Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) Libraries HQ Donovan Research Library Armor Research Library Fort Benning, Georgia Report date: 21 April – 25 July 1943 Title: After Action Report, 2 nd Armored Division Author: Headquarters Combat Command “A”, 2 nd Armored Division Abstract: Historical record of the 2 nd Armored Division beginning with training operations, followed by the invasion and casualties and prisoner reports. Number of pages: 119 Notes: Armor historical documents collection located at the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, GA. Document#: 802 AD 412 Classification: Unclassified; Approved for public release
Transcript
Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) Libraries HQ Donovan Research Library
Armor Research Library Fort Benning, Georgia
Report date: 21 April – 25 July 1943 Title: After Action Report, 2nd Armored Division Author: Headquarters Combat Command “A”, 2nd Armored Division Abstract: Historical record of the 2nd Armored Division beginning with
training operations, followed by the invasion and casualties and prisoner reports.
Number of pages: 119 Notes: Armor historical documents collection located at the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, GA. Document#: 802 AD 412 Classification: Unclassified; Approved for public release
HEADQJAtRS C OMBT C-0Tt-2' 1(V1./,2D ,J"ORED DWI.I3N-
APO 2~52,UNCLASSIFIEDlSicilyT" uly 5DJ.
1 -_-Ot.AiIOVJ OF DOL COI. .I?, tt'
or the period,--ypril 21, 143 to July 25, 19L I.nu ive.
SETION I Traininr Q .r..p Pior.To Thbnttion 'or cIT --n.II-!II - 0peratins Durin- _ Sub3equert : T- Iv "
SECTION III - Casualties :n-!Prisoners.
SECTION I- Training Operations Prior Tc.lmb-frkatin-r In;v_- si "n.
General Order _Number 27, Hequarters 2d .iuored Division, a ted .-ril 21, 1,3constitute& .Combat Q onmnd "K' as fllos: ( th .rnored Ee im. nt, 41st r :%oreaInfantry Regiment (less 1st Battilion), 14th Armored Field Artillery t lion, "BDompny 82nd rmored Reconnaissance B-ttalion, "A" 'o,..my 17th -xrmcred Engineer3attalion, "B" Company 48lth Ar.1mred .Iedical Battalion, "A',Company 2dArmoredDivision Supply 2.attalion, and *-Q Company 2d Armored Division M.Aintenance Eatta-lion. The Combat Command Headquarters was au-mented by addition:l officers andrnlisted men from Division Headquarters Comony, Division Service 'o-._ny, n& the142nd .rmored Signal Company.
Having been constituted, Combat CovmMnd 'A" moved from their bivouac positionsfrom the vicinity of Monod, French Morocco to an isolited area tas:eJ-ely ;, ast ofthe Division bivouac area and Northeast of ?ab.t, French More cC. un t hetnd of:,pril 1943, advunced elem .nts of Combat Oonnd "All were sent to the vicinity ofxrzew, Algeria to contact the 5th Army inv_.sion Training Center and the 3rd Infantry
Division under whom the CombCAt Command ws to train for a t o ;eeks p eriod.
The balance of Combat o'mand "A' moved by r-il nd motor from their bivouacfrom the vicinity of Rab.t, French .oro(,co to a new area in the vicinity of Portoux Poules-Fornaka, Algeria. Tjpon being assembled in this .rea a rigid course oftraining in invasion taocLies and physical conditioning was prescribed by The 5th. cm:y Invasion Training Center. This invasion training consisted of speed at rching,attacks on piliboxes, And strong points by inf ntry nd reconnaicssace elements,street fighting, loading and unloading on various types of landin- craft ancdcombined. arms problems.
On the 21st of May 1943, elements of Combat Ces.auand 'A" consisthng mostly ofthe 2nd Battalion, 66th .crmored RP iment were ordered to move c y sea to Phillipe-yille, Algeria nd then overland to J sapes, Algeria reperting on arrival tc'Ceraandinz General, 3rd Infantry Division. At that time it was contem.plited that
L._
S 32 C 2:?D
the a-ntire Coat 2omnand ould fllow.
Cl nel - -ice lose was assigned to and hi & the _Co, S S . nO Snd asumdcoim mnd ,ay 2th, 1943. On The 29th of -_y, 1943, the b l.nc of the T:- bat %im-ndwas ordered to be -.ov:d to the vicnity of lizerte, Tun isia by sea and by motor.3n Tune 3rd, 1943 all elements movin by sea had sailedJ. The -tor. confvoy ofCombat Comand "A" pulled out the mornin- of June 3rd oin by Iay of .l.iers,Setif, Ain-M' 'Lila, Juelia, Souk Ahras, Beja, Mactuor, Ferryville, .1 ele]ants exceptthose ordered to Jemuapes, closinp into bivou-.c in the vicinity of El .i-, TunisiaJune ' th.
At that time the Combat /oni.-nd bccaae " p.rt f the 3rd inf""Ltry DiLisionReinforced; and be.an prejm Stions for loadin o:n i:-v -sion craft Lp-atory for aninvasion. Missing elem:ients from Jea -pes closed Tuno 19th. On the 25th of Tmne, acomplete loading, insofar as -availf.". ility of cr Ut was possible, -., as f fected bythe 3rd Inflntry Division Reinforced. Thic task force put out to se. and cr)rducteda practice invasion on the shores in thIe vicinity of Lizerte - 2 i DJ!bel,Tunisia. ThSoi--at Conn, an d returned to its bivouac rea uwn co,.:.letion of itspart in this :maneuver -vTith the exc etion D vehicles hich ;o-e alorady od.These remained loaded on the various cr-ft. The next foci d'.,,rs rero sent in check-ingwiaterproif'ingequi-plent,comoletion of basic loAds and uking final .:Arran.e-
ments for the embarka:tion for inv sion. Th da; of July 5th brought all of theplans and loadin7. to co.letion.
SECTION Ii - Operations During' And Subsequent TC The Invsion.
On the afternoon of July 5th the 1oa-i-n of por.nn 1 bo;_.rd craft was startefor the invasion. LCi's were loaded with infantry, a.Il's- " nd LAT's c-rinjvehicles wer'e alode? ,ith their crews, :ith the exce)tJon of Lhe inf .ftt, n te6th and 7th of July. On the dornin of "he th of -4, the LM's ,i'a d anchorand sailed in co-iv ,y. The LSET's and LCT's reained behind to s-il t loter dote
On the .:ornin, ol July 7th the L!': dro d _nchor o Tuai . nd men
were taken -,shore for short hike and meal, returning to the ort..At in-he after-n)on. That evening the LCI's pulled out of the harbor nd .'c:.red just UP thecons- on the outside of Sousse. On the ni 'ht of the 3th of Tiuly, m tn±u &urin Zt e nijht, nchors were weighed .And the LO's 1_t out to L to r ±dzious%-ii thLET's and LCT's of t he blcance of the force. this rendczvous Was 0.d at boutdayli-rjht in the vicinity of alt , the cacry c ntinuing to:.-rds its destin.,tion.
xt 02453, 10th of July, light Indn orfIt l .nded bh ass.-ult infantry
batt lions of the 3rd Infantry Division .nO tAc 3rd T.-.n' r L]_tt lion a_ k., fourbeacixes on cither side of Lica, Sicily. B; la;iio ht 1 ractic -.l1y 11 aesistaace..lon._ the beat es h.0d been ..vor o_.-m ond the lmin w*as. tin- c~rriA,
) u-
scheduc ....
C0 bt S.o..rn.nd " (less 3rd Batta ion, 66th Armored Rogira>nt) .t Uh..t ...imeconstituted the flo- tinz resurve of A- 3rd Infiriy Divison .cinforccd, .d hadNith thu: o -.z 1urt of the rusorvo_ the 20thI- En~in-.r 2et m :nt (1o <les ,ona 'o-. a.,o..t So.._:nd "A' was lo- ce on 12_ LST's -:: , / LOT's .nd th,,u 20th En'in.. ._rs wore
- 2- --
S, 9
SECRET 9loaded on 6 LOT's.
The 3rd Battalion of the D6th Armored Regiment h.,-d ben detachd from Combatoxm.sand "A" prior to the landing. "G1 Compfly landecd at ed Beach .at dylight toassist the assault battalion in clearing a beachhead .nd destroying be-, ch fortifica-tions. oaany H w-.s landed at the same time -t Yollw Beach .ith the BattalionJeadquartors. Company I landed at Blue Be-ch.
't noon on July 10th the inf_.ntry and engineers were landed .t the port ofLicata, Sicily from their L's. LTE"'s be -ring the equipment of Combat Co.mmand *A"were ordered to t.o boeacs whore nov.<1 pontons ,yro to be used in tting the equip.
.ent to shore from the ships. 3evral LUT's were unloaded -t the port of' Lic.ta.all during this opetion from noon throu-jhout the night of July 10th-lita, .nwybombtrs were active over tlie hirior -n:d b chcs. .p)roxirm'"tely twovr-thirds of theCombat Cor nahdlanhadlnded and were in ase:bly positions ,,orthtrt of Liit, Sicilyby daylight the 11th of July 1943.
2n,- y boibors vere gu-in ctive durir- the unlo din.L of the nC- 0± uieJonma.nd on the .nornin- of July llth and one LST bearin half of bitt Co. nd "AsHeadquarters equipment, on- company of .mEdiur tankis, wnd vthicles of one co-pny ofinftntry was demolishA-.d by -3 enemy-- bomb -ftor h-vin; milo ded only 14 of thQcedium tanks.
"t 0600B, llth of July, Comibat Com-mad "' .s ordered to move >rthvicst on the•om of aro. They we-ved out in r .tion with o-y ny of the G2 .rccr dReconnaissance B-ttalion in front Lnd n advane gu-rd com...posed of a b-tt_,lion ofinfantry with a copany of .edium ta's rrt .ehod, -.Aquarters e.. t.t Co 2md "A'wasfollowed by the artillery, which was in turn, followed sy the ain body. 1stBattalion of the 36th A'rm2ored Regimcnt nd "al Co any ofE the 17th Eninecra -.ereinitielly in reserve. Durin the ni-ht the 62nd Arl-or,-. FiJd Artil ry 3,ttalionw:s attached to Coribt Cortmnd n" ad tw:o batterios of tt 443rd Co- .. tillury(At) wore also atached.
After roving over difficult terrain, a-itin'; sli:-ht resistance fro:. snip-rs,,nd atchine guns and b-in del yed by en .-V 1 -.nos stra,fing .nd boabig t . clu ,leading elem.nts moved into and occupied Naro at 1030L, 11th of July. Dri l.diarJenoral LIurico eRose, Combat Comad Co_.... nir, tce& over th to-.- ai d >dI thearrivl of .7.DOT authorities left two officrs :7n it on of if.stry to in-t an order within the tom. io bli_.fcl of th, 3o .-nd -- d ito ss -mblyposition North .and East of th toe of Nare aftr s.curia; the to',-a dr n_,' pro.red to
..rve on further orders fro±~ higher h,-.d.u-atcrs.
x..t 13003, tht 11th of July and until 15003, the 12th of July, A]:f .t Jom.a-i.dt." was strafed and bot.bed continously by allied Airer _Pt, 2-3d's, P- 9 1's, wee3-2"1 's which hod Aust. en CombatrDe,-mac- ""A for a Germn-'n .rcoral Division whichned been reportod C0 m. iles C~o-utbe~st of Pal -r ao. V hicul .r oazua~is from thisbombhing c -t str.fing sOdcd 'a tri-lly to che diffioulty of tr usportatien 0f m.enwnd supplies.
-3-Its 4 0 W u!IaIAat lfIEZ
P
UM5L ~&FIEO
1JILASSIFIEUAt 13302, 12th of July, n .tt Ic from or forward position wa,.s 1 woh,. on
the town of C .nicatti. Hevy a ti-t .r un fire nd occasional snIping lid not
,loy the ...dva'c a> a t 1500B on thQ 12th of July, Canictti was occuied 4troops of Comb-t Co.nm0n- "A". LI: ite st 1 s xreru taken to secure the tor_ 1nd
=y o :.c . ts w-oere pushed from the high ground Uorth ast of the toin but could not'o aislodgod direu'tly to the North a-d West. During the ni ht of the 12th-13th ofJuly, reorgntliz--tion of C omb t Co'n .n "A" was effected a:nd a coordin.-ted 'xtt ackof inf ntry, tt.nks, and artillery was lunched a-uinst the enemy stronchold in the
hills North and W-,est of the toiin. At 10302, 13th of July the townv ,s s comp1ct<Jysecured and the high rowund Northeast and 'st of the team was in our hands.
At this tlie, Combat Co-nano. A as to b- riljbwed by the 15th 2CT ad .d ut180O, 13th of July, 1943, the 15th cDT hId tsken over our dv rced-positions .dCo-mb .t Co.v :=.d " pulled b-,I....,to Wcm.tCof Aplleicned into Force res rvu in an asse-bly pooit"on in the
vicinity of C.unpobella.
During the 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th of July, intensive, __rosoive r.co:msi-ss nce was conducted in the entire sector of tte 3rd Infantry Division Reinforcedby Rconnn.issc4nee Coup r-ny of the 66th .,r ored Rc izBnt, 'qB Corpany of 32ndxmored Reconnaisance .att-;lion .d 1C the roon:masa:1ce patrols froms the it.rored Infntry. Duo to this .g r ssive r cor:' .ssanco thC txt of I eal-mte xis
occupied by ' Com cany of the 82rid tocmAss toe on the evening of the 15th ofJuly as ;.as the towmn of M onture. The tof aov&Ls occupied on-tht 16th ofJuly; the towins of ,r'ona, Co 31ittini ere occupied by ptrols of the 82nd A'rmored
eonnaissance on tbo 17th of July. The 41st -mored if ntry ..s protoctin; the
Northeast flank of the corps during th t .criod by patrolling the area of '_.v.nusa,Delia, Somantino, Ries , a-nd on the 16th of July contacted the 128th ?CDT at Rios%,the 1st Infantry Division at Mazz-.riao, both ofwhom were opcr ting ith the UnitedSt.Ates II Array Corps on the right of the 3rd Infantry Division Reinforced. The66th Armored Reconn iss_ ace Company confucted intensive reconnaiss.nco in the -rcaSouth of t'e ilne of Serradifalce, L.L C-tildo, Cltnisnt t . D fotatrolconsistin of o. officer and one enlisted .n from the 41st mored In). ... try mzovedthrough the nemy- lines into the ten of C-it aissett, stealin7 t:e oea .y bicyclesad returning through the enemy lines prior to daylight on-the night of 16th-17th
of July. During the 15th, 16th ad 17th of July, contact wts mined .11 :flntaincdover front extending Pro: 4rigunte in the Southrcst, North of the cu s of_ ra con a-d Coriotini - through Milena - to Colt nisata, an airlinc distance of30 miles,
"F" ompny f te 6th r., .ored Regi :eat 7-as atta.ched to the 7th ICT on: the17th of July aid joined them in the vicinuity of rj-ri gentoe. They aejoined theCombaft Com mand the night of July 18th.
On the 17th of July a report was ma de thaft a strong enemy colitis_ v;:s . pproach-ing from the Northw, est tow rds . ra on a6i Cer otini. A. Battalion of Fieldrtillery and the 1st B. ttulioa of the 66thn Arm ored Rc in't :mre alerted to
counter.ttack this enem.y force. Cur recor_ _'itss xce in thint .rea, how~ever, £e .ertc.dno such enery thr~ust nd the counterutt .ching foc 3nv sd
I
~~SE0 RZT
On the niht of the 17th of July, Comib-t Coram-.-d ",A' was orered to be reparedo assist the attack of the 15th RCT on Sorradiflco. Strong aggressive roconai-3s31 ce was pushed into that area. Patrols from the 41st .rm:-orcd Inf ntry wereDushed towards San Cataldo and Caltanissetta ahead of the 15th OT with reserveforce of - b ttalion of infantry supported by tanks _oin' into an assembly areai.edi:tely N[orth of Canicatti. At 2230', 17th of July, Reconnas-Lncc Com.pany ofthe 6 6th _ra-red Re)imnt moved into ... secured te toa0rn of Sorradifalco. Company"E" of the 41st Armored Infantry moved into :nd occupied the town of Dan Ctaldo at2335B 17th of July and by 07303 the 18th of July patrols of the 66th Arm:ored3connaissance Company and 41st Armored Infwntry had moved into ad secured the townDf Caltanissctta.
During the 18th of July, our recsn -ss -ce Jc.nts wore relievil by rcon a -;s-nco elcu-ents of the 3rd I 1-atry Division. .1 towns in our han, were takenover ither by the 3rd Inf ..ntry Division or the '4- 5 Inf ntry Division _ d .l-imcnts of the Combat Co.mnd hich had ben dotched Ucr_ released to rejoin theirmnits and again bee c1e part of Com-bat Coiwiard .t,. At this time the 62nd ..orod'ield ,Lrtillery Battalion 1was rclicvod from Utwcmunt as .;cre thc tvo b.zttcries ofhe 443rd Coast -rtillery (A.i) The Combat Co..nd -oved b oh into the s cue-ssembly area in the vicinity of Ca1upobell r.hero it w .s joined by the 2d ..r:m.roed)ivision md Combat Com]nd "B" on July 18th and 19th. At this time the Comb.to mand was rolcased fromi assign.mnt with the 3rd Infantry Division Rinforced and".vertcd to the 2d Armored Divi ion.
mt this time the 2d snxored Division was place) in Arry oserve with Comibato1 und RQI remining as constituted, except for B" Company of the 82nd Armoredeconnaissaiicc B lttion and "C" Company of the 2d armored Division M~intenanccBattalion which were ordered mder Divisional control.
At 2130B, 18th of July Com-b..t Cornamnd OA was ordercd to movc from:, itsmsecm.bly area in the vicinity of Ca:1pobell- towards tWstclvtran. Thue ' -siti.ted durin the hours of darxn, ess, Jong ti. main axis of supply of' Provision-A01i Corps, going by the route of Cam,,obelLi - Licata Acri ento. They moved into.n assem.bly position South of .rigento the m]orning of July 19, 1943 closi.:?- at9630B.
The Corps reo-aaiscance nd patrollin indicated the front line of the en:e,-myo eO that time fromyeeivna to C-ui.neiad Scenith the crossro .ds innuc.:y hands. It was coatc).plA.d by the Comb v Comnder tht Comw t Cot.nd "A"eould m ove on Pal. rmo. Consequently he ordered s-Ml! p trols 'ci a co±naassanoe of"outes to the point of contact uith, the n:y*Teep rl ee~ ioa,a1.naci and Sc iacca.
