fire on such collectors and

killing them. At least four persons had lost their lives in the three years preceding our

visit. They also know that the forests that provide them with their life-bearing resources

today cannot continue to do so for an indefinite time. But, they do not have any other

alternative. “How will we live now (chalibe)?” – is the only single-word answer in Oriya

that I could elicit when I asked them the most obvious question of why they continue to

enter the forest reserve. They do not have any agricultural land. They do not have any

traditionally inherited skills (like, the brass and bell metal artisans of nearby Khandapara

20

or the carpet-makers of Nayagarh). Their jobs as day wage labourers in the construction

sites are highly irregular. What will they do today excepting going to the forests illegally

and depending on them? Deprived of the enabling conditions, their pursuit of the secret

agenda of the right to livelihood depends on their ability to withhold their agenda from

the public domain and the peering eyes of the forest guards and keep it secret. The

fulfillment of this right directly clashes against the „collective goal‟7 of reserving the

forests and thereby preserving the forest cover of the country, its biodiversity and thereby

the survival of not just the citizens of India but the mankind as a whole. It shows how the

prerequisite of law and with it the implicit imperative of a certain concern for others

simply denies them the freedom of voicing their claim to the right to survival. When

rights claims are not allowed to be voiced, these are practised in ways that escape the

gaze of law.

If this is a secret agenda, it is also an open secret that one does not have to take pain to

reveal and disclose. If one were to know it and understand its reasonableness, one is sure

to miss it. Amartya Sen‟s plea for subjecting all our rights claims to some universal

criteria of „public reasonableness‟ (Sen 2009) 355-387) is bound to marginalize the

claims that emerge from the margins. For violations of rights are not about knowing and

establishing them as evidences and truths but about „imagining ourselves in the shoes of

the despised and oppressed‟ and empathetically listening to their „long, sad and

sentimental stories‟ (Rorty 1998: 167-85). If they cannot establish violations as truths,

they certainly have the other means of telling it. The speeches that remain unuttered or

half-uttered out of fear are no mean important. There may be many kinds of speech

between fearlessness and silence. One has only to be all ears in order to listen to them.

Has the „social ability to listen‟ declined?

Notes 1 We have depended on the Bengali version of the report.

2 See, Parbatya Chattagram Commission (2001)

3 According to Barrett, early Foucault has „no theory of interpretation and understanding‟ (Barrett

1991:164) – since all are constituted as effects of power. 4 Although right to communication is usually held as the key to communication of rights and therefore „an

a priori basic right‟ (see, Thomas in Raja ed. 2003:19). 5 I borrow this expression from Kaviraj (Kaviraj in Jayal ed. 2001: 229-57).

6 Their intertwined nature is however emphasized by a number of individual legal commentators (see, Neier

in Hesse & Post eds. 1999:39-52)

21

7 I use the expression in which Dworkin has used the term (1977: 82-3). For him, rights as those of an

individual or a section of them, a group or a community are a claim against the goal of the community as a

whole.

References

[All translations from original non-English sources are mine. The author]

Arendt, Hannah 1966. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt, Bruce &

World Inc.

Barrett, Michele 1991. The Politics of Truth: Marx to Foucault. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford

University Press.

Baruah, Debo Prasad 1998. Ancalikatar Dastabej (in Assamese) [Documents of

regionalism]. Guwahati: Lawyers‟ Book Stall.

Baxi, Upendra 1998. „The State and Human Rights Movement in India‟ in Manoranjan

Mohanty, Partha Nath Mukherjee with Olle Tornquist Eds., People’s Rights:

Social Movements and the State in the Third World. New Delhi: Sage.

Bharucha, Rustom 2001. „Between Truth and Reconciliation: Experiments in Theatre and

Public Culture‟ in Economic and Political Weekly, XXXVI (29), September 29.

Das, Samir Kumar 2010. „Nation and the Spirals of Insecurity: How the State Responds

to Ethnic Separatism in India‟s Northeast‟ in Robert Wirsing and Ehsan Ahrari

(eds.), Fixing Fractured Nations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Dworkin, Ronald 1977. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Press.

Foucault, Michel 1980. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other writings 1972-

1977, trans. by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham & Kate Soper. New

York: Pantheon Books.

Foucault, Michel 2001. Fearless Speech, trans. By Joseph Pearson. Los Angeles:

Semiotext(e)

Kaviraj, Sudipta 2001. „The Culture of Representative Democracy‟ in Niraja Gopal Jayal

(ed.), Democracy in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Locke, John 1946. „An Essay concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil

Government‟ in Sir Ernest Barker (ed.), Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume

and Rousseau. London: Oxford University Press.

Mamdani, Mahmood 2003. „The Truth according to TRC‟ (mimeo).

22

MASS 1998. Where have they all gone? (A report on some disappearances in Assam).

Guwahati: Manab Adhikar Sangram Samiti.

Mohapatra, Bishnu N. 2003. „A View from the Subalterns: The Pavement Dwellers of

Mumbai‟ in Rajesh Tandon & Ranjita Mohanty (Eds.), Does Civil Society

Matter? Governance in Contemporary India. New Delhi: Sage.

Neier, Aryeh 1999. „Rethinking Truth, Justice and Guilt after Bosnia and Rwanda‟ in

Carla Hesse & Robert Post (eds.), Human Rights and Political Transitions:

Gettysburg to Bosnia. New York: Zone Books.

Norris, Christopher 1993. The Truth about Postmodernism. Oxford: Blackwell.

Parbatya Chattagram Commission 2001. ‘Jeeban Aamader Nai’: Bangladesher Parbatya

Chattagrame Bhumi O Manabadhikar (in Bengali) [„Life is not Ours‟: Land and

Human Rights in Chittagong Hill Tracts]. Dhaka: Parbatya Chattagram

Commission.

Phukon, Girin 1998. „State of Human Rights in India: A Northeastern Perspective‟

(mimeo).

Rorty, Richard 1998. Truth and Progress: Philosophical Chapters, Vol. 3. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Sen, Amartya 2009. The Idea of Justice. New Delhi; Oxford University Press.

Shalti Research Group 2003. Uchchhed Uchchhed: Dharabahik Amanabikatar Khanda

Chitra (in Bengali) [Eviction, Eviction: Snippets of Continuously Inhuman

Treatment].

Thomas, Pradip (2003): „The Information and Communication Rights of Refugees in

South Asia‟ in Joshva Raja (ed.), Refugees and Their Right to Communicate:

South Asian Perspectives. London: World Association for Christian

Communication.

Unger, Roberto Mangabeira 1997. Politics: The Central Texts. Ed. Zhiyuan Cui. London:

Verso.

1

Fiscal Sociology of States in the North-East India:

A Theory of the Rentier Economy and External Rent Curse

Binod Kumar Agarwala

―The fiscal history of a people is above all an essential part of its general history.‖

―Our people have become what they are under the fiscal pressure of the state.‖

―Fiscal measures have created and destroyed industries, industrial forms, and

industrial regions even where this was not their intent, and have in this manner

contributed directly to the construction (and distortion) of the edifice of the modern

economy and through it of the modern spirit. But even greater than the causal is the

symptomatic significance of fiscal history. The spirit of a people, its cultural level,

its social structure, the deeds its policy may prepare – all this and more is written in

its fiscal history, stripped of all phrases. He who knows how to listen to its message

here discerns the thunder of world history more clearly than anywhere else.‖

J. A. Schumpeter,1

Joseph Schumpeter through his investigation of economic history of nations found that

public finance has an enormous influence on economic organization, culture, human

spirit, and the fate of peoples. For this reason, he argued that the study of the social

processes behind public finances, that is, fiscal sociology, is one of the best starting

points for an investigation of society and, particularly, its political life.2 So in this essay

we investigate the economy, politics, culture and spirit of the people in the North East

states in India starting from fiscal policies of these states. Another aim of this essay is to

acquaint scholars studying the developmental issues confronting the states in the North

East India with theoretical frame work used by many scholars studying similar problems

in various regions in the world.

India's North-East is also known as the land of the seven sisters. It consists of the

states3 of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and

Tripura.4 These states, collectively account for about 8 per cent of the country's

geographical area and roughly 4 per cent of its population.5 The region is known for its

The author is Professor, Department of Philosophy, North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong

2

ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious and physiographical diversity. Many of the States in

the region were created mainly to fulfill the ethnic, political and cultural aspirations of

the people. During the reorganization of the states in the North East, a pertinent criterion

— that the territory in question must have revenue resources to meet its administrative

and other non-development expenditure — was not taken into consideration. So, Central

assistance has been assured. Hence, states have not made much effort to develop their

internal financial resources. The North East has low levels of state taxation. Instead of

taxing their own populations, governments in North East are heavily dependent on

revenues generated from sources outside the physical boundaries of provincial territories

they rule. Three major points about government finances in the region are worth noting.

First, an overwhelming portion of the overall receipts comes from the Centre. Second, the

States‘ own tax revenues are very low, even negligible in some cases. Third, non-Plan

revenue expenditure is high in most of the States. The share of gross transfers from the

Centre to aggregate disbursements is the highest in Mizoram where the average for the

decade preceding 2006 had been about 88 per cent. The figure for Arunachal Pradesh is

about 83 per cent, and in Assam, 69 per cent. In the other States of the region, the share

of gross transfers is around 80 per cent of total disbursements. The All India average

during this decade was around 42 per cent.6 The transfer and devolution of resources

from the Centre to the States is essentially via three channels. First, there are statutory

transfers (comprising tax sharing and grants-in-aid) through Finance Commission

recommendations. Here it must be kept in mind that the Central government has

exempted a large population of North-East who are capable of paying income tax, from

this tax payment, due to political reasons. Hence there is very little collection of income

tax from the region. Hence, so called tax sharing becomes only an external rent from the

Centre for the North-East. Hence, rentier conditions are created by the centre by sharing

taxes with North-East without collecting income tax from a large population of this

region which is capable of paying income tax. Second, there are Plan grants through the

Planning Commission guidelines. The Planning Commission fixes the assistance to States

to carry out their Plans, while the Finance Commission determines the assistance required

for current account budgetary support. There are also ‗discretionary‘ grants through

central ministries, primarily for centrally sponsored schemes. There are also some

3

indirect channels, such as loans from the central government and allocation of credit by

financial institutions controlled by the central government. One can say that the states in

the North East of India have economies dominated by external rent, particularly rent of

dependency, as these states rely on strategic rents in the form of economic aid, loans, and

Central grants to meet their budgetary needs.

The dependency of the states in the North East is not the normal dependency, which

one finds in any other state in India, i.e., the dependency of a state on the national or

international market and their being tied to its weaknesses and its volatilities as well as its

strengths. North East states‘ dependence is a dependence on Central grants, loans, and

aid, as opposed to the capital of national or multi-national corporations. Since internal

resources do not suffice for North East state ruling elites they have had to look to external

sources for resources. Hence, the assumption that dependence on such resources is

morally questionable is never an issue here. The Central aid has become the most

important source of budgetary revenues. Paradoxically, despite internal bankruptcy and

despite the extravagances of the ruling elites in North East states, the Center continues to

allocate resources because it is not in the interest of Centre to allow states to collapse and

risk domestic unrest spreading into more regional conflicts than what is already present.7

So the Central assistance can be regarded as a subsidy paid by Delhi to maintain political

stability. Thus this dependency is very astutely fabricated interdependency. Since the

donor Center must provide the aid to prevent regional collapse, the recipients have

acquired a degree, albeit small, of political leverage. Hence, India‘s domestic politics of

aid is also critical to understanding modern North East economy and politics. For Delhi

aid prevents the breakdown of order in North East, for the recipient states it bolsters the

ruling elite against the counter hegemonic drives of forces within civil society. But the

net effect of this Central aid is that North Eastern states have become "rentier

economies."8 According to Hazem Beblawi, ―…a rentier economy is an economy which

relies on substantial external rent.‖9 It is important to add here that the rentier nature of

the new states is magnified by the ethnic (in most cases tribal) hegemonies of these

states.10

4

One pertinent question we need to answer, before we analyze the rentier economy of

the states in the North East region is the following: Why was there demand for states

knowing fully well that resources are not there within the boundaries for discharging the

legitimate functions of a state? The answer is complex. One of the factors is the ―hunter

gatherer mentality‖ which believes in ―taking‖ things from the forest for which it has to

give nothing back, as the forest is the gift of gods. Analogously Centre is now the new

forest from which the resources must be gathered. Second factor is the strategies of

extraversion developed to cope with colonial rule.11

The leading actors in the North East

tended to compensate for difficulties in the mutual autonomization of their power by

deliberate recourse to the strategies of extraversion, mobilizing resources derived from

their unequal relationship with the external environment of colonial rule.12

This recurring

phenomenon in the history of North East is due not only to the weak development of its

productive forces, but also to the desire of peoples to defend their autonomy against rival

powers. The desire took the form of struggle aimed to prevent the emergence of classes in

the lineage societies. The social struggle was such that it turned North East into an under-

exploited region where power to inflict violence did not match the power to force people

to work. In these conditions the relationship with the external environment of colonial

rule became a major resource in the process of accumulation of power and economic

accumulation. The factions and groups which squabbled over power and access to wealth

called on foreign power to overcome rivals. Political formations made use of British

occupation in order to safeguard or perfect regional hegemonies. As a system of

‗syncretic articulation‘ sensitive to indigenous social contradictions, colonization

perpetuated the political strategies of extraversion, by providing through the monetary

economy unheard of possibilities of domestic accumulation of wealth by the dominant

individuals. Indigenous participants played no less vital role in the extraverted,

centrifugal political process in the region under colonial rule. Even in the post colonial

period the paradigm of the strategy of extraversion, at the heart of which is the creation

and the capture of a rent generated by dependency13

and which functions as a historical

matrix of inequality, is not abandoned by the elite in the region. The creation of states

without the necessary economic resources is just a continuation of the strategies of

extraversion for accumulation of power and economic accumulation by the elite in the

5

North East.14

The creation of a separate provincial state apparatus is in itself understood

as getting a slice of the national cake so that most actors worthy of the name tried to get a

good mouthful. The economies of such provincial states in the North-East no doubt

turned out to be rentier economies. The dominant groups who hold power in North East

continue to live chiefly off the income they derive from their position as intermediaries

vis-a-vis the national system.

So, to understand the economies of states in the North-East we have to understand

rentier state and rentier economy. Rentier states are those provinces of India that receive

on a, regular basis substantial amounts of external economic rent from the Central

government. These rents are not rents related to any natural resource held by the states.

These rents are mere rents of dependency of these states, a dependency which has now

proved to be an asset for them in the present rentier circumstances. North-East tribal (and

non-tribal-ethnic group) leaders exploit the resources of dependence which is, it cannot

be ever sufficiently stressed, astutely fabricated as much as predetermined.

When one uses the term ―rentier economy‖ four points must be kept in mind. Firstly,

there is no such thing as a pure rentier economy according to Hazem Beblawi. Economy

of every state has some element of rent. A rentier economy is one where rent situation

predominates, as is the case with all the states in North-East India. Secondly, the origin of

this rent must be external to the economy. In other words, the rent must come from

outside sources. Domestic rent, even if it were substantial enough to predominate, is not

sufficient to characterize the rentier economy because economic rent is a factor income

that only results from production (labor), investment (interest), and management of risk

(profit), i.e. internal forces of production. In the states in the North East the rent comes

from the Centre. Thirdly, in a rentier state only the few are engaged in the generation of

rent, while the majority is involved in its distribution and consumption. Therefore an

open economy with high levels of outside trade is not rentier, even if it depends

predominantly on rent (e.g., tourism), because the majority of the society is actively

involved in the creation of wealth. The few who generate the rent in the states in the

North East are the ruling elite who lobby at the Centre. Finally, the state government must

6

be the principal recipient of the external rent in the economy. This last characteristic is

closely related to the concentration of rent in the hands of the few.15

For the states external rents may be very easy way of meeting budgetary needs but

ultimately these rents prove to be ―curse‖ for the state economies.16

Why is this so?

The most important feature of a rentier state accordingly is that external rent liberates

the state from the need to extract income, from the local economy. The governments of

the states with rentier economy embark on public expenditure programs without resorting

to taxation. Such states have primarily allocative function as against productive functions.

In contrast to a ―production state‖ that relies on taxation of the local economy for its

income and in which economic growth is therefore an imperative, an ―allocation state‖

does not depend on domestic sources of revenue. Rather a rentier state itself is the

primary source of revenue in the domestic economy. The policy of a production state is

therefore designed to increase economic growth while an allocation state fails to

formulate ―anything deserving the appellation of economic policy,‖17

and its budget is

nothing but statement of intended allocation for expenditure.

The primary goal of economic policy in an allocation state is spending (which other

states, including production states, must do together with other functions like collection

of tax etc.). Massive expenditure, without having to resort to local taxation or

burdensome public debt, should have given the rentier states a short-cut to development.

But the question is: why has this not happened? Why these rentier states, in spite of the

massive rent resources have not been among the fast growing state economies in India?

Here one cannot rely on any economic theory of rent, because even though rent is an

economic category, economic theory cannot tell us much about the rentier. For the rentier

is a social agent who does not actively participate in the production process yet still

shares in the fruits of the product. Leaving aside the question of the origins of rent, be it

physical or social, it is clear that rent is a factor income unlike the other traditional costs

of production. Wages are paid for labor, interest for capital employed, and profits for the

successful management of risk. For each of these factor incomes some element of

sacrifice and effort is involved. But the rentier is a member of a social group that is

7

devoid of such value addition. The purest rentier is but a parasite feeding on the

productive activities of others. The rentier violates the most sacred doctrine of the liberal

ethos: hard work. The rentier, absent from the value-addition process, reaps a reward that

does not make sense in the economic world of the Weberian work ethics. If the ―hidden

hand‖ of the marketplace (as in rentier capitalism) or even mysterious ―Nature‖ chose to

bestow upon the rentier a gift above and beyond the normal incomes of the productive

world (as in oil rich sovereign states in Middle East), then it is understandable why there

is rentierism. But unfortunately in the North-East states it is the outcome of political

decision of Delhi based on leverage that the states in the North East possessed by virtue

of their strategic location, nature of demography, and the nature of the culture here and

not by virtue of any natural bounty in these states.

Rentier economy creates a specific mentality called ―rentier mentality.‖ Rentier

mentality has three components. Firstly it embodies a break in the work-reward nexus of

such economy. Rewards in the form of income and wealth for the rentier do not come as

the end result of the individual involvement in a long, risky, and organized production

process, but rather are the result of chance or situation.18

Secondly, this mentality leads to

complacency in rentier economies and to absence of alarm and urgency even on the face

of massive poverty of the general population and their condition of economic and

technological backwardness. Since welfare and prosperity has to be brought from Centre,

it pre-empts urgency within the state for change and growth.19

This inertia is due to two

components. One: the flow of external rent deludes the rentier into an expectation of

ever-continuing flow of revenue in the future.20

Two: the rentier elites become satisfied

with their material condition. So instead of trying for basic socio-economic

transformation, they jealously guard status quo.21

Thirdly, with the high expectation of

continuous external rent flow, spending and consumption becomes the order of the day.

Here it must be kept in mind that rent injection has taken place in North East against the

background of long centuries of relative stagnation and poverty, so strong tendencies to

maximize present consumption have emerged in all rentier states. The experiences of

continuous increase in external rent revenues over a few years have further reinforced

tendencies in favour of present consumption. Being surrounded by comforts that external

rent provides, the rentier elite becomes complacent and feels no necessity for invention so

8

necessary for entrepreneurship. The break in the work-reward linkage leads rentier to

believe that income and wealth are situational or accidental, not the end result of a long

process of systematic and organized production.22

Rents lead to irrational exuberance, producing a "get-rich-quick mentality" among

businessmen according to Nurske and Watkins.23

This mentality has profound

consequences for productivity. It results in contracts being given as an expression of

contact and relation rather than as a reflection of economic rationale. Civil servants see

their principal duty as being available in their offices for some time during working

hours. Businessmen abandon industry and enter into real-estate. The best and brightest do

not go for business and rather seek out lucrative government employment. Manual labor

and other work considered demeaning by the rentier is given out to outside workers,

whose remittances flood out of the rentier economy.24

One can go on and on to list

consequences of rentier mentality. In extreme cases income is derived simply from

membership of some ethnic cultural group in the state. There is no education in the

uncertainty of the future, and the rentier elite have taken no measures to protect

themselves against future trauma. Unless steps are taken now these economies may be in

for blood letting if there is any economic shock.

Those vested with political power in the rentier states tend to forget that external rent

revenues will inevitably decline in due course and aim simply at achieving temporary

prosperity. This is the paradox of a rentier state that the security of external rent flow

over the medium term time horizon affords a period of grace during which the complex

tasks of development may be carried out through these resources. But this very financial

security, which could enable a state to take a long term temporal view, influences the

time preferences in favour of the present and tends to shorten the time horizon of the

planners and policy makers.25

The rentier mentality effects even the way academic appointments are seen by the local

ethnic actors. The recruitment of academic positions is seen as part of the modus

operandi of the ‗rentier contract‘, in which academic positions are seen as operating as an

income-providing, and not an academic-capital-generating, mechanism. The rentier mode

9

of production generates a pressure to see faculty appointments as an allocative

mechanism to accommodate local ethnic constituencies. In the colleges, where state

governments fund faculty salary, the pressure is maximum and in the university where

state government has no direct role, there is non-formal non-transparent pressure of the

local ethnic pressure groups. To use language of Pierre Bourdieu, the ‗academic field‘ is

getting intricately-linked to ‗the structure of the field of power‘ – that is, of wider

politics. The ‗activity of selection and indoctrination‘ operating within North East

academia is tending to contribute to the reproduction of rentier power. It is in and through

it‘s functioning as a space of differences between positions that the ‗academic field‘ is

tending to reproduce ‗the space of the different positions which constitute the field of

power‘.26

In most rentier states there seems to be a wide acceptance of the simple value judgment

that preferences of present generation are to be given a great weight, and those of the

unborn future generations to be given a negligible weight in forming the people‘s attitude

towards intertemporal choices.27

External rent causes a type of cognitive myopia among

public and private actors leading to pure time reference among state and non-state actors

in a rentier state. The presence of a strong pure time preference among members of the

rentier class is nothing but ‗greed‘. As all may be dead at the future date and they do not

rate the welfare of their heirs as highly as their own. The desire to use money now is

reinforced by animal desire, which is present in all human beings. This is ‗greed‘ but

unfortunately economists call it ‗pure time preference‘ which is more dignified and

honorific epithet for a base instinct. The rate of investment in any society determines

what may be called intertemporal distribution of welfare. Its optimum rate depends on the

extent to which society thinks it desirable to sacrifice present consumption for the benefit

of never-ending succession of future generations. But optimum rate of investment

depends on collective political decisions the states make regarding time horizon of inter

temporal social choices.28

Here following Pigou one must assert that individual

preferences ought not to count where decisions affecting the future are concerned, since

individual men lack temporal-telescopic faculty and tend to underestimate future

satisfaction. To increase future welfare the society needs investment for economic

growth. Economic development needs diversification of revenue for investment. But

10

external rents produce what is called ―sugar mentality‖ by Wallich and Levin that leads to

lax economic planning and insufficient diversification.29

Hence, diversification of revenue may be the answer for rentier states. But in a rentier

economy the development policies and the structure of expenditure are a function of the

structure of revenue.30

Hence, there are structural constraints on what is really possible.

If a rentier economy diversifies its sources and structures of income in a significant way,

then it has to abandon its nature of a rentier economy. But the crucial question is: how

does an external rentier economy diversify? And diversify to what? The rentier

economies cannot purchase their development, as it is not a commodity. It is a process.

