ENGINEERINGSCIENCES INVESTIGATION
MANAGING RISK THROUGH RELIABILITY-CENTRED MAINTENANCE
Presented by:Dave Gillingham, P. Eng., CFEI, LEED AP
43rd AnnualEngineering InsuranceConferenceToronto,ONOctober6,2016
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FORENSIC ENGINEERING
Theapplicationof theartandscienceofengineering inmatterswhicharein,ormaypossibly relateto,thejurisprudence system,inclusiveofalternativedispute
resolution
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FORENSIC ENGINEER
Someonewhodoesprecisionguessworkbasedonunreliabledata
providedbythoseofquestionable knowledge.
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Union Carbide pesticide plant experiences functional failureof safety systemsExplosion releases cloud of toxic methyl isocyanate gas intoatmosphereConsequences:– 1000’s injured or dead– Environmental contamination– $470M settlement
UNION CARBIDEDecember 2, 1984: Bhopal, India
expcep.com Photo:AssociatedPress/BruceWeaver
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Space shuttle Challenger experiences functional failure of O-ring on solid rocket boosterOrbiter and launch assembly break up over Atlantic OceanConsequences:– 7 crew members dead– 32-month shutdown of space shuttle program– $1.7B to build replacement orbiter Endeavour
SPACE SHUTTLE ‘CHALLENGER’January 28, 1986: Cape Canaveral, FL
expcep.com Photos: NOAA/DefenseMeteorologicalSatelliteProgram
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FirstEnergy experiences multiple functional and hiddenfailures of distribution networkNortheastern US and Ontario experience prolongedblackout conditionConsequences:– 10+ people died from secondary causes– Communications & transportation networks failed– Water supplies compromised– >$6B economic consequences
EASTERN NORTH AMERICA BLACKOUTAugust 14, 2003: Eastern USA and Ontario
expcep.com Photo:VirginGalactic/MarkGreenberg
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Virgin Galactic SpaceShipTwo experiences hidden failurebecoming functional failureShip becomes unstable and breaks apart at 50 000 ftConsequences:– Pilot injured, Copilot dead– Delay in commercial operation date– Redesign of orbital vehicle required– Construction of new orbital vehicle at significant cost
SPACESHIPTWOOctober 31, 2014: Mojave Air and Space Port, NV
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WHAT IS RISK?
Uncertaintyarisingfromthepossible occurrenceofgivenevents
Risk=(Probability ofLossEvent)x(FrequencyofExposure)x(SeverityofLossEvent)
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WHAT IS RISK MANAGEMENT?
Thepracticeofidentifying andanalyzinglossexposuresandtakingstepstominimize thefinancial impact
oftheriskstheyimpose
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WHAT IS RISK MANAGEMENT?
Thepracticeofidentifying andanalyzinglossexposuresandtakingstepstominimize
thefinancial,environmental,operational,andsafetyimpactsof theriskstheyimpose
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QUANTIFYING RISKThe Nomograph
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QUANTIFYING RISKThe Probability-Severity Quadrants
High
SEVERITY
HighProbabilityLowImpact
MediumRisk
HighProbabilityHighImpact
HighRisk
LowProbabilityLowImpact
LowRisk
HighProbabilityLowImpact
MediumRisk
Low PROBABILITY High
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QUANTIFYING RISKThe Risk Matrix
A BriefHistory of
RCM
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1950’s: aircraft maintenance costs are soaring
1960: maintenance task force formed, consisting of airlines and FAA representatives
1968: Maintenance Steering Group publishes MSG-1;Handbook: Maintenance Evaluation and Program Development Document
1970s: Maintenance Steering Group publishes MSG-2;Airline/Manufacturer Maintenance Program Planning Document
1974: US DoD commissions United Airlines to write a report on civil aviation maintenance practices
1978: Stan Nowlan and Howard Heap publishReliability-centered Maintenance
1979: Maintenance Steering Group publishes MSG-3;Operator/Manufacturer Scheduled Maintenance Development Document
1982-1990s: Stan Nowlan and John Moubray develop RCM2 for industrial facilities
A BRIEF HISTORY OF RCM
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MAINTENANCE:ensuring thatphysicalassetscontinue todo
whattheiruserswantthemtodo.
RELIABILITY-CENTRED MAINTENANCE:aprocess
usedtodeterminethemaintenancerequirementsofanyphysicalasset
initsoperatingcontext.