On the 20th of July, 19>3, Comb-.t OCo-_and ,'A', was ordered te m.:ove en. P-aler..o-La the route Ribera - Sciacca - C...stelvetr .no and then s; inging Northcst toalermo. Combat Costa nd ,,A, ias to cross the line of dop:.rture (Belice 2ivucr) at96003, 21st of July. The Comeamnd ±.oved into ma:rch bivouacs ;v et of Ribmra .nd Sastif Sciacca durin3 the ni ft of 20th-2lst of July :ith the adva~nced mgard consisting
UIWA~,SBSLF lED0
Uf bU0IE
UNBOLASIFIEDof 3rd Battalion, 41st ."xmored Taft "E" Company thlr e yiSi±t on theline of departure redy to cross at H-Hour. Reconnaissance Crnany 66th ArmoredRegiment was ord red to cross the line of departure -t 05453 13 d 'nova hu:d onCastelvetrano. The 62nd .rmored Field .rtillory Battalion was gain att .ched.
The econnaiss.nee cempay -'mdiately gind contct with the ene.±y and assoon .s cont-ct was gained and while the advance gruard was moving across the Beliceriver Combat Co.:and 2A was ordered to lit in place, clear the roads anv wait foruhe 39th RCT and the 4th Ranger Battalion to p ass through their lines.
At 1600B, 21 July, CorpS ,recounissance, 39th POT mci the 4th P .ng r Btt lion
lad the town of Castclv.trano n.d tt area to tf_ F1ort th. eof. C o-1,tC nd
"As was ordered into an -sse'.'.%ly position North of Cnstelvotr me n South of theline of Sale..i,S.infa, ttaia to s cure th t line .s a line of dortu re andline o Saleof, S.-infar , _. c
to cross it, attack, and siezc Piuleo at 0600. 2421, of July. The r.Aonniss Ance
scured the line of Josarture nod at 05453 proceeded rpidly in the dirction ofdibelini and Coarporealc. They were followed .edi"" tly by the.. ., LV '.rd.Combat Co.and Headquarters mrched bctw.cen t>, dv-.:uco urd ,- the field rtillery,rith the .. in body nd the reserve consisti_ c of the 66th I(rmored T n
reconnaissance company, one mediu tank co:m:pany .nd Ist Battlion) and 2nd B-tt -lion of the 41st .c;i:orcd Inf. ,ntry -s the m ain body4 The rcrcrve consisted of 1stBattalion (loss one company) of the 66th .rmored Regiment.
Progress of the colmnwl as uniinterrupted until they reached a point one m-ileSouth of the tom of S- n Guisseppe. The first contact with the encmy waUs gaincd *t10143, July 22nd at this point. It cnsisted of -.n eney minefield covered by anti-
t tak guns and iachine guns. This was reduced by .ction of the reconnaiss .ncecompany of the 66th 1.mored Regiment and the Adv nec guard. The ovcent thenoontinued through to the pass North of San Guisseppe where minCfields covered by.nti-tank tuns nd achine gun fire halted the forvard -ov--nont at 1230D. Artillery.zs called for nd pl.-ced on nun positions as far as possible. The co._.bind efforts)f the advance guard and the reconnaissance company of the 66th .rmorod tgiiont.,_s able to reduce this resistance by 1315B nd the column started . oving throughhe pass.
.t 1500B lcadin elements of the columnL hld ro echcd the cores restrjinz lineavin' encountered enemy resistance of a iinor nature from- the pass to thc point.Patrols xtere sent out fro'- this point Jon the route oPlnoreale - Palcro .on cross-ountry to Palere. These patrols meAt resist Lnce all the y ihto the city. The
econnaissanco pftrol by-passed-ost of lth rsistsnce hile the dv ace uardreducd$At and by 1558B had entered the outskirts of Phlcrmo. The entire resist-nce into the outskirts of the city 'a s from cu), n crew--s.
By 16008 Palerxo had capitulatei -- I :. resist ce !lon, the route to thetown-a ceased. Comubat Comma.nd "A" ssemb led in the outskirts of the townaTn thesaburbs South thereof and reor~anized on the nih ofte2ndo uy
C,.?. of Co~nb t Co:za=nd "'" opened at 22303 in the Villai T asca en the 22nid of
F uly.
-6-
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Reconnaissance Coiipany of t-e 66th i'r_..orod 2 -gi: ,- t iz- trols throughout the ton, the re:.aindor of thatn±itt and the next dLy util they.:ore reli-ved by elements of the 3rd Infantry Division -.-ho h-d moved in from theEast. Thu 41~st .r:.ored Infantry maintained patrols in Lioaxeale nd the suburbs ofPalermo and guardd prisoners a. t nS,_ Guisseppe, Soore .!c, 'rib4Thi and S. Ninf-.
he 62nd .r.ored Field Artillery Battalion aws relieved from- tt elaucnt at thisU il;e.
On the 24tl of July --ove-ent -.as initiated to thQ Division asscbly area North-J-est of Palerno and this n:ovuecnt as completd at 174.33, 25 July 1)'43. Upon the
2o±plction of this .. ovwnt, orders '-ero receivet fro Division dissolving7 Co.batJoa _ad "." as it had been constitutd. Xs of 1772, Cl units reverted to Divisionontrol at once.
During the entire ction of Co1b .t Co1nd 'A.4 0 n the islcnd of Sicily there
as a wrked short .gc of c-rgo vehicles 1 riers le.. .._>, p'0 1o..Cl - t ie S. C n Usc i tl t3upply of -ll classes of supplie.s to tc uni -.o the .Cobt.: en....... orC A:." t'i Co .nd 'DOC,_:i . o
)roblem. It w's t1.ougt best bcause of the short go of trucks for tr.ns-ort.tion)f essential supplies to support theopcr-tio:n, th .ttruciksofallj.1unitsfofthe
ombat Conand should be brought to2thur to op.rate under centralized control.
This plan was put into effect LaI-±edi tely upon landing .t Lic .ta on the 10th,ad 11th of July. This contraliz-tion was necessary to insure timlcy ccoipt of.ceded supplies of all classes, ince no one unit of the co ma]lnd h"d sufficient of.ts organic ;.hoeled adinistrativc vehicles to be self-sustaining, Thuspart ofhe ammuition section of thu lIst A-r'xored Infantry had to be called upon to hauluel and lubricants to Cle-ents 4' the 66th r:orcd aion trucks of
section fomd themiselves m-aking; the run to .munition dumps and thence to forwardluzonts of cIgaged units.
Such a mthod of operation obviously entailed dumping of one type of load inrdor to refill, at so::c distant point, w.-ith another type. Every effort "as m cintain some trucks as a rolling reserve ith balanced loads, but this -as possible
-aly to a sr.ll degree due to the .idoly divergent z:unition require:nts of thele-..nts of the Command. Opertin gunder c nditions as outlinod above, tvancelanning w,<s limited, _'nd as the needs -f th front line elam:-ents boca:c kaonox.n, it-s a matter of urgent neccssity that all cogs in the vh-icel of supply mush a-t once-.d begin rolling forward with the required loads.
The problem of supply was -artly h .:pcerud by the i ct th. t su_-1y line ofombat Cot. :and " Q .t the end of -ction stretched fro . Licata in the South c:ntralortion of Sicily to the :/est at COstelvetrano a.nd tteace Northe. st across th-eshad to Palerm o, a distance of over 125 muiles.
The Tbove outline is not a recuau=ended p1 as of operation, nor is it aticipa_ tcdtat a repitition be necessary. Ho:'cver, for all its unorthodox :-d rapidly cenc :v~d. d extended mlissions, proof, of its efficacy lies in the result "the sux~pert of theosnand_ logist ically was maintained. "
I
SECTION III - Casu,,.ltios And Pis n as.
o. at. oa ror.i dvionwic is not b'sica-lly sot 1U9 tocaturc and evacuate prisnnrs, the srift c yitul tion by all cn.<y resist-.tced.resented a problc:m ofthe', Co'_-t .... :5 K c-"ncatiag,9iiso in souch- iors as
never been nticieted. Consquently, so ccurate chock could p,)ossibly hzvoicon :zdo. 2here possible prisoners xwer- evncate to 7,7 collectin point where
I 1 to-a. :tt_.chcd to Com-.t Co- ad 4A r .s in .operation. My times unitsv--cuatod the prisoners only to the closest i2CfUtry unit supporting their action,
.- g no accurate count, but merarely turning over a group of prison-ers to theilf ,nury unit for uvasu-tion.
From July 10th to July 23rd 194$3, th re n 9 3,907 o:y of1±icr anr eCslisted-en who passed through CtC t o.:C).V( ± P? cli.tin; point, ...... tun>veto units of the 3rd Infl-tntry Division by cleu:.cts of S 2oI_ So. -. ' ". In additic:to this figure, there were over 3,000 priconers turned over to the , Lr±-.-±r~±Division by CobtCo 4nd ' when-c tt d r ion toocv ttof prisonurs during the Palermo push. This 2 7i tot,.,l bet;een ',000 an 7,000prisoners captured by Cor.ibt Co-.:rd "9 "ti tA 14 day period of etion w± the isl ,d
of Sicily fromi July 10th to July 23rd, 1943.
The -.mount of en ya aterial capturet a:d turned over to Force 4 'T other-4's is undeormtined. In m-.an ; coos beeuso of rapid ove:oat, Otbat Cons2ad UAI,as only ble to notify higher heXdquart rs of the aosition or the lee tic: of thiscaptured-mtrial. However, it is k o-n tn t 57 e ... nti-tak gus ore knocked
cut and d strayed -d that 15 one :y field picos 4ro put out of Cetion in C1ditionto thousd:_,'s of rifles, rovolvers, -.chine wrs, s: other small ars. The 1stttalion of the 66th L.rn.ored Regirent located end notified hiIcr h7qurt.rs of
,0:- a.nti-.-ircraft battery cozplcte t... ready 2cr operation o the utskirts ofPa 1icr-,-ao,
...caog the prisoners captured w- s Mjor Goneiral GiusCOpe- )Iolin, ,o .angJoneral of a Coasta-1 Division near Pale .. : . U jor General .... oare, staff
.ombor of the same unit.
The prisoners captured wore for the most 1 art Italians. Ho:Covor, ttr ;ro s a
r.cll percentage of Ger:ns or troops servinr i theY G n .r j.
Casunlties of Combat Cc ma..-d re be vist dun the first five 5 ys of-etion, but w.-ere very light cons iS ring tA 1 l-rj scale At'ision~s "tte:ptod -nS±ccon:plished by the Co. a....d Casualties of IsC-- ±dsr c2 -used . by thme aer1seurees: (1) Csue.-.tias caused by tir bombgo of ships -II be -cees chile !-nin(2) Casualties as a nesult of enao2y ensta o:.eats )r strafin; (3-,-atisC 1eby fire and bomubing by our own2 aircr ft. In, the entire -ction on Sicily covered bythis report, one. officer ana 25 e:2litcS ±2en -.sore hilled; t;.eo officers ±2-d 38 enlist-oad m.en ar.listed as muissing in actien, a.:N, six offiscers _nd 173 cnlistuu- n .a wreevacuated to field hospit is.
*To.'ns :hich- msre occupied .ith no rsist.-ce by Co.bt Co-: :d'," 82ndceconnaissa:-cu Battalion had previously boon in area however so full or.lit is not
cla~i<ed.
B. Prisoners t'Cu n: *,000 to 7,000.
Co * _s__ltics
KiledOff. 2 .
1 -25
Missig in .ctionOff. M.2 38
off. EM.6 173
D. Total uiloac coveredbypatrols: 254 -ifcs.
Comb .t Qoonts fthur than tcorn-iss..co or
nOS:,Cnd.
0FFIC IAL2:
/,0
IJKGLA&SJFIED
$7
a a f a
3 2 2 TU2 T
REC'..PIT JL'TI aLT
0
4MLSECRET
UQE: 4j IQ1cuiW _ic(X K D ';"TG C2!!!) ARUCIDDIVISIOUT
Sntod on moprwo ncoo in 3icily an Tunisia, I lave seen nothing
to in..c I. Ur. •. "-. I ti m ,rong with our reoent oi- uzctio. I do
cc- Lover that the cobat r o nd staff should be Incroasod to Ovidc an
0"Sah .r for ec posit-ion. i suffered oorwdornbly frcu t.a i nlaek--
oie of my staff wul&1 ot icO": tind io uld hbave 'n one to take his place,
.cr for the sug;Gestion ttL thu . o.. xc • nin L"n'nct
rtzat 'riot-, of the battzlion iieadmuters co:Ap& c Ac ilci
: ..tlv.:t c Liro. xn.,iico, I .oul& say-tl~oc, ±2 i~ -co .'r d r-'., s.,.on. whyJ . .i
a.ul
T TLf TT~
.e ssul itv c mr e to,:o _ 57s to replac 37,3-"- (.'( :c .. , arc not of
oI....' L . LJ-o L" . s ' o - t It is
t :c only til g " c:a&no the gortn -fots out c$ ticLr noait:tonzj. It is
el ...ccivc "wgLhs crzonnoc! is. £otdifil. Tr.,fi;to'. it is a good bur h
c. on, fo;- t z:s, C.lx Itaui.zn' .its: l>.v:v hZ':lim - ,' cxw,. :ns cdout like ;,P.
-- ca !,7 , ..... v,;:.: -.1r b it isduo to gev I
is dcfnitelyf n rnaCine ftrc' "'r ,trm as t',o tart is hilt- the LInd of
L .....1 - - r - r -
V-1 r , ,f , -, : 'mIF-% c t.Thc 4 Lr,.Jp zLr;.o.z I pI1ffttC $fIE
* *•
UBUSMIEDI Uk the halttrack, scao&r ot. I definitely jtIW/ u nl
repiee the Infant halftracks with trucks, I ued gV hs2faa mota
Infantry as cavabr. seat tn o uzr4, had them ditut, lpa theafa
tracks irce arom sa back. Neer w lot a halitrack dong It,
The tw2 Isfie. V/e hve mod xI use of ilt w mwdsi ach
re ve icle a long time,
We want about our r psoptn of motorcycles in the combat
contwl for meongere and for colum con l.
The arored division mt m tIre, 'o steal it right left,
In the lit hre Division we alwy used it. I do not rmmber a situatU
no ztter fast m ng we did h wire to oorbat ccwk,
I bee in dr6pping the B rakbag, ot the A hnracm c bag.
I uld k to be rid of the i for anything otir tahn
strmight dirty fatigue use,
'e would .±kFaow ordinary pork and beans for a C ration variety,
rWaazsS DOflflE mMzurn :s-DXRxzcAt the time of the NARO-CANACATTI buinmess we wee attacked rapeatodly
ait eft~ely by our o~ air oor, At tbat~time our casualties totalled
the sanw fra our own air acio an from ezwiy action.
The MZ~orecI Force ckorn ar4 training is bas±caUy aoti
Owr efrjmmshp is far superior to tht of the Gennn. Iangs work
has cerati yZ xxi ditidae, &AUl *en we were moving into Pale'rz
Just norti of a Gisopp4 we fowd t f8e in rnaition with the usual
m yL ptection The maft-lry was wel back at the nwatj. I
brotzht up tw 75m samult M we lugged it uut at 5.o yard.
$7 UiEf 0zr
JAW
officer while the battle was in propee, I agroacd tnGema
eomancdnr, Gua Krase9 end gave bin, the terms9 Un ftonertt W.u HI
0 9Rose, ootd.IE
!nocOPkd ther ou cc j te4 AtoL the loos of a vehicle to us9 tlo
we did looae several me. As sn as te & Lrm ncksd out, tanks
took out the xc hinegun.
Just south of Morneale, a subuf of Palcmo, ten we AT weapons,
and armored vehicles (not identiied) up ai a con a biL, covering the
.road on which we were arwoaok . Ts e- position e eg
by asault gtms, and the tanks and infantry of the advance guard, !rhAU
the 11' )ampeny of the 66th A0, cut acrs oountryj by*essed the ce
delaytig poition, and by the time the advance guard bad licttted the
postion, the RCU Corpar had a edy mtered Palao The meat of the
story is t.hi: A bymssed delayi. position is no d-elaing poaiton at
all. had tho position been fought In the orthodox Wy the delay would
have lasteC until darkm, and the advenee could rot have beem resued
until Moring.
Thc bignt lesson M ato, as early as possible , yet ry
tan-23 on a broad front and keep mo% rng As soon as the I two
tanks on a front instead of om 9 each tank has only about fifty percent
of the anw fire to withsta. As soon e there are a ntvr of tsnke
on the front the ew fire is so dltributed as to be alm nrArlized
by formation alone; nr own tir comP]tes the netralisatioc.
fl' hes br tco dad nawh talk caution and firm
reonmaisueno, The aunt be bo34m
I was the offic ent to deliver ow twins to the Gsmmzw in
uramnditional sunder so I mitered the Gem nes with a Owmn
W-- -- -01 -. . I mmF
7-V
Rose oontd:
General Krauae :cil..d houmch tim he had.'I pointed to a line of our tan cs
aprmacbnc-- a line exdLng as far an tl eye c o ard saido
"TheO they arc, you cmn figure for yor tow muhtoh e yu have."
He saido " I accept. km, how nmch tbne do I bae?9 I said, "Twenty
minutes", This implidtrMt minuteM to pock and aoCxpany me to
general Paruo, Tboy wo shelling tn Omu w post ubiCh helped
to-opeed things up, In V WpfenGe he gave the order over the voice
radio in the clearw "Cease firing, .ee srandpore ,j. terw unconditional".
I radioed 4jrnl ias1nm. Afte the Gmu *esed fire *we did so.
(In the SiUiion Campait) I usd halttrac1 uz1ed infantry
as eav lry; sent them arund; h tL s d ntp bad halftraoks circle
aruicand back; nevw los* half track doing it.
I do ut believe 4 acmlndr n of tho graje of ooloral or hIts -
ilv ever get into a tank. I opate frc m bantam with a 193 radio.
Yaajus c., ane t see or ontro from a tank, You rver see the coral
post f the start f the battL to the end of it. You just see a motom-
cycle mesmeirfran tdn to tie.