Hence there are problems with development and diversification of a rentier economy. Yet

the idea that "aid buys growth" is an integral part of the Central founding myth and

ongoing mission of the Central aid bureaucracies.31

The aid bureaucracies define their

final objective as "poverty reduction" (today's more politically correct name for

"growth") and their immediate output is aid money disbursement.32

Governments of the

North East states, through which the Central aid is directed, have little incentive to raise

the productive potential of the poor, especially when doing so might engender political

activism that may threaten the current political elite. The aid bureaucracies themselves in

this difficult environment do not have much incentive to achieve results, since the results

are mostly unobservable. One can hardly monitor growth itself for a given state for a

given year, since growth in any given year or even over a few years reflects too many

other factors besides aid. In these circumstances, it is understandable the aid

bureaucracies prefer to emphasize an observable indicator of effort-namely, aid

disbursements.33

This kind of disbursement amounts to high-income people making some

kind of transfer to very poor people. No doubt this remains a worthy goal, despite the

disappointments of the past.34

But the appropriate goal of Central aid is neither to move

such money as politically possible, nor to foster permanent cycle of transfer of money

from wealthy to poor. The goal is simply to benefit poor people of the region for some

time only. Not only that there should not be misplaced faith in altruistic cooperation

underestimating self-seeking behavior and conflict.35

The problems of the poverty in the

North East have deep institutional roots in the region, where markets don't work well and

politicians and civil servants aren't accountable to the citizens, and local institutions are

11

dysfunctional.36

Financial aid to regions where there is no consensus at all in favor of

reform has a negative impact on growth.37

North East most often lacks consensus on

reform policies due to ethnic and tribal polarization.38

This is not kept in mind by the

relevant actors in the region.

One problem is that the external rents of dependency received by rentier states have

nothing to do with the production processes of their state economies. Input from local

industries, including wages and salaries, payment to local contractors, and purchase of

local supplies is so insignificant that for all practical purposes one can consider the rent

revenues as a free gift of Centre. Consumption of local product is also severely limited.

Hence in rentier economies there are no industries and if there are some industries they

generate no backward or forward linkages. (Backward linkages are the purchase of local

inputs. Forward linkages are the local use of the sectoral output in further productive

operations.) Local productive forces are more or less insignificant or nonexistent. The

industrial production has mainly developed around tea, oil and timber in Assam, and

mining, saw mills and plywood factories in other parts of the region. State-owned

production — whether sugar mills, jute mills, paper mills or food processing units — has

not been successful. Small-scale industries have also not been viable and there is

widespread industrial sickness in this sector. Rentier governments have made various

attempts to encourage closer integration of outside operations with businesses in the local

economy. They often require progressive increases in the local value-added content either

within the outside affiliate or through subcontracting to local firms. Indigenization of

personnel is another avenue taken to increase local participation. But there are no takers

for these ideas due to law and order problem in the rentier states of North-East, which

itself is a consequence of the rentier nature of these states as it will be explained later.

Most of the North East states are characterized by the weak rule of law. A state where the

rule of law is weak is unable to attract investment in its manufacturing sector, as it leads

to weak security of property rights in such states. External rents are more easily captured

than revenues from taxation and the public purse is less closely watched and hence

wealth from rents is concentrated (through corruption and rent-seeking) in the politically

dominant group that determines policy and that these dominant groups have incentives to

‗divert‘ the state funds for private benefit rather than use it for growth of the economy for

12

the common good. There is deliberate maintenance of ambiguous property rights to

natural resources like agricultural land and mineral resources like coal.

The mechanism of a rentier economy is premised on the inflow of big amounts of

external rent. It allows them to purchase not only consumable goods (food, fuel,

medicine, etc.), but also the technology of the advanced mode of construction. But what

seems like a blessing is in reality a curse. The inflow of external rent throws the input-

output matrix of the economy into imbalance, as both the state and the society become

increasingly dependent on the continual input of this external revenue.39

One

consequence of the large amount of external rent available in a rentier economy is that

outside produced goods tend to replace locally produced goods, particularly in

agriculture and manufacturing, which often cannot compete with outside goods produced

under economies of scale.40

The outside foodstuffs compete with locally produced

foodstuffs on the local markets. Combined with the attraction of rural workers to the

urban areas (where the rents are concentrated) this input-output imbalance results in a

decline in agricultural production. The economies in the North East find themselves net

importers of food, with dire consequences for those poorer groups left outside the rent

distributing circuit of economy. Still the economy of the region remains primarily

agricultural, and the full potential of this sector has also not been tapped. Primitive farm

practices of slash and burn (jhum) shifting cultivation in many of the hill areas, and

mainly single crop traditional farming in the plains, continue. Neither agriculture nor

industry has taken off in the region. The states in the North East suffer from what is

known as the ―Dutch Disease‖, i.e., injection of external rent draw capital and labor away

from a state‘s manufacturing and agricultural sectors, raising their production cost with

declining production.41

Another consequence of the availability of large amounts of external rent is that

governments embark on big capital-intensive development projects. Possessing the

revenue required to purchase outside technology, the government has the capacity to

embark on large-scale infrastructural campaigns and state-run industries. The short-term

benefits of such programs are immense because infrastructural ―development‖ can

employ domestic labor and also because ―modern‖ industries endow the state with

13

prestige. The long term consequences of such ―modernization and development,‖

however, are less impressive. Rather than enlarging the goods-producing capacity of the

economy, inter-sectoral linkages tend to be negligible because of the high outside

technology intensity of infrastructural construction activities. The state-owned industries

are often worse in that they cannot employ a significant percentage of the population and

often demonstrate little commercial viability. They may even drive out small-scale local

capital from similar productive activities. These state-owned industries also tend to lack

backward intersectoral linkages, relying on constant outside items for their upkeep and

maintenance. When combined with the rentier mentality, the most euphoric capitalist

venture may turn into nothing more than another ―white elephant‖ as inefficiency and

waste in the production processes do not halt the continued inflow of investment, nor

does failure to find adequate markets for producer goods dampen the drive to ―produce.‖

So long as ―unearned‖ income continues to flow from the external rent, unprofitable but

prestigious development projects may continue to enjoy government allocation.42

Inevitable decline in the manufacturing sector takes place without affecting the primary

source of revenue in the rentier economy. And the consumption of outside manufactured

goods continues at conspicuous levels without domestic production being necessary at

all.43

The demand for domestically manufactured goods meanwhile does not keep pace with

and lags behind the demand for outside goods. Rentiers buy more and more outside

goods, and fewer and fewer domestically produced goods. There are several explanations

for this phenomenon. First there is the increased presence of what could be called

―conspicuous consumption‖ – the consumption of goods for the purpose of the creation

of invidious comparison. The status conferred by outside goods makes them more

desirable than local goods. This is related to the second explanation, which relates to the

quality of outside goods. Not only are outside goods desirable for the prestige associated

with their consumption, but they often possess qualitative advantages in and of

themselves because outside manufacturers often use advanced technology for production

of goods. Third factor is the relative low price of outside goods due to economies of scale

to disadvantage local manufacturers not only in the local economy but in the external

markets. Hence there can be no local industry with its comparative advantage to sell

14

goods outside and there is no rationale either for industries for import-substitution. A

fourth explanation is that domestically manufactured goods are often produced in the

absence of viable markets to buy them. Industries are established for development by

government policies that have extra-market considerations in mind (e.g., employment,

prestige, symbolism, diversification, etc.). Rentier states suffer increased dependency on

outside goods and great declines in their non-booming tradable sectors.44

Compared to the relative declines suffered by groups in the agricultural and industrial-

manufacturing sectors, the service sector in a rentier economy swells. Since government

is the principal recipient of external rent, there is a tendency for bureaucracies with

allocative functions to expand. The usual development process is reversed. Instead of the

progression from agriculture to industry to services, external rent provokes the growth of

only the third sector. Why does the service-sector swell in a rentier state? One reason is

the temptation of government bureaucracies to give pay raises and kickbacks to their

employees on a regular basis. Where can the external rent be invested? Looking at the

long-term picture one might argue that it should be invested in the internal productive

forces. But in the short-run (the time frame in which real policy decisions are usually

made) such domestic productive forces are insufficient in size to absorb large amounts of

investment into the rentier economy as done by Centre. This explains the reallocation of

external rents into the service sector. But service sector evolves to meet the needs of the

other sectors. But can a service sector create industrial and agricultural sectors? In terms

of actual output, the service-sector is ―unproductive‖ and cannot replicate the productive

structure of a modern industrial society nor even a traditional agricultural one. Rentier

states are placing the cart before the horse.45

Labor in a rentier economy also suffers from distortion. Wages earned by some, for

example, in service sector can artificially drive up wages earned by others in unrelated

sectors through the ―demonstration effect.‖ Labor is also affected by the rentier mentality,

as ―getting access to the rent circuit is a greater preoccupation than reaching productive

efficiency.‖ Hard workers in a rentier economy often discover to their dismay that the

service sector pay the highest wages but that access is a matter of whom one knows and

15

related with rather than what one knows (or how well one might contribute to producing

the state income out of the state wealth).46

―Remittance‖ workers fill the labor gaps of an external rentier economy when the size

and skill-level of the local labor force is limited, as is the case with North East. The

presence of migrant workers and trained professionals in rentier states is required.

―Remittances by outside labour are direct costs‖ on the gross state income. Much of this

migrant labor is low-skilled, filling the gap created by the rentier mentality in the work

ethos. Large numbers of migrant workers come into the rentier economy in search of jobs

deemed unworthy by its rentier class. But at the same time same low-skilled migrant

workers pose a direct threat to domestic employment and suffer wholesale expulsion and

xenophobic hostility giving rise to law and order problem in rentier states. Unionization

of labor is difficult to accomplish under these conditions, not only because ―remittance‖

workers can be employed and disemployed freely in the state, but also because the

normal tools of influence available to labor (e.g., the strike) are ineffective in an economy

where reward is not causally linked to work. In an external-rentier state it must be

remembered that people are not exploited. Also the sectoral imbalances in employment

disinvest unions of their traditional sources of power, i.e., factories. It is very difficult to

start unionization from the service sector. In spite of being ineffective strikes are endemic

to north-east states precisely for the reason that there is no work reward nexus. People get

their reward even when they do not report for work as it might happen in industrial

sector. Outside professionals are not so easily expurgated nor controlled, although

hostility to their presence is periodically vociferous.47

Theoretically, if external rent create the above distortions, then the complete cessation

of external rents, should remove such distortions. Reducing the supply of external rent

and hence of outside goods should provide a stimulation for local forces of production.

This suggests that the solution to the economic problems of a rentier state should be not

more government expenditure, but less. It also suggests that meaningful diversification

will not come from above, but from below. But this cannot work in the North-East as

there is hardly any production sector with surplus to invest in the economy. This also

would have disastrous socio-political consequences. So the situation is that rentier nature

16

of the economy will not let the production to grow, and without there being production

with surplus to invest in the economy external rent dependency cannot stop. So is the

North-East caught in the vicious circle?

So far we have taken industrialization as the proper measure of economic growth to

distinguish between apparent ―prosperity‖ of the rentier states of North-East and the real

economic ―development.‖ But increasing the overall productive capacity of an economy

is greatly dependent on such factors as higher capital per worker, improvements in

technical skills of the labour force, greater specialization and realization of potential

external economies in production. In short, real economic development is a kind of

significant advancement in the entire social structure, measured not merely by increased

per capita income, but rather by a transformation of the social forces of production: So

long as ―prosperity‖ of the rentier states derives from external rent, technological and

organizational improvements will remain undeveloped and real economic development

illusory.

There is another distortion in the rentier economy. The most highly visible distortion in

the rentier economy is the measurement and distribution of income. The measurement of

per-capita income is not a good indicator of the real material conditions of the

populations surviving in a rentier economy because it includes external rents as part of

the gross state product when in fact the external rent goes to the rentier elites and public

sector middle class. Real per-capita income in a rentier economy is considerably lower

than the simple division of gross state revenue by estimates of the total population would

have us assume. Hence growth by itself cannot solve the problem of widespread poverty

unless attention is given to how income and poverty are distributed. Rentier states may

have high per-capita incomes on paper, but in reality, they have a lot of very, very poor

people.48

Furthermore external rent is expected to exercises a multiplicative impact upon the

recipient state. But this does not happen as a ‗rentier multiplier‖ is a deviation of the

familiar Keynesian concept whereby an injection of funds causes a larger increase in

effective demand and leads to an increase in income greater than the net injector.

17

External rent is firstly spent through civil servants, contractors etc. spent on bringing

machinery and material from outside whereby funds leak out of the state economy. The

rest of the money spent at home also leaks out through purchase of outside goods. Hence

rentier multiplier is different from Keynesian multiplier. The later is the product of deficit

spending while the former is the injection of unrequited external rent. In fact the rentier

multiplier is net ―divisor‖ which intensifies the dependence on external rent further rather

than multiplying productive impetus of spending. The productive impetus of spending is

felt outside the rentier state, i.e. the place from where the goods are purchased. The

rentier multiplier has asymmetrical impact, within the rentier state, as the effects are

localized to sectors like construction and trade and among certain economic group like

rentier elite and public sector middle class.49

The structural problems intrinsic to the input-output imbalance of the rentier economy

are mirrored in the class structures and political rules of the game in the rentier state.

Politically speaking, the structure of public finance in a rentier state tends to concentrate

economic wealth and in the process, political power in the hands of few: the ruling elite

and the public sector middle class created with or without policy of protective

discrimination. There is a great temptation for a government bureaucracy to turn into a

rentier class with its own independent source of income.50

Creation of a rentier class is conditioned by the state‘s capacity to support itself

financially through external rents and socially reproduce its authority over society.

External rents enable the rentier state governments to embark on public expenditure

programmes without resorting to taxation as mentioned before. Hence, the allocative

functions of bureaucracy expand more than the revenue extraction capacities. The reason

for this is that in a rentier state there is very little production and therefore relatively little

to tax. But there is one more reason for this: the cost of tax collection administration is

high both financially and organizationally. But the most important factor is that external

rents permits the ruling elite to purchase consent of the governed in the short term

without paying political price of unpopular taxes over long term. For rentier states it is

better to give to the governed rather than to receive from the governed.

18

There are social and political consequences of absence of fiscal-tax policy. Purposes of

taxation are two fold: to generate government revenue and also to redistribute wealth and

income in the society. Tax collection is a fiscal policy that can direct and channel

revenues in socially desirable directions. Also, despite its onerous nature, taxation builds

institutions of governance that enhances the capacities of the state and the economy. Even

the Central government is failing here as it has exempted a large population from paying

income tax, even though they are capable of paying it. The central government has not

penetrated the society in the North East by tax administration and hence has to rely

heavily on armed forces for maintenance of law and order. By liberating itself from the

necessity of tax collection, the rentier states unwittingly diminish their own

administrative capacities along with the Centre. No doubt in some states governance has

become a problem. This lack of administrative extraction, intrusion, and penetration of

society by state merely means that there are no state institutions penetrating the civil

society for gathering relevant information for development. The Weberian conception of

extractive state does not apply because rentier states have been largely relieved of that

function. This defining exchange between Weberian state and society is absent.51

But this

does not mean that the North East has reified the state and that the state has achieved

autonomy from its society. In fact, state and society penetrate one another through

personnel and their relation like marriage, business partnerships, and monopolies on

economic activities etc. The ―boundaries‖ between state and society are permeable and

fluid as far as personnel are concerned and they influence each other. This penetration is

conducive to only information relevant for allocative decision and not for developmental

strategies. Here it must be kept in mind that rentier states often lack the information

necessary for the formulation of a coherent economic policy. The extractive and

allocative functions of the state require different types of information. In the absence of

revenue extraction, the state might lack adequate information about the local economy

and society. No doubt lobbying can fulfill the information gap for the state if it is by

business group, profession groups or economic classes like workers, peasants, artisans,

labour etc. But unfortunately for North East rentier states every kind of lobbying groups

come with an ethnic qualifier supplying information relevant for allocation and not

development.

19

In a rentier state and rentier economy emerges the rentier class as a new social

category displacing the traditional elite. Their economic control of the distribution of

external rent easily translates into political influence, which is magnified by the

autonomy of their source of revenue. Unlike the classical liberal third estate, however, the

rentier class is not driven by any notion of the ethical superiority of work and the rightful

representation based on merit. The rentier mentality isolates position and reward from

their causal relationship with talent and work. In fact it gets institutionalized through

policies of protective discrimination. Psychologically reinforced by the intangible nature

of bureaucratic output, this rentier mentality thrives in the environment of government

administration (where output is almost impossible to measure and where the rentier class

is not constrained by the same bottom-line as the capitalist). Popularity rather than

performance determines the position of the political elite. This helps us to understand the

reluctance on the part of the rentier class to collect taxes even when it possesses the

political power to do so. It also helps us understand why rentier states turn it into ethnic

cultural hegemony within the territory of the state. It is easiest way to become popular by

appealing to the ethnic cultural uniqueness and pride.

Usually treated as a subcategory of the service sector, the public bureaucracy of the

rentier state, swells to immense proportions.52

This swollen state apparatus has the

potential for extracting revenue from society at much greater rate, but satisfies itself

instead with more moderate revenue extracting behavior vis-a-vis the local society. To

understand why the rentier class refuses to maximize its extractive capacity one must

uncover the political "rules of the game" in the rentier state. A normal state develops a tax

collection capacity because it needs to extract revenue from its domestic society, which in

turn makes certain demands on the state in exchange for its legitimate right to collect

taxes. The state for its part must give credibility to the notion that it represents the

common good. Tax collection therefore requires at least some degree of acceptance on

the part of the population. This notion implies, in a normal state, the existence of a

relationship between taxation and legitimacy captured in the American revolutionary

dictum: "No taxation without representation.‖ But in a rentier state, it is through the

vehicle of public expenditure that the economy functions. Local society feeds on the

allocation of public loans, government subsidies, construction projects, and state-planned

20

industries. The rentier state reproduces or duplicates its own rentier mode-of-surviva1

within the local economy. Individuals within the society become rentiers dependent on

state expenditure, and, contributing little to it, have little say in the way it is dispersed.53

Here it is interesting to note that injection of external rent tends to enhance the political

leverage of non-state actors, i.e. sectors, classes, or interest groups, who favor growth-

impeding policies.54

The rentier class merely creates a mythos of ethnic cultural identity giving credibility

to the notion that it represents the ethnic and cultural pride and hegemony, which it does

by vigorously pursued policies of protective discrimination. This now becomes a new

ground of legitimation. Because it spends and does not tax, the rentier class is liberated

from the reliance on legitimation on economic grounds and considerations by its society

and thus suffers no serious economic challenge to its power. Economic democracy is not

a problem for the rentier state, because, to turn the phrase, there can be "no representation

without taxation."55

Given the blatant maldistribution of income and wealth, one might

assume that some form of class politics would emerge in a rentier economy to redress the

iniquity of material conditions. But class based politics are impossible because the

economic conditions and sectoral imbalances of the rentier state discourage class

formation in the usual sense of the term. A declining rural-agricultural sector; a state-

sponsored industrial sector; a booming service sector hardly gives any options for class-

based politics. There is no possibility of revolution in the North-East region of India.56

The Marxist understanding of class does not apply here because people do not identify

themselves by their relation to means of production.57

In point of fact, most rentier states have institutionalized some kind of vent for popular

discontent in the form of representative bodies and general assemblies. But these rely

only on ethnic cultural representation through reservation of seats in the assemblies. But

lacking the economic clout of a taxpaying middle class, none of the subaltern groups can

press their claims for increased participation. Since the government distributes benefits,

the opposition necessarily focuses its attention on how those benefits are distributed that

too only across ethnic cultural divides and not on economic class lines. This shapes the

entire political debate of dissent in the rentier state and produces a discourse in which the

21

solution of maneuvering for personal advantage within the existing setup is always

superior to seeking an alliance with others in similar condition.58

One also tends to

accentuate the distinctiveness of ethnic cultural group to which one belongs, to press for

better share in the rent. In rentier states the more salient identities are based on tribe,

region, and culture.59

Since rentier states depend on large outside labor force, the primary

group distinction is between indigenous tribes and outsiders. Most outside workers have

no political power or social status, have restricted access to state security, and remain at

the mercy of local population.

Theoretically, there is no incentive for a rentier class to promote truly democratic

reforms. Not only is it independent financially from such demands but also it bears a

vested interest in the status quo. This explains the reluctance of the rentier class to engage

in extractive fiscal policy. To do so would not only be unpopular, but would threaten the

very security of their elite status within the power structure premised on the inflow of

external rents. For these reasons, direct redistribution of external rents will not contribute

to greater democracy in the rentier states, but, in fact, will stultify it.60

That is to say

external rents61

working through non-taxation62

, buying allegiance through spending on

patronage,63

absence of economic class formation,64

hegemony of ethnic cultural group

formation65

, repression of dissenting minority ethnic cultural groups,66

and absence of

modernization in spite of adoption of modern consumption conjointly stultify

democracy.67

Only when governments levy tax that the people weigh the costs of funding

the government against the benefits they receive. When the ratio of taxes to government

benefits rises in a state, it will tend to increase the demand for democracy and

accountability, which will tend to produce a more democratic government and efficient

bureaucracy.68

People rebel against taxation without commensurate government

services.69

Struggles between citizens and governments over both taxes and government

services tend to produce greater democracy.70

Taxation brings into operation the desire of

people for a cost-effective government which in turn leads them to demand democratic

reforms and efficient bureaucracy. Hence the absence of tax regime makes the

government less accountable and less efficient in providing services like general security.

22

Dependence on external rent revenues affects the general tenor of civilian politics, and

reduces, through two very different mechanisms, the likelihood that citizens will engage

in politics in a "civic" (deliberative, institutionalized, and compromise-prone) fashion.

That is to say dependence on rent revenue leads to absence of public sphere for civic

rational political engagement. First, the absence of direct taxes reduces the likelihood that

citizens will be motivated to engage in politics through a sense of a right to influence the

use of "their" own money.71

Second, the absence of political contestation over the raising

of state revenue through taxation increases the space for conflict over more fundamental

issues of culture, morality and values that are more likely to generate permanent

differences and ill-feeling among people, and are less subject to compromise than are

questions of who pays how much tax for what purpose.

The failure to tax the bulk of the population, and thereby bring them into the ambit of a

regular civilian bureaucracy, leaves the state vulnerable to the (armed) organizational

challenge of competitors: guerrillas, private ethnic armies based on the narcotics and

arms trades, and non-state insurgent movements of various kinds. The key insight, shared

inter alia by counter-insurgency specialists, is that active revenue raising may be an

important means of keeping the state machinery alive and active at the grassroots. If the

revenue-raising function is permitted to decay or is absent, weak states leave themselves

vulnerable to more committed and organized predators.72

There is little incentive to establish an efficient public bureaucracy. The task of raising

revenue from external rent facilities requires no specialists. It is not necessary to establish

the kind of efficient meritocratic public bureaucracy that is required to manage a complex

tax system or to establish the control mechanisms and public-service values needed to

protect against the worst abuses in tax collection. In the civil bureaucracy, jobs will be

given mainly for patronage purposes and for directly political reasons. Insofar as there are

needs for an efficient public bureaucracy, these will be mainly in the military and

intelligence apparatuses, which come easily from the Centre.

The rentier states in North East suffer from low levels of economic and political

legitimacy on the one hand and due to high level of ethnic cultural hegemony also

23

experience penetration by civil society on the other, prompting ruling elite to engage in

the patrimonial policies towards dominant and co-opted ethnic cultural groups which

prevents development. Poverty and its distribution, in other words, is itself a political

outcome. Nepotism and patrimonialism creates the distributional conflicts between ethnic

cultural groups that prompt violence controllable to uncontrollable. Many a times

dominant and co-opted ethnic cultural groups trigger conflict by assaulting peripheral

minority ethnic groups, stimulating violent counteroffensives. State repression73

and lack

of political flexibility pushes oppositional groups' backs to the wall; it offers them no

other way out than violence or flight. External rent receipts in North East states is often a

catalyst for opposition to these states and conflict among ethnic groups, rather than a tool

to placate dissent, when it is perceived to be distributed inequitably (given in abundance

to some ethnic groups and withheld from others), and it provides potential dissenters with

the access to resources necessary for mobilization against the regime. In short, the states

in the North East being political organizations of some tribal hegemony74

engender their

own opposition and conflict leading often to law and order problem. Rentierism (income

without work), grievance (perception of being discriminated), greed (greater desire for

present consumption), frustration (at suffering due to repression), opportunity (enough

freedom to organize; access to finances, weapons, and people for recruitment),

widespread poverty (makes recruitment easy), increasing population (increases occasions

for conflict), strong ethnic identity (cohesion facilitates mobilization), ethnic divisions

with multiplicity of ethnic groups, and allocative state (with poor information for

administration) organized with ethnic hegemonies (leads to easy perception of

discrimination) is a potent mix for conflict explosion as we see in the North-East.