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FUNCTIONAL:
Failuresthatpreventtheassetfromdoingwhatitissupposed todo
Usuallyreportedbyoperationscrew
TYPES OF FAILURES
POTENTIAL:
Hidden failuresthatmaynotbecomeimmediatelyapparent
Usuallyreportedbymaintenancecrew
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SAFETY:PossiblelossofequipmentInjuryordeath
CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURES
OPERATIONAL:DirectcostofrepairsIndirecteconomic losses
NON-OPERATIONAL:Directcostofrepairs
HIDDEN FAILURE:Resultofundetected failureofahidden functionCreatesexposuretopossiblemultiplefailures
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REACTIVE:“RunToFailure”or“DoNothing”Typically appliedtolow-severity components
TYPES OF MAINTENANCE
PREVENTATIVE:Schedule-based maintenanceDesignedtopreventage-relatedfailures
PREDICTIVE:Undertakenwhenthereisadeviationfrombaseline operatingparametersRequiresregularorcontinuousmonitoring ofasset
DETECTIVE:“TechnicalIntegrityEngineering”Isintendedtodetecthidden failures
SYSTEM MODIFICATION:LastresortUsedwhenseverityishighandnoothermethodscanreduceit
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APPLYING RCM TO THE RISK MATRIX
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APPLYING RCM TO THE RISK MATRIX
Con
sequ
ence
s (S
ever
ity)
Extreme Detective Detective System Mods
System Mods
System Mods
Very High Detective Detective Detective System Mods
System Mods
High Predictive Predictive Detective Detective Detective
Medium Preventive Preventive Predictive Predictive Predictive
Low Reactive Reactive Preventive Preventive Predictive
Rare Unlikely Even Chance Likely Almost
Certain
Likelihood (Probability x Frequency)
The RCM Process
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RELIABILITY-CENTRED MAINTENANCE:aprocessused todetermine themaintenancerequirementsofanyphysicalasset
initsoperatingcontext.
Whatmustbedonetotheassettoensureitcontinuestodowhatwewantittodo?
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RCM FacilitatorManagement PersonnelAsset OperatorsAsset MaintainersAsset SpecialistsMaintenance EngineersDesign EngineersForensic EngineersInsurance Risk Manager
STEP 1: BUILD THE RCM TEAM
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What are the functions of the asset in its operating context?In what ways does it fail to fulfill its functions?What causes each functional failure?What happens when each failure occurs?In what way does each failure matter?What can be done to prevent each failure?What should be done if a suitable proactive task can’t be found?
STEP 2: RISK ASSESSMENT
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WHAT ARE THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ASSET IN ITS OPERATING CONTEXT?PrimaryFunction:Toperformaspecificprocessatspecific setpoints undergivenconditionsSecondaryFunctions:Additionalfunctionsoftheassetthatarerelatedtotheprimaryfunction
FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
IN WHAT WAYS DOES IT FAIL TO FULFILL ITS FUNCTIONS? – FUNCTIONAL FAILURECannotperformprimaryfunction atallCannotperformprimaryfunction asdesiredCannotperformsecondary functions
WHAT CAUSES EACH FUNCTIONAL FAILURE?– FAILURE MODE
Specificeventthatcausedthefunctional failureRequiresregularorcontinuousmonitoring ofasset
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN EACH FAILURE OCCURS?– FAILURE EFFECTSequenceofeventsthathappens followingfunctional failureuntilreturntooperation
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IN WHAT WAY DOES EACH FAILURE MATTER?SafetyConsequencesEnvironmentalConsequencesOperationalConsequencesNon-operationalConsequences
FAILURE CONSEQUENCES
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WHAT CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT EACH FAILURE?Whatproactivetasksaretechnicallyfeasible toreduce theriskoffailure?– Preventive– Predictive– Detective
FAILURE MITIGATION
Ataskistechnically feasibleifitisphysicallypossibleforthetasktoreduce,orenableaction tobetakentoreduce,theconsequencesoftheassociated failuremodetoanextentthatmightbeacceptabletotheownerofuseroftheasset
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FAILURE PROBABILITY PATTERNS
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FAILURE PROBABILITY PATTERNS
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WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IF A SUITABLE PROACTIVE TASK CANNOT BE FOUND?NoscheduledmaintenanceRedesigntheassetFormal/informalvisualinspections
FAILURE MITIGATION
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Approval of recommendations by managersDescribe routine tasks clearly & conciselyOne-off changes identified and implemented correctlyRoutine task changes incorporated into SOPsEnsure any detected faults are dealt with quickly
STEP 3: IMPLEMENTATION
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Higher plant availability and reliabilityGreater safetyMinimizes chance of catastrophic failureMinimizes potential for environmental damageLonger equipment lifeLots of data
WHAT RCM ACHIEVES
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QUANTIFYING THE NEW RISK LEVEL
Con
sequ
ence
s (S
ever
ity)
Extreme High High Severe Severe Severe
Very High High High High Severe Severe
High Significant Significant High High High
Medium Moderate Moderate Significant Significant Signif icant
Low Negligible Negligible Moderate Moderate Signif icant
Rare Unlikely Even Chance Likely Almost
Certain
Likelihood (Probability x Frequency)
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THE END GOAL
Riskistheuncertaintyarisingfromthepossible occurrenceofgivenevents
LowerProbabilityofLossEvent
LowerFrequencyofExposure
ReducedSeverityof LossEventxx
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More knowledgeable and engaged employeesFewer incidents involving MoE or MoLFewer claims submitted to insurance companyLower costs for asset owner and insurer
WHAT RCM ACHIEVES
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Increased amount of available system dataImproved employee knowledge of systemsConsequences:– Annual maintenance & energy savings >$5M– Reduced reactive maintenance– Increased asset utilisation
DOFASCO STEELHamilton, Ontario
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RCM DECISION DIAGRAM
THANK YOU
ENGINEERINGSCIENCES INVESTIGATION
DaveGillingham,P.Eng.,CFEI,[email protected]
1103WentworthSt.W.,Unit3Oshawa,Ontario,CANADAL1J8P7
905404-0237 | 855404-0237
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