Thee met bc 4-fbulckz in the advrrco cuard.
Wi, e i .e ayxmter@4 lad with luifantrf wire tweed
goin S posuible, lamd 4mth talm
As a tninnt b instill' reeponibilityp I r- oomamd-- th tunn of
geud=* seetions, tuv$ the lik,ovr to wrsxtnonod oflioea to tck
oult wI guide end wpol for periods of 24'4 tw.
/lED
(XL 13 @ SECRET 9WT (LB-P.J0llcutive uficer CC B ADoE(UEI LE[[hT:
Flmrc ed £ccrez&, wenood ~bettor rz14t,
Better vision do'iccc r indicat-ed, stood a buttoned w tt a i
while it xw fighting; - raL=e I had to call to the tank comnner
about new threate h dii not eoo, The xi need for Lhe device is to
get Mder oUrcur barage of tine fir..
The ratV tc rz r u. Cr1uoLh.o is ;zx',d o; we want the steel track;.
chevron type,
lessoas training docte xpricnc,
Soe our situation vrio, £r" orml in this carapaign no
lonsona are o be drawn,,e loot three klled cad oi(%t knksInked - out in the canpaign aM
-ill need re§Lrna aCCVr4Ar.
PWLL livn at a gasaline dup; MOVo 50-100 yards away,
flet evacuations of vehicles ill Le in the dark, We have done acne
relpair succosnt3y under artilr f Lire, trpc of efs it,,
The CA= IV certainly, aaybe e VIp, can be t.oimed by'
ehOee (itrr~iaj) or by WM an tracb;, ad moasiaa,
%$Streos in trtdinge 46a1Anm sisas for use vten radis o ut fiorders and tage dtntioa.
In so~ of ocr nnvmsts the jxdnt cr ir.e inking fox ty mil per
ho ws tired urcn an the just couldn tt be hit; t epwi tfl they
eould pul off tadcr cover,
Any detacut sat to other organitzations met bui with that truck
for supply, zoalntananco ut, rmelo, to. Outfitsto w o thq ar
attached do not r Ipo ovide for tlni
U5LAE EO
.9 9SECrsr
WL LB U UCQ4JICUOflAUJING U5hIPA 3BU (AIRDW)
we went a the helftraosIn t btaon whoh are used for
wmtion toar rplaced by st &*Ar4 2jton trucis.,7 ano i -nithckwrof dou t ttat or pt out of L .50 l Os
the Gaun airma change h d and il.
SUPPLY,
The parts suppym totally )aodng in this csmpe±a
fli t x s nin ebet q , 9
The uw roenin ildng R&* Is to ;t their intrimmn
ifiatliw ahead of their fichtimg islifatizw; ti Culd be rm
rts that are r rfeta- cld be hp.
i Ti NwG nommr -ElWQTCTtne a talacy to fl es lebe with artilleryrae
than siml sai the aeeded Th this em-a tre u mt bta
eta Stsaoof usingen wsplacdbfltmliaa for lne hnegt ae
Orgutattalions do not m our rvation facilities, W
etnuld be sate to su pr a bettalion or regiment of inftry or
tasks nther thea t. reinforoeir regla supctn artiery.
1t eessto pin anrk ,,tbm - thattlasbe
SECRETOL&E I, D. z:., VtL%.NDfl CC B3, "ND ALU'&) DIVSION.
Theis srie duplicationInts*regmente -and in the cctato nd, IS the TS orr,,.Ltton with sepr~ato batt oa , t i
be takm care of* I an rt vaory twfdn 4th the ropsed T1* I am
incliod to think it unocononica with so many eperate battalions having
serzate maintainanoc its and the 243. I iwj t al a yl aa that
the prcset toao=Aion. or zatton .has boen p v oIng,
I rathcr like the one light tant @cxpk ny tt rztiz tank conpan
batcaJion; I hawe never used it in camt bmt in maneuverz it vorks,
U * (X~ l he r ho'isIxbea#cnaia noe" oection Li the 2.q
i& ntical 7,vkth thttiLn a lie0,naC
Cue of tle three 105n battalir of fiel artillery in the divisiosc-!C be repltcd itt-1t1e 15m h tUer batt . Qur arnred artl
is fine.
I th nL the division should have a RM regtat c', that vv:should
do am #yith the regtxntal . o. The reZLmn*nd Cn now actually
orks aunder the (C, This ro vould eialfly RCtrnini if one offioer
was in charge, te M esct nI U zglinmmal R'OoomMy slcn c aCO&x .i , bf the {CU battalon,. Lb diftnome is in the trarct, The
IZCU. ccnipa rmuie rcre training than ay other type unit to be tvrth
ts nist; regimntal M h corpste ar ro gtig suc training, I a
a regmetal oczxer w.z deeply Lnenstel in r RCU ,pc~ but th
ziy naltituda other dutes old mt, 4$vs It tho supf that I
na m I br vz riht; I oiuld not brin; it up the RQ battalio
tamr. I have one a b Tat o at I T
poseslo, noo- iill oonlderd 9 bic organizstlon for the prorose1
IU3BIED
I D White, Contd: SEORtRan regimcnt are: (a) A tvn bcttelion r8giuvtp each batttaion with two
RON canparco= , a;d one tr,-Wn comn (b) A three battalion rement5
one buttalion to be cuqorm' IofVt t Ox w. , and the other tz
battalions each to be cora:poe of f tc RCU cripaniea... In
ease, the eMain thouu0t is to irvotrainin ani acnttratn I
consider tiAs changew08c4tial.
The e is one :f ho nwoeteaet ebieleo we Iav; me are thindn
about the idea c one 4" in och light tank plat w concluons,
The !53 0 Ll aV '11-LL n thu lig t tank i.n do ard bettr.
e3hmiasoutj we nant th 57=mnorbOttttefla d uforlights.
The 73ain in znodiI z' in (Y;, uuat Invo a bott wo tt for the 75mn awt be higher and
Lirhtrt br hel5m
AU2 toed 37e should be re xle with 5713,
The Iton an t-4tbiJ Poe sivuld be dopped.
The rub or tracl are no. dmxd god at lI I ckc't 1ow m&ythtig
about ctoel twckm.
ivt half track vnt do for Ri,. Xe need an crmored car for tI.eAA ur-
:'ooe; novWA I aIve sooemn approaches this need.
the 4 Cas t hud ha VmT r ha Vf9 aSLa owel carrIm
for- the inf'antry.
We &x t we &m' 1-2 bo rak l', smv parpse.
The rdi on the U-C prevents its use as a ooicsnd ca,
Ithak, In gcnol, that cm eqijn is saiecor as to typ,
win are a nistering the ma3Ilr tome It is recogid that it uuld
b u i to hare oneArst Sr each 'i3aep.oapturSet tb&tOehoffiers nest be used in 41case, SEC PrTT
Verde Contdl
I am wridg on the ida of usig the 34 of the divisioal
ordnane maintainanoe battalion as m mn to investigate anp ot upon
capturwed WhOI AD mS oldn, gwns*a ataflaI Ca1 ll lda. In thUa
campg, for lack of such An r sator oauld be onstantly on the
job, a opured, bren mwpr fufly battle sred, rr ark VI tank
was used by M tro Ipmat of its vLIei to our services to practioe
with their bawoka gm,.
QOFY
SACRETArmored Force
Introduction:
The Armored Force representative on the AT. Board in the
NATO was assigned to accompany the DIM.IE sub-task force in the invasion of
icily. The core of this force was thte 1st Infantry Division, - Lajor
General Terry Allen commanding both the Sub-task Force and the Division.
The Armored elements played various role-s at irregular intervals thru-out
the campaign. These roles, from the -)oint of view of the observer
will be related in more or less chronological order, the interview data
being placed in its proper sequence.
I. On the morning of the second day of the cmnpaign a
nnber of German tanks, 12-30, probably nearer the latter firure, emerged
into the Gela plains from the hills some four miles east of Gela. Your
observer, having left tie Division 17 some fifteen minutes earlier
fully primed with the G-2 know leure of the situation, but having no
kiowaledge of an impending ta,)k attack, sa-, a great nunber of soldiers
of all branches leaving the tall sand dhnes 60& yards in from the waters
edge and some two mriles east of Cela. upon enquiry, I was told C(erman
tanks were approaching. I clirned the dune and found myself between a
couple of the guns of the 33rd FA Bn which were busyily shooting at about
twelve German Tanks waich were milling about on both sides of the Gela-
Niscemi* road in that area where it is apiroxitaately aprrall to the beach.
I saw a tank or two hit, but none imnediately stopped until one was
hit and burned. The tanks were giving Ne guns near m e a rapid return
fire until suddenly they began getting fire from one of the 1st Div.
Cannon companies from far to t.-eir left (vicinity of 298278). At this
time the two guns in y vicinity gave out of ammunition and retired with
~SECRET
SSECRET 0
their guns. Also at this time all except three or four of the Cerman
tanks turned eastward to meet the new threat. As they turned there
was some further iilling as tho with indecision; further tanks were
hit (there were a total of seven left within a five hundred yard circle
about point26o290) and the eastward moving tanks disappeared from my
view. I am not quite sure what became of the tanks that did not move
eastward. I am told that tanks belonging to the 2nd Armored Div (CCB)
rolled off LCT's, moved some five to seven hundred yards and gave battle--
I did not see th .is and have not seen the 2nd Armored to check it. I am
further told that there was some naval gun fire (the Savannah) on these
tank-s. I did not recognize it as such. In any case, the German Tanks
came within some fourteen hundred yards of completely cutting th-ru the
1st Division front to the sea and were right handily stopped with heavy
loss.
2. During the next few days it was impossible for the division
coirmander to attach to tne CTs under nis control groups of six to twelve
tanks. It is improbable that these attachnents did very much actual ex-
ecution but thieir effect on our own infantry's morale was immense.
3. M'y next contact with tanks was to watch a day long battle
of the 26th Infantry CT to which the 70th Tk Bn was attached for
Barra Franca. M[y OF was very nigh and i could see a great many details.
The infantry was attacking, tw o battalions abreast along the ridge which
parallels the Mezzarino-Barrafranca road. The 70th Tank 13n was on the
right, east flank, of the 26th. About nine o'clock in the morning some
twelve -fifteen German Tanks waddled down from an eastern exit from the
hilltop town of ParraFranca. Our tanks were allerted from the OP I was
on. The GernTanks progressed very slowly and with excellent care for
cover down a strean Dine and thru wooded areas to;ard the position of
ASECRET
9 SECRETour arks. It- seemied to me that our tanks were slow getting set, but some
Sen minutes in advance they did get perfectly set with the tanks of one
company of nulldown defilade behind a ridge that comimanded the low ground
being followed by the German tanks. The remainder of our tanks v ere
loosely disposed in waides in rear of this front line. As the German
tanks came into range and view our lights let them have what they came
for-- 37mrm at 300 or less yards. Seven German tanks stayed. A small
riuwber retired. MLost of the German tanks were burned. At least two
more ivere knocked off well back toward Barrafranca by artillery. Cur
tanks did not follow thru im-ediately. An hour or two later they moved a
short distance forward (3-400yds) and then retired. Somewhile
after mid afternoon they did move forward and disappear into the shrubbery
all guns talking. <hi[ch concludes the important parts of what I saw
save this: about midday I sav a couple of groups of six nebelmerfer
rocket shells land among our lights. Yet when moving time came
they all moved off in good order except two that had thrown their tracks.
(Col 'ellborn the Tank Co-mmander later told me that these nebelwerfers
killed four who were momentarily outside their tanks but did not in any
wise hurt the tanks.)
4. The morning after the Barrafranca fight I met Lt. Col
'ellborn and his executive Major Davidson, and Captain Tapler hs S-3
on the road and talked to them and took the following notes, notes that
must be read in the light of the fact that they were just out of a right
hot battle."210mm mortar sh ells landed within 10 ftof tank but left it undamaged.Use only medbwns or better in combat.
Speed of the lig-ht talk is not necessary
in coribat..ust have a larger gun for combat.
SECRET
m
O SECRET
The 755mm howitzer in light tankchassis, the m-8, would be betterwith a 75rm gun.The Platoon leader in a half-tracklacks mobility-- has to use a K ,!-8to keep up.Drop all half-tracks in the tankbattalion except those of themedical people.Take no change in AFS tacticsteachings-- but-drop -the pl'rase,
tnormal situatipn". there is nosuch thing.
All officers fight anbuttoned toassure control--must keep headout-- teach that this is necessary.:Iigherpowered field alasses arenecessary for higher officers(eigit power)Do away with cannister..e want only two kinds of armun-ition, HE and AT, both as highpowered as possible.
A-LT
!
L -I
* SRETSThe next observed action of tanks was in the fight for B0MPBiTRO.
The plan for this fight was simply that some thirty tanks of the 70th
light Tank En plus a doven or so attached tediuns would be the leadoff,
the shock elements and would be followpd thru closely by the 26th Inf.
Altho I observed this action from a high vantage point, I could. see
but a very few individual tanks and those only for a very short while.
The broken nature of the terrain, its cover, the smoke of battle, and
the smoke of burning fields prevented anything like the over-all view
I had earlier at Barrafrarica and was to have later at Gangi. Later
reports show the 7a'k Bn entirely successful in driving thru all
opposition tlo they suffered relatively heavy tank casualties, this
latter probably due in cart to the fact that the 26th Inf Combat team did
not follow tliru closely.
A. Day or t-vo later I interviewed ,ajor Davidson and Captain
U,6ampler, Executive officer and S-3 of tne Bn respectively with the
following results:
DRGA!IZAflONeconmended that one Warrant Officer f-aintenance be
changed from the Bn iq Company to the Service Company-- that is where
he is actually used.
Ve want one company of mediun tanks in each LIGHT bn.
EQUPV"NT:
'e want at least a <7ram gun in our light tanks (but also we
want one mediiun company in each light battalion).
The m~ultitudinous pieces of soldier uniform should be stream-
lined along the Eritish lines of sinplicity.
Self sealing gasoline tunks for tanks are not considered
,n ... , -,
OF
practical.
The gasoline cruising radius of armored vehicles is considered
good to excellent.
For the fire-proofingr of tanks vwe recormmend a more generous use
of asbestos.
..e recommend the deletion of all half tracks app-earing in the
Tank Bn Tables except those assigned to the medical detachment.
As %4 armor thickness and ability to w ;ithstand renetration we
can say we6 gettinmk~urt in lights br anything that does not also
hart the rnediur--s.
"Te have o exnerience with 'esel driven tanks but with -asoline
wve are asir a lot of tanks to burning-- wc woulj like at least so-ie
diesels for comparative and ex.erimental prpoFseS.
The T-2 recovery vehicle has been invaluable. le casualties in
the battalion to date (July 26 1943) have been roughly as follows:
Of 39 officers, one killed, tm' o seriously wounded, one sligqtlywounuded.
Of 7 2 \ 9 _ .., eight killed, four missing, fourteen'serio-slyw;ounded,
fiften sl-, ightly wounded. . liftyfo r tanks oily seven have been
total losses-- a good nany others have mee knocked out, lefl, rec)vered
repaired and are readyi for action aain.
As to tank vision devices, ospecially for 4ank commanders, we
believe that tank commanders,. -. U... T .- :r-. . ... . 'T.... :.AD?, OLjT., until small
arts fire is received rcarilecs )f vision itevices now available.
F.urther we believe that this face. skouli e taughF as basic._ d c t rine.
Te have had no experience with steel tracks; however in Sicily
rubber tracks used from LlIA ttira Petralia arc now: of nocessity being
sih;- a"- E
moomr-
WOSECRET W
turned after an ,veraj-e of Just under two hundred miles wear.
AD,. orT! S 71 A TiO ,:
..hen battalions are attached to Infantry divisions, as this one
novj is, the Ordnance sUpply must ,e closer than nias been corrnon in
this campaign.e greatly desire to have the idea )f furtshing tanks and
tank crews as complete units of replace-lent pursued to a conclusion.
'7ne hundred fifty replacements rece'ved from the 7C at Cannistelle
about C/lF/43 'ere unsatisfact-ry, altI& there were a few excellent
men among hc:n. l most none lad 'arred t raining. Some had as little
as eight days basic training.
Iattle field recovery of all :sefj 1 atcriel has to date been
104. TLe T-2's are grand.
,anned heat, like that of the I.ritisi, desired.
TRAININMG:
Discipline--- Discipline--- Discipline---...
Infantry support must be close and i mediate.
Air Corps officers need a cople of lessons in map reading and
a couple in strafing and bombing. Our only air attacks to date have
been four by our ow,,n planes and xe have suffered no casualties from
them.
M edium tank crews should be capable indirect-fire artillerymen.
Ta~'k commanders must keep their Weads oa t unutil small arms
fire is received regardless of th:ie division devices nov. available--we
believe this should be taaght as basic doctrine.
Shortly after the foregoin1 j interview the comm anding officer of the
SECRET
SECRET
0-0ttlaon (i.t. Col. ' eIlborn) cam ,e in; He went over -y notes and
agreed with his subordinates in detail and added:
Te believe that a new type tank designed as a special Lead
tank should be built. , ts use-- to be the lead tank in channel-ized operations. Iuch a tank would have a heavr 5un, would have its
armor lightened every.,w 'here except in front; the front anyior would
be thickened byr as .any, inc °;es as proves possible-- six inches or
more of ar.or in front would not be too much.
2:houlder holsters should be furnished tankers to ease their
evacliation of a buruinr tank.
P.ange estimatior Til TLLLSCOFIC SIiTS must be taught all
tankers. Range estimation is not the ansver; the answ'er is range
esti-mationIT ?ZLLSCOTI2 SGHTS thru which the tank gunner
ever sees his prey.
Te have developed a couple of items in the battalion that are
of interest. One is a small metallic point so wi-elded on tle roof
of' thie tank turret that it is in allIgnEmnt with the vertical
Aairs in the tank commanders periscope, when the tank commanders peri-
scope is parralel to toe gun. "Vi k t.is device in place t he
tank commander who has found a taret , >uts h'is gunner on it by
having the runner rotate Vw turret until the m etallic point takes
its place in front oC. the '-old " airs; the turret is thus stopped at
the right place for the guner wi'th his fixeJ periscope to pick cm
the target. Pnic second item is a black out tent w~hich slides up
accordion fashlion over the regular bows on an K'-3 half track. The
frame for tnis is tvoro pieces of anle-iron waich slide along the
top of the nal track sides, pls three bows of slightly greater
Sm 1T
SECREThci--h- t tha-i "te bows on the half track proper. Pu,-lled out with its
cover in place, and with t hre half track rear door open, wie have a
nice roomy,. blackout t ent.