The rentier economy of North-East, with the adoption of massive consumerism of

modernity, has generated a culture of middle class and elites, which is prodigal,

promiscuous, and dominated by an anti-rational, anti-intellectual temper in which self of

the local, but not of outsiders, is taken as the touch stone of all judgments: political,

economic, social and cultural. In the North-East, therefore, the effect on the self of the

local is the measure of the total worth of experience. This culture is not tempered and

restrained by any economic order governed by an economic principle defined in terms of

efficiency and functional rationality, i.e. the economy is not governed by the organization

24

of production through ordering of things including human beings. In fact the culture of

the North-East is caught in its intractable opposition to the material rationality of the

modern economy.75

The result of this culture is that values in the sphere of consumption culture have

gained complete primacy negating fundamental economic processes and use-values

which underlay and produced them. What matters most is not the reality of labour and

production, but the autonomous, regulating force of the languages and codes which

govern the production and circulation of allegedly tribal values (which in fact are values

of consumerism masquerading as tribal values). This has led to culturization of

experience and commodities divorcing them from need and use. Experience and

commodities are sought not because of any known and existing needs but because it is

the in thing sanctioned by modern consumer culture.76

Intensification of logic of culture of consumption of middle and upper class in the

North-East has led to radical change in the nature of consumption. Consumption is no

longer a once-and-for-all using up value for pleasure and satisfaction. Pleasure and

satisfaction is no more a relation between an individual and an object, but is an element

of a system. Desire is not a desire for a particular object; rather it is a desire for

difference, i.e. for conspicuous consumption, whose satisfaction can never be fulfilled.

There can be no consummation of conspicuous consumption. The man in the North-East

is delivered to a dynamic of need and need production which is at once a rentier

economic system, a culture and a technology of political control.77

This system is a

product of habitus and symbolic capital. Habitus is the strategy-generating-principle as it

is the structure of social disposition or propensity, which organizes practice without

governing it. This strategy operates on the economy of gathering, exchange, and

circulation of non-material forms, qualities and values.78

North-East dwells in the universe dominated by the interconvertability of economic

and symbolic capital. The economic calculation directing the agent strategies in the

North-East takes into account profits and losses which from a Weberian economic ethics

are unthinkable and unnameable, and economically irrational. The practice of people

25

contrary to naively idyllic representation of tribal societies, conform to economic

calculation of rentier economy, even when it gives every appearance of disinterestedness

by departing from the logic of interested calculation and playing for stakes that are non-

material and cultural.79

North-East through the modern consumption from its rentier economy is living in the

indefinite reproduction of ideals, of phantasms, of images, of dreams, which are, from

now on, claimed to be behind people there, and which, they must nevertheless reproduce

in a sort of fatal postmodern indifference. Modernity has been adopted in North-East

emptying it out of all its great ideals: there is progress in consumption, but the Idea of

Progress is shunned, there is faster and faster hankering after wealth, but the Idea of

Production as a source of wealth has disappeared.80

Democracy is paid lip service, but

public sphere of free and frank discussion of political issues by citizens is not allowed to

develop, while the electoral process is reduced to legitimization of ethnic hegemony. All

great ideals of modernity in north east have met with such banal destiny due to its refusal

to entertain any theoretical and critical foundation for its culture and its justifying its

present condition in the name of post modernity. There is an erosion of the sense of

reality as an objective given due to proliferation of multiplicity of communications-

media-generated images, interpretations and reconstructions and wraps this all up within

a continuing deliberation on the homogenizing tendency of modernity and the hegemony,

neocolonialism, and imperialism of the mainland India. Celebration of weak thought,

nihilism, deconstruction, and difference is leading to transformation of the real world of

North-East into a fable through a weakening of reality. A bewildering experience of a

proliferation of world-views, tribal and non-tribal, and an associated irresistible

pluralization of interpretations advocated by philosophers, political scientists,

sociologists, anthropologists and cultural studies experts, within which the assumption of

a correspondence between information-media-generated images and simulations and a

real world can no longer be sustained. As Vattimo comments, ―the increase in possible

information on the myriad forms of reality makes it increasingly difficult to conceive of a

single reality. It may be that in the world of the mass media…the true world becomes a

fable.‖81

26

Here it needs to be recognized that differences are from the outset compromised and

lacking in innocence. The global diffusion of the values, assumptions, practices, and

institutions of modernity has constituted a process through which the idea of the ―radical

alterity of cultures‖ has been rendered problematic. Cultures in North-East have since

long lost their ―authenticity‖ and what one now encounters is a ―mixed reality‖ ―a

condition of widespread contamination,‖ ―an immense construction site of traces and

residues.‖82

There is a need to focus attention on the complex consequences of the

diffusion of the institutions of modernity, and in particular on the hybridization, that is,

the unpredictable patterns of articulations of global process with local/or regional

practices, customs , and traditions and one must conclude with Vattimo that ―the texts

belonging to our tradition…progressively lose their cogency as models and become part

of the vast construction site of traces and residues, just as the condition of radical alterity

of cultures that are other is exposed as an ideal which has perhaps never been realized,

and certainly unrealizable for us.‖83

North-East is experiencing fluctuating experiences of ―belonging and disorientation,‖

the familiar and the strange. The emancipation of North-East depends on the contingent

response it will give to its rentier conditions, which is the hybridization it has produced

by amalgamating its tribal work culture with the modern consumer culture. The

unanswered question the North-East needs to face squarely is whether it is ready to

overcome its individual and collective deep-seated nostalgia for the reassuring and

familiar hunter-gather work culture and respond positively to the contingency of rentier

conditions as an opportunity for a new way of being and work required by modern

consumption culture. It is this question which is simultaneously troubling the modern

sensibilities of outsiders and stimulating the postmodern imagination of the insiders in the

North-East.84

Here it must be remembered that postmodern is an epiphenomenon of

transformations in modern economy. It is the emergence of a ―late, or multinational, or

consumer‖ stage or moment in the development of modern economy.85

Now it has been

transported to North-East, by a transition to flexible forms of accumulation (or non

accumulation) or organization which, ―via the mediations of spatial and temporal

experiences‖, is in a particular an intense period of time-space compression.86

The

emphasis placed by postmodernity on cultural politics has served to deprive the people of

27

North-East of a ―crtitical perspective on itself or on the social processes of transformation

that underlay the surge into postmodernist ways of thought.‖87

The postmodern emphasis

on politics of culture has taken attention off from the functioning of economy in the

North-East and has led to a weakening of its normative evaluation.

Where can a beginning be made in the North East states for economic growth?

Institutions are obvious instruments were a beginning can be made as institutions trump

everything else.88

Qualities of institutions need to be improved keeping in view the

institutional environment rating of the investors and other observers. Institutional

environment must be such that any observer should be able to tell that there is a high

likelihood that investor will retain the fruits of their investments, that state actors or non-

state actors other than investors will not expropriate them, and that the social, political

and legal system will protect the property rights of the investors. Obviously the presence

of clear property rights and enforcement of these rights are two key elements in the

institutional environment that shapes economic performance. When investors believe that

their property rights are protected, they tend to invest more and the economy tends to end

up richer. But what form should property rights must take? Here there is need to

recognizing the importance of private incentives and aligning them with social costs and

benefits (so that productive efficiency can be achieved). Hence, the system of private

property rights that is able to achieve the following is good enough according to

Hernando de Soto, the famous Peruvian economist:

1. greater independence for individuals from local community arrangements to

protect their assets

2. clear and provable protected ownership

3. the standardization and integration of property rules and property information in

the state as a whole

4. increased trust arising from a greater certainty of punishment for cheating in

economic transactions

5. more formal and complex written statements of ownership that permit the easier

assumption of shared risk and ownership in companies, and the insurance of risk

6. greater availability of loans for new projects, since more things can be used as

collateral for the loans

28

7. easier access to and more reliable information regarding such things as credit

history and the worth of assets

8. increased fungibility, standardization and transferability of statements

documenting the ownership of property, which paves the way for structures such

as national markets for companies and the easy transportation of property through

complex networks of individuals and other entities.89

Without this kind of private property rights and its protection by rule of law the states

in the North East will neither be able to attract outside private investment nor be able to

raise internal private investment and hence, will have to continue to rely on external rents

with its detrimental impact on the economy.

Notes

1 "The Crisis of the Tax State," in R.A. Swedberg (ed.), Joseph A. Schumpeter: The Economics and

Sociology of Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, (1991 [1918]), P. 7. 2 For the idea of fiscal sociology cf. Mick Moore, ―Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of

Governance in Developing Countries,‖ International Political Science Review (2004), Vol. 25, No. 3, 297-

319; John L. Campbell, ―The State and Fiscal Sociology,‖ Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 19 (1993), pp.

163-185; Juergen Backhaus, ―Fiscal Sociology: What for?‖ American Journal of Economics and Sociology,

Vol. 61, No. 1, Special Issue: The New Political Economies: A Collection of Essay from around the World

(Jan., 2002), pp. 55-77; Richard E. Wagner, Fiscal sociology and the theory of public finance: An

exploratory essay, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007, 228 pp; Jurgen G. Backhaus,

―Joseph A. Schumpeter‘s contributions in the area of fiscal sociology: a first approximation,‖ Journal of

Evolutionary Economics (2004) 14: 143–151; Richard E. Wagner, Fiscal Sociology and the Theory of

Public Finance, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007; Michael McLure, The Paretian School and Italian

Fiscal Sociology, New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007; Fritz Karl Mann, ―The Fiscal Component of

Revolution: An Essay in Fiscal Sociology,‖ The Review of Politics, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Jul., 1947), pp. 331-349. 3 The word ‗state‘ in this essay is used not in the sense of sovereign nation state of international law but in

the sense of political organization of provinces within the sovereign state of India. 4 Now it has eighth member, i.e. Sikkim. But we will not be dealing with it.

5 From ―India‘s North-East: Rejuvenating A Conflict-Riven Economy,‖ by Gulshan Sachedeva, Manipur

Online, February 06, 2006. 6 From ―India‘s North-East: Rejuvenating A Conflict-Riven Economy,‖ by Gulshan Sachedeva, Manipur

Online, February 06, 2006. 7 In line with this argument Mizoram has been making a claim for additional funds called ―peace bonus.‖

Reported in news heading ―Ecologists bat for green bonus to North-East,‖ The Times of India, Guwahati,

Thursday, October 22, 2009, p. 2, column 6, 8 The concept of the "rentier state" was postulated by Hossein Mahdavy with respect to pre-revolutionary

Pahlavi Iran in 1970. Hossein Mahdavy, "The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier

States: The Case of Iran," in Studies in the Economic History o f the Middle East, ed. M.A. Cook (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1970). The idea has since been appropriated by a community of Middle East

specialists in their discussion of the Arab world. Cf Thomas Stauffer, Hazem Beblawi, Giacomo Luciani,

Mahmoud Abdel-Fadil, Michael Chatelus, Hamid Ait Amara, Dirk Vandewalle, Larbi Jaidi, Hesham

29

Garaibeh, Afsaneh Nafrnabadi, contributors to The Rentier State, vol. 2, Nation, State and Integration in

the Arab World, ed. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (London: Croom Helm, 1987). See also John R.

Minnis, ―First Nations Education and Rentier Economics: Parallels with the Gulf States‖ Canadian Journal

of Education / Revue canadienne de l'éducation, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2006),pp. 975-997; Ahmet Kuru, ―The

Rentier State Model and Central Asian Studies: The Turkmen Case,‖ Alternatives: Turkish Journal of

International Relations, Vol 1, No.1, Spring 2002; Hootan Shambayati, ―The Rentier State, Interest

Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy: State and Business inTurkey and Iran,‖ Comparative Politics, Vol.

26, No. 3 (Apr., 1994), pp. 307-331; Douglas A. Yates, The Rentier State in Africa: Oil Rent Dependency

and Neocolonialism in the Republic of Gabon, Threnton, N J: African World Press, 1996. Cf. B. Smith,

Hard times in the lands of plenty: oil politics in Iran and Indonesia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 2007;

T. Dunning, Crude democracy, New York: Cambridge University Press; 2008; T. Dunning, ―Conditioning

the effects of aid: cold war politics, donor credibility, and democracy in Africa,‖ International

Organizaion,. 2004;58(2):409–23; P. W. Moore, Doing business in the Middle East: politics and economic

crisis in Jordan and Kuwait, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2004; K. M.Morrison, ―Natural

resources, aid and democratization: a best-case scenario,‖ Pub Choice. 2007;131:365–86; D. Acemoglu, J.

A. Robinson, ―Economic backwardness in political perspective,‖ Am Pol Sci Rev. 2006;100 (1):115–31; R.

Rajan, A. Subramanian, Aid, Dutch disease, and manufacturing growth, Washington: Institute for

International Economics; 2006; M. Herb, All in the family: absolutism, revolution, and democracy in

Middle Eastern monarchies, Albany: SUNY; 1999; M. Herb, ―Taxation and representation,‖ Studies in

Comparative International Development, 2003;38(3):3–31; M. Herb, ―No representation without taxation?

Rents, development, and democracy,‖ Comparative Politics. 2005;37 (3):297–316; R. F. Doner RF, B. K.

Ritchie, D. Slater, ―Systemic vulnerability and the origins of developmental states: Northeast and Southeast

Asia in comparative perspective,‖ International Organization. 2005;59(2):327–61; N. Birdsall, A.

Subramanian, ―Saving Iraq from its oil,‖ Foreign Affairs. 2004 Jul/Aug; D. Brautigam, S. Knack, ―Foreign

aid, institutions, and governance in sub-Saharan Africa,‖ Economic Development Cultural Change.

2004;52(2):255–85; K. L. Remmer, ―Does foreign aid promote the expansion of government?‖ American

Journal of Political Science. 2004;48(1):77–92; C. Boix, Democracy and redistribution, New York:

Cambridge University Press; 2003; D. Eviatar, Petrol peril: Why Iraq’s oil wealth may do more harm than

good, The Boston Globe. 2003; J. Judis, ―Blood for oil?‖ The New Republic; 2003 March 31; S. Carapico,

―Foreign aid for promoting democracy in the Arab world,‖ Middle East Journal. 2002;56(3):379–95; M. L.

Ross, ―The political economy of the resource curse,‖ World Politics. 1999;51(2):297–322; M. L. Ross,

―Does oil hinder democracy?‖ World Politics 2001;53(3):325–61; J. Sachs,A.Warner, ―The big push,

natural resource booms, and growth?‖ Journal of Development Economics. 1999;59(1):43–76; J.

Sachs,A.Warner, ―Natural resources and economic development: the curse of natural resources,‖ European

Economic Review. 2001;45:827–38; S. Knack, ―Aid dependence and the quality of governance: cross-

country and empirical test,‖ South Econ J. 2001;68:310–29; G. Okruhlik, ―Rentier wealth, unruly law, and

the rise of the opposition: the political economy of oil states,‖ Comparative Politics. 1999;31(3):295–315;

D. A. Waldner, State building and late development. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 1999; D.

Vandewalle, Libya since independence: oil and state-building. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 1998; T. L.

Karl, The paradox of plenty: oil booms and petro-states. Berkeley: University of California Press; 1997;

M.Bratton, N. van de Walle, Democratic experiments in Africa: regime transitions in comparative

perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press; 1997; K. A. Chaudhry, ―Economic liberalization and

the lineages of the rentier state,‖ Comparative Politics, 1994;27(1):1–25; K. A. Chaudhry, The price of

wealth: economies and institutions in the Middle East. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 1997; S.

Heydemann, ―The political logic of economic rationality: selective stabilization in Syria,‖ in H. Barkey,

editor. The politics of economic reform in the Middle East. New York: St. Martin‘s; 1992; E. Bellin, ―The

politics of profit in Tunisia: utility of the rentier paradigm?‖ World Development 1994;22(3):427–36; L.

Anderson, The state and social transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830–1980. Princeton: Princeton

University Press; 1986; L. Anderson, ―Remaking the Middle East: the prospects for democracy and

stability,‖ Ethics and International Aff.airs, 1992;6:163–78; J. Crystal, ―Coalitions in oil monarchies:

Kuwait and Qatar,‖ Comparative Politics, 1989;21(4):427–43; G. Luciani, ―Economic foundations of

democracy and authoritarianism: the Arab world in comparative Perspective,‖ Arab Studies Quarterly.

1988;10:457–75; G. Luciani, ―The oil rent, the fiscal crisis of the state, and democratization,‖ in G. Salame,

editor. Democracy without democrats? The renewal of politics in the Muslim world. London: Tauris; 1994.

p. 130–55; K. P. Kimbrough, ―Foreign aid and optimal fiscal policy,‖ Canadian Journal of Economics.

30

1986;19(1):35–61; J. Delacroix, ―The distributive state in the world system,‖ Studies in Comparative

International Development. 1980;15(1):3–21; P. S. Heller, ―A model of public fiscal behavior in

developing countries: aid, investment, and taxation,‖ American Economic Review. 1975;65(3):429–45. 9 Hazem Beblawi, ―The Rentier State in the Arab World,‖ in The Rentier State, vol. 2, Nation, State and

Integration in the Arab World, ed. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (London: Croom Helm, 1987),

p.51. 10

―The formation of Tribal States and Union Territories in the region justifies them that, they are no longer

a primitive people…‖ Hamlet Bareh ―India‘s North-East and Her Ethnic Character during the British and

Contemporary Set-up,‖ in in Regionalism in India (With Special Reference to North-East India), edited by

B. Pakem, Nehu Publications, 1993, p. 197. The theories of rentier state and rentier economy has been

applied by economists so far for nation states and national eonomies. I have tried to extend the theory to

sub-units of nation state and national economy of India, i.e., I have extended with necessary modifications

the theory of rentier state and rentier economy to provincial states and provincial economies in India,

specifically the provinces and provincial economies of North-Eastern India. 11

The idea of ‗strategies of extraversion‘ is introduced by Jean-François Bayart in his, The State in Africa:

The Politics of the Belly, 1st Edition, Longman, Harlow, 1993; ‗Africa in the world: A history of

extraversion‘, African Affairs 99, 395 (2000), pp. 217–67; The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, 2nd

Edition, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2009. This concept has now become popular in study of African

identity politics. Cf. Jim Igoe, ―Becoming Indigenous Peoples: Difference, Inequality, and the

Globalization of East African Identity Politics,‖ African Affairs, 105/420, April 2006, pp. 399–420; Denis

M. Tull, The Reconfiguration of Political Order in Africa: A Case Study of North Kivu (DR Congo), GIGA-

Hamburg, 2005; Sandra J. Maclean, ―Fighting Locally, Connecting Globally: Inside & Outside Dimensions

of African Conflict,‖ in The roots of African conflicts: the causes & costs, By Alfred G. Nhema, Tiyambe

Zeleza, Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa, Ohio University Press,

2008. 12

―Northeast India came under the control of the British East India Company in 1826 at the end of the

Anglo-Burmese war when according to the Yandabo Treaty, the king of Ava (Burma) …agreed…to

recognize British-supported Gambhir Singh as the king of Manipur.‖ p.325 & ―…in 1845, when Captain

Butler traveled to the Naga Hills with an armed force, he made his way through the country ‗conciliating

the tribes and mapping the country‘…A number of villages eagerly sought British protection, but it was

only to ‗induce us to exterminate their neighbours‘.‖ pp. 326f. & ―In 1844, another expedition found that

Manipur was ‗helping one Naga clan to attack another‘…‖ p.327 & ―After two expeditions to the Angami

Naga country, Leutenant Vincent reported in 1850 that ‗in every Angami village, there were two parties,

one attached o the interests of Manipur and the other to the British, but each only working for an alliance to

get aid in crushing te opposite faction‘…‖ Sanjib Baruah, ―Confronting Constructionism: Ending India's

Naga War,‖ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 40, No. 3 (May, 2003), p.327. ―Similarly discontented with

the tyranny of the king, the people of Manipur under Irawat Singh led a Telengana-like revolt which

alarmed the moderate section of the Manipuri leadership belonging to the provincial Congress, and they

initiated a process which hastened the accession of Manipur into India. The decision not to join the Indian

union in Mizoram was similarly reversed and the popular movement supporting the merger started when it

was circulated that joining India meant the abolishment of Mizo chieftainship and an end to the exploitation

and oppression of the peasant community by the chiefs.‖ Sajal Nag, ―Multiplication of Nations? Political

Economy of Sub-Nationalism in India,‖ Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 28, No. 29/30 (Jul. 17-24,

1993), p. 1524.

13

Jean-Francois Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, 2nd

Edition, Polity Press, Cambridge,

UK, 2009, p. xvii. 14

In consistency with this argument Meghalaya additional principal chief conservato of forests T T C

Marak backed has backed the idea of ―green bonus.‖ Reported in news heading ―Ecologists bat for green

bonus to North-East,‖ The Times of India, Guwahati, Thursday, October 22, 2009, p. 2, column 6. Under

this news heading on 4th

column it was reported, ―Guwahati: Eologists are pitching for ―green bonus‖ to

North East as they feel the region, with a vast forest cover, contributes the least to the contry‘s total carbon

emission. They also argued many tribes in the North-East follow the traditional ―environmental-friendly

lifestyle‖ and should be duly compensated for being responsible for lowering the country‘s overall carbon

31

emission. The idea of ―green bonus‖ was aired during the release of US-based World-watch Institute‘s

State of The World Report, 2009, on climate change here recently. The Centre for Environment Education

(CEE), north eastern region, released the Indian edition of the report…‖ 15

Hazem Beblawi, ―The Rentier State in the Arab World,‖ in The Rentier State, vol. 2, Nation, State and

Integration in the Arab World, ed. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (London: Croom Helm, 1987),

p.51. 16

In economic literature this issue is discussed under ―resource curse,‖ because rents accrue to the most

states via export of the natural resources. Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner in Natural Resource

Abundance and Economic Growth, Development Discussion Paper no. 517a. Cambridge: Harvard Institute

for International Development, 1995,49 pp., examine ninety-seven countries over a nineteen-year period,

using regression analysis to measure the impact of mineral and other resource exports on GDP growth.

Their study shows that states with a high ratio of natural resource exports to GDP in 1971 had abnormally

slow growth rates between 1971 and 1989. The correlation remained significant even after the authors con

trolled for a wide range of growth-related variables, including initial per capita income, trade policy,

investment rates, region, bureaucratic efficiency, terms-of-trade volatility, and income distribution. Cf.

Michael L. Ross ―The Political Economy of the Resource Curse,‖ World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Jan.,

1999), pp. 297-322; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ―Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict,‖ The

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 4, Paradigm in Distress? PrimaryCommodities and Civil War

(Aug., 2005), pp. 625-633; Jeremy M. Weinstein, ―Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel

Recruitment,‖ The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 4, Paradigm in Distress?

PrimaryCommodities and Civil War (Aug., 2005), pp. 598-624; Richard Snyder and Ravi Bhavnani,

―Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes: A Revenue-Centered Framework for Explaining Political Order,‖ The

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 4, Paradigm in Distress? PrimaryCommodities and Civil War

(Aug., 2005), pp. 563-597; Päivil Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Elisabeth Gilmore, ―A Diamond Curse?

Civil War and a Lootable Resource,‖ The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 4, Paradigm in

Distress? PrimaryCommodities and Civil War (Aug., 2005), pp. 538-562; Macartan Humphreys, ―Natural

Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms,‖ The Journal of Conflict

Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 4, Paradigm in Distress? PrimaryCommodities and Civil War (Aug., 2005), pp.

508-537; Thad Dunning, ―Resource Dependence, Economic Performance, and Political Stability,‖ The

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 4, Paradigm in Distress? PrimaryCommodities and Civil War

(Aug., 2005), pp. 451-482; James Ron, ―Paradigm in Distress? Primary Commodities and Civil War,‖ The

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 4, Paradigm in Distress? PrimaryCommodities and Civil War

(Aug., 2005), pp. 443-450; Mark F. Giordano, Meredith A. Giordano, Aaron T. Wolf, ―International

Resource Conflict and Mitigation,‖ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Jan., 2005), pp. 47-65;

Darryl Reed, ―Resource Extraction Industries in Developing Countries,‖ Journal of Business Ethics, Vol.

39, No. 3, Resource Extraction Industries in the Developing World (Sep., 2002), pp. 199-226; Chris Ballard

and Glenn Banks, ―Resource Wars: The Anthropology of Mining,‖ Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol.

32 (2003), pp. 287-313; Michael L. Ross, ―The Political Economy of the Resource Curse,‖ World Politics,

Vol. 51, No. 2 (Jan., 1999), pp. 297-322; Ning Ding and Barry C. Field, ―Natural Resource Abundance and

Economic Growth,‖ Land Economics, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Nov., 2005), pp. 496-502; Michael L. Ross, ―How

Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases,‖ International Organization,

Vol. 58, No. 1 (Winter, 2004), pp. 35-67; R. M. Auty, ―Industrial Policy, Sectoral Maturation, and Postwar

Economic Growth in Brazil: The ResourceCurse Thesis,‖ Economic Geography, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Jul.,

1995), pp. 257-272; Scott Pegg, ―Can Policy Intervention Beat the Resource Curse? Evidence from the

Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project,‖ African Affairs, 105/418, 1–25. 17

Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (Eds.), The Rentier State, p. 70. Cf. Douglas A. Yates, The Rentier

State in Africa: Oil Rent Dependency and Neocolonialism in the Republic of Gabon, p.15. 18

Many scholars have attached behavioral attributes, like the absence of a productive outlook,

antiproductive bias, risk aversion, and laziness, to the economic conditions of rentierism. Beblawi; Chatelus

and Schemeil; Monte Palmer, Ibrahim Alghofaily, and Saud Nimir, "The Behavioral Correlates of Rentier

Economies," in Robert Stookey, ed., The Arabian Peninsula (Washington, D.C.: Hoover Institution Press,

1984). The "disdain for manual labor" among rentiers is often attributed to indigenous tradition. 19

Hossein Mahdavy, "The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of

Iran," in Studies in the Economic History o f the Middle East, ed. M.A. Cook (Oxford: Oxford University

32

Press, 1970), p.437; Douglas A. Yates, The Rentier State in Africa: Oil Rent Dependency and

Neocolonialism in the Republic of Gabon, p. 21. 20

Douglas A. Yates, The Rentier State in Africa, p.21. 21

Hossein Mahdavy, "The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of

Iran," p. 443; Yates, The Rentier State in Africa, p.21. 22

Beblawi & Luciani, The Rentier State, p. 52; Yates, The Rentier State in Africa, pp.21f. 23

Ragnar Nurske, "Trade Fluctuations and Buffer Policies of Low-Income Countries," Kyklos 11, no. 2

(1958); 63 (April 1955); Melville H. Watkins, "A Staple Theory of Economic Growth," Canadian Journal

of Economics and Political Science 29 (May 1963). 24

Yates, The Rentier State in Africa, p.22. 25

Mahamoud Abdel-Fadil, ―The Macro-behavior of Oil-rentier States in the Arab-egion,‖ in Beblawi &

Luciani, The Rentier State, p. 85. 26

Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus, translated by Peter Collier (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 40–41. 27

Mahamoud Abdel-Fadil, ―The Macro-behavior of Oil-rentier States in the Arab-egion,‖ in Beblawi &

Luciani, The Rentier State, pp.102f. 28

Mahamoud Abdel-Fadil, ―The Macro-behavior of Oil-rentier States in the Arab-region,‖ in Beblawi &

Luciani, The Rentier State, p. 103. 29

C. Wallich, Monetary Problems of an Export Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960);

Jonathan V. Levin, The Export Economies: Their Pattern of Development in Historical Perspective

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960). Wallich and Levin argued that the development path of

sugar-exporting states was distorted by a "sugar mentality" that led to lax economic planning and

insufficient diversification. 30

Beblawi & Luciani, The Rentier State, p8. 31

Aid buys growth is advocated in an influential paper by Craig Burnside and David Dollar, "Aid, Policies,

and Growth." American Economic Review, September, 2000, 90:4, pp. 847-68. The issue is further

explored in Henrik Hansen and Finn Tarp, "Aid Effectiveness Disputed," Journal of International

Development. April 2000, 12:3, pp. 375-98; Henrik Hansen and Finn Tarp, "Aid and Growth Regressions."

Journal of Development Economics, 2001. 64:2, pp. 547-70; Carl-Johan Dalgaard and Henrik Hansen, "On

Aid, Growth and Good Policies."Journal of Development Studies. August 2001, 37:6, pp. 17- 41; Patrick

Guillamont and Lisa Chauvet, "Aid and Performance: A Reassessment." Journal of Development Studies.

August 2001, 37:6, pp. 66-92; Paul Collier and Jan Dehn, "Aid, Shocks, and Growth." Working Paper No.

2688, World Bank, October 2001; Robert Lensink and Howard White, "Are There Negative Returns to

Aid?" Journal of Development Studies. August 2001, 37:6, pp. 42-65; Paul Collier and David Dollar "Aid

Allocation and Poverty Reduction." European Economic Review. September 2002, 46:8, pp. 1475-500. The

following papers put question mark on aid buys growth view: William Easterly, ―Can Foreign Aid Buy

Growth?‖ The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer, 2003), pp. 23-48; William

Easterly, "The Ghost of Financing Gap: Testing the Growth Model of the International Financial

Institutions." Journal of Development Economics. December 1999, 60:2, pp. 423-38; William Easterly, The

Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics. Cambridge, Mass.:

MIT Press 2001; William Easterly "What Did Structural Adjustment Adjust? The Association of Policies

and Growth with Repeated IMF and World Bank Adjustment Loans." Working paper, Center for Global

Development, 2002; William Easterly and Ross Levine, "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Politics and Ethnic

Divisions." Quarterly Journal of Economics. November1997, 112:4, pp. 1203-250; William Easterly, Ross

Levine and David Roodman, "New Data, New Doubts: A Comment on Burnside and Dollar's 'Aid,

Policies, and Growth' (2000)." American Economic Review, 2003. 32

William Easterly, ―Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?‖ The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, No.

3 (Summer, 2003), p.34. 33

William Easterly, ―Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?‖ The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, No.

3 (Summer, 2003), p. 35. 34

William Easterly, ―Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?‖ The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, No.

3 (Summer, 2003), p. 40. 35

William Easterly, ―The Utopian Nightmare,‖ Foreign Policy, No. 150 (Sep. - Oct., 2005), p.60. 36

William Easterly, ―The Utopian Nightmare,‖ Foreign Policy, No. 150 (Sep. - Oct., 2005), p 63.

33

37

Carol Graham, ―Foreign Aid,‖ The Brookings Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Spring, 1997), p.20. 38

For the view that it is more difficult to achieve a consensus for good policies in a polarized environment

cf. Torsten Persson and G. Tabellini, "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?" American Economic Review,

LXXXIV (1994), 600-621; Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini, "External Debt, Capital Flight and

Political Risk," Journal of International Economics, XXVII (1989), 199-220; Philip Lane and Aaron

Tornell, "Power Concentration and Growth," Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper

No. 1720, Harvard Univer- sity, 1995; Alberto Alesina and Dani Rodrik, "Distributive Politics and

Economic Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics, CIX (1994), 465-490. Ethnic conflict over economic

rents adversely affects policy choices according to. Gwendolyn Mikell, Cocoa and Chaos in Ghana (New

York, NY: Paragon House, 1989).

39

Yates, The Rentier State in Africa, p.24. 40

Yates, The Rentier State in Africa, p.24. 41

Graham A. Davis, "Learning to Love the Dutch Disease: Evidence from the Mineral Economies," World

Development 21, no. 10 (1955) The phrase ‗Dutch Disease‘ was originally coined to explain the negative

effects that North Sea oil revenues had on Dutch industrial production. 42

It was reported in The Times of India, Saturday, May 15, 2010, p.4, in its North-East section under the

heading ‗Meghalaya PSUs incurs huge losses‘: ‗Shillong: State-owned PSUs in Meghalaya are incurring

huge losses, a special report on state finances brought out by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG)

of India has observed… ―In view of the heavy losses of some of the undertakings, the government should

review their workings so as to wipe out their losses in the short run and to make them self-sustaining in

medium to long term,‖ it recommended. ―Otherwise, high-cost borrowed funds invested in projects with

low financial return will continue to strain the economy.‖ The report cautioned. The average return on

investments by the Meghalaya government in statutory corporations, state-owned companies and co-

operative societies was less than one percent during 2004-2009, whereas its average interest outgo was in

the range of 6.32 to 8.58 percent, the report said.‘ 43

Yates, The Rentier State in Africa, pp.25f. 44

Yates, The Rentier State in Africa, pp.26f. 45

Yates, The Rentier State in Africa, pp.28f. 46

Yates, The Rentier State in Africa, p.29. 47

Yates, The Rentier State in Africa, pp.29f. 48

E. Wayne Nafziger, Inequality in Africa: Political Elites, Proletariat, Peasants and the Poor, 2nd ed.

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p. 1; Yates, The Rentier State in Africa, pp.31f. As the

writing of this essay was in progress, the following news appeared in The Telegraph, Guwahati, Tuesday,

13 October 2009 on page 6, under the heading ―Urban-centric pointers - Meghalaya growth low, says

report‖: Shillong, Oct. 12: The first state development report released by Meghalaya chief minister D.D.

Lapang today pointed out that the human resource development of Meghalaya was poor and urban-centric,

leaving the rural areas in a state of total neglect. The report, which was completed after six years, suggested

that human development in Meghalaya is urban-centric, registering less percentage of human development

in the rural areas. Human development is a combination of people‘s entitlements and attainments relating to

education, health and livelihood. … ―A closer look at some of the components of the HDI suggests that

there has been stagnation or no development in Meghalaya in some areas,‖ the report said. …The report,

however, added that there has been an improvement in the spheres of income and education in the state

from 1981 to 2005. The district with the highest HDI is East Khasi Hills followed by West Garo Hills. ―The

two major towns in the state, Shillong and Tura, are in these two districts and the relatively higher HDIs of

these two districts seem to suggest that human development in Meghalaya gas been urban-centric,‖ the

report said. The other five districts have HDIs that are lower than the state average. Among the northeastern

states, Meghalaya fared better than Assam and Arunachal Pradesh only. 49

Yates, The Rentier State in Africa, p.32. 50

Yates, The Rentier State in Africa, pp.32ff. 51

Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World," in Giacomo Luciani, ed., The Arab State (Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1990), p. 89. 52

Regarding North-East India Xaxa writes, ―Along with this process of development, massive institutional

setup comprising a complex hierarchical bureaucratic structure has also been bought forth in the region.

34

There provide employment on a sizable scale to man the socio-economic, educational and cultural

infrastructure necessary to preserve and expand the capitalist socio-economic formation. This employment

is no-manual in nature. It comprises largely white-collar occupations, requiring certain skills and

educational qualification. This leads to the nation of category of occupational groups which claims higher

prestige and emoluments and so a disproportionately high sgare of income. Now, ethnic minorities as a part

of their participation in larger economy have also been interested in the bureaucratic structure. Similar

absorption is also visible in the political sphere.‖ Virginius Xaxa, ―Ethnic Minorities and Ntional

Integration,‖ in Regionalism in India (With Special Reference to North-East India), edited by B. Pakem,

Nehu Publications, 1993, p.145. 53

Yates, The Rentier State in Africa, pp.34f. 54

Cf. Miguel Urrutia, "The Politics of Economic Development Policies in Resource-Rich States," in

Urrutia and Yukawa, eds., Economic Development Policies in Resource-Rich Countries (Tokyo: United

Nations University, 1988); Gustav Ranis, "Toward a Model of Development," in Lawrence B. Krause and

Kim Kihwan, eds., Liberalization in the Process of Economic Development (Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1991); Gustav Ranis and Syed Akhtar Mahmood, The Political Economy of Development

Policy Change (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992); Robert Wade, "East Asia's Economic Success:

Conflicting Perspectives, Partial Insights, Shaky Evidence," World Politics 44 (January 1992); James E.

Mahon Jr., "Was Latin America Too Rich to Prosper?" Journal of Development Studies 28 (January 1992);

Richard M. Auty, "Industrial Policy Re form in Six Large Newly Industrializing Countries: The Resource

Curse Thesis," World Development 22, no. 1 (1994); Robin Broad, "The Political Economy of Natural

Resources: Case Studies of the In donesian and Philippine Forest Sectors," Journal of Developing Areas 29

(April 1995). Sachs and Warner offer a heterodox version of this argument, suggesting that when states are

affected by the Dutch Disease, lagging manufacturing sectors will demand compensation in the form of

trade barriers and thus produce economic stagnation. Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner. Natural

Resource Abundance and Eco nomic Growth, Development Discussion Paper no. 517a. Cambridge: Har

vard Institute for International Development, 1995,49 pp. 55

Scott Gehlbach, Representation Through Taxation: Revenue, Politics, and Development in

Postcommunist States, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. xix+ 194 pages. 56

Yates, The Rentier State in Africa, p.35. 57

Jacques Delacroix, "The Distributive State in the World System," Studies in Comparative International

Development, 15 (Fall 1980), 3-21; Hootan Shambayati, "The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the

Paradox of Autonomy: State and Business in Turkey and Iran," Comparative Politics? 26 (April 1994),

307-31. 58

Yates, The Rentier State in Africa, p.35. 59

Sanjib Baruah rightly pointed out, ―Assam's relative economic backwardness, for instance, which is

partly explained by the fact that Assam was integrated into the capitalist economy as much more of a

classic colonial primary commodity-producing area is an important aspect of Assam's tangled nationality

question.‖ Sanjib Kumar Baruah, ―Beyond Patriots and Traitors,‖ Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 15,

No. 20 (May 17, 1980), p. 877. 60

Yates, The Rentier State in Africa, p.36. Cf.Michael Herb, ―No Representation without Taxation? Rents,

Development, and Democracy,‖ Comparative Politics, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Apr., 2005), pp. 297-316. Michael L

Ross, in his ―Does Oil Hinder Democracy?‖ World Politics, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Apr., 2001), pp. 356-57, also

comes to the conclusion that the external rent revenue impedes-democracy claim is ―both valid and

statistically robust‖, ... external rent revenue ―does hurt democracy." This conclusion helps to "vindicate"

the rentier state theory. That rentierism harms democracy has been advanced in case studies and

theoretically by, among many others, Lisa Anderson, Jill Crystal, Dirk Vandewalle, and Giacomo Luciani.

Cf. Lisa Anderson, "The State in the Middle East and North Africa," Comparative Politics, 20 (October

1987), 1-18; Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Giacomo Luciani, "Allocation vs. Production States: A

Theoretical Framework," in Giacomo Luciani, ed., The Arab State (Berkeley: University of California

Press, 1990), pp. 65-84; Dirk Vandewalle, Libya since Independence: Oil and State-Building (Ithaca:

Cornell University Press, 1998).

35

61

State governments use their external rent revenues to relieve social pressures that might otherwise lead

to demands for greater account ability from governments according to Michael L. Ross, ―Does Oil Hinder

Democracy?‖ World Politics, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Apr., 2001), p.332. This is known as ―rentier effect‖ in the

literature on the rentier states. 62

When governments derive sufficient revenues from external rent, they are likely to tax their populations

less heavily or not at all, and the public in turn will be less likely to demand accountability from the

government. Michael L. Ross, ―Does Oil Hinder Democracy?‖ p.332. Giacomo Luciani, "Allocation vs.

Production States: A Theoretical Framework," in Beblawi and Luciani The Rentier State ,fn. 8. This is

known as ―taxation effect,‖ in the literature and it is the first of three mechanism through which ―rentier

effect,‖ operates. Cf. Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar

(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Laurie A. Brand, "Economic and Political Liberalization

in a Rentier Economy: The Case of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," in Iliya Harik and Denis J.

Sullivan, eds., Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,

1992). 63

The external rents may lead to greater spending on patronage, which in turn dampens latent pressures for

democratization. Michael L. Ross, ―Does Oil Hinder Democracy?‖ p.333. Ricky Lam and Leonard

Wantchekon, "Dictatorships as a Political Dutch Disease" (Manuscript, Department of Political Sci ence,

Yale University, January 1999). This is known as ―spending effect,‖ which is the second mechanism in the

operation of ―rentier effect.‖ Cf. John P. Entelis, "Oil Wealth and the Prospects for Democratization in the

Arabian Peninsula: The Case of Saudi Arabia," in Naiem A. Sherbiny and Mark A. Tessler, eds., Arab Oil:

Impact on the Arab Countries and Global Implications (New York: Praeger, 1976); Dirk Vandewalle, Libya

since Independence: Oil and State-Building (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univer sity Press, 1998); Carlos

Bazresch and Santiago Levy, "Populism and Economic Policy in Mexico, 1970-82," in R?diger Dornbusch

and Sebastian Edwards, eds., The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America (Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1991); Timothy P. Kessler, Global Capital and National Politics: Reforming Mexico s

Financial System (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999). 64

When external rent revenues provide a government with enough money, the government will use its

largesse to prevent the formation of social groups like bourgeoisie that are independent from the state and

hence that may be inclined to demand political rights. Democracy is stymied when oil revenues prevent

changes in class structure that usually lead to democracy. Michael L. Ross, ―Does Oil Hinder

Democracy?‖ p.334. This is known as ―group formation effect‖ which is the third and final mechanism

through which ―rentier effect‖ operates. Cf. Clement Henry Moore, "Petroleum and Political Development

in the Maghreb," in Sherbiny and Tessler, Arab Oil: Impact on the Arab Countries and Global

Implications (New York: Praeger, 1976) fn. 24; Ruth First, "Libya: Class and State in an Oil Economy," in

Petter Nore and Terisa Turner, eds., Oil and Class Struggle (London: Zed Press, 1980); Vandewalle Libya

since Independence: Oil and State-Building fn. 25; Eva Bellin, "The Politics of Profit in Tunisia: Utility of

the Ren tier Paradigm?" World Development 22 (March 1994); and Hootan Shambayati, "The Ren tier

State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy: State and Business in Turkey and Iran," Comparative

Politics 26 (April 1994); Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); John P. Entelis, "Civil Society and the Authoritarian

Temptation in Algerian Politics," in Augustus Richard Norton, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East, vol. 2

(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995); Farhad Kazemi, "Civil Society and Iranian Politics," in Norton, Civil Society in

the Middle East, vol. 2;Jill Crystal, "Civil Society in the Arab Gulf States," in Norton Civil Society in the

Middle East, vol. 2; Zuhair Humadi, "Civil Society under the Ba'th in Iraq," in Jillian Schwedler, ed.,

Toward Civil Society in the Middle East? (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995). 65

This is happening in all the seven sister states, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya,

Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura. In most of the states like Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram,

Nagaland state assembly seats are reserved for tribes only. Assam is also experiencing resurgence of

Assamese pride. Tripura has de facto Bengali hegemony. 66

External rent revenue distribution gives rise to ethnic cultural conflicts leading to repression of minority

ethnic groups by governments who tend to represent only the dominant or coopted etrhnic groups. This is

known as ―repression effect,‖ which is inimical to democracy. Michael L. Ross, ―Does Oil Hinder

Democracy?‖ pp.335f; Collier and Hoeffler (fn. 4); de Soysa (fn. 4). Nagaland is witnessing conflict

between the Angami, Sema and the Tangkhuls. Zeliangrong and Kukis are also demanding separate

36

identity against Naga movement. Meghalaya is also experiencing distancing of Garos rom Khasi-pnar.

Mizoram is seeing identity assertion of Hmars, Pawis, Chakmas and Brus (also known as Reangs). In

Assam Bodos are claiming separate identity. In Manipur Meitei ethnic group seeks to restore their

supremacy over other ethnic groups. In Tripura Bengali hegemony is being resented by Tripuris. 67

Thirdly democracy fails because of lack of modernization in spite of modern consumption culture due to

absence of development brought about by external rents. This is called ―modernization effect.‖ Cf. Michael

L. Ross, ―Does Oil Hinder Democracy?‖ pp.336f; Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy:

Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review 53 (March 1959);

Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review 55

(September 1961); Ronald Inglehart, Modernization andPostmod emization (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1997)fn. 1. 68

Michael L. Ross, ―Does Taxation Lead to Representation?‖ B.J.Pol.S. 34, 2004, p.234ff. 69

Michael L. Ross, ―Does Taxation Lead to Representation?‖ B.J.Pol.S. 34, 2004, p.247. 70

Michael L. Ross, ―Does Taxation Lead to Representation?‖ B.J.Pol.S. 34, 2004, p. 247. 71

Shambayati suggests that rentier states face little social pressure to improve their economic policies,

since their low taxes and generous welfare programs discourage opposition groups from mobilizing around

economic issues. Hootan Shambayati, "The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy:

State and Business in Turkey and Iran," Comparative Politics 26 (April 1994). 72

―For militant groups in north-east India, the major source of financing is what Indian officials term

extortion but, in an analytical sense, can be seen as taxation by non-state actors. Arguably, many militant

groups have better capacity to tax than the Indian state. Indeed, as Sanjay Ghose found in the case of the

engineers of the Nagaland govern- ment's public works department, unlike government tax collectors who

could tar- get only what is officially declared as income, militants - drawing on popular perceptions and

rumor- can impose higher taxes based on more realistic assessments of legal and illegal income...‖ Sanjib

Baruah, ―Gulliver's Troubles: State and Militants in North-East India,‖ Economic and Political Weekly,

Vol. 37, No. 41 (Oct. 12-18, 2002), p.4180. also see Sanjoy Ghose, Sanjoy's Assam: Diaries and Writings

of Sanjoy Ghose (edited by Sumita Ghose), Penguin India, (1999). ―For the last couple of years the valley

and hill militant groups have penetrated the state and central administration and carved out specific areas of

influence. Every month when salaries are disbursed, a percentage is deducted and paid to militant groups.

In effect this was a replication of what was done by the Naga Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN); in

Nagaland, as also the Naga districts of Manipur, regular de- ductions are labelled as house tax and ration

money. The militant groups report- edly interfere in the award of contracts and are also known to enter

offices carrying files to secure signatures of officers in gunpoint.‖ E. N. Rammohan, 'Manipur: A

Degenerated Insurgency' in K P S Gill (ed), Faultlines: Writings on Conflict and Resolution, Vol 11,

Institute of Conflict Management, New Delhi, 2002, quoted in Sanjib Baruah, ―Gulliver's Troubles: State

and Militants in North-East India,‖ Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 41 (Oct. 12-18, 2002),

p.4180. 73

As the writing of the paper was in progress the following news item appeared in The Telegraph, Kolkata,

Friday , August 7 , 2009 under the heading ―Panel to review land act - Meghalaya may bar 17 tribes from

buying or selling plots‖ from its correspondent: ―Shillong, Aug. 6: The Meghalaya government is

contemplating restricting 17 tribes from the Northeast, which have settled in the state, to buy and sell land

in the state after amending the Meghalaya Land Transfer Act, 1976.

A committee on the amendment of the land transfer act was set up by the government with deputy chief

minister Bindo Lanong as its chairman and revenue minister Prestone Tynsong as the vice-chairman. Eight

non-governmental organisations from the state, including the Khasi Students Union (KSU) and the

Federation of Khasi Jaintia Garo People FKJGP), are also a part of the committee.

Speaking to reporters, Tynsong said at present besides the three indigenous tribes — the Khasis, Jaintias

and Garos — 17 other tribes from the region settled in Meghalaya could purchase and sell land.

―However, the irony is that the Khasis, Jaintias and Garos do not enjoy the privilege of buying and selling

in other states of the Northeast,‖ Tynsong said.

He said the state government had collected information from the other tribal states and come to know that

the Khasis, Jaintias and Garos residing in those states were not allowed to buy land.

The land transfer act allows the sale and transfer of land only among the tribes in the state, including those

who are from other states of the Northeast.

37

―The committee set up yesterday under the initiative of the state revenue department will review the land transfer act to ensure that the three indigenous tribes of Meghalaya are not deprived of their precious land,‖

Tynsong said.

According to the revenue minister, the committee would study the pros and cons of the clauses in the act

aimed at restricting the sale of land among the other 17 tribes.

Tynsong recalled that during the recently concluded Assembly session he had assured the House that the

government was willing to amend the land transfer act so that the rights of the three indigenous tribes were

protected.