SECRgT
height than
t" -,e bows
on the half
track proper.
Pulled out
with its
cover
n place,
and :ith
the half
track rear
door open,
v e have
a
nfLce
roomy
blackout
tent.
._ .... . ,i -. f .._ . ./
@ .
he next ti.ne I sa. tar. ia ac tiqn was <ust east of Ca t, on
te r:)'a to Spirltnca. le set up vas thi s: A cour bat toan was first sent
down tiie road to captire two -Iite prominent 'ills that rose from the
floor of the broad east e.,st valley thra which the road passed; this
was in part accomplis-'ied but fa rther progress would be difficult and costly
in casaalties. hen a combat team was sent do-An each of' ine two
ridges bounding the north and south of the valley. This was done but
it was found that to close the pincers thus In part established and
to cLean out and on? u eiachod out area wvoull 1i elD: be a tter
of trading the r.an a one for one cas altv list- not our-.tay. It
ias then d ecided tfo send r;.flht down the floor of the -va1ey toe 70th
%ark ' rrinforce,' woth some twelve edius. Tc boftom of the valley
;,as narrow-- in rare placrs th) ere was .a maiever -;idtn for ta?.s of
t, hundred fIfty yards and this cutby a dry stream bed with sharp
SECRETand/or un 'ercut four-foot banks. The average maneuverable width was no more
than 106 yards and in a ,lace or two it was only tc oidth o the road.
from an excellent vanta-e point I watched the tanks --our in >Ust at last
i=iht of' eveni-n- .Iere W as no shooting uefore tni ; anks wert lost to
view in tao closiig dark. Then as I started to tnie rear and nad gone some
four or five -rudred yltrds all guns seemed to opern at once, I turned to
look at te fireworks when I heard Col Wellborns voice as he spoke intothe CF ,icrophone.. I went over and joined him. he vwatcaed for a while
what was to appearances only a fireworks display. Soon 7fellborn
said in effect, "George you may disengage your outfit now"; "Till
you cover him"; "Jxnr you come out now", "Pill wll cover you to", etc etc".
The radIio coTrliunications were working perfectly. A Company comrander
said "Colonel, please send an ambulance and a doctor to control point
ZX; there is a tank on its side tCere". A new voice broke in as
follows "Tever mind repeating that, Colonel, we heard and the ambulance
and te doctor are on the way". The Company Comanders voice said
"Fine, Doc". Tle whlole tank force was in the clear about forty minutes
after -rhtfalI , about fifteen minutes after the first disengager'ent.
The next morning it appeared that not too many Cerlans had actually
been killed, pernas a loz or tywo, bu the attack, but they had had
efplalted in teir souls a : ellova desire to be elsewhere and they
h~ad very promptly acted upton it. The :alley w'as cleared and the
slowed movcv:ent of tive Division eastv',ara became a smart movem'ent. Cost:
two burned tanks; twro dead, five wounded.
SECP :I
r
"e attite of our infantrymen toward tanks can perhaps best be
shn-V1n by twio observed happenings on the campalin. One. I was a division
CF listening to the preliminary instructions being given a conbat team
com-uander for an at+ack. 'is 4ea; was -1-o C&O. TheST CoIvWander started
talking about the weariness of hIs, no o, t-ov.hardI ,2 §ey had been fighting
and narchinr- etc.. Th1"en thatr n rtJ 4 of t'-e instructions tlat said a
n amber rjf tanks would be attacied to nis tea.ri was ryiven rim; hi looked
a L-reat deal happier and said no more aot tired ;'!en. Tho. I Vas
in the CP of a CT. he Pe-imental co ,utications officer came in and
said to the colonel in effect, "Thne ta. ks are coming Lp and you know
mhat tiat 'xeans; tney'll tear up half o~r wire". The colonel, who
I know was not indifferent to co; unications problems and necessities,
replied "I don't give a damn if they tear it all up; hell, we've
got TAPKS haven't -ve". These and otirh like th-.ings loads your observer
to believe that tanks are almost a norale-necessity to the infantryman
in almost any situation. Their worth as a morale factor indicates the
attaczament of' somie to infantry W;ether 4'e are to be used or misused,
either 'hay t e' will pay their ;a.
T'e tbllo-7-in officers of The division with which I travelled
all sated in varimos lanjsacs t at ye- ,,anted a tank battalion as an
i:ntegral part of he Infantry divisi/n.
Colonel J. A;,. Powen-- En Cordr thru Tunisia, Rgtl Coradr nVrS Sicily.
lt Col C E. Peck, Bn Son dr thra Tunisia, ,et x hr ~iy
Maj '.alter U" Grant, Dn Comdr thr Sicily-, Reti S$3 thro Tunisia
Lt Col John ,"illiarnspn Peril Fx Tunisia and CTicily
Lt Col Den Sturn.crg Rn Co-),dr Tunisia and Sicily.Sa t Carlo IRandall Co Com-r Wuisia, Rn 3-3 in Sicily.
.Iaj Prank Calisico Regtl S-b Tunisia and Sicily.
Colonel Ceorge Taylor 2,o-bat Teamfi comdr Thru Tunisia and Sicily
Lt Col R. S. Portr Division &-2, Tunisia and Sicily.
Some of' he foregoing said Reco:.nnaissance Squadron rather than
Tank Battalion but they all indicated one company of lirht tanks and
twfo of mediuns.
,ajor General Troe iddleton in a letter to 771. (Ops Div) dated
July 31st 1-943 said in part:
7he 45th Division Task Force could have used a lighttank company in lieu of one of the medium tank comnanies ofthe attacned mediiu tank battalion. Later in the operationa -ediun tank corpany nun traded to the 1st Division for alight compan.,y. Light %xnks are more maneuveruble and can goplaces where it is difficult to get the mediirn tank. I con-sider medium and liLiht tanks an essential part of an infant-ry division, unless the division is oprating 0here tanks
cannot be used. Thne mere presence of friendly tanks adds such tothe morale of infantry.
i was recalled from Sicily before it was possibic for me to
interview n-bers of tue 2nd trnTIored Division. This will be done as
early as circumnstances outside uy control permit.
Th e notes pertaining to0 tanks token by Colonel 2. C. Hamilton
Infantry met er of the AGE Board who accompanied the sub task force
of wh ich the 45th Division yeas the core, are hereto attached in appendix fern.
A.S.J. Stovall, Jr. etc.
-SECRET
vrST LIT Ar WATH E t fl, GCZIPATY 67m ArwPIDIDRElLr'(hsoff lee took part irn both the Twdtwa aMn SicIlian&iapigns
Twairsa was a case to thm tak r md o a a d
reiablq as, to reoepticag a gurn with sealsvloctysax a tank
with 1loti "tiro hsod
T1~e armor# on the tank could be heevie', but a hiter gun cos
fint, aneuverblity should ntbescifcdto aNr
taly cn3v ue of the tanks I hs bils out did bA catch cv,
fire.
Caqwrs14ts qx darb th the Cemn sight,
c~wr mw m 3 glas is supeior to the Gr a glass
Cir calo 50 AAt gun is the beet AA gun we could have, The draw..
beck is that the turret w ins herd to amo m the tank is moving or
on a slope, .e should have a rie r a sltfler to the b32 zwuat
on the 14L.cbmn trucks.
Our rcdios just do t reach t* far smgh The w shou ld
stan(ardiso radios to enable w ing with other orgnations aM
branches.
The Germzn mnzie- mk aI awe to bmk up alzlc blast,
Ow sse blast baa gLve ow postin away,
TRAIIn DOCTRINE uS S E(Fsassmx CE
For oc,*zml and obsevtion you ban got to be utero you canse
You can't tt D.g observation butored up, Cr3y air bursts or'
ommccntraed staing should cause the closing of the tank omaMm~ers
hateh.en K S akf xn~atcnkttt.aann .luc n lai
and Iatu tlink .
•BA rT
we laned in Sicily on . pi - om att ad to the s xeeth omat
TOM and t Into an s utl earo At 20m wen toM to be r psrS to
get up at 040 for an attack with the infantry. twe did get up at O0,
and I was told by r owmW z m (tbad bee an rooncssawe
the eve, before) to take my platond ! d tho ompan to amthe
asenbly are right beA of the ifantyf i0 area me s to be
fiflsvXy territory. I took the Lad astarted o T. e oame to a read
blok The cpn0cced poited out the Inantry position to ms
on the hi gr,'ound to the front We urn in mm or les a valley mith
sidee. That kept us canalized on the road$. at "bun the road, turned right at
the road block. e had gone a bout 2x yard do the road whn six Fo.
WeIcem O t mnd sbatet to raieel l. yirig to get off the road
where we could be so easily seeu we kW tn trying to find an exit trom the
road. I advised the ooapany to w=tch the flk and to the frmnt, vm -w
got o40-6X yards frm the Infantr tio we wm e openemd c m by Germa al an
and W. Two tanks a w mne got off the rwd in defilade adm brout flr on the
*nairy. learmshle they got ma tank; It burnod, all me escaped (It is
essetial thatevcrycw keep the scop hat free of stuff piled on top
or it and in mrlng eror) traded bows fro that poition; a verwy
wall area for three tan}kz, but good cdetilawe ib. order coae to withdaw
3;im the onl wa to. get out no to o bac cc the road, and slim th
germane bad ruso in on the spot where wo rat enter the rood I ordored
the platoon to lay awoke on the Can position. V. then ade otr ait zm
to the roa bl o we spifleci off the roa in the riddat ef a heavy
had or, tm right an e ould be at by a lid.. I took the l=d Asd
started A ceLiest Fi fi w with his platoon. I got abou
500 y d.amthe road. shells ne lng abcutB wIded
1E k5ERZ
Sieeley, contd:IS C ;z
on my tarikan krcoked out the eihtss I the drive INI the od"
to pun off tlm road wen we got to o we Then I ordered new
sigt heads to be put on and I ns a foot cmaiseane th. Wr to
the top of the hiJ Sw six Genwn tU e w ever oter vecles,
er do= to: v tank right awy Brought q tank into position We F-.t
an acmmition truak ript oft the btO We pt tbree Vie out of action
and tpersnnel carrier pull a em tea v n i out of action;
a projectile had si.pped out of a cace fra the bhat of rapid fir (we
fired 66 roids), About this t me I lamed that four of the tanks fol-
lowing ishad been knocked out, About 14 c altie of then tio dead,
We bace-d off the Il about tuty yards the cre tried to reduce thejaa, on by sn a Aledge on the rme aff, but oouldntrmake it.
Previous to this we were firing AP o n the tigers- ?D stopping them, WO
had mved fn mos position to another a nge s vared fr 90W tO
10 yards, &1.PDd throe of the six tiger with IE, the other thre
getting on thru y fie of tire,. I mt on back and startld looking for
my battahion oor er'Pound h i e ude a rtnnaiesanoe of the
battlefield Found tL tires tanks tE day later9 They we towed ray
by the Gemnwuheaour gunrnt out of actimn- right in pain view. I
Kimw w killed wot lees than ten Gern is
SECPT., i, .'
* * SECRET
Secnd Lieumta Gbaaw Fin m, t Inazr.
(vm the above in Officer wa k wh it as lik to be in aaowl out tank, he gv the foa* stofl)
It wac just east of Gels ab! *,14-1913. IW"wthe tank
oCcend, .The top tw dt atcs wn o We we in fit &reW the hel hit ti t I wa v all aoundo It it the et
I of thI tre, x o Im t t p of the dAver the
assistant driver, oh tcank w lost f"co l stawted going frie
one side to the other of the road; a d In the left diteh. I but
dcs ad &aked tether we are on tire. n 1ax s M 4 the rd s udd
he mn.-, no fire but at it we madNIe. I told the dr.ver to see ('uhother the tank wumd i mo# to p Se said he could no, i $0
the ona mx to ebaxbn tank I go A ut fit and juuped out toArd the roadand seatted in the bar d2tc0, fa hatche opicxid end th t
drivar and the driver etatedw Z W .gn- ot out with h
The radio man fof-lcu, "§m a mee 3mr I xtioned them to fofls
me. The rver A the ro M de a dirmt rmIn direftion The
gysand the aaistaft driver nt tright)tf~tem pswe Jimp"
ino deV in a little rer sta a very few minutee. ceu-me
the tank t&t a beiai moos p-- Mnn =0 owgetting out,, Beca of
the hefinbw lftcliminga bll.A lter it traed q' ak
The ank ie urne. Al. htchs ar ope wi thetir stated
SECRET
* q SECRET
fla! .wgsu t, R. ifon, ooaunlig a platoon of the 67th A%
I lib the psoline egine and we are doing alright with thee we have
bt I uould ptfer a 45 4 r por
We hae a good guz
We at a smem abouto ten out o a bunWred W. ue it for desa-
nton of targetas, to eacite the say to. lay m 50 ~o slx-uld have
about fiften rourds of AP in the hintrei al the rest IE. We use AP
only for tanks;m i m aLl kinds ttofa rI IA be s otarged,
I 311m the rubber track; w o with stee. Steel tacks cut
down s Speed has not ben ass A in thWicmp
The ocsztawl. rxc-hinegun tna1dbe a&.50 cal..
The.,50 la.sareleI t wplhe arnupfAVw. *l we plUUan
attack we patl the AAs de, sa. rnwnit thm right after the attack A04"We rwty ned a better e it,
The.5W t and he = radiosgo.out in dfilae; alao we have W tro= t
with their" f ue
The bet l are (K; tl sxalouder bolster is not necessary,
LSC1 STRAMflflDOC14LEX h2C
(Sgt . wiln,4 wusasked ta noiw a that he dad not know uben he
tt the flateq his ra is contained in the fis paragrap be ; the
other statust were witiru any direction of the flo on my part)
In tank C+ ghting talo it riloy. co lOts of obszxtit Fight a
utter of tanks togeter rather tint one or two ais Tank,---
nu~t get out of their tanks and reconnoitre ba e oxszttin them Nevm
exp the flank of the tank to the en bigg target, thiner ttal,
I us withthe Ranger MMh C Oat we we s at gun
emplacements, etc* *ie u-sly hit t the third slot. TheWU ei tu-sto€/4
SECREI
was ao4Ibe bM mseon Wttws alaotWf Thetank oo -ul
would ma thg eo* tOmatio w t hi. Wbn out of the tank.
I awysf ight vdth u head %&a my taik. I voul4 only button
up fortin tire . I think ve bmc ould be ojwi always. I am to thatifpecssion can kill ta both are lad tn there is a rby bch.
i fighting it th t s w wee in support ak nt
overusod.
hin the platoon ocir=nandw ge toe &pe he t toll the tatk
o as de muechs aa powiblow- t sy tara ho is oin, what t s going to
happen.
I zntrbl y tts by radio;baikelmn lo not xx; radio importatwctual
Een/axt the loader sbvuld have a rog, Snld wipe all
unition, and aftr every fiv or ixote etvu wipe out thebrnah
in about fifteen , and ehould wpe off the blook*
o ass s hou knld tm the stege pla of the kinds of
anunition in the tai.
The Guer should keep hV gn boreighted at all tims'- ur
less than n a day.
"%e loader shoulwd wm tny to set tUD.O asr or daloy.
Enyznin the OflW sould km all Us crwjos
SECRET
M- SEC ETA Staff Sergeant*?4iby PaonSegat6th a a AR
EtthIb el;hv tried thcr
echanics can be,: trnod to
O 75 sa ood s d wan.
Otr radtos kao wrksd nf
The*taWs*.lxna24ibelcnr ,I ies toethertoohg ild do
away withe thmsaoeRAder the bamet
I movld rather have a %U # 50Wr*-aial gun.AT A 50 is C 01 a zOkiuartad 9 etc., but in mtat it ha to be
The g*PP eight is the bout weve got but I icuJiit turn down abetter c inmt, ! is rt as pod asc the GerAn,
We airryon rveweary gpmt
We,.]. a Waumzr4tc in the pootn 5 supm4E 36 AarWN 9 A?,
(Sgt.'Shay was aekd tat be m that he cad ot 1 t he
left thle #4s 5 hsreply isntenslIn the flMparsaphb.14s"
mmod'one or are tanks around awl fire CS the guns# flnkIf Tanks arenot ( V) t tl snu) ot fgt to tanki but wititrur to
d Alse xlbrngfir. frcwatee If the e~tnsw akW ih
the tank* ontiarafcletilade IftpuiMes ittracks atband
SPC7or
SECRETany Contd:
bogle but make noholes in the flor. Ap ach probble arewas of tnes
after engi s have checked the SwA, It is likely that 'the eay
route around the tr" Is rnd, l o ut nLnes vdth a few Es
If I met a Gem ifantry battalo n withe bsoo ar - .w U3dtry to Openal=u
aluse nq Csl.,3Oto Cxl the, infantry ,ha*bm ~etop ut ta mrahb
outposet even in wsetary ote~rpuIn thec battle area.
SECPEr'
SECRET(Note: ttanpting to run down the cause of tank fires I asked the 3rdBattalion of the 67th Armored RegMnt (peraps the oo heavily engagedbattalior in the campaign) to let me teview all available occupantsof tanks that had brined; l u wte not availale due to their ownburns; some were just out of cp; availale were only four. The storyof a fifth is included as a s storay. Each story picks upwith the strike)
SERGLAIIT FA I'S D:?)iIA,671 %flflA E ) I
There were three strikes on the forward part of the hull and one
hit the right front final drive. in we cliited out of the escape
hatch I noticed the front Arrw onr the differential housing was red
hot, Tank was set fire by tracs h itting us whil gas was lking out
of the overturned tank.
s~rAF~rf m m;;IWN67th IICWRM fSC
The first strike did not peotate; hit the flange shield arouAd
the point where gan entors tvrret. esond strlIe did penetrate; went
into Lhe engine ooartment and pa t did not nter fighting
comprtment. Gasoline cauglt fire. to body got burned; six toardo
tile we wer getting out, o mn turned the fire extinguisher on AM
the seat of another mins trousers, w.hiUch -vro afIre, as he clibed out,
and saved Im, (The battalion executive hoard this story and took
additiona1l names and data for the purwce of looking into an award to
reoogize the rcsence of raid of the sol.dier vie' (Lu'~ the fire extinguisher),
OQflj-CHLL F.,Ce~rad, 6m7 AI4J.3 £Cfll.1
The tank was first struck just bein turret on the. right side
of the tank; teared off the hatch that covers the throw-out beorkgs;
did not penetrtte fithting conprtaent ruined motor;smeoke but amSECRET
4 SECRET
nofire Theecond k hit the hull at th- mtor oompartaent, hitting
the right asoline tmanks, The tank burnedT. The gamoe =c set on fire9IRIVAIr Mem lz 67Th AR IEI) 2 ML
FIR-:
1ot Tank,
The tank waEs hit by 1Cs several times. Backed off the road andturw over. It was very hot and acn inside 2e cane out of the
escape hatch. Another sbot- fire started. No shots entered the fighting
compartnMent.2nd Tz-n%.
Alter oeir .it sveral times by a Cenman !-ark VI tank about the
turret and distroyirc our rn and gmn shield, we wre hit b7 an AT
shell; it hit the en.ino cmpartment. (bees it ozploded thegasline.
Flame came out t hru the turret. No s entered the fighting cozpcrtront*,
L JCPC -BDC 671i wchi) 1tE15Tr
lot Liutenant J,L,dldte had his tank struck in the left side, just
below the synneon, and just in rear of the sprocket, Miark show the
projectile had comez ffr/V/t$%4/94t#, in oza a line about rna 1 to
the left side of the tank, and was traveling donard, tefl did nrtforce of thepenetrate. The/arploc of the shll. wa upward the floor of the
sponsora above the point cf irpact :.s blown upward and inv-ard, The driver
was killed irwtuntly, dh1ite, who got out alna Iw.tzi 1Jzy h~ad cevero
burns on the erjnsed jsrts o17 his hands and wrists. 4hite calls it a
UFlash Burn". KU. got out ezcept the driver. Al were burned. white is
stil under tratmmt.. r
1.0 .- , A -. ,'. a.' 4K -:
P7 ilJin. rc=JJUibAP&
are * asipotant as tt*ron Jut asa ocnpated if zxt More 9.ehoild be sfolal*#
S&CRETCotl Sidney1ft Ri mi 41A Armwd 1afantry
OROANIZATIC NI
I would lib*he fourth battain rpse y wm Rangsth21 ton tmuck would b3 mitbe for t batt&in only
0w Attirmed Th~fatryr Ttegliuetml maintonom pume e eiaermod, ie have a platoogu ed a m no mAncqarblo to that of the tank ndmt. The Ia m
offt€er should be a captain.
A
I iethe balftraok a ai;xI bott wnt tho 2jtootrack to
replace my halttracks,
I nil a jecwtemi tr e fthae -omu hm ave ad. up,They f Ire trontthe vehile. ifNOhaveslits to0 roost,, the feet Of W thebipod; nalii eapa.addbtwes uthbe trees, oIt has
nea w t thevehclItUs Atedto ebootto the frmotThepesees o]a.bat fift Im ruSofemito tr the artar,
Vs hvecp&red an ItaiazW Sitatarto pair with mb ofor60=wuters, This givesus btsowaouseofr wewcwat0=
sihs nthe Iaia ta eglr ag tab"leappie
Re SnXt a c wal,0gm axheaoh f o Lin 3 al traobgAdnp the
waterolc e..0
eREDthe foty 3C 3 is gsus assa specialisenareung thm formzythigfetol ttlieto lose he adem
should bec stndrdequipmt,
The table should provv.vid frsa wo t&k~lad ~fO, the
SFCP
rr
p --- qrlr:T -
BID "C ... -. .
2..
bI
em, n~':SECRET- equipmt.-
be mtdo uta~std W ear osiyzwia In thw peep.tn
tf-,*hrv flo n of dif! in nbflity,th
". V can p ja4sw the haftoit Oo~w .qzipt.We
wrnn ts~c);nop(Yor patEIvatt to rwa pwrtoa thirty
t Jack forstraiting Crse/#/l/%$# /%Tur.
04.tio weldeOto*1 in abmet stSn.
e S theequ t tracks: tc fr the oasplas a m
for thess~ 4 service offticr.
I bwve? .Isper.....loe that pfveth 3'Tha unseat e tt I do
go aJi tl/t~e that w*A.4tit* Athe fl7M -for it'.'We ceVWo atoI tu i Drp the A & B barack.,. -/ EL lot of .. m o b xa
bags; the manyto arry on]; tA4 be te*Oar in a Bwetkst cvr
&aoh a cover ti ar hr -tfltvwI~f rce M~a
on blanlnt.I!
hwe ta .t th tla .tr/ I pSdt bu
2u o ha a" good for5.X) ns wwa oCfl an thring on a pairn 'of wae~ ta nh to replac
tA
t
awl he raswcn lack Th taGf~t WI $ eo .4M te trcks
LESCN DOTRNETRAn INIl
Arwred dctrine isgeo%13j ..*.4t .
As a matter of genral *b"-t"0 the bt t -ore t
f•r/..,
/9S. / SECRT
to )spcotc Ith theoctat ndmorthe divisis
r Ie Dp e~ satimesuse the regia1sata .reoorm esVe nthe -flat
wbn the diitonal or 0Qat oomtoz4
in the iwa I-cc tFcir So tcavGncatti, teJavane e
ats w m4 the u and all fold the fooing pattonm
fdflove by a point or e , tur2.aao C meix tanks,latoon of ! SM baIftraomko All tr 1 offc.
sd im tank pltc,
f e by stinl o tus I
Co lie dhow two plate,
vsrtalbn of the ab ovwbh hMau# W s m
riding onthe eciow of tncs bsttte gnnefor tehevUnahn
If n otitnk osJionLw--tewdthe t&aksta*cs a lo
poition as ma ban of fire an4allelsenwwsfor the.ti
the position"toInteps tf seeiftrpan u
flt a* blan p ri ofi nfryfv iats
aur oql b aeo i tru en !abl W,
.in on lghtMneunsqwdHa~bs 8 tt ofoe in im wA#
bfightfora , a b
inxtedtoo socj.they.urn.gttina 6 . fin, ( ,-.
wugb to tntdsxztThyldtoeeozens hlmiec,
SECRFITu
mz~Cortd 1
foot *tdoh acstthiws about a SECouRETVe hasnom. a2ftrck btq twingIit too far fr~ e
on o0oasion b Irgtlfat rt n. hlttraclwto withIn ashrc ad
Of the rontM I
In t ~gtngup t Lop. n haftraoks -mthe silfatris u ing a
prpe, Sta, 1ap•wsor.Ti ed ieu n
plasmat ofm guds 8 *ia fl3z hicle hav to-e b aett o t
especiafl aginmg vhceuainph u-u vhceot@
tire c0s0
WO talme n31kn out of - 1ts regular three cpmtw ton wt
admwtitIn the plAtooqn led t ohalttriok* uThs gIve. Us atracko
for general -a.The ocpany ale hts thre towed thirty eevms*-
radio* e SA as 10 an' f ioyfiwsyi7o~dbe teleexrO itotspm platono riiSt
OIKMUIZi~da n wnanda N "2
mn othe tt44Tb grnnrs ertin sitar pmOp3.ewee
O4l O. / ,,Ii', •.
* to "ifl'y \t.Ibe XC rifles vw* s.tetitutt$s
thin , t
L S IJI il
IANss
epiLmabfl$ nthis operation am of qycoqantes
was omp3~4iy*ic only tornppsanw hepttontruk, W be r~sedat ams to egood M 4inaty
. ' In should be stressed lltrsinu..
It aed s tA$'-frct A wflVearnwe mwe mwthess atcnm*at 18I
n "a, 4t ., r- have wctetAdto be ronably Ntf0,
posil*S~1 ~UInjA ZUttUslater 9$with bavy bei Wltrin
/ ECt,
north of IA a ag t &tts*A m it. a a step b Wp attack,
a4 due to rsitana to ewrin of tmff , dayligtrmw - $tn sVrtsl otfit eou3A attackfugt
*u uaonaainb0dos wlnu ptkm WekgngfrcaO53Oto330
we we ndwr ont4r ai y rno t M atang osas
DOW.
It S. mossairyto 4w $ntnrAnfsty for a
mp....This atn..wkd In.COt n"In btan e3Wc
us dao. The laingwoawtad Woan swt Mtow to attak awl
occpya defnte c, Twr edvoncwl reached the objeouve9
and concerned itself rrmaly 4th iging in. An hour LAte, when the
battle M __ _s !ty. I ~~ it des'easng .ditanes on mawsrs
it van ocawa pratie to adopt *at41&y them fontn fr a
day or for a sight meh I het h the cet oo 1 asa
north on Pain this w a ffln o , 4 the w n at
abot 3( topxkiaty * ~'e~fetie Irmoa fdapostiosr a
about 30( yar," Iw a, the advance gur at the tin, and
we bad both Z4$it adtomedn0inifb n ht the only mmforce
that eWuld r ove with the situation w foot ifatr, thi w to rUe-
tinily m risflity. I the rA in th. are ctteld with
heavy stufr invauabl in dftinn bpt wels in the ngt, & mmi
,of our op aons 7 o the d a Sato the zh aw tn niht
into the day that we s t atms ws aluc fornf -&Afg or
SECRETIloea, wentdsfoRM Uo on td partsular I too ak o t a t* Zp n this
artllery e mozrtar ad to aw u p with infat al,* ~ ~i Whihoutysintot be 6atnsteinx)caim
that tanihe should leave the rad fr"ly But wht the ara is to
be mied it boom a date o ad be tol4 frm e=wriance
in Tnt, that the road h2w aint Inrabl min2 n Wn
air Mperity I oe advat a tm In rtni the risk of owcouteingis by leavin the wmiA.
The matter of burUl of t, m dead w handl.d by having the
moes per el, left far behnd, a 44 the halfws.
The remarkable efect and th am of ct of naval fire4
ao. T e cruiser Savannah supwrwv G*U to Butesa. Technique w
On identical dth the forward b syte,
Stree the necessty to eatuiMld-ing NQ* by giving thum added
rsonbItyHwel wteadstons an givemN (X an a
matte of routin-MM Mttar that $M. life and death, CkvM themr-
speciflc reelsib Aitie dn the training peiods, Take me of the
more al rejaiilities ad give then to the as training,HAialt ha a trumoLW cla ffect o the Ita, I
tw atrak go out, withs .axl nfl. end fire , and brn in
to dothe seon t k,
twe mle, Th oftcor of the deck •wa sppse to give the a berig
SECRET/#!
* / *SECRET• I H*A.CARRLL, &LAANDIN G X0 WNY4s AEWXIUD VN =Y
Thwe should be ropes1 harxflee or oth provisions on the drils of
tanks for the rding r iantry to Iod to,
I luive no us -or a tovwl AT gmit the 3"? on a u* : is pretaL,
17e have trouble ith the ikt guC dtig eaiy,
I believe nte AT rifl1e 1eado is go od de t baz. r man do
not like or trust the bazoekol 'Ve fix m the rocket fali tof fpr tue3j,
one or tw o of thec gu= i th4e dvision have explodd,
U aniorijnat ; 1 led the tyuc- ; now they =nt c=r it if
they can get "nimt!ing else; it is too chort runvoc
X'rta rmmc)1 chm ne tn #sand bazookamenw c,,houalbe armed with
te pistolK
The Mlftrack turn ca *30 orxw piercing atznition at 300.400yds,
Cw l±track bocics are so shnflow err of tte permnl has
difficClty getting dan m enxugh to be Irtected,
Iruldl to see to to b S tO .0, a xn type AA en-
in each infantry n.
Gvro mpa truck trarportat± is iav te e oed cue
aditioni &j tcz/ truck; we could do wiy with the throequarter tontruck frx which the 2T gn Ins boai, rcrcved (ad placed in ha~ftraok4.
Us% need one e r tmo tweln' fgtamm peeu b inulr in enob
The Genxmn ad Italian stool herld e olu type pick ax
to better then ourogetwtc landl~e; heavier.
uate' proof barrack bs@,are nweedead.(001 MindtubD S
seconded thisotic)
Ccrrml, CcctASbSE0F:T.
IL M3S 113 TiAI1ME DCC IIE LSPERILE
I think the old conccpL of fiveo nd bet vecn iteslirs is atirly
inadequate. At Canacatti we bad to a e tlre quarters of a mile over an r
an op ai; we were gutting arU r f ie, a little macht g-M
fir, and alsx the aborts £nn anti tank guns (fts or 90e), At the start
I ~o~r 2-25 yards between AldhadonyUw hree light oa
ualtiec, I feel oertain, Id we bow closer owe mld hay undobtedly had
more casw.ties. In a similar formtion we withstood stnf by p-36
without caculty.
I do rot believe in the l2Oyad interval betwme vridclos; 2503C0
yards would b better, if roal space pernttr. An air attaec opoed up
oy velicles whdh had these increased dist ceo and wont on to attack
some other vetlaeucat 75 yarld dIstancs, (Ccnaal 2A~oeoA446#tVfwho was pcenext.t iaareee rth ar distance greate tal cw wadred
tivty mde consideratlons of rood space, of tim, and o cntrl.)
Te presuat basic load for w 37 MiS E, APO w Weshould
oarwya mir-dimml fl t5CZ IHE*,
All sOldi s should be tau&ht to sim.
I sgt the feasibility ci making river c sings in csm&±g
in kapoc life jacket.A Tank carries seven infantrymen on its deck nicely; a tank company
carries an infantry company nicely.
SFCP"
• e SECRETGCWA siM -5 vAa's Ifl'Z#BT7Z 'v111OPL rnrl J w s, X 11,; FIFTHAflWCEI) ARTIU4EZY G7TLP
(ocwn cuMS lac had as JMnGj evice with 3SPartileyas sW otherrillerywn; he is the oy arti l men other than Brig Gm RobertUazet who hen fourht SP in jn ti Brig. G*n. Mau ie Re cas ofol .ol mooe that he in the best nd mt rie ed artieryan in
Amo.)
TMened for :lotge rean,. /Ae rv grig= in this U up, whch
In efect i Corp Artilery suppnfting an armored divison9 hasb
concluwively ormn in the Siclian Cm My letter in this regad
similar t one written after -the ?miaian Caxeign is hermth (follows
Colo wl Jonec' verbal stata its
I am zot sold on the SP, It is mooaical. Under a oawuflage 4)net there is aluays a l queson as to whether an SP can be saved fm
buming taf a s bit* emn ti Lre has burned four of m SPe,
Thebneed for &T- s in supportig role (rnt organic) reains to be men.
I a have arrived at the definite conviction that the need is
diuroven, e"d thatr ibe artillery is the asier in supporting roles,
The battalion oombat trains srho drop their haltraks and trailers
and get reg lr 2jTon k for hauml4g am tion; the truks should
have carg 'tra i .
As to reliability I rate the following vehicles in the order: let8
anthe15lihtak
Ou .0 cal, AA~s around gi poattione we a godoca! The AA int
on the hai~rack in bettor than that on the 2 o truk.
A-ISTRATIcrI
r1a o for DSCO legion of Uerits e c., taiet be clarified,
Mw, in csee of identical effort, a dec ation is awarded coeo $f i44' ~dmied to another
SECRET
Nlotan mt lcarred in the Twduin Camrc sbn oh lea in thesicilian Csair i o~~iOrported, have bow
verified in Jicily,
.jO have ioanid to work to zet road Jw.lotted to us rathor
than attmpc to nduct a enRus mrc=h.
(Aw oboozmvr are. soe ten tir as effective as wt; we iwe
of eional obom vr (3)1, 1 beleve w kL have either six or nu
in order to keep up cont4.nuo servl4oe. About thirty pucent of the
obnrvers are inffoctimo at;P &V oe navt chan n stations, ets.,
he FieldKilarj Soloctrinet 4 service artilery
lioations are C o ept the Idea that the survy can extd into the
target ar a is rediculoas,
attalion m o are ran th an organization of the tle of
nbpow' s a nraliy battcrj missions.
ItiCvchet fire can only be oTc valy loyo in a wry, very few
*:taatiora The riccto i o S nge of $ lp gEirafly U00
obtainable. [ath wit stay mnflAat pu4Iwill stay ai slope of
hils9 fore or af. Tbr Ls xo asareace there we an ricocet effect
in the T bolo Sicilin ccapi (This statement in made in the prNesec
of ld thre battaio xmmnders .rid with thei ful agreemnt).
SECRET
R&APQUARTZRS5TH FIJEtD ARTILLERY GROUP
V. AD O3.7
: -,- : C adn ,"General, NATOUS
1~ t i ugpntly requested thtteammnt of the three 'battalionsotthis Art '., the. 58th Armored PleiA A e t n, -the" 62nd Armo red- l b kileyattalion, and, the 65thi 'Armored Field Artiller atain be
,4 d frm ,hejL5mm Howitzer, Motor.Carriag M ote 4.5," Gun, towed. * . ork, - or by a teeled pime mover.
Z , .rst is based .e guns for
t~qXnizticig atileryar esental orsuccessful couter-batteryapit&6t~~41 Gihadvsoa rilr n eavy wveapons, a nd fo raid s hifting
etSpotn ie rmoesector to another. The aoe oclso is
i "!