―As there is a land scarcity, the concern for us is that by allowing the other tribes to buy and sell land in

Meghalaya, the land rights of the indigenous tribes of the state may be jeopardised,‖ the minister added.‖ 74

―…the legislative assemblies of Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Nagaland today have all but one seat

reserved for STs. In Meghalaya 55 of the 60 seats are reserved for STs…Apart from non-tribals not being

able to contest elections, the principle of one-person, one- vote, one-value has to be undermined as well in

order to achieve such a weighted system of representation.‖ Sanjib Baruah, ―Protective Discrimination and

Crisis of Citizenship in North-East India,‖ Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 38, No. 17 (Apr. 26 - May

2, 2003), p.1624. Even Assam also practices Assamese hegemony. Sanjib Baruah writes regarding Anwara

Taimur, who formed government during Assam movement for a short period, ―…her personal secretariat, it

was reported, had only Muslim gazetted officers or executives. These meas- ures accentuated the

legitimacy crisis in the state, for the process appeared to be one of de-Assamization of the state bureaucracy

and it reinforced the fear of Assamese minoritization, the loss of Assamese hegemony to immigrants. The

election of Taimur to the chief ministry of the state itself had ruptured the subtle rules on ethnic

accommodation in Assam's politics.‖ Sanjib Baruah, Immigration, Ethnic Conflict, and Political Turmoil--

Assam, 1979-1985,‖ Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 11 (Nov., 1986), p.1197. Cf. also, K. N. Deka, "Assam:

The Challenge of Political Integration and Congress Leader- ship," in Iqbal Narain, ed., State Politics in

India (Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1976), pp.34f. 75

This follows from the application, to the situation of North-East, of the thesis advocated by Daniel

Bells‘s The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, 2nd

edn. London:Hrinemann, 1979. The thesis

advocated is the disjunction of two values: on the one hand, there are the ―official‖ values of work, thrift,

and responsibility associated with capitalism; on the other hand, there are the energies and desires released

by a society of mass consumption, in which a hugely increased range of goods and services has become

available to a large proportion of the population. The North-East has the second half without the presence

of the first part of the disjunction. Absent in the North-East is the production side of capitalism which

requires something like the self-restraining character structure of the Weberian work ethics, along with the

differentiated and rationalized social relations that Max Weber had analysed as its mirror and consequence

in his The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism, Trans. T. Parsons, London: Allen and Unwin,

1976. But what reigns supreme in the North-East is the other side of consumption, the value of

untrammeled and self-exceeding selfhood, with its excited intensity and mobility of desire. 76

This follows from the application to North-East of Jean Baudrillard‘s views advocated in the following

three works: ―Consumer society,‖ Trans. J. Mourrain, in M. Poster (ed.) Selected Writings, Cambrdge:

Polity Press, 1970 (1988); For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, Trans. C. Levin, St. Louis:

Telos Press, 1972 (1981); The Mirror of Production, Trans. M. Poster, St. Louis: Telos Press, 1973 (1975). 77

Jean Baudrillard, ―Consumer society,‖ pp. 42ff. 78

Here I have applied to condition of North-East the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of

Practice, Trans. R. Nice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972 (1977), p. 172. 79

Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, p.177. 80

Nothing highlights the irony better than what the then home minister S B Chavan was told by Mizos in

1994 and what they do (or what they do not do). Mizos are reported to have said that "the need for tribal

people is survival as tribal and development is our secondary issue". Jayanta Madhab, ―North-East: Crisis

of Identity, Security and Underdevelopment,‖ Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 6 (Feb. 6-12,

1999), p. 320. And yet it wants the modern products to reach Mizoram through outsider traders. Because of

the contradiction the Mizoram government did not levy sales tax at that time, the most productive of state

taxes. If sales tax is levied, registration certificate will have to be given to outside traders which will enable

them to establish residency. 81

G. Vattimo, The Transparent Society, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992, p. 7.

38

82

G. Vattimo, The End of Modenity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Post-modern Culture, Cambridge:

Polity Press, pp. 158-9. 83

G. Vattimo, The End of Modenity, p. 161. 84

Cf. A. Heller and E. Feher, The Postmodern Political Condition, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988; Z.

Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991; and B.Smart, Postmodernity,

London: Routledge 1993. 85

F. Jameson, Postmodernism Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, London: Verso, 1991, p.36. 86

D. Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, Oxford: Blackwell, 1989, p.201. 87

Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, p.354, emphasis added. 88

Dani Rodrik, ―Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in

Economic Development,‖ Journal of Economic Growth, 9, 2004, pp. 131-165; Douglass C. North,

Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Perfrmance, New York: Cambridge University Press,

(1990); R. Hall and C. I. Jones, ―Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than

Others?‖ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, (1999),pp. 83-116; D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J. A.

Robinson, ―The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Epirical Investigation,‖ American Economic Review, 91, (2001)1369-1401; D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson, ―Reversal of

Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution,‖ Quarterly

Journal of Economics, 117, (2002), 1231-1294; D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J. Robinson, and Y.

Thaicharoen, ―Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth,‖ Journal of

Monetary Economics, 50 (2003) pp.4-123. 89

Hernando de Soto, Finance & Development, March 2001 - The Mystery of Capital (speech to the IMF)

also Hernando de Soto, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World. Harpercollins, 1989;

Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere

Else. Basic Books, 2000.

1

Ethnic and Religious Diversity:

The Unresolved Core Issue of Myanmar

T.T. Haokip

Abstract

The paper attempts to study the ethnic and religious diversity of Myanmar from

the points of view of complex pattern of ethnic distributions, the demands and

aspirations of the minority ethnic groups, the key issues that unites and divides

them and their relationship with the Myanmar government. The paper argues that

the single-minded focus on unseating military regime and restoration of

democracy or the international community‟s engagement with military junta and

National League for Democracy (NLD) without involving the minority ethnic

groups would be politically counterproductive as there is no guarantee that the

decades-old ethnic issues would disappear automatically with the restoration of a

democratic government. The plights and aspirations of the ethnic minorities

should always be part of the solutions. There is a need for a comprehensive

constitution to deal with the complex and multi-faceted minority ethnic issue.

Differences over strategies and goals, lack of inclusive and a united front, mistrust

and rivalry are some of the challenges that are likely to make cooperation among

ethnic minority groups difficult. Burma being a complex mixture of ethnicity,

religion and culture, building a lasting stability needs to be broadly based and

inclusive. So long as the nation-building process in Myanmar is Burman centric

and excludes the rights and aspirations of the ethnic minority groups, ethnic

nationalism would continue to represent a fundamental and intractable obstacle to

peace, development and consolidation of democracy.

Nestling between India and China to the North, Laos and Thailand to the East and

Bangladesh to the West, Myanmar (Burma) Burma1 had never existed as a unified nation-

state until the British annexed it as an Indian province in 1886. Indeed, Burma was built

by default, as the British never thought of incorporating it or establishing governance in

The author is Reader, Department of Political Science, North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong.

2

this geographically and functionally limited state. The territory now known as Burma was

the scene of constant warfare between the Burmans, Shans, Mons, and Arakanese. Yet,

they remain distinct in language, religion, and ecological adaptation.2 The Burmans,

despite their military prowess, failed to establish internal peace and security. While the

British took over the „Burma Proper‟ or „Ministerial Burma‟ (southern parts of the

territory) after the wars in 1824–1826 and 1852, it took over the „Frontier Areas‟3 or

„Scheduled Areas‟ in a war in 1885–1886. This marked the end of Burmese Monarchy,

which served as the head of state as well as the protector of the Buddhist faith. This was a

traumatic experience for the Burmans and unprecedented break with the past.4 While

„Burma Proper,‟ now divided into seven divisions5 was basically populated by the ethnic

Burmans, Arakanese, Mons and Delta Karens, the „Frontier Areas‟ at present divided into

seven states,6 were populated by the Shan people, Salween Karens, Kachins, Karennis,

Chins etc. Thus, the division of Myanmar into 'Ministerial Burma', and 'Frontier Areas'

which is described as 'order without meaning,‟7 separated not only lands but also

separated the Burmans and minority ethnic groups.8 The British colonial administration

categorised the entire population into different ethnic groups and subsequently favoured

one ethno-religious group against another. In the process, these categories became highly

politicised. The British left the Frontier Areas largely untouched, while they deliberately

adopted more intrusive and direct rule in “Ministerial Burma.” Additionally, while the

Act of 1935 enhanced self-government in the heartland, the Frontier area was further sub-

divided into „partially excluded areas‟ with some political rights and „excluded area‟

directly governed by the British governor. The British strategy of creating different

administrative divisions and instituting of different system of laws in order to manage the

ethnic groups of Myanmar set the ethnic groups of Burma on different visions of the

country's future especially on issues relating to political and economic developments.

The colonial state largely brought the ethnic groups into closer contact as well as

aggravated disputes and ethnic differences. Ethnicity and ethnic identity, which was not

paramount in pre-colonial Burma9 amplified and probably saw greater hardening of

divisions between the majority Burmans and ethnic groups under the colonial rule.10

The

process of assimilation of Arakanese and Mon into the dominant Burman culture

intensified during the colonial period.11

The recruitment of Kachin, Karen and Chin to the

3

colonial army resulted in establishing ethnically segregated units.12

Representing roughly

13 percent of the population, the Karen, Kachin and Chin ethnic groups accounted for 83

percent of the armed forces of Myanmar/Burma in 1931. The recognition of Shans in

Myanmar as a special group, frequent conversion of Chins, Kachins and Karens to

Christianity further created a gap between them and the Buddhist majority in the valley.13

The Japanese occupation not only resulted in the collapse of the political system of the

pre-war era but also militarised the Burman national movement and further polarised the

ethnic relations.14

Communal clashes erupted between Burman-dominated Burma

Independent Army (BIA) and Karen15

as well as Buddhist Arakanese and Muslim

Rohingyas in Arakan. In Shan state, the Sawbwas16

swore allegiance directly to the

Japanese rather than to the BIA.17

Contrary to the widespread expectation that independence and transition to

democracy18

would usher in ethnic harmony and political stability, a number of

insurgencies wracked the Union of Burma within six months of its independence. The

politicisation of ethnic identities that began during the colonial period resulted in

widening the socio-economic gaps, power disparities, competition for control over

territory and resources in the post-independence period of Myanmar. Increasing assertion

of the Burman majority group that progressively shut one door of privilege after another

on minority ethnic groups has led to the emergence of ethno-nationalist movements in

Burma. It was this mono-ethnic character of state and its policy of assimilation that have

determined the character of the ensuing politics in Burma.19

The Burman-dominated

military that took power in 1958 and again in 1962 and 1988 have closely followed the

ethnocentric basis for government policies.20

The impressive and unique diversity of

Myanmar capable of contributing to the enrichment of composite culture has been the

main source of conflict. The multiple and culturally rich ethnic identities are in conflict

with not only the state of Myanmar but also with each other. Nevertheless, the underlying

current of all the ethnic movements in Myanmar is that of wide spread dissatisfaction

with the existing set up and a deep urge for recognition of their identity, autonomy and

freedom.

4

Myanmar (Burma) is home to a large number of ethnic groups broadly divided into

Burmans and minority ethnic groups. Myanmar represents a society deeply fragmented

along ethnic line.21

While one survey has claimed 242 different languages and dialects,

another source claims 172 communities.22

Myanmar has been labeled “complex-

complex" because of its diverse ethnographic landscape. There is no reliable data on

Burma‟s ethnic groups, although one recent source of military regime claims 135

„national races‟ or „ethnic groups‟ in Myanmar.23

Demographically, the Burmans make

up approximately 60 per cent of Myanmar‟s 50 plus million populations, while the

remaining 40 percent of the population constitutes the ethnic minority groups who

occupied about one-half of the country‟s territory.

Predominantly Buddhists, the Burmans or Bamars are the largest ethnic group

concentrating on either side of the Irrawaddy in Central Burma. The Burman kings in the

past also annexed Ka-the (Assam and Manipur), Zin Mae State now part of Thailand) and

Lin Zin State (now Laos). The ethnic Burmans who spearheaded the nationalist

movement portrayed the independent state of Burma as successor to the Burman

dynasties of the past. The mono-ethnic character of state has determined the character of

the ensuing politics in Burma.

The Chins24

are the most diverse ethnic group inhabiting one of the most impoverished

regions of Myanmar. The entire Chin Hills was declared a „backward tract‟ under the

Government of India Act 1919 and „Excluded Areas‟ outside the control of Ministerial

Burma by the Act of 1935. During the British rule, many Chins who converted to

Christianity had remained loyal to the British. Consequently, the introduction of

education, improvement of communications and the growth of churches contributed to

the emergence of Chin identity. The Chin Hills Union Organisation formed in 1928 was

the first expression of Chin nationalism. The educated Chins also formed the Chin

Leaders‟ Freedom League to look after the interests of the local Chins from the

oppression of the Japanese. It was only in 1974 that the mountainous 36,019 square km

'Chin Special Division‟‟25

bordering Bangladesh and India had been upgraded into a Chin

state. There are approximately 1, 00,000 Chin refugees in Mizoram.

5

The Chinese, although historically they have lived in several parts of northeast Burma,

have been, granted a „kokang‟ or „national race‟ status only in the former Kokang sub-

state. The Chinese influence in Burma dates back to 1287. Chinese is the lingua franca in

many areas near the Chinese border in the Shan state. By 1931, the Chinese along with

Indians probably accounted for over ten per cent of the total population. The predominant

role played by the Chinese in business had put them in an ambiguous position as over

100,000 Chinese, most with more or less just the clothes on their back left Burma after

Ne win seized power in 1962. Eventually, in mid-1967, an anti-Chinese riot that broke

out in towns across Burma killed hundreds of Chinese.26

Consequently, the relations

between China and Burma took a nosedive and between 1968 and 1973, China provided

military support to Communist party of Burma (CPB), Kachin, Shan, and Naga

insurgents to fight the military junta. The 1988 democracy movements both in China and

in Myanmar generated some kindred spirit. Ever since then, the Chinese have used the

geophysical advantage to gain excess to Myanmar‟s mineral and natural gas resources. In

order to checkmate China‟s influence over Burma, India, which has followed pro-

democracy movement policy, started to follow the policy of „Constructive Engagements‟

with Burma since 1993. The military regime in Burma is using the competing interests of

India and China to its own advantage. There are estimated 400,000 Chinese living in

Burma today.27

Known as „kala‟ (foreigner), the Indian population in Burma before the Second World

War was estimated at over one million. Approximately forty five per cent of Rangoon‟s

population was Indian. The Indian influence in Burma, unlike China is recent and

confined only to the north-west frontier and the western seaboard. Large number of

Indians along with Europeans, Eurasians, and Chinese took up administrative posts for

which no trained Burmans were available. This happened in all aspects of economic life

apart from agriculture.28

The Burmans who were driven out from the towns restricted

their economic activities to agriculture. Therefore, the Indians have often been the targets

of anti-colonial resentments29

since the colonial time. The presence of a large Indian

population led to a strong and persistent Burmese prejudice against Indians at the

economic, political, religious, and racial levels.30

Many Indian fled to India between 1930

and 1967. They lost the dominant position they held once in various fields and are little

6

recognized nationality in Burma today.31

The Indians, who are barred from studying

professional subjects, constitute one of the poorest rural and urban workers in the

country.

The Kachin,32

along with Shans and Burmans form the majority population of the

Kachin state. The military prowess of the Kachins was well known as the Kachin units

serving under the British in both the World Wars earned the tag “the Gurkhas of

Southeast Asia". The 89,041 square km Kachin state was created under the 1947

constitution with the right of cession after a ten-year trial period. However, frustration

and resentment at the neglect of the Kachin region burst into open by early 1960s, when

U Nu tried to impose Buddhism as state religion. With the formation of Kachin

Independence Organization (KIO) in 1961, the Kachin people demanded complete

secession from the Union of Burma. However, in 1976 the KIO changed its policy from

secession to the creation of a federal Union of Burma and began to work in tandem with

other ethnic groups. The KIO became not only a founding member of the Democratic

Alliance of Burma but also provided arms and training to many smaller ethnic groups

both within and outside Burma. The Kachins, however, had paid a heavy price for their

determined opposition to central government rule. Since the early 1960s, a ruthless

„scorched earth‟ policy under the „Four Cuts‟33

campaigned has been used to cut off KIO

support.

The Karens lives in the valleys and hills straddling the Burma-Thailand border. The

term Karen is said to be a derogatory invention of the Burmese, which was only given

respectability by Christian missionaries in the nineteenth century. While anthropologists

estimate their population to be around four million in Burma and 200,000 in Thailand, the

military regime claims them to be just over 2.5 million. The Karen National Union

(KNU) claims that there are over seven million Karens. In addition, their complex spread

and the growing numbers of Karen who speak only Burmese further exacerbated problem

of identification. They are the largest non-Burman nationality comprising more than 10

percent of Burma's population. The identification of the Karens with the Baptists and the

British colonials widened further the gulf between the Karens and the Burmans.34

Of all

the ethnic nationalities, the Karens suffered most, being at the mercy of the ethnic

7

Burmans in the delta. San C Po, the widely respected „father of the Karen nation‟ in

1928, made the first call for an independent Karen state. The British placed some Karen

territory within Ministerial Burma and some within the Frontier Areas. In addition, many

Karens were killed, injured or arrested as „collaborators‟ with the British by their Burman

neighbours, leaving a legacy of bitterness and distrust between the two communities even

today. Following the formation of Karen National Union (KNU) in 1947, the Karen

leaders boycotted the Panglong Conference and the 1947 Constituency Assembly.

Consequently, the KNU declared to the world the formation of „Kawthoolei‟ in 1949.

The Karennis are a sub-tribe of Karens with a distinct set of local characteristics in

their languages, dress, customs, and mores. Their close proximity to the Shans influenced

their pattern of tribal organization and the names they adopted for their petty chieftains.

The Karenni state (renamed as Kayah state in 1952) is situated on the Thai-Burma

border. More than 75 per cent of them are Christians, predominantly Baptist and

Catholics. Karenni leaders claim ancient traditions of independence. The 1875 treaty with

the Burmese king Mindon officially acknowledged the independence of the western

Karenni region, which remained unchanged throughout the period. Indeed, maps of

Indian empire always marked the Karenni state as outside British Burma. The Karenni

state was granted the right of secession after a ten-year trial period under the 1947

Constitution. However, the assassination of the Karenni leader, U Bee Htu Re by the

government police in August 1948 led to armed violence in 1948. The renaming of

Karenni as „Kayah‟ by the government of Burma in 1952 was to make a divisive

distinction between the Karenni and Karen to get rid of a name synonymous with Karenni

independence. Subsequently, the legal right of secession too had been written out

altogether in the 1974 amended constitution. The attempts of the government to crush the

Karenni political movement under the „Four Cuts‟ campaign has led many Karennis

displaced from their homes. The Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) formed in

1957, the Karenni Nationalities People‟s Liberation Front and Kayan New land Party

have signed cease-fires with the central government.

The term Kuki,35

refers to an ethnic nationality, straddling the mountainous borders of

Burma, India, and Bangladesh. In India, they live in the states of Manipur, Assam,

8

Tripura, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Meghalaya. In Burma, their main concentration is in

Sagaing Subdivision. In Bangladesh, they are mostly found in Chittagong Hill Tracts.

They fought against the British from 1917-1919 for the preservation and protection of

their independence, land, culture and tradition.36

However, the separation of Burma from

India in 1937 divided the Kuki people. Nevertheless, the Kukis in western region joined

the Indian National Army (INA) and those from the eastern region with Aung San to

fight on the side of Japanese against the British during the Second World War. There are

more than 100 Kukis in the list of INA pensioners.37

The Kukis who featured both in the

World Wars became separated into India, Burma, and Pakistan without their consent. In

India, the Kuki National Assembly (KNA) formed in 1946, demanded sovereignty for the

Kukis. In Burma, the Kukis did not sign the widely- acclaimed 1947 Panglong

Agreement. An estimated 30,000 to 35, 000 Kukis fled Burma between 1962 and 1969.

The Kuki National Organization (KNO),38

which has entered into a cease-fire agreement

with Indian government, has been fighting for the creation of two separate Kuki states,

one each in Burma and India.39

The ethnic Burman populations, extricated mainly from

Rangoon and Mandalay, have been transplanted to the Kuki areas with a view to

rendering the indigenous people a minority. The Kuki Students Democratic Front

(KSDF), Kuki Women Human Rights Organization (KWHRO), and Kuki People's

Congress (KPC) seeks to protect the rights of the Kukis in Burma.

Known as brave people and as a nation of great hunters, the Lahus are of Tibeto-

Burman stock predominantly settled in Shan state. It is said that they came from

Southwestern China and Mongolia to Shan state centuries back. The Lahu people in

China call themselves as La Ho Ya. Every Lahu song ends with "Lahu...o...Ve", which

means "Dear Lahu". The Shans and Karens call them Muhso, Musho, or Meuseu.

However, the Lahu people preferred to call themselves Laho and not Lahu.The current

populations of the Lahu, according to one Lahu source estimates that there are 500,000 in

Yunnan Province near the Burma border, 400,000 in Burma and 100,000 in Thailand

while there are approximately 3000 Lahu refugees in USA. The Lahu Democratic Front

(LDF), a member of the Federation of Ethnic Nationalities of Burma (FENB),40

continues

to fight against the military regime. The goals of FENB are to achieve statehood for all

9

the unrepresented nationalities of Burma, and setting up of a Union of Democratic

Burma.

Mostly concentrated around Mandalay, there are approximately 40,000 Meiteis in

Myanmar. Many believed that they were taken to Myanmar as war captives by the

powerful army of Ava 200 years ago when it invaded and occupied Manipur. Of these,

3000 Brahmins who came to be referred to as Paona community have maintained Meitei

identity even after two centuries of separation with their ancestral territory, Manipur.

While the Bamons have fought on to remain distinct by refusing to intermarry, refusing

to give up their Hindu faith, refusing to eat meat, retaining their Hindu names,

maintaining typical Meitei-Bamon home facing the east, the non-Bamon Meiteis who

were more warlike gradually have come to be merged to the sea of Myanmarese all

around. One reason was that since the non-Bamans were more warlike, pressures for

them to conform to the Ava society and culture were much greater than that of the

Brahamins who did not suffer from any prosecution or overbearing vigilance under the

Ava kings. Nevertheless, the Bamons are also not completely free from the influence of

Burman culture as they maintain official Myanmarese names apart from making their

Meitei names a ritualistic compulsion. The Meitei-Bamon community in Myanmar would

have remained much bigger if not for the puritanical manner they have been maintaining

the purity of bloodline. Anybody who marries outside the community, girl or boy, is

excommunicated and outcast. The community has shrunk because of this, but this has

kept their identity intact. However, this has given rise to certain foreseeable problems.

Since Meitei custom forbids intermarriage between anybody within seven generations of

blood kinship, many people have chosen to remain single rather than marry outside the

community and give up their Meitei identity. Today Meitei language is the common

lingua franca at Nampalong market, the main trading centre situated inside Myanmar‟s

territory. Meitei militants are operating from Myanmar waging relentless wars against

India.

Predominantly Buddhists, the Mon were the earliest settlers of the valley and the first

to adopt Buddhist civilization, and adapted Indian laws to their local needs. Recognized

as highly cultured people, the Mon kings once ruled over much of the Lower Burma and

10

felt culturally superior to the Burmans. After the fall of Pegu in 1775, the Mons migrated

to other areas of Burma and Thailand. There was a long history of conflict between the

Burmans and the Mons. The British by encouraging the mass Burman immigration into

Mon territory and the choice of Burmese as the language of government further

accelerated the assimilation of Mon communities. However, Mon identity persisted and

the existence of a separate kingdom in the past provides the basis for the aspirations of

more autonomous state.41

It was only in the 1930s that revival of Mon cultural and

political movement again took place in the coastal plain around Moulmein and Ye. The

New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Mon National Democratic Front (MNDF) are the

two-armed groups of the Mons. The political demand of the Mon people for separate

state that began in 1948 was ignored until 1974 when a 12,295 square km Mon state was

formally created.

The Nagas live along Sagaing division and Kachin state in Burma and the states of

Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh in India. The Naga Hills Progressive

Party that won a seat in the 1990 election is the political party of the Nagas in Burma.

Traditionally headhunters and fierce warriors, today a great number of Nagas are

Christians, for the most part Baptists. Established in 1946, the Naga National Council

(NNC) demanded separation from India in June 1947 and declared independence on 14

August 1947, a day before India became independent. A plebiscite held on 16 May 1951

favoured the constitution of a sovereign Nagaland. The NNC under the leadership of

A.Z.Phizo began to achieve their goal through armed revolution and violent means since

1953.42

The Indian government conferred full-fledged statehood to Nagaland in

December 1961. The first cease-fire agreement with Naga Federal Government (NFG)

and India, which took effect on September 6, 1964 led to a truce without a political

settlement. In 1978, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) came into

existence following the major split of NNC. The NSCN again split into two factions in

1988: one led by Thuingaleng Muivah from Manipur and the other by S.S Khaplang from

Burma. Currently both the factions of NSCN have brokered ceasefire deals with the

Indian government since 1997. The core issue,43

at present is the integration of Naga

inhabited areas, which have been strongly opposed by the neighboring states of

11

Nagaland. Without doubt, unless all the Naga insurgent groups are involved in the peace

process, permanent peace would not return to Nagaland and Naga areas.

The Palaung are predominantly Buddhists with less than ten percent animists and

Christians. In the pre-colonial period, their own hereditary Prince ruled them. At times,

they were dominated by the Burmans and were forced to pay tributes. The atrocities

committed against the Palaung people by the Burman Army after 1962 resulted in the

formation of the Palaung National Front (PNF) in 1963. Thus, the Palaung people began

an armed movement. However, the Palaung State Liberation Party (PSLP) and its armed

wing, the Palaung State Liberation Army (PSLA) reached a cease-fire agreement with the

Burmese government in 1991 so as to avoid the sufferings of the Palaung people at the

hands of Burmese military regime. The government's refusal to arrive at a political

settlement led the Palaung leaders to form the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) in

1992 with the main objective of achieving a Palaung state and setting up of a genuine

democratic union of Burma.

Predominantly Buddhist, the Pa-O,44

forms the second largest ethnic groups in Shan

State with a population of 60,0000. Believed to be of Tibeto-Burman, and ethno-

linguistically related to the Karen, the Pa-Os settled in the Thaton region around 100 BC.

The Pa-Os are also known as Taungthu and Black Karen. The Pa-O derives their name

from the vernacular word Pa-U, which means being helped during birth. They are the

distant cousins of the Karens, although they are classified as part of the Shan National

race by the government. They are one of the well-organized and politically advanced

ethnic groups of Burma. They traditionally resisted the Shan domination and were one of

the important political forces in the politics of Shan State who objected to the

continuance of Sawbwa rule. The Pao leaders operated politically at two levels. At one

level, they formed the United National Pa-O Organization (UNPO) and strived for the

establishment of an autonomous state either within or outside of Burma. At another level,

they revolted against the Union government and cooperated with the Karens, the

communists and various revolutionary groups. The Pa-O People's Liberation

Organization (PPLO) is continuing the armed struggle against the military regime.

12

Ethnic Rakhine (Buddhist Arakanese) and Rohingyas (Muslim Arakanese) mostly

inhabit the Rakhine state, formerly known as the Arakan. The Arakans and Burmans

share many similarities in terms of culture and language. Many historians believed that

the Arakanese were part of the Burman immigrations but separated and settled in an area

that came to be known as Arakan.45

The Arakanese kingdom ended when the Burmans

defeated them in 1785.46

Consequently, many Arakanese were forced to leave their lands

and settled in Proper Burma where they were assimilated and integrated into Burman

society. However, there were anti-Burman sentiments among many Arakans who

continued to live in the depopulated area of Arakan and across India. The political

manifestations of the Arakanese have appeared to be largely the result of what they call

"AFPFL imperialism".47

It was only in 1974 that the 36,778 square km Rakhine state

created with its capital at Sittwe, although demands for greater autonomy began in the

late 1940s. Arakan which was one of the most prosperous areas of Burma during the

colonial period, is today one of the poorest regions of Burma. The Military regime also

rejected the use of the term „Rohingya‟ for Arakan Muslims, although successive

Burmese governments in the 1950s and 1960s accepted it.

The ethnic Shans comprise 7 to 8 percent of the country's populations. An important

Shan kingdom called Mao existed during the seventh century.48

The Shans attempted to

fill the power vacuum when the Burman Empire at Pagan crumbled and fell in 1227.

However, the Burmans under the new line of aggressive kings conquered the quarreling

Shans. Consequently, the Shan chiefs were allowed to rule their areas as feudatories of

the Burmans until 1885.The Federated Shan States (over 30 in number) was established

in the Shan State from 1922 to 1935.49

The British introduced neither Western democratic

institution nor did they make any serious attempt to modify the almost absolute character

of the chiefs‟ authority. Instead, the British took steps to restrict the contacts between the

Shan States and Burma Proper. The Shans agreed to join with the Burmans in forming an

independent state at Panglong and participated in the drafting of the Constitution. Indeed,

one of their delegates served as the second President of the Constituent Assembly who

later on was elected as the first President of Burma. The 1947 Constitution created the

155,801 square km Shan state.

13

The Wa people are of Mon-Khmer group, who resisted the British and Japanese forces.

They had never been brought under a common polity with the valley, although the Shan

chiefs before Burma‟s independence governed them. In the final annexation of Burma in

1885, the Wa area was classified as un-administered territory. The Wa territory was

divided between British and Burma following the signing of two border agreements in

1892 and 1941. Finally, Burma and China demarcated the boundary in the late 1960s

leading to the division of some Wa areas between China and Burma. The Wa people

under the leadership of Mr. Maha Sang

50 formed the Wa National Organization (WNO)

and its armed wing, the Wa National Army (WNA) in 1974. They have been fighting for

a Wa state and a democratic federal union of Burma. Other ethnic groups of Burma

include the Akha, Danu, Intha, and Moken,51

or Burma's Sea Gypsies and a host of

others, each with their own history, language, customs, and dress.

Burma represents a society deeply fragmented along religious line. Besides the

Theravada Buddhism shared by the majority Burmans and other ethnic groups such as

Rakhines, Shans and Karens, there are substantial number of Christians, Hindus, Muslims

and Animists. While the Buddhists constitute approximately 84 percent, Christians

around 4 percent of which 3 percent are Baptist, the Roman Catholics 1 percent, Muslims

account for 4 percent while others 3 percent. Christianity is more often than not identified

with the minority ethnic groups. Hinduism is mainly associated with Indians who came to

Myanmar during the British rule. The Indians whether Hindus or Muslims are still

considered as „kala‟ or foreigner even though they are largely the offspring of older

generations. Burma, which in theory was created as an inclusive secular state, in reality,

became a mono-ethnic Burman-centric state with Buddhism as the state‟s majority

religion. Unlike Aung San who sidestepped the religious and collateral Burman claims to

superiority, U Nu and the successive leaders of Myanmar lacked the vision and capacity

to carry the ethnic accord forward. Although U Nu immersed in politics, his heart was

with religion.52

The religious minorities strongly opposed when U Nu proposed a Union

based in part on Buddhism as the state religion in 1960. The proposal was seen as

violation of the essence of the Panglong Agreement, which guaranteed full autonomy in

internal administration, enjoyment of democratic rights, financial support, and economic

equality for the Frontier Areas. The ethnic minorities also viewed the state religious bill

14

not only as religious issue, but also as a constitutional problem, in that this had been

allowed to happen. The religious policies sparked off discontentment among the non-

Burman ethnic groups.

While the central part of Myanmar enjoys religious freedom, there has been

discrimination against Christians and Muslims in minority areas. The construction of

Buddhist structures in ethnic minority areas and restrictions on construction of new

churches particularly in Chin and Kachin states since 1988 has been seen by the ethnic

minorities as attempts to destroy their religion and displace them from their ancestral

lands. Burman nationalism also engages Buddhism in proactive tribal mission work

where Christianity had a long dominant presence. During 1991, Islamic schools in

northern Rakhine State had been closed. Further, serious accusations of religious

harassment have been made by Christian clerics in several areas, especially in the Kayah,

Karen, Kachin, Shan States and in the Delta region. Another alarming reports concern the

arrest and alleged extrajudicial executions of a number of Christian pastors and teachers

by the military regime. The military regime is also accused of exploiting religious

differences to divide the ethnic groups. The distribution of anti-Muslim literature in Shan

state in 1996, the anti-Muslim riots in Taunggyi and Prome during the pro-democracy

movement in 1988 and the tensions between the Muslims and Buddhists in the capital of

Rakhine state are believed to have been engineered by the military regime to stir up

religious and racial tensions for its own benefit. Thus, continued emphasis on religiously

oriented nationalism with close ties to Buddhism and Burman culture as the basis for

Myanmar‟s national identity in contrast with modernist and secularly oriented

nationalism challenge the notion that the populations of Burma share a common national

identity. It was this mono-ethnic character of state and its policy of assimilation that have

determined the character of the ensuing politics in Burma.53

Myanmar defined as a

secular inclusive nation state at independence failed to evolve as an inclusive secular

state as the ethnic Burmans portrayed the state of Myanmar as successor to the Burman

dynasties of the past. The non-Burman ethnic nationalities have been excluded from full

membership of the state and thence the nation.

15

The ethnic issue in Myanmar is complex and multi-faceted since most of the states and

divisions are multi-ethnic in composition. The Chinese are found in Kachin, Shan and

Wa inhabited regions. There are about 100,000 Kachins living in northern Shan state,

where they continue to identify themselves closely with Kachin political movement. The

Karens live throughout much of the Lower Burma, from the Arakan Yoma and Delta

region to the Shan state, and throughout the western Thai border region to the Tenasserim

Division. There are over 1 million Karens in the Irrawaddy delta, where they enjoy no

ethno-political recognition. There are also a small Buddhist Shan population and a

number of ethnic Burman immigrants in the Karenni state. Mon State‟s population also

includes other non-Mon ethnic groups such Karen, Pa-oh, and Burman. Besides, the

Arakans and Rohingyas, there are substantial population of Mro, Kuki, Chin, and other

hill peoples in Rakhine state. In addition to the Shans, there are Pa-Os, Kachins,

Burmans, Indians, Was, Lahus and a host of others in the Shan state. Pa-Os are also

found in Karen State, Karenni State and Mon State. The Kukis, Chins, Nagas, Meiteis are

also found in India‟s northeast. More than one million Palaungs are estimated to live in

the northwestern part of Shan state. Additionally, there are conflicting views about the

collective names for some ethnic groups as many ethnic sub-groups have asserted their

separate identities. It is very difficult to estimate the total numbers of the ethnic groups

and sub-ethnic groups. Several ethnic groups are represented by more than one

organization. Thus, the clan-based loyalty combined with complex pattern of distribution

make efforts to delimit an ethnic group area difficult. There is a need for a comprehensive

constitution to deal with ethnic diversity. This clearly points to the need for importance of

coherence and consistency in addressing the ethnic issues.

The ethnic groups have accused the successive Burman-dominated governments of

advocating the policy of “Burmanisation” as against the Panglong Agreement of 1947.

The ethnic minorities feel that they are marginalised not only economically, but also that

the Burman-dominated government is suppressing their social, cultural, and religious

rights. Majority of the ethnic groups who originally fought for independence seems to

have accepted the Union of Myanmar. Development of their regions and the right to

maintain and practice their language, culture and religion without constraints appears to

be the major concern of the ethnic groups.

16

The government has identified 17 ceasefire groups, which include major armed groups.

The only significant groups, which continue armed struggle, are the Karen National

Union (KNU), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the Shan State Army

(South). Other smaller non-ceasefire groups include the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP),

the Lahu Democratic Front (LDF), the Wa National Army (WNA), the Arakan Rohingya

National Organisation (ARNO), the National United Party of Arakan (NUPA), the Chin

National Front (CNF) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN). While the

government used the ceasefire groups against the non-ceasefire groups, the politics of

ceasefire have also failed to create a common front against the government as it caused

serious rift and conflicts among the key ethnic organisations. The cease-fire agreements

promised a process of economic development and political dialogue. Yet, it has only

brought little of the promised economic benefits. Nevertheless, Burma cannot

underestimate is the presence of several ethnic groups on both sides of its 4,016-mile-

long land border. Cross-border political movements represent the Kuki-Chin-Mizo and

Naga living in Indo-Myanmar border. Similarly, there are Kachin, Wa and Shan in China;

Karen, Mon and Shan in Thailand; Rakhine and Rohingya Muslims in Bangladesh. The

Lahu, Akha and Lisu are even divided across four modern-day borders, being split

between Burma, China, Laos and Thailand. The importance of inter-ethnic ties and its

consequences on Myanmar should not be underestimated.

The minority ethnic groups are yet to have an inclusive and a united front to influence

the national politics. The politics of ceasefire have caused conflicts between the ceasefire

and non-ceasefire groups as both the groups have suffered from factions breaking away

to establish ceasefires or to continue armed struggles. The Democratic Karen Buddhist

Army (DKBA), which broke away from the predominantly Christian KNU leadership

accepted material support from the Myanmar government in return for help against KNU

strongholds. Ceasefire groups especially the smaller armed groups have become

government militia or border police forces. The Myanmar army has launched several

major campaigns against the Shan State Army (South) with the cooperation of the United

Wa State Army (UWSA). It has also caused a serious rift between key organisations such

as the KNU and the KIO. While KIO aims at finding a peaceful settlement of the conflict

through negotiation, KNU and other ethnic groups wanted to find a political solution

17

before entering into ceasefire. Strategic differences have caused tensions and mistrust

among former allies, which is likely to make cooperation among ethnic minority

organisations difficult. The development of ethnocentric identities divides the minorities

from each other. The army in some cases has deliberately played minority groups against

each other. Control over territory and resources particularly the narcotic trade have led to

conflicts among different armed groups to the extent of aligning with the Myanmar

military. The limited political space under a centralized military regime and much

historic hostility and distrust, not only towards the government, but also towards other

ethnic groups and even within each group still remains. Politically, the ethnic groups are

divided over goals, strategy, and other issues, and are yet to have a truly effective

nationwide or broadly inclusive front. Despite differences and divergent goals, the ethnic

minorities share many grievances and aspirations. The challenge lies in building a

broadly inclusive, nationwide platform, open to all ethnic minority organisations

regardless of goals, strategy, race and religion.

Ethnicity and ethnic identity, which was not paramount in pre-colonial Burma became

politicised during the colonial period and nationalist movement. The myopic

management of ethnic issues in the post-independence period resulted in widening the

socio-economic gaps, power disparities, competition for control over resources and

territory. The ethnic policies of Myanmar with respect to religion, language,

historiography, curriculum and mono-ethnic ideology reinforce and intensify perceptions

of ethnic discrimination and ethnic nationalism. The minority ethnic groups depict

ethnicity as the alternative imagined kinship community as they consider the ethnic

policies of Myanmar as the source of social disruption, inequity, insecurity and not the

agent of equitable development.

The mono-ethnic character of Myanmar and its policy of assimilation that closes one

door of privilege after another on ethnic minority groups continue to dominate the

politics of Burma. As a result, the multiple and culturally rich ethnic identities capable of

contributing to the enrichment of composite culture are in conflict with the state of

Myanmar. Further, the change of name from Burma to Myanmar and holding of national

referendum on the 194-page draft constitution published only in Burmese and English on

18

May 10, 2008 without debates and discussion have once again shown that Myanmar has

no respect for non-Burman cultures, languages, and political aspirations. The

development of ethnocentric identities and the politics of ceasefire agreement divide the

ethnic minorities from each other. Thus, conflicts in Myanmar are not only political but

also ethnical as well. The single-minded focus on unseating military regimes and

restoration of democracy is likely to be politically counterproductive for the minority

ethnic groups as there is no guarantee that the other decades-old ethnic issues will

disappear automatically. Only restoring democracy is unlikely to restore the trust and

confidence of the overwhelming ethnic minority population, which constitutes a little less

than 40 percent of the country's total population but occupies more than two-thirds of the

land. The International community‟s engagement should not be just with the military

junta and the main political opposition groups including the NLD, but also with the

ethnic groups. The plights and aspirations of ethnic minorities should always be part of

the solutions. Any strategies for change must take into account the nature, demands and

aspirations of ethnic minority groups. Nation building in Myanmar requires, among

others, the recognition of its ethnic and religious diversity.

Notes

1 The terms „Myanmar‟ and „Burma‟ are used interchangeably throughout this paper without

attaching any political significance to the use of the term.

2. Leach, E.R (1960): “The Frontier of Burma”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 3,

1.Oct, pp.64-5 3 The terms „ministerial‟ and „frontier‟ have not been used since the September 1974

Constitution.

4. Suu Kyi, Aung San (1990): Burma and India, Delhi: Allied Publishers, p.13. 5 The seven divisions of Burma are Sagaing (93,527 sq. miles), Mandalay (37,023 sq. miles),

Magwe(17,306 sq. miles), Bago(39,404 sq. miles), Ayeyarwady(13,566 sq. miles), Yangon

(10,170 sq. miles) and Taninthayi(43,328 sq. miles).

6 .The seven states of Burma are Kachin (34,379 square miles), Chin (13,907 square miles) Shan

(60,155 square miles), Rakhine (14,200 square miles) Karenni/Kayah (4,530 square miles),

Karen/ Kayin (11,731 square miles) and Mon (4,747.8 square miles). 7. Aung-Thwin, Michael (1985): "British 'Pacification' of Burma: Order without Meaning"

Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, (September), p.245. 8 The term 'minority ethnic groups‟, is used here to denote the ethnic nationalities of Burma other

than the ethnic Burmans. Majority of the non-Burmans have used 'ethnic minorities' to refer

themselves collectively.

19

9 Tambiah, Stanley J. (1976): World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A study of Buddhism and

Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background, New York: Cambridge University press,

pp.102-131; Victor.B. Liberman (1978): “Ethnic politics in eighteenth-century Burma,” Modern

Asian Studies 12:3. 455-482. 10

. Seth, Andrew (1986): “Race and Resistance in Burma: 1942-1945”, Modern Asian Studies Vol.

20. No.33, p.484 11.

Taylor, Robert H (1987): The State in Burma, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp.91-8. 12

. This was in complete contrast to the prevailing practices in pre-colonial Myanmar, which was

hardly defined in terms of ethnicity. 13

. The Burman nationalists regarded Christianity as one of the divisive elements. 14.

Cady, John F (1958): A History of Modern Burma, N.Y: Cornell University Press, p.443. 15.

Smith, Martin (1991): Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, London: Zed Books,

p.62 16

Sawbwas were the princely rulers of Shans and Karens. They were allowed to retain their

quasi-feudal powers under the 1947 constitution of Burma. For further analysis of the 1947

Constitution, See, Gledhill, Alan (1956): “The Burmese Constitution,” The Indian Yearbook in

International Affairs, Madras: University of Madras, pp.214-224; Maung Maung (1961): Burma’s

Constitution, The Hague: Martinis Nijhoff. 17.

Smith, Martin, 1991, Op.cit. p64. 18

For details on consequences of democratisation on ethnic relations of Burma, See, Haokip, T.T

(2006): “Democratisation and Ethnic Relations: A study of Burma (1948-1962)” submitted to

Social Science Research Council South Asia Regional Fellowship Programme, New York on the

„Long‟ 1950s.

19. Silverstein, Josef (1960): The Struggle for National Unity in the Union of Burma, Cornell

University, P.36 20

For further details, Haokip, T.T. and Shah, Sayed Wiqar Ali (2007): “Collaborative Research:

Ethnic Mapping and Ethnic Nationalism: A comparative study of Pakistan and Myanmar"

submitted to Social Science Research Council South Asia Regional Fellowship Programme, New

York.

21.The Census of Burma 1872, (Rangoon: Government Printing Press, 1872),p.27.

22.For a scholar study of this issue, See, P. Kumstadter (1967): Southeast Asian Tribes,

Minorities and Nations, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

23. U Ohn Gaw, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Myanmar, in his address to the UN General

Assembly on 27 September, 1996, Burma Debate, Sep-Oct.(1996),p.8. 24

Different scholars have given different meanings of Chin. For details, See, H.G. Luce, „Chin

Hills-Linguistic Tour (Dcem.1954) University Project‟, Journal of Burma Research Society

(JBRS),42. 1 (1959): P.26; Bertram S. Carey, & H.N, Tuck, The Chin Hills, Vol.1, (Calcutta:

1932), p.3 ; Pum Khan Pao, „The Chins and the British (1835-1935)‟, (Ph.D. Diss., North-Eastern

Hill University, Shillong, 2006),p. 254; Stephen Khup Cin Pau, “A New Chin Paradigm,” The

Chin Forum Magazine, 1998-200, P.65; Sing Khaw Khai, Zo People and their Culture, 1995;

Kenneth Van Bik, „In search of the origin of the names: Kuki-Chin‟.

http:/www.lairoham.de/Kuki_Chin.htm.

25. The Special Division of the Chins was different from the other states in that there was no head

of state; the Council has no legislative powers and Minister for Chin Affairs was in charge of the

Chin General administration.

26. Smith, Martin, 1991, Op.cit. pp.224-7.

27. Smith,Martin (1992): „Burma Myanmar‟, The Chinese of South East Asia London: Minority

Rights Group, pp.32-3.

28. J.S. Furnivall,(1953):Far Eastern Survey, 22,3. P.22.

20

29. For more details, See, Lintner Bertil (1992): “Burma and Its Neighbors”, China Report: New

Delhi: Sage Publication, New Delhi, 1992.

30. Steinberg, David (1983): „Myanmar as Nexus: Sino-Indian Rivalries on the Frontier‟, Studies

in Conflict and Terrorism, 16, 1, P.3.

31. For the detailed discussion on the stateless persons of Indian origin in Burma, See,

Chakravarty, Nalini (1971)The Indian Minority in Burma: The Rise and Decline of an Immigrant

Community, London: London University Press.

32. It is estimated that over 10 percent Kachins had been internally displaced or refugees, while

over 30,000 Kachins lost lives at the hands of government. For further details, See, „The war on

Kachin forests‟, The Irrawaddy, 9, 8 (2001).

33. The strategy known as “Four Cuts‟ (Pya ley Pya), similar in concept to the „Strategic Hamlet‟

operation of the USA in Vietnam is to cut off the four main links- of food, finance, intelligence

and recruits between the civilians and the armed forces.

34. Aitcheson,C.U (1892): A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India

and Neighboring Countries, Calcutta: p.263. Also See, Marshall Harry Ignatius(1997): The Karen

People of Burma: A Study in Anthropology and Ethnology, (White Lotus Press, (Reprint). It is a

classical anthropological monograph written 80 years ago but remains a significant ethnographic

study.

35.The Kukis are found in India, Burma and Bangladesh having their own history, language,

culture, and tradition. For further details, See, Haokip, P.S(1998): Zale'n-Gam: The Kuki Nation,

(KNO Publication.

36. Higgin.J.C‟s letter No.1243 dated 7 November 1917 to the Chief Secretary of Assam. For

details, See, British Library, Burma and Assam Frontier, 'Kuki Rising, 1917-1919', L/PS/10/724,

Oriental and India Office Collections (OIOC).

37. For details See, Who's Who of Freedom Fighters of Manipur in Indian struggle for

Freedom,(Imphal: Manipur Pradesh Congress Committee (I), 1986),pp.90-112.

38. The KNO is the political wing of the following armed wings: the Kuki National Army, the

Kuki National Front (Military Council), the Kuki National Front (Zogam), the United Socialist

Revolutionary Army, the Zomi Revolutionary Front, the Hmar National Army, the Zou Defense

Volunteers, the United Komrem Revolutionary Army, Kuki Liberation Army, and the Kuki

Revolutionary Army(Unification).

39. For details, See KNO Website: www.kukination.org.

40.For further details, See, Enouhpun(1997): Lasu Stories, Chaing Mai: Kyaing Tong

Publication.

41. For a comprehensive study of Mon history, see, Ashley South(2002): Mon Nationalism and

Civil War in Burma: The Goldensheldrake; The Mon: A People without a Country,(Bangkok:

Mon Unity League, 1997).