: bdo e f ing onside ations
a. Our role will be an f f i one. The neay, forced to.reso to Vdet a.oe en f4r"e, will plac i f h divisional artillerylin suchdepth that he J U of, wifl provide a, t& or three thousand
yard ove rage It e foto i w rn lines His, 10541p gun-howitzer fir-EWing with super :. Ch.rg 'iaay berplaced 1 0 ndhisa own front linesand ac compli sh Such a xsjsion. If we a llown, 16thousanid yards from 'theeneftmy* to. our. own.--ront lines and 'a further five thousndyard for -positionsfor our divisional atier iisvdnthtriforcing. atley mustoccupy positions -that'requ re "a r-ange ofa es 70006 t,.~rd ,"to reach theenemv light artiller,. To effectiv6ly. counter-battery, the'e:. 6 dium andGeran li'h lean mqdiums anlery oute: range oth F i Ai rtillery-
i!":::: :: counter-bat ":% :, e ry gainsas without our beingd able tovrle. " Ha'tis ru
/ i+ '" the' same as" that":":: ofth orgbani9dligt aytionls4ntht diion, itn hans often'::!i!:: .: 1 re: sted i a seiousiova rlerrwdn of tkheavaibbeos ailler postd os aMin).:!i:: . a1 jammingOZ of he ro one lediog IPV nthe, Te boecnluini
Ltr, Hq.5th FAGp, "Re-armament of the 5th FA'Gp" (Cont'd)
This. ionditioa- has resulted in the assigning of position areas for the.,reinforcingartillery in rear of .tthose of the organic artillery. In someinstancesthese areas were necearily so far back that they could not betired trom A4, as a result6 the batalions of this -Group were forced onocO&s£Qps tctualy occupy positions in front of the friendly infantry.mtiL:. i+ t dangerous procedure. &nd one tht .could not be considered
in• th:e #-& 6ft strong opposition.m " d. The Germans-haver.ovod themselves skillfulin the delay-
Sand swiftwithdrawal.. Their use of mines, road blocks, and long.,:. igW~ intetc tion fires have repea. ly left effective pursuit to the dive" boobers aM long range artillery. tny prbitable targets under observationo f our forard observers have esdaP6d because of the short range of our
rein orcg weapons.., a.•,. Reinforcing artifl ysay frequeatlybe assigned missions
+inf adjoinig sectors over the Corps Afllery Officer's radio net. With thisl'ateraI diaplacement of targets an inase of at least 3000 yds in range
r is essential,*'--.-The.range of the 4.5 gunvAakes possible this shifting of firesthbtt adsptacement in most cases.
r I. t ,he following facts,. proved o, the battlefield, are also presentedfor considetaion•
* K "+!-'' +: a. The Motor Carriages, U-?, I:ith whth the Group is noweuie pseare requiting so much maintem at-U!. the Opresenttime.that 'it. ilSi..be necessaty for a100% replacement in theiear futu)e. It is estimatedthat a Motor Carriage, M-7, requires fturtu imes'.as puh +labor maintenance,and ten, times the: maintenance cost of aihflt-traok orwheeied promemover.
b. The normal consum -ioaof gasoline has been found to be,about one gallon per mile for a M.oto . arriage, M-7, against abo t Qnegallon per four miles for a half-trAek:.or wheeled prime mover.
c. While it has been prond0that the Motor Carriage, K-7,
Possesses truly remarkable abilityto negotiate rough terrain, it ha0 beenfound that truck drawn artillery has beenwable.to negotiate any terrain, theMotor Carriage, M-7, has traversed to date. The increased,;speed of towedartillery would result in a great saving of Y6ad space-and' tie, as thesteel tracks have reduced the speed ofthe -motor carriage:, M7 , to approxi-mately ten miles per hour.
• ~~d. The existing communication facilit~ese.of the battalions .. .; : ?.+ ++, . +
+of t his Group is superior+ to that of a regularly organited battalion of field++Sartillery, making it possible to utilize the increased range of the 4:.5 gun .--
4.e (In• view+ of the - above enumerated reasons, and !many others not+ mentioned, it is again requested that the battalions of the Grdi~pp be,
.. .equipped with 4.5 guns at the earliest possible date. . i..
N WTON W. JONES,Colonel, Field ArtilleryCommandng.SECRET
+. ,
N'- 7rW". . .. + ...... , +: , .
-- . . ... ... .. . _ ,.. . , ..
. + + . ..
:, ',L ++ "+, ' ....
O.+
., , . ,.
* SECRET
LT 0 0L E A BAIn-- OWDG 1 65T1! PA BEN (AMD) (5th ASd Art O
We went a gin that atrmW divisiO rd atUllery. I
would lke the 4*5 tr (rd e (or o u2) An Sp gun is not needed sc
far bt as we find ourselves. Tn pm savemantljn120C. prefer
a trek as the wmDf'(Miumint Tois t7tnjqob.
The t oberVr'sv radS R 50shod have half its
preent weight and twice its 'w.
If the LI-7 Mt be kept x--11d be mzMid to tt high an
ireo(abve11oe71 tJM.
The 616 can go thrwu broke cu tobtter than Sfa.jt'
SwhhMI
*
9tThM as no parusupport in sAc1. 7 l battalio has had fe
guns out at soe for of pas. Ports flow =at be seppe up*,a
have ~ ~ ~ 1" Oa glrprsspl ~ltcwe webroughtfzm e elaras
gave out*,
U,&MS uMG M=F,PUE
EvsbOdY neesaitM= ap nading#
The FA trdninc is OK# l's satisfied.
Tb.e7PAS mhould 4teach that ortillw7Itisualy40-5CKO yards behind
the ot as c as wit tthe7 tintid rI,4,I
SETIONS, Is there y M goodmltarroway, wh the air corpa
sould wt take a couple of looks at 0w 141 it lo s lik notbing esA
on earth, yet they bomb and statifft
SECR.T
f p
L Col R C Cow r cx g6 FAk(Amd) ( 5th niArt Gp)
& SECRETI cwlad-I tbe 4*5 for M inti po. and invbtWAS On
a basis of MVIJ a atereoioe of n tw we need a gm that
shoot as far as the. observer can see A n ned gm uuld have
bes fine a Blatsg, I am t tan of the tow
With the cactn ccr otis fsiA 4e a us for thica a, o ic tin we eatiafa . The e o rat t 4 be
taten awayh
Oi UIZ AP.IIC.'.h
The Grvup s.ald have a platoon of its o A, As the
groue cianC-e rw 9 mnew rnanc out4ite me in w nt believe us (we
say we ned and at lo trracks, d t m dn sax check) Th a
Ordnance outfits mve off withoutu0 oo (wie.4V.Jonos axi It Gol
B3. _'cQuwe are)
I believe there -tud be a battery m AA attached to ach battalion
UXPEIIENCE!
I find that wtm I W Ie a tmit the c better use of' observes
then they do the firat time
The A 003 psocbwt n sm reeults of the M ethodf selectio
pirto entry into 003.
SECR,(T
r-. ---. 0
SECRETLT COL L C VED2V V c th th Piold !rtifla< L!Battnlion (Arncnd)(In this irArvix.. Oo.Lonele. friocrsdcrtf ims aisat& by e-vorl of I-As staff)
CRGA TIIl
Owrbattrlon cub planes wre dticult to 21o70i01b2. to take
care of O ouritokt :nnurwr in Vetc Sicit. .Theyh bad to feLd tor
thcclves; picL o,: fioldo; supply solvet; ctc,0 2 s valid again be
triac 1,60,n a ;cItA I tx.,. I rO(XlIU d they booono divisiornal plcncm,
to cxo to us on c.1., The JIvIUO onn ha-wdle them all better in the
nvc raro situtton.
In t' e ease or P/) ;.r.ed out satisfactorily.
Lst S t. slrul.1xt be set up to maa2 an AA gum,
e n ve foun ccw anmored tr A very unwefl to handle beh
- tr. Id P 11e sh'tr t~1 afe mAe difficultW ul l . the
rrrrcr tbouti thery ar diffimult to lamd in Si) it has w Bttg5; bunts
u rtnnrniion. ,it havo tcoden rks n our -ims enablil an antunition
load $ 190 rcuxnds. TN13s is & little too much. Rooaammd ordance
supply a rack for the !!S4 erebUng a toa l load of 160 rounds on the
vektcle and that the troabla me trailer be dropped,
The bslftrck gies &n t justifiod enee of security to the men. i
dont believe the azwr ic vrth i n, I rre&sd tnt twenty tu &i
otitone tr'uck be isued to replace owtr ty n 3 kaaittracks which
are. used for haulitng annmitocz
Vie have: bee utldn on reutiore; lehve too UOI tuff!
cal ssaty C345 and stub CJ4
AlI R (In" ve t Eh to @Cmy TSEC R2T
SECRET
Fredeodortf, ntd: S C $
£2I tank grours;Iiftrac.o v"ont pal you out gruers wmit,, They tear of.
Tea of the ros twemty gvuce on nch halftraok,
All t r chalns except those o n trucl eM we:e
A.U. non-l*otchen tools now on the haltrck
AUl cl..O AL guno on bacttrcks,
1 U c-t tw bolt £12.nc, machOnev per bzttery.
111 acpt tzv liut wo-e (for .50) per battery.
; vl iamition boxes .I for Cal .50s wept tmt per jun (rmw have nine)
Qo tncnty-four g-llon (i can fiou cach battery,
('no thirty tvo gallon {r can f -i ackwaUtor battery.
iU Mtcmrm clips behvnd six p gin
All but ten of the present twcntyth'o firoeti ixtsjers (l-grlon tpe)Jcrtice r battery.
1AU but t'elve of thirtysix elettic lozap3 from Serv! ",eattorvj.
The Fife .nd )n sot,
Thc CX], platform scales frora erv rltory-- They have stocird.
Ck-ec. cC-q tC affor l store,
IIV of preoont ariuflago et A.
RaDiatoir flush Cm from Serv Battc'y
Tro air operated grease guns fra ervice BattcBry W ILACE Vai SERVICEABLE11.2'T' GJIS ThAT $)RK.
All- orfCot7 screw hexagonal wrenchee from Sevice Coripany.
,,,, r. tool box mechanics yr/a tools from Jrvce Dattory.
o: recor....i.t the replawnment &all .,2 halttracks with !1-3s t//winch.
"7e rocoranon a l ocxrt.ibioiin tons be :"eplacod oy ordinary i tns
. r~eom.end that di. 3? 37 hT cuns be replaced 'dth57 an towe
e ntrucks have the n-3T AA count, SEC tr/
SECRETFriederff, osoutd.*Qu
flesdquartmn Btt be thirty nine mvhcle cad eit moto,
It has only a half tru-ck for its rmatwn section; this emtion
should have an naQ& 2d ton trucke The hlftrack could then Suble
as a reoovery zvehl.
We r the issue of an afficere mees set to the service
the firkg btterie*,
,We red thirteen instad of ten Lame detecLors in the battalion;
the three extras receusted are: one for Service V-attery; em for the
Orrunition train; and one for z1eadqarters 5.Battery for battery as
s frcn bat4alion use.
The ,attc ion i'xecutiv Officer" should have eL -'ton for his ov.
use; we have had to divert one to Am,.,e feel it would be better to have SCR15(X with two receivers,
rath7r than 3T524 ith one receiver; this 'ould permit the cooling
-anQ rting£-f one receiver at all times.
1.1 officers and nonc-aIsoioned officers smould have a pistol
or revolver instead cf the presciberd carbine; actuzally we are getting
not. tli cuL'Lnc but U .03 r ifle.
Each vcldcle should have ThR? pioneer sets; r'1ith one set .,e cannot
dig in rampidly crnch; we have cuprlied te s coi et by rustling,
Th<c rQ c.-ad re -al sections have x lii§t transportation;
tl:oy Ladl,' need r.k
7e tecs should be Tsczd "per rtdiz" rather thn 'Tor radio
(-2 :erctor'; t) 1: rnul, - ':ocarc of the i,-dio teqnders.
&tchcs must be I&. UV ,z oLficecz an?. tLQ oc'nance oust have
on andjw la tols p tzetc., for the repeir 2ony au nd cl! oifSacreS
watches in the field,*E w s
* SECPITFriedersdorff, contd.
-e recommend the authorization of a portable sewing machine for the
Service Battery. Would effect a considerable savings of clothing.
The Fire Direction Set-up is large and there is insufficient trans-
port tion. .Je need cargo trailers for four of our headquarters battery
halftracks: one for the battalion S-3; One for the wire section; one
for the machine gun section; one for the radio maintenance section.
We use telephones to control firing batteries; we would like to have
SCR 536 radios to replace them; they should be allowed at the rate of eleven per
firing battery as follows: One per gun; one for the battery executive;
two for the battery commander; two for the RCN officer.
They should be so netted. Eight more are needed i the battalion head
cuarters, thus: Two for each of three forward observers, and two for the
battalion RCN officer.
4e need a portable, metal, flyproof, easily sanitated latrine seat.
I lile the 105; it is heavy enough, we can carry sufficient ammu-
nition for it; BUT we are outranged by the 88s and the 90s. I feel there
is an URGENT necessity for an alteration of the gun and/or ammunition
that will give us a 20,000 yand range. Not infrequently our opening rangesfrom points behind our own leading troops;
are/seven thousand yards or morej even tho we are at the head of the main
body, an advance guard consistinf of a battalion of infantry, some tanks,
some Engineers, etc., we find ourselves pretty well back when the first shot is
fired.
The personnel section should have a pyramidal tent in addition to
its present blackout tent.
The direct fire sight should be graduated to correspond with the AT Ammunition.
SEcrT
SECPsrJ e need, a fuo setter.
x noed fuses to fifty toconds.
Je need four orvrhn( -tro&il Loot c enuions U". Uk reoto control
to operate ZeIt'e o o' r_ ute. 500s .n the fIre U co o o o-f cCI.
7e h ave dovclon-ed a r-4c~det of which we yrr outJ liu., amatm
fire unt for he't-tn,' three m cnc] of A$ moss >It water vt a tere,
It is nrc1e y alterLr the stand.rd rare f iLm unit to by-pas'o th,
regular buroer and load the rasollne thru a slenler conper tube to
a Usahap. pi] , toc U being some six feet dee. and soce sb: icLhescross. The far ond of' Lho L -ahnat 4 p pe is stcred. The U-pipe
is 3et up so ±±t one branch is directly above the other, The 01 on c
enters th upe.r brvmch, passes into the lower branch, and exik t3Urn
tVec &ll pxpa s Cf sixteenth inch holes. These sets of holes are
about tPo i t apat. As the raw gasoline comes out it is ij.nited,
;hoat £rc: thoe )ocr branc flame soon heats tie gasoline in the
upper branch t o te ov4rization point art thereafter the flame from
the lotor brmch ci z o0.. the ,ic blow-torch type burring* This outfit
is used eitIer in a .:ftalLrao made for tho purpose, or in a slit
trench. Cost; neglif;ible,
LESSONS XIXChI.i1 !3YG MTQ NGEon LS~s
he best ay to loa! arrored trailer/is to use a peep as
rtel over assisted by about ten an; this also holde for any othar
type trailer.
Canzrnflage nets must be fireproof ad; we favo had tw fires fron them.
icochet Lire is vet;" eifCectivo but tinte fire is better. Jo
fired three thousand tvv hunded rounds of Staunition in this campaign.
Of these I doubt tether there was a mingle ricocet. Frankly, with the
SECkic
U ' ~
SECcTFriedorcdorff, cc 'td:
present :rt"iller; set up,, our orm caln t}hat .f The elmzz:, t iz h4
problxtica'l that, ti rtc t ,,tU 42.,.. cvoixcwx' be.d by t
In tirf"r cvocentr; tions a, prCotnfl uic rotina ci w tc'tos-hcrro'm. to€o oh f , .r, oun! s cf high cp:loSivc m an c xcx c Ia, t
gcnor2! :'lo. A P., rn ccflczt asulty agcnt; an ace2Lent ifc-nday
agent; .*i, cxc lent rtzi-oralc a:gent; it is grffct;erd by tcoe;
it is aexc-lInt to A.,um cat 2-t r' siticns n dcryelrt
In til ;ct .t-. Division the artillory battalion ccr rnder 7eneraly
person&Lv- ,cceumpanics tie conbct corrmnd corrr,.ndcr, and is his o nlia.o q o... Te bttalioi is rctwlly ccnducted by the battalion
liason b-11- talio,,
executive. It is the nnst effcctive Itorn method in crwred brk vhe
Pl!, c at cocnin. ca rncr ha1 the Imbit of rxring well forwrd.
Field r.illm'y doctninw{,as now constitctod, is sound,
SECPET
l
* @ SECRET
&iTENAITcckiOlONEL 1M.4 f Mx7811F*A AIM)REI), 2ND AftED DIVISION.
O RG,,AIZ AT IONU
[ I ±s$ the yr t dmgm battey especially weil, I .iould, based
on this wqrionco, reoxncnd six gm batteroe for infantry divisions,
I personlly belie the Arzned Iivision is too big a tv constitute
I believe in four se eate/attalorw in a division; to artillery
battalions each hav to D batteries rzA one 155a knitzcr batter
rius t he usual Z -nran-d ervieelcneto,ourwirex o sonnoL zaxL to svf. fdio is t tat u aed l the tim,
Cur wire oquLut is much too - fjrdio is not usod all the tiw,
Vie do not have sui ' icient wire to got a couieto wi-c sot up.
ii,4o hasu edanical and defik#e difcicutoea,
9e *hav a treat need for SC 5316a four in a/battery. Th e R officers
go out L a lftracks inwe the 5 36a to onable leavi.;. the haiftcke
going farthcw= forurd on foot, The other two in the z=m battery are for
the battery oorrnnder for the sai trpooe. For Iead artwi Batta'y,
I reomnend fourtoc 5366; t for ach of tw liaoon oflicers; tw for ie
battalion c rnnndor tw for mc of three forward m bservers; and two for
thle battalio survey officer.
Weshu. dhuve one Sch93 inch of the laon vehieloes at tic
present time no have sa[ 52Ss.
Crw.ent f3 gives us one W 193 in the Servico Battery; I reos
two additional be alowe for' ti as the 'Service Battery slxnld be ina
the Divilm Trans net and the Diviaton Actinstativo not*
I also rmerid three ligi tanks for IeadqwAers batteyOa t for
the battallon oMManderg o-ne for the 1=W oficr; own efor. a forward
observe. T tw m and we 1±t0t In te A t t wt suffice;
must haveniece noccrmidecltwice as 0org anictieL G 4I
oSECRET
I would reo a a gaoline tenkc with each artillery bttalion,t
uroro batt-hxw huvc. them* e hvIv to get al our gasolne by cans,
It muld be hpu if we could have so=m =$ tunty.xw
tlOUOOpOO of the uii'o -$ry typo. bScm artifzy in 'LtLa usad thWaM azv
they were a MJat help. The sbould be subt ia11y montm along Bcs(pe
Z would reocaaed all c ttnok o rojkcc& by .w3Azj ith vdnc
These SP 37 AT 'a ar n good; I nt the tood 5hrJ AT gmun Neither
the reset gtn n'r vehicle satisfactory. The 37SP is the first vehicle toget 1tuckin badging. It issohigh it tzes too long-toaigma,
The bazookma is till on tk&L in W outfit, The prntr.gc of hits
-"A .nticc ms 2m; the afot enog,lible
Ale AT rifleo gmnade secm to be prety good.
I uelicve th-at the sup xrting art lery groups ohculA, glC nCly-arn.ndrtth
spe g, be/Lger rond d rargd wea tlnt eeo of ora
The Azne Froc Gunery is tvuz4.
MyV Field Artillery 003 Gradnates have beexrdflent, but I do mt
te t last six w joi ju as we left AWMfric.
do tire has definite mos liUties but tim tre gretty
shadose in al repects. e have tried riotr in battle wre able
to observe effects. Prcticaly all was wiedth delae fme but obewrnd
no actual ricochets. I doubt it there m r wsz M of the long range,
SECRET
* SECr,
EtcnjContA
* I reornendas the n U ldWA,50ZWB /tun 15
* ZY% WP
26%%19 w/fuse IZS
35% IL v/Awume !67- ww(Ir/AT)
Our expeeAwth vAite plxsphorous is thaxt in addition to cat Icr
virtun it is an aelz casnlt7 aemt tad tank burner, I haveoJo
heard this Cnn te Co.C, of the 14th F.A, end froca other aztiflery officer
of the s&2e orgn, ization. I na';white phosphorowu ued by our 7 kn
assault guns -(TeJC0) aga&inst elgity eights very swcosefu~ly,
In wrrod urtflcry w jzu are dispxsod in depth isitV~ni battcwdn,;
hence wihen wee m :U.Lt~o fire for efteet the raV~a rcadins Oto3r whi4ch
r&&etlr ,-incroass e na to oJ? 'fire. br the eac rwmcmvcdo not ~ocuotre lves with the idth £ s axf ( cepto na 2 FeLt tar,-* )
Cur gnare usually 50-m75 yards apart* Fire aontro1 is b voice
radio# ielophono ruV lbe xmore siro,
- " SECREfLIUCLEoF. I Jn,,,r3rt12Y, U3111143? A1ERED ) I 4WY, AND OIIM A A*.,
( iZGAIIZATIGII:*
The present Tblea of organiaation; I ,giu you a copy of a lett I
have vitten on the subjec. (Coxted into the : eoord, immdiately oloin
%$/~t~/thinsegtof intcwviewg ajoro ma mi:
ehanpee have been ocopied directly into the letter.)
47e nod trO dentists ineach t* T h isnot jut a thoughts
it is experience.
313] PLY:
The C and 1, rations vere deficient in vibmin ontent, I propose
fort ticatton vith vitntne concttrates.
After discussion vidt1:the divisi mrgeoa I conclude we need more wire
ladder type splints an uore bass wood opliata and lese Thomas arm splint s.
Our C wr nerosis cases iwre La. I do wt believe we can rehabilitat .-
these caseoes in the forward areas to jy back into combat.
The tank fire lnsar has zxt afected the men perceptably.
lIf c*py the attached 1.ttercalling on Cci Stovall to qainanv questial mtte,
I
SECRET
SECRET
" SECF f-CSCAL1 JGU Dtt, 4C., SWLGDN 3RD BATITALIONI, 67 IJ -? MLtn r#,(tsmediatoly following this trasorit of irtervie, there is oopied intothe record a copy of a letter written bj the above nnnd officer.)
ve have i-l and 92 dcal 'hests two of each, one of each would
e sfUciMAt Still better, we tWe the cntents out of one set of chests
and rut them i specially designed chest These osecial chests ride anITefirst #M of
the vehicle asily end vie work directl out of our vehcles, fl chestsis a9/Mde frun/officers rac outfit chest. First chest: i has; built
in compartLmnts for s1afl vias, suture lmd;, etc* Two trays, six Pinches deep, tcl. cotton, solutions, ointnmtas, adhesives, etc.. Uderthe trays are torels, bandcys etc. . 2ri Chest: (Accident)
Interkor scissorsinonsionc:, d t by oiit by tw ty, all in Incihes; care fl
lot oa12 ki t, Suiia~~ drugs, narotics, a bhlie lie is oc-rupcnotunted to
fit contt.
i& peep .is radio a.dppsd with S 510; not autiorize, but very
necsery and very effective.
There should be an 3 510 or 528 in We zbuLncc.
A blaclnutoao-n post tent is uSIKI as an aid station when we
have a round set up,
We me an unautlorized tmi r to carry soe ucxical equipmnt,
The ioodico need tiold glaes;m &hCYJJ be so equippe4
o SI-LY:
Iypersona opinica is tb-at the U3 tatia .i. L., LLO QlWJOZ t"o the ratio
rations in such cases. I th~ink both the C ant K must be recgnzed as
fit only fo mrgacyuao and Uted tc that ue.
SEC£',r'-Eits, Coritd:
7rzAj*nrijC LBS:SOII2XCThI' fE1,LIU1~~j
It is a wste cf tie for medical personncl to train on tank
evacuation. Medical personnel do not -porten tdis function.. The medical
officers DO instrut the tankers in the mattor. It is easily overdone
The Thorxas splint is used In about :tLtty percent of the lw
frmcturees, The arm traction opllnt is was never used and I do no tae
that i is practizcble for uc, On aM we 'me motly ti-re basket splints
and bass wood spnrts-- they serve as well,
le have had Ler neuro-psychopathio cases, In one figh .we had
five or six tan h-rImocked out; in ezxther six or seven. One rn inc
in both gr oups. teither case rodueed ay psychoses. We have had about
four cases o be ovac utho duo to fear, but not fear peculiar to tanklesw
hcre have ben ro out aid out cases of cutrophobia, tio I have notLcvd
when tnks arc krocko. out they always expect that the tank 4wL$
burng/ ad they w'rill be burned it hn, CJ' three deathe in the camf
trt) x;ure fror burn.
Here coe attached letter....
SECPPT
" ,/COPY
SECRETi.EDI SAL DLTACHENT
3rd Battalion
67th Armored Regiment
A.F.O. 4252,
August 11, 1943.'1 " S ''iLIA w ...P: ' ,
r.FAIGK.REPORT.
TO : The Division Surgeon, 2nd Armored Division, A.P.O. / 1252.
I. Casualties:
a. Three men were killed in action.
(i) ro were burned to death whEn their tanks nere struckby enemy shells and set afirc.
(2) One -lied as the result of a head injury caused by enemy
sllel fire.
b. SiA teen ,ren from this battalion end t!hree men from th- e attached540ih Egineer Regiment were wounded in action.
(I) Six men sustained enemy artillery shell fragment wouids;of tnese, five were of extrcm. ties, slight, onewas a cAest wound, serioas.
(2) Five men vere wDunded by Allied naval anti-aircraft fire.
All 're ultiple ounds of ciest ,all, abdominal wall,anud xtremities, signt. Three of these men were from ;e
546th Ln-ineer Regiment.
(3) four en received second degree bxrns of extre-'ities whentheir respective tanks wxere struck by enemy artilleryand set afire. In all cases, t,.en to twenty per cent ofbody area was burned.
(4 '.?vo m received both second and third dcgzr-e burns of
extremitlis, face, and chest, and shell fagment woundsof extremities as the result of enemy ertillery stri king
their i:aqTk - and setting thiem ufire and +hen enemy hiph,exr~losive shell fire <trikirv- them after they aban-lonedthe i rning tanks.
(5) One an surtainod ruotured ear (Irums as the result of enemuy
shiell f'ire.
-T ie man was wounied by small arms fire resdlting in acomns'wnd fracture of the ineris.
SECRET
I . I
SECRETc. There was no loss of medical equ.jnent due to enemy action.
One of the half-track ambulances was struck by an enemy shell fragment. Athree-inch hole was blown in tie armor of the engine hood, but the use of' thevehicle was not impaired.
2. Re ports and Recomendations on:
a. Table of' Organization - An addit.onal ,medical officer wasattached to the Medical D(tachpent staff for this campaign. This wor:ed out
very satisfactorily, as it lid in the previous landing in Trench orooco.
it has been noted during this ca; raign that there have beenmany routine and emergency dental cases. Those oases required transportingto the .edical Battalion for dIental care. ThiV. mirht be r :.idied by addinga second dental officer to t,h rerimental 'm edical staff so 'hat one couldcirculate among the battalion aid stations spend-ng a ci-y or two with eachbattalion eac, w,,eek.
DLue to the fact that the tank battalion invariably operates incombat as a separate wrilt, 'hrowinv- the added b'urden of ad,.nkstrton, supply,and individual assi<ment of enlisted personnel upon the detachrient, thereshoald c the same ratings available for enlist-ed personnel as taere are nowin other separate battalions of tuhe division, i suj est that, in addition tothe ratings of one staff sere ant, one corpora], and four technicians fifthgrade, thiere be added the ratings of serreart to be used tor Supply andPharmacy, Technician foartn grade as a surgical tecxirician, an another techni-cian fifth grade to be used as & medical tecrinician. Hven with these additi-onal ratings the tank battalion :oul" have lesE ratings than the averaTeseparate battalion of' the division.
b. Table of Basic Allowances -- equipmrent -- In some instancesV;e experienced difficulty in speedily evacuatirg casualties with the relativelyslow and difficulty aneurzered' half-track ambulances there :ood roads vereavailable. in such cases cross-country box type ambulances might have beenmore desirable; and, in view of the fact that a great percentae of the tirmeeven in combat, is spent in bivouac where this type of ambulance is mostpractical, I suggest that one of the three half-track ambulances be replacedwith a cross-country box typc anbulance.
At present, the Table of Basic Allowances perm it s of two Yvrtbcr 1and two :,umber 2-'Wdical ...Thesto r,< r battalion. This is unnecessary and onlyadds to transoortaticn problems. I suggest that aria "aber 1 and one 'unber2 :.edical Chest be renoved from the Table of Basic Allowances.
I ugest th~at thiree blanket roll of twelv elnketc,: ch, b
allowed f or the battalion aid station to facilitate cutviuing thecm eve,. ibetwveen the three anbulances.
-2-
SECRETi L
SECRETti-e contents of the splint set as. prescribed by the Table of
Pasic Allowances are poorly balanced. From experiences .f three campairns,I have found that arm traction splints are very seldom used. All upper ex-tremity fractures are tuch more easily splintec. vith wire basket or basswoodsplints. This also makes the transporting of' the patient much simpler.Leg traction splints are used much more frequeLtly, especially in fracturesof the femur. I have found that The most satisfactory composition of avehicular splint set is two arm. traction splints and four leg traction splintswith accessories. There should be a Tozen win( basket splints tof-eter iththe proper paddin mat.erial. These splints arc( very practical.
it is unnecessary to carry extra litters in addition to thoseused in the ambulances and f-r the one quarter tonl tr c litter racks.
r 0 red cross -arkings on the vels mitht be improvod bypainting a scarlet cross on & sliver bflck bac> ground rateocr tan a red crosson a xnite backgroun~d, in poor lirht the "rosEes look clack and mi-ht beconfused with enelmy narkingjs.
Sufficient red cross flags shoul. be made available for useon every medical vehdicle.
c. Eqtip-nt .sed - not Table of ?afic Allowvanoes - A one-toncargo trailer was used by us to transport equipoment. it vias invaluable, andI recounoend it be added to f.able of Basic Allovances equipment.
A 510 P..r. radIo v'as used noantec in the surgeon's one quarterton truck. This proved to be very helpful in -'etting reports of' casualties andin designating their location. :uch valuable 4 ime was saved by !he useof' tie ralio. I recorm:iend that a P. radio be added to Table of Fasic
Allo -,ances for use in the surgeon's one quarter-ton truck and another for usein one of the half-tra't am-_bulances to facilitate better control of theambulances bj the surf-eon. This would make it easier for him to call foran aobulance after first, investigating the situ~atio)n in his one quarter-tontrick. 7he radio in toe ambulance should prefErably by a . . 528.
A C.F. blackout tet was used by us during this and iheTunisian a'mpaign. It Is uch ore PatIsfact--ry rhan the Table of ?asicAllowances pyramidal tent in combat b.caucse it can be amouflacoed more easIly;i.e., it can be cover,; toether ;Ith one of t.e half-track ambulances by a
lar-ge c moJfla n--et.
Aid hits made up of emp'ty m ie coxes were used in each of theth~ree ambulances and tie one nuart:er-ton truck. Thbey contained apuroxiroatelyfifteen large Carlisle dressings, t,,co dozen envelopes of sulfa~ilamidle crystals,a bottle of 250 sulfadiazin. tablets, two uoxe of morphine syrettec, severaltournignet. , tlo dozen rolls_ of ga ze candaoge, two rolls of three-inchadhesive tape, a pair of bana'age scissors, a book of unergency-Aedical Tags,a pencil, ano a pound jar o i sulfadiazine burn oin[tment. I'hese supplies weredivided into various compartr.tnts making them readily accessible. These kitsproved to be muach more satisfactory than the in~dividual first aid bags.
';& .- ET
S 4ECRET w
d. The tactical emnployment of this unit and supportinr units wasquite satisfactory. Attaching two cross-countr T box type ambulances to thebattalion on long" road marches would simplify the evacuation of patients tothe rear even though the supporting company oi the edical Pattalion werefollowing the road march, since it is much eas3ier for this vehicle to .-,throuth thick and congested traffic than it i;s for the half-track ambulance.One ambulance, box type, was attached to this unit during long bivouac sta~rs.
It proved useful to this unit in several emerg,_enrces.
e. Yomunications - Communication was accomplisned by toe use ofa F.. 5lCradio mqounted in the surgeon's one quarter ton truck and by runners.
Co :nwnLcation between the sireon and the battalion or companies wvas
satisfactorily negrotiated by means of F.::. radio. hjS _nis ou was fast and
accurate. ,,hen the surgeon, however, was sep.rated from the aid station orambulances and needed com unication with them, he either had to contact them
personally or send a runner. Both methods vere slow;; much valuable time a',rasfrequently lost. This could be remedied by the addition of a second F.
radio to be mounted in the C.P. half-track aac tae designation of a medical
radio channel. This ciuld be a universal charnel throughout the uivision
since toe range of tnese radios is quite short (two to ten miles) an,; little
interference on the c.iannel would be experienced since the units are usuallyfar enL.tgn a part that the closer transmissior will cut thiem out.
. -edical Supplies - Enough medicul supplies were carried to
carry us through all emergencies. 'hen supplies were needed, however, they
were easily procured from the supporting 1,edical Battalion by means of ambulnces
sent .back to evacuate patients.
Desi'2ated blood plasma was carried in a goodly qluantity.It w;as used in several burn cases. These cases were -not severe and could
easily have waited until +hey arrived at the ":edical '-attalion treatment
station. It is my opinion that a moderate amount of plasma will be used at
the battalion aid station; and it is therefore not necessary to carry morethan a dozen units. This supply can easily be replenished when patiets are
evacuated.
r To difficulties were experienced durin : the landing operation.
h. A cTaTe &ich ml-ht rovo valuaole in future landing operationsis better- distr"bution of _edical -reicles in The unloadinc- priority list.
Our medical vehicles wvere not unloaded until all combat vehicles were takenoff, and, since it is irnoractical to send company aid men w:ith the tan
companies, some of the tank ni~ s en~agled In co)mbat without the support of our
Battalion Jedical Detachment. These uits cou: d have been taken care of,
in these cases, by nearby medical personnel hadi an emergency arisen; but in
some instances tis support might not have been available.
- 4-
SECE
0
SECR ETCompany aid men were sent itrh separate tank platoons, .hich
were loaded on L.r.T.'s. These aid men Wee left on the beach when -he platoonsadvanced into action because of the imposs.bility of transporting them.
i. There vero nco oroblerfts rerardlinr medical service aboard s'ip.,e held our own sick call in the Sick Pay, and the transport surgeon attendedthe Tavy personnel.
It was convenient on bot-h,L.S.T.'s, on ;hich the battalion wastransported, for Lhe transport surg-eons to care for casualties sustainedduring the unloading ortration. This prevexted any delay in the unloading ofmedical personnel and eiuipnent. Beach medLcal service was rood.
S.o problens were encountered .n the care of civilian injured.They were treateu, tagged, ani evacaated through regular cnannels, to enemycasualties were handled.
k. !one.
Is/ John Irbes
Captain, 'edical Corps,Surg eon.
r
it 9 9GAVFAIU u r urnS ;mJUTTr, 66!! Ap --- " "" a
AD1'"aiaUJU11C.
:.4nt-.-perer of the ertLiotd rareinrnise there illotamts o0
arrival cveroz.
ThV avcrage officor in thc field dra-t .nd(cr fifty cb2.Jzrs I
ecL&4y draw faiftoen -do2L.I xss
Three percent of tho poeon3o t of t) rnt Lvc no iurvuma-w.ce.
These have beem requirod to sig 7oerWlatl scty'n.g 'e have done our
best to sell t , ai nrptti their refusal to hup.-- YE one to mmw
as enicry, etc )n ai raid a ritl back otcn ed up biso-= s
nu 2ezny and iront;i fy.
'p/
9 9SECPT
OJ(. , J C CFCrW C 42)AITDNLZIU,. .I UIL.
The OvlsioM ordsrc la e rity orof jwmeol to do its. Job
4r trackz, szndn out of tat I hae been told is reclcdncU
rubw CIrZ -t ottdlnr up. I i the s teal track. TA are uonc
both types mc uf, Doth are btte tfl the .ree r.cr track
.aiLVO nover been able to -et avugh bixcuLr or wathen
J!.tcle are ir t.nding up- tnt kvnr *other it is faulty lnstructionor rowh usa., %c riald cu; Eznbni use mst be replaced by the
rn-C or the i-30
d;o out ,t to sw.ttitute the toted 57 for the toned 37,
Undcrorc! the 4.2 w s to 44.ty Ciy
t,1l tho troopz prefCr t 1he 13- haftrack to lo i2 ly
bouso mio't..thoer:ncr otetzm ± ~frioin awet
C.ltael: rolors so-ve no sueZ'tL purpose,
I reocxrend reecroh on non inLrl le ooloration for camouflage
nets, 3yr tm exhaut rrna".ttme30 t then Ufire,
, ' '..