42. K. Maitra (1998): The Naga Rebel and Insurgency in the Northeast, New Delhi, p.21

43. The Tangkhuls from Manipur who forms the bulk of the armed cadres of the NSCN (IM) are

unlikely to settle for anything less than Naga integration even if New Delhi offers a Kashmir

Status or a Bhutan-type protectorate status within the present state of Nagaland.

44. For further details on the Pa-O people, See, Chann, Nandar (2004): „Pa-O: The Forgotten

people‟, The Irrawaddy,12, 5.

45. Silverstein, Josef, 1960):0p.cit. p. 36.

46. Havey. G.E (1925): History of Burma from earliest times to 10 March 1924; The Beginning

of the English Conquest, London: p. 268.

47. George Fairbairn(1957): „Some Minority Problems in Burma‟, Pacific Affairs, 30, 4. Dec. p.

304.

48. Silverstein, Josef(1958): „Politics in Shan State: The Question of Secession from the Union of

Burma‟, The Journal of Asian Studies, 18, 1, p.44.

21

49. Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, Shan State Affairs, (Shan State Organization,) p.6. Also See, Leslie

Milne, Shans at Home: Burma's Shan States in the Early 1990s, (While Lotus Press, 2001).

50. Maha Sang is commonly known as the 'Man of his people' for his struggle against oppression

to free the Wa people and for a democratic Burma.

51. Mokens are one of the smallest groups in Burma with a population between 2,000 and 3,000. 52

. Smith, Donald Eugene (1965): Religion and Politics in Burma, Princeton: Princeton University

Press, p.148

53. Silverstein, Josef (1960), Op.cit. p.36

Performance of the States of Northeast India:

A Comparative Analysis of Post and Pre Reforms Periods

Niranjan Roy

Avijit Debnath

Abstract:

This paper is an attempt to make a comparative analysis of economic performance of

India’s Northeastern States during pre and post reform periods. Our results show that all

the states of northeast India except Tripura experienced deceleration of SDP growth

during the post-reforms period. However, the performance of the States in terms of PCI

growth is, much impressive during the same period. Our study also reveals that the

economies of northeast India has undergone a structural change which is characterised

by increased share of service sector. Finally, no unambiguity has been observed

regarding the sectoral contribution to growth acceleration/deceleration among the state

economies. However, taking the seven states as a whole, the contribution by the tertiary

sector overwhelms the contribution by the other sectors.

Keywords: Reforms, Growth, Structural Change, Regional Disparity, Northeast India.

JEL Classification: E65, O18, O47, R11, R12.

Niranjan Roy, Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Assam University, Silchar.

Avijit Debnath, Department of Economics, Assam University, Silchar.

This study is an attempt to explore empirically the dynamics of economic growth in

Northeast India. The importance of such a study lies in the fact that in recent times the

impact of India‟s economic reforms on economic performance has been the subject of

much academic study and public debate in India, but the focus has been largely on the

performance of the economy as a whole or of individual sectors. The economic

performance of the individual states in the post-reforms period has received less attention

than it deserves in the public debate on economic policy (Ahluwalia 2000). Whatever

limited studies have been done, that too excluded the economy of northeastern region

except Assam in few cases. Since the region has wide untapped resources which can be

used to develop internal as well as international trade with the neighbouring countries

under the new market economy spearheaded by economic reforms, therefore, it is

necessary to study the regional dimensions of economic growth in Northeast India.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II is concerned with a

very short review of relevant literature on the subject. Section III is devoted to the

discussion of the methodology followed and data used in the present study. Section IV

presents the empirical results. Finally, in Section VI, we summarise the paper and offer

concluding remarks.

Even after the elapse of eighteen years since the initiation of economic reforms, studies

on economic performance of the states of NER is really scanty. Mohapatra (2002)

articulated that the path to development and economic prosperity of Northeast India to a

large extent lies in reworking its development strategy into areas it has comparative

advantage and to the extent it is willing to liberalize economy. He criticized government

attitude towards the development efforts. He pointed out that the periodic assistance from

the Central Government alone may not do the job of catapulting the region to a higher

level of development. Agarwal (2005) identified agriculture, horticulture, fish farming,

handloom and handicrafts and tourism as the leading sectors of this region which have

tremendous potential to generate employment opportunities. But central government‟s

policies taken so far have not been of much help to the northeastern states in the

exploration of their potentialities. As a result the region remained one of the poorest in

the country. He suggested to investment on linkage-based industries and especially on

those industries whose products have a good market in the neighbouring countries like

Myanmar and Bangladesh. Similarly, Bezbaruah (2007), with out any empirical evidence,

argued that in the changed economic environment initiated by economic reforms, the

NER has found itself in yet another phase of retarded economic growth. He thought that

there is hardly any visible impact of the reform process in the form of a boost to

production and income generating activities in the region. Bhattacharjee (2008) observed

inconsistent growth of SDP of the states of NER in the reform period. While Assam, in

his study, found to be progressing from its slumber, Meghalaya and Tripura have been

ranked among some of the top states in the country in terms of economic growth. In a

study Banerjee (2007) noted a mix kind of performance of the states of Eastern Zone2 in

terms of SDP growth during the post reforms period. States which shows dynamics in his

study includes West Bengal, Mizoram and Tripura and the states which show stagnation

are Assam and Bihar. He identified agriculture as the major contributory sector to SDP

followed by service sector in these states. Like the other one this study also explicitly

dealt with post reforms period. Passah (2008) emphasised on strengthening inter-sectoral

linkages for industrial development in northeastern region. He finds little perceptible

structural change in the secondary sector in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. In Manipur

unorganized sector has helped to raise the secondary sector‟s share. Construction industry

has played a dominant role in escalating secondary sector‟s growth in Nagaland and

Mizoram. In Meghalaya, economic development has had a little impact on the secondary

sector. Finally, in Tripura there has been a movement away from primary sector activities

to tertiary sector. Singh (2009) in a recent study found that the growth rates of all the

NER states have increased during the 3 five year plans with Manipur and

Tripura registering persistently higher growth. Sikkim and Manipur grew fastest among

NE states during 9th

and 10th

plan. Singh (2009) further maintained that except for

Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur the main source of growth in per capita income is

tertiary sector, though he did not given any methodological explanation in support of

these findings.

Data used in this paper are annual figures covering 1980-81 to 2006-07 period and

variables that are measured are at constant 1999-2000 prices. The major sources of the

data for this study are “Basic Statistics of NER-2006” published by NEC, Shillong,

Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation, 2009 and Handbook of Statistics

on Indian Economy published by RBI. Seven states of the Northeastern region viz.

Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Manipur, Sikkim and Tripura have

been selected for the study. Mizoram has been excluded from the study due to lack of

database for the related variables1. We calculated the estimates of annualized growth

rates based on continuous compounding by fitting the following regression for each time

period. We followed the model as developed by Balakrishan and Parameswaran (2007) to

analyse the sectoral contribution to the change in NSDP growth rate during the reform

period over pre-reform period.

The state domestic product (SDP) is an important, yet not perfect, indicator of

economic development. SDP of states in NER, like other parts of the country, consists of

produce originating from three broad sectors: agricultural sector, industrial sector and

service sector. There is huge variation among the sates of NER measured in terms of

SDP. However, this variation gets reduced considerably when Assam is excluded from

the picture. This indicates the obvious dominance of Assam in terms of SDP in the

region. In the pre-reform period, the annual average SDP of this region was Rs

29,557crore at constant 1999-00 prices, out of which SDP of Assam was Rs 22495 on

average. That is around 43 per cent of SDP in the region is contributed by Assam in the

pre-reform period. In the post reform period the picture remained almost unaltered. The

annual average SDP of NER, during 1993-2007, was Rs 50,193 crore and SDP of Assam

was Rs 33832 on average during the same period. This implies Assam still contributes

around 40% of total SDP of the region2.

Though Assam is the “Hulk” of NER in terms of the size of her SDP, this should be

taken as an evidence of best performing state in the region. For performance of an

economy is evaluated on the basis of production growth rather than absolute level of that

production. The secular behaviour of SDP has been tested by estimating a log linear

equation using data for each state. The estimated coefficients of time for all the seven

states during the three time periods (entire study period, pre-reform period, and post

reforms periods) are found to be positive, though the R2 values differ. This means that for

all the states SDP have an increasing trend irrespective of the time periods. However, for

the post reform period the coefficients were not significant for Assam and NER as a

whole. As a result, following Dholakia (2009) we calculated compound annual growth

rate (CAGR) of SDP for Assam and NER in those specified periods based on three year

average at the end points. Table 1 presents the estimated results.

In the post-reform period, only one state (Tripura) registered „acceleration‟ in growth

over the experience of pre-reform period. The growth rate of the 7 states taken together

has also marginally increased from 4.25% in the pre-reform period to 4.80% in the post-

reform period. This acceleration corresponds to a similar acceleration in GDP growth as

reported in the national accounts. But acceleration in Combined SDP growth of Northeast

states is much lower than national standard.

As one would expect, there is a considerable variation in the performance of individual

states, with some states growing faster than the average and others slower. The states

growing faster than the average during pre-reform period were Arunachal Pradesh,

Meghalaya, Nagaland, Sikkim and Tripura whereas during reform era Meghalaya,

Nagaland, Sikkim and Tripura have grown faster than the average growth of 5.75%.

Thus, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Sikkim are the three states which have grown faster than

the average in both the periods. The degree of dispersion in growth rates across states

decreased very significantly in the 1990s. The range of variation in the growth rate of

SDP in the 1980s was from a low of 3.59% per year in Assam to a high of 10.63% in

Sikkim. In the 1990s the variation was much lower, from a low of 2.84% per year for

Assam to a high of 7.97% for Tripura. It is also noted that almost all the states except

Tripura have experienced deceleration in SDP growth during reform era in comparison to

pre-reform era.

One important limitation of using SDP as an index of economic growth is that this

measure does not take consideration of population growth. Therefore, many scholars

favour per capita SDP as a better measure of economic growth for it gives an overall idea

regarding standard of living of the people. An analysis of NER shows that the average per

capita income level in the region during pre-reform period was Rs.9311 at constant 1999-

2000 prices is significantly below the average of the country. In the post reform period

the average per capita income level in the region has increased to Rs.14537 but this

increase was less than the amount by which per capita GDP of the national economy has

increased. Thus the divergence in per capita income between the country and the region

has shown a steady increase over the years.

There is significant difference in the level of per capita income between different states

of the regions. In the pre reform period, Nagaland was the richest state in the region in

terms of Per capita income where as Sikkim was the poorest state in the region by the

same measure. The average per capita income level in the region was highest in

Nagaland (Rs 11833) followed Assam (Rs 11202), Meghalaya (Rs.9399), Manipur (Rs

9290), Arunachal Pradesh (Rs 8676), Tripura (Rs. 7554) and Sikkim (Rs. 7223). Thus, in

the pre-reform period the best-worst difference in per capita income was Rs 4610. In the

post-reform period Nagaland was able to keep her position in the region as the richest

state in terms of per capita income, but now Sikkim has been replaced by Manipur as the

poorest state in the region. The average per capita income level in the region was highest

in Nagaland (Rs 16138) followed Tripura (Rs15795), Arunachal Pradesh (Rs.15421),

Sikkim (Rs.14757), Meghalaya (Rs.14360), Assam (Rs 12911), and Manipur (Rs 12377).

Thus, the best-worst difference in per capita income has fallen to Rs 3760 in the post

reform period. One important thing that deserves attention is the position of Tripura in

the latter period. Find that in the 80s Tripura was second worst state in the region and in

90s it turned into second best state in the region.3

We have also tested the secular behaviour of per capita SDP by fitting a semi-log trend

to the data for each state for pre and post reform periods. For both the periods, the

estimated coefficients of time are found to be significantly positive except for Meghalaya

in the pre reform period and Assam in the post reform period. The coefficient of

estimates does not found statistically significant for Meghalaya in the pre-reform period.

The same is true for Assam in the post reform period. As a result, we calculated

compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of SDP per capita for these two states in those

specified periods based on three year average at the end points. The estimated result

shows that for all the states, per capita SDP has an increasing trend in both the periods.

The annual (compound) rates of growth for the states, as obtained from the semi-log

curve for pre and post reforms periods, are given in Table 1.

There is also variation in the growth rate of per capita SDP (PCSDP) across the states.

The states growing faster than the national average, during pre-reform period, include

Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Sikkim and Tripura whereas during reform

era Meghalaya, Sikkim and Tripura have grown faster than the national average. Thus,

Meghalaya, Nagaland and Sikkim are the three states which have grown faster than the

national average in both the periods. This result is consistent with our findings as in

Table1. It is also found that the degree of dispersion in growth rates across states

decreased very significantly in the 1990s. The range of variation in the growth rate of

PCSDP in the 1980s was from a low of 1.19% per year in Assam to a high of 8.76 % in

Sikkim. In the 1990s the variation was much lower, from a low of 1.23% per year for

Assam to a high of 6.69% for Tripura. It is also noted that states (Sikkim in 80s and

Tripura in 90s) growing at the highest rates in terms of SDP growth and are also growing

at the highest rates in PCSDP growth.

Trend of acceleration/deceleration of PCSDP growth rates for the states of northeast

India is much better than that of SDP growth rates. While six out of seven states were

experiencing deceleration in SDP growth during reforms period in comparison to pre

reforms period, four states have experienced acceleration in PCNSDP during the same

period, Tripura being the most impressive one. This is really a good progress and one

crude reason for such progress in PCSDP may be a deceleration in population growth

rate.

The next step in our analysis consists of looking at state-level disparity in PCNSDP

level in NER. For this purpose, we have measured the dispersion of log PCNSD (ln y) by

three different yet similar measures viz the standard deviation, the covariance and the

Gini coefficient. Figure 1 depicts the results. Find that provincial income is converging

initially but starts diverging since late 90s. It can thus be commented that while economic

growth measured in terms of PCNSDP has been impressive in NER, especially in the

post-reform period, spatially the PCNSDP has not been equal.

In order to analyse structural variations amongst the states of NER, the SDP data is

divided into three major sectors viz agricultural sector, industrial sector and service

sector. It has been observed that the share of the industrial sector has remained mostly

stable or increased (marginally) in almost all states, except in Arunachal Pradesh and

Assam where the share of industrial sector has fallen. Second, the share of the primary

sector has fallen sharply in almost all the states and that of the tertiary sector has risen,

except for Nagaland where primary sector‟s share has increased and tertiary sector‟s

share has fallen over the study period. The next step in our analysis consists of looking at

sectoral overtaking. Here we found that the share of the tertiary sector has overtaken that

of the primary sector in most states, though the time point at which this has happened

differs from state to state. The overtaking has occurred in the post 90s for states like

Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, and Sikkim and in the late 80s for Manipur and Tripura. For

Meghalaya, however, the overtaken has occurred before 80. Figure 2 presents the picture

for the seven states as a whole.

Following the methodology as developed by Balakrishnan and Parameswaran (2007),

the change in the average growth rate of aggregate SDP is decomposed into the

contribution by constituent sectors. The result of this exercise is reported in Table 2. It is

found that the contribution of the tertiary sector overwhelms the contribution of the other

sectors for Assam. For Arunachal Pradesh and Tripura, it is the industrial sector which

contributed positively as well as dominantly in growth acceleration. Agricultural sector

made positive and dominant contribution in growth acceleration for Manipur, Meghalaya

and Nagaland. Thus, there is no unambiguity regarding the sectoral contribution among

the states of northeast India. However, taking the seven states as a whole, the contribution

by the tertiary sector overwhelms the contribution of the other sectors and it is consistent

with national picture.

The present study finds that all the states of northeast India except Tripura experienced

deceleration of SDP growth during the reforms period. The performance of the States in

terms of PCI growth is, however, much encouraging. Three states viz Meghalaya, Sikkim

and Tripura have grown at a rate higher than the national average. A matter of concern

however is the significant regional disparities in levels of PCNSDP particularly in the

post-90s. In respect of structural change, it is observed that the share of the primary

sector has fallen sharply in almost all the states, except Nagaland and that of the tertiary

sector has risen, except for Nagaland again. The share of the industrial sector has

remained mostly stable or increased marginally in majority of the states. Finally, we

observed heterogeneity in respect of sectoral contribution to the change in SDP growth

across individual states. Looking NER as a whole, however, reveals that agricultural

sector has contributed negatively to the change in SDP, while service sector and

industrial sector have contributed positively, former being the dominant contributor.

Our study, thus, adds to the empirical literature for understanding economic growth of

NER. Future research in this area should analyze the growth dynamics within each

component of SDP. This is likely to improve upon our results and is expected to provide

more sturdy conclusions.

Notes:

1 Data on SDP and its components at constant price are not available for Mizoram prior to 1999-00.

2Average NSDP figures have been calculated by authors using data published by the Economic and

Political Weekly Research Foundation (EPWRF), 2009 3Average PCNSDP figures have been calculated by authors using data published by the Economic and

Political Weekly Research Foundation (EPWRF), 2009

References:

Agarwal, A.K. (2005): Structural Change in the Regional Economy: Trends and

Implications”, in C. J. Thomas(ed), Polity &Economy , Indian Council of Social

Science Research. North Eastern Regional Centre.

Ahluwalia, M S (2000): “Economic Performance of States in Post-Reforms Period”

Economic and Political Weekly, May 6, 2000.

Balakrishnan, P. and Parameswaran, M. (2007): “Understanding Economic Growth in

India: A Prerequisite”, Economic and Political Weekly, July 14, pp. 2915-2922.

Banerjee, A.(2007): “Economic Reforms and the Eastern and North-Eastern States”, in

A. Banerjee(ed), Economic Reforms and Vision of North-East India, Kanishka

Publisher, Distributors, New Delhi.

Bhattacharjee, P.R. (2008): “Impact of New Economic Policy in North Eastern Region”

in B. J Deb (ed.), Globalization and North East India, Concept Publishing

Company, New Delhi.

Dholakia, R.H. (1994): “Spatial Dimension of Acceleration of Economic Growth in

India” Economic and Political Weekly, August 27, pp. 2303-2309.

_______________ (2009): “Regional Sources of Growth Acceleration in India”, IIM,

Ahmedabad, India, W.P. No. 2009-03-06, pp

M. P. Bezbaruah (2007): “Indo-Myanmar Border Trade: The Stakes for North East India”

Dialogue July-September 2007, Volume 9 No. 1

Passah, P.M.(2008): “North-Eastern Region of India and the Economic Reform

Programme” in B. J Deb(ed), Globalization and North East India, Concept

Publishing Company, New Delhi., Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi.

Singh, E.B (2009): “Understanding Economic Growth in the North Eastern Region of

India” Dialogue January - March, 2009, Volume 10 No. 3

Table 1 Growth of SDP in States of Northeast India

(At constant1999-2000 price)

STATES Growth Rates

NSDP PCNSDP

1981-1992 1993-2007 1981 to1992 1993 -2007

Arunachal Pradesh 8.31 5.24d 5.25 3.19

d

Assam 3.59 2.84d 1.19 1.23

a

Manipur 5.01 4.63d 2.19 2.48

a

Meghalaya 7.13 6.15d 2.46 4.44

a

Nagaland 7.23 6.45d 2.98 2.14

d

Sikkim 10.63 6.99d 8.76 5.55

d

Tripura 7.14 7.97a 4.01 6.99

a

NER 4.25 4.80a ----- -----

India 5.08 6.16d 2.82 4.40

a

Note: The abbreviations are: a- acceleration and d- deceleration.

Source: Calculated by Authors

Table 2 Sectoral Contribution to the Change in SDP Growth

(At Constant 1999-2000 price)

States Agriculture (in %) Industry (in %) Service (%)

Arunachal Pradesh (-)139.09 43.89 (-)4.80

Assam (-)250.32 (-)147.63 297.95

Manipur 19.89 (-)13.99 (-)105.90

Meghalaya 63.08 51.76 (-)14.84

Nagaland 1590.19 (-)334.48 (-)1155.70

Sikkim (-)103.13 7.49 (-)4.36

Tripura 8.13 68.39 23.48

NER (-)170.26 9.10 261.16

India (-)17.87 13.98 103.89 Note: Here SDP is narrowly defined as SDP=A+I+S.

Source: Calculated by authors

Role of Village Develoment Board to Regenerate Rural Society of

Nagaland: A Critical Observation

Janbemo Lotha

The Village Development Board (VDB), a model moral development institution of local

self-government in Nagaland, has got popularity allover the state for its better

performances. It is the offshoot of the Village Council which has two wings the Common

Fund Committee and the Village Social Security Trust. They were assigned the

responsibility to carry out management of the village development under the supervision

and guidance of the government. When the time came for launching the centrally

sponsored schemes, the idea was developed that let there be a separate agency assigned

with the task and responsibility to manage the affairs of the village development and the

agency should work on behalf of the Village Panchayat.1 It was the Village Common

Fund Committee, which was given a new terminology, namely, the Village Development

Board (VDB). The government of Nagaland by formulating two notifications, namely,

the Village Development Model Rules, 1980 and the Village Development Model Rules,

1989, established provisions for composition, power and function of the VDB.

The government of Nagaland formulated the VDB to be the core body in the form of

the Gram Sabha which comprises “all permanent residents of‟ the village” who form the

“general body of the VDB.”2 According to the Model rules the meeting of the VDB must

be held at least twice in a year to discuss and deliberate issues regarding village

development and approve the schemes chalked out by the Management Committee,

which is the most effective organ of the VDB. The Management Committee, which is

constituted for three years, has the strength of minimum five and maximum twenty five

members. These members are chosen by the Village Council from outside of its own

membership. The provision has been made to include women members in both the VDB

and the Management Committee (M.C.). The Deputy Commissioner or the Additional

Deputy Commissioner happens to be the Chairman of the Management Committee. The

members of the MC select one from among themselves as the Secretary who must be a

literate person of the village. In case, such literate man or woman is not available in the

The author is Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Research Scholar, Department of Political

Science, Nagaland University, Lumami.

village, the government may appoint one government servant as the Secretary to serve the

purpose. It is notable that “No Village Council‟s Chairman or Head Gaonburah (GB) or

village administration Head etc. shall be permitted to hold the post of the Secretary of the

VDB‟s Management Committee.”3 It means the post of the Secretary of the M.C. is very

much significant. This rank must be held by the members of the M. C. itself

The power and responsibility bestowed upon the Secretary by the government has

made the post of Secretary of the VDB very much influential and attractive. It is the

Secretary who puts before the general body “all details regarding the VDB schemes,

money drawn, and loans issued against fixed deposit security, interest of fixed deposit,

manner of utilization of interest amount and other issues.”4 The Secretary is always in

close contact with the Deputy Commissioner of other district authorities related to the

rural development. Any cheque issued by the district authorities related to rural

development or to the schemes and programmes related to the village development is

received by the secretary. It is he who maintains all records of income and expenditure.

All these provisions have definitely highlighted the rank and position of the Secretary not

only among the villagers but also amidst the government officials related to the VDB‟s

activities.

Since the VDB stands in stead of the Village Panchayat, it is provided with sufficient

funds for rural development through various agencies. The most reliable resource is the

Matching Grants given by the Government of Nagaland, which is equal to the amount of

the common fund raised by the villagers. However, it has upper limit of rupees five lakh

only. It means the villagers can raise the fund upto Rs five lakhs only and the government

of Nagaland would give another fund of Rupees five lakhs only. The villagers raise such

fund maximum mostly through labour free of cost done to the development schemes. The

labour component generally constitutes 30% of the scheme cost. Another reliable

resource is grant-in-aid given by the government of Nagaland annually. Each recognized

village receives grant-in-aid at a specific rate for carrying out schemes of community

development. In the beginning, the rate of allocation was Rs. 100/- per tax paying

household with a minimum of Rs. 5000/-. At present, the amount has been increased

manifolds. Funds allocated by the Central government of India for implementation of

various centrally sponsored schemes are another viable income resource of the VDB.

Since the VDB is a recognized field agency, subsidy amount is directly released to it, and

it is the VDB, which sanctions and disperses subsidy to a few selected households to

meet 50% of the cost of the scheme taken up.

The provisions have been made to handle the cash safely to avoid mismanagement or

malpractice of the funds under the VDB. Clause 8 of the Model Rules insists on opening

of bank accounts and their joint operation by the Chairman and the Secretary of the M.C.

Moreover, „„No cheque shall be honoured unless it is accompanied by a copy of the

M.C‟s resolution authorizing such withdrawal signed by the members of the M. C.

present.”5 The Secretary of the M. C. has to maintain full records of the amount received

in forms of grant-in-aid. He also maintains details of withdrawals of money and

disbursement under the running development schemes.

Following the system of the decentralized planning, in Nagaland, the planning process

begins at the grass-root level under the cooperation of the VDB. The schemes and

programmes formulated by the Gram Sabha are sent to the office of the Block

Development Officer (BDO). After proper scrutiny, the schemes are forwarded to the

District Planning Board (DPB), which ultimately sends them to the Rural Development

Department for final approval and realizing the grants-in aid. The BDO is the

withdrawing officer on behalf of the VDB. The amount sanctioned to meet the

expenditure for implementation of schemes is withdrawn from the bank after submission

of the completion report of the work where the BDO plays remarkable role because it is

he who ascertains whether the work has been completed or not.

The VDB is free to choose and construct the plan for development. However, the

government has provided some of the model schemes mentioned below.

1. Construction of resting shades on kheti, village approach roads, playgrounds,

community granary, common latrines in the village, foot-steps, drains, marketing

sheds, waiting sheds etc.

2. Programmes like community cattle, piggery, goat farming, poultry, fishery etc.

3. Community fuel wood production, embroidery centers, dairy, fair-price shops,

forestry, tea and coffee plantation and running of community buses.

In each recognized Naga village the VDB is active under the cooperation and

supervision of the district level officials including the Project Director, Project Officer,

Block Development Officer and many others. The VDB has assumed the responsibility to

utilize the development funds provided through different sources of the Central as well as

state governments. The District Planning Board also plays vital role in rural development.

However, the relation of the DRDA with the DPB has not been clearly defined with the

result that it creates confusion among the villagers on the one hand and brings about

certain difficulties in the process of implementation of programmes.

The nature of the responsibilities of the VDB, which it has received from the Village

council, is mentioned below:

1. Formation of village development schemes;

2. Supervision of various development schemes running in the village;

3. Help other development agencies to carry out development works;

4. Take development works on its own initiative or on request of the government,

borrow money from the government, banks, financial institutions for application

in the development and welfare work of the vi11age and repay the same;

5. Apply for or receive grant-in-aid, donations, subsidies from government or any

other agencies;

6. Lend money from its funds to deserving permanent residents of the village and

obtain repayment thereof;

7. Forfeit the security of individual borrower on his default in repayment of loan,

8. Raise funds for utilities services within the village by passing resolutions.

9. Community fuel wood production, embroidery centers, dairy, fair-price shops,

forestry, tea and coffee plantation and running of community buses.

The performances of the VDB in respect of rural development has been appreciable, no

doubt, but several shortcomings have been found in proper formation of development

schemes, their successful implementation and correct utilization of funds provided for

development. The objective of the VDB has been to draw the direct participation or

involvement of the villagers in development programmes. In formulating and

implementing the poverty alleviation programmes, the VDBs are trying to evolve a

balanced approach through trial and error. Being rooted in the soil, it seems to be

responding the demands of situation almost as a reflex action. As a field agency for rural

development the VDB in Nagaland has “appeared as shining-shine and a novel model

innovation in the process of rural development creating new hopes and aspirations among

the people, no doubt, but it has to cover a long distance to change the rural people‟s

economic conditions and rural face ...”6 Appreciating the role of the VDB, Mr. Hello, the

Project Director of Rural Development of Mokokchung District, said that the problems of

the state in implementing the SGSY and other related poverty alleviation programmes,

the “VDB plays a vital role and it may be a self-supporting institution relating to the rural

development programmes.”7

The objective of the VDB has been to draw the direct participation or involvement of

the villagers in development programmes. In formulating and implementing the poverty

alleviation programmes, the VDBs are trying to evolve a balanced approach through trial

and error.

The works of development in rural area, which have taken place in Nagaland, are

better than those of other states of India, no doubt, but the target fixed is still far away to

achieve. The main priority of development works in Nagaland has been to construct

community halls, play grounds, community latrines, waiting sheds, and village approach

roads, primary school buildings, running of community buses, dairy farms, piggery and

poultry farms and development of small scale industries. There is a provision to grant

sufficient loans to the villagers for initiating personal schemes like tea and coffee

plantation etc. All the schemes and programmes for generation of self-employment are on

run in the state. Under the Indira Awas Yojana and Samgra Awas Yojana, sufficient

funds have been allotted. The objective of the Matching Grants is not only the “resource

that the VDB could mobilize but also the judicious utilization of resources for gainful

purposes.” In Nagaland the VDB has assumed the status of non-banking financial

institute and has become a popular agency to give effect to newly launched multi-

dimensional programmes like JRY, JGSY, SGSY, IAY, NREGS etc. The state has

received huge amount for development of the rural areas and rural people.

When the IRDP came into being, not only sufficient funds were provided but special

care was taken to the development of the people of Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled

Tribes. Sufficient amounts have been provided free of cost from the government to

construct new pucca houses. All these programmes are centrally sponsored and are

funded on cost-sharing basis between the government of India and the government of

state in the ratio of 75:25.

During the last few years foremost priority has been accorded to development in rural

areas. The rural development programmes have been streamlined and strengthened. A

number of initiatives have been taken by the ministry of Rural Development for the

creation of social and economic infrastructure in rural areas to bridge the urban-rural gulf

as well as to provide food security and to fulfill other basic needs of the rural poor. To

meet the requirement of funds for rural development, the allocation of funds for the

implementation of various schemes has been enhanced to Rs. 76,774 crores as against Rs.

42,874 cores during the Ninth Plan. The approved outlay for the ministry of Rural

Development for the financial year that 2005-06 was Rs. 24,480 crores. Two main

schemes, one for providing ways employment- Sampooma Gramin Rozgar Yojana

(SGRY) and the other for providing self-employment „Swaranjayanti Gram Swarozgar

Yojana (SGSY) to the rural poor, are under implementation to face the biggest challenge

of unemployment in the rural areas. Both the programmes are on run in Nagaland where

the VDB is playing required role.

Nagaland state as the part of Indian federal system is entitled to get its shares in an the

development schemes, which have been launched from time to time to regenerate rural

areas and assist the rural people. Besides that, Nagaland has been given especial

preferences keeping in view the backwardness of the area and the people. When Atal

Behari Bajpayee, the then Prime Minister of India arrived in Nagaland in 2003, to attend

the convocation Programme of the Nagaland University, he sanctioned crores of rupees

for construction of four-lane roads from Dimapur to Koruma. The VDB being the main

agency for the rural development has to play big role in development of the state and its

people.

Speaking at the silver jubilee celebration of Koruma Block Village Development

Board at Ura Academy hall as the cruef guest on 10th

August 2005, Dr Shurhozelie, the

chairman of the governing body, DRDA Kohima, expected that “with help of VDBs

Nagas can once again be self-sufficient and independent.”8 He also stated that “VDBs

were formed with a view to let the grass-root villagers have an equal and active

participation in the policy and decision making functions of the government, which he

also termed as decentralization of power.”9 Calling upon the VDBs to have mutual

cooperation and support to develop rural areas, he urged upon the VDB functionaries to

strive hard for economic progress and self sufficiency.10

Dr Shurhozelie while

appreciating the role of the VDBs said that the development, which has taken place in the

state “has been a role-model for the rest of states of the country.” He further stated that

“The formation of the VDBs in Nagaland led to implementation of Panchayati Raj while

MP‟s Local Call Area Development Fund has also been started after the Compact Area

Development fund in Nagaland.”11

He suggested the people to be „hard working and self

-sufficient.‟ At the same occasion, the Director, Rural Development, Metsubo Jamir,

urged the VDBs “to have broader outlook and perspective in order to fulfill various

developmental programmes entrusted by the government and for judicious utilization of

the VDB deposited an amount of Rs. 45 crores.12

Today there are altogether 1083 VDBs and 52 Development Blocks in Nagaland which

are actively engaged in development administration especially in the rural areas. The role,

which the VDBs and other development agencies have played in development of

Nagaland, is notable and appreciable, no doubt. But it does not mean that they have

succeeded in alleviating poverty from the state and changing the socioeconomic structure

of the people on the required line. Development has taken place, but distribution of

benefits among the people is uneven with the result that the gap between the rich and the

poor has increased. Various elements and trends have appeared in the field of

development administration in Nagaland, which have hampered the progress of

development on the required line. There are several factors responsible for undermining

the working of the VDBs and other developing agencies. Some of them are mentioned

below.

In Nagaland, there is no dearth of funds for development, but there is lack of interest in

development. It has been found that neither the government officials nor the political

parties are truly committed to the task of development nor the people have real interest in

self-development. In the words of R K Misra “the initial euphoria “is over and the

“interest and extent of participation by the administration waved.”13

The officers who

have been assigned the responsibility to execute the works of development and supervise

various developmental works hardly bother to perform their duties actively and sincerely.

It has been observed that they release completion certificates of works either without

proper verification or under pressure from the higher concerned authorities, politicians

and dominant vil1age leaders. The study reveals the fact that the Naga villagers, who lack

the spirit of professionalism and awareness, are neither properly informed about

development schemes and participating procedures in development administration nor the

innocent vil1agers are nicely cooperated by the officials concerned. It has also been

found that a few conscious, alert and developed villagers, who have close link with the

district authorities, obtain undue benefits of the development schemes and programmes.

This is also evident from the statement of R K Misra, who had been the Commissioner

and Secretary of Rural Development in Nagaland, remarked that mainly due to the short

circwation of procedures by the Secretary and VDB members, often in collaboration with

the BDOs, the villagers do not avail chance to participate in schemes formulation and

their implementation.14

According to the legal procedure the Secretary of the Management Committee of the

VDB must be elected by the members of the VDB, but in practice most of the Secretaries

are elected either by the influential villagers or they manage themselves to be elected. It

has been found that most of the Secretaries come from the elite group who hardly care to

maintain the financial records strictly and follow the rules prescribed. There is “neither

clarity nor uniformity in maintaining the records .... and no village presents a clear picture

what has been done over all these years under the VDB programmes.”15

Maithani and

Rizwana have correctly observed that “People (of Nagaland) are not able to exercise

control over the VDB Secretary and other members do not feel themselves accountable to

the people.”16

The funds available should have been spent over the development of

households but major amount of the fund is spent over creation of social and economic

infrastructure. As a result, the basic objective of self-generating income has suffered. B.K

Roy Burman is also of the view that many Boards (VDBs) have been found to spend

large sums raised by them on religious festivals and recreational activities.”17

Moreover,

all VDBs are hedged by bureaucratic protectionism. According to Burman., “if it

continues too long, organic growth of the Boards will be arrested”18

Various development programmes have been launched in Nagaland without proper

information to the people. The Naga villagers who are mostly uneducated or illiterate

have no proper information about the development schemes. They lack the procedural

knowledge how to get the benefits and to whom should they contact. So the number of

the Naga beneficiaries to obtain benefits from various development schemes and projects

launched from time to time has remained very much limited. It is all because either the

villagers have little knowledge about running of the schemes or they are not informed

properly.

The uneven distribution of economic benefits due to overwhelming corruption and

embezzlement of development funds have resulted in “Yawning gap in the standard of

living between the rich and the poor, and the chasm that separates the elites from the

common man is an ominous portent.”19

Despite all the facts mentioned above the VDB

has done a number of appreciable jobs in the rural areas providing people economic relief

and employment opportunities.

Notes

1 Maithani and Rizwana, (1991), Decentralized Development, Hyderabad. , p. 8.

2 Village Development Board (Revised in 1989), Government Notification dated 21st November, 1989,

Government of Nagaland, Kohima 3 Ibid. clause (4)

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid. clause (d).

6 Singh Chandrika, “Functioning of Village Development Board in Nagaland”, Dialogue, Vol. VIII, No.3,

January-March, 2004, p. 187. 7 A Pamphlet issued by Hello Rengma, the Director of Rural Development, government of Nagai and,

1999, Mokokchung. 8 North East Herald, August 11, 2005, Dimapur, p. 2.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Misra, P.K, “Accountability Counts in Rural Development”, Nagaland Page, August 18, 1997, Dimapur.

P. 5. 14

Ibid. 15

Maithani B.B. and Rizwana A.R. Decentralized Development. Op. cit. p. 69 16

Roy Burman, V.K. (1984), Poverty alleviation Programme in Nagaland and Manipur, Mittal

Publications, New Delhi, p. XI. 17

Ibid. 18

Ibid. 19

Sema, Hokishe, “Reformation at All cost”, in Nagaland Page, August 1 1997, p.3

Drug Addiction in Manipur: Reasons and Remedies

Tomba Chingtam

This paper attempts to explore the reasons responsible for drug addiction. The reasons are

examined in relation to eight hypothetical factors, such as peer group, enjoyment,

frustration/tension, sufficient leisure, excess pocket money, imitation of family elders,

easy availability and curiosity. Moreover the remedial measures undertaken by the Drug

De-addiction centres and their benefits among the addicts are also analyzed.

Introduction

Manipur is a small state situated in the north ea tern region of India. The state is

geographically very close to the notorious “Golden Triangle” which geographically

composed of northern Thailand, northern and eastern Myanmar and western Laos.

According to U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency‟s report, Myanmar produced 2560 metric

tons of raw opium during 1996. In fact Myanmar is the world‟s largest single producer

and exporter of heroin drug, accounting for between 40% and 60% of world supply. The

purest heroin, “Number 4” is made for injection, although it can be smoked as well.

Heroin from Myanmar began to appear in Manipur in 1979-80. According to the various

key informants, the use of drugs like prodrom, mandrax, calmpose, etc., amongst the

youths started from the early part of 1970s.

The people and the Government noticed the seriousness of the problem from the mid

1980s. In 1987, the anti-drug lobby was very active in the form of stringent law enforcing

activity and the momentum has died now. In the early part of 1990s, a number of NGOs

came up working in the field of drug abuse. Most of them concentrated on treatment and

conducting few general awareness programmes. Ministry of Social Justice and

Empowerment (MOSJE) is supporting 16 NGOs in the state of Manipur through the state

Social Welfare Department. Out of those, 7 centres are in Imphal as of 1999. Out of the

total number of 25,602 HIV positive cases in the state of Manipur till February 2007, a

lion‟s share of 11500 (approximately) are Intravenous Drug Users (IDUs). This is only

The author is Lecturer, D.M. College Teacher Education, Imphal, Manipur

the proverbial tip of the iceberg. In fact, there are many un-noticed cases which are yet to

be discovered. In addition to this problem of HIV infection, innumerable death cases

because of AIDS and over-dose are reported quite often. So, it is felt necessary to take a

scientific step to study the factors which are affecting to this problem of drug menace.

One cannot ignore the fact that drug habits of the younger generation have complex

reasons and motivations which are to he explored. The present research aimed to study

the basic reasons leading to drug-abuse and its remedial measures.

Objectives of the Study

1. To find out the reasons ofl1laking an individual a drug addict in relation to: peer

group, enjoyment, frustration/tension, sufficient leisure, excess pocket money,

imitation of family elders, easy availability and curiosity.

2. To examine the remedial measures/de-addiction process undertaken such as:

motivation/counseling, feeling for self control, rehabilitation, substitution therapy

and family support.

Methodology

The data were extracted from a sample of 200 drug-addicts selected through random

sampling from live Drug De-addiction centres operating in Imphal West and Imphal East

Districts of Manipur. A self developed questionnaire consisting of 42 statements was

employed in identifying the reasons. The drug-addicts and the persons involved in

rehabilitation in the centres were also interviewed for ascertaining the remedial measures

undertaken and the benefits, if am, received by the addicts out of it. The data are

interpreted in term of percentage.

Results and Discussion

Table-1

Percentage showing age group of drug-addicts

Age group Frequency Percentage

18-22 08 04

23-27 64 32

28-32 72 36

33-37 28 14

38-42 22 11

43-47 06 03

The percentage of addiction is as high as 36 in the age group 28-32. But the majority of

cases fall in the age group 23-32 where this group comprises of 68% of the total

population. In ease of low or high age group, the cases are found to be low.

Table-2

Percentage showing qualification of drug-addicts

Educational Qualification Number of Respondents Percentage

Illiterate 00 00

Under-Matric 20 10

Matriculate 38 19

10+2 80 40

Graduate 52 26

Post-Graduate 10 05

The table indicates that all the drug addicts are literate or educated ones. Although

matriculates to graduates accounts for 85% of the total addicts, the secondary stage of

education ranks the highest addiction rate (40%).

Table- 3

Percentage showing marital status of addicts

Status Number of Respondents Percentage

Marrie

d

48 24

Unmar

ried

150 76

Total 200 100

76% accounts for the un-married youths and 24% for the married youths. So, it

can be stated that most of the drug-abusers are un-married youths within the age group of

23-32.

Table- 4

Percentage showing Reasons of Drug Addiction

1. Peer Group Pressure

Almost 73% of the abusers were initiated to drugs due to pressure from peers while

remaining 27% due to reasons other than peer groups influence. Most of the addicts had

been introduced to drugs by their peer groups during festivals/concerts/musical nites or

any other entertainment programmes.

2. Enjoyment

84% of the respondents said that they began to use drug for enjoyment. Enjoyment out of

the drug significantly contributes to the present woe of drug menace.

3. Frustration/Tension Remover

Frustration/tension remover accounts for 79% of the abusers. Failure in love affairs

among the abusers is something which influences the teenagers in using drugs. There are

a number of ups and downs in love affairs of these youths. For every conflict with their

love ones, they have a strong tendency of resorting to drug. Another main reason of

addiction is the regular abuse of drugs to get themselves relieved of mental setback,

physical pain or ally other reason which emanates out of various psychological/socio-

economic factors.

4. Sufficient Leisure

Sufficient leisure accounts for 83% of the abusers. As reported by them, they used to take

drugs during their institutional vacation, holidays. gap between the completion of school

final examination and starting of new academic session, etc.

5. Excess Pocket Money

It accounts for 75% of the abusers. To give money by the parents at random when

demanded for it by their children is the initial contributing factor of drug use.

6. Imitation of Family Elders

72% of the abusers began to use drug through imitation of their family elders and friends

and they subsequently became drug-addict

7. Easy Availability

87% of the addicts reported that they could easily acquire drug whenever needed. Almost

all the addicts at their chronic stage became drug pushers/peddlers to earn money to meet

their own demand.

8. Curiosity

97% of the addicts are dragged to the drugs out of curiosity to know about the nature of

the drugs. Curiosity to taste the drug and to see all by themselves how it affects to bring

about the desirable outcomes which they could not do so in normal situations like

approaching girls to woo them or say satisfying their girl friends while in dating etc.

Remedial Measures and Benefit Received

As reported by the rehabilitation centres, certain remedial measures were taken up.

Survey was conducted to understand the benefits received by the addicts out of the

measures.

Table- 5

Percentage showing Remedial Measures and Benefit Received

1. Motivation/Counselling

99% of the respondents did agree that motivation/counseling plays a vital role in the de-

addiction process. Motivational technique/counseling adopted by professional clinical

psychologists/Master of Social Workers (MSWs) in the rehabilitation centres were quite

effective in giving a heeling touch to the ailing addicts thereby enabling them to abstain

from further abuse.

2. Feeling for Self Control

80% of the addicts stated that most of the time they longed to control their drug habit and

tried many a times to shun this habit Taking up certain stringent measures with due care

as and when they felt for self control like making them duty bound while in treatment,

due sympathy, separation from the peer abusers, no pocket money till complete

abstinence or Rest in Peace, care to keep the individual addict away from any sort of

substitution drug.

3. Rehabilitation

65% thought that rehabilitation is the ultimate solution for the addicts to be brought back

to a recovered mainstream life. Long sufferers due to addiction always hoped for

complete abstinence from the drugs. However they couldn‟t do so because of various

probable reasons such as physiological and psychological imbalances and lack of

necessary support to face off such situations from near and dear ones. To attend the

rehabilitation/de-addiction centres was the best way for an addict to come back to

normalcy.

The 12 - steps Narcotics Anonymous session (N.A) in the rehabilitation centres which

includes confinement among the drug addicts forum to share thoughts, acceptance of

being an addict, submission of oneself to God, physical exercises, group discussions

along with Drug Substitution Therapy (DST) help individuals to achieve a completely

recovered mainstream life.

4. Drug Substitution Therapy

55% felt that the drug substitution therapy is the best method to keep the addicts under

control thereby paving way to bring them back to normalcy. The recently developed and

commonly exercised method of detoxification, i.e., Drug Substitution Therapy (DST), the

substitution of drugs by Bruprenorphine substance to control the urge of taking drugs by

the individual addicts were reported to be beneficial to the addicts.

5. Family Support

An overwhelming 98% respondents claim that there is no alternative method which can

substitute the important role of family members support for the complete abstinence of

the addicts. Family support and to create a conducive atmosphere in the home where the

individual addict feels everyone understands his wish and problems and that all are ready

to help and support him in relation to his recovery and future prospect are the most

important measures that enable the addict to subdue and resist the pain and suffering that

emerged out of the abstinence to achieve a completely recovered life.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

In the light of the above results, certain suggestions may be made. It is found that since

most of the addicts (68%) are in the age group 23-32 years, we all need to pay special

attention to the boys and girls of this age group in particular and the adolescents in

general. As per the survey, the majority of the addicts are unmarried ones who have had

lesser familial responsibility. It may therefore, be of value to shoulder certain

responsibilities on the unmarried individuals. The origin of the curiosity to know (97%)

about the nature of the drug is mainly from peer group‟s influence. Therefore, there

seems to be positive correlation between the two reasons: curiosity to kno and peer group

(73%). Easy availability (87%) of psychotropic drugs in the market and elsewhere in the

state should be controlled. As the addicts (84%) began to use drug to get themselves

pleasure from it, we need to provide facilities for better and positive forms of enjoyment

both in the schools and at home. It is also found that the addicts (83%) could not utilize

their leisure profitably during their school days. School authorities in consultation with

the parents need to provide adequate recreational facilities in this regard. Since the excess

pocket money accounts for 75% of the addicts, parents should give money to their

children purposefully. The addicts began to use drug out of frustration and as a tension

remover mechanism (83%), proper counseling of the youths may be useful in solving

their psychological problems, if any. It is also evident that 72% of the addicts began to

use drugs through imitation of their elders in the family. It is evident that there is

someone in the family of the addict who also abuses drugs. The appropriate measures

need to be taken up by identifying the abusers in the family.

So far as the benefits received by the addicts out of the remedial measures taken up by

the rehabilitation centres, motivation/counseling and family support rank the highest, i.e.,

99% and 98% respectively. Hence, these two measures need to be reinforced. It may be

mentioned here that the drug abusers are generally the rejected members of the family,

that their parents seldom look after them and that they are set free. Such an attitudes

towards the addicts would aggravate the problem and a positive attitude needs to be

created among the members of the family. Self-control (80%) is also reported to be

beneficial to the addicts. In this connection, Yoga may be introduced in the centres as a

part of self-control measure. As reported by the addicts, their habits of the use of drug

began to be disappeared with their joining the rehabilitation centres (65%). Therefore the

establishment of adequate number of rehabilitation centres in Manipur is highly called

for. Although the Drug Substitution Therapy (DST) ranks the lowest (55%), it was a very

useful measure at the initial stage as reported by the addicts. In fine, it may be inferred

that there are certain factors as discussed above which are responsible for causes of drug

abuse/addiction. Besides, there might be various other causal reasons which influence the

use, abuse and addiction of drugs. In this context, the sustained effort of the governments,

NGOs, and other civil organizations to contain this menace is „sine-qua-non‟.

References

Binalakshmi, N., South Asia‟s Fractured Frontier. Mittal Publications, 2002.

Kalra, R. M., Drug Addiction in Schools. Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1995.

MACS, Status Report - National Aids Control Programme. MACS, Imphal, 2005-06

Parikh, J. C and Krishna, K. S., Drug Addiction: A Psycho-Social Study of Youth.

Friends Publishers, Delhi, 1992.

Singh, Dineshwar, H. & Sharma, M., Rapid Situation Assessment of Drug Use in Imphal.

The Kripa Society, Imphal, 1999-2000.