SECRET
TfI FJ?* SC UTIU oG 1M/2,CAE WI ThA2CZ*S1CS Afl, M AMCREDIVISIAfter Gea my 'vea reatntion gcup gave ftint burUls to alt
the Ameria n dead oif the 3.cxz C fat D viajon, At Ges we bsWpai
with t d sw'xo ,c li at H tow plm fsaty five n w We
clereidllthe dnad frwuthe beada.wYbced l=cmmy sain a hardercampaign Tankmn do not clint out ndbup but we dontcpoit
The rrave recitratjn m i xwf satitact7 in S±C4.,
Hmowever with LEo casualtios it woL ha been iposible to do the
Job. Tars were not used nor should tbMy be, ith m jprobable mber
of casualties L future, cc lsZu afoqtm m with each anwred
reraent should do the job back to the colcting points but not includin
tho -ooiectizrAroint ,.crk. The trnsportAtion that Vu.d be necesary
"riulu be two thrce quzrter tonneo pr reict len chould be oelected
LAJL, (?) U tAI J. l u TJ , DTVI(iO cZAPIIJV, ZD ARI.LILLD DIVLSION.
BFcausa of 5rials, nd things connecttdd theewith, i am unabl
to hold mass or visit hospital ships for tn wets, The 'G.sm at be
incresed to tale this task off of us.
SECRT
/ 4A<-~2 . 4 A-c..
Cocucionsande19- Re1:wdatione fjgc
Of the ArW Ground -ree Board bay a c s intervin of Colonel o al
trith various officers and en of the SooonlItimirod .'vision after the
cortluslon of tl Siii n cn.p-it nterdw alich ave, becn fozmred
in transcript in earlier reyxts,
The Sicinn ouapain 4W/ t did mt ivlve the Secoond -rrd
iv' iou ac a ;holo in ay one tight; hoe= it is fair to say that tho
4 di; Q oi.ot tost the civistoml or t7a4oeconoIt:on to
be (tvn is tlat rmlclt orandzrAon. lhs not boen battlo-orven wrng',
'- rae pcn:- 4n~icwi-: Tt the s bjeuii, of jor dvisAonz. reorg-azaton
yr.ll be ito below CMr .poeralo ecmiticnz (2or rrnple, certain
it ,c o! onu ticnn oquinl)) rC mt mtio nd for the recason tha
the board in withmt a mfficiezt tectmrl bactcanqxd upon which to
bae en o, inionj such toto as ar avaixable ac-xn",g the excepted
te are contined i tr, trAcrips a ray of rcor in your otce.
i Th ee om litti. doubt that the 'M" & "' terac bag stam
La a faidlure at larit in the nz ciates in whih the arnvrxl
divisons have ben and sa-e operating This situation has in gemat).
been correted by c prt'v: th.e IY bag in nost case 9 the OOCSld tCA
of droppLng the 'A' bag av el in sotmm. ntl-c ocatin: l W
SECRET
SECR'ET?Jhere &jo x ALZ any eothor t eavy equdjrxnt to carry, for
oxaaplo a Uazooha or r ixwo lplAte 9! tiq jt& ox" t4 she ~2
be his j crbod WO,0I.
- v- zaion soldier hIt n Nin b vr rith his Getm
oponant .1n tbe mattc: of eihjt, t1* A; mriz mark S=ahp tips the scale
of battle i n the .'z4can's afavor.Te Ai Aericoa tu s i c iferiorerrarabloto th!:eft;orrr - zij~t c~~ iu4 in a clttct ton vt-iate thc. aricn r todepend on s-l zu or niouver for his in:aa Up.a. Uui or his znr'mzix'zlup,
C urw - tr .:c mt ar 4o. o b ~ 3~e Y tb L L ~ a tu ~ t i u t b uLt
they do ur~ tbUg yrt- , actter sight, Ziae te intervciews n viil,,INA
thie alrvc tTroz±or43 n we r xaorde-C, .thisboard lxw bocn
in rexdipt ofrmSris %bXt70 ts which ar s to the T?D Cant
and to the Let Anrvr&m Diision for tee Theme or arnziemtiou e o rle ortd
their teotx frPtVby It is thaeeocr bOLCc, that th au for t.-Ve
rilg't rtr tlor rn' oatclqybecad to bho i -. 0,
The troops in the field Ihave no 1wlede a to the feasibilty
or practieruit c- of th.n rroJe, but vd, fer c. rsthin that ill tas$
to lasonire haseai Your board t of ite oplion that tUs question
on0%at IN nof ocr0 &awrrod on the pravirvj gyvurwl3&4 than on the battl
the people sem wr tatn In tinn ofinp a nfl mt a bia-_ in, m
orabou .the tou to a ttr The oomwzto to be drw Is that the
tropew~ldwtvm aiv lv' oSEC-WN1~
0 9
a vn.n ve:cles& Chl atat o.is as Pe i e,. ol te ae tz
radi o v~.1leswer. 1-r-csrlby the Iadth of the e brxch eato U)division
1 duq Laul vIi± tazc&xv[I falabo tnack capcc-I U;Aties k a -um
10 pIX)fing ,of Tzinks,
The on. .2ycrcot nwr,:"cstion avai l along thee l wa on toauI a lthur
"mko a geevuv use of asbe tos" vt dets pecifie 0z I a
to armor the or. uton ontat es in the tank. The yet isiin tte fnc]d no of opinion as to thm cause of tank Lrz, toet
it appsar certaintI- VicP n....o, the runition# tn cr r t else. flU.r
tVotffiroohv orilntt dwith both gpairwadwwito.Than
is roweon to biveli hOe firM =start with rolls hung on
the o'iz.: n c2. tard:z, tho grtxtemm and ol n in vriouc ecbntsr s such
ap c'fferrntiolz and final driv* ( A mta* of thin board has xzn-ed
v.-torno .tnr"",Me:v0thc O MI.ffro rx a1a3c%;-or C10tt roll attai ed
to t n otulde; m!. ornth -r iare the tak burned andc cqlodod when the
only idrn-titicble hit tts a slct thru a rtiJLnmt final cb-ive -vf.ch
knool off the in r toothed gear 4 th pow and fl4 tWc4-fl0)
St %of tank /J Iikeu ndioata tpt t str s genate n'we
hat on ir wst a hoat sufficient to i Ws ly n34J in lel naterisl
it cbsiroablc to cait wet finhn pan trr som of the rrro
sensitive portions of thei.- crft It aIq cr that no seriousinod
hav bee.n madeo the wr- o oS the tank tfg-tt osee anIn Sily;
naing out suhm an Colaml )fl]cb r'flawb me it would geAtly
rase our Statas tankrs to knm just h w few IdaM t m in
our stopped talk. We lost ieV average of ona dead per stopped tank.
SAP
&aC tafl' Co nt dRecmrnerdtions arc that research in tht erttcr of tank fires be continuedand be extened to cover other possible sorces than gasoline and a tion,
and that s a natter of ophylaxls, such crtatcnerts as have boen made
by Colonel Collier wl Lt, Col. "1an cr, the sbject be available to
all officers of the .- nrcJ ccr(w=d as a ccuntor to ,ny uostions rait3d
by the wncmil. 4 te subject. It is furtfler tcomaended that idcnttfication4
tags of highcrfro-rczistancc than is now O=Ofn, bc issued to Tankers.*~CMS 14c tions&and abi4y t .O t19and ventratE
The trcm in t-o f4!old appear oatis.id genieraf with their armor;
they appear unilli that ayothor featur no present in theianix w be
etrafioed to eC Lrator armcr protoctia.
Qjopseln xiscxmiared !4thCTIe eperience of the intervieed n el rith the "iesal driven
verytank had, in cemal, been ,7f4$x latedp evrtholc:x they approached
unmnty fi o nimi that the diesel wa euprior to the gasoline dri v=n
tank. Many associated this idea dir1ectly w; the subject cf tank fires
~n nearly oil eases the opinion seemed at lest indirectly oasociatl with
that subject,
Thankzs to the excellence of the ?-2 rcovory vehicle,, and to a
La4 forward rnving, coain in which. there were few tank cas oualties9
t hee was an alneet cc4Lete if ixi cplt rooovsz'y 9( rw*re tank
casulties. Barn of the partill bured ton m were need a soirces of
nparepsrte for other inj3ured vehicles,
Tonicvisaion devices4 MA l ec~Lm&gaflem.The attitude of the 2nd Arored DivisiOn In this matte\ can be
e'zzd u,: Bettcr vision device, arc needed9 but: to vision dt4oe will
tECRETTank vision doiocs (contd)
be mch uoedg it .,Tdfl be useri a.l fa rassing nder frimlp, time-fire1
barreg s it vi be lesc frequently used to buttOnup frm graiadee, erali
arms fire, etc., thrn ms once oontenplated. It is z naed that this
item bo cissified as 14tg desireable bu rt ro t.
'ber tak lagL
The tracks se.I by t au Ar a r Division in Sicily. said by some
to be sythetic rubber, by othcrs to be reclaimed rubber, and by ctill
others to be a cobirnaton of the tmr tvly unsatisfactory as to
Iastn& q;tty on the tcrn in 1outered, Aftoer loss thsn tlaxc hundred
miles Z nemore thai sevcnty five percent of th Thnk tracs. in the division
wore ruindl. fla to coupaign L ted longer with a need for tank ma1.ight
eern:sin: if nrt v da.ngerou citation have developed. The pere-
onefl intervieved had only litrte. expet ewe with steel tracks but they
ne so irirresAod by the fafltre of the isctac ubbw track that they vre
practically unnius in destIn tn trick for Luture cap n;
furthar the prefer the lighter of the tzo teol taxv cs that they have
seen, the one they identity as having chovrtm type cleats, It is recommended
that chevron type, steel tracks be fisisi for future cw r, whatever
the ecow,M Classification UR&IV.
71o natur of the oporti, u.s of the aid tAnsored Divsio varied UK
far frc the rwnm that ir lessons are to be drawn fro the sicilian Campijgi.
?rnwvort0 because of shirping litatin 1 deeply cut. The advavce
on TOalmv mm made with such rapidity that the supply ln rutrohed
,imst abort of the breakin pointj hmeer .t mu be figurodthat4,
SECRETa rnaamomme n U a bes the sppl, n qmmts (epeo,
ially of ranvition) greter, the 3r es wuld natur117 bae bee
slmc and caorbr, and hcnce the inm al reclul of supples
.ouai havbeen hiled by the tt at .her4 t is to ay that
the sxcply situation of thzi divt.cion d wtthin itoef ting factors*The supply persnnel set up for the Arwnd Diviso
is onsidered adocyato
of acjjwfl an cx
The only dat4 .on a suc bject, nm3 a rIarm4fcz, odo0ooAth
7okh Thnk : L _j Ltion . 11om; ti,-n battallons are attrch3d to irfantry
Divisiopmsas- this one rnm is, th e ordncocsuppy amst be cl=c tti ham
.bc* occirn in 1I1G ccnydci."
No connuit.
The was m no r r'as anyxtio axyneeded in Vthi aaf.fa
the lomes contiUzmdin the they tak, for a prw ed (x.zpaig
of hib cs'rualty rates, and r tad betm e ,aa the earlier
idea of supplying vehicles-wpa cre as a roplarce-ai imnt md hcve
failnd the need for tanks tcul4 have nca at a rih hithcr rato than theerm
need for ew pthps one 4 for each tw or Urntanks._____ pcr ap e prfV or
The U ration apyr rs id eal for the Arrorod Force; sa organisattons
reprted their raero l oth to back tc b ztons, Icitohen preae,
when that became possible. The C aixi K zetions ar in eneni disfavor
exo$t Car tee in true cxercawies. Not ill the teaks or Othe vehicle
areocpipped with the anall uSclxne etows available to same* It is
remmee that such stov be made avaM ible to all sU rtvehicles.
SECREt
In sam. #CAW intet" Ow 3 w told by iMold conmndw, to stra evor
thing 1 tiing. Thiez maoa~ptded £8 IL hoflthy siji that manowe
and beyond thcr direct &.tamnat to the tiane effect, that the training,
the tactices the ckctr.ino, of the Arnnred (-wzd as TW stated in the
variouo official pibltcntim , #ro basioa2Ay oud and in x oeed of
alteraticn or mod+iction, On a npl1arty basis it vould appear tmt
the "temamot in need of cnstw4 strm we twdrl a
Whe avd to tel hat thq had Med in iU that they iad not
leawned in the United tate owtsin rnonm i officers nectind
a nunber of taw tint your inturviuut laaremoffered, taujt, ovwn
stressed in the United 2tates 14be lear3 to be daun frcn ti. atit
that sOno of intwrcW o aocn (Wt Uwtur L=. in the beat of mo) wt be
tkxi~$tullynetby neozw as violaS as tbtt dansnds. For
aptlst.4o nonoaitoeionod offietro odd they had leammd in Siclyv the
importance of reconnaiooa w, w to d iting fc a tank a n g
forward on Loo to tako a lookgte ?,Ath, than let thm la n I in
the theatre of opwationa by udf'ing a Ioas of into lives, let the earn
It in the 2 cno or the Interior by suffering the lo of como heavron
UCAWIED
t
,.. . . ,
A . .
A . ... r lg t k tD
tt
K .
The" gr MtnlMa t f s Va
r4ao byi the gtV in am 3X~0O. t"re ism aix isut$4arecrd f 152w ofth Of to fflil :Lts msio t o et *4
4 ,
qurucn bein classe =a- 3rgfthe
piee Imo the diiso ne the odIna tin the 3th ATime ArWJ7
picin any pati in armt srure dihoa axtiflrwy UMsreis
tin a We of thet olwd Artilley (b'o itp is & twilnl flrmodf
thUat , he Qopotanlesrmcn tha thei g.I tuh cznic
aortoa *.i vtpoe. of thomwt rileyu shall 4 be- seupr.s or
tmi to *4 pitso hebor thzaw th iros aw r l mu
balsam to.rz the matter btng decidd on a baiOtaf~ w at
o _41 tndthe VT t
IAN.
Iti~~s , dthat tUee be aitharisec to so ,,idlb,.p, viS,
u ItASFIEI9
AM I-AIRCRKFT M10JNTFOR AL I BRE ItFIFy AIACH].NE Gb7..
During the course of' numerous interviev's with officers and men of theSecond Anored Division two officers, Lt. Ccl. . J. MIoran, commanding the1st Battalion, 41st Armored infantry, and Lieut. Colonel . V. Exton, commnand-ing the 7Sth 7.A. Pn. (Arid,, spoke of an urgent need for a proper anti-air-craft mouat for the cal. .Eu machine gun. Cf these officers, the latter,0 ol. ?xton, offered a so!ution. That solution is shown below in t he formof two sterescoic pictur&s. In picture number one the proposed adapteris used in conjonction with a standard ground mount; in picture nuber twothe adarter is used in conjunction -with a staAard skatc mount in a half-track. The ada- ter was developed in the 7&ta Armored A. A. Do.
PICT E M:0. 1
FICTt E NO. 2.
scopo of the
unnecessary,stereoscopes
The above pictures will, if viewied thrustyle issued by the Corps of Eng;ineers,but tie explanation is added for use inare not available.)
a pocket type stereo-make explanatory -atteroffices where such
In picture number two, certain "umbers -ave been chalked on tiheadai--er'; they are as follows: -1- Peind tis nuiber passes a pin hru thebase of the skate yoke and the base of' the eaapter. -2- ehind js numberpasses a pin thru lc branc- es of the skate oke and the central part of
t
rE C
SEC[+.>ET
the adapter. 3 (and the arrow) point out a free swivel oint perMitting a300 degree traverse. 4 is a metal block placed between one branch of theskate yoke and the adapter to take up loo e motion-- a second such blockfor the other side of the adapter at pin -2- is missing thru inadvertance.5 (and arrow) point out the brackets which receive the upper end of thelegs-to-adapter braces when the adapter is,. ued on a ground mount.
qe &uaptur pbrr"is shooting to within about four degrees of thevertic le.
7olonel ixtcn reports that this adap4er hias been effectively used:n action.
ihe board wriersta-ids tUhat a very similar alapter has been under
test in Lhe zone of interior since the spr..ng of 1943.
• " sm ,rF
/ *0-..
OONEL J.J.00LMlI, CA2O&=!WING 66THA ATh, V '4R EI ' EUR*ORGh~lJICUi .: :
he divlsion hcz some table of orgartzation Cla= tho combat
AMUxindSet uP ic -:10tyet a CG°3e oP workivng itir cntt yet
pive a constructive sol,ion.
.,c wanba attalio' oil IAo : '- s in the divisiorn-- voo6cg
rnWed stuff,
I have -turked witi batalions of oLe light and two u-4ka.iu r coMatee
in prvobls an liked it; h6avonU ue. it in canpign,
I var : defiritely favor t1'e re .,iLa orgunition of tanko as
opposed to a grup of Lanl a ns.l Tlhe latter sctem cx'oiteo a
trrtatLion to 'reak up by L"tL-.1oA. Awriky, iy chane our organization
until it '1=2 been proven defInitolg wrong. I do not believe such proof
exists, Battles ,t. bu £0 4% L cobat conalso and those car. be
constructed and re-couotructod (iII bie spot, The first and only tie that
iTIkow of that the lot DivisiLon mz not caxitted piecemeal, and asam et
in as a ivision, -uas on t , rIve jat Va' eur, cal there as prsently
or ~nisscd, they did a Vialo of a good job, I cawn tine any divisicc
oranization that 7ueot si tin, The prosent orga nizationas
not, to my Iarl e, so far fsIlod.
Tic maintamnce section of ,o bata, hdqua cxxnpany sho
be identical it that of a lio Corxmy,
s URGEUTLY need a sight for ow' 75w that is th Oqa of or is
serior to the German article.
I favor the linud cooled diesel Utp tank, The maintdance bugs
can be overcome. Diesel mirft nwgce the xitt s fire hazzan1 tho nvu
tirgy cone inn loose n rU TI
36V.or
ld
w
Coler, Contd:
I have x mey of fireproWf i:g tanlis to offer,
The halftrack is gnerafly danmv aw wore lost in inisl;j BUT we
muot eacect to IMCc a good rr persoil rers en nu get that volume
of strafing no mattcr what velhicle is used,
The mediun tan>- tank v nt tut the gonmzn @3 or the Italian 90$ but
we juat don tlt cMpect it to dog no,
The Diesel izn been r eeted; it probably has c,reat possbilities,
The T2 rocov.rj vehicle is darMd goc4, Uot of our aoppxx tcnks
burned9 but l ULWut did not wre eormd / base ther wwe no
withdrawalu, but t.er .waz both rufovery n nanann ndr ire.
Vision dcvice: 4e never buttoned up tank ooanndacrs; they will be
b-uttoned up ;e- T.cyothrow ur omn ovr an tioiro. OCr cnmncrs
wore steel henot (loss lincr) ovr their tmk heLmets o as to use phones
